37594 2719

London GazetteOf TUESDAY, the tfh of June, 1946

Registered as a newspaper

WEDNESDAY, 5 JUNE, 1946

The War Office,May, 1946

OPERATIONS IN THE SOMALILAND PROTECTORATE, 1939-1940PREFACE BY THE WAR OFFICE

1. The following despatch deals with theperiod from the outbreak of war with Germanyin September, 1939, to the evacuation of BritishForces from the Somaliland Protectorate inAugust, 1940, in the face of Italian invasion.It covers the preparatory stage before Italy'sentry into the war on nth June, 1940, and -the.brief period of operations from 5th to i8thAugust, during which the small British Garrisonfought a fierce and skilful withdrawal actionagainst overwhelming numbers.

2. This is the personal narrative of GeneralSir Archibald (now FieldnMarshal Lord) Wavell,Commander-in-Chief, British Land Forces inthe Middle East. As such he was responsiblefor preparations over a vast area against thepossible entry of Italy into the war on theside of Germany. 'When this occurred in June,1940, he was faced with the problem of dis-posing pitifully small resources in manpowerand material to meet enemy aggression in anarea which included Egypt, Palestine, Trans-jordan, Sudan, Cyprus, Iraq, British Somali-land, the shores of the Persian Gulf and EastAfrica. The United Kingdom at the same timewas facing a still more desperate situationcaused by the fall of France and the apparentimminence of a German invasion.

3. No commander could have been satisfiedwith the inadequate resources available and itis understandable that the War Cabinet shouldhave appeared to General Wavell to be pre-occupied with the paramount task of the de-fence of the home country.

4. In retrospect it might appear that thepolicy of avoidance of any action which mightgive Italy cause for entering the war againstthe Allies was in some respects unjustified. Onher eventual entry, all the disadvantages ofsuch a policy became apparent, while the bene-

fits which would have been gained 'by her con-tinued neutrality tend to be forgotten. BritishSomaliland suffered particularly in lack ofdefence measures and intelligence of enemydispositions owing to the original policy ofcomplete evacuation in face of invasion. As aresult of 'Anglo-French Staff conversations justprior to the outbreak of war this policy wasmodified to the extent that the British Forcewas to withdraw to French Somaliland.

This policy was dictated by the general weak-ness of the position and by the inadvisability ofexpending resources on a Protectorate whichhad little or no strategic importance.

By December, 1939, the French hadstrengthened their garrisons in French Somali-land and a common defence plan and a moreenterprising policy become possible. This planwas based on the defence of Jibuti and Zeilahby the French while the British defended Ber-bera, the capital and centre of British interestsin British Somaliland.

5. The new defence policy required a changeof administrative control of the forces in BritishSomaliland from the Colonial Office to the WarOffice. Owing to discussions between the WarOffice, Colonial Office and G.O.C.-in-C.,Middle East, this change did not becomeeffective luntil June, 1940, when the War Officefinally assumed responsibility for the admini-strative control of the forces in the Protectorate.

6. Italian troops crossed the frontier on 5thAugust, 1940, and the small British Force,deprived of the expected support of the Frenchgarrison of Jibuti, was pressed back on the portof Berbera and successfully evacuated. Manyof the troops.so saved were re-deployed to re-turn on the tide of British offensives six monthslater, when all lost territory was regained inthe (first stages of the destruction of the ItalianColonial Empire.

2^20 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 JUNE, 1946

The following despatch was submitted to theSecretary of Stale for War on nzth September,1940, by General Sir ARCHIBALD P.WAVELL, K.C.B., CM.G., M.C., Cojm-mander-in-Ckief in the Middle East.

I.—INTRODUCTION1. For many years prior to the Italian occu-

pation of Abyssinia in 1935-36 there had beenno external threat to British Somaliland; andfor the preceding 15 years the Protectorate hadalso been quiet internally. The military garri-son had been progressively reduced until, afterthe financial crisis of 1931, it numbered only14 British officers, 400 African Askaris and150 African Reservists. This force, called theSomaliland Camel Corps, was the only militaryforce for external or internal defence in acountry of which the area was larger than thatof England and Wales. In 1939 it comprisedtwo Camel Companies, which included twoPony Troops, and one (Nyasaland) RifleCompany.

2. The Italian occupation of Abyssinia re-sulted in the Protectorate being faced by Italian,territory throughout almost the whole length ofits land frontier of over 750 miles. During theyears 1936 to 1938 various proposals were con-sidered on the defence policy to be adopted tomeet this changed situation. In 1938 totaldemilitarisation of ithe Protectorate was con-sidered as a solution, but it was eventuallydecided that in the event of war with Italy therole of the minute garrison would be to imposesuch delay as was possible on the enemy'sadvance on Berbera.

3. In May, 1939, an Anglo-French con-ference was held at Aden, at which the defenceof Jibuti and Berbera was considered. Thenorthern coastal strip of Somaliland, at the eastof which lies Berbera and at the west Jibuti,is closed in by a crescent of rugged hills throughwhich only six motarajble roads lead from theplateau of the interior. Four of these roadslead towards Jibuti and Zeilah and two to-wards Berbera. All six roads pass throughsome fonm of defile and it was agreed that theAllied plan should include the defence of thesesix defiles.

