Love, Madness, And Plato

8/12/2019 Love, Madness, And Plato

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Fall 2013

Love, Madness, and Plato

Phaedrus: the worthy other in Plato's dialogues

Raluca Rosu

( rosur00!newschool"edu #

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$ntroduction

My analysis will focus on two of Platos dialogues, namely the Phaedrus and the

Symposium. I will start from some remarks made by Charles L. Griswold in his book Self-

knowledge in Platos Phaedrus. Griswold seems to be surprised that Plato chose Phaedrus as a

character and named the dialogue after him. e refers to Phaedrus as being inferior to !ocrates.

e also finds their interaction as being mainly comical precisely because of this asymmetry in

their relationship. My interest is not to engage in a detailed criti"ue of Griswolds hypotheses. I

will ne#ertheless present briefly some of the points Griswold makes in his study of the Phaedrus.

$his helps me introduce my own thesis regarding Phaedrus significance for both the dialogue

and !ocrates.

%or Griswold, the main difference between !ocrates and Phaedrus would be that !ocrates

is already aware of his own ignorance, while Phaedrus cannot e#en reali&e the fact that he is

ignorant. Griswolds suggestion is then that Phaedrus is intentionally chosen by Plato as the ideal

character to illustrate the necessity of self'knowledge(. Phaedrus would be then useful to both

!ocrates and Plato. Moreo#er, Griswold seems to imply that Phaedrus appears in the dialogue due

to his unworthiness as an interlocutor, referring to him as mediocre). It is true that Griswold is

ready to acknowledge that Phaedrus is turned to philosophy by !ocrates by the end of the

dialogue. owe#er, he can only acknowledge Phaedruss utility. e will not talk about Phaedrus

1*it is precisely Phaedrus passi#e and formalistic lo#e of speeches that makes him congenial to !ocrates.+, in

Charles L.Griswold r., Self-knowledge in Platos Phaedrus -Pennsyl#ania Penn !tate /ni#ersity Press, (0012, )) 3

the use of the term congenial4my emphasis5 is only one of the many e6amples of how Griswold inscribes therelationship between !ocrates and Phaedrus in the language of mere utility. $his is the position I wish to argue

against. 7nother e6ample is the use of the term suitable: *Phaedrus does ser#e as a suitable 4my emphasis5

interlocutor for a con#ersation in which the self'knowledge theme is de#eloped. -Griswold,Self-knowledge in

Platos Phaedrus,)82. Last but not least, Griswold uses the term useful to describe Phaedrus +Phaedrus is useful4my emphasis5 to !ocrates as a con#eyer to the city of a partial, politically useful defense of philosophy.+ -Griswold,

Self-knowledge in Platos Phaedrus, )922:mediocre Phaedrus, in Griswold,Self-knowledge in Platos Phaedrus, (;

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as being intrinsically worthy. It is important to mention that this happens because Griswold fails

to notice the true nature of the relationship between !ocrates and Phaedrus. %or him, despite

!ocratess ob#ious interest in engaging in a con#ersation with Phaedrus

ustify my position. ?o less important will be e6ploring ideas such as

incompleteness and lack in both thePhaedrus and the Symposium. $o anticipate, an important

distinction must be made. @e ha#e on the one hand !ocratess incompleteness -he knows that he

does not know2 and Phaedruss initial incompleteness -he does not know that he does not know2.

3Griswold,Self-knowledge in Platos Phaedrus, )8')1.4*Aest is the relationship of friendship -philia2 between lo#ers of wisdom. -B2 Phaedrus and !ocrates do not attain

friendship in that sense., Griswold,Self-knowledge in Platos Phaedrus,


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My conclusion will be that Griswolds reading of the Phaedrus is problematic because it fails to

recogni&e the crucial importance of the role of the other in Platos dialogues. $his is why he talks

about usefulness in his account of thePhaedrus. My reading of the Phaedrus acknowledges

precisely the #alue of the other for the philosophical enterprise, by affirming Phaedruss worth.

%ocrates& attitude towards Phaedrus

$he first manner in which one can understand Phaedruss worth for !ocrates is by looking

at the latters attitude towards Phaedrus. $ake for e6ample the first two lines of the dialogue 1.

