Local Responses to Development and Conservation Projects – from an Actor Perspective

A case study in Río San Juan, Nicaragua

Master’s Thesis in International Development Studies

& Technological and Socio-Economic Planning (Tek-Sam)

By Sanne Dahlbom

June 2007 Roskilde University

Department of Globalisation and Society Department of Environmental, Social and Spatial Change

Supervisors: Henrik Secher Marcussen and Søren Lund

2

Acknowledgements Many people have made invaluable contributions and helped me throughout the long process which has followed from when this thesis was merely a vague idea to the completion of it. In particular, I am thankful to the people of Río San Juan and to the many NGOs, institutions, ministries and individuals in Nicaragua for their collaboration and valuable contributions, which made it possible to undertake and complete this work. During my fieldwork in Nicaragua, more people opened their homes and hearts to me than I could possibly thank by name. It was especially from the families in Las Maravillas that I learned what it means to be a poor Nicaraguan farmer. They are the ones who made this thesis possible and to them I am eternally grateful. A special appreciation goes to Gustavo Zapata for always having time to talk with me, for interesting conversations that showed me new insight, and for utter support and interest. I am also thankful to Ronny Gutierrez for his time, interest and support. Likewise, a special appreciation goes to all personnel, my friends and former colleagues, from Fundación del Río, but a special heartfelt thanks to Saúl Obregón Gutierrez for everything and to Mario Mayorquín for his friendship. Also warm thanks to Alexis Gregorian for her friendship in Nicaragua. I would also like to express my gratitude to Rikke Broegaard for helpful advice on field work techniques; and to André Mildam from Nepenthes for advice, interest and support while doing my fieldwork. In addition, for their time and insight, I am deeply grateful to Ove Faurby for providing perspectives and comments on my understanding of Nicaraguan forest policies; and to Thorsten Treue, The Royal Veterinary Agricultural University, for advice and interesting discussion about conservation and development issues. Also thanks to Michael Thurland for an interesting talk about development and conservation projects in the buffer zone. I also owe a debt of gratitude to those who read drafts of this thesis, or sections of it, and shared their comments with me. Thanks to Pernille Hansen for comments on earlier drafts of the thesis; and thanks to Pelle Gätke for his time to read the final version of it. My greatest gratitude goes to Maria Glindvad for her friendship, inspiration, support and constant believe in me. I could not have done it without you! A similar heartfelt appreciation goes to my friend Stine Skøtt Thomsen for her endless support while writing this thesis. Thanks for unforgettable moments, humorous days and sharing of ‘Romrotte’, triumphs and frustrations at RUC, where we have shared basically everything for the last months. Also thanks for helpful comments and proofreading of my thesis. And not at least, I am profoundly grateful to my supervisors, Henrik Secher Marcussen and Søren Lund, for their support, for providing me with enthusiastic and inspiring advice on how to approach the field for research, for interesting and helpful discussions, and for taking their time to read and comment on half and whole drafts of this thesis. Also I thank Danida Travel Grant and Knud Højgaards Fond for economic support, which made my field work in Nicaragua possible. And finally, thanks to my family and friends for keeping me sane and for bearing with me during the writing of this thesis.

3

Abstract Based on a case study in the buffer zone to the Biological Reserve Indio-Maíz,

Nicaragua, and by employing an actor-oriented approach, this thesis sets out to

explore how locals respond to conservation and development projects, and what

factors facilitate these responses. It will be argued that differentiation in people’s

capitals, such as access to wider social networks and information, capability to adapt to

changes in livelihoods and deal with project requirements, as well as coping with

inadequate resources and minimizing risks, to a large degree determine what kind of

activities are available to the households and thereby how people relate to or respond

to projects. By means of a capital ranking I found that the capital-strong people were

those engaged in projects, whereas the more capital-weak did not engage in projects.

Encountering a conflictual relation between locals’ different capitals or means to

engage in projects and projects’ conditionalities and approach for promotion and

implementation, it is analyzed how this contradiction is contested through community-

level negotiation. It is argued that all social actors exercise power, including those who

appear to be powerless, by negotiating, assimilating and contesting projects’

conditionalities, proposed ‘knowledge types’ and agricultural/conservation practices.

With a particular focus on social differentiation, conflicts and negotiation at

community level, and by recognizing that project external factors in the national and

local context can also influence on locals’ responses to projects, this thesis contributes

to a way of exploring and understanding issues of diversity and conflict inherent in

processes of external intervention.

4

Table of contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 2

ABSTRACT 3

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 6

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 8

INTRODUCTION & RESEARCH TOPIC 8 CHOICE OF RESEARCH TOPIC 10 CLARIFICATIONS & DELIMITATION 13 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 16

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 18

NOTIONS OF PROJECT INTERVENTION AND ITS IMPACTS 18 THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK – AN ACTOR-ORIENTED APPROACH 19 ’AGENCY’ AND POWER 20 ‘SOCIAL INTERFACE’ AND ‘ARENAS’ 22 CONTEXTUAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS 24 ANALYTICAL APPROACH 26 SUMMING UP 27

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 29

DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES 29 DESKSTUDY 29 FIELD STUDY 30 FIELD WORK TECHNIQUES 33 DISCUSSION OF METHODOLOGY, TECHNIQUES AND FINDINGS 39 READER’S GUIDE 44

CHAPTER 4: NATIONAL, LOCAL AND COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS AND CONTEXT 46

NATIONAL CONTEXT 46 A BRIEF POLITICAL-HISTORICAL & ECONOMIC OUTLINE 47 EXTERNAL DEPENDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN NICARAGUA 52 SUMMING UP 54 ENVIRONMENTAL AND FORESTRY POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS 54 INSTITUTIONS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT 55 DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS IN NICARAGUA 56 FOREST LEGISLATION & ITS CONTRADICTIONS 58 SUMMING UP 62 LOCAL CONTEXT – INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH AREA 62 THE INDIO-MAÍZ BIOLOGICAL RESERVE AND ITS BUFFER ZONE 62 THE ‘CONTRA WAR’ AND LAND TENURE ARRANGEMENTS IN RÍO SAN JUAN 63 A BRIEF AND GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO LIVELIHOODS IN THE BUFFER ZONE 66 COMMUNITY CONTEXT – LAS MARAVILLAS 68

5

LAS MARAVILLAS – “THE WONDERS” 68 LOCAL LIVELIHOODS IN LAS MARAVILLAS 69 POLITICAL SYSTEM IN LAS MARAVILLAS 72 DEVELOPMENT AND CONSERVATION PROJECTS IN LAS MARAVILLAS 72 COOPERACIÓN AUSTRIACA PARA EL DESARROLLO 73 DANIDA COCOA PROJECT 74 COMMON FEATURES AND LIVELIHOODS PROPOSED BY PROJECTS 77 CONCLUDING REMARKS 77

CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION, CONFLICTS AND NEGOTIATION IN THE COMMUNITY CONTEXT 79

CAPITALS AND PROJECT PARTICIPATION 80 PROJECT CONDITIONALITIES AND PROMOTION OF PROJECTS 80 LOCAL RESPONSES TO PROJECTS – SEEN FROM A ’CAPITAL PERSPECTIVE’ 82 CONCLUDING REMARKS 90 CONFLICTS, CORRUPTION AND CONTRADICTION 92 THE MAYOR AND HIS CORRUPT APPOINTMENT OF CDCA IN LAS MARAVILLAS 92 CONFLICTING NATIONAL FOREST LEGISLATION 95 CONFUSION IN THE COMMUNITY CONTEXT 98 INTERACTION BETWEEN DIFFERENT PROJECTS 102 CONCLUDING REMARKS 103 NEGOTIATION AND POWER 104 THE INTERSECTING LIFEWORLDS OF FOREST GUARDS AND PEASANTS 104 ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN ’LOCAL KNOWLEDGE’ AND ’EXPERT KNOWLEDGE’ 106 INTERVENTION AND POWER STRUGGLES 109 CONCLUDING REMARKS 111

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 112

CHAPTER 7: PERSPECTIVES 117

BIBLIOGRAPHY 119

ANNEX 1: SCOONES FRAMEWORK USED FOR THE ‘CAPITAL APPROACH’ 132

ANNEX 2: INTERVIEWS & PERSONAL COMMUNICATION WITH ‘KEY INFORMANTS’ 133

ANNEX 3: ‘CAPITAL RANKING’ OF ALL RESIDENTS IN LAS MARAVILLAS 135

ANNEX 4: ‘CAPITAL RANKING’ OF RESPONDENTS IN LAS MARAVILLAS 139

ANNEX 5: LIST OF RESPONDENTS IN LAS MARAVILLAS 142

ANNEX 6: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR INTERVIEWS WITH RESPONDENTS 145

ANNEX 7: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR INTERVIEWS WITH “KEY INFORMANTS” 147

ANNEX 8: PLAN OF FIELDWORK 148

6

List of Abbreviations ADA Austrian Development Agency CAD Cooperación Austriaca para el Desarrollo CAFTA Central American Free Trade Agreement CDCA Comité de Desarrollo Comarcal Ampliado Committee for Expanded District Development (my own translation) CONAFOR Comisión Nacional Forestal COSEMUCRIM Cooperativa de Servicios Multiples R.L., ’Cacao Reserva Indio Maíz’ Danida Danish International Development Assistance FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FdR Fundación del Río FSLN Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional Sandinista National Liberation Front GDP Gross Domestic Product IMF International Monetary Fund INAFOR Instituto Nacional Forestal National Foresty Institute MAGFOR Ministerio Agropecuario y Forestal Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry MARENA Ministerio del Ambiente y Recursos Naturales Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources MIFIC Ministerio de Fomento, Industria y Comercio Ministry of Development, Industry and Commerce MINSA Ministerio de Salud Ministry of Health Mz Manzana (Nicaraguan measurement for units of area) NGO Non Governmental Organization OTR Oficina de Titulación Rural Rural Titling Office PANic Plan Ambiental de Nicaragua Environmental Action Plan for Nicaragua PASMA Programa de Apoyo Sectorial Ambiental Environment Sector Programme Support PLC El Partido Liberal Constitucionalista Liberal Constitutionalist Party PMS Proyecto Manejo Sostenible

Sustainable Management Project PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal ProDeSoC Programa para el Desarrollo rural Sostenible en el Municipio El Castillo

Programme for Sustainable Rural Development in the municipality El Castillo

RAAN Región Autónoma Atlántico Norte North Atlantic Autonomous Region RAAS Región Autónoma Atlántico Sur South Atlantic Autonomous Region RRA Rapid Rural Appraisal UNO National Opposition Union

7

Map of Nicaragua Source: World Bank 2006a

Map of Río San Juan (Case study village is located roughly within the red circle).

8

Chapter 1

Introduction

Introduction & research topic

The area of Río San Juan in the south-eastern corner of Nicaragua consists of the

Biological Reserve Indio Maíz and the surrounding buffer zone, which has been the

host for increasing migration since the ending of the Nicaraguan ‘counter-

revolutionary war’ seventeen years ago. During this time the area has also been

continuously visited by various national and international NGOs and development

projects with their main areas of interest being environmental protection of the reserve

as well as improving the living standards for the poor communities in the buffer zone;

so called integrated conservation and development projects1. All this attention has

turned Río San Juan into a site of intensive development efforts and an arena of

conservation-development conflicts (Barrios & Broegaard 2006; Nepenthes 2003;

Nygren 2003; Ravnsborg 2006a; Ruiz García 2006; Utting 1993).

In the fall of 2005, I spent four months in this region as an intern for the Danish

environmental organisation Nepenthes. While doing my internship field study, which

partly consisted of interviewing the local peasants, I came across some interesting

attitudes and opinions which inspired me to reflect on some of the reoccurring

problems that are linked to almost all conservation and development projects.

What first aroused my interest was in particular that I was predominantly met with a

perception among the farmers that the projects did not listen to or take into account the

needs and wishes of the local population. In my opinion, ‘participation’ in

development projects should mean the active involvement of local people in the

1 The most commonly invoked definition for Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) is that ICDPs are projects that link biodiversity conservation in protected areas with local socio-economic development outside these protected areas. This linkage means that people living in or near protected areas are given alternative sources of livelihood that reduce the pressures on protected area resources. (Newmark & Hough 2000)

9

decision-making processes in so far it affects them (Cooke & Kothari 2002). However, it

is unfortunately too often “employed as part of a top-down management process that

includes people in passive forms of cooption and consultation, rather than as active

agents” (Brown 2002:11). This as a consequence can lead to negative responses in the

shape of locals’ resistance, avoidance or rejection of proposed projects, as well as it can

create conflicts and social differentiation, where only the opinion of certain people

counts. Also, many integrated conservation and development projects may

unintentionally promote dependency rather than reciprocity and have often treated

local communities as recipients of aid rather than partners in development (Newmark

& Hough 2000:589). This also seemed to be the case in the Río San Juan area.

An example of a comment I heard various times during my internship period, when

interviewing and talking with the locals living in the most remote villages, was that

they all expressed a wish for a road to be constructed in order not to cross endless

amounts of muddy path-roads when going to the doctor with a sick child or going to

the market in the nearby village; a journey that could be more than halved in time if a

‘decent’ road existed. When I asked the project leaders why no road has been build in

the area, the usual answer was either that a road was too expensive or too difficult to

build or that a road would open up for easier access to the more remote and still

untouched forest areas, for which reason “it was in the interest of nobody”.

This answer reflects lack of attention to local development needs or simply the

conscious ignorance of the locals’ development wishes and needs. By this answer, “in

the interest of nobody”, it became clear to me that the locals’ wishes do not always

rank with the wishes or objectives of the projects, in this case because the locals’

development wishes would conflict with the existent conservation goals. This opens up

the discussion of whether the development part in integrated conservation and

development projects is just a means to obtain conservation, just as it discloses the

ongoing discussion of ‘participation’ as a means or an end in development and

conservation projects. Likewise it is worth mentioning that a common goal of many

conservation efforts in the area has been “as much as possible to seek the participation

of the local population in the control and conservation of the protected area” (Ravnborg

2006a:5 – highlight is my own). Local involvement is thus mostly used as a means to

10

obtain protection of the reserve and might therefore not always take into account the

wishes of the locals, especially not if their values and wishes for their lives conflict with

these of the projects. My point is to emphasize the constant paradox in development

and conservation projects, given that these two objectives do not always go hand in

hand, as poor peasants, depending on the forest or cleared forest land for their

subsistence, do not necessarily have any obvious interest in conserving forest

resources.

During my internship, I also carried out interviews with and talked to a number of

employees from NGOs and other institutions working in the area. There seemed to

exist a consensus in their view about locals being opportunistic; taking immediate

advantage of any circumstance of possible benefit. They presented an account of lazy

inhabitants who did not want to work actively with the project but rather expected free

gifts and alms from them, and how people ran off from credits and loans, and only

entered projects in order to obtain free utensils and tools. This view is discussed by

Olivier de Sardan who states: “Insofar as a project always means a flow of money and

other material or symbolic advantages, the use of these opportunities becomes more

and more a part of peasant knowledge. Who in the world of research and universities

can say that this ‘outside-reliance’ or funding strategy (how to get the most funds for

the least work), is not a common and efficient logic?” (Olivier de Sardan 1988:223).

However, this rather one-sided view by project personnel on locals as being lazy and

opportunistic fails to deal with the important question of why some locals decide to

participate in projects and others not, and demonstrates lack of attention to

individuals’ different strategies and rationalities for doing so, as well as their different

logics and ways of dealing with project participation.

Choice of research topic

Development intervention, as well as how locals react or respond to this, is an

interesting area for research, because it is a study of meetings and conflicts between

different ways of understanding the term ‘development’. Robert Chambers’ often cited

question ”whose reality counts?” (Chambers 1997) fits in with my wondering about the

11

aspects and processes of development intervention. Sometimes the implicitly

normative ideas development donors have about development contradict with these of

the so-called ”targets” or ”affected” groups, which often creates problems and conflicts

(Nielsen 2000:37). The buffer zone in Río San Juan is especially an interesting site for

carrying out this type of research, since most of the local population in one way or

another depends on the forest or the land for sustaining their livelihoods, while the

many projects in the area attempt to change this pattern of forest and land use.

Planned intervention has most often been build on an image of the relationship

between policy, implementation and outcomes as a linear process, implying some kind

of step-by-step progression from policy formulation to implementation to outcomes,

after which one can make an evaluation to establish how far project objectives has been

achieved (Long 2001:25). Connected to this is also the image of development and social

change as something “emanating primarily from external centres of power via

interventions (...) following some broadly determined development path, signposted

by ‘stages of development’ (...)” (Long 2001:11).

Opposed to these determinist, linear and externalist views is an actor-oriented

approach, seeking to ‘deconstruct’ the concept of intervention by seeing it as an

“ongoing, socially-constructed, negotiated, experiential and meaning-creating process,

not simply the execution of an already-specified plan of action with expected

behavioural outcomes.” (Long 2001:25).

Likewise, the actor-oriented approach emphasizes that the “target people” or social

actors should not just be seen as passive recipients of intervention, but active

participants who process information and strategize in their dealings with various

local actors as well as outside institutions and personnel (Long 1992:21; Long 2001:13).

This means recognizing that social actors are ‘knowledgeable’ and ‘capable’; that is,

they devise ways of solving ‘problematic situations’, and thus actively engage in

constructing their own social worlds (Giddens in Long 1992:23; Long 2001:16). The

approach hence stresses the importance of not assuming so-called beneficiaries to limit

their perceptions of reality and its problems simply to those defined for them by the

development agencies and projects (Long 2002:50).

12

The actor-oriented approach designates development intervention as an “encounter at

the interface” by perceiving it as a political ‘arena’ where more or less serious interest

conflicts are being fought between the different actors involved (Long 1992). It is these

actors, who use, manipulate and transform intervention discourses and it is in the

encounter between development intervention and locals that the real effects of

development occur (Long 2001:53). This led me to wonder how the ‘beneficiaries’ and

in general the affected people of the projects in the buffer zone have reacted or

responded to the interventions; that is whether they uncritically accept the agenda and

policy2 set forth by the “developers” or whether they somehow consciously or

unconsciously try to affect the situation by setting up their own agenda and thereby

influencing on the development interventions and hence their own situation and

wishes for their lives. ”Development’s effects occur behind the backs or against the

wills of even the most powerful actors” (James Ferguson cited in Mosse 2004:6), for

which reason an interesting issue to investigate, in relation to integrated conservation

and development projects, is the actual responses to such projects in the local settings.

This type of intervention study also entails some understanding of wider structural

phenomena and different external factors, as local responses to projects likewise to a

certain degree is influenced by processes and factors outside the immediate arenas of

intervention (Long 2001:27; Olivier de Sardan 1988:218).

Accordingly, intervention should be seen as ”an ongoing transformational process that

is constantly reshaped by its own internal organizational and political dynamic and by

the specific conditions it encounters or itself creates, including the responses and

strategies of local and regional groups who may struggle to define and defend their

own social spaces, cultural boundaries and positions within the wider power field.”

(Long & Ploeg 1994:79). Therefore, by understanding the field of development as a

field of social interaction, that is socially constructed, constituted by different social

meanings and practices negotiated at different interface encounters, the central concern

of this thesis is to illuminate the complexity of intervention through a better

2 ’Policy’ is in this thesis understood as development models, strategies and project designs (adopted from Mosse 2004).

13

understanding of how conservation and development projects are received, perceived

and transformed during their implementation; that is how locals react or respond to

these projects.

With the above reflections in mind my research question sounds as follows:

”How do locals respond to development and conservation projects and what factors

facilitate these responses?”

The research question will be approached as a case study in one village in the buffer

zone to the Biological Reserve Indio Maíz, Nicaragua (the choice of village will be

presented and discussed in chapter 3, whereas a careful presentation of the village will

be given in chapter 4). The aim is to analyse how locals are responding to the

development and conservation initiatives in the village. There are various projects

operating in the buffer zone, but it will only be the activities of two specific projects

which will be the focus of analysis. These two projects, who will be presented more

thoroughly in chapter 4, have been chosen because of their integrated conservation and

development approach working with peasants and forest owners, as opposite to other

projects in the area, working with children and youngsters at the schools and other

more aid oriented initiatives only operating in the buffer zone occasionally. In order to

clarify the research question and guide the analysis, two sub-questions have been

developed:

1) Which external factors in the national and local context can help explain responses to

projects in the community context?

2) What kind of social differentiation, conflicts and negotiation occur related to the

projects and how does this influence on responses to projects?

Clarifications & delimitation

While the theoretical chapter (chapter 2) will present in depth the content of the actor-

oriented approach and discuss the central concern of this approach, namely that of

understanding the processes by which external interventions becomes “internalized”

14

in the meeting with locals and come to mean quite different things to different

individual (Long & Ploeg 1994:78; Arce et al. 1994:152), it is necessary to pose a few

remarks of delimitation and clarification here.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate locals’ different responses to conservation

and development intervention in the case study village, and discuss factors, both

inherent in the projects’ design but also “project external” factors in the national and

local context, that can help explain these responses. It is not the purpose to judge

whether the various projects have been a “success or failure”. Rather I will seek a

holistic understanding of the interaction between the promoted projects, the

livelihoods3 of the locals4 and the contextual factors (social, historical, economic,

political and environmental), which contribute to and shape the outcome of planned

intervention and development. I therefore emphasize that this thesis is neither an

evaluation, nor an overview of various development projects and their development

objectives. It is not a commentary on appropriate approaches or strategies, solutions to

problems, success or failure. I am not concerned here with ‘best practice’ or lessons for

replication. Rather, my concern is with the relationship between policy models and the

practices they generate, seen from the locals’ “point of view”. My concern is not

whether, but how development projects work in the given local context.

I aim at analyzing which types of social differentiation, conflicts and negotiations that

occurs at the community level due to project interventions. This also includes a focus

on differing capitals, power and other concerns which influence on how locals respond

to development intervention (which will be explained further in chapter 2 and

analyzed carefully in chapter 5). Underneath these concerns lies the recognition of an

unequal power relationship among the agents involved. In this regard it is relevant to

explicitly state, as indicated throughout the introduction, that I consider it important to

view intervention as a ‘multiple reality’ made up of differing perceptions and social 3 Livelihood, as defined by Ellis (2000), “comprises the assets (natural, physical, human, financial and social capital), the activities, and the access to these (mediated by institutions and social relations) that together determine the living gained by the individual or household.” (Ellis 2000:10). Hence, livelihoods are made up of practices by which individuals and groups strive to make a living, meet their consumption necessities, cope with difficulties and uncertainties, engage with new opportunities, protect existing or pursue new lifestyles and cultural identifications, and fulfil their social obligations (Long 2001:241). 4 My use of “locals”, “social actors”, or even “respondents” should not be distinguished. All terms are in this thesis used to describe the people living in the research area.

15

interests, as opposed to more structurally-oriented and linear views on intervention

and social change. Settling for “opportunism” and “laziness” as explanation of

responses to development intervention is in my opinion too simple and insufficient.

Therefore, by applying an actor-oriented approach, my interest is to counter prevailing

understandings of intervention, and I seek to understand intervention as perceived by

locals, rather than by “the developers”.

Although the thesis builds on a case study from a single community in Nicaragua, I

believe that the findings from this case study are more widely relevant, as they

illustrate mechanisms and concerns that also exist elsewhere, where conservation and

development goals conflict with local needs, although their extent and concrete

expression will depend on the specific context. The thesis encourages actor oriented

approaches to research and planning within the ‘development world’, where the

opinion, meanings, perceptions and conceptions of the “target groups” of development

intervention, the locals influenced by it, are placed in the foreground and given much

more attention. I believe that an understanding of development intervention can only

be satisfactory with an appreciation of what is happening through the eyes of those

concerned.

My aim is to analyze issues as seen from the locals’ point of view, but I hope that the

criticism of projects presented in the thesis will not be seen as an ‘I-know-better’

attitude, as I am well aware of the multiple pressures and difficulties under which

project management has to act, just like I truly admire project personnel for their hard

work in the area. Also, I must add that I of course remain solely responsible for any

errors of facts or interpretation.

It must also be emphasized that I am aware that negotiation occur on other ”levels”

than just the community level, e.g. on national level in the elaboration of forest policies.

I acknowledge that these other “levels” of negotiation are indeed important as they

also influence on the community-level responses to project intervention. However,

given the scope of this thesis and my interest in local level responses, I must delimit my

research from examining negotiation on other levels than the community level.

16

Concepts central to my research will be explained in the theoretical and analytical

framework in the next chapter.

Structure of the thesis

Below the main content of each chapter will be explained in order to give the reader an

overview of the substance and structure of the thesis.

Chapter 2 will account for the theoretical and analytical framework of the thesis. The

first part of the chapter provides a brief overview of notions of project intervention,

which leads to the presentation of my own choices of theoretical and analytical

framework. This includes presentation and clearer definitions of analytical concepts,

which are central to this thesis and hence constitute the theoretical and analytical tools

applied for investigating the research question.

Chapter 3 contains a description of my fieldwork and applied fieldwork techniques;

how the research question was investigated, and hence an outline of the methodology

used in the thesis in relation to theory and empiric evidence, including the strengths

and weaknesses of the applied fieldwork methods. An assessment of the quality of the

thesis will end the chapter addressing indicators of validity, reliability and sufficiency;

as well as a reader’s guide will be provided.

Chapter 4 commences with a description of national and regional characteristics in

Nicaragua that are relevant in regard to discussing how external factors, such as

history, politics, economy, policies and legislation, influence on locals’ responses to

project intervention; and hence the aim is to answer the first sub-question. The chapter

continues with a contextual outline of the research area and the case study village,

including a brief presentation of local livelihood strategies and locals’ conceptions of ‘a

good life’, as well as a presentation of present conservation and development projects

in the buffer zone.

Chapter 5 continues the presentation of findings from the field research, including a

narrative illustration of locals’ diverse livelihoods and means of living, and hence their

17

differing responses to development and conservation projects. The chapter approaches

the second sub-question for which reason the focus will be social differentiation and

differing capitals, conflicts, power and negotiation, and how these different issues all

influence on how locals respond to development intervention.

Chapter 6 will conclude on the research question as a whole; that is how locals respond

to development and conservation projects and what factors can help explain these

responses.

Chapter 7 contains perspectives on issues presented in the introduction of the thesis

and seek to discuss aspects as regards project logics and development and

conservation interventions.

18

Chapter 2

Theoretical and Analytical Framework

My interest focus as well as the previous presented research question and sub

questions set the scene for an actor-oriented exploration of the encounter between

development interventions and the people whom they touch upon. Recognising that

development intervention is a ‘social event’ where the “developers” and those “to be

developed” interact, analysis must logically take place on the local level (Olivier de

Sardan 1988:217). Hence, methodologically the research question calls for an

ethnographic5 understanding of everyday life, local livelihood strategies and local

responses to conservation and development projects, for which reason an actor-

oriented approach is applied. In the following chapter I shall outline the contents of

this approach – and my own application of it – by presenting some of the authors who

refer themselves to it, as well as encircle the positioning of the thesis in relation to

wider discussions of project intervention and local responses to it.

Notions of project intervention and its impacts

The term ‘planned intervention’ tend to express development as something that can be

predicted, managed and controlled (Secher Marcussen & Bergendorff 2004). As

mentioned in the previous chapter, planned intervention has most often been build on

an image of the relationship between policy, implementation and outcomes as a linear

process, implying a step-by-step progression from policy formulation to

implementation to outcomes, after which one can make an evaluation to establish how

far project objectives has been achieved (Long 2001:25). Impact is generally defined as

the long term, sustainable changes as a result of a given intervention (e.g. Bond 2005;

Oakley et al. 1998), but various authors emphasize the importance of seeing impact as

something that is felt from the first day a particular intervention is conceived and

5 Ethnography presents the results of a holistic research method founded on the idea that a system’s properties cannot necessarily be accurately understood independently of each other and therefore stresses processes, relationships, connections and inter-dependency among the component parts (Mikkelsen 2005:125).

19

unfolds over time (Folke & Nielsen 2006:2; Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen

2003:234), which calls for a deconstruction of the concept of intervention, so it is seen as

an ongoing socially constructed and negotiated process (Long 1992:35; Long 2001:25-

26).

In Ferguson’s widely acclaimed book “The Anti-Politics Machine” about development

projects in Lesotho (Ferguson 1990), he emphasizes the importance of looking at what

projects actually help to maintain or what impact projects actually have “outside” the

project objectives, instead of just focusing on “what went wrong” when analysing

intervention impact.

Similarly, Roche (2000) underlines that when analysing impacts of project intervention

it is important to consider which changes are being regarded as important, plus for

whom and by whom these changes are important, which leads him to conclude that

changes come into existence by a combination of a given projects’ activities, and the

dynamics which exist in the context where these project activities appear (Roche

2000:74-75). It is therefore important to remember that “development and change is

never solely a product of a controlled process” (Roche 2000:75 - my own translation).

To understand the dynamics of development intervention, Long (2001) points out that

planned intervention is an on-going process which is transformational and is

constantly re-shaped by its own internal organisational and political dynamic, as well

as reshaped by the responses and strategies of locals individuals and groups who may

struggle to define and defend their own social spaces, cultural boundaries and

positions within the wider power field (Long 2001:27).

Theoretical and analytical framework – an actor-oriented approach

Starting out with a brief continued explanation of the actor-oriented approach

pioneered mainly by Norman Long and his colleagues at the Wageningen Agricultural

University in the Netherlands, I will work my way through to the theoretical concepts

which are central to this thesis and hence constitute the analytical tools applied.

20

Long (2001; 2002; Long & Long 1992) argues for an actor-oriented approach, when

analysing development intervention and social change. The essence of an actor-

oriented approach is that its concepts are grounded in the everyday life experiences

and understandings of the involved actors, both the “affected” or “beneficiaries” and

the ”developers”. According to Long (1992, 2001) it is theoretically unsatisfactory to

base analysis only on the concept of external determination, since ”all forms of external

intervention necessarily enter the existing lifeworlds6 of the individuals and social

groups affected, and in this way are mediated and transformed by these same actors

and structures” (Long 2001:13; Long 1992:20); for which reason the focal point when

analysing social change is the “meeting” between projects and locals, and how locals

respond or react to intervention. Mosse (2004) supports this idea of using an actor-

oriented approach when focusing on project interfaces arguing that ”policy ideas do

not have a life of their own apart from institutions, persons and intentions, but can

only be understood in terms of the institutions and social relationships through which

they are articulated (...)” (Mosse 2004:28). Hence, when analysing development

intervention and social change by using an actor-oriented approach it is important to

put emphasis on social interactions and use them “as productive pathways into social

reality, as means of deciphering concrete social situations, both in terms of actors’

strategies and contextual constraints, and as means of approaching practices and

conceptions, of pinpointing conjunctural and structural phenomena” (Olivier de

Sardan 2005:12).

’Agency’ and power

A cornerstone of the actor approach is the interest in accounting for the differential

responses to similar structural circumstances, even if the conditions seem relatively

homogeneous. Accordingly one assumes that the differential patterns that arise in

connection with development intervention are formed as a result of the different actors

and their different ways of responding to the proposed changes by development

projects (Long 2001:13). In connection to this, Long (2001) emphasizes the importance

6 Long (2001) defines ’lifeworld’ as ”lived-in and largely taken-for-granted social worlds centring on particular individuals. (...) Lifeworlds embrace actions, interactions and meanings, and are identified with specific socio-geographical spaces and life histories.” (Long 2001:241). The origin of the concept of ‘lifeworld’ stems from Habermas (Andersen 2001).

21

of not to depict actors as passive recipients of intervention, but rather as “active

participants who themselves process information and strategise in their dealings with

various local actors as well as with outside institutions and personnel” (Long 2001:13).

It therefore becomes important to document the ways in which people “manoeuvre”

their own lives and “muddle their ways through difficult scenarios, turning ‘bad’ into

‘less bad’ circumstances” (Long 2001:14,71), or in other words, how actors deal with the

problematic situations they encounter (Long 2001:57). It is actors, who use, manipulate

and transform intervention discourses and it is in the encounter between development

intervention and locals that the real effects of development occur (Long 2001:53).

