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Linking Strategic Gains to the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) doctrine

MA International Relations and World Order

M14 International Security PL7505

Joé Majerus

Student Number: 129047454

Due 18 June, 2014

Word Count: 4324

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I.) Introduction

The "Responsibility to Protect"-Doctrine (R2P) is not as much

an obstacle to ending human suffering in war-torn countries as its

detractors maintain. Originally conceived as a UN-sponsored attempt

to provide the international community with a more efficient

instrument for preventing or halting mass violence and human rights

violations, it was hoped that R2P would overcome the controversies

frequently associated with humanitarian interventions.1 Yet ever

since its conception, R2P has likewise met with extensive criticism in

regard to some of its key tenets.2 In particular it is argued that a

potential military intervention in governments' internal affairs not

only constitutes an encroachment upon state sovereignty,3 but also

merely serves as a pretext of stronger states to impose their will and

power upon weaker ones.4

In the context of western calls for foreign involvement in the

ongoing Syrian civil war, R2P accordingly figures as a particularly

delicate issue. Yet whereas international observers such as David

Petrasek contend that R2P's failure to stop human suffering in Syria

is primarily due to its "illusory military solutions",5 this essay will

argue instead that R2P has been unsuccessful because the human

tragedy presently unfolding in Syria is still not universally recognized

as an incidence of wide-scale aggression which beyond humanitarian

exigencies for intervention could ultimately also easily evolve into a

1 Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), pp. 35-65.

2See in particular Philip Cunliffe (ed.), Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect:

Interrogating Theory and Practice (New York: Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2011). 3 Mohammed Ayoob, "Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty", The International Journal

of Human Rights, Vol. 6:1 (2002), p. 92. 4Alex de Waal, "No Such Thing as Humanitarian Intervention: Why We Need to Rethink How to

Realize the 'Responsibility to Protect'", Harvard International Review, December 2007. http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154/26062.html [accessed 23 May 2014];

Aidan Hehir, Humanitarian Intervention: an Introduction (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave

Macmillan, 2010), p. 121; "An idea whose time has comeand gone?", The Economist, 23 July 2009.

http://www.economist.com/node/14087788 [accessed 23 May 2014]. 5 David Petrasek, "R2P-hindrance not a help in the Syrian crisis", Open Democracy, 13 September

2013. http://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/david-petrasek/r2p-%E2%80%93-hindrance-not-help-in-syrian-crisis [accessed 21 May 2014].

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threat to the international community as well. In other words, since

humanitarian considerations are apparently unable to bring about a

peaceful resolution of the conflict by virtue of their own inherent

urgency and moral imperatives, an international consensus can

effectively only be reached by placing greater rather than less

emphasis on common strategic concerns as well, so that dialogue

between international actors for ending the slaughter in Syria must

also reflect mutual interests in relation to the safety and well-being of

all of them as opposed to only those of some. In order to further

substantiate that view, the essay will first critically engage R2P's

reference to military action before thereafter discussing the over-all

prospects for foreign intervention6 in Syria following a re-evaluation of

the principles of non-interference and state sovereignty. Finally, it will

seek to demonstrate the need for external interventions in states'

domestic affairs to be more systematically related to the dangers of

regional instabilities and transnational terrorism as a result of not

protecting civilian populations from intra-state violence in a timely

and expedient fashion.

II.) Analysis

R2P and military action

The "Responsibility to Protect-doctrine" was established as a

new international norm by the International Commission on

Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001 that regards national

sovereignty not as an inherent privilege of state actors, but rather as

a fundamental duty to shield their citizenry from any type of grave

and murderous harm such as ethnic cleansing, war crimes, genocide,

6 Humanitarian intervention shall be defined as the involvement of foreign powers in the internal

affairs of sovereign nation-states that need, however, not necessarily signify the use of military force, but may instead primarily compromise other coercive and non-forcible means such as international sanctions or material/financial assistance for ending human suffering within their territorial boundaries. See David J. Scheffer, "Towards a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention", University of Toledo Law Review, Vol 23. (1992), pp. 253-274.

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and crimes against humanity.7 It further stipulates that the

international community has a responsibility to assist governments

meet that duty, yet that it will typically only do so at their explicit

request for helping them overcome internal disruptions, thereby

essentially respecting their national sovereignty. In extreme cases,

however, R2P also reserves for itself the right to interfere in states'

domestic affairs even without prior consent of its leaders if the latter

are not only deemed incapable to protect their own population, but

especially if they themselves are perceived to be the main originators

of intra-state violence and aggression.8

It is in particular this third provision of R2P which has received

a substantial amount of criticism these past few years, notably over

foreign military intervention outside the Security Council and the

arguably adverse long-term effects of interference in states' domestic

affairs on international peace and stability in general.9 In that regard,

Petrasek is certainly right that non-sanctioned military action is likely

to meet with profound reservations of many sovereign powers and

that a genuine consensus on alleviating human suffering in conflict-

ridden regions is the only universally efficient solution to such

problems.10 After all, multilateral responses not only stand to

generate greater international support, but they are also less likely to

bring "the harmony and concord of the society of sovereign states into

7 ICISS, "The Responsibility to Protect", Report of the International Commission on Intervention and

State Sovereignty (New York: ICISS, December 2001). Document available at: http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf [accessed 21 May 2014]; United Nations World Summit Outcome Document 2005 (New York: United Nations, 2005). http://www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf [accessed 23 May 2014]. 8 Cristina G. Badescu, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Security and