4. The two roads leading to Berbera, fromBurao and Hargeisa respectively, pass throughthe belt of hills at the Sheikh Pass and theTug Argan Gap. At the former the road runsthrough a steep and narrow pass, easily de-fended; but the Tug Argan Gap is some fourmiles wide, and was the obvious route by whichthe enemy would approach Berbera. In July,1939, the sum of £900 was allotted for thedefence of these two positions. Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. Chater, D.S.O., O.B.E., RoyalMarines, who was O.C. Troops in Somaliland,at once began the work of organising thedefence of these two passes. The moneyallotted was expended on the construction ofconcrete machine-gun posts, designed by regi-mental officers and constructed by the civilPublic Works Department, and 001 providingthese posts with water tanks. At the SheikhPass extensive demolitions of the road wereprepared. Once the positions of Sheikh Passor Tug Argan had been forced, there was noposition on which a smaller force could forlong delay an advance on Berbera, since thecountry was generally flat and-open.

II. OUTBREAK OF WAR WITH GERMANY.5. In July, 1939, approval was given for the

embodiment of the Reserve; and the outbreakof war with Germany found the SomalilandCamel Corps (still at the strength given inparagraph i) disposed so that the towns ofBurao and Hargeisa were covered by mountedunits, while the Sheikh Pass and Tug ArganGap were held by dismounted companies andmachine-guns. In October a very valuablereinforcement of 17 officers and 20 Warrant andNon-Commissioned officers was received fromSouthern Rhodesia. No other reinforcementsreached the Protectorate till I5th May, 1940.The Governor's request to be allowed to enlist50 additional men hi the Camel Corps, madeon I5th September, 1939, was not approved tillthe spring of 1940, some six months later. Arecommendation submitted by myself to theWar Office on I5th January, 1940, tomechanize two Camel Corps Companies was notapproved until igth May, 1940.*

6. I had taken over the Middle East Com-mand at the beginning of August, 1939, andwas responsible for military plans in Somali-land; but it was not until I3th January, 1940,as a result of the recent decision to defendthe Protectorate, that the troops in BritishSomaliland came under my full operationalcontrol. Administrative control remained underthe Colonial Office till ist June, 1940. TheCamel Corps, on the outbreak of war withGermany, had been concentrated at the SheikhPass and Tug Argan positions, and the greaterpart of the Protectorate had been abandonedfrom a military point of view. It was obviousthat the Camel Corps could not possibly holdthe defences against any serious attack. It didnot seem to me that this policy was consistentwith our obligations towards our French Alliesat Jibuti, where strong defences had been con-structed, and that it would be fatal to ourprestige to make so little attempt to defendthe Protectorate. It did not at that time seemlikely that the Italians, if they entered thewar, would expend large forces in the occupa-tion of a country which had little strategicvalue; and that small enemy forces might beheld in check if the garrison received somereinforcement. I recommended accordinglythat the Protectorate should be defendedagainst Italian invasion.

7. On igth December the Chiefs of Staff'sCommittee agreed that " the proposal to alterthe defence policy of Somaliland to the defenceof the territory, and in the last resort ofBerbera, from the abandonment of the countryin the face of any Italian invasion, is approvedin principle." I was instructed to make theplans necessary to implement this policy, incollaboration with the French authorities atJibuti. The proviso was made that no troopswere to be moved into the Protectorate withoutthe sanction of H.M. Government, " in orderthat the effect of such a movement on ourrelations with Italy can be studied and thenecessary notification can be given to theItalian Government."

8. I visited French and British Somalilandfrom gth to I3tht" January, 1940, to considerthe plan of defence and the reinforcementsnecessary. I saw the defences at the Sheikh

* See Preface para.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 JUNE, 1946 2721

Pass and Tug Argan Gap and the defences ofJibuti; and discussed the defence of Somali-land with General Legentilhomme, the Frenchmilitary commander at Jibuti, and withColonel Chater. By agreement with theFrench, General Legentilhomme had beenplaced under my orders.

9. I came to the conclusion that with a com-paratively small reinforcement it would bepossible to hold both British and FrenchSomaliland against any probable Italianattack, and that it was most desirable to doso, both for reasons of prestige and becauseJibuti and Berbera and the railway and roadsleading thence into the interior formed the bestline of invasion of Abyssinia. It was likelythat if Italy entered the war we should eventu-ally attack the Italian forces in Abyssinia,when sufficient troops became available. Theloss of British Somaliland would increase thedifficulties of such an invasion. I recommendedthat the garrison of British Somaliland shouldbe increased by one battalion King's AfricanRifles at once, and by another battalion anda battery if relations with Italy deteriorated,that two mechanised companies should beformed in the Camel Corps, and that moneyshould be allotted for the improvement of de-fences and roads. The money authorised bythe Colonial Office had already been expendedand the defences Were still very incomplete. Iemphasised that my recommendations repre-sented a minimum and might require to beincreased. I also recommended that the passesat Dobo and Jirre, from which roads led downto Zeilah, should be occupied and defended bythe French. This was a weak point in theAllied plans for the defence of Somaliland sincethe enemy by these passes could penetrate be-tween Jibuti and Berbera and separate theFrench and British forces. General Legentil-homme -had troops available to defend thesepasses, and was most anxious to do so, buthad failed to obtain permission from theFrench Colonial Office. I decided in the eventof war with Italy to place General Legentil-homme in command of both British andFrench Somaliland.

10. My recommendations were approved inprinciple -by the War Office, but the FrenchColonial Office refused to allow GeneralLegentilhomme to fortify Jirre, on the groundsthat it was too far from Jibuti. GeneralLegentilhomme placed a detachment at Jirre,but did not construct defences. Preparationswere made to block the road through the Dobodefile by demolitions.