Thus, central in Long’s work is the concept of agency, that is people’s capability to cope

with the challenges they face and to create their own room for manoeuvre within a

given institutional framework (Long, 2001:16-18,182,240-241). He refers to Anthony

Giddens’ social constructionist theory when arguing that actors both act within the

limits of and regenerate the structures of society. An application of this approach to my

rural Nicaraguan setting implied conceiving the informants as somewhat constrained

by the predominant social and cultural norms and the economic and political

institutions which surround them7, while at the same time seeing them as actors who

are able to influence these, and to create room for manoeuvre within them (Long

2001:13-20). The insight that the notion of agency can give to the analysis is to show

that all actors exercise some kind of power, including those who appear to be

powerless. The term agency therefore encompasses power and knowledge. Power and

knowledge is not something which is possessed; it emerges out of social processes.

Locals’ responses to a given project, as well as the project’s ability to influence or to

pass on a command (e.g. get locals to accept a particular conservation initiative), are

therefore crucially depending upon “the actions of a chain of agents each of whom

‘translates’ it in accordance with his and her own projects” (Latour in Long 1992:23).

Power, which can be defined as “the capacity of an individual to impose his or her own

will upon others” (Villarreal 1992:256), involves struggles between actors who aim to

enrol others in their ‘projects’ and winning them over to their point of view (Long

2001:20). Power is inherent in every social relation and setting (see Christensen &

7 Later in this chapter I will go into further explanation of the conception of contextual and external factors in relation to an actor oriented approach.

22

Jensen 2001). Power manifests and reproduces itself in families, workplaces and any

other organizational setting of everyday life (Foucault in Long 2001:64). Someone

having power or knowledge does however not entail that others are without (Long

2001:19). Those apparently being “powerless” or “oppressed” in a specific situation are

not utterly passive victims and may be involved in active resistance (Villarreal

1992:257), since even the decision of not getting involved in a development project can

demonstrate a degree of power and knowledge, or agency. When people decide to

involve themselves in a development project it often means “delegating” power to the

project, accepting certain meanings and different or new points of view (Long 2001:19-

20; Long 1992:22-25). Yet, even though a person decides to get involved in a

development project and thereby accept the project’s “agenda” of e.g. a special type of

land use or livelihood, this person might still carry out his own “projects” or ways of

living parallel to his participation in the project. Thus, “when looking for power, we

see struggle, negotiation and compromise” (Villarreal 1992:257). A central question for

my research, then, is how actors - within the existing constraints - find room for

manoeuvre to carry out their own “projects”.

‘Social interface’ and ‘arenas’

Another concept central to Long’s exploration of development intervention is that of

‘social interface’. Interface analysis helps to understand the differential responses by

locals (both target and non-target groups; participants and non-participants) to

planned intervention by showing how the interaction between “intervening” parties

and local actors shape the actual outcomes of particular intervention policies. Interfaces

could also be called the meeting between “developers” and “beneficiaries” (both target

and non-target) and even though the word “interface” tends to evince the image of

some kind of face-to-face confrontation, interface situations are more complex and

“abstract” in nature embracing multiple different interests, relationships and levels of

power (Long 2001:66). Interface articulates situations and places where different – and

often conflicting – lifeworlds meet; where different local actors and intervention

interact and where the different actors see their own realities and work on how to

achieve certain goals they may have set for themselves, which as a result shape the

actual outcome of a particular intervention (Long 2001:65-66). Linked to the last point

23

is the importance of knowledge, which - like power - is present in all social situations,

and “emerges as a product of interaction, dialogue, reflexivity and contests of meaning,

and involves aspects of control, authority and power” (Long 2001:71). Processes of

knowledge constitute “the ways in which actors come to grips with the world around

them cognitively, emotionally and organisationally. They do this on the basis of their

own and others’ experiences and understandings (...)” (Long 2001:242). Likewise,

interface analysis concentrates upon examining ‘arenas’, which is a term important to

the notion of development intervention, and entails understanding the struggles and

power differentials taking place between actors involved (Long 2001:72). Arenas

should be understood as “spaces in which contests over issues, claims, resources,

values, meanings and representations take place” (Long 2001:242). The image of

interface and arenas can also be portrayed metaphorically as a “game” in which the

players (the social actors involved) come face to face and compete with each other, all

playing according to different rules. In this “game” the involved players possess

different interests, different levels of power and different resources or ‘capitals’ (this

last concept will be elaborated further later in this chapter), which all enable them to

influence the progress and the execution of the “game” (Olivier de Sardan 2005:185;

Bierschenk 1988:146).

Therefore, in order to examine local-level development processes and responses to

planned intervention it is useful to work with the concept of social interface, since this

explores how contradictions of social interest, cultural interpretation, knowledge and

power are mediated and perpetuated or transformed at decisive points of policy

intervention. The interface approach emphasizes that intended policy outcomes are

always mediated by the characteristics of local and external actors and by the

negotiations between the relevant actors; and advocates the importance of looking

beyond predetermined categories, such as beneficiaries or target groups, since

development intervention is a negotiated and collaborative process, which cannot

simply be imposed even by the most powerful external agencies, but rather mediated

through the interactions among the various actors (both target and non-target) (Long

2001:69-72).

24

When analyzing social interfaces and arenas, a key word is ‘conflict’ or what Long &

Long (1992) refers to as ”encounter at the interface”, where more or less serious interest

conflicts are being fought on the arenas. The title of their book ”Battlefields of

knowledge” (Long & Long 1992) underlines this image or idea about contested arenas

in which actors’ understandings, interests and values are pitched against each other.

Arenas of conflicts are therefore often linked to the implementation of projects,

constituting a social field where different groups compete with each other for material,

symbolic or institutional resources provided by the project (Bierschenk 1988:146).

Although interface interactions presuppose some degree of common interest, they also

have a tendency to generate conflict due to opposing interests and objectives or to

unequal power relations. Negotiations at the interface are sometimes carried out by

individuals who represent particular groups or organisations. Their position is

inevitably ambivalent since they must respond to the demands of their own groups as

well as to the expectations of those with whom they must negotiate. One should

however not assume that because a particular person “represents” a specific group or

institution he or she necessarily acts in the interests or on behalf of his/her fellows

(Long 2002:7). Long & Long (1992) argue that it is in the field of intervention that

struggles over social meanings and practices take place. Therefore, when looking at

local ‘responses’ to development projects one should focus at the conflicts that appear

in relation to the projects as well as look at who is part of the conflicts and how these

conflicts are fought. Conflicts might as an example emerge when or if development

projects fail to consider local situations or when conservation and development

projects introduce new policies in regard to use of natural resources (Matiru 2000).

Conflict is almost always associated with an element of change (Pendzich et al. 1994),

and since development intervention will always in some way or another entail

changes, knowledge about conflicts or struggles can help understand how projects

have influenced on the local settings (Nielsen 2000:40) and hence help explain local

responses to projects.

Contextual and external factors

Although adopting an actor-oriented approach in this thesis, analysing social events of

development intervention at the community level, it is important to emphasize that

25

contextual and external factors likewise play a role as regards the way locals react or

respond to projects (Olivier de Sardan 2005:139; 1988:218). Therefore, it is relevant to

take into account the various external factors, often beyond the control of projects,

which can influence on the implementation of conservation and development

initiatives (and consequently influence on the way locals respond to these same

initiatives). This includes among others the economic, political and ecological context

in which both the projects and the local population are embedded (Olivier de Sardan

1988:219). As an example, integrated conservation and development projects will

almost always be subject to national and international law regarding resource use and

resource conservation, which also touch upon the locals and hence the interaction

between projects and locals. Thus, projects and locals “enter into a relationship in the

context of an environment that does not depend on them and that exerts a significant

pressure on their relationship” (Olivier de Sardan 2005:139). This view is supported by

Agrawal & Gibson (1999), who emphasize that ”analyses of only local-level

phenomena are insufficient to explain interactions at the local level. All local

interactions take place within the context of larger social forces” (Agrawal & Gibson

1999:637), although not repudiating the important role of local actors and the notion of

social interface. External forces, such as new state policies can drastically change the

shape of local level phenomena, but “introduced changes will themselves always be

contested in the local context, and their meanings transformed by the communities

whose actions they are supposed to alter” (Agrawal & Gibson 1999:639).

In this regard, it is useful to turn back to the metaphorical example above about arenas

and interface as a game. Development projects are also players in this game, and hence

enter into the game in the context of an environment with a variety of factors beyond

their control. These factors could, among others, be climate, local prizing systems, and

not least other past or present development projects operating in the zone. Locals’

ways of reacting to a new project to a large degree depend on their experiences with

past or present intervention. Although projects very often act as if they were

“debarking on virgin territory”, there is a memory of previous intervention among

locals, and their reactions or responses to projects today therefore have to be

understood in the context of previous experiences (Olivier de Sardan 1988:219;

2005:139).

26

Analytical approach

The concepts of agency, social interface, arenas, power, conflicts, knowledge processes,

etcetera, as introduced above, provide a well-founded basis for analysing aspects of

development intervention. However, in order to understand locals’ reactions or

responses to projects and their rationales for engaging or not in these, it is also fruitful

to make use of Scoones (1998) as he provides a framework for analysing sustainable

rural livelihoods. It is however not the aim of this thesis to appraise the sustainability

of neither local livelihoods nor projects. Rather, I allow myself to single out certain

elements of his framework; highly useful for my analysis (the framework is available in

Annex 1). The aim is to provide a holistic picture of the context in which people and

projects are embedded, and thereby to contribute to the understanding of the

interactions between locals and projects, locals responses to projects and hence factors

that facilitate this response.

Firstly, the framework comprises these contextual and external factors already

emphasized as important in the previous section. Yet, most importantly, the

framework provides a “tool” or apparatus for an understanding of people’s means to

react to e.g. development intervention; namely by ‘capitals’, closely linked to the notion

of agency. In order to understand locals’ responses to development and conservation

projects, it is therefore fundamental to look at local livelihood resources or capitals8.

These are the basic building blocks, upon which people are able to engage in the labour

market, undertake production, participate in development projects and involve

themselves in reciprocal exchanges with other people. Livelihood capitals may be

described as stocks of resources that can be utilised directly or indirectly, to generate

the means of living, and are divided into natural, economic, human and social capitals

(Scoones 1998:7pp).

Natural capital refers to the natural resource stocks from which resource flows useful

for livelihoods are derived (including land, water, soil, wildlife, biodiversity,

environmental resources).

8 ’Capitals’ and ’resources’ are in this connection reflecting the same object.

27

Social capital refers to the social resources upon which people draw in pursuit of

livelihoods (i.e. social relations and networks, membership of groups, relationships of

trust, access to wider institutions of society).

Human capital refers to the skills, knowledge, ability to labour and good health

important to the ability to pursue different livelihood strategies.

Economic or financial capital refers to the financial resources which are available to

people (whether savings, supplies of credit or regular remittances) and which provide

them with different livelihood options. In addition, basic infrastructure such as

buildings, roads, potable water, as well as production equipment, are following

Scoones’ framework included in the economic capital and are means which enable

people to pursue their livelihoods.

If once again returning to the metaphorical example above about arenas as a game, the

capitals influence on the game, because all actors hold different capitals, which enable

them to influence on or even get involved in the game and interact with the other

players. Some have more capitals than others; e.g. more money, more land, more

energy, more contacts (better networks), more technical aptitude, etcetera (Oliver de

Sardan 2005:186). In this game everyone then tries to take advantage of his/her capitals

and influence the game to his/her advantage.

Summing up

As explained carefully in this chapter, I apply an actor-oriented approach in this thesis

conceiving the field of development as an arena or a social interface, in which contest

over issues, resources, practices, knowledge and values take place. Therefore, by

recognizing development intervention as a ‘social event’ where the “developers” and

those “to be developed” interact, I seek to understand and analyze how this contest

unfolds at the community level, by giving particular attention to locals’ different

responses to and negotiation with projects and by taking into account those possible

external factors influencing on this response. The following chapter will thoroughly

28

explain how the analytical concepts were converted into methodological tools in the

carrying out of fieldwork.

29

Chapter 3

Methodology

Having introduced and delimited the area of research, as well as having presented the

theoretical and analytical framework, this chapter will describe and discuss the

methodologies used for approaching the research question. At first, the overall

methodology employed for data collection will be outlined; the desk study and the

field study. The latter will contain a justification of the choice of case study village. This

leads to a presentation of the applied field work techniques with the aim of explaining

how the analytical concepts presented in the previous chapter were converted into

methodological tools and thereby practice in the field. The strengths and weaknesses of

the applied fieldwork methods will be discussed continuously throughout the chapter,

but at the end of the chapter the methodology, techniques and findings will be

discussed in relation to the validity, reliability and sufficiency of the study. As a final

point, by means of a reader’s guide, it will be clarified the way findings are presented

and adduced throughout the thesis.

Data collection techniques

To establish the reliability of the research methodology, the following will present the

techniques employed for collecting data. The primary data collection took place as a

fieldwork of 12 weeks in Nicaragua from September to December 2006 (plan of

fieldwork is available in Annex 8), for which reason this will be given particular

attention in the chapter, where the field work techniques will sought to be fully

documented and discussed.

Deskstudy

Understanding local responses to conservation and development projects requires

knowledge of the broader context on national and local level, including historical,

political and socio-economic characteristics of Nicaragua, as well as policies relevant

30

for the research field. This was sought through various sources of secondary

information before, during and after the field study. Besides studying general

methodologies and theories for conducting case study research before conducting the

fieldwork (McNeill & Chapman 2005; Mikkelsen 2005; Neuman 2000; Punch 1986;

Robben & Sluka 2006; SLUSE 2004), the desk study consisted of reviewing relevant

literature within the field, first of all academic research on development intervention,

in particular those using an actor-oriented approach of analysis. Furthermore, the desk

study consisted of examining Nicaragua’s national environmental and forestry related

policies and official reports pertaining to this matter, which have primarily been

accessed through websites and through academic studies. The desk study has therefore

contributed to a detailed understanding of both historical and contemporary factors

influencing processes of development in the local context.

Field study

As previous mentioned, I knew the buffer zone area from my internship period, for

which reason I was already familiar with the local surroundings, the culture, the food,

the weather, and all these other things that one normally has to get used to when first

initiating field work in a foreign country. I therefore also had the advantage of already

knowing a lot of people in the area, both locals as well as personnel from the different

projects, organizations and institutions, which made it easier to initiate and carry out

my field work in Nicaragua9.

The employed methods were mainly qualitative, endeavouring profundity in the

research instead of covering a large physical area in the buffer zone, for which reason a

case study village was selected. The first week was spent in Boca de Sábalos (see map

on page 7), which is the main community and a connection point for trade and traffic

in and out of the municipality as well as the location for projects and institutions

operating in the zone. In order to single out a village for my investigation the first

week was spent on visiting the different project and institution offices, presenting

myself to project personnel, talking about my thesis, having informal conversations, as

9 The case study village I selected was however unfamiliar to me.

31

well as obtaining information about the different communities in the municipality and

the project presence in these. Likewise, during this first week and also later during my

field work I carried out semi-structured interviews with project staff and people

employed in organisations and institutions working in the area, in order to deepen my

understanding of specific aspects as well as the general idea about the projects. These

interviews also provided me with a more thorough and site-specific understanding of

the local and national context, as well as an initial understanding of the locals’

livelihood strategies. During my field study I carried out informal conversations,

interviews and follow-up interviews with 20 so-called “key informants”10, that is

people that had a specific knowledge of the issues to be explored, such as current and

former project staff, mayor of the municipality, as well as personnel from local and

national institutions operating in the area. These informants are listed in Annex 2,

where it also appear whether the type of communication was informal talks or

interviews, as well as the dates for the interviews are listed. Interview guide for the

interviews with “key informants” is listed in Annex 7.

Based on information from project personnel and various considerations, such as

project presence, forest cover, my safety and accessibility, I decided on a village for my

field work research, Las Maravillas, located approximately 25 km northeast of Boca de

Sábalos and 7 km west of the Reserve (map on page 7). Las Maravillas was chosen

because it is one of the remote villages in the buffer zone which is still relatively easy

accessed and above all because it is located outside the “danger zone”11 closer to the

Reserve. On good days (with no or less rain) Las Maravillas can be reached in “taxi”

(jeep) from Boca de Sábalos in about 1½ hours, due to a road and a bridge (crossing a

main river close to Las Maravillas) being built about 3 years ago. On rainy days, the

road turn into an inaccessible mud-road and the last 4-5 km. has to be done by foot.

Likewise, an essential consideration for choosing Las Maravillas as case study village is

that this rural community and the surrounding area still holds adjoining forest areas,

which makes it a “target village” for development and conservation project

10 From lack of a better word, project personnel are called ”key informants” although I found the respondents in the case study village to be the true key informants. 11 Closer to the Reserve boundary (in the area close to La Quezada), there are some conflicts going on about land property and cattle. During the last years there has been armed conflict with several victims, and in generel it is not recommended to visit La Quezada, especially not if you are a stranger, let alone a girl.

32

intervention. Las Maravillas consist of a “main centre”, with roughly 93 families

(approximately 500 persons)12, and about additional 70 families spread sporadic in two

other sectors in eastern and northern direction officially belonging to Las Maravillas.

However, in order to concentrate my research on a delimitated case study area, only

Las Maravillas “centre” was selected for my field study, for which reason only this

limited area is comprised in the words “Las Maravillas” throughout the thesis.

Almost three months were spent living with a family in Las Maravillas and carrying

out the field study. From the beginning I sought to take part in the family’s life and

daily routines, which meant getting up early at 5.30 AM with the rooster and the rest of

the family, participating in the cooking, going to the church, washing clothes in the

river with the women, eating rice and beans for breakfast, lunch and dinner, going on

family and acquaintance visits, chop wood and what else needed to be done in the

household. Living with a family for several months facilitated the opportunity of

getting to know more people from the village and thereby of developing a certain

knowledge of and insight into people’s lives and livelihood strategies, as I eventually

became part of many families with whom I spent weeks and weeks. Therefore, living

in and forming part of the community gave me the advantage of knowing and

becoming aware of minor details and information about local livelihoods, conflicts,

opinions, rumours, and other factors relevant to my research, as well as it served as a

gateway to identify ‘backstage negotiations’ in the village that I would not otherwise

have been “allowed” to witness since it would be more or less ‘invisible’ viewed from

the outside or by ‘experts’ or researchers in a hurry or visiting on one-day trips.

I made an explicit use of the actor-oriented approach throughout my fieldwork,

adopting the notion of “interface” as an analytical tool to examine local responses to

conservation and development projects and comprehend the possible factors

facilitating these responses. By understanding intervention as an ongoing, socially-

constructed and negotiated process (Long 2001:25; 72), I paid particular attention to

different arenas of conflict, negotiation, power struggles and knowledge processes. The

12 Numbers are based on estimates from the local population living in Las Maravillas, due to the fact that the “Alcaldía” (mayor’s office) did not for the time being possess numbers from this part of the municipality.

33

field for research was understood as a field of social interaction, socially constructed,

constituted by social meanings and practices negotiated at different interface

encounters where particular ‘external’ intervention (specifically two conservation and

development projects, which will be presented in chapter 4) were among many other

actors and factors influencing on locals’ reactions to projects. This was not always

something obvious or visible, but rather something I sought out by means of a wide

range of tools within the RRA/PRA methodological approach and more

anthropological approaches. This involved a combination of formal semi-structured

interviews, rankings, informal conversations, observation, informal visits to farms and

fields, and participation in social events as well as in meetings between project staff

and project participants in the village. It goes without saying that I have thought it

important to listen carefully to the locals I was studying; to their experiences, to their

values, to their understanding of the situation. In the following section I seek to present

my applied field work techniques in the most extensively detailed manner.

Field work techniques

During the first weeks I carried out transect-like walks with people living in Las

Maravillas, in order to know the community geographically and understand land use

patterns. This was also a good opportunity to meet many of the families from Las

Maravillas and introduce myself, so they knew why suddenly there was a chela (white

person) living in their village. Later on, the transect walks also came to work as a

means of triangulation, since it sometimes revealed differences between “the said” and

“the done”.

Likewise, by using participatory methods, a rough “capital-ranking”13 estimate was

undertaken with 6 persons from the village, both men and women, young and old.

These 6 persons were selected on the basis of my own observation in the community

and information obtained by talking to “key informants” (projects personnel) so that

they represented some of the “parameters” I wanted to enclose in the ranking. These

parameters were based on or inspired by Scoones’ capital approach, trying especially

13 Similar to ’wealth ranking’ (Mikkelsen 2005), but differing as I strived for ranking capitals inspired by or following Scoones, as explained in the previous chapter, and hence the ranking included factors other than just ”wealth”.

34

to include social, natural and economic capital (social capital being e.g. influence and

prestige; natural capital being amount of land owned, and economic capital being

“rich/poor” based on assets). In Danish or international terms everyone would of

course be poor14, but still some are relatively more rich or better off than others in the

community. By recognizing that only people themselves can judge their own welfare

(Angelsen & Wunder 2003), with their own set of indicators, the parameters for

classifying “rich” and “poor” in the community were discussed and elaborated by the

6 persons, so that we ended up with 4 categories from A to D. A being relatively “rich”,

a category for people with own ‘finca’ (farm), land and forest, pasture and business; B

being “regular” – for people with farm, land and forest, pasture, but no business; C

being “poor” – for people with minimum or no land and forest; and D being

“miserable” – for people with absolutely nothing, not even their own house. The

influence and prestige parameters were divided into ‘political influence and prestige’,

‘influence in the churches’, and ‘founder’ (being people arriving to the area 35-45 years

ago when still no people were living in the area and when Las Maravillas was still just

all forest and without name – and thereby often people with a certain respect in the

community).

The rough ‘capital ranking’ estimate was carried out over various days, and ended up

being a ranking of the approximately 93 families living in Las Maravillas. Most families

consist of husband, wife and 4-6 children, but normally only the man possess prestige

or political influence, for which reason the families were mentioned as e.g. “Family

José Gonzales” meaning that the family of José was included in “José” (in some cases a

woman was living alone, and was therefore considered the head of the household).

While doing the ranking I also made sure that they emphasized who of the families

were involved in projects. Whereas the “capital ranking group” (the 6 persons) had

absolutely no problems in remembering the names of all the families in the

community, including names of the “head of the household” (which not surprisingly

almost always was a man), they had more difficulties remembering who was or was

not involved in some project or another. However, it gave me an important incipient

14 Per capita GDP in Nicaragua was estimated to be US$ 867 in 2005. Nonetheless, over 25% of the population, mostly rural dwellers, remain below the poverty line (WTO 2005), which is most certain the case for most people living in the buffer zone.

35

idea about project participants15 and the ranking therefore also became my entrance or

gateway to project participants. I then sought out the project participants from the

ranking and when the first interviews with these were carried out they could normally

name other persons involved in the projects, for which reason the ranking or rather my

participant list was adjusted accordingly over time. I therefore added their position as

project participant in the ranking, before selecting the final respondent for my research.

Thus, the ranking gave me an overview of the inhabitants in the village and served as a

mapping of the actors, showing me who was “poor” and who was “rich”, who

possessed political influence (and influence in general) and prestige and who did not;

as well as who was involved in projects and who was not. For more in-depth study I

initially selected 25 families from the ranking based on parameters such as involved in

projects/not involved in projects, rich/poor, founders or long time living in the

community/short time or newcomers to the community, political influence/no

influence and so forth. Hence, I tried to select key families by “cross-selecting” in

regard to the different categories in the capital ranking, so that I selected both poor

people from the “lower” categories (C and D) with no influence or with influence

involved or not involved in projects, as well as rich people from the “higher” categories

(A and B) with no influence or with influence, involved or not involved in projects.

Moreover, during the process of capital ranking with the group, I explained them the

idea of a social network (important to the notion of social capital), which subsequently

led to a drawing session, where they by means of arrows and circles tried to roughly

group or map the social relations, social ties and networks within the village. This was

sought developed later during the fieldwork through the individual interviews, where

I asked people about their connections and relationships in the village. When you

explain the notion of a social network most people can understand the basic idea quite

easily, since everyone in some way or another is involved in a social network (Davies

2003). I am well aware that networks can be seen and analysed at many scales as well

as there is a wide range of methods for describing the structure of networks and

15 For unknown reasons, and quite surprisingly, the Danida administrator in Boca de Sábalos did not want to, or following the exact formulation “was not able to”, provide me with a name list of their project participants in Las Maravillas beforehand.

36

people’s places within those networks (Scott 2000; Davies 2003), but due to time

limitations this method was considered useful and suitable. In continuation it should

be mentioned that human capital likewise was sought “measured” or explained by

means of the individual interviews carried out later.

I then started my “detective”-part of the field work by spending weeks and weeks

following these 25 selected families/persons in their everyday life; which meant eating

with the families, spending time in their houses, making good friends with the

children, washing clothes or assorting beans with the women, going to the field with

the men, going to “the market” (small local shops, selling everything from toilet paper,

to soap and beans) to buy products, participating in family events such as birthdays

and other family gatherings, etcetera.

The 25 selected families accepted surprisingly that I was always around following

them in their everyday practices, but for different reasons I spent more time with some

people than with others. Likewise, I got to know much more families than the 25

selected, based on the simple fact that for many people the presence of a pale-faced

chela is something new and exotic, for which reason I was very often invited into the

houses of people for dinner or a talk, as well as people sought me out in order to talk to

me. Not wanting to exclude the opinion of certain people, I extended my study to

embrace more people. 4 persons were added to my research later due to their position

as project participants. Consequently a total of 39 people were subject to my research.

From among these, 14 respondents were project participants (of which 2 were engaged

in the two different projects simultaneously) and 25 were non-participants (of which 1

was former participant in the Danida cocoa project). 9 were female and 30 were male.

Different typologies of people were interviewed in accordance with the above

explained “cross-selection” from the capital ranking divisions. Roughly 28 respondents

of the 39 were visited several times in order to make follow-up interviews and further

in-depth study.

The ranking of all the 93 families is enclosed in Annex 3. Names are left out (for

reasons I shall explain later in this chapter), and Roman numerals are used instead for

this annex. A “star” or the sign * against the Roman numerals will indicate the 25

37

persons originally selected for “in-depth study”, whereas two stars, the sign **, will

indicate the ensuing 14 persons added to my study. In order to provide a well-

arranged overview, Annex 4 provides a separate ranking outline of the 39 respondents

for my research.

Intentionally I sought to carry out only individual interviews as opposed to group

interviews. This was done for various reasons, but mainly due to the probability of

obtaining more confidential information than could have been done through group

interviews (Ravnborg et al. 2000:21). Funnily enough, the individual interviews

sometimes ended up being improvised group interviews. When carrying out

interviews with people in their houses or in front of people’s houses, often other

people than the respondent stopped by to see what the ’chela’ was doing. Sometimes

the visitors just watched in silence for a time before sneaking away, but other times the

visitor or the visitors started to add comments or even discuss some of the answers of

the actual respondent. When such a discussion unfolded in front of my eyes I sought to

be “invisible” by letting the people have their discussion, while I wrote down as fast as

possible in my notebook to capture all the opinions presented (for the same reason my

research was extended to include a total of 39 people as mentioned above).

The basis for an actor-oriented approach is paying attention to the ways in which

people reflect on themselves, by looking for theories people construct about history,

society, and the things that happen around them. Inspired by “The Most Significant

Change”-approach (Davies & Dart 2005) I therefore also made use of the ‘story’- or

‘life-story’-approach, hoping to get answers to some of the central questions about

change in the form of stories told by the locals of who did what, when and why – and

the reasons why the event was important. The aim of using this approach was to

understand and analyze how project intervention has influenced (or not) on people’s

lives by paying attention to “the way in which the locals tend to express themselves

about themselves, the history of their community, and other topics they may come up

with themselves” (Nuijten 2005:11). By using the story-approach and letting the

respondents tell about particular changes they found to be the most significant ones, I

was hoping to understand in what ways and if development interventions had

influenced on local lives and everyday social practices. A methodological problem with

38

this approach is that people have a tendency to remember the past in either a too

exaggerated or understated way (like when we in Denmark remember our childhood

winters with at least 5 meters of snow for several months). However, the approach

showed especially useful when talking to women. In general, the women had a

tendency to “underestimate” their own knowledge, meaning that when trying to make

formal interviews with women they most often referred to their husbands or oldest

sons, excusing themselves by saying that they did not “know anything about that”.

Even though I always tried to explain that I did not seek for correct answers or that my

questions were related to their own lives and opinions, they almost always stressed

that they “did not have any opinions”. The story-approach, although employed in a

very informal way - most often when sorting beans with the women - turned out to be

very useful and allowed me to gain insight in their lives, their “ups and downs”, their

dreams, and their hopes for the future. Likewise, by talking casually with the women it

always emerged that they did have opinions about project intervention, even though

they most often ended their sentences by saying “but what do I really know about that;

my husband say that it is…” (e.g. good/bad/useful/or other adjectives pointed at their

husbands’ opinions about the projects).

Even though this range of research techniques was used during my fieldwork, one of

the most useful methods turned out to be observation. Even though I was never an

invisible observer I took part in several meetings with technicians (project personnel)

and participants from the village where observation proved a useful tool, as well as I,

as previously mentioned, took part in the daily life of locals through my active

participation in their everyday activities. In relation to conflicts, observation was of

great use. Since conflicts are always a very sensitive issue, it was difficult to investigate

upon by the use of interviews. It should be mentioned that I was being careful when

asking questions about conflicts, meaning that I was never insensitive or trying to

provoke a revelation of conflicts. In my research of conflicts, I therefore applied an ad

hoc-approach, sensing and observing any possible conflicts, and sensing whether it was

appropriate to “dig deeper” and if so, tried to make the interviews and conversations

in a diplomatic way, in order not to insult anyone. The meetings with project

technicians and local participants, where I participated as a silent observer, turned out

to be better occasions, though still difficult, for studying conflicts and “clashes”

39

between so-called expert knowledge and local knowledge. The meetings gave clues

about what was happening “behind the scenes”; like for example from the ironic

remarks, the facial expressions and the conversations and discussions afterwards. Also,

direct observation has been an excellent source not only to information but also as a

means to triangulate findings from interviews and informal talks. As regards people’s

forest utilization, observation proved useful to reveal differences in rhetoric and

realities, in articulation and practice, since what people said they did often differed

from what they really did.

Discussion of methodology, techniques and findings

It was a huge and invaluable advantage that I speak Spanish, so that none of my field

work had to be done with the use of an interpreter. Even though a lot of information of

course can be obtained with the use of interpreter, it was nevertheless a big advantage

that I speak Spanish myself, since this opened up for the possibility of having

conversations and interact on a more personal level with the locals. I am quite sure that

this type of fieldwork would prove difficult, if not impossible, to conduct, by means of

an interpreter, since many of my findings are based on informal everyday-talks I had

with the people while living in Las Maravillas16.

I did not tape record any of the interviews, but took notes in my notebook or directly

on the interview guide paper, which was a conscious choice, in order not to make the

respondents feel “interrogated”. During interviews I made sure to keep eye-contact

with the respondents, which gave the feeling of a more personal contact. Still, I came to

find informal conversations much more fruitful than actual interviews, mainly due to

the fact that people talked more freely when I was e.g. asking casual questions while

sorting beans with the women or walking with the men in their fields, than when I was

asking questions in a more formal setting writing down simultaneously. My primary

way of organizing this amount of information gathered from both formal interviews,

informal conversations and observation was by taking field notes as soon as possible

after each interview or conversation, which has left me with a great many notebooks

16 I compare this to my earlier fieldwork experiences from Thailand, where all interviews and conversations had to go through an interpreter.

40

full of respondents’ answers, personal thoughts, reflection on the research process and

extensive descriptive details drawn from memory. Sometimes I wrote down whole

quotes, if a certain sentence or answer seemed particularly useful or interesting.

Keeping a fieldwork “diary” was very useful in the process of follow-up interviews or

when I needed clarification of prior comments and opinions later on during the

fieldwork.