Human Rights (New York: Taylor and Francis e-library, 2010), p. 110; Aidan Hehir and Philip Cunliffe, "The responsibility to protect and international law", in: Philip Cunliffe (ed.), Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory and Practice (New York: Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2011), pp. 84–100; Ban Ki-moon, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (A/63/677) (New York: United Nations, 2009). http://www.unrol.org/files/SG_reportA_63_677_en.pdf [accessed 22 May 2014]. 6

Şaban Kardaş, "Humanitarian Intervention as a ‘Responsibility to Protect’: An International Society

Approach", A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, Vol. 2:1 (January 2013), pp. 27-29. 10

David Petrasek, "R2P-hindrance not a help in the Syrian crisis", op.cit.

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jeopardy."11 However, such concerns should nevertheless not be

construed to suggest that seeking approval by the Security Council is

invariably the most reliable way for stopping atrocities. While every

effort to reach a consent on intervention should be pursued, one

must not forget that in the meantime, people will continue to suffer

under oppressive regimes even as political leaders are attempting to

unanimously decide on the proper course of action for ending their

suffering. After all, such agreements not only take time, but they are

also hampered by the composition of the UN Security Council itself.12

No matter how severe intra-state confrontations may be, a common

understanding on how to address them will arguably not materialize

for as long as not all SC members attach equal urgency to the need of

foreign intervention, let alone if they believe such methods to detract

from their own national interest. Accordingly one should perhaps not

too hastily dismiss the possibility of unauthorized action achieving at

least some successes in abating humanitarian crises as Kardas

reminds us. As long as it expresses "the collective will of at least a

certain part of the society states",13 it might nevertheless succeed in

obtaining a sufficient degree of legitimacy among the international

community,14 notably since such multilateral operations hardly pose

a risk to the over-all stability of the international order.15

A second line of criticism directed against R2P not only

challenges intervention outside the Security Council as such, but in

particular the use of force as a measure of last resort. In that context,

the very idea of military action is often seen as fundamentally

inadequate and even counter-productive to reaching an international

consensus on protecting civilian populations to begin with.16

11

Hedley Bull, Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 195. 12

C.A.J. Coady, "The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention", THE USIP Peaceworks No. 45

(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2002), p. 26. 13

Kardaş, p. 28. 14

. Coady, p. 26 15

Kardaş, p. 28. 16

Justin Morris, "Libya and Syria: R2P and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum", International Affairs, Vol. 89:5 (September 2013), p. 1272.

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However, although Petrasek has a point that R2P will require

rethinking if human rights violations are to be prevented, it does

nevertheless not follow from that observation that the primary reason

why R2P failed to build an international consensus on Syria was

mainly due to its "illusory military solutions",17 or, put differently,

that the mere possibility of military operations has been chiefly

responsible for Russia and China's continued opposition to other

measures against the Syrian government.18

Admittedly, there can be no doubt that Russia and China are

traditionally overly wary of external interferences in states' territorial

jurisdiction.19 Above all the recent experience in Libya appears to

have reinforced their concerns over R2P, given that NATO's armed

intervention was widely perceived by them to having only worsened

the humanitarian situation there instead of improving it.20 On that

note, however, two important qualifications are in order. For one, it is

perfectly legitimate to question the results of NATO's mission in Libya

and to allege that regime change rather than humanitarian

considerations alone informed the former's approach to that

conflict.21 Importantly, however, Libya in particular was a case in

which no genuine amelioration of the population's situation was de

facto possible without some form of regime change, if only because

those in power were after all responsible for their suffering in the first

17

Petrasek, "R2P-hindrance not a help in the Syrian crisis", op.cit. 18

Ibid. 19

Christopher Holland, "Chinese Attitudes to International Law: China, the Security Council, Sovereignty and Intervention", NYU Journal of International Law and Politics Online Forum (2012), pp. 1-44.http://nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Christopher-Holland-China-the-Security-Council-and-Intervention.pdf [accessed 23 May 2014]; Vladimir Baranovsky, "Humanitarian Intervention: Russian Perspectives", Pugwash Occasional Papers, Vol 2:1 (January 2001). http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/como_russia.htm [accessed 23 May 2014]. 15

See minutes of 6627th

UN Security Council Meeting. "Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution Condemning Syria’s Crackdown on Anti-Government Protestors, Owing to Veto by Russian Federation, China", United Nations Security Council 6627

th Meeting (New York: United

Nations, 4 October 2011). http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10403.doc.htm [accessed 21 May 2014]. 21

Alan J. Kuperman, "A Model Humanitarian Intervention?: Reassessing NATO's Libya Campaign", International Security, Vol. 38:1 (Summer 2013), pp. 113-115.

