Ltd Case Digests Compilation Day 5

LAND TITLES AND DEED CASE DIGESTS BALDERAS FABULA PASTOR

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DAY 1 ORIENTATION DAY 2 CHAPTER I (SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF PD 1529) SECRETARY OF DENR V. YAP G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008 FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801. Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles. The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, declaring that, PD 1810 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45. On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable). On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed. Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.


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PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity. The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain. A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof. Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801. NOTES: 1. Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of Public Land Act, gave the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain. 2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry is particularly instructive: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually


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looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land. 3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess. For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law. More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill now pending in the House of Representatives.

REPUBLIC V. NAGUIAT G.R. No. 134209 January 24, 2006

FACTS: Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.

Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.

ISSUE: Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain?

HELD: No. the said areas are still classified as forest land.

The issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.


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CRUZ V. SEC OF DENR G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000

FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources somehow against the regalian doctrine.

DAY 3 TORRENS SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION LEGARDA V. SALEEBY GR No. 8936, October 2, 1915

Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land where it stands is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the decree of registration is released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter included the stone wall and the strip of land where it stands.

Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has been registered under the name of two persons?

Held: The earlier date must prevail. In successive registrations where more than 1 Certificate is issued in respect of a particular interest in land, the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who obtained the 2nd certificate.

For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can be construed that where two certificates purports to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold title and will prevail.

The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land. The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.

SOLID STATE MULTI PRODUCTS CORP V. CA G.R. No. 83383 May 6, 1991

Facts: Petitioner, a domestic corporation, filed an action for quieting of title against the respondent estate of Virata alleging that it is the registered owner of a parcel of land (a friar land) located at Imus, Cavite, which was covered by a Certificate of Title issued on February 24, 1976; that Virata, during his lifetime thru the use of fraud, caused the issuance of Certificate of Title on


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September 1, 1959 thru an administrative reconstitution of a nonexistent original title covering the same parcel of land; that by reason of the said reconstitution and subsequent issuance of TCT, there now exists a cloud on the title of petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent Virata denied the allegations in the complaint, contending that his predecessor, one Mabini Legaspi, bought the subject property through a public bidding, wherein consequently, a TCT was issued in his name, and that subsequently a deed of sale was executed in favor of Virata. Such deed was then registered with the Register of Deeds, who later on issued a TCT to Virata. However, the Provincial Capitol building of Cavite which housed the Registry of Deeds was burned, destroying land records and titles in d registry among which were the records relating to the subject property. Hence, the RD administratively reconstituted the original TCT based on owner's duplicate certificate.

Issue: Whether petitioners contention is meritorious

Held: Yes. Sale of the subject land to Mabini Legaspi, respondents predecessor is void

There was neither allegation nor proof that the sale was with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. The absence of such approval made the supposed sale null and void ab initio.

Without the certificate of sale to prove the transfer of the ownership of the land from the government Mabini Legaspi and without the required approval of the sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, he did not in any manner acquire ownership over the land in 1943.

The ownership or title over the subject land remained in the government until Pearanda, petitioners predecessor, lawfully acquired ownership over the same lot on February 28, 1969 by virtue of a sales contract executed in his favor.

The issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Mabini Legaspi did not vest ownership upon respondent over the land nor did it validate the alleged purchase of the lot, which is null and void. Time and again, it has been held that registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence of such title over a particular property. Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than that what he actually has

Did petitioners action prescribe? NO

Although a period of one year has already expired from the time the certificate of title was issued to Mabini Legaspi pursuant to the alleged sale from the government, said title does not become incontrovertible but is null and void since the acquisition of the property was in violation of law.

Further, the petitioner herein is in possession of the land in dispute. Hence, its action to quiet title is imprescriptible. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- GREY ALBA V. DELA CRUZ G.R. No. 5246 Sept. 16, 1910

FACTS: The petitioners herein are the he only heirs of Doa Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey. The four petitioners, as co-owners, on Dec. 18, 1906 sought to have registered a parcel of agricultural land in Bulacan. The petition was accompanied by a plan and technical description of the said lot. After hearing the court, on Feb. 12, 1908, entered a decree directing that described in the petition be registered in the names of the 4 petitioners.

On Jun, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration (CLR) asking for a revision of the case, including the decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the 2 parcels of land described in said motion and which he alleges to be included in the lands decreed to the petitioners. He alleges that the decree of Feb. 12, 1908 was obtained maliciously and fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said lands. For him, The petitioners deliberately omitted to include in their registration his name as one of the occupants of the land so as to be given notice of registration. He further alleged having inherited the 2 lots from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state grant for the same (was duly inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan on April 6, 1895.)


