Compilation of Case Digests Jurisdiction

7/24/2019 Compilation of Case Digests Jurisdiction

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D. TYPES/ CLASSES OF JURISDICTION

i. Orginal concurrent jurisdiction vis--vis original exclusive

jurisdiction

ALFEO D. VIVAS, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE

SHAREHOLDERS OF EUROCREDIT COMMUNITY BANK,

PETITIONER, vs.THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO

SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT

INSURANCE CORPORATION,RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:In January 2006, Vivas acquired the Rural Bank of Faire, Inc.(RBFI). Upon acquisition, Vivas initiated an internal audit of RBFI. Theaudit highlighted the dismal operation of RBFI.

On 8 Dec. 2006, BSP issued a Certificate of Authority extendingthe corporate life of RBFI for another fifty (50) years. The BSP alsoapproved the change of its name to EuroCredit Community Bank, Inc.(ECBI)

R.A. 7653, The New Central Bank Act, required the generalexamination of certain banks including ECBI. The following are theserious findings and supervisory concerns noted during the generalexamination:

1. Negative capital of P14.674M and Capital Adequacy ratio of

Negative 18.42%;

2. Capital Asset Management Earnings Liquidity composite ratingof 2 with a Management component rating of 1; and

3. Serious supervisory concerns on activities deemed unsafe orunsound.

Because of these findings, BSP cancelled the rediscounting lineof the ECBI. Moreover, BSP directed the bank to:

1. Infuse fresh capital of P22.643M

2. Book the amount of P28.563M representing unbooked valuationreserves on classified loans and other risks assets on or before October31, 2008; and

3. Take appropriate action necessary to address theviolations/exceptions noted in the examination.

Vivas claimed that the Integrated Supervision Department II(ISD II) took the above courses of action due to the joint influenceexerted by a certain hostile shareholder and a former BSP examiner.Vivas moved for reconsideration of such resolution for being arbitraryand violative of due process.

BSP on the contrary, said that there are several instances thatthe BSP invited ECBI to discuss pertinent matters but Vivas kept onpostponing the meeting.

The Monetary Board of BSP posited that ECBI unjustly refusedto allow the BSP examiners from examining and inspecting its booksand records, in violation of Sections 25 and 34 of R.A. No. 7653. In itsletter, 13 dated May 8, 2009, the BSP informed ECBI that it was alreadydue for another annual examination and that the pendency of itsappeal before the MB would not prevent the BSP from conductinganother one as mandated by Section 28 of R.A. No. 7653.

In view of ECBI's refusal to comply with the requiredexamination, MB issued a resolution imposing penalty on ECB. In aLetter-Reply of ECBI, it asked for another deferment of the examinationdue to the pendency of certain unresolved issues subject of its appealbefore the MB, and because Vivas was then out of the country. The ISDII denied ECBIs request and ordered the general examination toproceed as previously scheduled.

A complaint was filed before DOJ for Estafa ThroughFalsification of Commercial Documents against certain officials andemployees of ECBI.

Eventually, the Monetary Board issued a resolution as follows:

Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries 1


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1. To prohibit the Eurocredit Bank from doing business in thePhilippines and to place its assets and affairs under receivership; and

2. To designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation asReceiver of the bank.

Vivas filed a petition for prohibition before SC, ascribing grave

abuse of discretion to the MB for prohibiting ECBI from continuing itsbanking business and for placing it under receivership.

ISSUES: (1)Whether the Monetary Board has jurisdiction over the case

(2)Whether Vivas was correct in filing a prohibition before the SupremeCourt

RULING:(1)The Monetary Board (MB) may forbid a bank from doingbusiness and place it under receivership without prior notice and

hearing.

(2) The Petition for PROHIBITION Should Have Been Filed in the

CA

Even if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition should have beenfiled with the CA. Section 4 of Rule 65 reads:

Section 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filednot later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or

resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timelyfiled, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day periodshall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to theacts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer orperson, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over theterritorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed inthe Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellatejurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate

jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicialagency, unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition

shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.[Emphases supplied]

That the MB is a quasi-judicial agency was already settled andreiterated in the case of Bank of Commerce v. Planters DevelopmentBank And Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas.30

Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissiblebecause it simply ignored the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. True, theCourt, the CA and the RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction toissue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The concurrenceof jurisdiction, however, does not grant the party seeking any of theextraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any courtof his choice. The petitioner has not advanced any special or importantreason which would allow a direct resort to this Court. Under the Rules

of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court only on purequestions of law.31In the case at bench, there are certainly factualissues as Vivas is questioning the findings of the investigating team.

Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that wherethe issuance of the extraordinary writs is also within the competence ofthe CA or the RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writmust be presented to either court. As a rule, the Court will notentertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot beobtained in the appropriate lower courts; or where exceptional andcompelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and withserious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedyof writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise ofits primary jurisdiction.32The judicial policy must be observed toprevent an imposition on the precious time and attention of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DENIED.

PACIFIC ACE FINANCE LTD. (PAFIN) V. EJIEYANAGISAWA

G.R. No. 175303 (2012)

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FACTS: Eiji, a Japanese, married Evelyn, Filipina, in 1989 at the City

Hall of Manila.

On August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a townhouse in

Paranaque. The Registry of Deeds issued a title to Evelyn P. Castaneda,

Filipino, married to EjieYanagisawa, Japanese citizen, both of legal age.

In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint before RTC Makati for thedeclaration of nullity of his marriage with Evelyn on the ground of

bigamy. During the pendency of the case, he asked that Evelyn be

enjoined from disposing or encumbering all of the properties registered in her

name. Evelyn and her lawyer voluntarily undertook to acede to the motion of

Eiji.

In 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan of P500,000 from petitioner PAFIN. To

secure the loan, Evelyn executed a real estate mortgage (the property above-

described). At the time of the mortgage, Eijis's appeal was pending before the

CA.

Eiji filed an action before RTC Paranaque for annulment of the real

estate mortgage. PAFIN denied prior knowledge of the Order in the first case.

PAFIN admitted that it did not conduct any verification of the title because

Evelyn is good and friendly. Moreover, PAFIN averred that Eiji has no

personality to seek the annulment of the REM because a foreign national

cannot own real properties located within the Philippines.

The RTC Paranaque dismissed the case for lack of cause of

action. Eiji cannot possibly own the property because he is a foreigner.

Eiji appealed, arguing that his inability to own a real estate does

not automatically deprive him of all his interest in the mortgaged

property, because the same was purchased with his money.

The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. It ruled that the property

should be liquidated and divided between Eiji and Evelyn.

The appellate court determined that the Paraaque RTCs Decision

was improper because it violated the doctrine of non-interference. Courts of

equal jurisdiction, such as regional trial courts, have no appellate jurisdiction

over each other. For this reason, the CA annulled and set aside the Paraaque

RTCs decision to dismiss Eijis complaint.

ISSUE:Whether the RTC Paranaques decision was proper?