!ocratess "uestion pro#es to be the most meaningful "uestion one can ask. $his has to do with

the idea of education as being a turning of the soul. !ocratess "uestion could be rephrased in the

following manner can we say that Phaedruss soul is turned into the right directionD 9%rom the

first lines we understand that the two first "uestions are at stake for the whole dialogue. $his is

only the first clue that !ocrates will be trying to seduce Phaedrus.

!ocrates and Phaedrus embody the relationship between the erastes -adult, acti#e lo#er

and citi&en2 and eromenos -a young boy, the belo#ed who is yet to become an acti#e citi&en2. In

7ncient Greece, an educational relationship like this was a learning opportunity for the young

boy. It was considered that homoerotic relationships strengthened ci#ic bonds;. $his is why these

6*!ECF7$! Phaedrus, my friend @here ha#e you beenD 7nd where are you goingD+ -Plato, *Phaedrus+, in

Plato. Complete Works, ed. ohn M. Cooper and H.!. utchinson -Cambridge ackett Publishing Company, (0092,))9a.77s Fichard Aernstein had pointed out.8Ene must also ha#e in mind Phaedruss speech in the Symposium where he talks about *an army of lo#ers and

belo#eds, a producti#e, happy polity composed entirely of erastai and eromenoi.+, in ictoria @ohl, *$he ros of

7lcibiades+, #ol.(; of Classical nti!uity) -(0002,


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relationships consisted in standardi&ed practices of homoeroticism0. $he proper practice would

imply that the relationship was not reciprocal. $he boy would not se6ually desire the lo#er. e

was supposed to enter the relation out of admiration for the lo#er and for impro#ing himself. $he

boy was supposed to play coy, seriously e#aluate if the erastesdeser#ed his fa#ors. 7 positi#e

erotic relationship needed to be transformed intophiliawhen the passion was gone and the boy

became an adult.

$he dialogue starts by !ocrates con#incing Phaedrus to read him one of the speeches of

Lysias, the famous rhetorician. 7lthough Phaedrus is more than eager to do so, he pretends he is

not comfortable doing it. e is playing the co"uette(J. Phaedruss age is ne#er mentioned in the

dialogue. e is ne#ertheless known to ha#e been around thirty or forty years old. Hespite that,

there are many instances in which he acts as a boy. $his resistance, an inherent part of any game

of seduction, is an important proof of the erotic nature of the relationship between the two

characters of the dialogue.

Lysiass speech deals with seduction through persuasion, aiming *at seducing a beautiful

boy, but the speaker is not in lo#e with him.+((. 7s we will find out later in the dialogue, for Plato,

the soul is immortal because it is a self'mo#ing mo#er(). @e might say that Phaedruss

incompleteness consists precisely in his soul not showing self'mo#ement. Ene can clearly

obser#e that Phaedrus lacks autonomy at this point. e is more than ready to succumb to the

9ictoria @ohl offers a detailed and comple6 analysis of this relationship and its rele#ance for 7thenian democracy

in +$he ros of 7lcibiades+. !he talks about a *democratic ros+ that *defined the 7thenian citi&en as socially

autonomous and se6ually dominant.+, in @ohl, *$he ros of 7lcibiades+, 8(. I will come back to @ohls te6t in a

following section of this paper.10*Ho you think that a mere dilettante like me could recite from memory in a manner worthy of him a speech that

Lysias, the best of our writers, took such time and trouble to composeD, Plato, *Phaedrus+,));a.11Plato, *Phaedrus+,))9c.12*#ery soul is immortal. $hat is because whate#er is always in motion is immortal. -B2 !o it is only what mo#es

itself that ne#er desists from motion, since it does not lea#e off being itself.+, Plato, *Phaedrus+,)=8c.

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*cle#er and elegant+(ust seeing him

3 he was filled with delight he had found a partner for his fren&ied dance, and he urged him to lead the way.+, Plato,

*Phaedrus+,));b.16!ECF7$! *Eh, Phaedrus, if I dont know my Phaedrus I must be forgetting who I am myself.+, Plato,

*Phaedrus+,));a.17Plato, *Phaedrus+,));d.

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out of place only in his description of the scenery. is lo#e for Phaedrus is rather a part of

!ocrates being his usual self(;.