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place.22 Secondly, what practical alternative did there actually exist

for ending atrocities at that point? Peaceful dialogue had clearly failed

to reduce violence and aggression within the country,23 and apart

from NATO, no other international actors were willing to actively

contribute their share to alleviating human suffering. Military

approaches to intra-state conflicts are certainly anything but ideal

solutions, so that a peaceful and political settlement is always

preferable. Yet despite its many shortcomings, the military

intervention in Libya at least attempted to relieve civilian populations

of their agony even if some of the ensuing actions arguably added to

the latter as well.24 The only other option would have been to simply

trust that ultimately everything would have worked out fine even

without foreign involvement, knowing that such a procedure would,

however, only further have prolonged human suffering and violence.

Ultimately, it is rather widespread reluctance to question the

legitimacy of established regimes by identifying them as the true

sources of popular unrest and civilian distressand not merely the

supposedly adverse effects resulting from a military execution of

R2Pwhich forms the actual impediment to an international

consensus on Syria. From this perspective, it is simply unreasonable

to assume that without the threat of armed intervention, Russia and

China would more likely back other UN measures (financial

sanctions, referral to the International Criminal Court) for stopping

the killing in Syria.25 The truth of the matter is that Russia and

China are not only opposed to any resolutions that might lead to a

forceful enactment of R2P; rather they appear unwilling to support

22

On the Human Rights situation in Libya under Muammar Gaddafi, see in particular: Morayef Heba, Truth and Justice Can't Wait: Human Rights Development in Libya and Institutional Obstacles (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009). 23

Chris McGreal, Harriet Sherwood, Nicholas Watt and Ian Traynor, "Libyan revolutionary council rejects African Union's peace initiative", The Guardian, 11 April 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/11/libyan-rebels-reject-peace-initiative [accessed 26 May 2014]. 24

"Ban Ki-moon alarmed over rising civilian toll in Libya", The Telegraph, 12 August 2011. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8696961/Ban-Ki-moon-alarmed-over-rising-civilian-toll-in-Libya.html [accessed 21 May 2014]. 25

Petrasek, "R2P-hindrance not a help in the Syrian crisis", op.cit.

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any truly comprehensive measures against the Assad regime as a

matter of principle. Such reluctance is after all evidenced by their

rejection of several UN resolutions urging the Syrian government to

moderate the use of force against its own civilian population,26 thus

essentially confirming their apparent disinclination to place

humanitarian considerations over the purported legitimacy of the

Assad regime.

That R2P's inclusion of military force is not per se opposed by

Russia and China is ultimately also substantiated by the fact that

they did not always block UN resolutions invoking R2P provided

that they did not impinge on their own national interests or run

counter to their axiomatic adherence to the principles of 'state

sovereignty' and 'non-interference in internal affairs'.27 In particular,

both countries seem to have been fine with limited military action so

long as it was not aimed at ruling governments themselves or

challenged their claim to national sovereignty. Accordingly, Russia

and China approved UN interventions in Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and Libya

for varying reasons not primarily related to humanitarian concerns,

for instance to strengthen internationally recognized President

Alassane Ouattara (Côte d'Ivoire) or to contain the threat of

widespread national subversion by terrorist networks (Mali).28 In

contrast, China initially opposed an armed intervention in Libya, but

26

"Russia, China block second draft of resolution on Syria", The Voice of Russia, 10 June 2011.

http://voiceofrussia.com/2011/06/10/51517343/ [accessed 7 April 2014]; "China and Russia veto UN resolution condemning Syria", BBC News, 5 October 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15177114 [accessed 7 April 2014]; Steve Gutterman, "Russia won't back U.N. call for Syria's Assad to go", Reuters, 27 January 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/27/us-syria-russia-idUSTRE80Q0I620120127 [accessed 7 April 2014]; Neil MacFarquhar and Anthony Shadid, "Russia and China Block UN Action on Crisis in Syria, The New York Times, 4 February 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/world/middleeast/syria-homs-death-toll-said-to-rise.html?pagewanted=1&hp&_r=0 [accessed 7 April 2014]. 27

Minutes of 6627th

UN Security Council Meeting, op.cit. 28

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1975 on Côte d'Ivoire (New York: United Nations,

2011). http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1975%282011%29 [accessed 21 May 2014]; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2085 on Mali (New York: United Nations, 2012). http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085%20%282012%29 [accessed 21 May 2014].

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ultimately only refrained from doing so in order to preserve its

relationship with several Arab countries supporting it.29 In all these

incidences, it were distinctly national concerns which mainly

informed their reasoning, not any categorical opposition to military

operations in general. Hence the argument that without R2P's threat

of military action, Russia and China might endorse less radical

measures against the Assad regime is essentially unfounded, if only

because, at least in Russia's case, its stability is still viewed of great

strategic importance to it.30

Altogether, R2P's provisions regarding military force outside the

Security Council are therefore but one aspect of Russian and Chinese

aversion to a more active role of the UN in Syria, though certainly not

the main one. Consequently, these provisions alone cannot effectively

account for why the doctrine has thus far failed to resolve the

precarious situation in Syria. If R2P has been unsuccessful, it is

rather because it has not given nearly enough attention to the

potential dangers involved in stolidly adhering to the idea that the

non-infringement of states' national sovereignty will by default always

and without fail form the most reliable guarantor of long-term

international peace and stability.