RULING: No. A review of the complaint shows that Eiji did not claim

ownership of the Paraaque townhouse unit or his right to consent to theREM as his bases for seeking its annulment. Instead, Eiji invoked his right to

rely on Evelyns commitment not to dispose of or encumber the property (as

confirmed in the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC), and the

annotation of the said commitment on TCT No. 99791.

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption

by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an insurmountable barrier to

the subsequent assumption by the Paraaque RTC.By insisting on ruling on

the same issue, the Paraaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTCs

resolution of the issue and created the possibility of conflicting decisions.

Contrary to petitioners stance, the CA did not make any disposition as to who

between Eiji and Evelyn owns the Paraaque townhouse unit. It simply ruled

that the Makati RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the said question and

should not have been interfered with by the Paraaque RTC. The CA only

clarified that it was improper for the Paraaque RTC to have reviewed the

ruling of a co-equal court.

G.R. No. 176162 : October 9, 2012

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,Petitioner,v.COURT OF APPEALS,DR. DANTE G. GUEV ARRA and ATTY. AUGUSTUS F.

CEZAR,Respondents.

G.R. No. 178845

ATTY. HONESTO L. CUEVA,Petitioner,v.COURT OF APPEALS, DR.

DANTE G. GUEV ARRA and ATTY. AUGUSTUS F.

CEZAR,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA,J.:



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These are consolidated petitions for review under Rule 45 of the RevisedRules of Civil Procedure assailing the December 29, 2006 Decisionofthe Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 95293, entitled"Dr. DanteG. Guevarra and Atty. Augustus Cezar v. Civil Service Commission and

Atty. Honesto L. Cueva."

FACTS:

Respondents Dante G. Guevarra (Guevarra) and Augustus F. Cezar(Cezar) were the Officer-in-Charge/President and the Vice President forAdministration, respectively, of the Polytechnic University of thePhilippines (PUP

Honesto L. Cueva (Cueva), then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed anadministrative case against Guevarra and Cezar for gross dishonesty,grave misconduct, falsification of official documents, conductprejudicial to the best interest of the service, being notoriouslyundesirable, and for violating Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.6713specifically the Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and

Employees of the Republic of the Philippines, in which the latter deniedthe existence of his pending criminal and administrative cases

In his Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and Employees ofthe Republic of the Philippines (General Form No. 58-A), he answeredQuestion No. 11 in this wise:

11. Do you have any criminal or administrative records? NO. If so,state briefly the nature thereof NO

This was despite the undisputed fact that, at that time, both Guevarraand Cezar admittedly had 17 pending cases for violation of Section 3(e)

of R.A. No. 3019 before the SandiganbayanThe respondents explained that they believed "criminal oradministrative records" to mean final conviction in a criminal oradministrative casebecause their cases had not yet been decided by theSandiganbayan, they asserted that Guevarra responded to Question No.11 in General Form No. 58-A correctly and in good faith

March 24, 2006, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued ResolutionNo. 060521formally charging Guevarra with Dishonesty and Cezar withConduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service after a primafacie finding that they had committed acts punishable under the CivilService Law and Rules.

the respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration and Motion toDeclare Absence of Prima Facie Case.

Cueva, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for theIssuance of Preventive Suspension12rll and an OmnibusMotion13rll seeking the issuance of an order of preventivesuspension against Guevarra and Cezar and the inclusion of thefollowing offenses in the formal charge against them: Grave Misconduct,

Falsification of Official Document, Conduct Prejudicial to the BestInterest of the Service, Being Notoriously Undesirable, and Violation ofSection 4 of R.A. No. 6713.

CSC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents forbeing a non-responsive pleading, akin to a motion to dismiss, whichwas a prohibited pleading under Section 16 of the Uniform Rules onAdministrative Cases in the Civil Service Commission.15rll It alsodenied Cuevas motion to include additional charges against therespondents. The CSC, however, placed Guevarra under preventivesuspension for ninety (90) days, believing it to be necessary because, as

the officer-in-charge of PUP, he was in a position to unduly influencepossible witnesses against him.

Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition forcertiorariand prohibition beforethe CA essentially questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC over theadministrative complaint filed against them by Cueva.

CA rendered its Decision granting the petition and nullifying andsetting aside the questioned resolutions of the CSC for having beenrendered without jurisdiction

the CA noted that the CSC erred in recognizing the complaint filed by

Cueva, reasoning out that the latter should have exhausted alladministrative remedies by first bringing his grievances to the attentionof the PUP Board of Regents.

Hence, these petitions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has original

concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases falling under the

jurisdiction of heads of agencies.

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The Court agrees that the only question which must be addressed inthis case is whether the CSC has jurisdiction over administrative casesfiled directly with it against officials of a chartered state university.

HELD:

The petitions are meritorious.

CSC has jurisdiction over cases

filed directly with it, regardless of

who initiated the complaint

Section 2(1), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution defines the scope ofthe civil service:

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,and agencies of the Government, including government-owned orcontrolled corporations with original charters.

By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341 PUP became a charteredstate university, thereby making it a government-owned or controlledcorporation with an original charter whose employees are part of theCivil Service and are subject to the provisions of E.O. No. 292.

The controversy, however, stems from the interpretation of thedisciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC as specified in Section 47, Chapter7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292:

SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (1) The Commission shalldecide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving theimposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or finein an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary

or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be fileddirectly with the Commission by a private citizen against a governmentofficial or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or itmay deputize any department or agency or official or group of officialsto conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall besubmitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty tobe imposed or other action to be taken.

(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities,provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigateand decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and

employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case

the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or finein an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decisionrendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission,the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to theCommission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory exceptwhen the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executoryonly after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.

The understanding by the CA of Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, TitleI, Book V of E.O. No. 292 which states that "a complaint may be fileddirectly with the Commission by a private citizen against a governmentofficial or employee" is that the CSC can only take cognizance of a casefiled directly before it if the complaint was made by a private citizen.

There is no cogent reason to differentiate between a complaint filed by aprivate citizen and one filed by a member of the civil service, especiallyin light of Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of thesame E.O. No. 292 which confers upon the CSC the power to "hear anddecide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or

on appeal" without any qualification.

It cannot be overemphasized that the identity of the complainant isimmaterial to the acquisition of jurisdiction over an administrative caseby the CSC.

CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction

with the Board of Regents over

administrative cases

The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service(the

Uniform Rules) explicitly allows the CSC to hear and decideadministrative cases directly brought before it:

Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The CivilService Commission shall hear and decide administrative casesinstituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, includingcontested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of itsoffices and of the agencies attached to it.

Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the CivilService Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon theremoval, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the



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civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline andefficiency of such officers and employees.

The CA construed the phrase "the Civil Service Commission shall havethe final authority to pass upon the removal, separation andsuspension of all officers and employees in the civil service" to meanthat the CSC could only step in after the relevant disciplinary authority,in this case the Board of Regents of PUP, had investigated and decided

on the charges against the respondents. Regrettably, the CA failed totake into consideration the succeeding section of the same rules whichundeniably granted original concurrent jurisdiction to the CSC andbelied its suggestion that the CSC could only take cognizance of caseson appeal:

Section 7. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. Heads of Departments,agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalitiesshall have original concurrent jurisdiction, with the Commission, overtheir respective officers and employees.

