R 54: R.P. Kapoor v State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866Held: It is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice.R 55: Rajendra Prasad v BashirFacts: Aggrieved by the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Deeg by which charges were framed against them for offences punishable under Sections 147 148 323 324 149 427 and 395 of the Indian Penal Code, the respondents filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") praying for quashing the aforesaid order. Holding that the Magistrate, being the court of committal, had no power to add four respondents as accused-persons without adopting procedure as prescribed under Section 203 of the Code, the High Court allowed the petition of the respondents and set aside order the court by which cognizance of offence under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code was taken. The case has been remanded back to the learned Magistrate to hold inquiry as per the provisions of Section 203(2) of the Code with direction that if he finds that a case under Section 395 IPC is made out, he will pass necessary orders against the accused persons and commit the case to the Sessions Judge, if necessary.Held: This Court held that though the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is very wide, yet the same must be exercised sparingly and cautiously particularly in a case where the petitioner is shown to have already invoked the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code. Only in cause where the High Court finds that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order was not correct, the High Court may, in its discretion, prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. It was further held, "Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person - accused/complaint - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or under inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code.

R 56: J P Sharma v Vinod Kumar JainFacts: Three petitions arose out of a complaint under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the 'Act') which had been made by the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Shri J.P. Sharma of which the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi took cognizance and issued summons against the accused persons. The allegation was that the accused had entered into a conspiracy to contravene the provisions of the Act.Held: It was laid down clearly that the test was that taking the allegations and the complaint as these were, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence was made out then only the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of CrPC. There this Court observed that the power under Section 482 should be used very sparingly. In that case the fact that proceedings had been quashed against some of the directors would not prevent the court from exercising its discretion under Section 319 of the Code if it was fully satisfied that a case for taking cognizance against them had been made out on the additional evidence led before it. Section 319 of CrPC gives ample powers to any court to take cognizance to add any person not being an accused before it and try him along with the other accused. The learned judge, in the instant case had observed that in this case the Bank had not been made a party to the conspiracy.R 57 G C Rohilla v Gian RiceFacts: The question raised in this petition filed by the plaintiffs under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is as to whether the High Court in its inherent jurisdiction could quash the criminal proceedings initiated by way of criminal complaint and what is the scope of its power under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure.Held: The Supreme Court has cautioned that the power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised in a limited type of cases and not in a routine and mechanical fashion. the use of inherent power under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings at the threshold and observed as under :-"The High Court, we cannot refrain from observing, might well have refused to invoke its inherent powers at the very threshold in order to quash the proceedings, for these powers are meant to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection when there is reason to believe that the process of law is being misused to harass a citizen."R 61 Mac Culloh v. State, 1974 CrLJ"Criminal Proceeding shall not be initiated if prima facie case is not made out."Facts: . A petition was filed by the complainant, Md. Sharfuddin on the 30th January, 1973 before the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta under Sections 147, 323, 341, 448, 504, 427 and 506, I.P.C. The cause title mentioned that the application is under Section 156(3), Criminal Procedure Code and it contained a prayer to the effect that the police may be directed to take cognizance of the offences committed on treating the complaint as F.I.R. or in the alternative process may be issued against the accused.Held: Whether the accused persons had mens rea or not can only be determined on proper materials adduced during the trial. Quashing is always an extraordinary remedy and can only be allowed in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.R 62: Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v StockwainFacts: Strict liability emerged in the 19th Century to improve safety and working standards in factories. These laws are applied either in regulatory offences enforcing social behaviour where minimal stigma attaches to a person upon conviction, or where society is concerned with the prevention of harm, and wishes to maximise the deterrent value of the offence. The imposition of strict liability may operate very unfairly in individual cases as seen in Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Storkwain (1986) 2 ALL ER 635. The justification in this case is that the misuse of drugs is a grave social evil and pharmacists should be encouraged to take even unreasonable care to verify prescriptions before supplying drugs.Farquharson J said: It is perfectly obvious that pharmacists are in a position to put illicit drugs and perhaps other medicines on the market. Happily this rarely happens but it does from time to time. It can therefore be readily understood that Parliament would find it necessary to impose a heavier liability on those who are in such a position, and make them more strictly accountable for any breaches of the Act.