Prospects for Intervention

In the final analysis, the war in Syria and the attending

difficulties for implementing R2P in that conflict are less about the

possibility of military operations per se than about the problematic of

reconciling the supposedly incompatible principles of state

sovereignty and non-interference on the one hand and the promotion

of human rights on the other. In that regard, advocates of non-

intervention typically refer to the Westphalian principles of state

29

Saibal Dasgupta, "China opposed to UN resolution on Libya", The Times of India, 18 March 2011.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/China-opposed-UN-resolution-on-Libya/articleshow/7736989.cms?referral=PM [accessed 7 April 2014]. 30

Azuolas Bagdonas, "Russias's Interests in the Syrian Conflict: Power, Prestige, Profit", European Journal of Economic and Political Studies, Vol. 5:2 (December 2012), pp. 55-77.

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sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction that sought to reduce inter-

state conflicts by not only prohibiting any outside interference in

states' domestic affairs,31 but by moreover assuming a primacy of the

state over the rights of individual citizens and thus, as Robert

Jackson notes, ultimately also of the principles of sovereignty and

non-intervention over human rights.32 As a result, strict adherence to

these norms is seen as a fundamental prerequisite for preserving the

peace and stability of the international order, in particular as

interference in states' internal activities is believed to produce

disruptive and destabilizing effects on the international community as

a whole.33 Since non-intervention thus basically serves the dual

purpose of protecting state autonomy and preventing the resurgence

of inter-state conflict, it is held as a cornerstone of international

stability that must be given absolute priority over any secondary

concerns arising from the imperfect nature of world politics,34

including domestic human rights violations by a sovereign

government.35 By permitting even only sporadic interventions on

behalf of humanitarian exigencies, such practices are presumed to

invariably result in a long-term erosion of the norms of state

sovereignty and non-intervention and, before long, thus also of the

general well-being of the international community as well.36

However, it is questionable whether a blind attachment to these

principles still represents the most viable approach to the multi-

faceted realities of contemporary world politics. For one, the concept

31

R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 113-114. 32

Robert H. Jackson, "Armed Humanitarianism", International Journal, Vol. 48:4 (Autumn 1993), pp. 582-583. 33

Kardaş, p. 25, 27; Hedley Bull, Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 85. 34 Stanley Hoffmann, "Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention", in: Stanley Hoffmann (ed.), The

Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), p. 12; Lori F. Damrosch, "Introduction", in: Lori. F. Damrosch, Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflict (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 8. 35

Kardaş, p. 27. 36 Nicholas Wheeler and Justin Morris, "Humanitarian Intervention and State Practice at the End of

the Cold War", in: Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (eds.), International Society after the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), p. 166.

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of states allegedly possessing some form of absolute sovereignty not

only appears increasingly outmoded in light of economic globalization

and the establishment of supra-national bodies, but it is also widely

agreed that states have at least some minimal obligation to respect

the rights of their citizens.37 Accordingly, critics above all take issue

with the inherent rigidness of the principle of non-interference which

ultimately does not even allow for exceptions in cases where it

literally affronts the moral conscience of humanity itself.3839

Importantly, however, it are not only moral considerations

which guide the reasoning of those advocating greater flexibility in

the application of the norm of non-intervention in international

affairs. Just as its proponents routinely cite geo-political arguments

for upholding that standard, notably to maintain international

stability, so too may the latter, however, likewise be endangered by at

times not sufficiently taking into account the necessity to protect

civilian populations from genocide and state oppression. More

specifically, humanitarian interventions may well have a direct

bearing on the very peace and security of the international system

itself, notably since by offering at least some type of redress to the

pernicious long-term effects of intra-state confrontations on regional

stabilities, they essentially seek to preserve the fragile structures of

that system as well.40 Especially the fact that human rights abuses

and civil wars are no longer only of relevance to local authorities, but

may instead also affect the security and well-being of other nations

ultimately adds further substance and legitimacy to the argument of

not a priori excluding humanitarian intervention as a means for

resolving such crises.41 Consequently, it is that fundamental

interdependence between defending basic human rights and common

37

Coady, pp. 21-22. 38

Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, Protection and Impartiality in a Policy Vacuum",

Adelphi Paper 305 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 20. 39

Kardaş, p. 29; Hoffmann, "Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention", p. 22. 40

Kardaş, p. 25. 41

Francis Koi Abiew, "Assessing Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Period: Sources of

Consensus", International Relations, Vol. 14:2 (August 1998), p. 62.