All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC,unless otherwise provided by law. Being a non-career civil servant doesnot remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC.

Career or non-career, a civil service official or employee is within thejurisdiction of the CSC.

CSC has original concurrent jurisdiction shared with the governingbody in question, in this case, the Board of Regents of PUP. This meansthat if the Board of Regents first takes cognizance of the complaint,then it shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the CSC.Thus, notall administrative cases will fall directly under the CSC. Secondly,

Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the AdministrativeCode affords the CSC the option of whether to decide the case or todeputize some other department, agency or official to conduct aninvestigation into the matter, thereby considerably easing the burdenplaced upon the CSC.

WHEREFORE, the petitions areGRANTED. The December 29, 2006

Decision of the Court of Appeals is herebyREVERSEDandSET ASIDE.Resolution Nos. 060521 and 061141 dated March 24, 2006 and June30, 2006, respectively, of the Civil Service Commission

areREINSTATED.

FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS AND CARMELITA C. LLAMAS VS. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BRANCH 66 OF THE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY ANDTHE PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS Petitioners were charged before the RTC of Makati with the

crime of other forms of swindling for selling the mortgaged land. Theland was mortgaged to Rural Bank of Imus.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. The

appellate court further denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners filed before this Court a petition for review, however,

denied the same for petitioners failure to state the material dates.

Since it subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration,

the judgment of conviction became final and executory.

With the consequent issuance by the trial court of the April 19,

2001 Warrant of Arrest, the police arrested, on April 27, 2001,

petitioner Carmelita C. Llamas for her to serve her 2-month jail term.

The police, nevertheless, failed to arrest petitioner Francisco R. Llamas

because he was nowhere to be found.

Petitioner Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the warrant

of arrest, raising for the first time the issue that the trial court had no

jurisdiction over the offense charged.

There being no action taken by the trial court on the said

motion, petitioners instituted, the instant proceedings for the

annulment of the trial and the appellate courts decisions.

The Court initially dismissed on technical grounds the petition

in the September 24, 2001 Resolution, but reinstated the same, on

motion for reconsideration, in the October 22, 2001 Resolution.



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In its September 29, 2009 Decision, this Court held that,

following the ruling in People v. Bitanga the remedy of annulment of

judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases. The Court likewise

rejected petitioners contention that the trial court had no jurisdiction

over the case.

ISSUES

1.Whether the ruling on PEOPLE VS BITANGA would apply to this

case?

2.Whether the accused were guilty of other forms of swindling?

RULING

1.No.

Petitioners took many procedural missteps in this case,

from the time it was pending in the trial court until it reached

this Court, all of which could serve as enough basis to dismiss

the present motion for reconsideration. However, considering

petitioners advanced age, the length of time this case has been

pending, and the imminent loss of personal liberty as a result of

petitioners conviction, the Court resolves to grant pro hac

vice the motion for reconsideration.

This Court has, on occasion, suspended the application

of technical rules of procedure where matters of life, liberty,

honor or property, among other instances, are at stake. It has

allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent

procedural defects and lapses on the principle that rules of

procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of

justice. The strict and rigid application of rules that tend to

frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always

be avoided. It is far better and more prudent for the court to

excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the

case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the

case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties.

Thus, the Court, at the first instance, had recognized

that the petition, although captioned differently, was indeed one

for certiorari.

Since we have resolved to treat the petition as one

for certiorari, the doctrine in People v. Bitanga no longer finds

application in this case.

Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal Code states:

ART. 316. Other forms of swindling. The penalty of arresto

mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not

less than the value of the damage caused and not more than

three times such value, shall be imposed upon:

2.Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered,

shall dispose of the same, although such encumbrance be not

recorded;

In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove

beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime

charged and the complicity or participation of the accused.

For petitioners to be convicted of the crime of swindling

under Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution

had the burden to prove the confluence of the following essential

elements of the crime:

1. that the thing disposed of be real property;

2. that the offender knew that the real property was

encumbered,



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whether the encumbrance is recorded or not;

3. that there must be express representation by the

offender that the real property is free from

encumbrance; and

4. that the act of disposing of the real property be made

to the damage of another.

One of the essential elements of swindlingunder Article 316, paragraph 2, is that the act of

disposing the encumbered real property is made to

the damage of another. In this case, neither the trial

court nor the CA made any finding of any damage to

the offended party. Nowhere in the Decision of the

RTC or that of the CA is there any discussion that

there was damage suffered by complainant, or any

finding that his rights over the property were

prejudiced.

On the contrary, complainant had possession and

control of the land even as the cases were being

heard. His possession and right to exercise dominion

over the property was not disturbed. Admittedly,

there was delay in the delivery of the title. This,

however, was the subject of a separate case, which

was eventually decided in petitioners favor.

If no damage should result from the sale, nocrime of estafa would have been committed by the

vendor, as the element of damage would then be

lacking. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that

petitioners should be acquitted of the crime charged.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered,

the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated September 29, 2009

is SET ASIDE and a new one is

entered ACQUITTING petitioners of the crime charged

on the ground of the prosecutions failure to prove

their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERTO LASTIMOSO, ACTING CHIEF

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), DIRECTORATE FOR

PERSONNEL AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT (DPRM), INSPECTORGENERAL, P/CHIEF SUPT. RAMSEY OCAMPO and P/SUPT. ELMER

REJANO,petitioners, vs.P/SENIOR INSPECTOR JOSE J. ASAYO,respondent.

FACTS:The Court granted the petition, holding that the PhilippineNational Police (PNP) Chief had jurisdiction to take cognizance of thecivilian complaint against respondent and that the latter was accordeddue process during the summary hearing. Hence, this motion forreconsideration.

Respondent argues that the decision should be reconsidered forthe following reasons:

1.Proceedings were null and void because no hearing was conducted;

and

2. The evidence does not prove that respondent is guilty

ISSUES: 1. Whether the Summary Proceedings conducted were null

and void

2. Whether the evidence presented is insufficient to prove

respondents guilt

RULING: 1. NO.The fact that there was no full-blown trialbefore the

summary hearing offi cer does not invalidate said proceedings. In

Samalio v. Court of Appeals,the Court reiterated the time-honored

principle that:Due process in an administrative context does not

require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice.

A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all

instances essential. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for

being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a



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case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentaryevidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may takethe place of their direct testimony.

2.To resolve the second issue, respondent would have the Court re-calibrate the weight of evidence presented before the summary hearingofficer, arguing that said evidence is insufficient to prove respondent's

guilt of the charges against him.However, it must be emphasized thatthe action commenced by

respondent before the RTC is one forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of

the ROCand as held inPeople v. Court of Appeals,3where the issueor question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the

decision not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision

the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for

certiorari.The general rule is that the filing of a petition forcertioraridoes

not toll the running of the period to appeal.However, Section 1, Rule

1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules shall be liberallyconstrued in order to promote their objective of securing a just,

speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

InGinete v. Court of Appeals5andSanchez v. Court of Appeals,6theCourt saw it proper to suspend rules of procedure in order to promotesubstantial justice where matters of life, liberty, honor or property,among other instances, are at stake.The present case clearly involves the honor of a police officer who hasrendered years of service to the country.