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He therefore asked a revision of the case, and that the said decree be modified so as to exclude the two parcels of land described in said motion. The Land Court upon this motion reopened the case, and after hearing the additional evidence presented by both parties, rendered, on the Nov. 23, 1908, its decision modifying the former decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz.

From this decision and judgment the petitioners appealed.

The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act. The trial court further held that the grant from the estate should prevail over the public document of purchase of 1864.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners did obtain the decree of Feb 12, 1908, by means of fraud.

HELD: NO

The petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was occupying the said parcels as their lessee at the time they presented their application for registration. They did not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent intent, when they omitted to include in their application the name of the appellee as one of the occupants of the land. They believed that it was not necessary nor required that they include in their application the names of their tenants.

The Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the petition and given notice by registered mail. However, this did not do the appellee any good, as he was not notified; but he was made a party defendant, as we have said, by means of the publication to all whom it may concern. Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to the [given] exceptions. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description to all whom it may concern.

As to whether or not the appellee can successfully maintain an action under the provisions of sections 101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs. 2365, 2366, Compilation) we do not decide.

NOTES:

The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible.

The element of intention to deprive another of just rights constitutes the essential characteristics of actual as distinguished from legal-fraud

Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice, a proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible, were this not so, for it hardly would do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)

action in rem vs. action in personam:

If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular person, with a judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in personam, although it may concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strenght of alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)


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Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive fraud as distinguished from constructive fraud

Advantages of the Torrens System:

1. It has substituted security for insecurity. 2. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to shillings, and the time occupied from months to days. 3. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage. 4. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the three Rs can transact his own conveyancing. 5. It affords protection against fraud. 6. It has restored to their just value many estates held under good holding titles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical defect, and has barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults. (Sheldon on Land Registration, pp. 75, 76.)

DAY 4 JURISDICTIONS OVER LAND REGISTRATION CASES VIRGINIA FRANCO VDA. DE ARCEO, CARMELITA ARCEO, ZENAIDA ARCEO, ROMEO ARCEO, RODOLFO ARCEO and MANUEL ARCEO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Former 16th Division), PEDRO M. ARCEO, SOTERA ARCEO, LORENZO ARCEO, and ANTONIO ARCEO G.R. No. 81401 May 18, 1990 FACTS: Spouses Abdon and Escolastica were the owners of four parcels of unregistered land in Bulacan. They had one son, Esteban, who then had five children, Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera. Jose, one of Estebans children, married Virginia, with whom he fathered six children. Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera, the siblings of Jose are the private respondents herein while Jose's widow, Virginia and their children are the petitioners. On October (or September) 27, 1941, a deed of donation inter vivos was executed by the Spouses Arceo bestowing the 4 parcels of land in favor of Jose. Since 1942, Jose had been paying taxes thereon, took personal possession, worked, and claimed them as owner thereof. Then on October 3 (or 30), 1941, the Spouses allegedly revoked the deed of donation inter vivos by signing a deed of donation mortis causa, which gave away the subject parcels of land in favor of all his grandchildren. On 1972, Virginia and her children filed with the cadastral court an application for registration in their names of the subject lots on the strength of the deed of donation inter vivos. Private respondents, opposed the application on the basis of the deed of donation mortis causa which revoked the first deed. The cadastral court rejected all the documents and distributed the properties according to the law on intestate succession. Virginia and her children went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the cadastral court. Hence, this petition. The petitioners argue that the cadastral court was bereft of the power to determine conflicting claims of ownership, and that its authority was solely to confirm an existing title, and that anyway, all the lots should have been awarded to them by virtue of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession since 1941 or by acquisitive prescription. They also assert that the deed of donation inter vivos had validly transferred the subject lands to them. Private respondents for their part, contend that the cadastral court had the jurisdiction to decide questions of ownership of property, and that the deed of donation inter vivos was rescinded by the deed of donation mortis causa. Issue: 1. Whether the cadastral court had the power to determine conflicting claims of ownership YES 2. Who has the right over the subject lots? PETITIONERS HELD: 1. Under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land registration court, is no longer as limited as it was under Act No. 496, the former land registration law. That the Decree "has eliminated the


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distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court." The amendment was "aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the required trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for 'original registration' 'but also 'over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications or petitions.'"