The people’s interest in me as a person from “far away” was very overwhelming, and

often the two-way communication resulted in me answering more questions than I

posed. Nonetheless, gaining the confidence of the people and following their life as if I

was a daughter in the family gave me invaluable insight in not only people’s

livelihoods, but also an insight into problems and conflicts (both at family and

community level) and made it easier for me to carry out interviews later on, since the

confidence was then already established. Likewise, by becoming part of the daily life of

people I had the opportunity of observing their everyday practices, which - in

combination with the interviews – turned out to be a very essential field work

technique, since it provided a window on the diversified livelihood strategies of the

people and allowed me to identify the differential responses to projects. It should

however also be mentioned that being a foreigner carrying out fieldwork is not as

simple as it might sound, meaning that I am aware of the probability of my presence

creating barriers or falsity in my relation with locals. It is possible that they perceived

me as a representative of the “development circus” and consequently modified their

behaviour and answers. Similarly, even though I stressed my position as a student not

working for any project, it is possible that locals perceived me as a connecting link

between themselves and the projects and therefore were cautious about their responses

to my questions. Speaking hypothetically, for instance, some people might not have

wanted to reveal the truth to my posed questions in order to “save face”, while others

may have wanted to exaggerate their poverty out of a strategic desire to increase the

likelihood of development assistance. As already mentioned, this potential obstacle

was sought overcome by stressing my position as independent student, and by means

of triangulation which will be enlarged on later in this section.

41

It is in accordance with the actor-oriented approach that I did not work with

predefined indicators and categories, but rather established these through the

encounter with the reality in the research area and the rhetoric and definitions used by

the local people themselves. For instance, the locals were the ones to define proper

categories in the capital ranking procedure. Also, using loosely-structured interviews

allowed respondents room to develop their own perspectives and agendas. I have

attempted a full and plausible account of responses to development intervention and

factors facilitating these responses that rely as much as possible on the evidence,

experience and descriptions which the locals have themselves provided. However, in

addition, it should be emphasized that I am aware of the fact that I am ultimately

rooted in an academic and ideological background and have been guided by my

research question, for which reason I was usually the one to select approaches and

thematic focus in the interviews, as well as I ultimately have been the one to analyze

the findings, make the judgements, interpret data and select what to include and

exclude in the presentation sat forth in this thesis. This also applies for my use of

observation, where I am aware that I myself have been part of the process being

described (Booth 1994:21). The ‘fullness’ of this thesis is thus limited by own empirical

and analytical interests, and obviously by the practical limits of time and space (Scott

1985:46). I have however sought to be loyal or genuine towards answers and issues put

forward by the locals and have not, I hope, replaced their account with my own. Also I

have aspired to transparency at all levels, for instance by this chapter’s thorough

presentation and discussion of field work techniques as well as by including life stories

and quotations in the presentation and analysis of data.

My fieldwork was carried out in a period of national elections, which in many ways

may have influenced on my research and findings. Nicaragua is a country of politics,

which became even more evident when doing my fieldwork in an election period.

People carry with them very clear memories from the time of the Sandinista rule and

the civil ‘contra’ war. In the times of the revolution and war there was no middle

ground; you were either on the side of the Sandinista or on the other side (Kinzer 1991;

Obregón, pers. comm.). This division can still be traced today. During my fieldwork

everything was marked by the elections; both the physical surroundings and the

“contents” in conversations and interviews. Even the most ramshackle houses were

42

painted in black and red, if supporting the Sandinista party, and in white and blue if

supporting the Liberal parties. On almost every house propaganda and posters were

put op. Political flags flapped lazily from flagpoles made for the occasion around the

village. People wore caps in party colours. Political battle songs could be heard around

the village. The upcoming elections influenced on interviews in unexpected ways.

Every conversation or interview was marked by locals’ political opinions, party

affiliation and war memories. Even when asking about things that hardly could be

attached to politics, people often made very fierce political statements, and framed

their answers and perspectives in relation to the political antagonism present in

national politics at the time. Especially the part of my interviews that focused on locals’

hopes for their lives and factors influencing on their livelihoods were coloured by this.

Therefore, although trying neither to underestimate nor overestimate this situation as

an external factor influencing on people’s responses, the political reality of that time

was not one I could ignore (Olivier de Sardan 1988:218). However, to this must be

added that I do believe that this rather extreme expression of politics and war

memories was only perceptible and vital to such an extent due to the time for my

fieldwork.

Living in the village for several months (as opposed to most of the project staff

working in the area who travel forth and back between Boca de Sábalos and Las

Maravillas) allowed me a certain insight into local gossip and rumours. Gossip and

rumours are normally considered unreliable and unworthy of serious study, but I came

to find particular rumours valuable in my research of locals’ responses to projects. A

detailed account of rumours’ validity and reliability is neither necessary nor plausible

here, but I will however emphasize how some anthropologists have suggested that

”gossip is a cultural device used by the individual to forward his own interests” (Suls

1977:164). Also, rumours have been described as public communications that are

infused with private hypotheses about how the world works and can be a barometer of

tensions in a community as well as sometimes a predictor of behaviour (Rosnow 1988).

Of course not all gossip and rumours were relevant for my research, but I came to find

that a great many rumours flourish about the projects as well as about the mayor in the

municipality. As you will come to see, some of these rumours are presented in chapter

43

5 and analysed as part of the findings in order to elucidate factors influencing local

responses to projects.

Actor-oriented tools are all about human relationships and therefore cannot help but

be political. “They need to be used with sensitivity, awareness and with an

acknowledgement that the user is never neutral. Actor-oriented tools may reveal

information which some actors may not find easy to accept. It is also important to

realise that different actors may have different interpretations of reality and that these

interpretations may be politically motivated.” (Biggs & Matsaert 2004:11-12) Therefore,

knowing that the rumours, as well as people’s other statements, answers and actions,

are affected by subjective perceptions, I have sought to establish the validity or rather

the authenticity by means of triangulation; both by utilising several different field

work techniques and by looking at things from different points of view (different

sources/stakeholders). I sought to cross-check the validity or “truthfulness” of my

findings by presenting and discussing them with project personnel and other people

living and working in the buffer zone (Annex 2), as well as by reviewing other

academic literature of research in the buffer zone.

The thesis builds on a case study from one single community in the buffer zone. By

having the village committee appointed in a corrupt manner by the municipal mayor

(as will be explained later in chapter 4 and 5) Las Maravillas differ from other villages

in the buffer zone in this particular (by being the only known village having their

village committee appointed by the mayor of the municipality). The projects operating

in Las Maravillas are similarly present in other villages in the buffer zone, yet with

varying numbers of participants as well as with different project components. The

responses to conservation and development projects I came to find in Las Maravillas

may be found in other villages in the buffer zone or even in other countries. Yet, the

factors facilitating the responses would vary accordingly over time and space as would

the responses presumably. Certainly other responses, other types of negotiation, other

conflicts etcetera could have been found if the fieldwork had been carried out earlier,

e.g. when the projects were firstly introduced in the village, or later, when the projects

have officiated for a longer period. It is therefore important to emphasize that my

findings from Las Maravillas only serve as a “snapshot” of current conditions, as well

44

as the finding apply only to this village. Also, any local situation is of course unique,

just as any project is (Olivier de Sardan 1988:218). Nevertheless, I believe and hope the

findings from this case study to be more widely relevant, as they illustrate mechanisms

and concerns that also exist elsewhere, although their extent and concrete expression

will depend on the specific context. Actually, I believe that the arguments and

reasoning sat forth throughout the thesis are well-founded and valid in general when

discussing rural development intervention.

Reader’s guide

First of all, it should be clarified that I throughout the analysis refer to people’s

‘capitals’. ‘Capital’ is liable to be understood only as economic resources, for which

reason I hereby strongly emphasize that I apply this term as including all four capitals

as described in the previous chapter; that is natural, economic, human and social.

Various individual life- or case-stories will be used throughout the analysis in chapter

5 as illustrations of the significance of social networks and varying capitals, and as an

indication of how promoted project activities are used divergent in different livelihood

strategies, and hence in order to exemplify the differences in locals’ responses to

projects and the diverse circumstances influencing these responses. The stories are

pieced together from findings during my fieldwork in Las Maravillas and are based on

interviews, observation and informal conversations. In the writing of the stories, I have

sought to be as loyal as possible to the words and expressions phrased by the

respondents themselves. Fictive names have been used in order to protect the

anonymity of the respondents. The case-stories are used when considered relevant for

the content of the chapter and can refer to points or analysis made both before and

after the case-story. The case-stories are put in italics (e.g.: Juan is 55 years old and came to

Las Maravillas four years ago...).

In general, I have decided to conceal the identity of the local respondents from Las

Maravillas in order to protect them from reprisals or consequences of any possible

kind. References to interviews or informal talks with residents from Las Maravillas will

accordingly be provided with a number (Respondent No. 1, 2, 3, etcetera). All the

45

respondents from Las Maravillas will be listed in Annex 5 by means of numbers,

omitting the names, but with a column stating whether the respondent is a participant

in a project or not. Likewise, the type of communication will appear (e.g. informal

talks, interviews, follow-up interviews) as well as the dates for the interviews will be

stated. The interview guide used for interviews with local respondents is available in

Annex 6.

Likewise and as already mentioned, the capital ranking of all 93 families in Las

Maravillas is enclosed in Annex 3. Names are left out and Roman numerals are used

instead. A “star” or the sign * against the Roman numerals will indicate the 25 persons

originally selected for “in-depth study”, whereas two stars, the sign **, will indicate the

ensuing 14 persons added to my study. In order to provide a more well-arranged

overview, Annex 4 provides a separate ranking overview of the 39 respondents for my

research (these are listed by numbers corresponding to the numbers used in Annex 5;

the complete list of respondents).

“Key informants” (current and former project staff, mayor of the municipality, as well

as personnel from local and national institutions operating in the area) did not request

to be anonymous when asked, and thus they are quoted by their surnames throughout

the thesis. The reference will similarly indicate whether the information obtained was

through interviews (e.g. “Interview with Dahlbom”) or informal conversations (e.g.

“Dahlbom, pers. comm.). In continuation of the Bibliography all “key informants”

referred to in the thesis are listed by names (surnames first), with a description of their

project or institution affiliation. However, sometimes I have chosen to omit references,

which is particularly the case when writing about very sensitive issues that could have

my informants fired for breach of the law. In particular, in the section about conflicting

forest legislation in chapter 5 I intentionally leave out names of the specific employees,

but rather refer to e.g. the ministry MARENA or the institute INAFOR as a whole. As

already mentioned, a complete list of “key informants” and others talked to during my

fieldwork is available in Annex 2, where it will also appear whether the type of

communication was informal talks or interviews, as well as the dates for the interviews

will be stated.

46

Chapter 4

National, local and community characteristics and context

Understanding local responses to conservation and development projects requires

knowledge of the broader context on national and local level. The context, often

beyond the control of donors as well as recipients, influences the way locals – both

participants and non participants - respond to and interact with the projects, just as it

constitute the context or milieu in which projects have to act. Thus, external and

contextual factors can help explain locals’ rationale for participating or not in projects

and why they respond as they do. Therefore, what will firstly be outlined in this

chapter are the national context and the most important factors inherent in and

influencing on the community context. This includes historical, political and economic

characteristics of Nicaragua, as well as policies relevant for the research field. In

continuation, the local and community context will be portrayed, including a

characterisation of the conservation and development projects in the case study area;

their project objectives, requirements for participants as well as the design and

promotion of their activities. This chapter hence serves as a background to analyze the

community context, in order to identify the external factors that facilitate locals’

responses to projects.

National context

Nicaragua - a country of lakes, rivers and volcanoes - covers approximately 130,000

km2 and is the largest country on the Central American isthmus, bordering Honduras

at the north and Costa Rica at the south, and with coast lines towards both the Pacific

Ocean and the Caribbean Sea/Atlantic Ocean. This location has founded strong

geopolitical interests of different world powers in the territory, due to the possibility of

creating an inter-oceanic canal from one ocean to the other (Gutierrez et al. 1999;

Christie et al. 2000).

47

Nicaragua has a warm tropical climate dominated by moist easterly trade winds. A dry

season extends from January through April; and a wet season from May through

December. Topographic differences produce roughly three main regional variations; a

warm Pacific coastal region including the rift valley and west-facing mountain slopes

with pronounced dry and wet seasons; more humid interior mountains with cooler

temperatures; and the Caribbean lowlands and east-facing mountains slopes with a

warm, wet climate and rainforests (Nepenthes 2004). The latter is the location for my

field study.

A brief political-historical & economic outline

Nicaragua’s history is an epic of tyranny and rebellion. Since independence17 and its

colonial inheritance, Nicaragua has been governed by a series of centralist,

authoritarian governments coupled with recurrent foreign interference, which has

influenced on the socio-economic structures of the country and its culture and thus

formed a Nicaragua plagued with political and economic instability. Because of the

dramatic regime transformations during the last decades - from the Somoza

dictatorship to Sandinista revolutionary rule in the 1980s to neo-liberal electoral

democracy - complex institutional structures exist in this country and Nicaraguan

democracy remains fragile in terms of basic citizen rights. The state has demonstrated a

weak capacity for good governance, especially concerning the issues of land rights,

poverty alleviation, and human rights (Spalding 1994; Walker 1997; Abu-Lughod

2000).

An important theme in Nicaragua’s historical formation has been the periods of foreign

intervention. First came the Spaniards, then the British and the United States; the latter

becoming increasingly involved in Nicaragua’s affairs. From 1912 until the end of 1932

(except a short interval in the mid-1920s) Nicaragua was occupied by the US Marines.

When the US withdrew in 1932, command of the National Guard was turned over to a

Nicaraguan; Anastasio Somoza. Once in command of the military, he quickly

17 Nicaragua became a colony of Spain in the early 16th century. Before the Spaniards, it had been home to a population of approximately 2 million indigenous peoples. In 1821, independence was declared from Spain, and Nicaragua became an independent republic in 1838.

48

consolidated his power and by January 1937 he was the president of Nicaragua. With

Somoza as president began the longest-lived dynastic dictatorship in Central American

history. The Somoza family - with the support of USA - ruled Nicaragua for over 40

years. During this time per capita income remained below average even for

impoverished Latin America, with the lower 50% of the population in the late 1970s

probably having access to under US$ 300 per person per year. Meanwhile, the Somoza

family fortune, which had consisted of a small run-down coffee farm in the early 1930s,

had risen to at least US$ 500 million by 1979. The Somoza system accentuated class

differences and social problems. The agro-export economy of the country was

continuously made more exploitative and many peasant farmers were displaced in

order to make way for the production of cotton in the 1950s. As more and more land

was cultivated to produce export crops, less and less food was produced for

consumption by an expanding population. The main developments occurred in

economic infrastructure and in urban growth, most of which was in the hands of the

controlling elite, thus the majority of the population was excluded from any of the

benefits (Gutierrez et al. 1999; Walker 1997).

In July 1979 the Somoza regime was overthrown by the national insurrection led by the

FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional)18. By the revolution in 1979 FSLN had

managed to build an alliance with most of the discontented sectors of Nicaraguan

society and had sought multi-class support.

With the Sandinista revolution began a long epoch with major transformations, which

still imprints Nicaragua and not least the Nicaraguans of today. Dramatic social,

political and cultural changes were reshaping the country as Sandinista leaders sought

to wipe away the society that had existed for generations and replace it with a very

different one. And as this was happening, a guerrilla force created and directed by the

United States plunged the country into full-scale civil war (Kinzer 1991).

During the early 1980s, Nicaragua saw major changes in social security and the

revolutionary government established programmes of agrarian reform, food subsidies,

18 FSLN was formed in 1961 by a small group of Marxist students who had left the Nicaraguan Socialist Party, which they found to be too closely controlled by the Soviet Union.

49

housing, universal health care and education. After the revolutionary victory, the

Sandinista revolutionary government immediately initiated social processes of

profound change in the education and health sectors, as well as in land tenure and

property rights. The properties of the Somoza family and their allies were nationalized

as were those assets that appeared abandoned by wealthy people who had panicked

and emigrated to other countries. These confiscated properties were turned into state

farms, peasant cooperatives and, to a lesser extent, individual plots. With this initiative

of new agrarian reforms far more peasants had access to land than during the Somoza

period and Nicaragua became more self-sufficient in domestic food production. Social

security and social welfare were radically expanded, and if measured in terms of

growth in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, the results of the new Sandinista

policies were generally positive. From 1979 through 1983, Nicaragua experienced an

overall growth in GDP per capita of 7% while Central America as a whole suffered a

decline of 14.7%. Perhaps the most impressive change was the programs in health and

education. With the support of tens of thousands of young voluntary people literacy

crusades were carried out in the whole country, making significant gains against

illiteracy (Walker 1997; Kinzer 1991).

In November 1984 the revolution moved from transitional government to

constitutional government through election, where FSLN’s presidential candidate,

Daniel Ortega, won 63% of the votes. The election did not pass off without resistance

though, due to the USA and the US president at that time, Ronald Reagan. The Reagan

administration denounced the 1984 elections as a ”Soviet-style farce” and had tried to

ruin the elections by employing a ”teaser” candidate to show interest in running

campaign without formally registering and then withdraw with great fanfare claiming

that conditions for a free election did not exist in Nicaragua. Using US influence in the

World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, the Reagan administration

managed to cut off all normal lending to the upstart republic, while at the same time

orchestrating a massive anti-Sandinista propaganda campaign typified by frequent

distortion and outright fabrication. At the same time the USA trained, equipped and

directed an exile counterrevolutionary army (known as the Contras) consisting of ex-

Somoza supporters and unsatisfied peasants to fight against its own government. By

the end of the 1980s, after a decade of civil war (internationally known as the Contra

50

War), the USA blockade and its ”destabilization campaign” against the Sandinistas, a

worsening economic situation in the country, a shift in budgetary priorities from social

programs to the war, and a decline in the legitimacy of FSLN in the eyes of many of the

Nicaraguan people, the Sandinista-led government stood to lose the upcoming

elections. In 1990 the Sandinista revolution was formally over, when Daniel Ortega lost

elections to the National Opposition Union (UNO) led by Violeta Chamorro (Walker

1997).

The Chamorro government announced sweeping neo-liberal measures, including

massive public-sector layoff, privatization, rate increases in public services, a sharp

reduction in social spending, and the elimination of subsidies on public consumption.

Important objectives of the new government was to root out any vestige of Sandinista

influence and to incorporate the population into a ”new history”; a population whose

consciousness and daily practices had been transformed during the ten years of

revolution. The development of a polyarchic political culture and the legitimization of

a neo-liberal social order was a crucial counterpart to eroding the revolution’s value

system. The manipulation of religious values, patriarchal and traditional cultural

patterns was central to this endeavour. One of the first steps was the penetration and

restructuring of the educational system as a key institution of ideological reproduction.

Millions of US$ were allocated to replace textbooks that the Sandinista government

had developed for the schools. The old books were ordered burned and the new

”depoliticized” textbooks referred to divorce as a ”disgrace” and to abortion as

”murder” and stressed the importance of ”obedience to parents and legitimate

authorities” as well as ”order in the family” (Obregón, pers. comm.; Robinson 1997).

The 6 years governed by Chamorro was characterized by three major transitions; from

civil war to peace, from planned economy to market economy, and from a one-party

dominant system to democracy. Even though the new government had relatively

success with these three fundamental transitions, the imposed changes had high social

costs and the implementation of decreased social programs and the development of the

market economy brought even more insecurity to most Nicaraguans (McConnell 1997).

The election in 1996 was won by the liberal candidate Alemán, whose administration

has been characterized by central decision-making and repetitive corruption scandals.

51

Enrique Bolaños, from the same liberal party as Alemán (PLC), won the elections in

2001, after a polarized election campaign between Daniel Ortega (FSLN) and Bolaños.

Bolaños’ government programme contained among other things advancement of good

governance including combating corruption, and depoliticization of the judicial system

and other central institutions (UM 2006a).

In January 2007 Daniel Ortega (who lost the elections in 1990, 1996 and 2001) was once

again inaugurated as president of Nicaragua, by winning the elections in November

2006. If he complies with his campaign pledges, which among other things was to fight

the country’s poverty, hopefully the poor Nicaraguan ‘campesinos’ (farmers) can face a

brighter future, with Ortega’s promises of promoting rural development. There are

enough problems in the country to address oneself to as president of Nicaragua.

Today, Nicaraguans are still struggling to survive and have very few support options

available to them. It is a nation of high unemployment, poor health standards and

declining levels of education (UM 2004; 2006a).

The period from 1986 to 1990 was an economically difficult time for Nicaragua, being

characterised by hyperinflation and a general shortage of imported goods. For the

same reason, survival – not development – became the overriding goal for the

Nicaraguan government (Frühling 2000:9). Over the past decades, Nicaragua has

witnessed a very significant transformation; from a nation torn by war, with its

economy plunged into chaos, it has re-emerged as a democracy where the foundations

for economic growth and sustainable development are being laid. Notwithstanding

this progress, Nicaragua still remains among the poorest countries in Latin America

(World Bank 2006a).

Nicaragua is subsequent to Haiti the poorest country in Latin America-Caribbean and

one of the countries in the world with the most unequal distribution of income. Per

capita GDP in Nicaragua was estimated to be US$867 in 2005. Although poverty

declined from 50.3% in 1993 to 45.8% in 2001, over 25% of the population, mostly rural

dwellers, remain below the poverty line and survive for less than US$ 1 per day (Corral

& Reardon 2001; World Bank 2006a; UM 2004; UM 2006a, WTO 2005).

52

Nicaragua is a small country, with less than six million inhabitants and plenty of land

suited to farming and forestry. Most of its economy depends on agriculture and

associated activities in the agriculture and food chain. The economy is still suffering

from the extensive crisis for export crops, where a decline in coffee prices on the world

market in 2001 and 2002 contributed to hunger situations in Nicaragua (UM 2006a).

During the last 30 years, the economy has varied from modest to slow growth, to

outright recession and shrinkage. With an economy very open to the world market, the

country imports twice as much as it exports, leaving it heavily dependent on

remittances and aid receipts (ODI 2005:7-8).

External dependence and international development assistance in Nicaragua

Nicaragua receives one of the highest levels of per capita external assistance in the

world; well over US$ 100 per capita per annum, or about 13% of GDP. The total

external aid down payment number US$ 400-500 million per year. Nicaragua receives

external assistance from 19 bilateral donors and 21 multilateral institutions. Over the

period 1997-2000, there was a balance between multilateral financing and bilateral

grants. Five organisations; the World Bank, European Union, Inter-American

Development Bank, World Food Programme and the United Nations Development

Programme; provided 90% of multilateral assistance. Of the total value of contributions

by multilateral institutions, approximately 75% are loans (UM 2002; EC 2002).

Nicaragua became member of WTO in 1995. Moreover, in 1995 Nicaragua affiliated to

the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) which came into force in April

2006. Nicaragua is under IMF and World Bank influence and was in 2006 by IMF given

100% debt relief for the country’s debt from before 2005 (approximately US$ 5 billion)

under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. During 2007, Nicaragua is going to

renegotiate its Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility agreement with IMF, which was

agreed upon in 2002 and constitutes the overall frame for Nicaragua’s effort to create

better living conditions for the country’s population and constitute simultaneously the

frame for the Danish aid programme. The agreement aims at giving rise to macro

economic stability with policy aims of high economic growth rates, low inflation, job

53

creation and a sustainable balance of payments (UM 2004, 2006a; Government of

Nicaragua 2002; World Bank 2006b).

Denmark has carried out aid projects in Nicaragua since 1981 and in 1993 Nicaragua

became a Danish programme country for bilateral development assistance (UM 2005a).

The overall aim for Danish development policy is to increase sustainable development

through a poverty oriented growth (UM 2004). The overall Danish aid support to

Nicaragua in the period 1991-2001 was evaluated in 2002. The evaluation report

estimated among other things that the chosen sectors were in accordance with the

Nicaraguan government’s priorities, but that “the sustainability of the programmes

generally has been problematic, mainly due to weak Nicaraguan institutions with very

limited own funds for financing of maintenance” (UM 2004:7 - my own translation). A

revised country strategy for the Danish aid assistance to Nicaragua (2004-2009) has

been developed in collaboration with the Nicaraguan authorities and the focus for the

aid is four sector programmes, namely agriculture, transport, environment and

education (UM 2005a; NETARD/ReNED 2005).

Denmark has provided support to the environment in Nicaragua since the early 1990s,

but in 1999 the support was expanded or gathered to be an actual sector programme.

In the period from 1999 to 2004 a total of US$ 25 million were donated from Danida to

the PASMA programme (Environment Sector Programme Support) under the

environment sector (MARENA 2004a). Included in the components for this sector

programme support is institutional capacity building and strengthening of the

Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources (MARENA) (UM 2005b). PASMA

was originally scheduled to conclude in late 2004, but was extended to the end of 2005,

using the remaining funds still available in the overall budget. A new phase of the

Danish support to environmental management in Nicaragua, named PASMA II, was

initiated in January 2006 and is expected to conclude by the end of 2010. The overall

budget for PASMA II is of US$ 32 million (UM 2005c).

As a component of the PASMA programme Danida has been supporting conservation

and development projects in the buffer zone of Río San Juan since 1991, firstly with the

54

local NGO, Fundación del Río, and later in close cooperation with MARENA and the

local government (Dahlbom & Mayorquín 2005).

Summing up

Nicaragua’s history is one of tyranny, corruption, rebellion and war, and the country

has witnessed a very significant transformation; from a nation torn by war, with its

economy plunged into chaos, to a democracy where the foundations for economic

growth and sustainable development are being laid. Notwithstanding or maybe as a

result of this progress, a strong national sentiment exist in Nicaragua; people are proud

of being Nicaraguans19 (Kinzer 1991; Obregón, pers. comm.) Likewise, the history of

Nicaragua, in particular the revolution and civil ‘contra’ war, has left clear marks into

present Nicaragua. Today, people are still much divided between either being

Sandinistas or liberals. People have a very clear memory of the time during the

Sandinista revolution, and either recall this period as one of glorification or as one of

true disaster.

As presented above Nicaragua is a land of projects. However, this “projectisation” also

has a profound impact on the nature of institutions, and the institutional landscape in

Nicaragua contains a confusing and seemingly paradoxical mix of policies, structures,

and priorities (ODI 2001), which will be presented and discussed in the following

section.

Environmental and forestry policies and institutions

Updated and concordant information about the forestry sector in Nicaragua is scarce,

but newest numbers from FAO show that approximately 5,2 million hectares of forest

existed in Nicaragua in 2005, which correspond to approximately 40% of the national

territory (FAO 2005).

19 Besides from this being visible in Nicaraguan poetry and songs, I also came to find a nation full of indisputable pride during my stays in Nicaragua.

55

Protection of the environment and natural resources is a transverse consideration in

Nicaragua’s policies, laws and action plans. Nicaraguan legislation recognizes natural

resources as the basis for the country’s (sustainable) development and local

governments as important participants in development (Larson 2002:22). The

Nicaraguan Constitution establishes that access to a healthy environment is a

fundamental right of all Nicaraguans and that the State has the obligation to preserve

the environment and natural resources by means of sustainable use (Constitution

2000:11). Likewise, the Nicaraguan government declares in its Environmental Action

Plan (PANic) from 2000 that it recognizes natural resources and the environment as the

most important resource of the country and that it aims at contributing to the well-

being and development of the human being by using its natural resources in a

sustainable manner (PANic 2000:5).

Despite good intentions, the institutional landscape in Nicaragua contains a confusing

and seemingly paradoxical mix of policies, structures, and priorities, which

unfortunately are disaccording in its contents and therefore often as a consequence

become ineffectual in practice, which we shall examine in this section.

Institutions in the environmental context

Institutions responsible for environmental protection and natural resource

management in Nicaragua are numerous, but unfortunately unclear and overlapping

responsibilities appear, which causes frustrations within the different institutions and

authorities, but also causes confusion and distrust among the population.

In the environmental subject matter responsibilities are distributed between the central

government and local (municipal) governments. At central government level,

MARENA is the authority with mandate to direct national environmental policies,

formulate norms for environmental quality and sustainable use of natural resources

and to supervise the fulfillment, control pollutant activities, administer the system of

protected areas and supervise fulfillment of International Agreements in

environmental matters. At the same time, the responsibilities and fields related to

profits from natural resource use fall within Ministry of Development, Industry and

Commerce (MIFIC), with the exception of biodiversity (belonging to MARENA) and

56

forest use, belonging to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests (MAGFOR) through

National Forest Institute (INAFOR) (UNDP 2006).

These above mentioned responsibility areas are general for environmental and natural

resource use. With regard to purely forest, even though this is also a natural resource,

the responsibilities slightly change. Authority over the forestry sector lies with

MAGFOR, a task it carries out in consultation with the National Forest Commission

(CONAFOR) and in coordination mainly with MARENA and MIFIC. The

responsibilities of MAGFOR include formulation of agricultural and forestry

development policies, plans and strategies, whereas INAFOR is responsible for

implementing forestry policy (FAO 2004a). With regard to the latter it is INAFOR’s

responsibility to “supervise the sustainable management of the nation’s forest

resources, by inspecting, acting and punishing according to this Law and related

Regulation” (INAFOR 2003: Arto. 7.1 - my own translation), as well as it is their

responsibility to “approve logging permits and to know, evaluate and control forest

management plans” (INAFOR 2003: Arto. 7.3 - my own translation).

On the other hand, as part of a greater decentralization process in Nicaragua (see

below, in the section “Decentralization process in Nicaragua”), the local municipal

governments are responsible for the development, conservation and control of the

rational use of the environment and natural resources, by promoting local initiatives

and contributing to the monitoring, surveillance and control of these. These

responsibility areas should, however, always be carried out in coordination with

national or central authorities and institutions (UNDP 2006).

Decentralization process in Nicaragua

Decentralization in Nicaragua was initially promoted primarily by international

donors and was seen as a means to improve resource allocation, efficiency,

accountability, and equity (Ribot et al. 2006:1876). The institutional foundation for the

current decentralization process in Nicaragua was initiated under President Daniel

Ortega with the passage of a new Constitution in 1987, which re-established municipal

autonomy (eliminated in 1939) as well as direct election of local authorities, and the

57

creation of The Municipal Law of 1988 being the basic legislation governing municipal

activities. Since Daniel Ortega’s government lost the national elections in 1990, further

decentralization in Nicaragua was suggested and presented by international donors,

and later in the rhetoric of the new government and of civil society movements, as part

of a broader process to increase popular participation and establish and strengthen

post-revolutionary democracy (Ribot et al. 2006; Larson 2002). The decentralization

process in Nicaragua has however not been unproblematic. The problem hitherto

about decentralization is that local authorities and governments in Nicaragua have

mostly been allocated huge amounts of responsibility but without any comparable

fiscal transfers that could help improve their capacity to meet these new obligations

(Larson 2002).

Natural resource management literature often gives little attention to local

governments, and instead has much more focus on community-based conceptions of

decentralization (Larson 2002:17). Anyhow, decentralization to local governments as

regards natural resource management has been under way for some years in

Nicaragua, but not without complaints and obstacles. Academic and policy literature

show that decentralization is a highly complex process fraught with obstacles (Larson

2002:17). Add environment and natural resources to the equation and complicacy and

obstacles multiply accordingly (e.g. Batterbury & Fernando 2006; Larson 2002; Ribot et

al. 2006; Wardell & Lund 2006; Verón et al. 2006; Wilder & Lankao 2006). Reforms to

the Municipality Law in 1997 substantially increased municipal responsibilities

regarding natural resource management, still without further fiscal support (Larson

2002; Ribot et al. 2006). The 1997 Municipality Law grants local governments the

responsibility ‘‘to develop, conserve and control the rational use of the environment

and natural resources as a basis for the sustainable development of the Municipality

and the country (...)” (Gaceta 1997: Arts. 6 and. 7, point 8). Local governments are

responsible for developing land use plans and several have passed comprehensive

natural resource ordinances establishing local norms and rules for resource use.

Nevertheless, it is not always clear which local norms are legally binding, or what

mechanisms local governments have to enforce these ordinances. In addition, the laws

are often unclear and contradictory and establish overlapping authority. Coordination

with line ministries is minimal, with the latter usually simply setting the standard that

58

local authorities are expected to follow. There are few, if any, institutional mechanisms

through which local authorities can hold central government authorities accountable.

(Ribot et al. 2006:1876-1881; Gutierrez, pers. comm.; Mayorquín, pers. comm.).

The lack of correlation between responsibilities delegated to local authorities and fiscal

support with regard to natural resource management has brought along disavowal of

responsibilities and corruption in local governments. In the opinion of many local

government officials, central authorities have only transferred natural resource

burdens rather than benefits to the local level, and minimal budgets has encouraged

municipalities to promote resource extraction in order to exact tax income. Throughout

time there have been various examples of local authorities and governments having

misused the unclear laws by giving out logging permits to big forest companies in

order to earn money to their own account (Larson 2002; Gutierrez, pers. comm.). A step

to overcome this obstacle was taken in 2003 when the first Municipal Transfer Law was

implemented in Nicaragua, guaranteeing 4% of the national budget in 2004, increasing

gradually to 10% in 2010, to local municipalities (Ribot et al. 2006; Gaceta 2003).