In addition, it is also understandable why respondent immediatelyresorted to the remedy ofcertiorariinstead of pursuing his motion for

reconsideration of the PNP Chiefs decision as an appeal before theNational Appellate Board (NAB).It was quite easy to get confused as towhich body had jurisdiction over his case. The complaint filed againstrespondent could fall under both Sections 41 (where it shall be filed inPeoples Law Enforcement Board) and 42 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.6975 (states that it is the PNP Chief who has authority to immediatelyremove or dismiss a PNP member who is guilty of conduct unbecominga police officer) or the Department of the Interior and Local Government

Act of 1990.

It was only inQuiambao v. Court of Appeals,promulgated in

2005 or after respondent had already filed the petition for

certiorariwith the trial court, when the Court resolved the issue ofjurisdiction. The Court held that the PLEB and the PNP Chief and

regional directors haveconcurrent jurisdiction over administrative

casesfiled against members of the PNP which may warrant dismissalfrom service, but once a complaint is filed with the PNP Chief or

regional directors, said authorities shall acquire exclusive originaljurisdiction over the case.

With the foregoing peculiar circumstances in this case,respondent should not be deprived of the opportunity to fully ventilate

his arguments against the factual findings of the PNP Chief.He may

file an appeal before the NAB, pursuant to Section 45, R.A. No.

6925.It is a settled jurisprudence that in administrative

proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not

strictly applied.8InLand Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,9the Courtstressed thus: After all, technical rules of procedure are not ends inthemselves but are primarily devised to help in the proper and expedient

dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may be

construed liberally in order to meet and advance the cause of substantial

justice.Thus, the opportunity to pursue an appeal before the NAB

should be deemed available to respondent in thehigher interest of

substantial justice.

MR: Partly granted. Allowed to file an appeal.

GARCIA VS. SANDIGANBAYANG.R. NO. 165835

FACTS:Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff for

Comptrollership of the AFP.On 27 September 2004, the Ombudsman, after due

investigation, filed a COMPLAINT before the Sandiganbayan againstGarcia for VIOLATION of the following:

1. SECTION 8 in relation to Section 11 of RA 6713 (Code of

Conduct of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)

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2. Art 183, RPC3. Sec52(A)(1), (3) & (20) of the Civil Service Law

His wife and 3 sons were impleaded for violation of RA 1379insofar as they acted as conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts ofpetitioner in receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of ill-gottenwealth.

Also, a PETITION W/ VERIFIED URGENT EX PARTEAPPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARYATTACHMENT was filed by Ombudsman before the SB vs. Garcia, hiswife and 3 sons. Ombudsman has determined a prima facie case existsagainst Maj. Gen Garcia since during his incumbency as a soldier andpublic officer he acquired huge amounts of money and propertiesmanifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and hisother lawful income. SB GRANTED PETITION, ISSUED WRIT OFPRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

Garcia filed Motion to Dismiss and a Petition for Certiorari:Garcia alleged that the Sandiganbayan has a LACK OF

JURISDICTION over forfeiture proceedings (CIVIL ACTION) under RA1379. He claimed that RTC has the jurisdiction as provided underSec2(9) of the law.

Moreover, the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in Civil Actionspertains only to separate actions for recovery of unlawfully acquiredproperty vs. Pres. Marcos etc.

SB was intended principally as a criminal court. This issupported by Presidential issuances and laws, to wit:

(1)E.O. No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good

Government (PCGG) for the recovery of ill-gotten wealthamassed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his familyand cronies,

(2)E.O. No. 14 which amended P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No.1379 by transferring to the Sandiganbayan jurisdictionovercivil actionsfiled against President Marcos, hisfamily and cronies based on R.A. No. 1379, the CivilCode and other existing laws, and

(3)E.O. No. 14-A which further amended E.O. No. 14, P.D.No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by providing that the civil

action under R.A. No. 1379 which may be filed againstPresident Marcos, his family and cronies, may proceed

independently of the criminal action.Even if SB has jurisdiction, petition for forfeiture is fatally

defective for failing to comply with jurisdictional requirements under RA1379, Sec. 2:

i. inquiry similar to a Preliminary Investigationii. Certification to Solicitor General of prima facie case (In this

case: there is no certification)

iii. action filed by Solicitor General. (In this case it is filed byOmbudsman)

COMMENT by SB:In Republic v. SB the Court ruled that there is no issue that

jurisdiction over violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 now rests withthe Sandiganbayan.

Moreover, under Constitution and prevailing statutes, SB isvested w/ authority and jurisdiction over the petition for forfeitureunder RA 1379.

SBs jurisdiction based on PD 1606 encompasses all casesinvolving violations of RA 3019 IRRESPECTIVE OF WON THESE CASESARE CIVIL OR CRIMINAL IN NATURE

COMMENT BY OMBUDSMAN:1. Republic vs. SB2. Grant of jurisdiction over violations of RA 1379 did not change evenunder the amendments of RA7975 and RA 8294, though it came to belimited to cases involving high-ranking public officials3. It has authority to investigate and initiate forfeiture proceedings vs.petitioner based on Constitution and RA 6770: The constitutional power

of investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman is plenary andunqualified; its power to investigate any act of a public official oremployee which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficientcovers the unlawful acquisition of wealth by public officials as definedunder R.A. No. 13794. Section 15, RA 6770 expressly empowers Ombudsman to investigateand prosecute such cases of unlawful acquisition of wealth.5. ON REQUIREMENTS under RA 1379: inquiry was conducted similarto PI + SOLGENs participation no longer required since Ombudsmanendowed w/ authority to investigate and prosecute

6. dismiss petition for forum shopping: MTD was already filed before SB



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REPLY by Garcia1. SBs criminal jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its civiljurisdiction : SBs jurisdiction over forfeiture cases had been removedw/o subsequent amendments expressly restoring such civil jurisdiction2. Petition for forfeiture is not an ancilliary action for the criminalaction against him, so not under jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan

ISSUES1. Whether SB has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under RA13792. Whether Ombudsman has authority to investigate, initiate andprosecute such petitions for forfeiture3. Whether petitioner is guilty of forum shopping

HELDPetition without MERIT, dismissed

I.SB HAS JURISDICTIONUnder RA 8249, jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 and1379 is lodged w Sandiganbayan.

In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, originally, the solicitor generalwas authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before CFI of the city orprovince where the public officer/employee resides or holds office [RA1379, SEC2]. However, upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan [PD1486], original and exclusive jurisdiction over such violations wasvested in SB.