%or now, the most important aspect of the beginning of the Phaedrus is that !ocrates

knows #ery well that Phaedrus is e6tremely interested in hearing speeches. $he former then

proceeds to talk to the latter about his lo#e for words, engaging in a meaningful and soul'turning

dialogue. !ocrates is trying here to take Phaedrus away from Lysias. !ocratess intention is to

seduce Phaedrus into an understanding of what lo#e truly is. @e can e#en talk about a contest

between Lysias and !ocrates for the soul -psyche2 of Phaedrus. @hy then would !ocrates fight

for a soul that is unworthy and try to pre#ent it from being seduced by anything but philosophyD

he inal ste) in seducing Phaedrus into )hiloso)hy

!ocratess affectionate attitude towards Phaedrus, his attempt at seducing him and turning

his soul towards philosophy is an important and necessary step in pro#ing Phaedruss worth.

owe#er, this is not sufficient. It is not enough to pro#e that !ocrates is interested in Phaedrus.

$his is due to the fact that one can still maintain, as Griswold does, that Phaedrus is merely useful

in !ocratess pursuit of knowledge. #en if we recogni&e an erotic relation between the two, we

could be faced with yet another ob>ection. $he erotic relationship, followed by philiacould still

be >ust a gateway and first step towards reaching true beauty, which would be the philosophers

purpose. Phaedrus could still be merely useful to !ocrates and disposable after accessing the form

of Aeauty itself. $his is why it is necessary to further e6plore the way in which !ocrates himself

is incomplete. 7lso, it will pro#e helpful to look into the definition of ros as not being a god in

18P7HF/! *7nd you, my remarkable friend, appear to be totally out of place.+, Plato, *Phaedrus+,)


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another dialogue, namely the Symposium.Aefore e6ploring all this, a last argument from the

Phaedrus must be detailed.

$here is a part in this dialogue -)91a')99a2 where we can already see why we must talk

about Phaedrus as being worthy and not useful. $owards the end of the dialogue, !ocrates

emphasi&es the importance of the right kind of speech(0. !ocrates considers that the proper kind

of discourse and the proper kind of writing is the one that aims at the soul of the listener)J. e is

actually describing here what happens between him and Phaedrus. It can also be seen as a

reference to the silence of Lysisass speech, which is read by Phaedrus in Lysiass absence

)(

.It is

another way for !ocrates to tell Phaedrus that it is the right decision to choose philosophy o#er

-bad2 rhetoric. !ocrates is the *sensible farmer+))he himself refers to. is use of the imagery of

the seeds that are planted in the soul pro#es his belief in an inner worth of Phaedrus. !ocrates

talks about planting *the seeds he care4s5 for+ and the importance of when and where these seeds

are planted. $he mere decision of engaging in a seduction of Phaedrus through dialogue shows

that Phaedruss soul was worthy enough for !ocrates to choose it among other souls)


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uncon#incing if someone would interpret this passage as referring to Phaedruss utility for

!ocrates. I consider the passage an important proof for the worthiness of Phaedrus, whose already

fertile soul allows !ocrates to plant a *discourse -B2 which is not barren, but produces a seed

from which more discourse grows+)8. Platos message seems to lead to the crucial importance of

reciprocity)1, e#en though the relationship between the two characters of the dialogue remains

asymmetric. It is not as if !ocrates is merely using Phaedrus for his philosophical ascent towards

a world of pure contemplation. $heir dialogue takes place outside the city walls, but in the end

they return to the city. $he city is the place were !ocrates feels to be himself, in contrast to how

he feels in the countryside, where he is out of place -%&P&%%&S'(2. $heir friendship sur#i#es

their return to the city);. $he whole dialogue shows how !ocrates cares and takes care of

Phaedruss soul. It is impossible to consider !ocrates would lo#e someone whose worth is

uncertain. I consider this to be Platos intention and message. Philosophy turns out to be an

e6istential)0practice that aims at gaining knowledge of the truth. In order for this to happen, one

must transform oneself and Phaedrus rises to the challenge. !ocrates already knows that. 7s this

transformation occurs, the soul is changed and this leads to further transformation knowing the

truth restructures Phaedrus. $he "uestion then arises how can someones soul be restructured

unless they already had the possibility of this reshaping within themD $his is one of the reasons

why we should be speaking of worth and not instrumentality in the case of Phaedrus.

