LGU Creation, Power, Attributes Digests

8/12/2019 LGU Creation, Power, Attributes Digests

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lgu-creation-power-attributes-digests 1/21

PELAEZ V. AUDITOR GENERAL, 15 SCRA 390 (1965)

FACTS: In 1964, President Marcos issued EOs creating 33 municipalities pursuant to the Sec 68

of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President may by EO define the

boundary, or boundaries of any province, sub-province, municipality, municipal district or

other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein

1. VP Pelaez filed a special civil action to prohibit the Auditor General from disbursing

funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Petitioner alleged that the EOswere null and void on the ground that Sec 68 has been impliedly repealed by RA

2370 and such constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power

2. Sec 3 of RA 2370 provides that barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered

nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by act of

Congress. Petitioner argued that if under RA 2370, the president cannot create a

barrio, by analogy he cannot create a municipality since a municipality is composed

of several barrios

3. In its defense, respondent alleged that only barrios are barred from being created by

the president. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be

created without creating new barrios

ISSUE: WON the Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President byvirtue of Sec 68 RAC

HELD: No. It is well-settled that the authority to create new municipal corporations is

essentially legislative in nature. Although the Congress may delegate to another branch of

the government the power to fill in the details of the execution, enforcement or

administration of law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of

powers, that said law:

(a) Be complete in itself – it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out

or implemented by the delegate; and

(b) Fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to

which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

Without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate

such policy, which is the essence of every law; and without the aforementioned standard,

there could be no means to determine with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has

acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon

himself the power, not only to make the law, but also to unmake it, by adopting

measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus

nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and

consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.



JIMENEZ V. BAZ, 265 SCRA 182 (1996)

FACTS: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO 258 by then President Quirino

pursuant to Sec 68 RAC.

1. By virtue of a Municipal Resolution, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of Barrio Tabo-o

and Barrios Macabayo, Adrorable, Sinara, Baja and Sinara Alto based on the

technical description EO 258. The claim was filed with the provincial board of MisamisOccidental against the Municipality of Jimenez

2. While contending that the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, the Municipality of

Jimenez, in its answer, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement

it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement, which was approved by

the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental, fixed the common boundary of

Sinacaban and Jimenez

3. On October 11, 1989, the Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of

Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving the agreement between

the parties was void since the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of

Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258, that power being vested in Congress pursuant to the

Constitution and LGC of 1983 (BP 337), Sec 134.

4.

On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamusin the RTC of Oroquieta City against Sinacaban, Province of Misamis Occidental and

its Provincial Board, COA, DILG, DBM and Executive Secretary

5. The trial court held that Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it had completely

organized itself even prior to the Pelaez case and exercised corporate powers for 40

years before its existence was questioned

ISSUE: WON Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim

HELD: No. The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a

municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General that the creation

of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was

without power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. However, wherea municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts

are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned.

A municipality has been conferred the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation

where its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.

A quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced

within 5 years from the act complained of was done/committed. Sinacaban has been in

existence for 16 years, yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned .

Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only

because it had laid claim to an area that is apparently desired for its revenue. The State and

even the Municipality of Jimenez itself has recognized Sinacaban’s corporate existence.Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of MTCs

in the country. Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an

agreement with it regarding their common boundary.

The Municipality of Sinacaban attained a de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance

appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country,

which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Sec.

442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in

the creation of Sinacaban since it states that:

―Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and

operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Municipal_corporation

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Philippines

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Philippines

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Municipal_corporation



executive orders and which have their respective set of municipal officials holding office at

the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be regular municipalities.‖

ISSUE: WON RA 7160, Sec 442(d) is valid despite not conforming to the constitutional and

statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscite in the creation of new municipalities

HELD: Yes. Sinacaban is not subject to the plebiscite requirement since it attained defacto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. The plebiscite requirement for the

creation of municipalities applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under

the Constitution – it cannot be applied to municipalities created before.

ISSUE: WON the boundary provided for in EO 258 or in the Provincial Resolution should be

used as basis for adjudicating Sinacaban’s territorial claim

HELD: EO 258. E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now

barangays) therein mentioned. What it says is that ―Sinacaban contains‖ those barrios. The

reason for this is that the technical description, containing the metes and bounds of a

municipality’s territory, is controlling. The trial court correctly ordered a relocation survey as

the only means of determining the boundaries of the municipality & consequently to whichmunicipality the barangays in question belong.

Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality

is not the carrying into effect of the law but its amendment – and a resolution of a provincial

Board declaring certain barrios part of one or another municipality that is contrary to the

technical description of the territory of the municipality is not binding. If Resolution No. 77 of

the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the technical description of the

territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as basis for opposing S inacaban’s

claim.

In case no settlement of boundary disputes is made, the dispute should be elevated to the

RTC of the province (Sec. 79, LGC of 1983). Jimenez properly brought to the RTC for reviewthe Decision and Resolution of the Provincial Board. This was in accordance with the LGC of

1983, the governing law when the action was brought by Jimenez in 1989. The governing law

now is Secs. 118-119, LGC of 1991 (RA 7160).

Jimenez’s contention that the RTC failed to decide the case ―within 1 year from the start of

the proceedings‖ as required by Sec. 79 of the LGC of 1983 and the 90-day period provided

for in Art VIII, Sec15 of the Constitution does not affect the validity of the decision

rendered. Failure of a court to decide within the period prescribed by law does not divest it

of its jurisdiction to decide the case but only makes the judge thereof liable for possible

administrative sanction.



SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI V. COMELEC, 334 SCRA 379 (2000)

FACTS: In 1997, a petition for annulment of several precincts and annulment of book of voters

in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, including Padian Torogan, was filed with the COMELEC byprivate respondents

1. COMELEC, then, sent telegrams to the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of the

questioned precincts to file their answer to the petition

2. The incumbent of mayor of Madalum, petitioner Usman Sarangani opposed the

petition alleging that the abolition of the questioned precincts were for the purpose

of diminishing the bailiwicks of the incumbent mayor of Madalum.

3. COMELEC conducted an ocular inspection on the alleged ghost precincts and found

that the area had only 2 structures which were obviously uninhabited.

4. As such, COMELEC declared Padian Torogan as ghost precinct and shall be

excluded from the special election to be conducted in Madalum

ISSUE: WON respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct

HELD: No. It is a time-honored precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its

own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, more so,

in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same .COMELEC exerted

efforts to investigate the facts and verified that there were no public or private buildings in

the said place, hence its conclusion that there were no inhabitants. If there were no

inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be no registered voters, or the registered voters may have

left the place. It is not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants

considering that people migrate. A barangay may officially exist on record and the fact that

nobody resides in the place does not result in its automatic cessation as a unit of local

government. Under the LGC of 1991, the abolition of a local government unit may be doneby Congress in the case of a province, city or municipality, or any other political subdivision.

In the case of a barangay, except in the Metropolitan Manila area and in cultural

communities, it may be done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang

Panlungsod concerned subject to the mandatory requirement of a plebiscite conducted for

the purpose of political units affected.



ALVAREZ V. GUINGONA 252 SCRA 695 (1996)

FACTS: In April 1993, HB 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into anIndependent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the HOR.

1. In May 1993, a Senate bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817

was introduced in the Senate.

2. In January 1994, the HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the

Senate conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate

Committee on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB

8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA

7720).

3. Now Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that

the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that the Santiago

was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to

be a city. That in the computation of the reported average income of P20,974,581.97included the IRA which should not be.

ISSUE: WON RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.

HELD: No. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows. Further, the

Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB was on its 1 st, 2nd and

3rd reading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its 1 st hearing on the said SB one month

after the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well).

ISSUE: WON the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) should be included in the computation of

an LGU’s income.

HELD: Yes. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGU’s average annual income

as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the

gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and

automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of

the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government can

invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.

To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the

same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its

own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special

funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of ―funding support from the national

government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations.



LEAGUE OF THE CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COMELEC, 571 SCRA 263 (2008)FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the

COMELEC and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the

Cityhood laws

1. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 which took effect on

June 30, 2001. RA 9009 amended Sec 450 LGC by increasing the annual income

requirement for conversion of a municipality to a city from P20 million to P100 million

to prevent the ―mad rush‖ of municipalities to convert to cities solely to secure a

larger share in the IRA despite the fact they are incapable of fiscal independence

2. During the 13th Congress, 16 municipalities filed individual cityhood bills. The Cityhood

bills contained a common provision exempting all 16 municipalities from the P100

million requirement in RA 9009

3.