Eventually, PD 1606 repealed PD 1486 and modified jurisdictionof SB by removing its jurisdiction over civil actions brought in

connection w/ crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of SB, including:* Restitution or reparation for damages;* Recovery of instruments and effects of the crime;* Civil actions under Art32 and 34 of the Civil Code; and* Forfeiture proceedings provided under RA 1379BP 129 abolished concurrent jurisdiction of SB and regular

courts, and expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of SB overoffenses enumerated in Sec. 4 of PD 1606 to embrace all such offensesirrespective of imposable penalty.

PD 1606 was later amended by PD 1869 and eventually by PD

1861 because of the proliferation of filing cases w/ penalty not higher

than Prision Coreccional or its equivalent and even such cases notserious in nature.

ON CIVIL NATURE OF FORFEITURE ACTIONSForfeiture actions are actions in rem, therefore, civil in nature BUTFORFEITURE OF AN ILLEGALLY ACQUIRED PROPERTY PARTAKESTHE NATURE OF A PENALTY [as discussed in Cabal vs. Kapunan]

SB VESTED W/ JURISDICTION OVER VIOLATIONS OF RA 1379[AnAct Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found toHave Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee andProviding For the Proceedings Therefor.]: the law provides a procedurefor forfeiture in case a public officer has acquired during hisincumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion to hissalary as such public officer or employee and to his lawful income andincome from legitimately acquired property. No penalty for the publicofficer for unlawful acquisition but the law imposes forfeiture as apenalty for unlawfully acquired properties

2. YES, as resolved in Republic vs. SB (it was the main issue there)

RA 6770 and Article XI, Sec. 13 of 1987 Constitution providesfor the POWERS OF OMBUDSMAN:

1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency,when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper orinefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the

Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, maytake over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government,the investigation of such cases;(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986 andthe prosecution of the parties involved therein.

It is the Ombudsman who should file petition for forfeitureunder RA 1379

BUT powers to investigate and initiate proper action for recovery of ill-



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gotten and/or unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases for therecovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed AFTER FEB1986.

3. ON FORUM SHOPPING: GUILTY!Garcia failed to inform the SC that he had filed a Motion to

Dismiss in relation to the petition for forfeiture before the SB.

A scrutiny of the Motion to Dismiss reveals that petitioner raisedsubstantially the same issues and prayed for the same reliefs therein asit has in the instant petition. In fact, the petitioners argument that theSandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over separate civil actions forforfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties appears to be wholly liftedfrom the Motion to Dismiss. The only difference between the two is thatin the Petition, petitioner raises the ground of failure of the petition forforfeiture to comply with the procedural requirements of R.A. No. 1379,and petitioner prays for the annulment of the SandiganbayansResolution dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachmentdated 2 November 2004. Nevertheless, these differences are onlysuperficial. Both Petition and Motion to Dismiss have the same intent ofdismissing the case for forfeiture filed against petitioner, his wife andtheir sons. It is undeniable that petitioner had failed to fulfill hisundertaking. This is incontestably forum-shopping which is reasonenough to dismiss the petition outright, without prejudice to the takingof appropriate action against the counsel and party concerned.

G.R. No. 173121 April 3, 2013

FRANKLlN ALEJANDROvs.OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT-

FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, represented by Atty. Maria

Olivia Elena A. Roxas,Respondent.D E C I S I O N

BRION,J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari,1filed by FranklinAlejanctro (petitioneJ), assailing the February 21, 2006 decision2andthe June 15, 2006 resolution3of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.SP No. 88544. The CA dismissed for prematurity the petitioner's appealon the August 20, 2004 decision4of the Office of the DeputyOmbudsman in OMB-C-A-03-0310-I finding him administratively liable

for grave misconduct.

FACTS:On May 4, 2000, the Head of the Non-Revenue WaterReduction Department of the Manila Water Services, Inc. (MWSI)received a report from an Inspectorate and Special Projects team thatthe Mico Car Wash (MICO), owned by Alfredo Rap Alejandro, has beenillegally opening an MWSI fire hydrant and using it to operate its car-wash business in Binondo, Manila.5

On May 10, 2000, PNP-CIDG conducted an anti-water pilferageoperation against MICO.

During the anti-water pilferage operation, the PNP-CIDG discoveredthat MICOs car-wash boys indeed had been illegally getting water froman MWSI fire hydrant. The PNP-CIDG arrested the car-wash boys andconfiscated the containers used in getting water. At this point, thepetitioner, Alfredos father and the Barangay Chairman or punongbarangay of Barangay 293, Zone 28, Binondo, Manila, interfered withthe PNP-CIDGs operation by ordering several men to unload the

confiscated containers. This intervention caused further commotionand created an opportunity for the apprehended car-wash boys toescape.

Office of the Ombudsman Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau, afterconducting its initial investigation, filed with the Office of the OverallDeputy Ombudsman an administrative complaint against the petitionerfor his blatant refusal to recognize a joint legitimate police activity, andfor his unwarranted intervention.

In its decision9dated August 20, 2004, the Office of the DeputyOmbudsman found the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and

ordered his dismissal from the service. The Deputy Ombudsman ruledthat the petitioner cannot overextend his authority as BarangayChairman and induce other people to disrespect proper authorities. TheDeputy Ombudsman also added that the petitioner had tolerated theillegal acts of MICOs car-wash boys.10

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

The petitioner appealed to the CA via a petition for review under Rule43 of the Rules of Court. But the CA dismissed the petition forpremature filing.

The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CA ruling-DENIED.

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Hence this petition.

The petitioner argues that the Office of the Ombudsman has nojurisdiction to order his dismissal from the service since underRepublic Act No. (RA) 7160 (otherwise known as the Local GovernmentCode of 1991), an elective local official may be removed from office onlyby the order of a proper court. Finally, he posits that the penalty ofdismissal from the service is not warranted under the available facts.

ISSUES:

I.

WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVEREMEDIES REQUIRES A REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION FROMTHE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN TO THE OMBUDSMANFOR THE PURPOSE OF A RULE 43 REVIEW.

II.

WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTIONOVER ELECTIVE OFFICIALS AND HAS THE POWER TO ORDER THEIRDISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE.

III.

WHETHER PETITIONERS ACT CONSTITUTES GRAVE MISCONDUCTTO WARRANT HIS DISMISSAL.

HELD:

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

No further need exists to exhaust administrative remedies from

the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman because he was acting in

behalf of the Ombudsman

The petitioner has fully exhausted all administrative remedies when hefiled his motion for reconsideration on the decision of the DeputyOmbudsman. There is no further need to review the case at theadministrative level since the Deputy Ombudsman has already acted on

the case andhe was acting for and in behalf of the Office of the

Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative

cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or

administrative agencies

The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than theConstitution.18It is tasked to exercise disciplinary authority over allelective and appointive officials, save only for impeachable officers.While Section 21 of The Ombudsman Act19and the Local GovernmentCode both provide for the procedure to discipline elective officials, theseeming conflicts between the two laws have been resolved in casesdecided by this Court.20

The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act oromission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction ofthe Sandiganbayan. RA 6770 provides:

Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of theOmbudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency,when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper orinefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by theSandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it maytake over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government,the investigation of such cases. [italics supplied; emphasis andunderscore ours]

The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction extends only to public officialsoccupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher.22

Since the complaint against the petitioner wasinitially filedwith theOffice of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction isto the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan whose exercise of

jurisdiction isconcurrent.