11. It was proposed to increase the garrisonof Somaliland by the transfer of two battalionsof the King's African Rifles and a battery fromKenya. These would hold the defensive posi-tions, and release the Camel Corps to patrolthe remainder of the Protectorate. Butalthough the reinforcement of the garrison hadbeen approved in principle in January, 1940,it was not till gth March that authority wasreceived to move one battalion, and owing todifficulty in providing the necessary shippingit was not till I5th May that the ist BattalionNorthern Rhodesia Regiment -of the King'sAfrican Rifles, with certain administrativeunits, arrived at Berbera and began to dis-embark. Delay in giving authority for themove was apparently due to financial discus-sions between the War Office and the Colonial

Office, and to Foreign Office apprehension thatthis 'move might be considered provocative byItaly. The move of the second battalion andthe battery was approved " in principle " on20th April, but permission for the move wasonly given on 6th June. There was a furtherdelay owing to the slowness of the move ofthe West African troops which were to rein-force Kenya, before whose arrival more troopscould not be taken from Kenya. The battalionand battery did not reach Somaliland till I2thJuly, 1940.

12. It was impossible for many months toobtain financial approval for the expenditureof any further money on defences or roads;and essential equipment, which had beenordered by Colonel Chater many months pre-viously, was not supplied by the ColonialOffice, which was still responsible for theadministration of the troops. It was not tillist June, 1940 that administrative control ofSomaliland was taken over by Middle East. Itseemed difficult to persuade the authorities toconsider seriously the possibility of war withItaly; and even as late as April I was stillbeing refused permission, as the result of theGovernment policy of avoiding the provoca-tion of Italy, .to send any Intelligence agentsover the frontier to obtain information ofItalian dispositions, on the grounds that ourrelations with the Italians might thereby beimpaired.

13. A further difficulty in dealing withBritish Somaliland was its distance of nearly2,000 miles from Cairo. I had frequentlyasked for long-range aircraft for intercom-munication in my wide-spread Command, butwithout success. It was difficult therefore forCommanders or Staff Officers to visit Somali-land at sufficiently frequent intervals. TheA.O.C.-in-C. put an ordinary service machineat our disposal, whenever possible, but theresimply were not sufficient aeroplanes for themany tasks in hand, and it was not often possi-ble to spare one for intercommunication. There

•'"was .no regular mail service and letters oftenrequired a month to reach Somaliland.

III. OUTBREAK OF WAR WITH ITALY.14. At the outbreak of war with Italy on

nth June, 1940, the Northern Rhodesia Regi-ment, K.A.R., held the Tug Argan position,while the Somaliland Camel Corps held theSheikh Pass, the Dobo defile, where certaindemolitions were effected, and advanced posi-tions at Hargeisa and Burao. There was alsoa force of Illalos (irregular native troops) whichpatrolled the frontier under the control of theDistrict Officers.

15. Up till the end of July only minor mili-tary activities occured. The Somaliland CamelCorps and the Illalos made a number ofsuccessful raids on the enemy's frontier posts.These raids were almost uniformly successful,in spite of the enemy's superior numbers, andreflect great credit on those who carried themout. There was a considerable enemy concen-tration in the Harar-Diredawa-Jijiga area but itremained inactive.

16. On I7th June news of the Frencharmistice arrived. On i8th June Air ViceMarshal Reid visited Jibuti and was assured byGeneral Legentilhomme that the French Forcesthere would fight on. Lieutenant-Colonel

2722 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 JUNE, 1946

Ghater received similar assurances fromGeneral Legentilhomme both on i8th June andon 3rd July. On 6th July I cabled to ColonelChater that he should prepare a scheme forevacuation, as I considered that our positionin Somaliland would be untenable, if theFrench at Jibuti ceased to fight. At this timethere were in Somaliland one battalion K.A.R.(Northern Rhodesia Regiment) and one Indianbattalion (1/2 Punjab Regiment), which hadbeen sent from Aden a few days previously,besides the Camel Corps. Another battalionand a battery were on their way from Kenya,and I was considering diverting them to Adenif it was decided to evacuate Somaliland.Colonel Chater replied that when the additionalbattalion and battery arrived he did not con-sider his position untenable, even if Jibuti gavein. As General Legentilhomme continued toassure me of his determination to fight on,whatever happened, I allowed the battalionand battery to be landed at Berbera.

17. On i5th July General Germain, who hadbeen sent by the French Government by planeto Italian East Africa to take over commandfrom General Legentilhomme, arrived at theoutposts of Jibuti. He was refused admittanceby General Legentilhomme, who was stilldetermined to continue the fight. On 22ndJuly, however, General Legentilhomme wasoverruled at a Council at which he announcedhis intention to the Civil authorities, and. foundhimself unable to enforce his decision withoutbringing on an internal armed conflict. On23rd July General Germain entered Jibuti andassumed office as Governor and Commander ofthe troops. On 27th July the French detach-ment which held the Pass of Jirre was with-drawn.

18. This collapse of French resistancereleased the whole of the Italian Eastern Armyfor operations against British Somaliland. ThisItalian force amounted to some twenty Colonialbattalions, four Blackshirt battalions, fourgroups of Pack Artillery, two groups ofMedium Artillery, about thirty tanks, twosections of Armoured Cars and eleven groupsof Banda (native irregulars),

19. The garrison of British Somaliland nowcomprised the Camel Corps, the NorthernRhodesian Regiment, K.A.R., the ist Battalion2nd Punjab Regiment, the 2nd Battalion King's-African Rifles and ist East African LightBattery, which arrived from Kenya on i2thJuly. On ist July the 2nd Battalion The BlackWatch had been sent to Aden by cruiser, atthe request of General Legentilhomme, whoconsidered that the support of British troopsmight assist him to resist an attack on Jibuti,and that this assurance of British supportwould be a powerful factor in persuading thegarrison of Jibuti to continue the struggle.This battalion was therefore also available toreinforce Somaliland.