The HOR subsequently approved the cityhood bills. The bills lapsed into law in 2007without the President’s signature

4. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the

voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their

municipality to a city

5. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for

violation of Art X, Sec 10 of the Constitution as well as for violation of equal protection

clause. Petitioners also argued that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into

cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the IRA because more cities will share

the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Sec 285 LGC

ISSUE: WON the Cityhood Laws violate Art X, Sec 10 of the Constitution

HELD: Yes.

1. Applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a

prospective application because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the Cityhood bills

became laws more than 5 years later

2. The Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation

of a city in the LGC and not in any other law, including the Cityhood laws – The

criteria prescribed in the LGC govern exclusively the creation of a city. The clear

intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units

must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the LGC.

RA 9009 amended Sec 450 LGC to increase the income requirement from P20 million

to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect in June 2001. Hence, from

that moment the LGC required that any municipality desiring to become a city must

satisfy the P100 million income requirement.

3. The Cityhood Laws violate Art X, Sec 6 of the Constitution because they prevent a fair

and just distribution of the national taxes to LGUs

4. The criteria prescribed in Sec 450 LGC as amended by RA 9009 are plain and

unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction -- It does not provide

any exemption from the increased income requirement



5. Even if the Cityhood laws were written in Sec 450 LGC, the exemption would be

unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause

MARIANO JR. V. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 213

FACTS: Two petitions were filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting the

Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as

unconstitutional.

1. Sec 52 RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of

Makati by special law in violation of Art VI Sec 5(4) requiring the general

reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3 years following the return of

every census

2. Also, the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord within Art VI

Sec5(3) of the Constitution for as of the 1990, census, the population of Makati stands

at only 450,000

ISSUE: WON the additional of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional

HELD: No. Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such

as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be

composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the

Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,

other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in

enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative district. Moreover, to

hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a

review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would

create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be

denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerablesituations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.

Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in

accord with Art VI, Sec 5(3) of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census of the population of

Makati stands only at 450,000. Said section provides that a city with a population of at least

250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati

as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has

met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.



AQUINO III V. COMELEC

FACTS: The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and

Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared as

unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled ―An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st)

and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating

a New Legislative District from such Reappor tionment.‖

1. Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President

Macapagal-Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and

apportioned districts shall form additional district where the new first district shall be

composed of 176,383 population count.

2. Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional

standard with a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of alegislative district under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

3. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners that if population is less than that

provided by the Constitution, it must be stricken-down for non-compliance with the

minimum population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.

4. Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical

effects: first, error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and

Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no locus

standi to question the constitutionality of R.A. 9716.

5. Respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue

that a plain and simple reading of the questioned provision will show that the same

has no application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces.

Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of alegislative district in a city

ISSUE: WON a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the

creation of a new legislative district in a province

HELD: No. It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction

between a city and a province was explained under the second sentence of Section 5 (3)

of the Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a representative, with nothing was

mentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum population of 250,000 must first be

satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled to two

additional districts from the present of four.

There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the additional district within a city,

should be applied to the additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative

district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in

order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province,

considering that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and

regardless of its population.

Moreover, Sec 461 LGC provides that the requirement of population is not an indispensable

requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.



CITY OF MANILA V. IAC, 179 SCRA 428 (1989)

FACTS: Vivencio Sto. Domingo was buried on June 6, 1971 in Lot 159 Block 194 of the North

Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to private respondent Sto. Domingo from June 6,

1971 to June 6, 2021

1. Apart from the receipt, no other document was executed to embody such lease

over the burial lot in question.

2. In 1975, the Mayor of Manila prescribed uniform procedure and guidelines in the

processing of documents pertaining to and for the use and disposition of burial lots

and plots within North Cemetery. Based on such, the subject burial lot was leased to

private respondent for 5 years only; subject lot was certified in January 1978 as ready

for exhumation

3.

As such, the remains of Vivencio were exhumed and removed from the burial lot andkept in the depositary of the cemetery.