The Ombudsman has the power to impose administrative

sanctions

Section 15 of RA 677027reveals the manifest intent of the lawmakers to

give the Office of the Ombudsman fulladministrativedisciplinary

authority. These powers unmistakably grant the Office of the

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Ombudsman the power to directly impose administrative sanctions; itspower is not merely recommendatory.

It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended toprovide the Office of the Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensurethat it can effectively carry out its mandate as protector of the peopleagainst inept and corrupt government officers and employees. TheOffice was granted the power to punish for contempt in accordance with

the Rules of Court.It was given disciplinary authority over allelective and appointive officials of the government and its

subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies(with the exception onlyof impeachable officers, members of Congress and the Judiciary). Also,it can preventively suspend any officer under its authority pending aninvestigation when the case so warrants.

Substantive Issue

The petitioner is liable for grave misconduct

After the petitioner introduced himself and inquired about theoperation, the police officers immediately showed their identificationsand explained to him that they were conducting an anti-water pilferageoperation. However, instead of assisting the PNP-CIDG, he actuallyordered several bystanders to defy the PNP-CIDGs whole operation. Thepetitioners act stirred further commotion that unfortunately led to theescape of the apprehended car-wash boys.

Sufficient records exist to justify the imposition of a higher penaltyagainst the petitioner. His open interference in a legitimate policeactivity. and defiance of the police's authority only show his clear

i1itent to violate the law; in fact, he reneged on his first obligation asthe grassroot official tasked at the first level with the enforcement of thelaw. The photographs, taken together with the investigation report ofthe Police Superintendent and the testimonies of the witnesses, evenlead to conclusions beyond interference and defiance; the petitionerhimself could have been involved in corrupt activities, although wecannot make this conclusive finding at this point.43We make thisobservation though as his son owns MICO whose car-wash boys wereengaged in water pilferage. What we can conclusively confirm is that thepetitioner violated the law by directly interfering with a legitimate policeactivity where his own son appeared to be involved. This act qualifies

the misconduct as grave. Section 52(A)(3), Rule IV of the Revised

Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service providesthat the penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from the service.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we herebyDENYthe petition for

lack of merit, andAFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88544.

ii. Appellate jurisdiction vs Original jurisdiction (review)

DARMA MASLAG VS ELIZABETH MONZON, WILLIAM GESTON, AND

REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF BENGUET

FACTSThis is a Petition for Review on Certiorari on the resolution of

CA which dismissed petitioner Darma Maslag's ordinary appeal to it for

being an improper remedy. The Petition also assails the CAs September

22, 2006 Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The petitioner filed a Complaint for reconveyance of real property with

declaration of nullity of original certificate of title against therespondents. The Complaint was filed before the Municipal Trial Court.

After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in

obtaining an OCT over petitioners property.

Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the

MTC without jurisdiction over petitioners cause of action. The presiding

judge declared that it will take cognizance of the case pursuant to

Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which provides for appeal from

orders dismissing the case without trial; lack of jurisdiction.

RTC thereafter reversed the decision of the MTC, prompting the

petitioner to file a Notice of Appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the said appeal and affirmed the

respondents contention that the proper remedy is a Petition for Review

under Rule 42, and not an ordinary appeal.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

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ISSUE:

1.Who has jurisdiction over the case?

2.Whether petioners appeal is the proper remedy?

HELD:

1.Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real

property, original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the

RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the subject

property. Pertinent provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP)

129,29as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691,30provides:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall

exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is

incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,

real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value

of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos

(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where x x x the

assessed value of the property exceeds Fifty thousand pesos

([P]50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful

detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is

conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial

Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

x x x x

SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial

Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.

Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit

Trial Courts shall exercise:

x x x x

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title

to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the

assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed

Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro

Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand

pesos (P50,000.00).

2. Yes. The CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of appeal

should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of

Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.

In fact and in law, the RTC Resolution was a continuation of the

proceedings that originated from the MTC. It was a judgment issued by

the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

It cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is

conferred only by law and it is not within the courts, let alone the

parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside. Neither

would the active participation of the parties norestoppeloperate to

confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal

only wields appellate jurisdiction over the case.

The present court looks at what type of jurisdiction wasactually

exercisedby the RTC, and not into what type of jurisdiction the RTC

should haveexercised.

Inquiring into what the RTC should have done in disposing of the case

is a question that already involves the merits of the appeal, but the

court obviously cannot go into that where the mode of appeal was

improper to begin with.

Wherefore, Petition for Review is denied for lack of merit. The Court

affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.

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MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG, Petitioner,

vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION

(PAGCOR), as represented by its incumbent Chairman EFRAIM

GENUINO,Respondent.

FACTS:Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles CityBranch, Angeles City, which was operated by respondent Philippine

Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). While he wasperforming his functions as teller, a lady customer identified later asone Cecilia Nakasato (Cecilia) approached him in his booth and handedto him an undetermined amount of cash consisting of mixed P1,000.00and P500.00 bills which in total amounts to P50,000.00. Followingcasino procedure, petitioner laid the bills on the spreading board.However, he erroneously spread the bills into only four clusters insteadof five clusters worth P10,000.00 per cluster. He then placed markersfor P10,000.00 each cluster of cash and declared the total amount ofP40,000.00 to Cecilia. Convinced that she was tricked by the petitioner

in getting less than the amount she must received.

She filed a case against petitioner. And On January 8, 2009,petitioner received a Memorandum issued by the casino informing himthat he was being charged with Discourtesy towards a casino customerand directing him to explain within 72 hours.

Subsequently, on June 18, 2009, PAGCOR issued a Memorandumdated June 18, 2009 practically reiterating the contents of its March19, 2009 Memorandum. It informed petitioner that the Board ofDirectors 2009 resolved to deny his appeal for reconsideration for lackof merit.

On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, before the CA,averring that there is no evidence, much less factual and legal basis tosupport the finding of guilt against him. Moreover, petitioner ascribedgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction tothe acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing toobserve the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and inimposing the harsh penalty of a 30 -day suspension. Justifying his

recourse to the CA, petitioner explained that he did not appeal to the

Civil Service Commission (CSC) because the penalty imposed on himwas only a 30- day suspension which is not within the CSCs appellatejurisdiction. He also claimed that discourtesy in the performance ofofficial duties is classified as a light offense which is punishable only by

reprimand.ISSUE: Was the CA correct in outrightly dismissing thepetition for certiorari filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion ofadministrative remedies?

RULING:Court of Appeals decision reversed.

In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequateremedy in the ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's allegationthat PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or withgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis ofnon-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legalstanding and should therefore be set aside.

Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid onlywhen the question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when there isgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction onthe part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions.Hence, courts exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain fromreviewing factual assessments of the respondent court or agency.Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual matterswhen the evidence on record does not support those factual findings; orwhen too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare orincomplete facts appearing on record. Considering the circumstances

and since this Court is not a trier of facts, remand of this case to theCA for its judicious resolution is in order.