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strategic interests by way of ensuring continued international peace

and stability which altogether reinforces the need for occasional

interference in states' domestic activities for the sake of protecting

innocent civilian populations.42

Since humanitarian interventions are, however, likewise

subject to the constraints of the existing world order, their

application may arguably never take on a universal form, but will

have to remain selective to some degree.43 After all, they must also

consider "the scale of likely outcomes of a military intervention" as

Coady remarks, given that "a response proportionate to one situation

may be disproportionate to another."44 Thus humanitarian

interventions may not always be conducive to international peace and

security, notably in places where intervening on behalf of suffering

populations would almost certainly involve too grave a risk to over-all

world peace and stability.45 Consequently, supporters of

humanitarian interventions must clearly identify such incidences

where ignoring the plight of civilian populations could also yield

negative consequences for the wider international community.

Serious human rights violations like genocide arguably comprise one

such case, yet even greater threats to international peace and

security issue in particular from such societies where civil unrest and

social chaos are likely to foster threats to regional or even

international stability as well.46 Accordingly, it is only by more

systematically linking humanitarian intervention to such geo-political

considerations that calls for actively protecting local populations may

ultimately reach a greater number of nations.

42

Albrecht Schnabel, "Humanitarian Intervention: A Conceptual Analysis", in: S. Neil MacFarlane and

Hans-Georg Ehrhart (eds.), Peacekeeping at a Crossroads (Clementsport: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), p. 27. 43

Ayoob, pp. 85-86. 44

Coady, p. 27. 45

For instance in Chechnya or Tibet. Coady, p. 25., 27. 46 See Stanley Hoffmann, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post–Cold War Era (Lanham,

Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), pp. 161–164.

12

To that end, however, western countries first need to provide

other nations with plausible justifications as to why exactly the

responsibility to protect civilian populations is ultimately of such

seminal significance to the proper functioning of the international

system. Accordingly, it must be made clear that a foreign involvement

in Syria would indeed only be undertaken if all other means of

coercive diplomacy have wholly failed.47 Above all, they must

persuade political decision-makers that a potential regime change in

Syria is not being pursued primarily for increasing western influence

in the region,48 but that it would over the long run inure to the

benefit of the entire international community instead.

Starting from that premise, subsequent debates must centre in

particular on the modern definition of state sovereignty and on

whether the Assad regime actually still has a legitimate claim to that

pivotal institution. In the context of R2P, views on and respect for

national sovereignty will therefore assume an indeed preeminent

significance, notably as that concept is after all central to the main

tenets and suppositions underlying it.49 This is especially true for the

third pillar of R2P according to which foreign powers have a

responsibility to interfere if local governments are themselves the

primary source of violence and aggression.50 In that event, the latter's

excessive use of force is basically held to nullify their arrogated right

of exercising absolute sovereignty, so that an external intervention

would consequently no longer constitute an assault on national

sovereignty itself, but rather form part of an international attempt to

47

Withdrawal of existing diplomatic support, termination of trade relationships, economic sanctions,

etc.. See Coady, pp. 28-29, and in particular Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991). 48

Holly Yan, "Syria allies: Why Russia, Iran and China are standing by the regime", CNN, 30 August 2013. http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/29/world/meast/syria-iran-china-russia-supporters/ [accessed 22 May 2014]. 49

Bellamy, pp. 19-66. 50

Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocities Once and For All (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), p. 105.

13

return it to the very people currently suffering under those acting in

its name.51

Accordingly, R2P is firmly grounded in the belief that a state's

autonomy should not be construed as an end in itself, but rather "as

a means for realizing the basic human rights of individuals living

within the boundaries of sovereign states.52 It is that very rationale

which also informs Kofi Annan's reasoning on the two concepts of

sovereignty, meaning that instead of individual persons being merely

considered subjects of their states, it is the latter which instead ought

to serve the needs of its people, so that any international norms first

need to ensure the well-being of individual human beings as opposed

to protecting those who abuse them.53 From this point of view, an

outside interference would therefore only amount to an intrusion on

states' internal sovereignty for failure to guarantee their citizens basic

human rights, and thus not necessarily to an infringement of their

external sovereignty towards other nations as well.54 It is only when

governing authorities are unfit to assure their people's safety and

well-being that foreign interference becomes permissible according to

R2P,55 given that it does after all not seek to weaken a state's over-all

autonomy and territorial integrity, but only to rectify "the relationship

between the government and the governed and the way the internal

aspect of sovereignty is constructed."56 In such cases, a foreign

intervention may therefore be the only way for not only providing vital

goods and services to native populations,57 but for likewise restoring

the internal aspect of their national sovereignty in the process.58

51

Kardaş, p.35; Ban Ki-moon, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (A/63/677) (New York: United Nations, 2009), pp. 7-8. http://www.unrol.org/files/SG_reportA_63_677_en.pdf [accessed 22 May 2014]. 52

Kardaş, p. 31. 53

Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty", The Economist, 16 September 1999. http://www.economist.com/node/324795 [accessed 27 May 2014]. 54

Kardaş, pp. 31-32. 55

Paragraph 139 of United Nations World Summit Outcome Document 2005, op. cit. 56

Kardaş, p. 32. 57

Ayoob, p. 97. 58

Ban Ki-moon, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, pp. 7-8.