20. When the French at Jibuti decided toaccept the armistice, I had to decide whetherto evacuate British. Somaliland forthwith or tocontinue to hold it. After consultation by cablewith Colonel Chater, who had now beenappointed Brigadier, I decided that we' shouldcontinue to defend the approaches to Berberafor as long as 'possible. Brigadier Chater re-ported that if the force was increased to fivebattalions he considered that there was a goodprospect of holding his positions; also with-

drawal without fighting at all would, I con-sidered, be more damaging to our prestige thanwithdrawal after attack. The French had con-sistently reported that the morale of (the Italianforces in .the Harar area was low, and that theywere unlikely to attack fortified positions withany vigour. Our patrol encounters on thefrontier of the Protectorate seemed to confirmthis estimate. I reported accordingly to theWar Office, and ordered the 3/15 PunjabRegiment which was already under orders toproceed to Aden from India to go to Somali-land. Two 3-inch A.A. guns were sent fromAden to Berbera, where A.A. protection hadalways been sorely needed, but the greatshortage of A.A. equipment in the Middle East5iad made provision impossible. Now withthe increased force in Somaliland, it wasessential to take risks elsewhere and these gunswere sent from Aden, where they were re-placed by guns from Port Sudan, which in itsturn was reinforced from Port Said. Ourgeneral shortage and the movement of convoysmade necessary this rather complicated shuffle.

21. On ist August, 1940, .the disposition ofthe forces in Somaliland was as follows: —Covering Troops.

(a) Dobo area, one Company SomalilandCamel Corps less one Troop;

(b) Hargeisa area, Motor CompanySomaliland Camel Corps less one Troop;One Troop Somaliland Camel Corps; OneCompany Northern Rhodesia Regiment,K.A.R.;

(c) Burao, one Company and one MotorTroop Somaliland Camel Corps.An Officer's Patrol wMi wireless was on the

coast road between Zeilah and Berbera. Alarge number of Illalos were working in dieforward areas, mostly under 'the control ot theDistrict officers, to provide information ofenemy movement.Tug Argon Position.

(a) Northern Rhodesia Regiment less oneCompany, Machine-Gun Company, B Com-pany Somaliland Camel Corps, and ist EastAfrican Light Battery, held -the mainposition.

(b) The loft flank of the Tug Argan posi-tion was covered by 2nd King's AfricanRifles with Headquarters at Mandera.

(c) The 3/15 Punjab Regiment -was con-centrating at Laferug. On the arrival of the2nd Battalion, The Black Watch, on 7thAugust, 1ihe 3/15 Punjab Regiment extendedthe right flank of the Tug Argan position byholding the approaches through the hillsbetween the position and the Shell Gap defileon the coast. The Black Watch becameForce reserve at Laferug.

Other Positions.The 1/2 Punjab Regiment held the Sheikh

Pass, the Shell Gap (on the coast road fromZeilah), the Bihendi Gap on the East ofBerbera, and the Base at Berbera.

IV.—ITALIAN ATTACK ON BRITISH SOMALILAND.22. On ist August, reports of an Italian

concentration began to be received. On 5thAugust an Italian force of an estimated strengthof two battalions with 30 motor vehicles enteredZeilah through -the Jirre Pass. On the sameday the Camel Corps detachment at Dobo wasforced to withdraw by a superior enemy force.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 JUNE, 1946 2723

23. On 4th August the enemy began his ad-vance on Hargeisa, and was engaged by amotor company of the Somaliland Camel Corps,which inflicted considerable loss. One enemyarmoured car was set on fire and two othersdamaged by fire from Boys rifles. Next daythe enemy attacked our covering position atHargeisa, and after three hours' continuous fireby artillery, mortars and machine-guns,attacked with 12 light tanks which overran theposition and compelled a withdrawal. Theenemy made no further advance on 6th or 7thAugust and was apparently concentrating atHargeisa.

24. The enemy resumed his advance fromHargeisa on 8th August. At 12.30 hours onQth August he encountered our forward delay-ing detachment, consisting of one CompanyNorthern Rhodesia Regiment with one machine-gun section of the Somaliland Camel Corps.This position was quickly overrun by threetanks which are reported to have been ledround the mines, which had been placed in frontof the position, by Somalis who knew theirlocation. These tanks were reported as mediumtanks, their type has not been definitely estab-lished, but they were certainly larger than lighttanks. Since the force at this time possessedno weapon to deal with medium tanks, CaptainHowden of HM.A.S. Hobart sent a 3-pdr.naval gun with three ratings up to the battle-field where it was placed at Observation Hillin the Tug Argan position. On I3th Augusttwo Bofors guns also arrived at the front.

25. On nth August the main attack on theTug Argan position began. At 0730 hours aheavy, low altitude, air attack by bombs andmachine-gunning was made on the 2nd bat-talion The Black Watch in reserve aboutLafenig. The battalion sustained no casualtiesand brought down one bomber by A.A. Brenfire. At 0840 hours an enemy bombardmentopened on the Tug Argan position. The TugArgan Gap, through which runs the main Har-geisa-Berbera road, is some 8,000 yards inwidth. It is flanked on the north-west by asuccession of flat-topped hills with numerousdeep sandy tugs (" tug " is the local namefor wadi or ravine) separating them; and onthe south-east by a range of hills varying from600 to 1,500 feet above the floor of the gap.The country in the gap itself is fairly flat,sparsely covered with thorn bush and inter-sected with fairly numerous tugs of all sizesmostly running in a south to north direction.The Tug Argan itself is a large sandy riverbed some 150 yards in width and runningroughly south to north; it was on the south-west or enemy side of all our defended localities.