Forest legislation & its contradictions

Going into profound analysis of contradictions in Nicaraguan environmental and

forest legislation would be a thesis in itself. For this reason, I restrict the below

presentation and discussion to sum up only the most important aspects considered

important for the case study context.

Law 559; Special Law for Crimes against the Environment and Natural Resources20,

came into force in November 2005. Law 559 establishes in its article 57 that no trees can

be cut down from within a radius of 200 meters from streams and river margins

(INAFOR 2005). Furthermore, this law introduced new and severe sanctions to

breaches of the law as Article 31 reads: ”those people who log or destroys trees or

shrubs that are destined to protect water basins, water sources or water recharge areas,

will be sanctioned with 2-4 years imprisonment and a fine equivalent in Córdobas from

20 Ley Especial de Delitos contra el Medio Ambiente y los Recursos Naturales

59

US$200 to US$5,000, as well as they will be obliged to plant five trees of the same

species for each tree logged” (INAFOR 2005 - my own translation). It is quite difficult,

if not impossible, to find a tree in the area of Río San Juan where there is no stream

within a distance of 200 meters. This however did not restrain INAFOR from

continuing the issue of logging permits in the buffer zone after this law came into force

(Faurby 2007, pers. correspond.). It is of course easier to be “flexible” with this law,

since most streams are not marked on maps, and are therefore more easily

”overlooked” than clearly marked zones of 10 or 15 kilometres (a point I shall return to

later) (Faurby 2007, pers. correspond.). Also, the Law 559 contradicts with the Law 462;

Law for the Conservation, Promotion and Sustainable Development of the Forest

Sector21, from 2003. While Article 57 in Law 559 establishes a distance of 200 meters

measured from the river margin throughout its course (INAFOR 2005), Article 27 of the

Law 462 establishes a distance of 50 meters measured horizontally from river margins

(INAFOR 2003). This discrepancy in the two laws could most likely have created

confusion and uncertainty for both forest officials and logging operators in the buffer

zone, as it implied that forest management should be considered illegal - even when

following permits INAFOR had authorised - if the permit had taken into account the

area of 50 meters established in Law 462 from 2003 (Global Witness 2007). However,

whether Law 559 created confusion in the buffer zone among locals, logging

companies and forest authorities is uncertain, since shortly after a new even more

severe and inflexible law came into force that with certainty has created confusion in

the buffer zone.

Between March and May 2006, the Nicaraguan press uncovered illegal logging

activities in forests in the regions of RAAS and RAAN. It was the first time that illegal

logging of such a scale was covered by the media, and created concern and complaints

at a national level about the lack of control that INAFOR was able to extend on the

logging and trading of timber products (Global Witness 2007; Gutierrez, pers. comm.).

This led to President Enrique Bolaños issuing an Economic Emergency Decree in May

2006, of which the main objective was to stop uncontrolled exploitation of forests in

four departments of the country; Nueva Segovia, RAAN, RAAS and Río San Juan. The

21 Ley de Conservación, Fomento y Desarrollo Sostenible del Sector Forestal

60

Decree suspended the approval of any new permits and ordered that all forest

operations being implemented in those areas at the time should be brought to a halt

and inspected (Gaceta 2006a; Global Witness 2007).

Shortly after, as a consequence of the Decree, Law 585; Law for the Banning of

Logging, Utilization and Trading of Forest Resources22, came into force in June 2006.

This law prohibits logging and trade of six tree species in all of Nicaragua for the next

ten years (Gaceta 2006b; CCAD 2006). Moreover, it bans any logging activity in all

protected areas for an indefinite time and establishes ‘restriction areas’ with limited or

no utilization permitted in a buffer strip of 10 kilometres from the border of two

Biosphere Reserves and a Natural Reserve, and 15 kilometres from the country’s

borders inwards (Gaceta 2006b). Yet, the law declares that wood originating from

plantations approved by INAFOR is exempted from the ban (Gaceta 2006b:Arto. 3).

Within an area of 10 kilometres from protected areas, the ban allows “only non-

commercial forest utilization for domestic (household) purposes used solely in the

area” (Gaceta 2006b:Arto. 1) whereas no forest utilization whatsoever is allowed 15

kilometres from the country’s borders inwards (Gaceta 2006b:Arto. 1). The law has

caused confusion in the buffer zone, which I shall return to in details in the

forthcoming chapter and only briefly touch upon here. Parts of the buffer zone to the

Biological Reserve Indio Maíz (including my case study village, Las Maravillas) is

“double” affected by this ban, as it lies within both the radius of ten kilometres from

the border of the protected area and within the limit of fifteen kilometres from the

country border. The ban is therefore ambiguous or vague in its design which makes it

open for interpretation. For the same reason, there are different opinions as to whether

small-scale logging for household purposes in the buffer zone is legal or illegal, as well

as the responsibilities for the different authorities are unclear. As mentioned

previously, INAFOR is the authority to implement policies in the buffer zone and to

issue logging permits (which officially shall be sought even for household purposes).

However, MARENA has certain responsibilities in protected areas, but – on paper -

does not have actual competence in the buffer zone. In practice, however, it was my

clear impression that MARENA has the principal say in the matter of the buffer zone.

22 Ley de Veda para el Corte, Aprovechamiento y Comercialización del Recurso Forestal

61

Likewise, Law 585 establishes in Article 1 that it is the responsibility of the national

army to control the observance of the logging ban in the 15-kilometres zone from the

country border, in coordination with the competent authorities (Gaceta 2006b:Arto. 1).

So, basically, what we are dealing with here is a strict law which in practice becomes

vague because of the many authorities stumbling over each other with different and

yet complementary responsibilities, and without no shared interpretation of the law’s

content. Due to its contradictory content in the case of the buffer zone, it creates a space

to interpret the law at discretion, and since authorities operating in the area themselves

are disagreeing on how to interpret the law, it generates insecurity to local

communities, as well as it creates space to undertake corrupt practices by

circumventing the law and take advantage of the lacking common agreement on the

content of the law. However, it should be emphasized that there are no longer any

logging companies operating in the area, due to the ban, so it is only small-scale

logging by local inhabitants that are now an issue for discussion.

Also worth mentioning is a point made by Ove Faurby about the restrictions in Law

559 (article 57) and the logging ban (Law 585), and most of other restrictions in forest

laws in Nicaragua, being unconstitutional as regards private forests under

management plans, since the government cannot dispose of people’s trees without

paying compensation for encroachment of the property rights (Faurby 2007, pers.

correspond.). However, a minimum of people actually possess management plans in

the buffer zone, for which reason this argument is not so valid in the case study

context, but however worth mentioning, since it gives an idea of the conflicting laws in

Nicaragua. Likewise, both Law 559 and Law 585 have been widely criticized for

increasing insecurity and ambiguity of the legal framework. Also, “the measures

established apply equally to all forest operators, regardless of their level of compliance

with forest management regulations. This has generated significant discontent

amongst numerous companies and timber producers, who consider that efforts being

made by some to operate within the law are not being taken into account, and that the

sector as a whole is being treated as harmful.” (Global Witness 2007:3).

62

Summing up

Besides from contradicting forest legislation in Nicaragua, the institutions in charge of

protecting these natural resources lack officials trained on specific topics such as

environmental offence, means of evidence, evidence collection and other elements

pertaining to the process of compliance (GEF 2006). Furthermore, there is a general lack

of trust amongst the Nicaraguan population in their legal system. This mistrust does

not only reside in the lack of adequate laws, but also in deficits of their administration

as well as lack of knowledge of the persons in charge. Thus, there is a high perception

of corruption in the administration of justice; and a general perception that the

judiciary as a whole is politically biased, which constitutes one of the most serious

judicial problems in Nicaragua (GEF 2006:13-14).

Local context – introduction to the research area

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, it is not possible to make a clear

division of local and national contextual factors, for which reason this section will also

contain presentation of national issues that have influenced on the local context.

The Indio-Maíz Biological Reserve and its buffer zone

The Indio-Maíz Biological Reserve, covering approximately 2,640 Km2 of land, and its

buffer zone, with the size of 1,800 Km2, constitute the municipality El Castillo (in the

department Río San Juan) and are located in the south-eastern corner of Nicaragua,

bordering Costa Rica, and has presently some 20,000 inhabitants (Nygren 2004:125;

Díaz, pers. comm.)

The Biological Reserve Indio-Maíz was established in 1990 by the Nicaraguan

government, and belongs within the category of strictly protected areas; the only

activities permitted inside the reserve are scientific research and wilderness protection.

The reserve has acquired an international recognition as one of the most outstanding

protected areas in Central America. It belongs to the Mesoamerican Biological

Corridor, extending from Guatemala to Panama, and aims to protect some of the

world’s most diverse ecosystems. In 1999 the limits of the protected area were slightly

63

changed, which meant that communities which until then had been located outside the

reserve suddenly found themselves inside. Some families have been compensated by

being allocated land outside the reserve, but others have not, and still more families

have settled inside the protected area. At the same time, the buffer zone to the reserve

is one of the most intensive agricultural frontiers in the country, with high rates of

immigration and deforestation; consequently the agricultural frontier has already

reached the boundaries of the Indio-Maíz reserve (Ravnborg 2006a; 2006b; Nepenthes

2003).

The reserve Indio-Maíz and its buffer zone have for many years been perceived as an

area where land is ‘cheap and free’ and as an area with valuable forest resources, just

waiting to be exploited (Ravnborg 2006a; Gutierrez, pers. comm.). The majority of the

population in the buffer zone are land-poor peasants who have migrated from other

parts of Nicaragua in search of new land, a better life, or as a response to increasing

constraints on their livelihoods. The buffer zone and the municipality El Castillo in

general belongs to one of the poorest areas in the country. The communities in the

buffer zone suffer from a lack of basic infrastructure, such as roads, electricity, schools,

and health centres (Nepenthes 2003; Nygren 2004). Most adults in the buffer zone are

illiterates and have limited school education (Estrada, pers. comm.).

The ‘contra war’ and land tenure arrangements in Río San Juan

Until the 1950s, few people inhabited the area of Río San Juan, but in the 1950s, the

dictator Somoza began to annex large areas of land in Río San Juan for cattle grazing as

well as for national and foreign timber companies, who were given logging rights to

the forests in the area (Nygren 2000, 2004; Gutierrez, pers. comm.). During the 1960s

and 1970s, a great amount of new colonists entered the region. They were mainly

smallholder ‘campesinos’ from the western part of Nicaragua in search for new land.

In the time of the Somoza dictatorship, the colonization of Río San Juan was

encouraged, seeing it as a vent for social tensions caused by land-tenure conflicts in the

western part of Nicaragua (Nygren 2004; Utting 1993). These colonists began to open

up the forests of Río San Juan to slash-and-burn agriculture. According to the agrarian

legislation of that time, a person could assimilate a parcel of public land by putting it to

64

productive use; and the best means to prove that the land was under production was

to cut down the forest (Nygren 2004; Gutierrez, pers. comm.). Most of the settlers had

no titles to their lands, but the property rights were conceptualized in terms of

‘usufruct’ rights, meaning that the person who used the land was entitled to the

benefits from this land. Likewise, according to legislation at that time, a person who

could prove that he had lived in the area and cultivated the land without disruption for

more than ten years could apply for ownership of the land (Nygren 2004; Utting 1993;

Gutierrez, pers.comm.).

Soon after the Sandinista government took power in 1979, a “civil war” broke out in

Nicaragua. Heavy fighting took place in Río San Juan in the early 1980s, when a

fraction of the counter-revolutionary army (‘Contras’) began to operate in the area. The

1980s was a decade of tremendous threats upon the people of Río San Juan. Both the

Sandinista and the Contra armies treated people with violence, underage boys were

inducted into the military, and many families saw their fathers and sons tortured and

murdered. People were highly polarized and there were few opportunities to remain

neutral. ‘Campesinos’ worked armed in the fields and many people found their

neighbours or close friends suddenly to be participating actively in the war on either

the Sandinista or the Contra side. During these years, thousands of people from Río

San Juan left their land behind and fled to Costa Rica in order to save their lives and

avoid taking part of the war (Respondent No. 1 and 4; Gutierrez, pers. comm.; Nygren

2003; 2004).

At the same time, the Sandinista agrarian reform significantly transformed the land

tenure system in Río San Juan, as elsewhere in the country. Between 1979 and 1981, the

government confiscated all rural properties owned by Somoza and his close associates,

in total more than 20% of Nicaragua’s cultivable land. These holdings were primarily

turned into state farms, and in 1981 land redistribution to agricultural cooperatives

began, while in 1985 the government started to redistribute land to individual small

farmers (Nygren 2004; Gutierrez, pers. comm.; Broegaard 2005). Especially the creation

of cooperatives created resentment among the population in Río San Juan. The

members of the cooperatives came from different backgrounds, but yet they had to

make joint decisions about production. Many people did not identify with the

65

cooperatives, feeling that that the cooperative’s land was not really theirs, and a great

number of cooperatives in Río San Juan collapsed under high debt and evidence of

corruption (Gutierrez, pers. comm.; Nygren 2004).

The military fighting in Nicaragua ended in 1990 when the Sandinista National

Liberation Front (FSLN) lost the elections to Violeta Chamorro. Colonization along the

agricultural frontier in Río San Juan accelerated rapidly in the early 1990s following the

Contra War. Much as in the time of the Somoza dictatorships, President Chamorro

allowed the agricultural frontier to serve as a “political safety regulator”; from the

device that the nation’s rural poor are less likely to rebel if given access to land

(Gutierrez, pers. comm.). The demobilization of two armies was an enormous task;

hence the peace agreements promised to provide land to fighters who laid down their

weapons, giving priority to Contra soldiers. The main areas of resettlement designated

for demobilized soldiers were located in Río San Juan and in northern Nicaragua. With

this new agrarian reform, a lot of newcomers moved to the Río San Juan area, where

they received land titles to the allocated land, while many people furthermore returned

to Río San Juan from their ‘hideout’ in Costa Rica. This influx of a large number of

people put pressure on the forest resources of Río San Juan and created land conflicts.

The National Institute of Agrarian Reform did not investigate whether the lands

designated to ex-soldiers were unoccupied, for which reason many of the demobilized

groups received ownership of land already possessed by smallholders, who did not

hold any land title and hence were unable to claim legal rights to their land (Nygren

2004; Abu-Lughod 2000; Gutierrez, pers. comm.). The new agrarian reform favoured

the ex-combatants and ignored the demands from non-combatant landless peasants,

which caused intense land conflicts and made violence a common way to settle

disputes (Abu-Lughod 2000).

Furthermore, during the presidential period of Alemán in the late 1990s, more people

were given land titles in Río San Juan from the OTR (Rural Titling Office), even though

‘old’ land conflicts had still not been solved (Interview with Gutierrez).

Violent land invasions still break out in Río San Juan now and then, and in recent years

they have spread to the protected area of Indio-Maíz. According to MARENA and

66

INAFOR, some three hundred families are recorded as squatting inside the Indio-Maíz

at present (Interview with Gutierrez; Harquín, pers. comm.).

Summa summarum, a wide range of land tenure arrangements exists in Río San Juan

as a consequence of the political changes and transformations that have taken place in

Nicaragua during the last decades. The agrarian legislation is confusing and has been

manipulated by different parties. Even though many people in Río San Juan possess

formal land titles, a lot of people are still without. In spite of recent projects’ efforts to

undertake land registration programs in Río San Juan, there are still unsolved land

conflicts going on, due to projects and responsible authorities failing to recognize the

unofficial rights of resource access and the less visible forms of resource tenure that

have existed for decades in the area. A gap exists between the formal law and more

informal systems of property rights, which acknowledge land ownership through

socially recognized occupation (Interview with Gutierrez; Chamorro, pers. comm.;

Nygren 2004).

A brief and general introduction to livelihoods in the buffer zone

The municipality El Castillo belongs to one the poorest municipalities in the country,

with very bad possibilities for paid work in the area, for which reason the main part of

the population is farmers (Nepenthes 2003). Most of the current inhabitants in the

buffer zone are non-indigenous smallholders (‘campesinos’), who cultivate basic crops

by slash-and-burn agriculture and supplement their livelihood with small-scale cattle

husbandry, logging and trading. At present the main income sources in the buffer zone

are cattle, corn and bean production (mainly produced for the local market or own

consumption) and palm oil production. Palm oil production was launched in the zone

in the 1980s by the Sandinistas as a mean to create more work and thereby to avoid the

many new settlers in the area to seek work as “contra” soldiers against the

government. Even though the palm oil processing factory located in the area today is

owned by the Chamorro family, and the pay is lower than when it was state owned,

palm oil production still makes up an important income generating activity for many

families in the area.

67

The farmers in the buffer zone often attempt to practice corn and bean agriculture just

as it is done in western Nicaragua, from where many arrived after the Contra War. Yet

rainforest soils are poor, and are typically unable to support corn and beans for more

than a few years. At this point the land is either sold for cattle pasture or abandoned,

and the farmers move on to colonize new lands, clearing more forests. Likewise,

having cattle represent a status symbol, for which reason many of the land owners

clear the forest without any idea of the economic and ecological value these forests

hold, in order to make grass fields for their cattle. Similarly, as a result of land laws in

the early colonial periods of many countries in Latin America including these of

Nicaragua, there is a strong norm that land is only useful when cleared of trees and

used for agriculture (Agrawal & Gibson 1999; Gutierrez, pers. comm.; Zambrana, pers.

comm.).

Commercial logging has been very widespread in the area and has often been

conducted with little governmental regulation. A rather forceful actor in the area has

for many years been the timber industry. The national logging company PLYNIC has

been operating in the area for decades with minimal government supervision. In many

cases, commercial forestry has occurred along the agricultural frontier, and the roads

created by logging operations are now used by settlers as entry ways for colonization

of a new area. However, due to the new forest law put into force in June 2006, there are

no longer any logging companies operating in the area, but the marks left by their

logging operations are still evident in most parts of the buffer zone shown by empty

lands.

Nicaragua has been known for its many cooperatives formed after the Sandinista

Revolution as a result of a new agrarian reform in 1981. The 1981 agrarian reform

enabled the government to take over large farms abandoned by their owners, and to

give the land to farm worker or landless labourers on the condition that producer

cooperatives were formed with a collective user right to the land. In the Río San Juan

area, however, there is no particular tradition of farm cooperatives, due to the fact that

most people living in this area are new settlers, who have arrived to the area during

the last 10-15 years (Chamorro, pers. comm.). Also, due to the large distances between

68

villages and even between the different sectors of a given community, social relations

are faint (Ravnborg 2006a:6).

Community context – Las Maravillas

Whereas the previous section focused on national and overall local context, the aim of

this section is to present characteristics in the specific case study village, Las

Maravillas.

Las Maravillas – “The wonders”

Las Maravillas is located about twenty-five kilometres northeast of Boca de Sabálos

(map on page 7), seven kilometres away from the Reserve frontier23. On days with no

or less rain Las Maravillas can be reached in “taxi” (jeep) from Boca de Sábalos in

about 1½ hours, due to a road and a bridge (crossing a main river close to Las

Maravillas) being built about 3 years ago. On rainy days the road turn into an

inaccessible mud-road and the last 4-5 kilometres has to be done by foot.

Las Maravillas has approximately 500 inhabitants consisting of 93 families. Before the

war less people were living in Las Maravillas. According to one of the oldest

inhabitants there were only some 20 families living in the community, which at that

time did not even have a name. When the war began most people moved to Costa Rica

in order to escape from war duty, and once the war finished families returned to the

community in the beginning of the 1990s to find that their houses were still there.

People found it so wonderful to return and meet old neighbours again that they named

the community “Las Maravillas” (The Wonders); since it was so wonderful to come

back to this beautiful spot (Respondent No. 1 and 4).

Las Maravillas has a school, a communal house, a health centre, five churches and nine

“pulperías” (small local shops). Las Maravillas is, as the majority of the communities in

the buffer zone, without electricity, but most families are provided with portable water

and latrines.

23 Although seven kilometres might sound like a short distance, it takes approximately five to six hours to reach the reserve by foot due to the muddy pathways.

69

Local livelihoods in Las Maravillas

The livelihood strategies practiced by the majority of the inhabitants in Las Maravillas

are characterised by the search for survival; a day-to-day living. The main agricultural

production is primarily for subsistence use and consists of maize, beans and rice.

However, there is a variety as to the degree and importance of agricultural activities

carried out in relation to people’s livelihoods. As well as different types of diversified

livelihood strategies exist, there are equally distinct differentiations between household

size, access to resources and networks. Some people engage in day labouring, seasonal

migration to Costa Rica, involvement in development projects, small-scale cattle

husbandry, small businesses and so on; all significant characteristics of people’s

livelihood strategies in Las Maravillas24.

The amounts of land owned by the households widely vary from 1 manzana25 to 110

manzana. People normally only cultivate minor areas for providing sufficient food to

the household. Some cultivate bigger areas and produce enough for selling in the local

shops. Nourishment consists of rice, beans and tortilla, and seasonal vegetables such as

“quequisque”26 and plantains, and for the less poor sometimes meat. When one fellow

in the village kills a pig, he gives part of the meat to friends and relatives, and sells the

rest to neighbours or exchanges it for other goods. Before long, someone else kills a pig

and returns the favour. It is a relatively fair system, though naturally does nothing to

change the reality that less poor people can eat much more meat than those who are

really poor. In many of the poorest households, meat is not a part of the diet.

Studies show that non-rural sources of income are important to farmers in Nicaragua,

amounting to approximately 40% of households’ income (Corral & Reardon 2001).

Studies also show that non-rural incomes are more important to the “less poor” than

the poorest (Reardon et al. 2001; Broegaard & Ravnborg 2001). However, my studies in

Las Maravillas indicated that rural income sources are still the most important to most

24 No villagers in Las Maravillas labour for the palm oil production company, due to the distance to this. 25 1 manzana (Mz) equals 0.6989 hectare or 6.989 square meters. Please note that the size of a Mz vary slightly across North, Central and South America. The measures provided here refer specifically to the Nicaraguan usage. 26 Purple yautia (Malanga Lila - Xanthosoma Violaceum). It is cultivated in tropical warm and humid climates. Quequisque is a nutritious crop similar to potato and the tuber is after cooking used in the local daily diet (MAGFOR 2005)

70

families, composing the majority of their total income. Likewise, I found that people

with the most capitals, were the ones to engage in projects, which hence correspond

with the above mentioned studies about non-rural incomes being more important to

the “less poor”. For the most poor, agriculture constitutes a ‘secure’ income providing

the family with food for survival, whereas project participation serves as an additional

source of income for those with more energy and stronger social capitals, not fighting a

day-to-day survival (which shall be analyzed thoroughly in the next chapter).

Most people living in Las Maravillas have arrived from other parts of the country after

the ending of the war in 1990, and traditionally they have been practising agriculture

by the use of slash-and-burn and rotation systems. They have been used to practice

annual cropping27 or multi-cropping28; the latter conceived as the most intensive

system of land use, since the same plot of land bears two or more crops every year

(Boserup 1972:9), where fallow periods are very limited or negligible. However, while

living in the buffer zone in Río San Juan, many have come to realise that yield is

diminishing year after year. This can be explained by the fact that soils in tropical

rainforests are very nutrient poor. The topsoil is only 2.5 to 5 centimetres deep and the

plants store the nutrients in themselves rather than getting them from the soil. This is

why farmers can only use the rainforest soils for a very limited amount of years when

clearing the forest, before all nutrients are stripped from the soil (Boserup 1972;

Gutierrez, pers. comm.; Mayorquín, pers. comm.). Very few farmers in the area possess

familiarity with cultivation in rainforest soils and therefore lack knowledge on how to

maintain yield without resorting to fertilizer (Gutierrez, pers. comm.). It has been

common practice to cultivate land for two to three years and then convert land into

pasture and sell it to cattle owners, followed by clearing of new forest for cultivation.

This has been considered normal practice, if not the only logical practice, since - as

briefly mentioned earlier - clearing forest land has historically been considered an

improvement of land (Agrawal & Gibson 1999; Utting 1993).

27 Land is left fallow for several months every year between the harvest of one crop and the planting of the next (Boserup 1972:9) 28 Land is never left fallow, due to the planting of one crop shortly after the harvesting of the preceding one (Boserup 1972:9)

71

Most people are depending on forest resources for their survival; however with

varying degrees of dependence. All households construct their houses from wood, as

well as firewood collected in the forest are used by all households for cooking. In

addition, some families have for many years depended on forest resources as an

additional source of income; by selling the trees on their forest areas to logging

companies. People have not been aware of the economic potential (not to mention the

ecological potential) of their forest areas and have therefore sold logging right to

companies, who have paid minimal prices to the farmers. However, for most farmers

the whole procedure of seeking logging permits from forest authorities is a confusing

task, for which reason selling the logging rights to timber companies seems like an

easier solution, in order to avoid bureaucracy and time demanding procedures and still

get some economic profit from forest they under all circumstances would have cleared

for making agriculture or pasture.

In recent years, livelihood opportunities have been complicated by resource use

restrictions imposed by conservation authorities (Nygren 2003). However, in the case

of Las Maravillas the withdrawal of logging companies has not influenced local

livelihoods in any drastic way, since the local economy particularly in Las Maravillas is

not as such depending on profit from logging companies’ forest extraction, but no

doubt that the local government have suffered from the drop in tax income because of

the ban, which in the end also is likely to influence on Las Maravillas regarding

budgets allocated to improvements in infrastructure, etcetera.

Despite great poverty in Las Maravillas, with limited opportunities for increased

income, people in general are proud of being peasants; this is what they have been

doing for all their lives and it is therefore not an identity that one wants to give up that

easy. However, there seemed to be a tendency that the better off people were, the more

hopes, wishes and dreams did they have. Common for the people ranked as ‘capital

weak’ was that they considered a ‘good life’ one with secure food supply and work

(Respondent No. 3, 6, 15, 33). People ranked as ‘capital strong’ considered ‘a good life’

as one with more material contents, such as a bigger house, a television, and even a

sofa (Respondent No. 1, 2, 7, 18, 30, 35). Common for both weak and strong resource

person was that of “good health”.

72

Political system in Las Maravillas

As in any other community in the buffer zone, Las Maravillas has a ‘CDCA’; a “local

committee for expanded district development” (my own translation, see List of

Abbreviation). These committees form part of the decentralization process in

Nicaragua since the idea of CDCAs is to increase the role of civil society organizations

in the development of the municipality, in a way so that all actors within the different

communities are involved and represented, such as church, youth, sport, women,

etcetera (FUNDAR 2004; MARENA 2004b). CDCA is supposed to be democratically

elected by the community villagers in a way so that all local interests are represented.

However, in the case of Las Maravillas, CDCA has been appointed by the mayor of the

municipality, so that all members of CDCA are representing his party, PLC. This was

done after the inauguration of the new mayor in 2005, when he did not win in the ward

of Las Maravillas.

Development and conservation projects in Las Maravillas

Throughout the last decade, many projects have supported efforts to encourage more

sustainable production systems in the buffer zone, which would imply less pressure

upon the forest resources (Ravnborg 2006a, 2006b; Ruiz García 2006). Despite different

means, the conservation and development projects present in Las Maravillas do have

the same overall goal; namely conservation of forest resources in the Reserve and the

buffer zone. Two projects targeting at peasants have been working permanently29 in

Las Maravillas for the last years, namely Cooperación Austriaca para el Desarrollo

(Austrian Cooperation for Development), and PMS-Danida (Sustainable Management

29 A third relatively significant project in Las Maravillas is Fundación del Río (FdR), who encompass the same main objective as Danida and CAD, that is conservation of forest resources. However, their means are quite different and in Las Maravillas FdR works exclusively with environmental education in schools and in youth groups; hence with the target group being children and youngster I delimited my research from this project. However, educating children in environmental awareness might make an essential difference in the future. Besides from these permanent projects present in Las Maravillas, there was (during my field work period) a one-day visit and contribution from an American private, non-profit organization, called “San Juan Rio Relief” – an American couple who during holidays in Nicaragua decided to collect money back in the States to bring medical equipment and books to health centres and schools in the area of Río San Juan. Likewise, Global Humanitaria arrive once every year to provide notebooks, school bags, pencils and school uniforms to the children in 1st to 6th grade in the primary school in Las Maravillas. Médicos del Mundo is likewise said to visit the health center in Las Maravillas occasionally, in cooperation with Ministry of Health (MINSA). However, due to the aid approach of these projects, their effects, as well as responses to these, were not investigated further.

73

Project by Danida). The projects carry out various and different types of development

and conservation initiatives in the whole buffer zone, but only the components

implemented in Las Maravillas will be touched upon in this section.

Cooperación Austriaca para el Desarrollo

Cooperación Austriaca para el Desarrollo (CAD)30 is working in Las Maravills with its

“Forest Component”, which is the only component carried out in Las Maravillas as

part of their overall project “ProDeSoC”31. The overall aim of the project is to “promote

sustainable rural development and preserve the remaining forest in the buffer zone

and thereby to stabilize the agricultural frontier and to avoid more intrudes on the

Reserve” (Interview with Zapata). The Forest Component endeavours sustainable rural

development by paying ‘productores’ (peasants and forest owners) an annual amount

for making forest plantation on deserted agricultural land or on forest land with low

wood productivity. Participants are paid approximately US$ 100 annually for each

hectare of forest plantation, with 1 hectare as a minimum request and 5 hectares as a

maximum for participating in the project. This means that a farmer who makes five

hectares of plantation will receive an annual payment of US$ 500 from the project for

the next five years. So far the project is predetermined to run for five years, initiated in

December 2005, and from then on it is still unclear if anyone will take over the

payment to participants. Only two persons from Las Maravillas engaged in the

plantation project when it was first launched in 2005, and were therefore on the brink

of receiving their first annual payment by the end of December 2006, provided that

INAFOR approved the plantations. Since then four more people have entered the

project and stand to receive their first payment by the end of 2007. Although not using

this term themselves, the project can be considered as “payment for environmental

services”, since people get paid for making new forest areas for future generations. The

participants buy the seeds or small plants from the project, and only certain types of

30 A project working under Austrian sector programme support from ADA. 31 Programme for Sustainable Rural Development in the Municipality El Castillo

74

trees are allowed for plantations32, which are native species in the area of particular

commercial importance.

The projects’ requirements for participants in the plantation project are; signing a

contract with the project and INAFOR (and accepting the following requests for

participating), registration of all land (both forest and agricultural land) at INAFOR,

possessing legal certificates of the property and land, guarantee permanent human

presence on the farm, accepting the visit of INAFOR for annual or more frequently

inspections and to do whatever proposed to improve plantations, not to perform any

burning of vegetation (and if done anyway, to keep the fire controlled and limited), to

participate in project meetings where training and technical assistance take place, and

to participate in community activities that aim at preventing forest fires (ProDeSoC

2006; Interview with Zapata; Interview with Gutierrez). These requirements play an

important part in explaining why some people decide not to participate in projects,

which we shall return to in the next chapter.

Included in the project is also the opportunity for participants to obtain credits and to

receive scholarships for their children. This latter is not mandatory when participating

in the projects; it requires that the children get certain marks in school, but if this

prerequisite is met, the participant can apply the project for scholarship for his/her

children. However, none of the two offers, neither loans nor scholarship, have so far

been applied for by participants.

Danida cocoa project

A similar effort to conserve and protect forest resources is supported by Danida33 by

promoting the production and marketing of organic cocoa. The cocoa project was

initiated under PASMA, with a component being the support for promoting better

natural resource management in and around the Reserve Indio-Maíz. Likewise, the

32 Almendro (Dipteryx panamensis), Caoba (mahogany – Swietenia macrophylly), Cedro Real (Cedrela odorata), Roble (Tabebuia rosea), Cedro Macho (Carapa guianensis) and others (ProDeSoC 2006). 33 When I name the project ”Danida” or use the phrase ”Danida staff” I do not refer to Danida in its original sense, that is as the Danish International Development Agency, but rather use the term as it is locally embedded when refering to the project. Currently the project has no Danish staff, and Danida technicians have always been Nicaraguans, but still the project is commonly known as ’Danida’.