A.Errors of Jurisdiction vis-a-ivs errors of judgement

DIPAD V. OLIVAN

G.R. NO. 168771 (2012)

FACTS: The car of Dipad and passenger jeep of Olivan collided. Dipad



17/65

filed a civil action for damages. Dipad claimed that he is entitled of

damages because he was not able to use his car for his buy-and-sell

business. But when Dipad was being asked by the defense to produce

his Income Tax Return years 2001-2003, he refused to do so on ground

of confidentiality. He claimed that the demand for his ITR was

incriminatory and in the nature of a fishing expedition. The MTC judge

ordered the petitioners to show their basis for invoking the

confidentiality of the ITR's. Dipad invoked the provisions of the National

Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) on the rule on confidentiality of Income

Tax return.1Moreover, in a commentary of the NIRC by Gonzales, there

is a general rule that despite a court order, copies of the income tax

returns cannot be furnished in view of the prohibition contained in

Section 332 (now Section 286) of the Tax Code. Eventually, the court

required the production of the ITR's.

Dipad filed a MR, but was denied. He instituted a Petition for

Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 before the RTC alleging thatthe MTC issued the order with grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction. The RTC dismissed the case because the

petition filed is an inappropriate remedy. The error alleged to be

committed is error of judgment. Errors of judgment is correctible by

appeal, and not by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

ISSUE:

1Natinoal Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 71: Disposition of

Income Tax Returns, u!lication of "ists of Taxpa#ers and $ilers

% &fter t'e assessment s'all 'ave !een made, as provided in

t'is Title, t'e returns, to(et'er )it' an# corrections t'ereof

)'ic' ma# 'ave !een made !# t'e Commissioner, s'all !e

*led in t'e +ce of t'e Commissioner and shall constitute

public recordsand !e open to inspectionas suc' upon t'e

order of t'e resident of t'e 'ilippines, under rules and

re(ulations to !e prescri!ed !# t'e Secretar# of $inance, upon

recommendation of t'e Commissioner.-

Whether the petition for certiorari is a proper remedy in this case?

Whether the ITR's sought to be produced are confidential in nature?

RULING:

I

No. A petition for certiorari is not a mode of appeal. This remedy

only corrects errors of jurisdiction. If the issue involves an error of

judgment, it is correctible by an appealviaa Rule 45 petition.

Errors of jurisdiction occur when the court exercises

jurisdiction not conferred upon it by law.

Errors of judgment are those that the court may commit in the

exercise of its jurisdiction. They include errors of procedure or mistakes

in the court's findings20 based on a mistake of law or of fact.

Here, it is patently clear that petitioners do not question

whether the MTC has jurisdiction or authority to resolve the issue of

confidentiality of ITRs. Rather, they assail the wisdom of the MTC's very

judgment and appreciation of the ITR as not confidential. Specifically,

they claim that the ruling violated the provisions of the NIRC on the

alleged rule on confidentiality of ITRs.

IINo. The commentary was explaining Sec. 270. This provision

prohibits employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) from

divulging the trade secrets of taxpayers. The provision does not in any

way address the confidentiality of ITR's.Thus, petitioners cannot rely on

the inappropriate provision.

Section 71 is an excerption to the rule on unlawful divulgence of

trade secrets.

G.R. No. 162757 December 11, 2013



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UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, Petitioner,vs.

CHRISTOPHER LUMBO and MILAGROS LUMBO,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN,J.:

The implementation of a writ of possession issued pursuant to Act No.

3135 at the instance of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale of themortgaged property in whose name the title has been meanwhileconsolidated cannot be prevented by the injunctive writ.

FACTS:

Petitioner United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) appeals the decision ofCourt of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the order by the RegionalTrial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8,2denying the motion ofrespondents Christopher Lumbo and Milagros Lumbo for the issuanceof a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of the

writ of possession issued against them.The respondents borrowed the aggregate amount of P12,000,000.00from UCPB. Tosecure the performance of their obligation, theyconstituteda real estate mortgage on a parcel of land located in Boracay,Aklanand all the improvements thereon that they owned and operatedas abeach resort known as Titays South Beach Resort.

Upon theirfailure to settle the obligation, UCPB appliedon November 11,1998 for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, and emerged asthe highest bidder at the ensuing foreclosure sale held on January 12,1999. Thecertificate of sale was issued on the same day, andUCPBregistered the sale in its name on February 18, 1999. The title over themortgaged property was consolidated in the name of UCPB after therespondents failed to redeem the property within the redemptionperiod.

On January 7, 2000, the respondents broughtagainst UCPB inthe RTC3

an action for the annulment of the foreclosure, legal accounting,injunction against the consolidation of title, and damages(Civil Case No.5920).

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 5920, UCPB filed an ex parte

petition for the issuance of a writ of possession to recover possession of

the property (Special Proceedings No. 5884).-GRANTED and ISUUE thewrit of possession directing the sheriff of the Province of Aklan to placeUCPB in the actual possession of the property.

The writ of possession was served with a demand for them to peacefullyvacate. Although the possession of the property was turned over toUCPB on February 1, 2002, they were allowed to temporarily remain onthe property for humanitarian reasons.

On February 14, 2002, the respondents filed inthe RTC handlingSpecial Proceedings No. 5884 a petition to cancel the writ of possessionand to set aside the foreclosure sale.

Special Proceedings No. 5884 was consolidated with Civil Case No.5920 on March 1, 2002.

On March 19, 2002, the RTC denied the respondents application forthe issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Aggrieved by the denial, the respondents brought a petition forcertiorari and/or mandamus in the CA which resolved C.A.-G.R. SP No.70261 by granting the respondents petition, setting aside the assailedorders,and enjoining the RTC from implementing the writ of possession"pending the final disposition of the petition for its cancellation and theannulment of the foreclosure sale.

UCPBsought thereconsiderationof the decision, butthe CA denieditsmotion for reconsiderationon March 8, 2004.

Hence, UCPB appeals by petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:

UCPB asserts that the CA did not rule in accordance with prevailinglaws and jurisprudence when it granted the respondents petition forcertiorariand enjoined the implementation of the writ of possessionissued by the RTC in favor of UCPB;

that the respondents were not entitled to the issuance of an injunctivewrit;

that the assailed decision and resolution were tantamount to a pre-judgment of the respondents petition to cancel the writ of possession;andthat the respondents were illegally attempting to wrest away itspossession of the property.

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HELD:

The petition is impressed with merit.

It is necessary to explain the nature of the writ of possession and theconsequencesof its implementation.

A writ of possession commands the sheriff to place a person inpossession of real property. It may be issued inthe following instances,

namely:

(1) Land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496; (2)judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of themortgaged property, and no third person, not a party to the foreclosuresuit, had intervened;(3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, pendingredemption under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.4118; and(4) Execution sales, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 33, Rule39 of the Rules of Court.

The purchaser at the foreclosure sale may apply ex parte with the RTCof the province or place where the property or any part of itis situated,to give the purchaser possession thereof during the redemption period,furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the useof the property for aperiod of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor shouldit be shownthat the sale was made without violating the mortgage or withoutcomplying with the requirements of Act No. 3135.