There were four forward defended localitiesnamed Black Hill, Knobbly Hill, Mill Hill andObservation Hill. These hills were from 1,000to 2,000 yards apart and were held by threecompanies of the Northern Rhodesia Regimentand the Machine-gun 'Company of the Somali-land Camel Corps. There were two guns ofthe East Africa Light Battery on Knobbly Hilland two on Mill Hill. The comparatively shortrange of these guns necessitated their being putin these forward positions.

'Behind -these four forward posts was CastleHill held by the remaining Company of theNorthern Rhodesia Regiment. The posts them-selves were reasonably strong but there was no

Aa

depth hi the position, nor did the ground lenditself to defence in depth, had more troopsbeen available.

26. During the morning of nth August theenemy made an infantry attack on the hillpositions. The main localities held out success-fully but some the enemy pentrate'd round theleft flank, between the Northern RhodesiaRegiment and .the 2nd K.A.'R.

27. At 2000 hours on this date Major-GeneralGodwin Austen arrived and assumed com-mand. He had only completed handing overthe command in Palestine on 8th August andwas not available earlier. He was sent whenit seemed likely the reinforcements orderedwould increase the number of troops above thatof a Brigadier's command.

28. On i2th August the enemy's attackdeveloped in full force, each defended localitywas attacked by large forces of infantry, sup-ported by artillery. The enemy came on withgreat determination and undoubtedly sufferedextremely heavy losses. Mill Hill position,which was the weakest of the four forwardposts, since it had been the last constructedand its defences were still incomplete, fell atabout 1600 hours. The section of 3.7 guns inthis post was lost, but only 7 rounds ofammunition remained; the guns were renderedcompletely useless before withdrawal. Theother posts all held out. The enemy succeededin working round the left flank and reachingthe high ground about Donkey Hill, whichoverlooks both Observation Hill and CastleHill. Small detachments also penetrated to theBerbera road behind Castle Hill.

29. During the night of I2th-i3th August the2nd King's African Rifles, who were holdingthe hills on the left flank of the Tug Arganposition, were driven from the Mirgo Pass;and the enemy thus threatened to cut the roadbetween the Tug Argan position and Berbera.Measures were taken to restore the position inthis area but were not completely successful.

30. Enemy action on I3th August was lessdetermined. The garrison on Knobbly Hillbroke up an enemy attack at daybreak andcaptured two pack guns; and further attackson Black Hill and Castle Hill were also re-pulsed during the morning.

31. During the night of >the I3th-i4th Augusta convoy, consisting of one Company 2ndBlack Watch with two carriers, was despatchedto deliver water to Castle and Knobbly Hillsand gun ammunition to Knobbly Hill. Thisconvoy was ambushed near Castle Hill. Onecarrier fell into the ditch and could not berecovered and three lorries were abandoned bytheir Somali drivers. But the enemy thenwithdrew and the remainder of the columnreached the posts, delivered ammunition andwater, evacuated the wounded and returnedbefore daylight on I4th August.

32. This incident showed Major-GeneralGodwin Austen the danger of the line of re-treat to Berbera being cut by continued enemyinfiltration. It was also obvious that theenemy, with his great superiority in artilleryand numbers, could concentrate on each postin turn and destroy it. There was only onebattalion in reserve, and if this was used tocounter-attack or to reinforce the forward posi-tions there was a serious danger that the wholeforce might be surrounded and unable to re-treat. In these circumstances Major-General

27̂ 4 SUPPLEMENT TO .THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 JUNE, 1946

Godwin Austen prepared a plan for evacua-tion, but decided to wait the issue of the nextday's events.

33. On I4th August heavy enemy shellingbegan on Castle and Observation Hills at0700 hours. Over 500 enemy shells fell onCastle Hill during the day. At 1600 hours aheavy -infantry attack on Observation Hill wasrepulsed. Its garrison reported that manyparts of the defences had been destroyed bygun fire, and that it would be impossible tohold the post much longer. A message wassent to the post encouraging them to hold on,to which they responded.

134. Meanwhile a counter-attack had beenmade on the positions about Mirgo Pass whichhad been lost on I2th August. This was atfirst successful, but in the evening our troopswere again driven back. Further east theItalians made an attempt to reach the Berberaroad by the Jerato Pass, but were driven back.

35. The position early on I5th August wasas follows. Observation Hill, which was vitalto 'the defence of the whole position, wasdominated by artillery from Round Hill atshort range. Many of the defences had beendestroyed; and the garrison, which had gal-lantly resisted for four days, was becomingtired. Attempts to dislodge the enemy fromthe Mirgo Pass and from the low ground southof Castle Hill had failed. There was also athreat from the enemy detachment advancingalong the coast road from Zeilah, though thisadvance, which had been shelled by the Navyfrom the sea and bombed by the R.A.F., wasnot being pressed with any great energy.Enemy air attacks on troops and transport inthe open had been constant. They were notvery dangerous but had a considerable nuisanceeffect. In these circumstances General GodwinAusten came to the conclusion that a retreat onBerbera and evacuation -was the only course tosave the force from a dangerous defeat andpossible annihilation. He accordingly tele-graphed G.H.Q., Middle East, giving .the twoalternatives, immediate evacuation or con-tinuation of the action with probable loss of avery large proportion of the force.