At any rate, we have also stated that the limited jurisdiction rule governing land registration courts is subject to recognized exceptions, to wit, (1) where the parties mutually agreed or have acquiesced in submitting controversial issues for determination; (2) where they have been given full opportunity to present their evidence; and (3) where the court has considered the evidence already of record and is convinced that the same is sufficient for rendering a decision upon such controversial issues. 13 By the same token, it has been held that the rule is not, in reality, one of jurisdiction, but rather, of mere procedure, which may be waived. It is not amiss to state likewise that where the issue, say, of ownership, is ineluctably tied up with the question of right of registration, the cadastral court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction over it, as, for instance, in this case, where both parties rely on their respective exhibits to defeat one another's claims over the parcels sought to be registered, in which case, registration would not be possible or would be unduly prolonged unless the court first decided it. 2. The next question refers to acquisitive prescription. The evidence for Virginia et al. do not persuade us that they have acquired the lots by lapse of time. The fact that in 1941, Jose possession thereof, does not amount to adverse possession because as a co-owner, he had the right of enjoyment, and his use thereof can not by itself prejudice the right of his fellow co-owners. Nonetheless, the Court grants the petition on the finding that the lots had been conferred to Jose by a valid donation inter vivos. The Deed of donation inter vivos appears to have been executed in compliance with legal requirements, i.e., as to form and acceptance. We cannot say that the subsequent deed had validly revoked the first deed. The weight of authority is that a valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with charges imposed in the donation, or by reason of ingratitude. There is simply no proof that Abdon when he executed the deed of donation mortis causa, was in possession of a legal ground for annulment.

RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS, INC vs. THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF PARAAQUE CITY G.R. No. 133240. November 15, 2000 NATURE: A petition for review on the decision rendered by RTC of Paraaque City, Metro Manila involving questions of law. FACTS: Petitioner Corporation amended its Articles of Incorporation to change its name from RudolfLietz, Incorporated to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. and such was approved by SEC. As a consequence of its change of name, petitioner sought the amendment of the transfer certificates of title over real properties owned by them, all of which were under the old name. For this purpose, petitioner instituted a petition for amendment of titles with the RTC Paraaque City. The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, apparently because the titles sought to be amended, all state that they were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition that the lands covered by the subject titles are located in Pasay City. Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject titles are in the custody of the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City. Hence, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition impleading instead as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City, and alleged that its lands are located in Paraaque City. In the meantime, however, the court a quo had dismissed the petition motu proprio on the ground of improper venue, it appearing therein that the respondent is the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and the properties are located in Pasay City. Petitioner filed with the lower court a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. On the other hand, in view of the dismissal of the petition, the lower court also denied the Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition.


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The Solicitor General filed his Comment contending that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the res because it appeared from the original petition that the lands are situated in Pasay City; hence, outside the jurisdiction of the Paraaque court. Since it had no jurisdiction over the case, it could not have acted on the motion to admit amended petition. ISSUE: Whether or not RTC Paraaque City has jurisdiction over the petition for amendment of titles filed by petitioner. HELD: YES. LRC Case No. 97-0170 is ordered REINSTATED. Petitioner correctly invoked the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court in seeking the amendment of its certificates of title. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over matters involving the registration of lands and lands registered under the Torrens system is conferred by Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, The Property Registration Decree, viz: Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. --- Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system. Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interest therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. More specifically, jurisdiction over petitions for amendments of certificates of title, such as the one brought below, is provided for by Section 108 of P.D. 1529, thus: Amendment and alteration of certificates. --- No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except upon order of the proper Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). A registered owner or other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground xxx that the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; xxx or upon any other reasonable ground and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper: xxx. Venue of real actions. --- Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the proceedings. Where the defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to belatedly challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed waived. Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in the rules of court to take its proper course. Amendments as a matter of right A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served. Amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of cases or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. The trial court, therefore, should have allowed the amendment proposed by petitioner for in so doing, it would have allowed the actual merits of the case to be speedily determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner. The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment to the complaint was made before the trial of the case thereby giving petitioner all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.