The RTC, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession beissued, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is

situated, who shallthenexecute said order immediately. The relief isgranted even without giving an opportunity to be heard to the personagainst whom the relief is sought.

Its natureas an ex partepetition under Act No. 3135, as amended,renders the application for the issuance of a writ of possessiona non-litigious proceeding.17Indeed, thegrant of the writ of possession is but aministerial act on the part of the issuing court, because its issuance isa matter of right on the part of the purchaser.18The judge issuing theorderforthegranting of the writ of possession pursuant to the expressprovisions of Act No. 3135cannot be charged with having acted without

jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

The property was sold at the public auction on January 12, 1999, withUCPB as the highest bidder. The sheriff issuedthe certificate of saletoUCPB on the same day of the sale. Considering that UCPB registeredthe certificate of sale in its name on February 18, 1999,the period ofredemption was one year from said date. By virtue of the non-redemption by the respondents within said period, UCPB consolidatedthe title over the property in its name.

It isclear enough, therefore, that the RTC committed no grave abuse ofdiscretion but acted inaccordance withthe law and jurisprudenceindenying the respondents application for the injunctive writ filed onFebruary 14, 2002 in Special Proceedings No. 5884 to prevent theimplementation of the writ of possession issued on December 4, 2001.

Consequently, the CAgrossly erred in granting the respondents petitionfor certiorariand/ormandamus, and in enjoining the RTC fromimplementing thewrit of possession in favor of UCPB.

Otherweighty considerations justify resolvingthis appeal in favor of

UCPB.The first is that the CA did not properly appreciate the nature of thesupposed error attributed to the RTC.

Assuming, though not conceding, that the RTC did err in denying therespondents applicationfor injunction to prevent the implementation ofthe writ of possession, itserror related only to the correctapplication ofthe law and jurisprudence relevant to the application for injunction. Assuch, the error amounted only to one of judgment, not ofjurisdiction.An error of judgment is one that the court may commit inthe exercise of its jurisdiction, and sucherror is reviewable only

throughan appealtaken in due course.In contrast, an error ofjurisdiction is committed where the act complained of was issued bythe court without or in excess of jurisdiction, and sucherror iscorrectible only by the extraordinary writ ofcertiorari.25

Considering that there is no question that the RTC had jurisdictionover bothCivil Case No. 5920 andSpecial Proceedings No. 5884, itshould follow that its consideration and resolution of the respondentsapplication for the injunctive writ filed in Special Proceedings No. 5884were taken in the exercise of that jurisdiction. As earlier made plain,UCPB as the registered owner of the property was at that point

unquestionably entitled to thefull implementation of the writ of

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possession. In the absence of any clear and persuasive showing thatitcapriciouslyor whimsicallydenied the respondents application,itsdenial of the application did not constitute grave abuse of discretionamounting to either lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The second concerns the CAs reversing and undoing the RTCs denialof the respondents application for the injunctive writ, andenjoining theRTC from implementing the writ of possession against the respondents

"pending the final disposition of the petition for its cancellation and theannulment of the foreclosure sale."27The CA effectively thereby grantedthe respondents application for the injunctive writ. In so doing,however, the CA ignored the essential requirements for the grant of theinjunctive writ, and disregarded the patent fact that the respondentsheld noright in essence that the injunctive writ they were seeking wouldprotect. Thus, the CA committed another serious error.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action orproceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or acourt, an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular a particular

act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act oracts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.

Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, the issuance of a writ ofpreliminary injunctionmay be justified under any of the followingcircumstances, namely:

(a)Theapplicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or partof such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance ofthe act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an actor acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b)The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or actscomplained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to theapplicant; or

(c)A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or isattemptingto do, or is procuring or suffering to bedone, some act or actsprobably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting thesubject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgmentineffectual.

In the case of injunction, the right sought to be protected should at

least be shown to exist prima facie. Unless such a showing is made, theapplicant is not entitled to an injunctive relief. The Court has stressed

the essential significance of the applicant for injunction holding a rightin ease to be protected, stating:

As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at theinstance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to theright or the property sought to be protected

Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ arc:(a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie;

(b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and

(c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ toprevent serious damage.

The absence of a right in esse on their part furnishes a compellingreason to undo the CA's reversal of the RTC's denial of their applicationfor injunction as well as to strike down the injunctive relief the CAafforded to the respondents. It cannot be otherwise, for they had no"right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matterof law".

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;REVERSES the decision promulgated on November 27, 2003 and theresolution promulgated on March 8, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 70261;DISMISSES the petition in C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 70261 for lack of factualand legal merits; DECLARES that there is now no obstacle to theimplementation of the writ of possession issued in favor of thepetitioner; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

LIGOT VS REPUBLIC

FACTS:This is a petition for certiorari wherein Ligot et al claim that theCourt of Appeals (CA) acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued its resolution extending thefreeze order issued against the Ligots properties for an indefinite periodof time.

Lt. Gen. Ligot argues that the appellate court committed grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it extendedthe freeze order issued against him and his family even though nopredicate crime had been duly proven or established to support theallegation of money laundering. He also maintains that the freeze order

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issued against them ceased to be effective in view of the 6-monthextension limit of freeze orders provided under the Rule in CivilForfeiture Cases. The CA, in extending the freeze order, not only undulydeprived him and his family of their property, in violation of dueprocess, but also penalized them before they had been convicted of thecrimes they stand accused of.

ISSUE:Whether a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy inassailing the said freeze order.

RULING: (Generally) NO. Certiorari not proper remedy to assail freezeorder.

Section 57 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases explicitly provides theremedy available in cases involving freeze orders issued by the CA:

Section 57. Appeal. - Any party aggrieved by the decision or ruling of

the court may appeal to the Supreme Court by petition for review oncertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The appeal shall not staythe enforcement of the subject decision or final order unless theSupreme Court directs otherwise. [italics supplied]

From this provision, it is apparent that the petitioners should have fileda petition for review on certiorari, and not a petition for certiorari, toassail the CA resolution which extended the effectivity period of thefreeze order over their properties.

Even assuming that a petition for certiorari is available to the

petitioners, a review of their petition shows that the issues they raise(i.e., existence of probable cause to support the freeze order; theapplicability of the 6-month limit to the extension of freeze ordersembodied in the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture) pertainto errors of judgment allegedly committed by the CA, which fall outsidethe Courts limited jurisdiction when resolving certiorari petitions. Asheld in People v. Court of Appeals:

In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow inscope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to

stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence such

as errors of judgment. Errors of judgment of the trial court are to beresolved by the appellate court in the appeal by and of error or via apetition for review on certiorari in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rulesof Court. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It isnot a remedy to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is onein which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, andwhich error is reversible only by an appeal. Error of jurisdiction is one

where the act complained of was issued by the court without or inexcess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by theextraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cureerrors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of theparties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and itsconclusions of law. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, anyalleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount tonothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal ora petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.25 (ci