Lieutenant-General Sir H. M. Wilson, whowas in temporary command of Middle Eastduring any absence in the United Kingdom,decided in favour of evacuation. I have nodoubt that both General Godwin-Austen'srecommendation and General Wilson's decisionwere correct.

36. During .the morning of I5th August theenemy remained inactive but during the after-noon he renewed his attacks. Black Hill wasnot directly attacked but .the enemy infiltratedround this position and endeavoured to dig ina pack battery in a position behind the post.They were dispersed by gun fire and thenshelled Black Hill heavily. Castle Hill wasalso shelled. The brunt of the enemy's effortwas, however, made on Observation Hill whichwas subjected to a very heavy bombardmentfor two hours. This was followed by a fierceinfantry attack at 1700 hours, under which thegarrison at last gave way. I regret that the3-pdr. gun of H.M.A.S. Hobart was here losttogether with the detachment. Their presenceand conduct had been of the utmost value tothe morale of the garrison.

37. During the night of the i5/i6th with-drawal from the Tug Argan position was

carried out. It was covered by the and BlackWatoh with two companies of the 2nd King'sAfrican Rifles in a position at Barkasan, fivemiles south-west of Laferug, some 35 milesfrom Berbera. It was intended that this posi-tion should be held for 48 hours, and that afurther rearguard position should then be heldat Nasiye, 15 miles, from Berbera.

38. The movement to Berbera on the i6ihwas carried out without interference from theenemy; and embarkation began on the nightof i6th/i7th August. The Italians had lost twoplanes in an air raid on Berbera on I5th, andtheir air force was afterwards inactive overthis area. During i6th August, the enemyoccupied the Tug Argan position, but made noother forward move.

39. At 1040 hours on ]7th August a reportwas received of an Italian column havingentered Bulhar, 40 miles .west of Berbera.H.M.S. Ceres, patrolling off this coast, engagedthis column and stopped its advance. At 1050hours on the same day the enemy began aseries of attacks against the 2nd Black Watchand the two Companies 2nd K.A.R. atBarkasan, which lasted till dark. The attack-ing force consisted of at least a brigade of freshtroops with artillery and tanks, which had beenbrought forward in M.T. An attack on the leftof the position was first repulsed; and then abattalion attacked the centre Company andin spite of heavy casualties began to surroundthe forward posts. The position was restoredby the Company Commander,. Captain D.MacN. C. Rose, who, with three carriers, ledhis Company Headquarters and reserve platoonin a bayonet charge which- threw the enemyback some 500 yards. Later the enemy againattacked the left and centre with infantry sup-ported by eight to ten tanks, of which at leasttwo were larger than light tanks. This attackwas also checked by the use of the reserveCompany. At least one medium and two lighttanks were destroyed by the fire of the Bofors.Towards evening a serious threat by anotherenemy battalion began to develop against theright flank, and there seemed a danger thatthe whole force might be cut off from its trans-port and line of retreat. A gradual withdrawalwas therefore ordered. The rear parties of TheBlack Watch hung on to their posts until nightfell and the whole force was able to reach itstransport and embus without interference, theenemy failing to take advantage of hissuperior numbers or to press home his attack.

40. It had now been decided not to hold afurther position at Nasiye, but to embark thewhole force during the night of the i7/i8th.By the morning of the i8th the whole of theforce, with the exception of a few hundred menholding the outskirts of Berbera and a fewstragglers, had been embarked. The wind,which frequently renders embarkation im-possible at the port of Berbera for many hoursat this time of year, had fortunately beenfavourable. The local Somalis of the CamelCorps were given the option of evacuation toAden or disbandment. The great majority pre-ferred to remain in the country. They wereallowed to retain their arms.

41. During the i8th H.M.A.S. Hobart em-barked the remaining personnel, including somesmall parties which continued to come in.During the evening the destruction of petrol,-vehicles and other stores- was continued by

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 JUNE, 1946 2725

demolition parties. One raid by three aircraftwas made in the evening, and bombs fell closeto Hobart.

On igth August H.M.A.S. Hobart finallysailed after destroying the principal Governmentbuildings.

V. SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONS.42. Oui total casualties were 8 British officers

killed, 4 wounded, 4 missing; 8 British otherranks killed, 18 wounded, 17 missing; 22Indian or African other ranks killed,80 wounded, 99 missing: a total of 260, orlittle more than 5 per cent, of the force. Almostexactly half of these casualties were in theNorthern Rhodesia Regiment of the King'sAfrican Rifles, who held the Tug Argan posi-tion. The great majority of the missing arebelieved to have been killed.

That the casualties were comparatively lightwas due to the fact that most of the troops whowere heavily attacked were in strong defences;and that the withdrawals, which were skil-fully carried out under cover of darkness, werenot interfered with or followed up by theenemy, presumably owing to the heavy casual-ties he had suffered during the day.

43. Four 3.7 Howitzers, the only artillerywith the force, were lost. These guns, owingto their comparatively short range, were placedin forward posts where they undoubtedly didgreat execution. Two were lost when the poston Mill Hill was overrun; and it was impossibleto withdraw the other two when the mainposition was evacuated, as transport could notbe brought up to the front line. All four gunswere rendered useless before being abandoned.