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DAY 5 CHAPTER II- SECTIONS 4-13 (G.R. No. 101387. March 11, 1998) LABURDA V. LRA FACTS: Petitioners applied for the registration of a parcel of land located in Mandaluyong City. The trial court, acting as a land registration court, found the application meritorious, and so it declared, confirmed and ordered the registration of their title in the name of spouses Mariano and Erlinda Laburada After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, issued an order dated March 15, 1991 requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence, petitioners filed an action for mandamus. Attached to the LRAs comment on the petition is a report signed by Silverio G. Perez, director of the LRA Department of Registration, which explained public respondents refusal to issue the said decree. After the filing of memoranda by the parties, petitioners filed an urgent motion, for an early resolution of the case. On December 29, 1995, the solicitor general submitted his compliance with the above resolution. It was also informed that for this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the decision dated January 9, 1991 and order dated March 15, 1991, would result in the duplication of the title over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purposes of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same (O.R. No. 63189 Pedro K. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrio, et. al.). Hence, this case will be submitted to the Court for dismissal to avoid duplication of title over the same parcel of land. ISSUES: WoN in an original land registration proceeding in which applicants have been adjudged to have a registrable title, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) may refuse to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that the subject land may already be included in an existing Torrens certificate of title? NO. Under this circumstance, may the LRA be compelled by mandamus to issue such decree? NO. Petitioners Contention: Petitioners contend that mandamus is available in this case, for the LRA unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, citing four reasons why the writ should be issued: a. Petitioners claim that they have a clear legal right to the act being prayed for and the LRA has the imperative duty to

perform because, as land registration is an in rem proceeding, the jurisdictional requirement of notices and publication should be complied with. Since there was no showing that the LRA filed an opposition in this proceeding, it cannot refuse to issue the corresponding decree.

b. It is not the LRAs concern, but the private person-holders of said titles, to institute in a proper, separate action whatever claim they may have against the property subject of petitioners application for registration.

c. Petitioners contend that they suffered from the delay in the issuance of their title, because of the failure of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila to furnish LRA with the certified copies of TCT No. 29337 and TCT No. 6595 notwithstanding the lack of opposition from the holders of said titles.

d. The State consented to its being sued in this case, thus, the legislature must recognize any judgment that may be rendered in this case as final and make provision for its satisfaction.

LRAs contention: The decision of the trial court is not valid, considering that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and so a second decree for the same land is null and void. HELD: NO. The petition is not meritorious. 1. Judgment Is Not Yet Executory


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Contrary to the petitioners allegations, the judgment they seek to enforce in this petition is not yet executory and incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law. That is, they do not have any clear legal right to implement it. We have unambiguously ruled that a judgment of registration does not become executory until after the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree of registration. We explained this in Gomez vs. Court of Appeals: This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. 2. A Void Judgment Is Possible That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration. In Ramos vs. Rodriguez, this Court ruled that the LRA is mandated to refer to the trial court any doubt it may have in regard to the preparation and the issuance of a decree of registration. In this respect, LRA officials act not as administrative officials but as officers of said court, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings. Land registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the government and its branches, irrespective of whether they were personally notified of the application for registration, and whether they filed an answer to said application. This stance of petitioners finds support in Sec. 38 of Act 496 which provides:

SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description To all whom it may concern. Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal herein before provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title issued to persons not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. (As amended by Sec. 3, Act No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630, and PD 1529, Sec. 39).

The property which petitioners are seeking to register -- Lot 3-A, is a portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, over which TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon the other hand, in regard to Lot 3-B of said Lot 3, TCT No. 29337 was issued in lieu of TCT No. 6595. Thus, the LRAs refusal to issue a decree of registration is based on documents which, if verified, may render the judgment of the trial court void. It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same land would be null and void,[19] since the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once. In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and void. This is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is already a res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in rem. The registration of the property in the name of first registered


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owner in the Registration Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the latter applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a title so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To declare the later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its indefeasibility. Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled through mandamus. Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not compellable by mandamus because it is a judicial act involving the exercise of discretion. Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded. But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue. A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a question submitted to it for decision, but it cannot be enjoined to decide for or against one of the parties. As stated earlier, a judicial act is not compellable by mandamus. The court has to decide a question according to its own judgment and understanding of the law. In view of the foregoing, it is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree of registration. However, to avoid multiplicity of suits and needless delay, this Court deems it more appropriate to direct the LRA to expedite its study, to determine with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, and to submit a report thereon to the court of origin within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, after which the said court shall act with deliberate speed according to the facts and the law, as herein discussed. Petition is DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. LRA is ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60) days from notice. After receipt of such report, the land registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue the decree of registration, according to the facts and the law as herein discussed.

Spouses ABRIGO vs. DE VERA G.R. No. 154409 June 21, 2004 FACTS: Villafania sold a house and lot located Pangasinan and Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go covered by a tax declaration. The said sale became a subject of a suit for annulment of documents between Villafania (vendor) and Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go (vendees).