75

project has as objective to contribute to the socio-economic development and to

improve living conditions for the population living in the buffer zone by helping them

to make more sustainable use of natural resources, in this case by implementing

agroforestry systems cultivating cocoa34. The cocoa production, commenced in Las

Maravillas approximately three years ago, do no pay off until after three to four years,

for which reason the first cocoa harvest and common sale is expected during 2007

(Interview with Zambrana; UM 2005b; UM 2005c; Simonsen 2006). However, before the

real commencement of the cocoa project in Las Maravillas some experimental cocoa

plots were cultured approximately five years ago, for which reason there has been

some small-scale sale of cocoa on the local market.

The cocoa producers from the project, operating in most of the buffer zone, are

organized in a cooperative (COSEMUCRIM). People participating in the cocoa project

have to form part of this cooperative, and in order to become member of the

cooperative participants have to join a 48-hours course and pay a one-off amount of

approximately US$ 75. In reality, people not producing cocoa can also join the

cooperative, if still fulfilling the above demands, but will not have a share of profit

from the cocoa sale. The cooperative has not as such had a practical function yet, due

to the first common sale not being a reality yet. A cooperative directorate has been

appointed, with members from the whole buffer zone. It is the responsibility of the

directorate to “lead” the cooperative and to decide who are commendable to have

access to credits, from the cooperative’s credit bank. The “headquarter” for the

cooperative is going to be located in Las Maravillas in the nearest future, where a

house is under construction, which will be the rallying point for cocoa producers from

Las Maravillas and the surrounding areas. This will serve as accumulation of cocoa

produce, with a kiln to dry the cocoa beans, before transporting the yield to Boca de

Sábalos, and from there to San Carlos with connection to wherever in Nicaragua the

emporium turns out to be (Respondent No. 1, 7, 16, 35; Zambrana, pers. comm.; Ríos,

pers. comm.).

34 The cacao tree is very subtle and sensitive, so it needs protection from the wind by other, taller trees and requires shade. A newly planted cacao seedling is often sheltered by a different type of tree. It is normal to plant food crops for shade such as banana, plantain or coconuts, but forest trees are also used for shade. Once established, however, cacao trees can grow in full sun light provided there are fertile soil conditions and intensive husbandry. Cacao plantations must have evenly distributed rainfall and rich, well drained soil (Zambrana 2006, pers. comm.).

76

It should be mentioned that previously, before the cocoa project was initiated, in the

1990s, Danida made an effort in the buffer zone to secure land tenure rights (UM

2006c). This has resulted in estimated 90% of the population now having legal tenure

certificates (Díaz, pers. comm.). However, with different types of certificates from

different periods of land reform, there are still struggles and disputes over land in the

buffer zone, albeit less than earlier (Interview with Gutierrez; Nygren 2003).

In theory the Danida cocoa project is less “demanding” in its design than the CAD

project with regard to participation requirements. People participating in the cocoa

project do not bind themselves on paper to any specific requirements when joining the

project, except for the signing of contracts when obtaining loans. However, from the

project’s standpoint it is expected from the participants that they do not engage in

illegal intrusion on the Reserve and of course it is a request that people have forest on

their land in order to grow the cocoa in shade of the trees (Interview with Zambrana).

Likewise, taking part in the cocoa project also means having a “management plan”

made for your household, “finca” (farmstead), land and forest. A management plan is

a new ‘component’ in the cocoa project and is therefore not a request when first

entering the project, for what reason many present participants are still without. A

management plan is made by the project technicians and MARENA in conjunction

with the respective participants and the aim is to put down in writing which resources

the household possess35, including socioeconomic information about the family and a

diagnosis of the bio-physical aspects regarding land and forest, leading to a future plan

on how to make use of and manage these resources. The notion of making

management plans is to make people aware of the many resources they already

possess, make them reflect upon how to use these the best and assist them in planning

how to obtain the most profit from their already existent resources; and thereby keep

people away from intruding on the Reserve in search for new land and more resources.

There is so far nothing juridical binding about having a management plan made as

well as there are no sanctions if not observed, and participants are free to make

modifications to the plan at all times (Interview with Paucar de Vega; MARENA year

unknown).

35 Among these amount of land and forest, number and type of animals, tools and utensils, etcetera.

77

Common features and livelihoods proposed by projects

In sum, the common project objectives, for both the Danida and the CAD project, are

those of protection and conservation of forest resources in the Reserve and the buffer

zone. This is sought by means of economic incentives for farmers to sustainable utilize

natural resources and by promoting new income increasing alternatives. The

livelihoods proposed are ecological sustainable and economic ameliorating, in the

shape of agroforestry (cocoa) and forest plantations on agricultural land.

In addition, both projects have institutional strengthening as objective, for which

reason both projects work in close cooperation with national institutions. On the

national level Danida collaborates with and support institutional strengthening of

MARENA, and has for many years likewise worked in close cooperation with

MARENA on local level in the buffer zone. However, this collaboration between

Danida and MARENA on local level has been ended, so that MARENA no longer form

part of the project. CAD works in close cooperation with INAFOR on both the national

and local level (Danida 2005; Interview with Zambrana; Interview with Zapata).

Concluding remarks

The aim of introducing the national, local and community context has been to apply a

holistic approach, where those factors and processes inherent in and framing the case

study village context has been presented. Obviously, this brief overview is by no

means exhaustive, but however, singling out the most important factors serves to

explain the context in which local implementation of projects is carried out and hence

how external factors influence on the local context and facilitate locals’ responses to

projects. The political-historical outline serves to debate how past events such as the

civil “contra” war influence on people’s attitude today towards project intervention

and their motives for relating to or dealing with intervention the way they do.

Likewise, rural reforms, national environmental and forestry policies and land tenure

arrangement frame projects’ possibilities for manoeuvre in the local context and

restrain their activities, which as well influences on how local people respond to these

projects. In addition, as will be analyzed in the next chapter, national policies can

create room for contradictions and conflicts in the local context, which is also a

78

concurrent cause or explanation of local responses to conservation and development

intervention. On the basis of this chapter it is therefore now possible to thoroughly

analyze how locals respond to conservation and development projects and particularly

analyze which factors facilitate or help explain these responses, which is the aim of the

following chapter.

79

Chapter 5

Social differentiation, conflicts and negotiation

in the community context

Having presented the broader context on national and local level in the previous

chapter, the aim of this chapter is to analyze the social event of development at the

community level, that is how locals respond or react to projects and what factors help

explain these responses.

Firstly, this will be done by pointing to factors inherent in projects’ design, such as

projects’ objectives, conditionalities and the way projects are promoted, and then

analyze how this influences on locals’ reactions to projects. The idea is to show how

differentiations in capitals determine what kinds of activities are available to people

and thereby how people relate to or respond to projects. Secondly, it will be discussed

and analyzed how other factors outside of the project, such as national forestry

legislation and local government corruption, partly presented in the previous chapter,

can also serve as an explanation for people’s responses to development and

conservation projects. It will be argued that people decide how and if to engage in

development projects based on past experiences with project intervention, rumours, as

well as by taking into account the experiences of other groups within their social

networks. Thirdly, it will be emphasized how project intervention entails constant

negotiation between the involved stakeholders, where ‘local knowledge’ versus ‘expert

knowledge’ is negotiated and transformed, involving power struggles and projects’

clash with existing local knowledge and power structures, which also alter the

conditions for differential reactions to projects.

Although dividing the chapter into three sections, where the last section specifically is

called ”Negotiation and Power”, it should be emphasized that negotiation and power

struggles are inherent in all social interface and therefore also perceptible in the other

sections throughout the whole chapter. Accordingly, the whole chapter endeavours to

80

grasp and analyze negotiation and power struggles, although not explicitly enunciated

at all times.

Based on the idea of differential responses to conservation and development projects

and diverse circumstances influencing these responses, various life-stories or ”cases”

will be incorporated throughout the chapter (written in italics). The aim of the case-

stories is to illustrate the diversification of activities engaged in, the significance of

social networks and varying capitals, locals’ negotiation with projects and general

external intervention (including the ban on logging), and as an indication of how

promoted project activities are used divergent in different livelihood strategies, and

hence in order to exemplify the differences in local responses to projects. The case-

stories are used when considered relevant for the content of the chapter and can refer

to points or analysis made both before and after the case-story. During the chapter you

will come to meet six local villagers from Las Maravillas.

Capitals and project participation

The aim of this section is to focus on the correlation between livelihood capitals and

project participation, with the purpose of approaching possible explanations of why

locals respond to projects in a certain way and which factors that facilitate this

response. The section commences with a presentation of project conditionalities and

the way projects in Las Maravillas have been promoted, which lead on to a discussion

and analysis of farmer responses to and negotiations with the conditionalities in the

projects, which have a significant bearing on determining the course of development

and conservation in the area.

Project conditionalities and promotion of projects

There is a long tradition for project intervention in Las Maravillas, as in elsewhere in

the buffer zone. In earlier days projects had a tendency to function as a “cargo” event

(Long 2001), that, besides from introducing new livelihood strategies or production

systems, also meant transferring free goods and gifts to the local population.

Nowadays, projects present in Las Maravillas have tightened their support, not giving

81

anything away free of charge, but now rather demanding something back from

participants. Conditionalities in development aid is not a new concept in general

(Schulpen 2001:28), but a rather new trend in the buffer zone area. According to project

personnel and inhabitants in Las Maravillas, in earlier days projects gave away tools,

agricultural utensils, seeds, domestic animals, etcetera for free, without asking

anything in return, with the result that many people entered projects just to obtain free

planting seeds, chain saw, machete-knives or similarly useful tools, whereas projects

nowadays request participants to pay for these same goods. However, participants do

have the opportunity of obtaining loans from the projects with the purpose of buying

these materials, but due to earlier bad examples with people omitting to pay back

loans, today people sign contracts with the project before obtaining loans. This new

‘development discourse’ from the projects’ point of view should be seen in the light of

earlier bad experiences with people breaking tools or having them stolen in very short

time, and then returning to the project to ask for new tools. Nowadays, people are

asked to pay for their tools themselves, from the rationale that you take better care of

things that you have paid for yourself than if you were given them for free. (Diáz, pers.

comm.; Interview with Zambrana; Interview with Zapata). Also, it is part of a wider

change in development aid, where projects aim at local self-reliance rather than

”spoon-feeding” (Olivier de Sardan 1988; Zapata, pers. comm.).

The Danida and CAD projects do not work with a specific and limited so-called ‘target

group’ as such. Projects are officially open for anyone interested in participating

(farmers and forest owners, both men and women), but especially the CAD project has

clear formulated requirements for participants as mentioned in the last chapter. The

projects do no longer spend the same amount of resources (time and money) on

promoting their projects, as was the case when first launched; people themselves now

have to make contact with the projects in order to participate (Interview with

Zambrana; Interview with Zapata). However, the CAD project was initially promoted

through CDCA, so that it was in the hands of CDCA to diffuse the project opportunity

to villagers (Zapata, pers. comm.). In case of the cocoa project, it was first launched

among certain selected farmers with “potential” (Zambrana, pers. comm.) who became

“test drivers” of cocoa cultivation. These spread the word and more participants

became part of the project. In the first years of the cocoa project, numerous

82

‘capacitaciones’ (instruction) were given to participants in order to train them in

becoming cocoa producers. Technicians from the Danida project coached the

individual cocoa producers on their farms as well as coached the joint group in the

communal house in Las Maravillas. After the first year, when cocoa was already

planted and technical assistance had been given continuously by Danida staff,

‘promoters’ were selected among the participants. The aim of selecting promoters was

to make these transmit experiences and carry out the future instruction of new cocoa

producers. Danida has appointed promoters, who have had the best achievement of

cocoa cultivation and who are considered competent at coaching. From Danida’s point

of view the rationale of having local promoters is that there is a shorter distance

between local promoters and local producers, than between Danida technicians and

local producers (Interview with Ríos).

Local responses to projects – seen from a ’capital perspective’

First of all, it is time to reveal that the capital ranking (please see Annex 4) shows a

tendency towards people’s capitals being a determinant factor for whether to engage in

projects or not. When taking a closer look at the ranking, an unmistakable pattern

emerges, showing that the ‘capital-strong’ people are also those engaged in projects,

whereas the more ‘capital-weak’ are not. Having this presented, the aim of the section

is now to illustrate, discuss and analyse why this tendency is so.

The director at CAD has been surprised that such a relatively limited number of people

have decided to participate in the plantation project, and explains it with “laziness”,

indicated by people’s resistance to work for the money by maintaining the plantations

frequently as requested by the project (Zapata, pers. comm.). Obviously, this brief

argument alone is highly questionable. In fact, it shows signs of ignorance or discount

of other important factors and motives for not participating. First of all, it takes a bit of

conscious ignorance to be surprised that a project promoted through the local

committee (CDCA) will not be crowded by participants. As pointed out earlier, the

CDCA in Las Maravillas is not popular among the local villagers, simply due to its

corrupt inauguration. This may help explain the lack of interested participants in the

plantation project, because why engage in a project promoted by a corrupt entity that

83

one does not trust. On the one hand, promoting a project through CDCA could from

the project’s standpoint be seen as an expression of support to the decentralization

process in Nicaragua where the role of civil society organizations is increased. On the

other hand, it is a well-known fact that CDCA has been appointed in a non-democratic

way (Zapata, pers. comm.; Zambrana, pers. comm.), which hence clearly demonstrates

that projects close their eyes to or ignore corruption and power abuse, presumably

because they do not know what to do about it.

However, depending on how one understands the word “laziness” it might not be

completely improper to use this as an argument for default of participating. According

to both a participant in the project and a non-participant (Respondent No. 35 and 10),

the project does not pay off, since much more money could be earned if the same

hectare was used for cultivating beans or quequisque36, which then must be reckoned

as a fairly economically rationale rather than pure laziness. According to local peasants

(Respondent No. 4, 10, 19) cultivation of quequisque on one hectare of land could give

the farmer an income of approximately US$ 1700-2300 in a good season, which makes

US$ 100 seem like a symbolic payment in comparison. However, according to an

agronomist working for the project (Hernandez, pers. comm.), this calculation is out of

proportion, since such a profit can only be made from large-scale intensive cultivation

with sale to well-paying middlemen from outside the area, which is out of the question

for most farmers, who cultivate predominantly for subsistence use or for small-scale

sale on the local markets. In addition, what farmers often forget is that cultivating this

amount of quequisque or beans requires a lot of hard work and that the quality of

rainforest soils are rapidly declining after few years of cultivation (Zapata, pers.

comm.; Gutierrez, pers. comm.; Hernandez, pers. comm.). However, due to severe

differentiation among farmers with regard to resource endowments, the opportunity

cost of one hectare of land is far from uniform. A small-scale farmer only producing for

household consumption and with no cattle might find an annual payment of US$ 100

sufficiently attractive to keep him from cutting down the forest. On the contrary, a

livestock or large-scale farmer is less likely to find this payment sufficiently attractive

to keep him from converting forest into pasture or agricultural land (Ravnborg 2006a).

36 As already mentioned in a footnote in chapter 4, quequisque (Xanthosoma Violaceum) is a nutritious crop similar to potato and the tuber is after cooking used in the daily local diet (MAGFOR 2005).

84

The above discussion about people’s motives for not participating in the CAD project

are indeed valid, but I am also inclined to think that an important part of the

explanation should be found in the project’s close cooperation with the forest

authorities. As mentioned in chapter 4, when entering the project the participants sign

a contract allowing annual check-up of the plantations and are hence subject to

profound control by the projects and not least by forest authorities, INAFOR, in regard

to forest use. In view of the fact that most people in someway or another are depending

on forest resources for livelihood means, it may seem as an unattractive offer to

participate in such a project and subjugate oneself to control and restrictions on this.

However, an advantage of participating in the CAD project – which most people still

have not realised, mainly because the CAD project have not yet made an effort to

disseminate it - is that plantations are exempted from the new restrictive forestry ban,

which in its current shape is in force for an infinite time (Interview with Gutierrez;

Zapata, pers. comm.; Gaceta 2006b). Therefore, people engaging in the CAD project

now are guaranteed exploitable forest resources in the future, since plantation is

excepted from the ban on forest utilization.

Also, I experienced a general fear of or opposition to projects’ initiatives or proposed

new cultivation sorts among the local farmers (Respondent No. 4,10,12,13,19,35).

People tend to be conservative in regard to their livelihoods; they prefer doing things

the way they have always done it. This impression was confirmed by project staff who

claimed that people in the buffer zone hold on firmly to the agricultural knowledge

and practices they have been carrying out in their place of origin (Interviews with

Chamorro; Zapata; Zambrana; Ríos; Gutierrez). This, as an example, includes the idea

mentioned earlier about ‘improving’ land or gaining value to your land when clearing

it for forest. This solidly established idea has been one of the greatest obstacles for

projects to operate in the area (as well as it has been one of the reasons or necessities for

project presence). Planting trees, rather than felling them, is such a new and remote

concept for the locals, that have not yet gained a footing in people’s mind. The CAD

plantation project is hence “odd” and very different from local livelihoods, and the

reasoning of planting trees is not easy for people to grasp. Likewise, Danida has found

many potential participants to be sceptical towards cultivation of cocoa. Many people

prefer the “safe” mode of life, where wealth is not in sight, but at least you know what

85

you have. Similarly, I found that people with the less capitals (economic, social, human

and natural capitals) tend to be the more sceptical towards new livelihoods, not daring

to take any chances that might engender unsteady or insecure income or food supply.

People with subsistence agriculture, small areas of land and weak social networks are

much more vulnerable facing changes in livelihoods, as opposed to capital-strong

persons, who dare to or allow themselves to take a risk, since a potential failure will

not leave them and their family without food or income, as this first case-story will

illustrate:

Margarito is a large-scale farmer with diverse livelihood, possessing approximately 90 Mz. of

land. He owns a local “pulpería” (shop) in Las Maravillas, he cultivates for own consumption

as well as for sale on the local market and to middlemen coming from outside the municipality

to buy his agricultural products. At the same time he forms part of the Danida cocoa project and

the CAD plantation project. He was the first participant in the plantation project and has

planted the allowed maximum of five hectares plantation. He does not do it for the money, since

he deems to be able to earn much more from cultivating the same amount of hectares with beans

or quequisque, even though he recognizes that this would take a lot more of work than the

plantation requires. Instead he participates because he finds it important to think about the

future. He acknowledge that he himself will not be able to make use of the plantation, but he sees

it as an investment for his children to profit from the plantation in the future. (Respondent

No. 35)

Not surprisingly, which is also evident from the life-story fragment above, Margarito

was ranked as capital strong in all senses (see Annex 4). Due to strong livelihood

capitals he is able to think and plan more far-reaching and care for a “luxury” as the

future of his children. Indeed every person interviewed or ranked, no matter how

capital-weak or capital-strong, worried about the future of his/her children, but only a

few actually had the means to undertake any concrete actions in order to secure the

future of their children; for the part of most people bringing stable food to the dinner

table and praying to God for help was the best they could do. For Margarito,

participating in the plantation project is just a livelihood activity on the sideline that

86

serves as an investment for his children in the future37. It does not bring him any

immediate economic advantages, since he could earn more money from cultivating the

same area of land, but by making plantations he has made an effort to secure his

children access to forest resources and hence profit in the future. Margarito is an

example of a resource strong person with enough “surplus” (psychic, psychical and

economic) to engage in a rather demanding project without having to reduce, restrict

or hazard his livelihood.

As described in the previous chapter, CAD has established clear-cut requirements for

participants of the project. Opposite Margarito, for many people taking part in the

plantation project is an enormous task with almost impossible requirements to fulfil

and no doubt that this keeps many people away from involving themselves in the

project. Even if managing to fulfil the claims for entering the project, which in itself is

quite a barrier for many people, there is always the risk of not having the plantations

approved by the end of the year, which would mean default of payment from the

project, and hence a year of work wasted. The risk is simply too high and some people

prefer to stay “safe” and stick to what they already know and have, and hence rather

spend time on something they consider to be more productive or that will give

immediate or more ”safe” results (Chamorro, pers. comm.; Ravnborg et al. 2000). It

shows a tendency of the poorest pursuing ’risk minimizing strategies’ (Elwert &

Bierschenk 1988:104) rather than ’profit maximizing strategies’.

Likewise, the CAD project requires participants to possess legal certificates of their

property and land, and even though this is more common in the buffer zone now than

earlier (Interview with Gutierrez; Nygren 2003), some people are still without and are

therefore excluded from participating in the project38. In addition, the requirement of

“not to perform any burning of vegetation” is another obstacle for participating in the

project for many people. People with a minimum of land practice agriculture with

37 Is is noteworthy that Margarito did not mention or consider the forest as a resouce worth conserving for its ecological value or potential, but rather thought of it as an economic investment for his children to benefit from in the future. 38 Lack of land can obviously also constitute a barrier. However, all of the respodents claimed to possess their own land, although varying amounts of it, and none stated that they had rented land. Even the ”poorest” in the buffer zone normally have at least 1 Mz. of land and in most cases much more. However, some peasants in the buffer zone are without and therefore lease land from others (Gutierrez, pers. comm.)

87

limited periods of fallow and most people believe that rice cannot be cultivated

without burning the land before sowing, for which reason burning of weeds and

vegetation is normal procedure for most peasants. However, as stated in chapter 4, let

me add in parenthesis – as do the CAD project – that the requirement of “not to

perform any burning of vegetation” is toned down by the amendment “and if done

anyway, to keep the fire controlled and limited” (ProDeSoC 2006), showing a great

deal of realism from the project. In any case, the projects’ requirements for participants

compose in itself a barrier for many people’s possibility of participating. In the case of

the CAD project it is clear-cut ‘action’ requirements that constitute the barrier, whereas

in the case of the Danida cocoa project the amount of US$ 75 that participants have to

pay in order to join the cocoa cooperative, which is a requirement to form part of the

project, can for some constitute an economic barrier for entering the project (having in

mind that their is no economic gain from the cocoa until after 3-4 years).

Having presented the story of Margarito, as an example of a capital-strong person,

engaging in a rather demanding project without having to reduce, restrict or hazard his

livelihood, it is now time to introduce Juan, whose situation is quite different:

Juan is 55 years old and came to Las Maravillas four years ago with his wife and children in the

search for a new life. Juan used to drink a lot and spent all money on alcohol, so that there was

no money left for food to the family. Juan is a subsistence farmer cultivating basic grains for

family consumption, he owns approximately 2 Mz. of land that he bought from one of the

villagers shortly after arriving. Money is scarce, but Juan does no longer drink. Instead he has

found rescue in God and goes to church every night with his family. His youngest daughter is

sick, so his wife spends all day in the house taking care of her, while Juan takes care of the fields.

Juan and his family do not know many people in the village and do not have strong relations

with anyone outside of the family. However, sometimes Juan helps some of the other peasants in

the village with minor doings or assists them in their fields when it is time to harvest. They

normally pay him salary, but Juan prefers to be paid in kind, like beans or rice. One time a

friendly peasant even paid him with a piece of meat from a newly slaughtered pig – that day was

remarkable and Juan smiles by the thought of the feast he had with his family the following days.

Juan is not engaged in any projects, mostly because he does not feel that he has been invited to

do so. At the same time he does not want to participate in any project, because he feels that this

88

puts restrictions on his livelihood. He believes that being part of a project is time consuming

and requires giving up control with your destiny. His opinion is that if you decide to grow

cocoa you must be aware that maybe it leaves you worse off than before the project, and this is

not a chance he can afford to take with a large family to maintain. Also, he says, he does not

need more than he has already. They might be poor, but they are surviving. He prefers to leave

his destiny in the hands of God rather than a project. (Respondent No. 13)

The story of Juan is an example of a livelihood strategy founded in survival and day-

to-day living which is not uncommon in Las Maravillas. The story of Juan is just one

out of many. It is a way of life practiced by many of the poorest households in the area,

well captured in the Nicaraguan expression “buscando el día” (searching for the day),

which illustrates the short term perspective and lack of possibilities that many people

are confronted with. Many of these turn to God for guidance and help. Likewise, the

story demonstrates how some people cannot afford to join a project, and how the

promotion of the projects does not reach the poorest and those with the weakest social

networks. Juan feels that he has not been invited to join projects, which is correct; he

has not been invited, because the projects do no longer promote their projects by

inviting people. In this regard, it is also important to emphasize how locals’ choices

and rationales for engaging or not in projects are influenced by their past experiences

as well as their individual measures for a decent life, where secure food supply and

surviving today weigh heavier than future possible profits. This is related to what

Bourdieu calls ’habitus’ or ’embodied history’ (Long 2001:14,17; Järvinen 2001:350),

since most of the peasants – as is the case of Juan - have been poor for their whole life

and have found a way of living that seems secure and sufficient. Also related to

’habitus’ is the sense of reality and own limitations, so that, according to Bourdieu, ”an

agent does not seek for something that does not seek for him/her (..), meaning that an

almost complete harmony arise between the objective possibilities available for an

agent and the goal he/she considers desirable, realistic and imaginable” (Järvinen

2001:350 - my own translation). As regards the cocoa project it is doubtful that Juan

would ever had been invited, since Danida intentionally made contact to those with

“potential” when first initiating the project (Zambrana, pers. comm.; Ríos, pers.

comm.). Also, he does not have strong social networks in the village, which

consequently means that he has never been recommended or sought out to participate

89

by anyone. When interviewing the cocoa producers I asked them how the project

originally had come to their attention, and it turned out that every of the respondents

could name one or two names of people who had convinced them or “invited” them to

join the project. This basically means that the participants in the cocoa project are one

big “family” in the sense that they are connected in their social networks with one

another. This is however not a social network that has come into existence by

participating in the project, but rather a network that already existed before, so that

those knowing each other, maybe making business together in one way or another,

extended the acquaintance to the project in certain circles. There is nothing odd about

the fact that people knowing each other diffuse the acquaintance to certain people

within their own networks, but the consequence is that some individuals outside this

network are marginalized and excluded from participating.

This marginalization is furthermore fortified by the fact that Danida not only leave in it

the hands of “potential” and specially selected participants to find new project

participants, but also appoint promoters among the most resource strong:

Chilino, 59 years old, is basically founder of Las Maravillas having lived the longest period of

time in the village. He came to Las Maravillas forty-five years ago with his family, when it was

nothing but forest as far as the eye could see. He fled to Costa Rica in 1983 because of the war

and came back in 1991 to find that his house and land were still standing/available. The

household of Chilino consists of twelve persons, and besides a large family he also has wide and

strong social networks in and outside the village. He is well-known and respected in the village,

mainly due to his position as the founder of the community and because many people have

bought land from Chilino during the years. Likewise he is actively engaged in the Danida

project, both as ‘regular’ participant, as member of the cooperative’s board of directors and as

appointed promoter. The role of promoter is not unknown for Chilino, since he has been used to

help people seeking his advice during the years. Chilino has been appointed as promoter by the

extensionists (technicians) of the Danida project, due to his strong social position, his

community connections and respectability and his desire to support and work for his fellow

90

cooperative members, as well as he has showed good results with his cocoa cultivation and is

considered capable of transmitting experience to other farmers. (Respondent No. 1)39

As mentioned before, from Danida’s perspective the rationale of having local

promoters is that there is a shorter distance between local promoters and local

producers, than between Danida technicians and local producers (Interview with Ríos).

The notion of appointing local promoters could also be seen as a decentralization

process and an attempt to hand over the ownership of the project to participants.

However, my findings showed evidence that the most resource weak did not

participate in the project (Annex 4). Hence, only relatively capital strong people

participated in the cocoa project, and within this group of relatively alike resource

strong people, the most capital-strong were appointed promoters. Choosing the most

“potential” and resource strong as promoters might be logical from the project’s

standpoint, since this as well can help guarantee the sustainability of the project

(Jürgensen & Schultz 2001; Mosse 2004). Robert Chambers refers to this as “person

bias”, characterised as projects’ tendency to approach those persons belonging to the

elite, the resource strong, often men, active people and receptive to changes (Chambers

1983:18-19). However, this also gives more power to those who already have the most,

as well as it exclude certain people from participating. As both the case stories of Juan

and Chilino show, the ones with the strongest social networks and positions in the

community are favoured by the projects, which further strengthen these persons’

identity as resource strong and hence their social position in the community and

maybe even broaden their access to expanded networks further, while the poorer and

the resource-weak are left behind and further marginalized.

Concluding remarks

In sum, as the life-stories of Margarito, Juan and Chilino have illustrated, people have

different capitals and thereby different means by which they try to make a living (in

which case the story of Juan represents the poorest and marginalized, nonetheless not

being an isolated example, because many people’s livelihoods and situation are similar

39 With additional comments from interviews and informal talks with the Danida technician, Ríos.

91

to that of Juan). This differentiation in capitals (such as access to wider social networks

and information, ability to labour, capability to adapt to changes in livelihoods and

deal with project requirement, as well as coping with inadequate resources and

minimizing risks) to a large degree determine what kind of activities are available to

the households and thereby how people relate to or respond to projects.

My findings overall indicate that people engaging in the projects are those already with

the strongest or the most capitals. Strong capitals were therefore not something people

achieved through project participation, but rather something they already possessed

when engaging in the projects. It therefore seems viable to deduce that participating in

these projects requires strong capitals and that people with fewer capitals cannot cope

with the work that project participation requires (Chamorro, pers. comm.).

Likewise, I found that projects – either consciously or unconsciously - favor above

others and target at those persons with strong social capitals and positions in the

community, in the hope that this will help guarantee the success of the project. In case

of the CAD plantation project, the design of the project excludes many of the resource

weak from participating, simply because of the clear-cut participant requirements.

Regarding the Danida cocoa project, the search for participants with “potential” as well

as the appointment of promoters among the most resource strong, similarly

marginalize certain individuals or social groups and favour the already resource strong

belonging to strong social networks.

It was mentioned in the beginning of the section that projects in Las Maravillas, as in

elsewhere in the buffer zone, have tightened their material support; not giving away

tools, agricultural utensils, seeds, etcetera free of charge, but requesting participants to

pay for these goods. This change in support might also keep away the poorest from

participating, now that they have to buy the articles necessary for e.g. cocoa cultivation

themselves. Although projects offer loans, the discussion of risk minimizing strategies

is valid in this case as well, as most poor people do not dare to borrow money that they

might never be able to pay back. Hence, the change in material inputs may constitute

an economic barrier for the poorest.

92

Having analysed factors inherent in the project design and project approach that can

help explain the social differentiation between resource-strong and the poorer or the

more resource-weak, and hence people’s motives or rationales for participating and

especially for not participating in projects, the following section will now look at how

other factors outside of the project can also serve as an explanation to people’s

responses to development and conservation projects.

Conflicts, corruption and contradiction

The aim of this section is to illustrate and analyze how other factors outside of the

projects, such as national forestry legislation and local government corruption, can also

serve as an explanation for people’s responses to development and conservation

projects. The aim is to show that people also decide how and if to engage in

development projects based on past experiences with project intervention, rumours, as

well as by taking into account the experiences of other groups within their social

networks.

The mayor and his corrupt appointment of CDCA in Las Maravillas

Being mayor in one of the poorest municipalities in Nicaragua is definitely not an easy

task. Development goals are difficult to reach during one election period as mayor,

while local expectations are high. Fransisco Diáz was elected mayor in the municipal

elections in 2005 and as any other politician he is very exposed to public attention and

opinion formation. He is friendly and smiling, and seen from the outside he is not

genteel and has no posh manners as he always finds time to talk to villagers in the

streets of Boca de Sábalos, where the local government office is located. However,

rumours have it that he is corrupt40 in the savage sense of the word. He supposedly

won the election by promising roads to all of the communities in the municipality.

When he won, he instigated a collection of money from all the municipalities stating

40 Corruption is an elusive and complex phenomena, diffucult to separate from other forms of social exchange, and closely linked to questions of public morality and morality in general (Theobald 1990:1). For the same reason many definitions of corruption exist, but I will here refer to the clear and focused definition provided by Transparency International, which defines corruption as ”the misuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International 2006).

93

that all communities interested in a road to their location should contribute with

money in order to make it possible (Respondent No. 2,3,4,7,9,14,24,26,37; Romero, pers.

comm.). Almost two years later there is still no sight of roads in the communities. At

the same time, there are various and diverse speculations about where the collected

money went. Everybody talks about the large luxurious jeep, in which he has been

seen driving from San Carlos to Managua now and then. And there are an endless

number of equivalent stories and rumours. There are different accounts of the events

and the background and people differ in their judgement and verdict of the mayor41.