The amount of equipment lost by the fightingtroops was not abnormal, and was mostly in-curred in the posts that were overrun by theenemy. A considerable proportion of thestores at the base and practically the whole ofthe transport of the forces was lost. This wasdue to the poor facilities of Berbera as aport. All embarkation and disembarkation hadto be done by lighter, of which very few wereavailable, or by ships' boats. Work is onlypossible at all for two hours 'each side of hightide. At the season of the year when theoperations took place a strong wind, whichblows for a number of hours during everytwenty-four at irregular times, makes embarka-tion impossible. It was .therefore rightlydecided to concentrate on making certain ofembarking all personnel. In daylight the shipswould have formed a very vulnerable targetfor the enemy air force. As it happened, theenemy did not follow up to Berbera at once,but by the time that this was evident, thetransport had been damaged to render it im-mobile. Its destruction was therefore com-pleted by naval landing parties.

44. The conduct of the troops, as may bejudged from the above account, was in everyway excellent in very testing circumstances.They had to face greatly superior numbers, toendure continual heavy artillery fire, often atclose range, and to withstand constant attacksfrom the air. The weather was hot and theclimate of Somaliland induces extreme thirst.The steadiness and discipline of all units wasvery noticeable and there was no failure ofresistance or premature retreat. The qualitiesof the African and Somali troops, on whom thebrunt of the fighting fell, are not usually best

shown in static defence and they had not pre-vious experience of shell-fire, yet they showedremarkable stubbornness and bravery. TheIndian battalions fought with the skill andtenacity expected of them. The action of TheBlack Watch on I7th August was worthy oftheir best traditions.

45. The enemy attacked on many occasionswith great dash and determination, and un-doubtedly suffered very heavy casualties.After all allowance has been made for thetendency to exaggerate the losses suffered bythe enemy, it seems certain that the enemy'scasualties were not less than two thousand.

The enemy on several occasions failed -totake advantage of his superior numbers and thefavourable tactical positions he had obtained,and thus allowed our forces to escape frommore than one very dangerous position.

46. An outstanding feature of this shortcampaign was the wholehearted co-operationafforded to the Army by the Royal Navy andthe Royal Air Force.

The work of the Royal Navy in disembarka-tion and embarkation of the force under themost difficult conditions was most remarkableand deserves the warmest thanks of the Army.I desire to express its appreciation to Rear-Admiral A. J. L. Murray, C.B., D.S.O.,O.B.E., and to all those under him.

The Royal Air Force afforded the utmostpossible assistance that their resources per-mitted, and took very considerable risks indoing so. The Army is deeply grateful to AirVice Marshal G. R. M. Reid, D.S.O., M.C.,and to the Royal Air Force at Aden. I attachas Appendix A a short report by Air ViceMarshal Reid on the work of the Royal AirForce.

47. The temporary loss of the SomalilandProtectorate was due to four main causes:

(a) Our insistence on running our Colonieson the cheap, especially in matters ofdefence.

(b) The slowness of the War Cabinet, inthe first eight or nine months of the war, toallow proper precautions to be taken againstthe possibility of Italy joining the war againstus. This resulted in long delays in thearrival of reinforcements, the withholding ofthe money necessary for defences, the non-arrival of essential equipment, and arefusal to allow of measures to be taken toestablish a proper Intelligence service for fearof impairing relations with Italy.

(c) The collapse of French resistance atJibuti after a long period of uncertainty. Itwas this that allowed the full weight of theItalian concentration hi the Harar area to bedirected against British Somaliland.

(d) The almost complete lack of facilitiesin Berbera as a port. This was one of thechief reasons why it was impossible to sendreinforcements rapidly. A full report of thishad been made in 1936 by Colonel Hornby,but no steps were taken to carry out therecommendations made. It may be notedthat it took a 3,ooo-ton ship ten days innormal conditions to unload at Berbera.48. The reinforcement of Somaliland was

piecemeal and hurried. The original delays insending reinforcements have been explained inparagraph n above. That further reinforce-ments could not be sent earlier was due mainly

2726 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 JUNE, 1946

to the meagre resources available in the MiddleEast to meet its very wide responsibilities. Itwas necessary to keep the commitment inBritish Somaliland to a minimum, hoping tothe last that the French would continue thestruggle at Jibuti, of which I had had repeatedassurances from General Legentilhomme. Thepoverty of Berbera as a port made landing slowand difficult when reinforcements did arrive.

VI. APPRECIATION OF SERVICES.49. I wish especially to bring to notice the

work of Brigadier A. R. Chater, D.S.O.,O.B.E. Throughout a most difficult and tryingperiod his work and spirit have been admir-able. His disposition of his slender resourceshas always been made with sound judgment;his appreciations of the situation have been wellfounded; and the way in which he has inspiredand led the forces under his command has beenadmirable. I consider that his services inSomalilafid deserve special recognition.

50. Major-General A. R. Godwin Austenshowed great skill in his handling of operationsduring the short period he was in command.He took over while a battle was in progress,grasped the situation rapidly, and by his per-sonal energy and spirit did much to inspirethe resistance. It was due to his well thoughtout arrangements that the evacuation wascarried out with so little loss.

APPENDIX " A "Air Headquarters, Steamer Point, Aden.

22nd August, 1940.

THE SOMALILAND CAMPAIGN.INTRODUCTION.

On 6th July, 1940, G.H.Q. Middle Eastasked O.C. Somaliforces whether, if the Frenchat Jibuti accepted the terms of the armistice,he considered, that British Somaliland was un-tenable and that troops should be graduallywithdrawn. O.C. Somaliforces replied thatwith certain additional military forces he didnot consider the position in Somaliland unten-able provided he could rely on his Naval re-quirements and on air support from Aden.