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Plato, *Phaedrus+,)99a.267fter !ocrates great speech, the one deli#ered to purify himself from the untruthfulness of his first speech,

Phaedruss attitude has already changed. e says *I >oin you in your prayer 4for con#erting Phaedrus to philosophy5.-B2 7s to your speech, I admired it from the moment you began. -B2 Im afraid that Lysiass effort to match it is

bound to fall flat.+, Plato, *Phaedrus+,)89c.277s Cin&ia 7ru&&o pointed out, the Greek word is a superlati#e and can also mean absurdity.28In the last lines of the dialogue Phaedrus asks his belo#ed friend !ocrates to pray for him as well *Make a prayer

for me as well. %riends ha#e e#erything in common.+, Plato, *Phaedrus+,)90c.29:$his e6istential option -B2 implies a certain #ision of the world, and the task of philosophical discourse will

therefore be to re#eal and rationally >ustify this e6istential option, as well as this representation of the world.+, adot,

What is ancient philosophy$,


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%ocrates& inco*)leteness

7s I ha#e mentioned earlier, it is necessary to e6plore !ocratess specific incompleteness.

In order to do that, both the Phaedrus and the Symposium will pro#e to be rele#ant. @e can

already see in the Phaedrus how !ocrates directly e6presses his own lack. $his has to do with

him being aware that he cannot yet truly understand and know himself. It constitutes his main

concern


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Phaedrus *when someone who lo#es beautiful boys is touched by this madness, he is called a

lo#er.+


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older lo#er, but does not know what he lo#es


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ioti*a&s s)eech: Love is not a god

Aefore e#en starting his speech, !ocrates promises to offer a truthful account of lo#e =(

through his speech. It is important to note that he then attributes the words he is about to utter to a

woman, Hiotima ' the priestess of Mantinea. 7ll of the people present at the ban"uet and who

ga#e speeches described ros as a god. !ocrates then starts by saying that Hiotima contradicted

him on this issue when he himself e6pressed a similar #iew. e had already pro#ed 7gathon =)

that Lo#e needs beauty and the good=


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7lso, ros is the capacity of some human beings to transform their acknowledged

condition of lack into access to reality, to the forms. @hen I say some human beings I ha#e in

mind Platos idea of people who are *ignorant+ and who do not recogni&e their own ignorance

8J

.

7t first Phaedrus is one of them, but he is "uickly urged by !ocrates to mo#e towards another

type of incompleteness that belongs to the philosopher. $he same happens to the supposedly

untamable and contro#ersial 7lcibiades. 7lcibiadess more complicated case will be analy&ed in

the following section.

Feturning to Hiotimas speech, one can find here a similar image to one found in the

Phaedrus. Lo#e is not only a desire for what is wise and beautiful, but also a desire for fecundity,

adot obser#es. It is a desire *to immortali&e oneself by producing+8(. Hiotima carefully makes

the distinction between the fruitfulness of the body -gi#ing birth to children2 and the souls

fruitfulness -gi#ing birth to ideas28). In thePhaedruswe ha#e this in the image of *impregnating

minds+8


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Phaedrus -and any other of his partners in dialogue2 in terms of usefulness is a serious

misunderstanding of what philosophy stands for. It is unconcei#able to talk about utility in the

interaction between master and disciple, although their relation is defined as asymmetrical. $hey

are not using each other in the #ulgar sense Griswold proposes. $he dialogue itself is worth both

their time81. $his happens because of the acknowledged worth of both interlocutors. It is true

though that this is more e6plicit in the Symposium than in thePhaedrus.

$he idea of the soul being impregnated with the truth is correlated by Hiotima with

beauty. $his can be seen in her description of lo#ers as *gi#ing birth in beauty, whether in body or

soul.+89. Aeauty is a component of reproduction because of the di#ine nature of the latter.

owe#er, there is more #alue in the product of what we might call an intellectual reproduction.

7gain, the lo#erbelo#ed educational relationship8;is described here. It is through the other that

we are reminded of beauty, of something that we ha#e *been carrying inside -B2 for ages+80. $his

is how true friendship is reached. I consider this to be an accurate description of what happens

between Phaedrus and !ocrates in thePhaedrus.