R 65: M.C.Mehta v. Union of IndiaDignity and authority of the Court has to be protected not for any individual but for maintenance of the rule of law.The Power conferred to Supreme Court is most potential weapon to use it in a case properly coming under this article.

The power conferred by the present Article is the most potential weapon in the hand of the Supreme CourtR 66: Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni Moopil Nayar Vs. The State of Madras and Ors.R 67: Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Vs. Union Of India And Others (It is meaningless to confer fundamental rights without providing an effective remedy for the for their enforcement, if and when they are violated.)Petitioner sought for directing Respondents not to sell away plant and equipment and they should be asked to withdraw their decision to sell the same and said decision should be quashed as being illegal and unconstitutional - Hence, this Petition - Whether, any of fundamental rights of Petitioners was violated by sale of plants and equipment of Factory - Held, plants which were initially advertised for sale, went through variation, that after sale was adjourned, requests received by F.C.I. from other public sector undertakings stating, that they were in need of part of equipment which was advertised for sale, led to substantial reduction in goods advertised for sale - However, officers regarding sale had attracted criticism that during course of negotiations original bid was reduced without justifying cause - Moreover, reduction in price was necessary and fair consequence of reduction in quantity of goods later offered for sale - Thus, one could not exclude possibility that better price might have been realized in fresh public auction, but such possibilities could not vitiate sale or justify allegation of mala fides - Hence, sale was not vitiated by any unfairness or arbitrariness - Therefore, fundamental rights of Petitioners under Article 14 and Article 19 of Constitution were not violated - Petition dismissed.R 68: Raja Ram Pal Vs. The Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha and Ors.

R 70: Ramchand Jagadish Chand v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. : FACTS:By a consolidated order dated December 7, 1955, known as the Imports (Control) Order 1955, restrictions on the import of certain goods were imposed.The petitioners submitted that the Controller of licences had arbitrarily reduced the value of their import licence under the Export Promotion Scheme and had thereby unlawfully infringed their fundamental right to carry on business.HELD:The fundamental right of a citizen to carry on any occupation, trade or business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution is not absolute : it is subject to reasonable restrictions which may be imposed by the state in the interests of the general public.R 73: Madhya Bharat Cotton Association Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Anr.FACTS:This is a petition made by the Madhya Bharat Cotton Association Limited, under Article 32 of the Constitution, complaining of restraint of trade under Article 19(1)(g). The Cotton Control Order of 1950 banned all cotton contracts and options in cotton except those permitted by the Textile Commissioner. The restraint of trade is because the petitioner has been prevented by certain notifications, which it impugns, from carrying on the business of hedge contracts; the discrimination lies in the fact that whereas the petitioner has been prevented from carrying on this trade, the East India Cotton Association Limited, Bombay, has been allowed to do so and has been given a virtual monopoly in India.HELD:Cotton being a commodity essential to the life of the community, it is reasonable to have restrictions which may, in certain circumstances, extend to total prohibition for a time, of all normal trading in the commodity. Accordingly, we are of opinion that the Cotton Control Order of 1950 does not offend Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.In Madhya Bharat Cotton Association Ltd. MANU/SC/0161/1954 : AIR1954SC634 , the Court had to consider the constitutionally of an order which in effect prohibited a large section of traders, from carrying on their normal trade in forward contracts. In holding the order to be valid, the Court said "Cotton being a commodity essential to the life of the community, it is reasonable to have restrictions which may, in certain circumstances, extend to total prohibition for a time, of all normal trading in the commodity."Pratap Pharma (Pvt.) Ltd. and another etc. etc. Vs. Union of India and othersFACTS:The writ Petitions, filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of IndiaSection 3(h) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act challenging as unconstitutional, being arbitrary and violative of Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.HELD:It is now well settled legal position that regulation includes total prohibition, if it is found necessary in the public interest.R 74: Cooverjee B. Bharucha Vs. The Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner, Ajmer and Ors.FACTS:5) That the provisions of the Excise Regulation and the auction rules made thereunder were ultra vires as the same purport to grant monopoly of trade to a few persons and are thus inconsistent with article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and that the provisions of the regulation regarding levy of licence fee with the avowed object of raising a big source of revenue also seriously affected the fundamental rights of the petitioner under article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.R 75: Chintamanrao v. State of M.P., AIR 1951 SC 118FACTS: An order was issued by the Deputy Commissioner under the provisions of the Act forbidding all persons residing in certain villages from engaging in the manufacture of bidis during a. particular season. A manufacturer of bidis and an employee in a bidi factory residing in one of the said villages applied under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ of mandamus alleging that since the Act prohibited the petitioners from exercising their fundamental right to carry on their trade or business which was guaranteed to them by cl. (1) (g) of Art. 19 of the Constitution, the Act was voidHELD:

R 76: Laxmi Khandsari and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. and Ors. (The restriction depends upon the extent of evil that is sought to be remedied)FACTS:With the objective of removing nation-wide shortage of sugar and for the purpose of enhancing sugar production in order to achieve an equitable distribution of the commodity so as to make it available to consumers at reasonable rates and thereby relieving the sugar famine, a notification was passed by Cane Commissioner, Government of Uttar Pradesh directing that no power crusher, except, of a khandsari unit or any agent of such owner in the reserved area of a mill could be worked for a certain period. In order to facilitate production by the sugar mills, most of whom were controlled by the State, a reserved area of the fields growing sugarcane was fixed throughout the State The Notification applied only to the reserved areas of a mill and not to any other area. Restriction was laid only on specific reserved areas and only for specific time, making the restriction reasonable. The restriction(notification issued for temporary stoppage of power crusader of khandsari unit) depended on the degree of evil(to regulate supply of sugar) it sought to be remedied.HELD:All requirements of reasonableness are fulfilled and hence the notification is not violative of Article 19 (1) (g).R 77: Narendra Kumar and Ors. Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Ors.FACTS:Restriction should be reasonable in interest of publicBy Government order restrictions imposed on grant of permit and maximum price for purchase and sale of copper fixed. Petitioners were dealers of non-ferrous metal. Petitioner contended that clauses of the order were violative of Article 19 as it imposed unreasonable restrictions and caused discrimination. HELD:However Court observed that clause as restrictions imposed were in interest in general public and reasonable.79: Municipal Corporation v Jan Mohd.

R 80: The State of Maharashtra Vs. Himmatbhai Narbheram Rao and Ors.FACTS:The respondent was involved in business of skinning carcasses of dead animals and utilising products for industrial purposes - By State Legislature amending Act, an owner of the carcass of a dead animal shall deposit it at the place appointed in that behalf by the Corporation, and entrusted the Corporation with power to arrange for disposal of the carcasses. Contract of such disposal given to some other organisation and respondent stopped from doing its business. Respondent challenged validity of such amendments being ultra vires as violative of Article 19 (1) (g) - Supreme Court observed that reasonable restrictions do not infringe Article 19 and restrictions were to be judged in light of nature of commodity and its capacity to be detrimental to public health. HELD:The court has held that while striking a balance between rights of individuals and rights of citizenry as a whole the financial loss caused to individuals becomes insignificant if it serves the larger public interestNo compensation is to be paid to owners of carcass and the amendments were not violative of any provision. The decision of High Court was overruled and such amendments wee held as valid and justified.R 81: Sushila Saw Mill Vs. State of Orissa and othersThe petitioner has established a Saw mill in Keonjhar District of Orissa State. The notice under Section 4(1) of Orissa Saw Mills & Saw Pits (Control) Act, 1991 (for short 'the Act') was issued to the petitioner to close down its operations with immediate effect. Challenging the validity of Section 4(1) of the Act and the notice, he filed the writ petition contending that it violates his fundamental right to carry on trade and business It was also contended that the Act did not create any total ban but gave discretion to the licensing authority to grant or refuse the renewal of licence. Appeal in Supreme Court was filed -HELD: Court observed that right to carry on trade or business subject to provisions of Act and the total ban imposed was which found to be in public interest which was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.R 84: R.K. Garg and Ors. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.There is no qualitative difference between the Ordinance the validity of a law or an order passed by the President and an Act of Parliament.FACTS:The writ petition relates to the constitutional validity of the Special Bearer Bonds (Immunities and Exemptions) Ordinance, 1981 and the Special Bearer Bonds (Immunities and Exemptions) Act 1981 which classified holders of special bearer bonds into honest tax payers and tax evaders. The ground on which the Ordinance is assailed as constitutionally invalid and is that the President had no power under Article 123 of the Constitution to issue the Ordinance which alter or amend tax laws and the Ordinance is therefore ultra vires and void.HELD:the President has legislative power under Article 123 to promulgate an ordinance and this legislative power is co-extensive with the power of the Parliament to make laws, it is difficult to see how any limitation can be read into this legislative power of the President so as to make it ineffective to alter or amend tax laws. If Parliament can by enacting legislation alter or amend tax laws, equally can the President do so by issuing an Ordinance under Article 123.R 85: Rustom Cavasjee Cooper Vs. Respondent:Union of India (UOI)FACTS:The President is under the Constitution not the repository of the legislative power of the Union, but with a view to meet extraordinary situations demanding immediate enactment of laws, provision is made in the Constitution investing the President with power to legislate by promulgating Ordinances.