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It is precisely such inability of the Syrian government to afford

its people elementary freedoms and acceptable socioeconomic

conditions which has virtually forfeited all by itself any pretensions of

the Assad regime to further represent the interests of the Syrian

state.59 Yet its blatant dereliction of the duties vis-à-vis its own

citizens ultimately warrants foreign involvement not only for the sake

of reinforcing Syria's internal sovereignty. For since the country's

descent into civil war also stands to lastingly affect its relations with

other political entities, there exists an even greater need to consider

the erosion of its internal sovereignty also in light of the growing

threats which that development could before long spell for the

international community as well. More concretely, Syria is a supreme

example of the fact that civilian strife may not only be a danger to the

peace and stability of the concerned states themselves, but ultimately

also to those of other trans-regional actors and/or the international

order on the whole.60 As Glennon observes, it is simply no longer in

keeping with the realities of modern-day international relations to

hold on to the assumption "that the core threat to international

security still comes from interstate violence."61 Hence it is critical that

political leaders recognize that the forces which could severely

undermine the viability and efficiency of the international order may

nowadays just as easily originate from intra-state violence as they

once did from cross-border confrontations.62

Above all where sovereign authorities are unwilling to

peacefully resolve internal problems, foreign interventions may

59

See Human Rights Watch World Report 2010 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010), p. 555; Amnesty International Report 2009: Syria. http://report2009.amnesty.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/syria [accessed 23 May 2014]; Suzanne Saleeby, "Sowing the Seeds of Dissent: Economic Grievances and the Syrian Social Contract's Unravelling", Jadaliyya, 16 February 2012. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4383/sowing-the-seeds-of-dissent_economic-grievances-an [accessed 23 May 2014]. 60

See Stanley Hoffmann, "Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention", in: The Ethics and

Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), pp. 28–29. 61

Michael J. Glennon, "The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78:3 (May/June 1999), p.2. 62

Glennon, pp. 3-5.

15

ultimately not only be required, but arguably even legitimate for

eliminating any threats emanating from within that state to the peace

and security of the wider international community.63 As Bull has

remarked, the norm of non-interference may after all not always

reflect the realities of the time, so that it should accordingly be

subject to at least some degree of modification in order to better meet

the requirements of the situation in question.64 Similarly, Hoffman

further notes that there may well be "cases in which the effects of

non-intervention might be worse than those of intervention",65 so that

continued reluctance to act against those responsible for intra-state

violence could ultimately rather harm than protect international

peace and stability.

Since the Syrian crisis arguably constitutes such a threat to

international peace and security, a more assertive role of foreign

powers in that conflict may indeed be indispensable for keeping its

inimical, trans-national implications at bay. Those in favour of

outside interference must therefore make every effort to persuade

other nations that an intervention would accordingly not only serve

national self-interest, but that failure to do so could eventually entail

even greater risks to the over-all peace and stability of the

international community.66 By re-shifting attention from chemical

weapons and moral imperatives to such dangers, western countries

in particular need to convince other nations that an intervention

would thus ultimately protect common strategic interests as well,

notably through avoiding a potentially disastrous state failure, stifling

the spread of transnational terrorism and, arguably just as

importantly, disavowing the perversive notion of unpunished state

aggression in the 21st century.

63

Schnabel, "Humanitarian Intervention", p. 27; Abiew, "Assessing Humanitarian Intervention", p. 62. 64

Hedley Bull, Intervention in World Politics, p. 187. 65

Hoffmann, "Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention", p. 20. 66

Glennon, pp. 4-5.

16

Humanitarian intervention as part of geostrategic concerns

The causal links between civil wars, failed states and

international terrorism have been explored at length,67 yet in public

discourses on Syria they still do not receive such consideration as

they deserve. However, the potential risks to international peace and

security by not appropriately reacting to such humanitarian crises

are indeed manifold as the chaos in that country clearly shows. In

particular, the destruction in Syria not only places tremendous

logistic, political and socioeconomic burdens on neighbouring

countries in the wake of mass refugee movements, but it has

moreover also sparked a renewed process of radicalization and

secessionist activities in several other populations.68 Above all,

however, it has simultaneously strengthened terrorist organizations

on a domestic and transnational level, with the result that their

operations will in all likelihood not remain confined to merely Syria

itself.69 The very fact that Syrian extremists have already established

connections with terrorist networks in Iraq is after all a clear

indication of the threat that the Syrian conflict ultimately poses to

both local and regional stabilities, notably by aiding terrorists reignite

civil wars in equally unstable territories.70

Accordingly, it is imperative to re-focus attention on these

highly relevant issues, notably since international peace and security

and, by extension, the question of foreign interference are inextricably

67

Ken Menkhaus, "Quasi-States, Nation-Building, and Terrorist Safe Havens", Journal of Conflict

Studies, Vol. 23:2 (Fall 2003), pp. 7–23; Stewart Patrick, "Failed States and Global Security: Empirical

Questions and Policy Dilemmas", International Studies Review, Vol. 9:4 (Winter 2007), pp. 644-662;

Robert I. Rodberg, State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington, D.C.: Brookings

Institution Press, 2003).