However, the truthfulness of the rumours itself is not so important42. What is

important is the fact that people find something rotten about the mayor and his

actions, and the rumours could therefore be seen as the locals’ only means to stand up

against such a power by besmearing his reputation.

However, it has been possible to confirm some rumours as being facts, as the case

about the mayor’s engagement in corrupt means in relation to the democratic structure

of village committees. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the CDCA in Las

Maravillas was appointed by the mayor shortly after his inauguration in 2005, so that

all members of CDCA are now representing his party, PLC. As already mentioned, the

community committees form part of the decentralization process in Nicaragua and the

idea of CDCAs is to increase the role of civil society organizations in the development

of the municipality. CDCAs are officially supposed to be democratically elected in the

community and operate as a link between the community and the local government,

where CDCA represents and transmits local opinions and proposals, as well as the

other way round where CDCA brings forward initiatives and information from the

local government to the community (or as in the case of the CAD project, promote

initiatives relevant for the community). It can be seen as an expression of citizens’

political participation, which has been defined as ”taking part in the process of

formulation, passage and implementation of public policies” (Parry et al. 1992:16).

41 The rumors could of course never be ratified and were logically disclaimed with laughter by the mayor himself and his closest affiliates. 42Rumors have been described as public communications that are infused with private hypotheses about how the world works, or more specifically, ways of making sense to help us cope with our anxieties and uncertainties and as an attempt to deal with these anxieties and uncertainties by generating and passing stories and suppositions that can explain things, address anxieties, and provide a rationale for behavior (Rosnow 1988).

94

However, ”the control of the structure and processes for participation - defining

spaces, actors, agendas, procedures - is usually in the hands [of] governmental

institutions and can become a barrier for effective involvement of citizens” (Gaventa &

Valderrama 1999:7), which is most certainly the case in Las Maravillas, where the

mayor has exercised power and corruption by ”ignoring” civil society for his own

gain43. Consequently, because of the non-democratic elected CDCA, people have lost

confidence and no longer consider this organ as valid (Respondent No. 1,2,3,4,7,8,9,14,

16,22,26,27,32,33,37; Interview with Romero). For the same reason anarchy to a certain

degree exist in Las Maravillas, with, on the one hand, all power being centred at a

corrupt appointed CDCA and on the other hand with a CDCA without no real power,

due to the fact that this committee has lost its legal status among the villagers, who do

not trust nor approach CDCA, and hence “everyone does what he or she wants to

without asking CDCA for permission or advice” (Romero, pers. comm.).

The local government and hence the mayor has for years formed part of the Danida

project. While on the one hand seemingly being corrupt and carrying out actions for

his own lucre, on the other hand he is ‘playing the tunes of the projects’ in the sense

that he curries favour with project personnel. This apparently makes projects believe

his good intentions, while at the same time being aware of the rumours about him, but

always allowing him back into the fold, due to their intentions of working in

cooperation with local governments and authorities while carrying out projects in

Nicaragua. Paradoxically, the Danida project is blamed for the mayor’s corruption and

fraud in many villages, where locals have tended to see the Danida project and the

mayor as one single organ, and yet continues to turn a blind eye to his behaviour and

thereby aggravate their own image among the locals; a point I shall return to later in

this section. Seemingly paradox is the fact that the CAD project chose to promote their

project through the local CDCA knowing that this has been corruptly appointed by the

mayor.

43 Although it is very unclear what the mayor gains from his corrupt appointment of CDCA in Las Maravillas, ”an informed” guess is that he has sought to secure his own policies a certain ”legitimacy” or ”acceptance” in the village, knowing that CDCA supports him and his doings. However, the ”situation” is enveloped in mystery, and it has unfortunately not been possible to elaborate further on this issue.

95

Conflicting national forest legislation

Having presented the forestry legislation in the previous chapter, it is now relevant to

have a closer look on the effects of these laws and policies in the local context. For

years it has been standard procedure in Nicaragua that people should obtain

permission for felling trees. These permissions have only been given to people with

forest management plans showing sustainable long-term management. Ordinary poor

peasants and forest owners do normally not have these plans or the money to have one

made. For the big logging companies, felling thousands of hectares of forests at a time,

it has been simple to pay some technician to make such a plan, even if the plan does

not match reality, knowing that the authorities have not had opportunity to control it

(Faurby 1997). Making complex laws and regulations with technical claims as a

condition for felling trees has not been the solution for increasing forest degradation in

Nicaragua. Rather, it has turned poor forest dwellers into criminals, by not being able

to fulfil technical claims and procedures (and obtaining felling permission). For the

large logging companies or similar big forest cutters, the technical claims has been a

formal procedure, where most strict claims can be overcome by means of bribe (Faurby

1997). For the last decade thousands of hectares of forests have been cut down in order

to clear the way for agriculture, at variance with the Environmental Law from 1996,

with a minimum of intervention from the authorities. Illegality is as a result an old-

established part of the peasants’ everyday life (Gutierrez, pers. comm.; Faurby 2007,

pers. correspond.).

As already mentioned, the ambiguous content of the laws makes them open for

interpretation, which causes a great deal of confusion in the local context. In general,

the forest legislation in Nicaragua is unclear regarding responsibilities and

competences of the different forestry and environmental authorities, and confusion is

total not only among the different authorities themselves, but logically also among

local peasants and forest owners. It is very unusual that people living in rural areas

actually ask for permission to fell trees for own utilization, and similarly unusual that

the authorities take action against this logging (Faurby 2007, pers. correspond.). Very

few locals in Las Maravillas know about changes in forest legislation, let alone the

original conformation, and if people dare to contact authorities for information about

logging rights or issue of logging permission, they quickly come to learn that illegality

96

is worthwhile, since seeking logging permission can be a very bureaucratic, time-

consuming and frustrating procedure.

During my fieldwork I decided to investigate exactly how difficult it could be to obtain

logging permission and whether it was at all possible to have one issued now that the

forestry ban has come into force in the buffer zone. I found it logical to start my

investigation by visiting MARENA’s surveillance post in Las Maravillas, assuming that

this would be the obvious place to start for a peasant living in the village44. I talked to

four different forest guards from the army that did not manage to give me clear

answers. Two of the guards deemed it possible to have a logging permission issued,

whereas the other two insisted that with the forestry ban it was no longer a possibility.

I was then referred to a fifth forest guard, who had worked the longest for MARENA,

and was told that a logging permission could be obtained by applying at the office of

INAFOR in Boca de Sábalos. The trip from Las Maravillas to Boca de Sábalos

(approximately 25 kilometres) could in my case be done in 1½ hours in ”taxi” for the

amount of 40 Córdobas (≈ $US 2.27). For a poor peasant however, it is more likely that

the journey would be done on horseback or by foot and hence takes a longer time. At

the office in Boca de Sábalos I was told that INAFOR indeed is the authority to

implement policies in the buffer zone and to issue logging permissions, but since

MARENA has certain responsibilities in protected areas, it is necessary to have an

approval document from MARENA before going to INAFOR for issue of permission. I

then went to the MARENA office in Boca de Sábalos, and was told that logging

permission could no longer be issued due to the forestry ban. This information was not

given to me at the INAFOR office. I therefore went back to INAFOR for clarification

and was told that permission with reference to commercial logging could not be

issued, but that people could still apply for permission to fell a few of their own trees

to use for house construction. Back at the MARENA office I was once again told that no

logging permissions – for whichever purpose – could be issued, and that all logging of

trees in the buffer zone (and the Reserve) was illegal.

44 Of course I knew that as a stranger I would not be allowed to get a logging permission, for which reason I asked my questions hypothetically: ”If I was a Nicaraguan living in Las Maravillas, where would I have to go in order to get a logging permission issued and which papers would I have to bring?” etcetera.

97

I began to realize that no shared standpoint about how to interpret the logging ban

existed between the two authorities and that contradiction was probably all I was ever

going to find in my search for the “truth”. With this complexity it is no wonder that

people living in the buffer zone omit to seek for logging permission let alone try to

understand the standing legislation. If I as an academic having gone through the

legislation am not capable of understanding its content, in order not to mention that

the authorities working with it every day likewise do not clearly understand it, how is

a poor and often illiterate peasant supposed to grasp the meaning of it?

I also wanted to clarify who is in charge of presenting or introducing the forestry ban

to the local villagers, assuming that they should be informed or warned about the total

ban on logging as a natural part of the legislation implementation. This turned out to

be an equally impossible task with contradictory answers. By INAFOR I was told that

the different conservation and development projects operating in the buffer zone were

the ones to bring forward the information to the villagers; this was easier, since they

operated in practically all of the villages and hence were in close contact with the

locals. However, at the CAD office in Boca de Sábalos I was told that it was not the

responsibility of the projects, but rather a task for MARENA. By Danida I was likewise

told that in general it was a task for INAFOR or MARENA and not an obligation for

the projects, but that Danida through their technicians had promulgated the ban to the

cocoa promoters and left it in their hands to inform other participants of the project.

According to MARENA it is a common responsibility to bring about the ban and that

normally these types of information go through the CDCA in each of the villages.

This investigation did not leave me with a clear-cut answer either. For all I know, in

Las Maravillas I experienced a general lack of knowledge about the forestry ban, which

among other things can be explained by the CDCA not having any legal status in the

village anymore and therefore not intercommunicate with the villagers as meant to. No

doubt that some villagers have been informed about the forestry ban, while others

have heard about it by means of rumours, while others are still blissfully unaware of

the ban.

98

All things considered, there is no doubt that total anarchy exist in the forest sector of

Nicaragua. The laws and policies are so comprehensive that they become ineffective

(Gutierrez, pers. comm.; Faurby 2007, pers. correspond.). The authorities meant to

enforce the legislation are ”paralysed” by the disaccording content of it and no

common understanding exist of how to understand the laws let alone implement them

in practice. The projects are just as confused as the authorities on the standing

legislation but prefer not to take any responsibility neither for its diffusion nor its

observance. This can also help explain why the CAD project has not made a more

proactive effort to diffuse the fact that plantations are exempted from the logging ban,

although this could be an obvious possibility to acquire more participants. The

plantation project, with the annual payments to participants, is predetermined to run

for five years. A lot of new changes in Nicaraguan forestry laws can happen in five

years, for which reason the project might not want to make too many promises to

participants, if plantations are later to be included in the logging ban45.

Confusion in the community context

I came to find that many locals have difficulties distinguishing between projects and

authorities operating in the buffer zone. They tend to see them as an aggregate or joint

entity, which in my opinion have caused certain problems for the projects. The Danida

project did for many years work in close cooperation with the mayor (local

government) and MARENA, but does not anymore. People, however, continue to view

the three organs as one. When MARENA carry out implementations of forest policies,

people accuse Danida for putting pressure on their livelihoods (Respondent No. 2,4,5,6,

9,11,12,16,17,18,21,27). When the local government (and the mayor) neglect their duties

and promises, as have been the case with the maintenance of a ramshackle bridge at

the entry point of Las Maravillas, people blame Danida (Respondent No. 2,4,6,11,12,14,

17,22,24,28,33,38). When Danida officiates as intermediary or messenger of central

government programmes, which has been the case of a ‘Libra por Libra’ programme,

45 The CAD project has already experienced the consequences of the logging ban in other communities in the buffer zone, where they have been forced to close down a project component aiming at sustainable forest utilization with training in commercialization and support in finding national marketing possibilities for forest products. According to the CAD coordinator it was not an easy task to convey the message to the participants when the component had to close down, since this left the participating forest owners disillusioned and above all without immediate alternatives for income (Zapata, pers. comm.).

99

people believe it to be a project of Danida. The latter example is worth focusing a bit

more attention on, as it serves to illustrate how national (or even international)

programmes and development initiatives influence on local level, and also supports

the ‘cargo’ image of intervention (Long 2001:33-36).

Some years back the Nicaraguan government launched a programme called ‘Libra por

Libra’ (Pound for Pound), financed among others by The World Bank and FAO, with

the aim of giving farmers access to new varieties of genetically improved grains with a

larger nutritious potential. Small-scale farmers receive agricultural certified inputs and

at the end of the harvest they have to repay in equal amounts in the form of seeds,

hence the name; Pound for Pound46 (Nuevo Diario 2002b, 2004, 2005; Prensa 2004;

MAGFOR 2007; IMF 2005). In this connection, a small scale pilot project was launched

in some of the communities in the buffer zone by MAGFOR. MAGFOR asked Danida

to distribute the improved ‘miracle’ seeds of maize and rice, which have had certain

consequences for Danida, which the following case-story will illustrate:

Carlo was among the ”potential” farmers selected by Danida to run test plots of cocoa before the

actual commencement of the Danida cocoa project. Simultaneously he was likewise one of the

farmers receiving the “miracle” variety of rice seeds. He was explained about spacing and

cultivating techniques as well as special fertilizers in order to make it grow. He was also

explained about the “wonders” (the better nutritious potential) of this rice variety and was

therefore curious to see the results, while at the same time being sceptical, since he found his

own cultivation procedure better and easier, since he had been used to cultivate rice in a certain

way for most of his life. He was worried to see that the rice plants were not nearly as tall as the

rice plants he used to cultivate. When the rice was finally harvested, Carlo was shocked to find

that that the rice was sticky when cooked and had a weird brown colour instead of the white

non-sticky rice he had been used to. He was angry and disappointed about Danida handing out

such a bad rice variety that had made him leave out sowing of the conventional rice type.

Without any further actions taken or any questions asked he decided to leave the cocoa project in

protest. (Respondent No. 12) 46 ”The element of exchange was to avoid handouts and instead create a feeling of responsibility. Since Nicaragua’s history of aid dependency and high inflation has given an attitude of remittance, the factor of material exchange was to change this attitude by obliging a personal contribution. The exchange however was much criticised because farmers would exchange seed that reproduced for seed that would not and farmers would be caught in a system where seed had to be bought every season” (Widegård 2003:51).

100

Danida distributing the ’miracle’ rice seed did not have anything to do with the cocoa

project. However, Carlo confused Danida with other entities, and since Danida was the

”mediator”, they were reproached for the failure, for which reason Carlo decided to

leave the project in discontent and disappointment. It is very important to emphasize

that Carlo was only dissatisfied with the colour and the consistency of the rice when

cooked, as well as with the cultivating techniques different from the ones he used to

practice (where soil and minor vegetation is burned before sowing). He, however,

might have been ”hitting the bull’s eye” with his dissatisfaction – although not aware

of it – since the Libra por Libra programme has been widely criticized among other

things for running errands of Monsanto, the world’s leading producer of genetically

engineered seed (Widengård 2003; DeSantis 2003; Nuevo Diario 2001a, 2001b, 2002a).

However, this was not the reason for Carlo’s dissatisfaction. So, without going into

further analysis of the Libra por Libra programme, as this is outside the scope of the

thesis and not relevant for Carlo’s motive for leaving the cocoa project, it is still

relevant to note that his story illustrates how some locals do not distinguish between

projects and authorities operating in the buffer zone, but rather tend to see them as a

joint entity. Also, it serves to exemplify the asymmetry in the division of knowledge,

where it has been decided on ”superior level” what is needed among peasants on local

level. For a peasant like Carlo, not close to dying of starvation (opposite other farmers

in Nicaragua, where the Libra por Libra programme has been received differently since

free seeds has been handed out in some municipalities affected by floods – see FAO

2004b), issues such as taste and cooking time are important factors, that may not have

been considered by those far away from the actual utilization settings, who

furthermore have not involved the target group in the definition of quality objectives.

Needs are thus defined by experts according to preconceived criteria, that may not

apply in every situation or setting (Olivier de Sardan 1988). Also, it shows lack of

knowledge-sharing in the sense that Danida as mediator did not provide sufficient

explanation of the rice seed and its qualities (Ríos, pers. comm.), since Carlo would not

have been surprised if done so. Also, the Danida project has obviously not made it

clear enough that they were only ”mediator” of this programme, presumably by reason

of not expecting the reactions to be negative.

101

Thus, as is the case regarding rumours about the mayor, an endless number of similar

rumours flourish about Danida, and these influence on people’s perception of the

project and hence on people’s responses to it. Some people make decisions about

whether to participate or not in the project based on these rumours. In particular,

Danida is often accused of practising double standard and supporting corruption. A

peasant explained that he had considered to join the cocoa project, but changed his

mind when it came to his attention, through his social networks, that Danida

apparently had distributed rice, hens and pigs to some of the villagers, which he did

not benefit from. He found this differential treatment ”repulsive” and reminded him

about the time during the war when the Sandinistas favoured some citizen instead of

others in their distribution of the country’s resources. With disillusion he then

concluded that Danida was corrupt and nothing better than the Sandinistas that had

created so much suffering in his life (Respondent No. 22). This can be characterized as

what Elwert & Bierschenk narrate as ’historical consciousness of risks” (Elwert &

Bierschenk 1988:104).

Whether true or not people base their decisions and responses to projects on rumours,

as well as they estimate and weigh how and if projects can contribute with anything

useful in their lives taking past experiences and personal sentiments into consideration.

Mistrust plays an important role in this regard. People have clear memories from the

period of war in Nicaragua, and combined with political affiliations as well as tangible

war experiences have come to form part of the way most Nicaraguans think and reason

today. People either recall the time of Sandinista revolution as one of glorification or as

one of true disaster47. Going into a comprehensive account of the war’s impact on

contemporary Nicaraguan living is unfortunately outside the scope of this thesis,

although extremely interesting for a researcher having done field work during an

47 While the Sandinista adherents indicated strong confidence in a brighter future if Daniel Ortega once again became president of Nicaragua, arguing that ever since the Frente Sandinista lost elections in 1990, the Liberal governments have worked against especially the farmers, the opponents were worried that Daniel as president was equal to a new war. Hence, among some farmers, a strong belief existed that a change of government back to the Sandinistas would mean more support and inputs to poor rural livelihoods, such as credit, consultancy, good or better market prices, whereas the opponents of a Sandinista government feared a decrease in support and market prices.

102

election period48. It is however worth emphasizing the importance of people’s

memories in regard to project involvement. I came to find a ’culture of mistrust’ (Xin &

Rudel 2004; Envío 1996) among the peasants in Las Maravillas, where the confidence in

public officials (particularly the mayor) was minimal (Respondent No. 1,2,3,4,6,7,8,12,

16,17,20,27,32,33,37). This mistrust of course is not only connected to the war, but

political shifts in Nicaragua in general, with endless examples of corruption, lies and

failed promises. Nicaraguan people in general, but the poorest in particular, have

experienced several presidents promising improvements for the rural poor during

their election period, but then not fulfilling any of their promises when ultimately in

power, which has created a greater mistrust among poor people towards the

politicians, who promise everything and deliver nothing (Respondent No. 2,10,12,15,

17,23).

Interaction between different projects

Similar relevant to take into account, when analyzing interface and responses to

planned intervention, is the interaction between different conservation and

development projects. In general and officially the different projects in the buffer zone

aim to cooperate in regard to their common goal, namely conservation of the Reserve.

This collaboration is reflected in the different projects coordination of institutional

strengthening (Danida worked with MARENA, CAD still working with INAFOR) and

coordination of project activities so that they do not overlap (CAD works with cocoa in

other communities, but due to Danida already carrying out such a project in Las

Maravillas, CAD does not). However, even though mostly hidden and unsaid, certain

disputes exist between the projects. As with any other conflict, this was a difficult

research topic to investigate, due to its sensitivity as an issue, but some projects more

than others were indiscreet or outspoken, when asked about their opinions about other

projects in the area. Especially the executive director of the Danida project, the national

coordinator, had a tendency to slander the other projects, emphasizing Danida’s own

excellent work in the area, and attacking and neglecting the work of other projects.

48 For reading about the contra war in Nicaragua I can strongly recommend ”Blood of Brothers” by Stephen Kinzer; an American journalist, who has made a vibrant portrait of the Nicaraguan people and their history. (Kinzer 1991)

103

Likewise, power conflicts were revealed. It is not popular among the projects that

participants in their specific project also engage in others. Officially, participants are

free to engage in whatever and as many projects they want, but there are examples of

one project “threatening” participants, saying ‘if you engage in our project you cannot

engage in others’ (Mariscal, pers. comm.). The reason why multiple project

participation is not popular is that when projects make evaluations of their specific

impact, they desire to take the credit for e.g. so and so much forest being preserved or

such and such an increase in socio-economic conditions (Zapata, pers. comm.).

Concluding remarks

This section has sought to demonstrate how social actors are, within the limits of

information, uncertainty and the other constraints that exist, ‘knowledgeable’ and

‘capable’ (Giddens in Long & Long 1992:23; Long 2001:16). People process their own

experiences of ‘projects’ and ‘interventions’, alongside their many other experiences

and livelihood concerns. They construct their own memory of these experiences, as

they estimate and weigh how and if projects can contribute with anything useful in

their lives by taking past experiences and personal sentiments into consideration. We

have come to see that locals also base their decisions and responses to projects on

rumours, as well as by taking into account the experiences of other groups within their

social networks. Mistrust play an important role in this regard, which was explained

from the corrupt mayor and his undemocratic appointment of the village committee, as

well as from people’s memories from the period of war in Nicaragua, which combined

with political affiliations come to form part of the way locals react and reason. Their

reactions or responses to projects today therefore have to be understood in the context

of previous experiences (Olivier de Sardan 1988:219; 2005:139), since it is with these

perceptions, memories and experiences in mind that people decide how and if to

engage in development projects (Long 2002:50).

The section has also emphasized how social differentiation and different responses to

projects can be further reinforced and influenced by external factors such as local and

national development processes. The ambiguous content of the forestry legislation

makes it open for interpretation, which cause a great deal of confusion in the local

104

context. In general, the forest legislation in Nicaragua is unclear regarding

responsibilities and competences of the different forestry and environmental

authorities, and confusion is total not only among the different authorities themselves,

but logically also among local peasants and forest owners. The locals tend to conceive

projects and authorities as an aggregate or joint entity, which gives rise to

misunderstandings and hence negative reactions to projects.

Negotiation and power

Although also implied throughout the last two sections, the aim of this section is to

point out and analyze explicitly how project intervention entails constant negotiation

between the involved stakeholders, where ‘local knowledge’ versus ‘expert

knowledge’ is negotiated and transformed; involving power struggles and projects’

“clash” with or intervention in existing local knowledge processes and local power

structures, which also alter the conditions for differential reactions to projects.

The intersecting lifeworlds of forest guards and peasants

On paper the army has an assisting function when INAFOR’s own resources are not

sufficient (Gaceta 2006b:Arto. 12), but in the buffer zone undue power has been given

the army to enforce the law and control the observance of it (Chamorro; Estrada;

García, pers. comm.). ”In general, the military plays an active role in the protection of

threatened environmental areas in Nicaragua, and the soldiers apparently have a

positive reputation among the local population. Considering the violent history of the

country this is remarkable.” (Simonsen 2006 - my own translation). It seems severe

when a group of full front military carrying machine guns walks through the village,

which is a normal sight in Las Maravillas being the location for the central surveillance

post of MARENA’s forest guards. In spite of that, I came to find that the task for the

army in the buffer zone is rather ”symbolic” than practical; even though this might not

be the way they comprehend it themselves, and it is certain that the role they play in

the Reserve and at the border of this is way more active and practical than in the buffer

zone. During my fieldwork in Las Maravillas I counted three new houses being build

(out of wood). The army passed by the ”construction site” daily on their way back to

105

the surveillance post, and not once did I see them or hear about them give a warning or

hand out a fine. This issue shall be discussed and analyzed below, starting with the

case-story of a local forest guard:

Luís lives in a village in the buffer zone and has worked as forest guard for MARENA for the

last five years. He works in rotation at the five different surveillance posts; the one in Las

Maravillas and the others along the reserve border. The job as a forest guard gives a high degree

of authority, and Luís is well aware of his duty and responsibility as a guard, knowing that any

logging of trees is illegal and hence oblige him to impose penalty. However, Luís finds the law to

bee too strict and unfair and therefore normally close his eyes to illegality: “If I see a person

from one of the villages cutting trees I am supposed to take his saw away from him and even

give him a penalty, but I never do that, (....) instead I tell him that he has to be more careful so

that we don’t see him cutting trees (…) How can I take away his survival opportunities, when I

know that he is not the only one who cuts trees?”. (Respondent No. 31)

The story of Luís is a good example of the ’dual role’ many forest guards possess in the

buffer zone, since they often live in the same society as they are supposed to supervise.

There is a certain clash, so to speak, between their role as forest guards enforcing the

law and controlling the observance of it, and their role as private person living in the

society and feeling a natural affinity with the villagers and even personally knowing

many of the people they are supposed to give penalties. Long (2001) comments on this

issue as well, by saying that “One should not assume that, because a particular person

‘represents’ a specific group or institution, he or she necessarily acts in the interest or

on behalf of his/her fellows.” (Long 2001:70). Research by Ravnborg in the buffer zone

closer to the Reserve border shows similar conclusions concerning the dilemmas facing

the forest guards, as she points to the fact that forest guards - living in the control posts

for a continuous period of three weeks - are depending on the surrounding population

for food, social relations and personal security49 (Ravnborg 2006a:6-7).

The story of Luís can also help explain why the army (the forest guards) apparently

have a positive reputation among the local population, because if all the forest guards

49 Personal security is more ”relevant” at the surveillance posts along the Reserve border than at the central surveillance post in Las Maravillas, due to armed conflicts that erupt occasionally.

106

act and reason as Luís, their role become symbolic rather than action-oriented, and

hence the locals have no reason to fear the forest guards. Luís’ entanglement of two

contrasting and conflicting worlds produces a room for manoeuvre in which he

devises his own strategies of intervention and hence creates an ”encounter at the

interface” (Long 2001:73-92), where national policies and conservation ”projects” meet

local society and are negotiated, transformed and implemented at the encounter with

this context.

In continuation of this, it is of course relevant to consider if there can be other motives

for Luís’ behaviour than just purely good morals and solidarity with his poor

community comrades. Although I was touched and impressed by Luís’ solidarity, I

could not help but wonder; does he rather take advantage of his public position for

personal gain? His role as forest guard, with the power to impose penalties, puts him

in an obvious flagrant position to exert corruption by means of bribe in exchange for

his ignoring of illegal logging. However, as regards bribe, this did not seem to be the

case. On basis of informal talks with local villagers regarding this issue there are no

evidence or reasons to believe that Luís or other forest guards are corrupt, which

however of course does not have to be the whole truth in all of the buffer zone

(Respondent No. 8,13,22,26,33,36).

Encounters between ’local knowledge’ and ’expert knowledge’

Opposed to the forest guards, the technicians working for the Danida cocoa project are

educated and often from outside of the municipality. They are the ones who give

technical assistance and instruction to the participants in the cocoa project. A

technician has various communities as his responsibility area, and works according to

a “21-plan”, which means he works for the first twenty-one days of the months and

then spent the last nine to ten days on vacation. During the twenty-one days of work,

the technicians are supposed to travel around in the buffer zone attending various

communities where the cocoa project operates. Their work task is to facilitate the cocoa

farmers in the cultivation, giving technical assistance and advice. Likewise, it is their

task to make management plans with participants. However, the technicians also tend

to have a lot of desk work, for which reason a lot of time is spend in the project office in

107

Boca de Sábalos, which as a consequence means long periods without attending the

communities.

According to Ríos, a Danida technician working in Las Maravillas, he often encounters

expressions of so-called ’local knowledge’, where local embedded knowledge

contradicts with his technical knowledge and with the objectives of the project. In one

case he experienced a farmer (newcomer in the project) planting the cocoa on naked

agricultural land with no trees around, which was not how participants had been

explained to do it. The farmer argued that he did this “because the trees would cast

shadow and prevent the cocoa plant to grow”, which was a total contradiction of the

idea behind using cocoa as agroforestry (Ríos, pers. comm.). Similar incidents are

presented in Long (2001), who draws on examples from a water irrigation project in

Mexico, where local water guards and engineers are confronted with ’local knowledge’

as an obstacle to carry out project objectives (Long 2001:73pp). Another example of

’local knowledge’, which I have emphasized previously, is that of ‘improving’ land or

gaining value to your land when clearing it for forest. This solidly established notion

has been one of the greatest obstacles for projects to operate in the area. People have no

conception of the economic or ecological value their forests represent; it is rather

perceived as an obstacle to cultivate basic grains, which is what they have been used to

do for their whole lives. Likewise, people tend to be very tradition-bound and ”afraid”

of changing practices which they have exercised for decades. As already mentioned,

they prefer the safe mode of life, where you are guaranteed food on the table as long as

you cultivate your fields, and people hence tend to have a ”short-term mentality”

worrying mostly about the day tomorrow instead of the future (Gonzáles, pers. comm.;

Romero, pers. comm.; Interview with Ríos; Interview with Gutierrez).

Likewise, the fact that the technicians are not constantly present in the villages has

some consequences related to local knowledge and practices. I witnessed an episode

where a technician was giving technical advise and assistance to a group of cocoa

farmers about how to ”clean” around the cocoa plants and on their fields in general

without the use of chemicals or burning of vegetation. While he spoke the farmers

were putting concentrated attention to his words, while nodding and approving his

suggestions without any questions asked. When the technician took off, the group

108

afterwards initiated a discussion about the illogical content of his suggestions, not

grasping at all why burning could not be conducted, since this at all times seemed as

the easiest and most logical way to weed. Whether the farmers ultimately followed his

advice or actually conducted burning is unfortunately unknown. However, what is

important about this example is the fact that people negotiate the ’expert knowledge’,

not necessarily directly with the ’expert’, but behind the back of the technician and

within their social networks or groups. This allows the peasants and cocoa participants

room to create their own autonomous field of action, where ’expert knowledge’ is

compared carefully with their own knowledge, considering benefits, obstacles and

practical execution, before action is taken. Accordingly, linked to this above point is the

importance of knowledge processes. Knowledge is constantly shaped by the

experiences and encounters that emerge at the points of intersection between different

actors’ lifeworlds. The incorporation of new information, in this case about agricultural

techniques and practices, take place on the basis of already existing (’local’) knowledge,

local norms, values and beliefs, that are ”confronted” with ’expert knowledge’, which

is then discussed, judged and considered before being rejected or accepted. An

interface approach depicts knowledge as arising from ‘an encounter of horizons’ (Long

2002:8). Knowledge is present in all social situations and is often entangled with power

relations and the distribution of resources and hence involves aspects of control,

authority and power (Long 2001:77,183). The situation presented above is a clear

example of a contest of meaning, where power plays a certain role. Although not

expressed explicitly this way by the peasants themselves, I came to see their discussion

and facial expressions as a sign of a ”what does he know”-attitude targeted at the

technician. Their considerations were closely linked to their norms for appropriate

agricultural practices as well as their self-perceived identity as peasants with years of

experiences (Lønholdt & Lund 2005). Accepting the technicians suggestions and advise

without further ado would be equivalent to rejecting years of tradition-bound practices

handed down in their respective families for generations, and thus implies giving up

power and own value systems. With the risk of being accused of over-analyzing, I

must underline the ”teacher-student”-relationship of the situation, where a technician

from outside the municipality with a higher education lectures uneducated and

supposedly illiterate peasants - proud peasants - on how to cultivate properly, and

thereby asking them implicitly to give up their own knowledge by adopting his. I tried

109

to imagine what it would feel like for the peasants, and the image in itself made me

want to help the peasants burn some fields, just to show the technician that he might

have an impressive rhetoric, but the peasants have the ultimate power to decide

whether to accept or reject his suggestions.

”Various types of knowledge, including ideas about oneself, other people, and the

context and social institutions, are important in understanding social interfaces. (...)