2. In forwarding Somaliforce signal toG.H.Q., A.O.C. Aden stated that " a measureof air support could be provided but air forceshere (in Aden) are small and have prior com-mitment with convoys and in defence of Aden."

3. The role of the air forces in Aden hasbeen clearly defined:—

(a) Protection of convoys.(b) Neutralisation of enemy air forces as

far as possible to achieve (a) above and toprotect shipping at Aden.4. Permission was, however, obtained from

H.Q. R.A.F. Middle East for a flight of air-craft to give close support in Somaliland to thebest of their ability. It was never intendedby Higher Command to use any more thanthis flight in close support of the Army exceptin the case of emergency.

OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE ROYALAIR FORCE.

From outbreak of War with Italy up to Startof Advance on Somaliland.

5. Forty-four reconnaissances were carriedout on the Somaliland-Abyssinian frontier.

These entailed thirteen detachments to Berberaeach of about three days' duration. Duringthis time our casualties were two officerswounded, one aircraft lost and one damaged.

From $th August to igth August.6. The following was carried out:—

(a) Twelve separate reconnaissances.(b) 'Nineteen bombing-reconnaissances

employing thirty-two aircraft.(c) Twenty-six bombing attacks on enemy

troop concentrations, and transport employ-ing seventy-two aircraft.

(d) Standing fighter patrols were main-tained over Berbera for thirteen days employ-ing 36 sorties.In addition to the above, No. 223 Squadron

carried out six long distance raids on enemybases in the back areas, including Addis Abeba.The intention was to draw the enemy fightersaway from British Somaliland. The total num-ber of sorties for these operations wasthirty-two.

7. During these operations approximatelysixty tons of bombs were dropped and the totalnumber of sorties was 184.

Casualties.8. Our casualties were as follows: —

(a) Seven aircraft lost.(b) Ten severely damaged and a number

slightly damaged by enemy action.(c) Twelve killed.(d) Three wounded.

9. During the period under review the follow-ing enemy aircraft were shot down ordamaged:—

(a) By fighters—One shot down and oneheavily hit.

(b) By bombers—Two shot down inflames.

Achievements.10. Long range fighters were used in stand-

ing patrols for the protection of Berbera againstair attack during the evacuation. It will benoted that this port was reasonably immunefrom air bombardment during this criticalperiod. Had this not been so the evacuationmight have been badly held up with unfor-tunate consequences.

11. In co-operation with the Royal Navy ourair forces effectively delayed and finally stoppedthe Italian advance along the coast roadfrom Zeilah to Berbera.

DIFFICULTIES UNDER WHICH THE ROYAL AmFORCE WAS WORKING.

12. Although the maximum air effort pos-sible was afforded in support of the Army inSomaliland it may not have appeared impres-sive from the ground. The difficulties underwhich we were working were as follows:—

(a) There was no protected aerodromefrom which either our fighters or bomberscould operate in Somaliland. The twoaerodromes—one at Berbera and one atLaferug—were quickly made untenable byenemy bombardment which was practicallyunopposed by ground defences. Two of ourfighters were destroyed in the initial stages onthe ground owing to lack of protection nor-mally afforded by the Army. Fighter air-craft therefore had to be withdrawn.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 JUNE, 1946 2727

(b) In view of the above it was impossibleto operate fighters at all and for this reason,and only this, the enemy had local airsuperiority.

(c) Because there was no aerodrome inSomaliland from which to work, ourbombers were forced to operate from Adenwhich was a range of 200 miles over sea. Atthis range the air effort was greatly ham-pered and it was impossible to keep in closetouch with the military situation.

(d) Since the enemy had local airsuperiority our bombers were continuallybeing attacked by fighter aircraft while thecrews were trying to concentrate their atten-tion upon the ground to assist the Army andtrying to get a grip of the fast changing mili-tary situation. This made our bombersextremely vulnerable.

(e) The aircraft with which we areequipped is a fast medium bomber which isexcellent for its proper role but unsuitablefor close army co-operation work, especiallywhen not protected by fighters.

Conclusion.13. In short the air effort expended in sup-

port of the Army in Somaliland was the maxi-mum which could be given with the air forcesavailable and with no protected aerodromefrom which to work. It proved expensive inaircraft and crews but certain valuable resultswere obtained.

14. In conclusion the sincere thanks of theR.A.F. at Aden are due to the MilitaryAuthorities in Somaliland for their assistance,close co-operation and careful regard to ourlimitations in the circumstances.

Sgd. G. R. M. REID,Air Vice Marshal,

Air Officer Cx>inmanding,British Forces in Aden.

NOTE BY FORCE COMMANDER INREFERENCE TO PARA. 12 (a) of REPORTBY A.O.C., BRITISH FORCES IN ADEN.

1. In normal circumstances A.A. Boforsguns would have been made available for thedefence of aerodromes at Berbera and Laferug.None, however, existed with the force.

2. I would not like an impression to arisethat no A.A. defence was provided by theArmy at these two aerodromes. Each aero-drome was given ground and low altitudedefences by a Platoon of Infantry with twoA.A. V.B. guns; whilst at Berbera the A.A.layout of the two 3-inch A.A. guns includedprotection of the aerodrome as far as waspossible, though the primary objective pro-tected was the port area.

3. In actual fact, the platoon protecting theBerbera aerodrome brought down one enemyfighter.

Sgd. A. R. GODWIN-AUSTEN,Major-General.

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