$nitiation into the ritual o love

$he true challenge of ros consists, according to Hiotima, into mastering a certain path

that must be followed, *through lo#ing boys correctly.+1J. $his passage -)(Jb')()c2 is comple6

56*caring for oursel#es and "uestioning oursel#es occur only when our indi#iduality is transcended and we rise to

the le#el of uni#ersality, which is represented by what the two interlocutors ha#e in common.+, adot, What is

ancient philosophy$,


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and problematic precisely for the "uestion of #alue or worth I ha#e been raising. Hiotima

describes the philosophers ascent from particular, bodily beauty to Aeauty itself1(. Aefore talking

about the actual steps of this ascent, I must notice the #erb to use

1)

in the translation of Platos

te6t. !omeone like Griswold would take this as a definiti#e proof of the belo#ed being

instrumental and disposable after true Aeauty is finally reached. I understand why someone

would be tempted to interpret it like this, but I intend to e6plain this statement in relation with the

entire passage about the destination of the philosophers >ourney. 7lso, in the Symposium the

ascent seems to be presented as not being interrupted by any interior conflict. Ene might want to

contrast this with what happens in thePhaedrus in the dramatic myth of the charioteer and the

idea of the tripartition of the soul1


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here. More than this, Phaedrus is not irrele#ant to !ocrates at any point. $he #alue of the boy is

truly recogni&ed when the philosopher understands that he should go beyond his passion for a

beautiful body

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. $he beauty of the body reminds him of the beauty of the soul. $he moment

when the boy is truly #alued is when his soul begins to be cared for and taken care of19.!o, when

we are talking about the soul -psyche2, instrumentality seems inappropriate. In order to

understand why Phaedrus is #aluable and needed e#en after contemplating the forms, I shall

return to the idea of dialectics present in thePhaedrus and in Plato in general.

%ocrates& inco*)leteness reconsidered

@e must correlate the image of the ladder used in the Symposium with the importance of a

certain type of dialogue in Platos work. $his is present e6plicitly in the Phaedrus. $he dialogue

between !ocrates and Phaedrus, the constant interaction between the lo#er and the belo#ed can be

en#isioned as a perpetual tra#ersing of all the steps re"uired by true Lo#e. !ocratess

incompleteness can be better understood in this light. e acknowledges both his and Phaedruss

troubles within the soul, although they may be different at first. e is indeed leading Phaedrus

through his transformation, but this itself is part of his own effort towards reaching knowledge.

adot points to the difficulty of holding onto wisdom once it has been reached as part of the

philosophers destiny. $his is why philosophy has to do with the constant desire for wisdom par

e6cellence. adot stresses the fact that !ocrates indeed tests his partners in con#ersation, but also

66*he will think that the beauty of bodies is a thing of no importance.+, Plato, *!ymposium+, )(Jc.67*our lo#er must be content to lo#e and care for him and to seek to gi#e birth to such ideas as will make young men

better.+, Plato, *!ymposium+, )(Jc.

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himself1;. It is true that Phaedrus in this instance is a step towards a destination that should be

final the realm of the forms.

owe#er, this destination must be perpetually won, or at least this seems to be Platos

message. $his is why !ocratess need for Phaedrus should be defined in terms of worth.

Moreo#er, this is why philosophy in#ol#es a life choice and not an isolated, singular e#ent 10. Ene

must be reminded here again that in thePhaedrus, !ocrates and Phaedrus e#entually return to the

city, where !ocrates willfully decided to spend all of his life. $he philosopher is indeed an

intermediate between this world and the world of the forms, but his life must be spent in the

company of other people whose #alue he ine#itably recogni&es. It seems now that we ha#e

escaped the possibility in which a particular belo#ed is disposable and lacks true worth. $o

conclude this section, we must admit, along with adot, that !ocrates was always the first to

emphasi&e the necessity of *li#ing contact between human beings+ and that Plato agreed with

him on this topic9J.I would add that the basis of this #iew lays in a firm belief in the worth and

possibility of transformation -askesis2 of other peoples souls.