Hence knowledge emerges as a product of interaction, dialogue, reflexivity, and

contests of meaning, and involves aspects of control, authority and power” (Long

2002:54). The following sub-section strives for further clarification of this issue of

intervention and power struggles, initiating with a case-story:

Intervention and power struggles

Danielo is in his mid-fifties, is good-looking for his age, personable and charismatic. Everyone in

the village knows who he is and he has an extensive social network. He knows what he wants

and everyone in the family respect his opinion. He has been a leader of his local church for many

years, and is well respected among the church-goers. Likewise, he has been actively engaged in

almost all community groups and committees during the years. He has been politically active

and ran as liberal vice-mayor candidate during the last municipal elections (where he lost), just

like he has been part of the CDCA for eleven years. This came to a halt when the mayor installed

the current CDCA, whom Danielo mention with great resentment. Danielo became part of the

cocoa project (Danida) when it was first initiated in the community, but left a few years ago due

to his personal dissatisfaction with the project. (Respondent No. 2)

When asked to clarify and enlarge on his ”dissatisfaction” with the cocoa project, he

mentioned the same discontent as described above about the rice seeds promoted by

Danida, and in general found that the cocoa project has not been able to ”impart to

advantages in his life in any positive way” (Respondent No. 2). Also, he blamed

Danida for applying double-standards and in general used a lot of less flattering

adjectives when talking about the project. He clarified ”double-standards” by saying

that Danida discriminated against the villagers and brought up the examples

mentioned earlier about Danida distributing hens and pigs only to certain inhabitants,

110

as well as he blamed Danida for not maintaining the road to Las Maravillas and the

bridge at the entry point of the village.

It is relevant to note that according to Danielo he left the project ”a few years back”,

whereas according to project personnel Danielo is still officially listed as part of the

project and has never explicitly made it clear that he no longer wanted to participate

(Zambrana, pers. comm.; Ríos, pers. comm.). In fact, project personnel seemed

sincerely surprised to hear that Danielo not considered himself as participant, when I

asked them about his resignation from the project. Without accusing any of the parts,

this clearly indicates deficiency in the communication between project and

participants.

Danielo is an example of an extremely political active person, with strong capitals, who

has been making the most of these capitals by involving himself in numerous

committees, a political party, in the community council, church work, and finally a

development project. He is said to have been making use of corrupt means for his own

lucre during his years as member of CDCA, which - as the only known example -

includes a case where he ”confiscated” a public piece of corporate land in Las

Maravillas and turned it into his own by cultivating it (Romero, pers. comm.). He is

articulated, with strong opinions and a capability to turn things into his advantage, but

in the case of project involvement he has not been able to ‘manipulate’ or change the

‘trend’ of the project for his own advantage. Rather, he has experienced a decline in his

”position of power” the last years; at first by being ousted from CDCA and recently

due to illness that forces him to reduce the church activities that he likes so much.

Danielo’s decision of leaving the project could be seen as a rebellion against the new

CDCA, although not enunciated this explicit by Danielo himself. He blames Danida for

not maintaining the road and the bridge (even though this is the responsibility of the

local government), which demonstrates that he as well does not distinguish between

projects and authorities operating in the buffer zone. His resentment towards CDCA is

following this logic consequently reflected back to the project as he sees them as an

aggregate unity. Also, it is relevant to call attention to the fact that Danielo has not

been appointed promoter in the cocoa project. For an esteemed man used to be

engaged in practically any village activity with a degree of status and power, it must be

111

a defeat to be overlooked as potential promoter. Once a position of power is achieved,

it may be difficult to later consider and accept any changes or shifts in that power base.

His dominating position in the village has hence further been challenged or threatened

by the project, by not having appointed him promoter; and it is hence an obvious

possibility that he left the project for this very same reason. The project’s reason for not

promoting him promoter is unfortunately unknown. However, the point is to

demonstrate how projects can conflict with local power structures; in this case the

power position of an individual, who perhaps as a consequence desist from

participating in the project. This hence serves as an illustration of a “contested arena”

in which actors’ understandings, interests and values have been pitched against each

other.

Concluding remarks

This section has discussed and analyzed how intervention as an ”encounter at the

interface” entails constant negotiation between the involved stakeholders. We have

come to see how locals create their own room for manoeuvre, by negotiating,

contesting, questioning and transforming the external intervention, both in regard to

project intervention or in the enforcement of legislation.

Project intervention entails constant negotiation between involved stakeholders, where

‘local knowledge’ versus ‘expert knowledge’ is negotiated and transformed; involving

power struggles and projects’ “clash” with existing local knowledge processes and

local power structures, which also alter the conditions for differential reactions to

projects. Participating in projects to a certain degree requires that locals ‘abandon’ old

agricultural practices and thereby accept the ‘external’ or ‘expert’ knowledge as

“better”, which also means ‘delegating’ power to projects (Long 2001:184).

112

Chapter 6

Conclusion

This thesis set out to explore how locals have responded to proposed conservation and

development initiatives and what factors that facilitated these responses. The

theoretical conceptions for understanding local responses was founded in an actor-

oriented approach, allowing to comprehend locals’ relationship with projects not only

as one of dependence and passiveness, but rather as one in which locals are

‘knowledgeable’ and ‘capable’, creating their own room for manoeuvre within the

limits of information, uncertainty and the other constraints that exist (Long 2001).

Essential for this approach is the notion of ‘agency’, which attributes to the individual

actor the capacity to process social experience and to devise modes of coping with life

(Long 2001:16). By means of a capital ranking I found that the capital-strong people

were those engaged in projects, whereas the more capital-weak did not engage in

projects. However, the insight which the notion of agency gave to the analysis was to

show that all actors exercised some kind of power, including those who could appear

to be powerless, by negotiating, assimilating or contesting the projects’ conditionalities,

as well as the proposed ‘knowledge types’ and agricultural/conservation practices. In

this way, the theoretical and analytical framework contributed to an analysis of

different responses to project intervention; people’s different motives, rationales and

means for participating or not in projects, which included particular focus on social

differentiation, conflicts and negotiation at community level.

Also, the thesis has elucidated external and contextual factors in the national and local

context, which influences the way locals respond to and interact with projects (Olivier

de Sardan 1988; 2005). This included a presentation and discussion of historical,

political and economic characteristics of Nicaragua, as well as policies relevant for the

research field. Also, by having examined factors inherent in the projects’ design; the

project objectives, requirements for participants as well as the promotion of projects, I

have sought to explain possible factors enabling locals’ diverse responses. Thus,

113

external and contextual factors have likewise helped explain locals’ rationale for

participating or not in projects and why they respond as they do.

Nicaragua’s history is one of tyranny, war, rebellion and corruption, and in particular

the revolution and Contra War have left clear marks into present Nicaragua. People

have a very clear memory of the time during the Sandinista revolution, and either

recall this period as one of glorification or as one of true disaster. I found some

peasants to be sceptical towards foreign interference, because seen in the light of

Nicaragua’s history this has normally caused problems. People hence carry with them

a ’historical consciousness of risks’ (Elwert & Bierschenk 1988:104), which influences to

a certain degree on their responses to project intervention.

Most institutions, be they projects or local institutions, tend to approach the local

population through the village committee (CDCA), which in the case of Las Maravillas

has been inserted in a corrupt manner by the mayor and therefore has no legal status

among the local population. Likewise, the projects are and have been working in close

cooperation with the local government and forest authorities, for which reason locals

tend to perceive them as one joint unity. This combined with rumours about and

conceptions of corrupt projects working with a corrupt mayor, gives rise to

misunderstandings and has further enhanced some peasants mistrust to project

initiatives, and hence cause negative reactions to projects.

Also, an ambiguous content of the forestry legislation makes it open for interpretation,

which cause a great deal of confusion in the local context. In general, the forest

legislation in Nicaragua is unclear regarding responsibilities and competences of the

different forestry and environmental authorities, and confusion is total among the

different authorities themselves, but also among local peasants and forest owners.

Hence, various external factors, such as contradictory national forest legislation, weak

and often corrupt institutions and authorities, as well as a corrupt political system in

the community, influence greatly on locals’ rationales for involving themselves in

projects or not. People estimate and weigh how and if projects can contribute with

114

anything useful in their lives by taking past experiences and personal sentiments into

consideration. We have seen that locals base their decisions and responses to projects

on rumours, as well as by taking into account the experiences of other groups within

their social networks. Mistrust play an important role in this regard, which was

explained from the corrupt mayor and his undemocratic appointment of the village

committee, as well as from people’s memories from the period of war in Nicaragua,

which combined with political affiliations come to form part of the way many locals

react and reason.

The majority of the population in the buffer zone of Río San Juan have arrived from

other parts of the country within the last 10-15 years. This as a consequence implies

weak social networks as well as limited or no knowledge about agricultural cultivation

in rainforest soils. People are bound by traditions and tend to be conservative as

regards their livelihoods; they prefer doing things the way they have always done it

and hold on firmly to the agricultural knowledge and practices they have been

carrying out in their place of origin. Especially, among the capital-weak a certain fear

or opposition to projects’ initiatives was traced. Many of these prefer the “safe” mode

of life, where wealth is not in sight, but at least you know what you have. Similarly, I

found that people with fewer or weaker capitals tend to be more sceptical towards new

livelihoods. People with subsistence agriculture and weak social networks are much

more vulnerable facing changes in livelihoods, and therefore do not dare to take any

chances that might engender unsteady or insecure income or food supply, whereas the

capital-strong persons dare to or allow themselves to take a risk, since a potential

failure will not leave them and their family without food or income.

Hence, people have different capitals and different means by which they try to make a

living. This differentiation in capitals, such as access to wider social networks and

information, capability to adapt to changes in livelihoods and deal with project

requirements, as well as coping with inadequate resources and minimizing risks, to a

large degree determine what kind of activities are available to the households and

thereby how people relate to or respond to projects. As already mentioned, I found that

people engaging in projects are those already with the strongest capitals. Strong

capitals were therefore not something people achieved through project participation,

115

but rather something they already possessed when engaging in projects. Likewise, my

findings indicated that projects favour above others and target at those persons with

strong social capitals and positions in the community, in the hope that this will help

guarantee the success of the project. In case of the CAD plantation project, the design

of the project exclude many of the resource weak from participating, simply because of

its clear-cut participant requirements as well as its close cooperation with the forest

authorities. For instance, not all people possess a legal land tenure title, which is one of

the requirements, and are hence excluded from participating. Regarding the Danida

cocoa project, the search for participants with “potential” as well as the appointment of

promoters among the most resource strong, similarly marginalize certain individuals

or social groups and favour the already resource strong belonging to strong social

networks. Also, projects have tightened their material support; not giving away tools,

agricultural utensils, seeds, etcetera free of charge, but requesting participants to pay

for these goods. This change in support can also constitute an economic hindrance for

the poorest in participating.

All in all, this causes asymmetry in power relations and project participation, by giving

more power and opportunities to those who already have the most and hence exclude

the most poor or capital-weak from participating. However, negotiation (Long 2001)

was identified at all “levels”, that is both among the capital-strong and the capital-

weak. I found that project intervention entailed constant negotiation between involved

stakeholders, where ‘local knowledge’ versus ‘expert knowledge’ was negotiated and

transformed; involving power struggles and projects’ “clash” with existing local

knowledge processes and local power structures, which also altered the conditions for

differential reactions to projects. By having analyzed intervention as an ”encounter at

the interface” entailing constant negotiation between the involved stakeholders, I

found that locals create their own ‘room for manoeuvre’, by negotiating, contesting,

questioning and transforming the external intervention, both in regard to project

intervention or in the enforcement of legislation. The stories of Margarito, Juan,

Chilino, Carlo, Luís and Danielo served as illustrations of the constant negotiation and

interface situations present in all aspects of everyday lives, not only regarding project

intervention, but in general. Even the poorest or most resource-weak were exerting

they own form of action, either by passive resistance to the projects, refusal to

116

participate, leaving a project, contravening forest legislation, and by stratagems

involving particularly rumours.

Some of the external factors influencing on locals’ responses to projects can be

considered as structural problems, where resources and power are systematically and

asymmetrical apportioned in a way which is not in accordance with project objectives

that after all do aim at improving the lives of the poor. The next and last chapter of this

thesis seeks to provide perspectives on and suggestion for overcoming these

hindrances.

117

Chapter 7

Perspectives

When analysing development intervention, it is always interesting to pose the question

“what would have happened if the development intervention (e.g. the integrated

conservation and development projects) had not been introduced?”. As regards the

conservation part, it is most likely that the Reserve would have long since been

intruded by settlers seeking new land. Likewise, there is no doubt that pace of forest

degradation in the buffer zone has been slowed down by the effort of NGOs, with the

help of present forest legislation that has put a stop to logging companies’ operation in

the buffer zone.

Also, although I found that the most resource-strong are those benefiting the most

from development projects, projects have been filling a void in the area by providing

resources that would otherwise not have been accessible, such as seeds, technical

assistance, credits and so on. However, with the projects’ change in development

assistance, from providing these resources for free to require self-payment along with a

general tightening in participant requirements, the gap between those benefiting from

the projects and those left out have been further reinforced. The poorest or the most

resource-weak have been left behind. So what are the possibilities of changing this

tendency; what could have been done differently by the projects? The first step is

obviously to recognize that the poorest do not benefit from the assistance offered. This

however is recognition not necessarily that obvious. Seen from the outside, everyone in

the buffer zone are poor, in Danish or “western” terms at least. However, as my

findings showed, there are great differences in people’s capitals, which to a large

degree determine what kind of activities are available to people. One suggestion

therefore, which is obviously not new in any way, is to emphasize the need to bring

participatory or actor-oriented approaches higher on the agenda in planning and

implementation of projects. Although the actor-oriented approach as developed by the

Wageningen School has never been intended as a tool for improving development

intervention it contributes with an explicit attempt “to involve the subjects of

118

development in understanding and changing their own lives. Indeed, it makes clear

that there can be no successful understanding without an appreciation of what is

happening through the eyes of those concerned.” (Edwards 1994:291). The actor-

oriented approach as well as the tools and techniques I made use of during my

fieldwork can definitely be useful in understanding and addressing many of the issues

connected to development and conservation intervention. The techniques of course

have their strengths and weaknesses, like all theories, methods and tools. Mostly they

are time-consuming, which is an obstacle for most project planning. However, most

projects could easily employ and integrate professional staff with actor-oriented social

science skills (e.g. applied anthropologists, evaluation specialists and ethnographers)

into their mainstream activities, as opposite to purely agronomists and other natural

science engineers.

Also, actor-oriented approaches could help reveal factors important for locals’

responses to projects that might not have been considered by the projects themselves.

As my findings indicated, mistrust and scepticism due to corruption, combined with

the confusing and seemingly paradoxical mix of policies, structures, and priorities in

the institutional landscape, play a vital role in this regard. Hence, there is a need to

take this mistrust serious, which could be done by introducing improvements in good

governance, including transparency, combined with effective project-institution

coordination. Reducing the scope for corrupt practices could delimitate some of those

factors which create marginalisation among the locals as well as help delimitate the

increasing gap between project and locals. The concrete solution should obviously not

be provided from ‘outside’ but rather be identified jointly by projects and locals.

119

Bibliography Abu-Lughod, Deena I. (2000): “Failed Buyout: Land Rights for Contra Veterans in Postwar Nicaragua”, Latin American Perspectives, Issue 112, Vol. 27, No. 3, May 2000, pp. 32-62. Agrawal, Arun. & Gibson, Clark C. (1999): “Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation”, World Development, Vol. 27, No. 4. Andersen, Heine (2001): “Jürgen Habermas” in “Klassisk og moderne samfundsteori” edited by Heine Andersen and Lars Bo Kaspersen, Hans Reitzels Forlag, København, Denmark. Angelsen, Arild & Wunder, Sven (2003): ”Exploring the Forest-Poverty Link: Key Concepts, Issues and Research Implications”, CIFOR, Occasional Paper No. 40, Center for International Forestry Research, Indonesia. Arce, Alberto, Villarreal, Magdalena & de Vries, Pieter (1994): “The Social Construction of rural development: Discourses, Practices and Power” in “Rethinking Social Development. Theory, Research & Practice” edited by David Booth, Longman Scientific & Technical, Longmand Group Limited, England. Barrios, Mariana & Broegaard, Rikke (2006): “La gestión ambiental llevada a cabo por las autoridades en El Castillo 1999-2005”, Cuaderno de Investigación 23, NITLAPAN–UCA, Managua. Batterbury, Simon P.J. & Fernando, Jude L. (2006): “Rescaling Governance and the Impacts of Political and Environmental Decentralization: An Introduction”, World Development, Vol. 34, No. 11, pp. 1851–1863. Bierschenk, Thomas (1988): “Development projects as arenas of negotiation for strategic groups – A case study from Benin”, Sociologia Ruralis, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 146-160. Biggs, Stephen & Matsaert, Harriet (2004): “Strengthening Poverty Reduction Programmes Using an Actor-Oriented Approach: Examples from Natural Resources Innovation Systems”, Agricultural Research and Extension Network Paper No. 134, January 2004. Booth, David (ed.) (1994): “Rethinking Social Development: Theory, Research and Practice”, Longman Scientific & Technical, Longmand Group Limited, England. Boserup, Ester (1972): “The conditions of agricultural growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change under Population Pressure”, with a foreword by Nicholas Kaldor, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, UK.

120

Broegaard, Rikke & Ravnborg, Helle Munk (2001): ”Diversificeringens forskellighed”, Den Ny Verden 1, 34. årgang, maj 2001, Center for Udviklingsforskning, København, Denmark. Broegaard, Rikke (2005): “Land Tenure Insecurity and Inequality in Nicaragua”, Development and Change 36(5), pp. 845–864. Brown, Katrina (2002): ”Innovations for conservation and development”, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 168, No. 1, March 2002, pp. 6-17. CCAD (2006): “Noticias de la CCAD – Aprueban ley de veda forestal en Nicaragua”, Comisión Centroamericana de Ambiente y Desarrollo (CCAD), June 2006, http://www.ccad.ws/noticias/2006/2/veda.htm (Accessed 26/2/2007) Chambers, Robert (1983): “Rural Development: Putting the Last First”, Longman, Harlow, England. Chambers, Robert (1997): “Whose reality counts? Putting the first last”, ITDG Publishing, London, England. Christensen, Søren & Jensen, Poul-Erik Daugaard (2001): “Kontrol i det stille – om magt og deltagelse”, 2. udgave, Samfundslitteratur, Denmark. Christie, P., Bradford, D., Garth, R., Gonzáles, B., Hostetler, M., Morales, O., Rigby, R., Simmons, B., Tinkam, E., Vega, G., Vernooy, R., & White, N. (2000): ”Taking care of what we have: participatory natural resource management on the Carribean Coast of Nicaragua”, IDRC & CIDCA, Managua, Nicaragua. Constitution (2000): “Constitución Política de la Republica de Nicaragua”, published and executed in Managua, Nicaragua, 18th of January 2000 by President of Nicaragua Arnoldo Alemán Lacayo, available at the webpage of MARENA: http://www.marena.gob.ni/legislacion/pdf/constitucion/constitucion_politica_nicaragua.pdf (Accessed 24/3/2007). Cooke, Bill & Kothari, Uma (eds.) (2002): “Participation, the new tyranny?”, Zed Books Ltd, London & New York. Corral, Leonardo & Reardon, Thomas (2001): ”Rural nonfarm incomes in Nicaragua”, In World Development, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 427-442. Dahlbom, Sanne & Mayorquín, Mario (2005): “Análisis del sector forestal y organizaciones agroforestales del municipio El Castillo, Río San Juan, con el objetivo de buscar elementos para la formulación de un proyecto de certificación forestal”, study made for Nepenthes & Fundación del Río, Final Version, Boca de Sábalos, Nicaragua, November 2005 – Unpublished document

121

Danida (2005): Component Description “Support to Enforcement of the Legal, Political and Institutional Framework for Environmental Management (Component 1)” of the Environmental Sector Programme Support, Phase II, 2006-2010, Nicaragua; July 2005, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark: http://www.danidadevforum.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/CB17B6AE-0E63-4ECF-9E90-CBDF9F28E472/0/N_CD_1.pdf (Accessed 27/3/2007) Davies, Rick (2003): “Network Perspectives In The Evaluation Of Development Interventions: More Than A Metaphor”, New Directions in Impact Assessment for Development: Methods and Practice, EDAIS Conference November 24-25, 2003: http://www.enterprise-impact.org.uk/pdf/Davies2.pdf (Accessed 23/2/2007) Davies, Rick & Dart, Jess (2005): “The ‘Most Significant Change’ (MSC) Technique: A Guide to Its Use”, Version 1, April 2005, www.mande.co.uk/docs/MSCGuide.htm (Accessed 12/6/2006) Degnbol-Martinussen, John & Engberg-Pedersen, Poul (2003): “Aid: Understanding International Development Cooperation”, Zed Books Ltd, London & New York. DeSantis, S’ra (2003): “Control Through Contamination - US Forcing GMO Corn and Free Trade on Mexico and Central America”, A report by S’ra DeSantis for ISE Biotechnology Project and ACERCA, June 2003. EC (2002): From webpage of the European Commission, External Relations: “Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006: Nicaragua”, may 2002: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/nicaragua/csp/02_06_en.pdf (Accessed 26/3/2007) Edwards, Michael (1994): “Rethinking social development: the search for ‘relevance’” in “Rethinking Social Development: Theory, Research and Practice”, edited by David Booth, Longman Scientific & Technical, Longmand Group Limited, England. Ellis, Frank (2000): “Rural Livelihoods and Diversity in Developing Countries”, Oxford University Press, New York, USA. Elwert, Georg & Bierschenk, Thomas (1988): “Development Aid as an Intervention in Dynamic Systems. An Introduction”, Sociologia Ruralis, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2/3, 1988, pp. 99-112. Envío (1996): “Honduras – The Culture of Mistrust”, Number 182, Septiembre 1996: http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/1973 (Accessed 14/5/2007) FAO (2004a): “Forestry policy, institutions and major programmes”, FAO Forestry Department country pages; Nicaragua: http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/23748/en/nic/ (Accessed 13/4/2007) FAO (2004b): “Foodcrops and Shortages - Nicaragua”: ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/J2969e/J2969e00.pdf (Accessed 9/5/2007)

122

FAO (2005): “FAO Forestry Department country pages: Nicaragua. Source: Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005”: http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/32185/en/nic/ (Accessed 14/4/2007) Faurby, Ove (1997): “Hjælper miljøbistanden miljøet?”, Mañana, Latinamerikabladet, Nr. 23, april 1997, pp. 22-24. Ferguson, James (1990): “The Anti-Politics Machine: ’Development’, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho”, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis and London. Folke, Steen & Nielsen, Steen (eds.) (2006): “Aid Impact and Poverty Reduction”, Palgrave-Macmillan, New York, USA. Frühling, Pierre (2000): “When Development Projects go Orphan – Lessons from 20 years of Swedish forestry support to Nicaragua”, Sida Evaluation 00/34, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Department for Natural Resources and the Environment, Stockholm, Sweden. FUNDAR (2004): ”Plan de Manejo de la Reserva Biológica Indio Maíz, Período 2005 – 2010”, Third version, 23rd of June, 2005, Realizado por FUNDAR con el apoyo de Critical Ecosistem Partnership Fund (CEPF), Nicaragua. Gaceta, La (1997): “Ley No. 40 y 261: Ley de Municipios”, Diario Oficial, no. 162 del 26 de agosto de 1997, Managua, Nicaragua. Gaceta, La (2003): “Ley No. 466: Ley de transferencias presupuestarias a los municipios de Nicaragua”, Diario Oficial, no. 157 del 20 de agosto del 2003, Managua, Nicaragua. Gaceta, La (2006a): “Decreto No. 32-2006: Estado de Emergencia Económico”, Diario Oficial, No. 86 del 04 de Mayo del 2006, Managua, Nicaragua. Gaceta, La (2006b): “Ley No. 585: Ley de Veda para el corte, aprovechamiento y comercialización del recurso forestal”, Diario Oficial, No. 120 del 21 de junio de 2006, Managua, Nicaragua. Gaventa, John & Valderrama, Camilo (1999): ”Participation, Citizenship and Local Governance”, Background note prepared for workshop on ’Strengthening participation in local governance’, Institute of Development Studies, June 21-24, 1999. GEF (2006): “Nicaragua: Mainstreaming the Multilateral Environmental Agreements into the Country’s Environmental Legislation”, project proposal from UNDP/Global Environment Facility (GEF), available at http://www.gefweb.org/Documents/Medium-sized_Project_Proposals/MSP_Proposals/documents/Nicaragua-MainstreamingtheMultilateralEnvtlAgreements.pdf (Accessed 14/4/2007)

123

Global Witness (2007): “Independent Forest Monitoring Pilot Project in Nicaragua, First Summary Report of Activities August 2006 – March 2007”, available from the web page of Global Witness: http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/536/en/first_summary_report_ifm_nicaragua (Accessed 9/5/2007) Government of Nicaragua (2002): “Strengthened Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (SGPRS)”, First Progress Report, November 2002: https://www.imf.org/External/NP/prsp/2002/nic/01/110102.pdf (Accessed 27/3/2007) Gutierrez, Maribel; Rosalia Jovel, Jessica Martinez & Peter Oakley (1999): “The Danish NGO Impact Study: A Review of Danish NGO Activities in Developing Countries: Nicaragua Country Study”, Study Commissioned by Danida and Danish NGOs, INTRAC, Oxford, UK. IMF (2005): “Nicaragua: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper”, IMF Country Report No. 05/440, December 2005: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05440.pdf (Accessed 23/4/2007) INAFOR (2003): “Ley No. 462: Ley de Conservación, Fomento y Desarrollo Sostenible del Sector Forestal”, available through the web page of INAFOR: http://www.inafor.gob.ni/legislacion_normas/PDF/Leyes/Ley%20462%20Ley%20de%20Conservacion,%20Fomento%20y%20Desarrollo%20Sostenible%20del%20Sector%20Forestal.pdf (Accessed 27/3/2007) INAFOR (2005): “Ley No. 559: Ley Especial de Delitos Contra el Medio Ambiente y los Recursos Naturales”, available through the web page of INAFOR: http://www.inafor.gob.ni/legislacion_normas/PDF/Leyes/Ley%20559,%20Ley%20de%20delitos%20ambientales.pdf (Accessed 26/4/2007) Järvinen, Margaretha (2001): “Pierre Bourdieu” in “Klassisk og moderne samfundsteori” edited by Heine Andersen and Lars Bo Kaspersen, Hans Reitzels Forlag, København, Denmark. Jürgensen, Inger & Schultz, Karin E. (2001): “Netværks og identitets betydning for diversificering”, Den Ny Verden 1, 34. årgang, maj 2001, Center for Udviklings-forskning, København, Denmark. Kinzer, Stephen (1991): “Blood of brothers: life and war in Nicaragua”, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, New York. Larson, Anne M. (2002): “Natural Resources and Decentralization in Nicaragua: Are Local Governments Up to the Job?”, World Development, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 17-31. Long, Norman (1992): “From paradigm lost to paradigm regained. The case for an actor-oriented sociology of development” in ”Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development”; Long & Long (eds.); Routledge, London.

124

Long, Norman (2001): “Development Sociology – Actor perspectives”, Routledge, London. Long, Norman (2002): “An Actor-oriented Approach to Development Intervention”, Background paper prepared for APO Meeting, Tokyo 22-26 April 2002, Wageningen University. Long, Norman & Long, Ann (eds.) (1992): ”Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development”, Routledge, London. Long, Norman & Ploeg, Jan Douwe van der (1988): ”New Challenges in the Sociology of Rural Development. A Rejoinder to Peter Vandergeest”, in Sociologia Ruralis, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1. Long, Norman & Ploeg, Jan Douwe van der (1994): “Heterogeneity, actor and structure: towards a reconstitution of the concept of structure” in “Rethinking Social Development: Theory, Research & Practice”; Booth (ed.) (1999), Longman Scientific & Technical, Longmand Group Limited, England. Lønholdt, Jens & Lund, Søren (2005): “Project Identification and Formulation” in “Water and Wastewater Management in the Tropics”; Lønholdt Jens (ed.), IWA Publishing, London, UK. MAGFOR (2005): From webpage of MAGFOR: “Cadena del cultivo del quequisque (Malanga Lila) Xanthosoma Violaceum con potencial exportador.” Elaborado por: Ing. Thelma Gaitán N., consultor nacional, Managua, 14 Enero 2005: http://www.magfor.gob.ni/servicios/descargas/Estudios_Mercado/Mercado_Quequisque.pdf (Accessed 21/4/2007) MAGFOR (2007): From webpage of MAGFOR: “Programa Nacional Libra por Libra (PNLL)”: http://www.magfor.gob.ni/proyectos/pnll.html (Accessed 12/5/2007) MARENA (year unknown): ”Planificación de Fincas en Areas Protegidas – Formatos y sus Instructivos”, Documento # 2, Ministerio del Ambiente y los Recursos Naturales (MARENA). (Achieved through personnel at the Danida project office in Boca de Sábalos, Nicaragua) MARENA (2004a): From webpage of Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources in Nicaragua: “Ficha del Proyecto: Programa de Apoyo al Sector Ambiental de Nicaragua (PASMA)”: http://www.marena.gob.ni/proyectos/pasma.htm (Accessed 9/3/2007) MARENA (2004b): From webpage of MARENA: “Identificación Participativa de los Espacios de Conectividad en el Corredor Biológico El Castillo-San Juan, Actualización de Ficha Técnica”, Segundo Informe, Programa para la Consolidación del Corredor Biológico Mesoamerica, MARENA-SICA-CCAD-PNUD-GEF-GTZ-PNUMA-BANCO MUNDIAL, Río San Juan, Nicaragua, Febrero 2004: http://www.marena.gob.ni/documentacion/pdf/Ficha%20Corredor%20Castillo-San%20Juan.pdf (Accessed 18/4/2007)

125

Matiru, Violet (2000): “Conflict and Resource Management”, Forest, Trees and People Brochure, FAO, Rome. McConnell, Shelly A., (1997): ”Institutional Development” in ”Nicaragua without Illusions: Regime Transition and Structural Adjustment in the 1990s” edited by Thomas W. Walker, Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, USA. McNeill, Patrick & Chapman, Steve (2005): “Research Methods”, 3rd edition, Routledge, New York, USA. Mikkelsen, Britha (2005): “Methods for Development Work and Research: a New Guide for Practitioners”, 2nd edition, Sage Publications, New Delhi. Mosse, David (2004): ”Is Good Policy Unimplementable? Reflections on the Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice”, Development and Change 35(4): pp. 639–671, 2004. Nepenthes (2003): Projektdokument “Miljøbevidstgørelse i bufferzonen til ’Gran Reserva Biológica Indio Maíz’, Nicaragua, 2. fase”, Nepenthes & Fundación del Río & MECD, marts 2003. Nepenthes (2004): From webpage of Nepenthes: “Nicaragua geografisk”: http://www.nepenthesprojekter.dk/doc.asp?pageid=101&lang=da (Accessed 14/3/2006) NETARD/ReNED (2005): “Exploring possibilities and conditions for Danish–Nicaraguan research collaboration within the agricultural and environmental sectors in Nicaragua”, Compiled by Anne Sørensen (NETARD), Ole Mertz (ReNED) with Matilde Sommariba Chang, Network for Agricultural Research for Development (NETARD) & Research Network for Environment and Development (ReNED), January 2005: http://www.geogr.ku.dk/projects/rened/NicaraguaReport11012005.pdf (Accessed 23/3/2007) Neuman, W. Lawrence (2000): “Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches”, 4th edition, Allyn and Bacon, USA. Newmark, William D. & Hough, John L. (2000): ”Conserving Wildlife in Africa: Integrated Conservation and Development Projects and Beyond”, BioScience, July 2000, Vol. 50, No. 7, pp. 585-592. Nielsen, Henrik J. (2000): ”Teoretiske tilgange til impactstudier”, Den Ny Verden 3, 33. årgang, november 2000, Center for Udviklingsforskning, København, Denmark. Nuevo Diario, El (2001a): “El DDT y las «Frankcomidas»”, Miércoles 8 de Agosto de 2001, Managua, Nicaragua. Nuevo Diario, El (2001b): “Ing. Bolaños ni representa ni representó a MONSANTO”, Viernes 10 de Agosto de 2001, Managua, Nicaragua.