R 86: K. Nagaraj and Ors. Vs. Respondent: State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. ()the President can promulgate an ordinance on the advice of the Council of Ministers to meet the requirements of a situation when either House of Parliament is not in sessionFACTS:An Order was issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh for reducing the age of superannuation of all Government employees, other than in the last Grade Service, from 58 to 55 years, on the ground that it had become necessary to provide greater employment opportunities to the youths. These writ petitions were filed by the Andhra Pradesh Government employees to challenge the aforesaid Order. In the case it was said that the President can promulgate an ordinance on the advice of the Council of Ministers to meet the requirements of a situation when either House of Parliament is not in sessionR 87: Amar Nath Sen Vs. Union of India (UOI)FACTS:The petitioner contended that National Tax Tribunal Ordinance, 2003 promulgated by the President is not constitutionally valid under articles 123. HELD:The conditions precedent to article 123 are satisfied and, therefore, President was well within its power to promulgate the Ordinance.In the absence of those conditions the act of the President, may be a legislative one, under article 123 of the Constitution of India, would be struck down as the same would be unconstitutional. It has also been settled by the apex court that such power of President is co-existensive with the power of Parliament within its own field meaning thereby, the President has power to promulgate ordinancesR 89 : Samsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Anr.FACTS( READ it once)Under Punjab Civil Services Rules 1952, the services of a Subordinate Judge was terminated on probation. The appellant approached the court through an appeal. the President as well as the Governor exercises all powers and functions conferred on them by or under the Constitution on the aid. The ordinance is promulgated in the name of the President and in a constitutional sense on his satisfaction. However in truth, it is promulgated on the advice of council of ministers.R 91 : A.K. Kaul and another Vs. Union of India and another

R 92: A.K. Roy and Ors. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (The ordinance passed by the government is law within the meaning of Article 21 of Constitution of India. Article 356 empowers the President to issue a proclamation in case of failure of constitutional machinery in the States. An Ordinance is a legislation)

The Writ Petition has been filed under Article 32 of the Constitution by Shri A.K. Roy, a Marxist member of the Parliament, challenging the validity of the National Security Ordinance, 2 of 1980, and certain provisions of the National Security Act, 65 of 1980, which replaced the Ordinance for detaining under the Ordinance by an order passed by the District Magistrate, Dhanbad, on the ground that he was indulging in activities which were prejudicial to public order.R 93: McNabb V USA1. The power of this Court upon review of convictions in the federal courts is not limited to the determination of the constitutional validity of such convictions.

2. Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence. 3. The principles governing the admissibility of evidence in criminal cases in the federal courts are not restricted to those derived solely from the Constitution. 4. In the exercise of its authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts, this Court, from its beginning, has formulated applicable rules of evidence; and has been guided therein by considerations of justice not limited to strict canons of evidentiary relevance. 5. The circumstances (detailed in the opinion) under which federal officers obtained incriminating statements from the defendants in this case, together with the flagrant disregard of Acts of Congress requiring that accused persons arrested by federal officers be taken before a United States Commissioner or other judicial officer, rendered the evidence thus obtained inadmissible in a criminal prosecution in a federal court, and convictions resting upon such evidence must be set aside. 6. Although Congress has not explicitly forbidden the use of evidence so procured, yet to permit such evidence to be made the basis of a conviction in the federal courts would stultify the policy which Congress has enacted into law. R 94: Shaughnessy V USAn alien resident of the United States traveled abroad and remained in Hungary for 19 months. On his return to this country, the Attorney General, acting pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 223 and regulations thereunder, ordered him permanently excluded without a hearing. The order was based on "information of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest," and on a finding that the alien's entry would be prejudicial to the public interest for security reasons. Because other nations refused to accept him, his exclusion at Ellis Island was continued for 21 months. A federal district court in habeas corpus proceedings then directed his conditional parole into the United States on bond.Held: the Attorney General's continued exclusion of the alien without a hearing does not amount to an unlawful detention, and courts may not temporarily admit him to the United States pending arrangements for his departure abroad. (a) In exclusion cases, the courts cannot retry the Attorney General's statutory determination that an alien's entry would be prejudicial to the public interest. (b) Neither an alien's harborage on Ellis Island nor his prior residence in this country transforms the administrative proceeding against him into something other than an exclusion proceeding, and he may be excluded if unqualified for admission under existing immigration laws. (c) Although a lawfully resident alien may not captiously be deprived of his constitutional rights to due process, the alien in this case is an entrant alien or "assimilated to that status" for constitutional purposes. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,344 U. S. 590, distinguished. Pp. (d) The Attorney General therefore may exclude this alien without a hearing, as authorized by the emergency regulations promulgated pursuant to the Passport Act, and need not disclose the evidence upon which that determination restsR 95: State of Nagaland Vs. Ratan Singh, etc.Ordinance is a piece of legislation which has same power and potency and is co-extensive as that of law made by legislature. Article 21 takes in laws other than those enacted by legislature.Case Note: The case dealt with the validity of rules framed under Scheduled Districts Act, 1937 and whether such rules violated Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India It was ruled that the said rules under the Act are validly enacted and clearly indicates the policy to be adopted - It was also ruled that Article 21 of the Constitution did not make the said rules ineffective - It was observed that the backwards tracts were not found effective for the application of the Criminal Procedure Code.Facts of the Case: Appeals by the State of Nagaland against the judgment and order of the High Court of Assam and Nagaland, August 26, 1965, by which the High Court, allowing certain writ petitions filed by the respondents, issued a writ of mandamus directing the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Kohima and the State of Nagaland, not to proceed with the trial of the respondents. The High Court has certified the case as fit for appeal to this court. Ratilal Bhanji Mithani Vs Asstt. Collector of Customs, Bombay and Anr.R 96: Rohtas Industries Vs. S.D. Agarwal and Ors. (A plea of mala fide will succeed only if it appears that either the President acted upon no evidence at all as to urgency of the situation, or the circumstances which were acted upon him, are not relevant to the object for which the power has been conferred by the constitution upon the executive)FACTS:R 97: Keshavan Madhava Menon Vs. The State of Bombay (Article 13(2) of the Constitution of India prescribes that the Union or the States shall not make any law that takes away or abridges any of the fundamental rights, and any law made in contravention of the aforementioned mandate shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void)Facts:A pamphlet entitled "Railway Mazdooron ke khilaf Nai Zazish" is alleged to have been published in Bombay by the petitioner as the secretary of that company. The petitioner states that the pamphlet was published as a "book" within the meaning of section 1 of the Press and Registration of Books Act (XXV of 1867) and that the provisions of that Act had been duly complied with. However, The Bombay Government authorities took the view that the pamphlet was a "news sheet" within the meaning of section 2(6) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, and that as it had been published without the authority required by section 15(1) of that Act, the petitioner had committed an offence punishable under section 18(1) of the same Act.R 99: Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.(If the ordinance having the effect of law does not infringe the constitutional safeguard , it cannot be examined nor can the motive for such a promulgation be in question.)R 64: Rameshwar Prasad and Ors. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Anr.FACTS:The challenge in the present petitions is to the Constitutional validity of Notification dated 23rd May, 2005 ordering dissolution of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Bihar - Whether the proclamation dated 23rd May, 2005 dissolving the Assembly of Bihar is illegal and unconstitutional. In this case it was said that Article 32 of the Constitution provides for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights by means of the specified writ or writs of the same nature.