+lci-iades&s unta*ed .ros/1

68

*such wisdom is ne#er ac"uired once and for all. It is not only others that !ocrates ne#er stops testing, but alsohimself. -B2 !elf'transformation is ne#er definiti#e, but demands perpetual recon"uest.+, adot, What is ancient

philosophy$, ected by the Greeks. $he latter belongs to 7lcibiades, who actually *"ueers -B2 the #ery distinction between good

and bad eros.+, in @ohl, *$he ros of 7lcibiades+,


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I will now focus shortly9) on 7lcibiades in the Symposium. I do this not only because

Griswold talks about it. $he other reason is that I consider it to reinforce the idea of Phaedruss

#alue, which has been my main concern here. 7s I ha#e mentioned before, 7lcibiades is

considered to be e#en less worthy of !ocratess time than Phaedrus. !ocrates has completely

failed in turning the contro#ersial 7lcibiades to philosophy, according to Griswold. ictoria @ohl

offers a comple6 discussion of 7lcibiades as a real person. I only want to point to her account of

the Symposium. %or her, Platos dialogue is a place where the strange ros of 7lcibiades can be

accepted. More than that, this ros is crucial for both !ocrates and Plato9


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worthy of !ocratess time because he is mediocre. $heir interaction would then be merely useful

to !ocrates in his pursuit of knowledge.

$he first step in arguing against this position was to point to !ocratess attitude towards

Phaedrus. $he former is affectionate and cares about his partner in con#ersation. !ocrates sees

beauty in Phaedrus and wants to turn the latters soul towards philosophy. $his is a first sign of an

inner worth of Phaedrus. owe#er, I reali&ed it not to be enough, although the two of them ha#e

an erotic relationship. Phaedrus pro#es to be incomplete in the sense of lacking e#en the

awareness of his own ignorance. $his is where !ocrates steps in. $he metaphor of the dialectician

planting seeds in a proper soul, as presented by Plato in the Phaedrus, strengthened my

argumentation. 7 proper soul has worth and not mere utility.

7 second step in#ol#ed discussing !ocratess incompleteness, which pro#ed to be the

philosophers incompleteness. It is recognition of lack. !ocrates needs and desires a knowledge

he is aware he does not yet possess. $his was seen operating both in the Phaedrus and the

Symposium. $his is the reason why I proceeded in analy&ing 7ristophaness and Hiotimas

speeches from the Symposium. 7ccording to Hiotima, Lo#e is not a god. ros is presented as an

intermediate between humanity and the gods. Hiotimas description of ros coincides with

!ocratess figure and with the figure of the philosopher in general. It also made clearer the reason

why !ocrates engages in a meaningful con#ersation with Phaedrus after all. $his also hinted to

the actual worth of Phaedrus that defines !ocratess position towards him.

7 third step dealt with the philosophers ascent present in Hiotimas speech. 7lthough this

passage remains problematic, I tried to offer an interpretation that ser#ed my main purpose. $he

main idea was to stress on the fact that the physical beauty of a young boy does not define him

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completely. @hen the philosopher -!ocrates2 acknowledges the rele#ance of the beauty of the

soul of his partner in dialogue, he actually acknowledges his worth. I sustained that this is the

case with Phaedrus as well.

7 last step was to connect Phaedruss character with 7lcibiadess character in the

Symposium. ictoria @hols account of the relationship between !ocrates and 7lcibiades pro#ed

to be e6tremely helpful. !ocrates sees true beauty in 7lcibiades, which then confirms e#en

7lcibiadess worth. I applied this to Phaedrus as well. Ay the end of my enterprise I came to

reali&e the reason why Griswolds interpretation was so disturbing for me. Griswold had

misunderstood the crucial importance of the role of the other in Platos dialogues. $his is why he

talks about usefulness in his account of thePhaedrus. My argumentation can be read then not

only as an attempt to pro#e Phaedruss worth and crucial importance for !ocrates. More than this,

it can be taken as an account of the crucial role of the other for the philosophical enterprise. It is

also a way of offering a tentati#e solution for the problems raised by the ascent of the philosopher

towards true knowledge in Hiotimas speech. My conclusion is then that the other is not merely

left behind and treated as a means to an end. e is an engaged partner whose worth consists in

taking part in a constant effort for understanding and reaching the truth.

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$L$R+P45

(. Griswold, Charles L. r. Self-knowledge in Platos Phaedrus. Pennsyl#ania Penn !tate

/ni#ersity Press, (001.

). adot, Pierre. What is ancient philosophy$. $ranslated by Michael Chase. Cambridge

ar#ard /ni#ersity Press, )JJ).

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Love, Madness, And Plato