68 Kenneth M. Pollack and Ray Takeyh, "Near Eastern Promises. Why Washington Should Focus on

the Middle East", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93:3 (May/June 2014), pp. 96-99. 69

Andrew J. Tabler, "Syria's Collapse. And How Washington Can Stop It", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92:4 (July/August 2013), pp. 90-91. 70

Pollack and Takeyh, p. 96, 99; "Syrian War Worsens Lebanon’s Malaise", IISS Strategic Comments,

Vol. 19:25 (September 2013) (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2013). http://www.iiss.org/-/media/Silos/Strategic%20comments/2013/Syrian-war-worsens-Lebanon--39-s-malaise/Syrian-war-worsens-Lebanon--39-s-malaise.pdf [accessed May 26 2014].

17

related to them. In that context, non-interventionists first need to

critically re-evaluate their view that non-interference in states'

internal activities invariably makes for a guarantor of international

peace and stability,71 and finally embrace the possibility that intra-

state confrontations may just as likely disrupt the operations of the

international system as cross-border combat might. With this mind,

any prospects for reaching an international consensus on Syria will

essentially boil down to the normative interpretation of 'national

sovereignty', i.e. whether sovereignty should solely be seen as a

vested right of individual nation-states, or rather as an obligation of

acting governments to not only ensure their own population's well-

being and security, but ultimately also those of the wider

international community.72

After all, a state may not only harm other countries through

offensive military operations against their immediate territorial

integrity; instead it might also endanger them by a repressive

handling of its own internal problems. In Syria, Assad's brutal

crackdown against his own people thus precipitated a situation that

could easily jeopardize other nations' security as well-not through

any direct external aggression, but rather through governmental

negligence to likewise meet the Syrian state' responsibilities towards

other nations, notably by maintaining such societal peace and

stability within as is necessary for prohibiting the rise and spread of

any homegrown forces that might before long develop into an

imminent threat to the latter's safety as well. 73 Hence it is a

fundamentally mistaken view to believe the Assad regime capable of

bolstering regional stability when continued support for it does in fact

71 Chu Shulong, "China, Asia and Issues of Sovereignty and Intervention", Pugwash Occasional

Papers, Vol. 2:1 (January 2001). http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/como_china.htm [accessed 23 May 2014]. 72

Ayoob, p. 84. 73

Richard Outzen, "The Flawed Strategic Debate on Syria", INSS CSR Strategic Forum No. 285, January 2014 (Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2014), pp. 1-12. http://inss.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/SF-285.pdf [accessed 26 May 2014].

18

nothing but only further prejudice the chances for sustained peace

and security.

In that regard, Russian and Chinese understanding of the

Assad regime as a reliable actor against trans-national terrorism is

essentially confusing cause for effect.74 More specifically, what now

appears a country riven by multiple terrorist networks was, at least

initially, not an instance of religiously motivated terrorism.75 Instead

popular opposition to the Assad regime was clearly national rather

than ideological in nature, with Islamic extremists only subsequently

joining in.76 Yet by continuing to back a repressive regime while

simultaneously ignoring those suffering under it, such an approach is

arguably more likely to spur rather than to contain or eliminate

regional terrorism.77 Consequently, it is crucial to no longer see

Assad's actions as a self-proclaimed attempt to crush international

terrorism,78 but rather as the root cause for helping it gain a foothold

in an already volatile region in the first place.

In so doing, even the Syrian governments' staunchest allies

should realize that Assad is ultimately anything but a safeguard

against international terrorism. Quite to the contrary, Assad has

allowed a situation to arise in which terrorist elements have found

fertile breeding grounds for eventually waging their ideological war

against other countries as well.79 If government malpractices can

74

See Vladimir V. Putin, "A Plea for Caution From Russia", The New York Times, 11 September 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html?_r=0 [accessed 22 May 2014]. 75

On 'new terrorism', i.e. networked terrorist groups supposedly driven by religious rather than by

political objectives, see in particular Michael Stohl, "Myths, new fantasies and the enduring realities of terrorism", Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 1:1 (2008), pp. 5-16; and David Tucker, "What's New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It", Terrorism and Political Violence 13 (Autumn 2011), pp. 1-14. 76

Tabler, p. 98. 77

Simon Tisdall, "Forget Ukraine, Syria is now the world's biggest threat", CNN, 3 April 2014.

http://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/03/opinion/syria-refugees-tisdall/index.html?hpt=hp_c1 [accessed 27 May 2014]. 78

"Syria's Assad determined to 'eradicate terrorism'", The Voice of Russia, 18 August 2013. http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_08_18/Syrias-Assad-determined-to-eradicate-terrorism-army-killed-jihadist-leader-5766/ [accessed 23 May 2014]. 79

Brian Michael Jenkins, The Role of Terrorism and Terror in Syria's Civilian War (The Rand Corporation, November 2013).