126

Nuevo Diario, El (2002a): “Nos regalan maíz prohibido en EU”, Miércoles 12 de Junio de 2002, Managua, Nicaragua. Nuevo Diario, El (2002b): “Hambre disminuirá hasta en el 2015”, Lunes 19 de Agosto de 2002, Managua, Nicaragua. Nuevo Diario, El (2004): “FAO entrega semilla de frijol mejorada”, Sábado 4 de Diciembre de 2004, Managua, Nicaragua. Nuevo Diario, El (2005): “Aumentan asistencia en plan Libra por Libra”, Martes 3 de Mayo de 2005, Managua, Nicaragua. Nuijten, Monique (2005): ”Power in Practice: A Force Field Approach to Natural Resource Management”, The Journal of Transdisciplinary Environmental Studies / TES (available on the webpage of TekSam), vol. 4, no. 2, 2005. Nygren, Anja (2000): ”Environmental Narratives on Protection and Production: Nature-based Conflicts in Río San Juan, Nicaragua”, Development and Change, Vol. 31 (2000), pp. 807-830. Nygren, Anja (2003): “Violent Conflicts and Threatened Lives: Nicaraguan Experiences of Wartime Displacement and Postwar Distress”, Journal of Latin American Studies, 35, pp. 367–93. Nygren, Anja (2004): ”Competing Claims on Disputed Lands: The Complexity of Resource Tenure in the Nicaraguan Interior”, Latin American Research Review, Vol. 39, No. 1, February 2004. Oakley, Peter; Brian Pratt & Andrew Clayton (1998): “Outcomes and Impact: Evaluating Change in Social Development”, Oxford, INTRAC. ODI (2001): “Extension, Poverty and Vulnerability in Nicaragua: Country study for the Neuchâtel Initiative”, Working Paper 150 by Ian Christoplos, Uppsala University and Overseas Development Institute (ODI), October 2001. ODI (2005): “Poverty Reduction Strategies and the Rural Productive Sectors: Insights from Malawi, Nicaragua and Vietnam”, ODI Working Paper 258, Elizabeth Cromwell, Cecilia Luttrell, Andrew Shepherd & Steve Wiggins; Edited by Lídia Cabral; November 2005, Overseas Development Institute, London, UK. Olivier de Sardan, Jean-Pierre (1988): “Peasant Logics and Development Project Logics”, in Sociologia Ruralis, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2/3. Olivier de Sardan, Jean-Pierre (2005): ”Anthropology and Development: Understanding contemporary Social Change”, Zed Books, London, UK.

127

PANic (2000): “Política Ambiental de Nicaragua”, MARENA, MIFIC & MAGFOR, September 2000, available from MARENA’s webpage under Environmental Legislation and Policies: http://www.marena.gob.ni/legislacion/pdf/politicas/politica_ambiental_nicaragua.pdf (Accessed 14/3/2007) Parry, Geraint; Moyser, George & Day, Neil (1992): ”Political Participation and Democracy in Britain”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. Pendzich, C., Thomas, G., Wohlgenent, T. (1994): “The Role of Alternative Conflict Management in Community Forestry”, Forest, Trees and People Working Paper No. 1, FAO, Rome. Prensa, La (2004): “Extienden a 5 años Plan Libra por Libra”, Miércoles 3 de Marzo del 2004, Nicaragua: http://www-ni.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/2004/marzo/03/nacionales/nacionales-20040303-17.html (Accessed 14/5/2007) ProDeSoC (2006): “Programa para el desarrollo rural sostenible en el Municipio El Castillo: Componente Forestal, Fondo Municipal de Incentivos Forestales FMIF; Primera Fase Noviembre 2004 a Octubre 2007”, El Castillo, Agosto 2006 (pamphlet from Cooperación Austriaca para el Desarrollo). Punch, Maurice (1986): “The Politics and Ethics of Fieldwork”, Qualitative Research Methods Series, Vol. 3, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, USA. Ravnborg, Helle Munk; María del Pilar Guerrero & Olaf Westermann (2000): “Collective action for managing natural resources: a manual for identifying stakeholders”, Cali, Columbia: Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical. Ravnborg, Helle Munk (2006a): “Biodiversity conservation in the context of poverty, greed and weak institutions – lessons learned form Indio Maíz, El Castillo, Nicaragua”, DIIS Brief, January 2006. Ravnborg, Helle Munk (2006b): “Conservación de biodiversidad en el contexto de pobreza, avaricia e instituciones débiles”, UCA Cuaderno de Investigación 25, NITLAPAN-UCA, 2006, Managua, Nicaragua.

Reardon, Thomas, Julio Berdegué & German Escobar (2001): “Rural Nonfarm Employment and Incomes in Latin America: Overview and Policy Implications”, World Development, Vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 395-409. Ribot, Jesse C., Arun Agrawal & Anne M. Larson (2006): “Recentralizing While Decentralizing:How National Governments Reappropriate Forest Resources”, World Development Vol. 34, No. 11, pp. 1864-1886.

128

Robben, Antonius C. G. M. & Sluka, Jeffrey A. (eds.) (2006): ”Ethnographic Fieldwork: An Anthropological Reader”; Blackwell Anthologies in Social and Cultural Anthropology; Blackwell Puhlishing Ltd., UK. Robinson, William I., (1997): ”Nicaragua and the World: A Globalization Perspective” in ”Nicaragua without Illusions: Regime Transition and Structural Adjustment in the 1990s”, Walker, Thomas W. (ed.), Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, USA. Roche, Chris (2000): ”At se skoven og træerne”, Den Ny Verden 3, 33. årg., november 2000, Center for Udviklingsforskning, København, Denmark. Rosnow, Ralph L. (1988): ”Rumor as communication: A contextualist approach”, Journal of Communication, No. 38, pp. 12-28. Ruiz García, Alfredo (2006): ”Incentivos para estimular el manejo sostenible de los recursos naturales”, Colaboración: Edna Susana García, Maria Raquel López, Guillermo Martínez; Cuaderno de Investigación No. 24, NITLAPAN-UCA, Managua, Nicaragua. Schulpen, Lau (2001): “Alternativer til konditionalitet”, Den Ny Verden 1, 34. årgang, maj 2001, Center for Udviklingsforskning, København, Denmark. Scoones, Ian (1998): “Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: A Framework for Analysis”, IDS Working Paper 72. Scott, James C. (1985): “Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance”, Yale University Press, New Haven and London. Scott, John (2000): ”Social network analysis: a handbook”, 2. edition, Sage, London, UK. Secher Marcussen, Henrik & Bergendorff, Steen (2004): “Catchwords, Empty Phrases & Tautological Reasoning – Democracy & Civil Society in Danish Aid” in “Ethnographies of Aid - Exploring development texts and encounters” edited by Jeremy Gould & Henrik Secher Marcussen, Occasional Paper No. 24, International Development Studies, Roskilde University, Denmark. Simonsen, Bo (2006): “Militæret beskytter Nicaraguas sidste regnskove”: http://www.um.dk/da/menu/Udviklingspolitik/Aktuelt/Udvikling/Artikelbibliotek/Latinamerika/MilitaeretBeskytterNicaraguasSidsteRegnskove.htm?WBCMODE=P (Accessed 14/3/2007) SLUSE (2004): “Compendium for SLUSE course on Interdisciplinary Land Use & Natural Resource Management (ILUNRM) 2004-2005”, september 2004, Denmark. Spalding, Rose J. (1994): ”Capitalists and revolution in Nicaragua: opposition and accommodation, 1979-1993”, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, N.C., USA. Suls, Jerry M. (1977): “Gossip as Social Comparison”, Journal of Communication, pp. 164-168, 1977.

129

Theobald, Robin (1990): “Corruption, Development and Underdevelopment”, Macmillam Press Ltd., London, UK. Transparency International (2006): “Frequently asked questions about corruption”: http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq#faqcorr7 (Accessed 2/6/2007) UM (2002): “Evaluation Report: Danish Development Assistance to Nicaragua”, No 104. Nicaragua.1.Eval, December 2002. UM (2004): “Nicaragua-Danmark Partnerskab; Strategi for udviklingssamarbejdet 2004-2009”, Danida, Udenrigsministeriet, 2004, Denmark. UM (2005a): From webpage of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (Udenrigsministeriet): “Udviklingssamarbejde med Nicaragua”: http://www.um.dk/da/menu/Udviklingspolitik/LandeOgRegioner/Programsamarbejdslande/Nicaragua/UdviklingssamarbejdeMedNicaragua.htm?wbc_purpose=Basic&WBCMODE=Prese (Accessed 14/3/2007) UM (2005b): From webpage of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (Udenrigsministeriet): “Danidas Årsberetning 2005 – Bilaterale programmer og projekter – Nicaragua: Sektorprogramstøtte for miljø”: http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/6556/kap62.htm#62.7 (Accessed 4/3/2007) UM (2005c): From webpage of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (Udenrigsministeriet): “Programme Document: Environment Sector Programme Support, Phase II, 2006-2010, Nicaragau, Final”, Jrn Nr. 104 Nic. 806, July 2005: http://www.danidadevforum.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/395847B1-6DC4-402B-B50A-9502472E5379/0/N_PD_ph2.pdf ) (Accessed 15/4/2007) UM (2006a): From webpage of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (Udenrigsministeriet): “Landefakta Nicaragua”: http://www.um.dk/da/menu/Udenrigspolitik/Landefakta/LandefaktaLatinamerika/LandefaktaNicaragua.htm (Accessed 19/2/2007) UM (2006c): From webpage of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (Udenrigsministeriet): Embassy of Denmark, Managua: “Sektorprogrammerne; Miljø (PASMA), Komponent 2”: http://www.ambmanagua.um.dk/da/menu/Udviklingspolitik/Sektorprogrammerne/MiljoPASMA/Komponent2/ (Accessed 26/2/2007) UNDP (2006): “Estrategia del Programa de Pequeñas Donaciones de Nicaragua 2006-2008”, Managua, Nicaragau: http://www.undp.org.ni/sgp/documentos/estrategiappd.doc (Accessed 29/12/2006) Utting, Peter (1993): “Trees, people and power: Social dimensions of deforestation and forest protection in Central America”, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Earthscan Publications Ltd, London, UK.

130

Verón, René; Glyn Williams, Stuart Corbridge & Manoj Srivastava (2006): “Decentralized Corruption or Corrupt Decentralization? Community Monitoring of Poverty-Alleviation Schemes in Eastern India”, World Development Vol. 34, No. 11, pp. 1922-1941. Villarreal, Magdalena (1992): “The poverty of practice. Power, gender and intervention from an actor-oriented perspective” in ”Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development”, edited by Norman Long & Ann Long, Routledge, London, UK. Walker, Thomas W. (ed.) (1997): ”Nicaragua without Illusions: Regime Transition and Structural Adjustment in the 1990s”, Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, USA. Wardell, Andrew D. & Christian Lund (2006): “Governing Access to Forests in Northern Ghana: Micro-Politics and the Rents of Non-Enforcement”, World Development Vol. 34, No. 11, pp. 1887–1906. Widengård, Marie (2003): “Intellectual Property Rights in Common Bean Breeding – Opportunities and Constraints for Local and Participatory Breeding in Nicaragua”, MSc Thesis Work, MSc of Environmental Engineering, Uppsala University, MSc of Rural Development, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, August 2003. Wilder, Margaret & Lankao, Patricia Romero (2006): “Paradoxes of Decentralization: Water Reform and Social Implications in Mexico”, World Development Vol. 34, No. 11, pp. 1977-1995. World Bank (2006a): ”Nicaragua Country Brief”: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/NICARAGUAEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20214837~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:258689,00.html (Accessed 19/2/2007) World Bank (2006b): “Nicaragua to Receive Debt Relief Totaling US$1.148 Billion”, News Release No. 2006/NI/June 29, Washington: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/NICARAGUAEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20980236~menuPK:50003484~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:258689,00.html (Accessed 27/3/2007) WTO (2005): From webpage of World Trade Organization: “Nicaragua – Trade Policy Review”: http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/tpr_e/s167-01_e.doc (Accessed 12/7/2006) Xin, Xiaohui & Rudel, Thomas K. (2004): “The Context for Political Corruption: A Cross-National Analysis”, Social Science Quarterly, Volume 85, Issue 2, pp. 294-309.

131

Interviews & Personal Communication

(“Key informants”, whom I refer to throughout the thesis. For dates of the interviews and informal talks, please see Annex 2.) Chamorro, Alejandro (Former Coordinator , “Componente Productivo”, PMS-Danida) Díaz, Fransisco (Mayor in the municipality El Castillo) Estrada, Ronald (Employee, Fundación del Río) Faurby, Ove (Forester in Nicaragua) García, Juan Carlos Martínez (Employee, Fundación del Río) Gonzáles, Maríbel (Forest Guard Chief for MARENA in Las Maravillas) Gutierrez, Ronny (Forest engineer and technician at INAFOR, working with CAD) Harquín, Harlam (Municipal delegate for MARENA) Hernandez, Pedro Pablo (Agronomist and technician at CAD) Mariscal, Teresa (Director at Fundación del Río) Mayorquín, Mario (Forest engineer and employee at Fundación del Río) Obregón, Saúl Gutierrez (Employee at Fundación del Río) Paucar de Vega, Alicia (National Coordinator, PMS-Danida) Ríos, Filimon (Technician at PMS-Danida) Romero, Leoncio Gonzales (Teacher in Las Maravillas) Zambrana, William (Component Coordinator, PMS-Danida) Zapata, Gustavo (Coordinator ‘Proyecto Forestal’ at CAD)

132

Annex 1

Scoones Framework used for the ‘capital approach’

133

Annex 2

Interviews & personal communication with ‘key informants’ & others A complete* list of “key informants”, with whom I carried out interviews or informal talks during my fieldwork in the period from September 12th to December 5th 2006. In addition, Ove Faurby is listed, with whom I had an email correspondence in April 2007. * I carried out more informal conversations with people from INAFOR and MARENA than listed here. However, I have chosen to omit references to these throughout the thesis (in particular in the section about conflicting forest legislation in chapter 5 where I refer to INAFOR or MARENA as a whole), to protect these respondents from reprisals or consequences of any possible kind, as explained in the Methodology in chapter 3. Name Description Type of communication

Broegaard, Rikke PhD Fellow, Roskilde University Informal talk 6/10 in Granada about fieldwork techniques.

Chamorro, Alejandro Former coordinator for “Componente Productivo” at PMS-Danida. Contact info: Phone: +505 645-8354

Interview 22/11 Informal talk 9/11 Follow-up interview 23/11

Díaz, Fransisco Mayor in municipality El Castillo Interview 11/10 Informal talks 20/9

Estrada, Ronald Employee, Fundación del Río Informal talks 20/9, 7/11 Faurby, Ove Forester

Lived in Nicaragua since 1994 Contact info: http://www.flordepochote.com/

Email correspondance April 2007

García, Juan Carlos Martínez Employee, Fundación del Río Interview 13/11 Informal talks 18-24/9

Gonzáles, Maríbel Forest Guard Chief for MARENA in Las Maravillas

Interview 18/10 Informal talk 23/10

Gutierrez, Ronny* Forest engineer and technician at INAFOR, working with CAD. Contact info: Phone: +505 583-0176

Interview 20/11 Informal talks 10/10, 9/11 Follow-up interview 29/11

Harquín, Harlam* Municipal delegate for MARENA Informal talks 10/10, 8/11 Hernandez, Pedro Pablo Agronomist and technician at CAD Interview 23/10

Informal talk 8/11 Mariscal, Teresa Director for ”Proyecto de

Educación Ambiental” at Fundación del Río.

Informal talk 10/10

134

Marlin, Chris Peace Corps Volunteer, El Castillo Informal talks 19/09, 17/11

Mayorquín, Mario Forest Engineer and employee, Fundación del Río

Informal talks 21/9

Mildam, André Nepenthes’ representative in Central America

Informal talks 11-12/11

Obregón, Saúl Gutierrez Employee, Fundación del Río Informal talks 18-19/9, 7/11 Paucar de Vega, Alicia National Coordinator, PMS-

Danida Contact info: Oficina de PMS-Danida Boca de Sábalos, Río San Juan Phone: +505 583-0179

Interview 20/11

Ríos, Filimon Technician, PMS-Danida Contact info: Oficina de PMS-Danida Boca de Sábalos, Río San Juan

Interview 20/11 Informal talks 15/10, 21/11 Follow-up interview 22/11

Romero, Leoncio Gonzales Former employee at Fundación del Río, teacher in Las Maravillas

Interviews 18/10, 22/10 Informal talks

Zambrana, William Component Coordinator, PMS-Danida Contact info: Oficina de PMS-Danida Boca de Sábalos, Río San Juan

Interview 19/9 Follow-up interviews 14/10, 11/11 Informal talks 18/9

Zapata, Gustavo Coordinator “Proyecto Forestal”, CAD Contact info: Cooperación Austriaca Oficina El Castillo Boca de Sábalos, Río San Juan Phone: +505 583-0174

Interviews 19/9, Follow-up interviews 14/10, 11/11 Informal talks 10/10, 18/9

135

Annex 3

‘Capital ranking’ of all residents in Las Maravillas This table shows the ‘capital ranking’ of all 93 families in Las Maravillas. The sign * against the Roman numerals will indicate the 25 persons originally selected for “in-depth study”, whereas the sign ** will indicate the ensuing 14 persons added to my study. This total of 39 respondents will be listed in a separate ‘capital ranking’ in the following annex. #Economy & assets: A = relatively “rich” (people with own ‘finca’ (farm), land and forest, pasture and business) B = “regular” (people with farm, land and forest, pasture, but no business) C = “poor” (people with minimum or no land and forest) D = “miserable” (people with absolutely nothing, not even their own house) ↑

Family

Additional Comments

Ranking of influence & prestige #Economy & assets

Political influence

Influence in churches

Founder

(Number of years in village)

A

B

C

D

I*

Participant in Danida cocoa project

(45 years)

II Teacher and former employee at FdR (Romero = included in interviews with “key informants”)

III* Former participant in cocoa project

IV* V

(46 years)

VI

(40 years)

VII

136

(35 years) VIII*

(30 years)

IX

(40 years)

X XI XII*

Participant in Danida cocoa project.

XIII XIV**

XV Forest guard for MARENA at the Reserve border.

XVI XVII** Participant in

Danida cocoa project

XVIII* XIX XX* Shop-owner XXI Shop-owner XXII** XXIII Shop-owner XXIV* XXV XXVI Business XXVII XXVIII XXIX*

XXX**

XXXI** Participant in CAD plantation project

XXXII*

XXXIII XXXIV* Participant in

Danida cocoa project

XXXV* Participant in Danida cocoa project

XXXVI XXXVII* Participant in

Danida cocoa

137

project XXXVIII XXXIX* XL Business XLI XLII XLIII** XLIV XLV XLVI XLVII* XLVIII XLIX** L LI**

LII** LIII LIV* LV

LVI* LVII LVIII** Woman/wife

is participant in CAD plantation project.

LIX LX** LXI LXII** Woman/wife

is participant in Danida cocoa project.

LXIII* Woman/wife is participant in CAD plantation project.

LXIV* Forest guard for MARENA in Las Maravillas.

LXV LXVI*

LXVII*

LXVIII LXIX LXX LXXI LXXII

138

LXXIII* Participant in Danida cocoa project & CAD plantation project Member of CDCA

LXXIV LXXV LXXVI LXXVII

LXXVIII LXXIX LXXX LXXXI LXXXII* Participant in

CAD plantation project & Danida cocoa project Shop owner

LXXXIII LXXXIV LXXXV** Woman living

alone. Teacher.

LXXXVI** LXXXVII LXXXVIII*

Participant in CAD plantation project

LXXXIX* Participant in Danida cocoa project

XC Member of CDCA

XCI XCII XCIII

139

Annex 4

‘Capital ranking’ of respondents in Las Maravillas

This table shows the ‘capital ranking’ of the 39 selected families/respondent in Las Maravillas (from the previous annex). Respondents are in this table listed by regular numbers, which match the numbers stated in the following annex (annex 5). #Economy & assets: A = relatively “rich” (people with own ‘finca’ (farm), land and forest, pasture and business) B = “regular” (people with farm, land and forest, pasture, but no business) C = “poor” (people with minimum or no land and forest) D = “miserable” (people with absolutely nothing, not even their own house) ↑

Family

Additional Comments

Ranking of influence & prestige #Economy & assets

Political influence

Influence in churches

Founder

(Number of years in village)

A

B

C

D

1

Participant in Danida cocoa project

(45 years)

2 Former participant in Danida cocoa project

3 4

(30 years)

5 Participant in Danida cocoa project.

6 7 Participant in

Danida cocoa project

8 9 Shop-owner

10 11 12 13 14 Participant in

CAD plantation project

140

15 16

Participant in Danida cocoa project

17 Participant in Danida cocoa project

18 Participant in Danida cocoa project

19 20

21 22 23 24

25 26

27 Woman/wife is participant in CAD plantation project.

28 29 Woman/wife

is participant in Danida cocoa project.

30 Woman/wife is participant in CAD plantation project.

31 Forest guard for MARENA in Las Maravillas.

32 33 34 Participant in

Danida cocoa project & CAD plantation project

141

Member of CDCA

35 Participant in CAD plantation project & Danida cocoa project Shop owner

36 Woman living alone. Teacher

37 38

Participant in CAD plantation project

39 Participant in Danida cocoa project

142

Annex 5

List of respondents in Las Maravillas

I have carried out more informal talks than are listed in this table. However, only the informal talks that have been written down in my field notes are listed here with dates. The respondent numbers are equal to the numbers used in the prior annex. Respondent

No. Project Affiliation Other Comments Type of

communication 1 Participant in Danida

cocoa project Male. 45 years in the village. “Chilino” (fictive name) from case-story, chapter 5.

Interview 16/10 Informal talks 25/9, 26/9, 26/11 Follow-up interview 31/10

2 Former participant in cocoa project

Male “Danielo” (fictive name) from case-story, chapter 5.

Interview 23/10 Informal talks 24/10, 25/11 Follow-up interview 2/11

3 Non-participant Female Interview 16/10 Informal talks Follow-up interview 13/11

4 Non-participant Male 30 years in the village.

Interview 16/10 Follow-up interview 30/10

5 Participant in Danida cocoa project.

Male Interview 24/10 Follow-up interview 13/11 Informal talks 25/11

6 Non-participant

Male Interview 30/10 Informal talk 17/10 Follow-up interview 15/11

7 Participant in Danida cocoa project

Male Interview 24/10 Informal talk 23/10 Follow-up interview 15/11

8 Non-participant

Male

Interview 25/10 Informal talk 28/10

9 Non-participant

Male Shop-owner

Interview 26/10 Follow-up interview 13/11 Informal talks 25/11

10 Non-participant

Male Interview 27/10 Informal talk 24/10

11 Non-participant

Male Interview 25/10 Follow-up interview 10/11

12 Non-participant

Male “Carlo” from case-story, chapter 5.

Interview 17/10 Follow-up interview 13/11 Informal talk 26/11

143

13 Non-participant

Male “Juan” from case-story, chapter 5.

Interview 26/10 Informal talk 17/10, 26/11 Follow-up interview 10/11

14 Participant in CAD plantation project

Male Interview 17/10 Follow-up interview 10/11 Informal talk 25/11

15 Non-participant

Male Interview 18/10 Follow-up interview 10/11

16 Participant in Danida cocoa project

Male Interview 18/10 Follow-up interview 1/11

17 Participant in Danida cocoa project

Male Interview 28/9

18 Participant in Danida cocoa project

Male Interview 29/9 Informal talk 25/10, 26/11

19 Non-participant

Male Interview 20/10 Follow-up interview 14/11

20 Non-participant Female Interview 22/10 Informal talk 18/10 Follow-up interview 14/11

21 Non-participant Male

Interview 26/10 Informal talk 28/10 Follow-up interview 17/11

22 Non-participant Male Interview 28/10 Informal talk 27/10 Follow-up interview 17/11

23 Non-participant Male Interview 2/11 Informal talk 28/10

24 Non-participant Female

Interview 2/11 Informal talk 21/10

25 Non-participant Interview 21/10 Follow-up interview 2/11

26 Non-participant Female

Interview 2/11 Informal talk 19/10, 29/10

27 Woman/wife is participant in CAD plantation project.

Female Interview 2/11 Informal talk 31/10 Follow-up interview 10/11

28 Non-participant Male Interview 29/10 Informal talk 17/10 Follow-up interviw 16/11

29 Woman/wife is participant in Danida cocoa project.

Female Interview 21/10 Informal talk 17/10, 25/11 Follow-up interview 16/11

30 Woman/wife is participant in CAD plantation project.

Female Interview 17/10 Follow-up interview 16/11

31 Non-participant Male “Luís” (fictive name) from case-story, chapter 5.

Interview 29/10 Informal talks 23/10, 2/11

144

Forest guard for MARENA in Las Maravillas.

32 Non-participant Female

Interview 3/11 Informal talk 29/10

33 Non-participant Male Interview 20/10 Informal talk 16/10 Follow-up interview 15/11

34 Participant in Danida cocoa project Participant in CAD plantation project Member of CDCA

Male Interview 22/10 Informal talk 19/10

35 Participant in CAD plantation project. Participant in Danida cocoa project Shop owner

Male “Margarito” (fictive name) from case-story, chapter 5.

Interview 29/10 Informal talk 16/10, 26/11 Follow-up interview 30/10

36 Non-participant Female Woman living alone. Teacher.

Interview 22/10

37 Non-participant Male Interview 3/11 Informal talk 22/10 Follow-up interview 14/11

38 Participant in CAD plantation project

Male Interview 31/10 Follow-up interview 1/11

39 Participant in Danida cocoa project

Male Interview 31/10 Follow-up interview 15/11

145

Annex 6

Interview guide for interviews with respondents in Las Maravillas The following interview guide outlines the main topics and questions that guided each interview. However, the interviews were mostly carried out as loosely-structured, allowing respondents plenty of room to develop their own perspectives and agendas. Further, the guide was adjusted accordingly during the interviews in order to ask further into what the respondents were saying. Personal information o Name o Gender o Age o Civil status o Level of education o Amount of people living in household o Number of years living in this community/area o Number of years engaged in development/conservation projects

Household economy o Main income source for the household o Other income sources (in general, income generating activities) o Migration – seasonal work in e.g. Costa Rica or elsewhere o Principal agricultural or livestock activities undertaken o Assets:

- landownership (how much land/forest owned, borrowed, rented) - housing (do they own their own house; are they house lords for

others.) - means of production (tools, utensils, fishing gear, chain saw...) - means of transportation (boat, truck, car, bicycle, horse, mule…) - stocks of merchandise (in the case of commercial activities)

Forest utilization and land use o Land certificate o What purposes are land used for o How is the forest used (as a resource) o How is the forest “managed” (do they have management plan)

Project involvement o Which project have respondent been engaged in over time o What concrete form of involvement o Do respondent receive any kind of technical assistance from projects o In which ways have projects influenced on respondents life

(positive/negative; either projects engaged in or not) o Any conflicts in relation to the projects

146

”Good life” o What do the respondent consider ‘a good life’ for him/her and the family o How can this life be obtained o Have respondents ”quality” of life improved, worsened or remained the same

during the last years o Main reasons that the quality of life has improved, worsened, or remained the

same during the last three years - (referring to findings about the ‘good life’ elements above, and

consider e.g. family relations and situation (deaths, births, divorce/marriages, family conflicts or unifying events), job availability, resource access (both natural resources as well as social and financial ones), safety and security, health and access to public health services, environment, housing, access to education, social position, dependency on others/outsiders, taxation and other obligations, etcetera.)

o What are the most important problems facing respondent for obtaining the life wished for

Information and innovation o From where (what sources, networks) do respondent access information that

he/she feel is valuable to his/her livelihoods o Do respondent feels that he/she is particularly lacking in certain types of

information o Who does the respondent learn from in view of improving livelihoods and

reaching the life wished for? o Has the respondent learned anything valuable from the projects

Conflicts and governance o Who makes the decisions; who rules; who participates in making the rules (in

the village/municipality) o What are the rules about rights, access, duties, and liabilities which people

have to conform to (e.g. in relation to forest utilization) o Any conflicts in the community o Conflicts about what o What is the “story” behind the conflict o Any conflicts with projects/projects personnel o Conflicts about what o What is the “story” behind the conflict

Social networks and relations o Groups or organizations, networks, associations to which respondent or

members of household belong (formally organized groups or ’informal’ groups of people who get together regularly to do an activity or talk about things)

147

Annex 7

Interview guide for interviews with “key informants” The following interview guide outlines the main topics and questions that guided each interview, but for each interview the guide was amended according to which organisation and position the informant represented, just as the guide was adjusted during the interviews in order to ask further into what the informants were saying. General project overview

o Aim of project and project objectives? o How many years operating in the buffer zone? o How much staff and what background/education? o Geographic location – in which villages do the projects operate? o Target group and how many participants? o How have projects been promoted?

Experiences and relations

o Any changes in project activities over the years? o Any problems related to the projects in the different villages? o Positive and negative experiences with project activities and objectives? o Projects’ relations to other projects, NGOs, government institutions,

ministries etc.? o Relation to ”beneficiaries”/”target group”? o How do project objectives fit in with people’s livelihood strategies? o How have ”target group” responded to projects? o What have been your ”results” so far with reference to project

objectives? Illegal logging, conflicts & Logging Ban

o How is the situation of illegal logging in the buffer zone? o How is this prevented? o Conflicts due to logging in the buffer zone? o What do you think about the Logging Ban – how does it help to prevent

logging in the buffer zone? o How has the Logging Ban influenced on project activities and

relationships to locals? o How has the Logging Ban been promulgated in the buffer zone? o What is your position/role/responsibility with reference to the Logging

Ban and its promulgation?

148

Annex 8

Plan of Fieldwork Location: Río San Juan, Nicaragua Period: 12 weeks (September 12th to December 5th 2006)

Week Activity 12-17/09

Arrival to Nicaragua and settling in (Boca de Sábalos). Establishing contact to projects and institutions in Boca de Sábalos.

18-24/09

Informal talks with Díaz, Estrada, García, Marlin, Mayorquín, Obregón, Zambrana and Zapata in Boca de Sábalos. Interviews with Zapata and Zambrana in Boca de Sábalos. Deciding on a case study village; and moving in with family in Las Maravillas.

25/09-1/10

Informal talks with people in Las Maravillas. Transect walks with Respondent No. 1,4,36, some youngster in Las Maravillas. Transect walk with Romero in Las Maravillas.

2-8/10

Commencing execution of ’capital ranking’ with Respondent No. 1,4,15,20,33,36. Informal talk & discussion of field work methods with Rikke Broegaard, Granada. Elaborating final interview guides for project personnel and for locals.

9-15/10

Accomplishment of ’capital ranking’ in Las Maravillas. Participating in meeting with MARENA and PMS-Danida about Logging Ban in Boca de Sábalos. Interviews and follow-up interviews with Diáz, Zambrana and Zapata Informal talks with Gutierrez, Harquín, Mariscal, Ríos, Zapata in Boca de Sábalos

16-22/10

Selecting respondents from the ‘capital ranking’ for further study. Interviews with Respondent No. 1,3,4,12,14,15,16,19,20,25,29,30,33,34,36 Informal talks with Respondent No. 1,6,13,20,24,26,28,29,33,34,35,37 Interviews with Gonzáles and Romero in Las Maravillas.

23-29/10

Interviews with Respondent No.2,5,7,8,9,10,11,13,17,18,21,22,28,31,35 Informal talks with Respondent No. 2,7,8,10,13,18,21,22,23,26,31,32 Interview with Hernandez in Las Maravillas. Informal talk with Gonzáles in Las Maravillas.

30/10-5/11

Interviews with Respondent No. 6,23,24,26,27,32,37,38,39 Informal talks with Respondent No. 27,31 Follow up interviews with Respondent No. 1,2,4,16,25,35,38

6-12/11

Informal talks with Chamorro, Estrada, Gutierrez, Harquín, Hernandez, Mildam, Obregón in Boca de Sábalos. Follow-up interviews with Zambrana, Zapata in Boca de Sábalos. Follow-up interview with Respondent No. 11,13,14,15,27 in Las Maravillas.

13-19/11

Follow-up interviews with Respondent No. 3,5,6,7,9,12,19,20,21,22,28,29,30,33,37,39 Interview with García in Las Maravillas.

20-26/11

Interview with Chamorro, Gutierrez, Paucar de Vega, Ríos in Boca de Sábalos. Follow-up interviews with Chamorro, Ríos in Boca de Sábalos. Informal talks & clarification of issues from interviews with Respondent No. 1,2,5,9, 12, 13,14,18,29,35 in Las Maravillas.

27/11-5/12

Farewell to families in Las Maravillas. Follow-up interview with Gutierrez in Boca de Sábalos. Farewell in Boca de Sábalos - Departure from Nicaragua.