The RTC rendered judgment approving the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties. In the said Decision, Villafania was given one year from the date of the Compromise Agreement to buy back the house and lot, and failure to do so would mean that the previous sale in favor of Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go shall remain valid and binding and the plaintiff shall voluntarily vacate the premises without need of any demand. Villafania failed to buy back the house and lot, so the [vendees] declared the lot in their name

Unknown, however to Tigno-Salazar and a Cave-Go, Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land involved. The said free patent (OCT NO. P- 30522) was later on cancelled by a TCT (TCT NO. 212598). On Oct 16, 1997, Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to the Spouses Abrigo. On Oct 23, 1997, Villafania sold the same house and lot to de Vera. De Vera registered the sale and as a consequence a TCT was issued in her name.


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De Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages against Spouses Abrigo before the MTC. The parties submitted a Motion for Dismissal in view of their agreement in the instant (RTC) case that neither of them can physically take possession of the property in question until the instant case is terminated. Hence the ejectment case was dismissed. Spouses Abrigo filed a case with the RTC for the annulment of documents, injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order and damages Villafania.

The RTC rendered the assailed Decision awarding the properties to Spouses Abrigo as well as damages. Moreover, Villafania was ordered to pay [petitioners and private respondent] damages and attorneys fees.

Not contented with the assailed Decision, both parties [appealed to the CA].

In its original Decision, the CA held that a void title could not give rise to a valid one and hence dismissed the appeal of Private Respondent de Vera. Since Villafania had already transferred ownership to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De Vera was deemed void. The CA also dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and found no sufficient basis to award them moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

On reconsideration, found Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith and for value. The appellate court ruled that she had relied in good faith on the Torrens title of her vendor and must thus be protected.

Hence, this Petition. ISSUE: Who between petitioner-spouses and respondent has a better right to the property? HELD: DE VERA The petition is denied, and the assailed decision affirmed. Double Sale Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus:

Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to lands registered under the Torrens system.

In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of the property. Since neither petitioners nor their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that the property was covered by the Torrens system, they registered their respective sales under Act 3344. For her part, De Vera registered the transaction under the Torrens system because, during the sale, Villafania had presented the transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering the property.

In Soriano v. Heirs of Magali, the Court held that registration must be done in the proper registry in order to bind the land. Since the property in dispute in the present case was already registered under the Torrens system, petitioners registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code. More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the right of a party who had registered the sale of land under the Property Registration Decree, as opposed to another who had registered a deed of final conveyance under Act 3344. In that case, the priority in time principle was not applied, because the land was already covered by the Torrens system at the time the conveyance was registered under Act 3344. For the same reason,


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inasmuch as the registration of the sale to Respondent De Vera under the Torrens system was done in good faith, this sale must be upheld over the sale registered under Act 3344 to Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo.

NOTES: The principle in Article 1544 of the Civil Code is in full accord with Section 51 of PD 1529 which provides that:

no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its registration. Thus, if the sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the buyer but it does not affect innocent third persons.

2. In Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo, the Court explained the difference in the rules of registration under Act 3344 and those under the Torrens system in this wise:

Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is without prejudice to a third party with a better right. The aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in ones favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals is a case in point. It was held therein that Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to land not registered under Act No. 496. Like in the case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of the same unregistered land. The first sale was made by the original owners and was unrecorded while the second was an execution sale that resulted from a complaint for a sum of money filed against the said original owners. Applying [Section 33], Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court held that Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though the latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this second sale was registered. It was explained that this is because the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriffs execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latters interest in the property sold as of the time the property was levied upon. Applying this principle, x x x the execution sale of unregistered land in favor of petitioner is of no effect because the land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time of the said execution sale.

Good-Faith Requirement We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second buyer to acquire the immovable in good faith and to register it in good faith. Mere registration of title is not enough; good faith must concur with the registration. We explained the rationale in Uraca v. Court of Appeals, which we quote:

Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer does not by itself confer ownership or a better right over the property. Article 1544 requires that such registration must be coupled with good faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that (t)he governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyers rights except where the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first, as provided by the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights under the law, among them, to register first her purchase as against the second buyer. But in converso, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer being able to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyers rights) - from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by registration, or failing registration, by delivery of possession.34 (Italics supplied)

Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking such certificate for value and in good faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances, except those noted and enumerated in the certificate. Thus, a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the registry to determine the condition of the property, since such condition is noted on the face of the register or certificate of title. Following this principle, the Court has consistently held as regards registered land that a purchaser in good faith acquires a good title as against all the transferees thereof whose rights are not recorded in the Registry of Deeds at the time of the sale

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Ltd Case Digests Compilation Day 5