19

therefore generate such a potential threat to the safety of others, one

needs to seriously reconsider arguments as to the inviolability of its

national sovereignty, notably since the risk of transnational terrorism

will arguably grow only further by not engaging it in due course in

those areas where it stands to gain most in strength80in particular

by permitting governments to indiscriminately murder large parts of

their own people.

The recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq should after all

serve as a warning example of how easily terrorist groups may exploit

local grievances for their own ends.81 In the process, these conflicts

turned into what Alexis Debat fittingly called "a public relations

windfall for their ideologues, a training ground for their 'rookies,' and

even a safe-haven for their leadership."82 In Iraq, it was American

unilateralism which resulted in a dangerous security vacuum that

allowed Al-Qaeda to take advantage of civil unrest83 and expand its

network of regional affiliates.84 However, a similar such strengthening

of Al-Qaeda may ultimately also occur by allowing it to thrive

unchecked in equally contested areas such as presently in Syria.85

In light of this, transnational terrorism therefore not only poses

an acute threat to western civilization, but to the wider international

community as well. After all there does already exist some evidence

that indifference to oppressive governments murdering innocent

Muslims has had some repercussions on non-western countries

too.86 At the very least, terrorist activities aimed against the proper

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT402/RAND_CT402.pdf [accessed 22 May 2014]. 80

Marc Sageman, "A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists", Annals of the American

Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 618 (July 2008), p. 229. 81

Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth Pollack, "Iraq's Long-Term Impact on Jihadist Terrorism", Annals of

the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 618 (July 2008), p. 58. 82

Alexis Debat, "Vivisecting the jihad", The National Interest, Vol.76 (Summer 2004), p. 22. 83

Byman and Pollack, pp. 62-63. 84

Reid Sawyer and Michael Foster, "The Resurgent and Persistent Threat of Al Qaeda", Annals of the

American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 618 (July 2008), p. 200. 85

Tabler, pp. 90-92. 86

See, for instance, the recent repeated outbreaks of violence in China's western province Xinjiang that have been traced back to Syrian extremists by Chinese authorities. Sui-Lee Wee, Michael Martina, Li Hui and Nick Macfie, "China state media blame Syrian rebels for Xinjiang violence",

20

functioning of the international system might before long also

impinge upon their own national well-being, if only because the very

norms and institutions which Islamic extremism seeks to undermine

do after all in no small measure account for the over-all prosperity of

non-western societies as well. Hence it is in the best interests of the

entire international community to end human suffering in Syria

before it will only further contribute to the cause of jihadist terrorism

by providing it with the very assets and environments needed for

eventually turning its energies against other countries as well.

im Unterschied

Conclusion

Thus rather than detaching R2P from strategic concerns as some

have argued,87 it actually needs to be more systematically linked to

them instead.

Foreign intervention under the auspices of the UN Security Council

preferable, however if the Syrian conflict poses a threat to the

international system and thus by extension to the security and well-

being of its constituent members states as well, then the latter

ultimately ought to have the right to protect themselves from such a

danger even without the assent of other major powers.

If Russia and China, who rightfully (by every right) ought to be

treated by western countries as equal and legitimate partners in the

Reuters, 1 July 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/01/us-china-xinjiang-idUSBRE96005I20130701 [accessed 28 May 2014]; Michael Martina, "China state media says five suicide bombers carried out Xinjiang attack", Reuters, 23 May 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/23/us-china-blast-idUSBREA4L01K20140523 [accessed 28 May 2014]. 87

Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein, "R2P After Syria: To Save the Doctrine, Forget Regime Change", Foreign Affairs, 26 March 2013. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139080/jon-western-and-joshua-s-goldstein/r2p-after-syria [accessed 22 May 2014].

21

workings of the established international system, truly desire to

maintain and preserve the basic structures and operations of that

order by which their own people and economies after all benefit as

well, then they too will before long have to realize and acknowledge

that in modern-day world politics, threats to the long-term security

and stability of that order can ultimately just as well arise from intra-

state rather than only from inter-state conflict and that, as a result,

the notion of state sovereignty needs to be reassessed and re-adapted

accordingly in order to better (more efficiently) meet the dangers and

adverse effects potentially emanating from such a reality.

The need for ending humanitarian suffering at the hand of oppressive

regimes is not merely borne out of some overly idealistic thinking or

morality; rather it forms part of the very essence of geo-political

realities in the 21st century. If political leaders therefore truly wish to

preserve the stability and peace of the present international system,

they will before long have to accept the fact that a responsibility to

protect innocent civilians in war-torn countries does ultimately not

only exist on purely ethical grounds, but essentially also for distinctly

strategic reasons in relation to their own long-term national security

and prosperity as well.

It may at the present time arguably prove impossible to enshrine the

responsibility to protect innocent populations as a universal norm in

international law, so that although moral conscience may demand it,

violations of human rights can ultimately not in all cases be entirely

prevented or adequately addressed by the international community. A

more systematic relation of humanitarian concerns to common

strategic interests will in that context certainly not serve as an ideal

solution either, yet it may at least help to relieve part of the suffering

in those regions where otherwise no action at all would likely have

been taken to actively resolve such humanitarian crises.

22

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