4. Subsequently, the same lot was rented out to another lessee so that when the private

respondents went to said lot, the resting place of their departed did not bear the

stone marker placed on the tomb

5. As such, Sto. Domingo filed an action for damages against the City of Manila

6. Petitioners alleged that North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use. Since

the city is a political subdivision in the performance of its governmental function, it is

immune from tort liability which may be caused by its public officers or employees

7. On the other hand, private respondents contended that the City of Manila entered

into a contract of lease which involve the exercise of proprietary functions with

private respondent. As such, the city and its officers can be sued for any violation of

the contract of lease

ISSUE: WON the operations and functions of a public cemetery are governmental or

proprietary

HELD: Proprietary. The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with

the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in

conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. it may sue and be sued, and contract

and be contracted with. Its powers are two fold in character: (1) governmental or political:

and (2) corporate, proprietary and corporate.

Governmental powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the State and

promoting public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political.Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of

the community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate. In

connection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it may acquire property in its public

or governmental capacity, and private or proprietary capacity.

It is well-settled that with respect to proprietary functions, the rule is that a municipal

corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu.

CAB: The North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila which was created

by a resolution of the Municipal Board. The administration and government of the cemetery

are under the City Health Officer, the order and police of the cemetery, the opening of the

graves, niches or tombs, the exhuming of human remains are under the charge andresponsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. With the acts of dominion, there is no



doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in

its proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was

leased in favor of private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the

force of law between the contracting parties. Therefore, a beach of contractual provision

entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the

contract.

BAYAN V. ERMITA, 488 SCRA 226 (2006)

FACTS: Petitioners assail some provisions of BP 880, as well as the policy of Calibrated

Preemptive Response (CPR). They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the ―no

permit, no rally‖ policy and the CPR policy recently announced

1. In the height of protests and rallies, the Executive Secretary released a statement

instructing the PNP and LGUs to strictly enforce a ―no permit, no rally‖ policy and

disperse groups that violate this standard and arrest all persons violating the laws of

the land and ordinances on proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations

2. Petitioners alleged that BP 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public

assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It

also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expressionclause

3. Respondent Mayor Lito Atienza contended that the petition should be dismissed on

the ground that RA 7160 gives the mayor power to deny a permit independently of

BP 880, and that his denials were under the clear and present danger rule as there

was a clamor to stop rallies that disrupt the economy and to protect the lives of other

people

ISSUE: WON the mayor may deny the issuance of a permit to conduct a protest or rally

HELD: Yes. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety

and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as

inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good orderupon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most

familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of

highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all,

it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other

circumstances would be entitled to protection.

As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient

standard —the clear and present danger test stated in Sec 6(a). The reference to ―imminent

and grave danger of a substantive evil‖ in Sec 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is

not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent mayor has the same power

independently under RA 7160 is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and was

not pursued by the parties in their arguments.



BINAY V. DOMINGO, 201 SCRA 508 (1991)

FACTS: IN 1988, the Municipality of Makati approved Resolution No. 60 which confirmed the

ongoing burial assistance program by the Office of the Mayor. Qualified beneficiaries, under

the Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved families of Makati whose gross family income

does not exceed P2,000 a month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other requirements,

would receive P500 cash relief from the Municipality of Makati

1. Pursuant to the resolution, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement fund of

P400,000 for the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program

2.

The resolution was then referred to COA for its allowance in audit. However, COAdisapproved the resolution and disallowed in audit the disbursement of the funds for

the implementation thereof

ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power

under the general welfare clause

HELD: Yes. Police power is inherent in the State but not in municipal corporations. Before a

municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such

power by the legislature which is the repository of inherent powers of the State. A valid

delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere

fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipalcorporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation

which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes

conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do

things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people.

Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies, must have such measures

of the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their governmental functions. The

power is a continuing one, founded on public necessity.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant

thereto they are clothed with authority to enact such ordinances and issue regulations as

may be necessary and proper to provide for health, safety, comfort and convenience,

maintain peace and order, improve public morals etc. Under Sec 7 of BP 337 (Old LGC),every LGU shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom,

as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and

safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the LGU, and

preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited

number of persons. The drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies

to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as

well as human dignity and respect for human rights.



BALACUIT V. CFI, 163 SCRA 182 (1988)

FACTS: The Municipality of Butuan City passed an ordinance, which penalizes any person/s

who charges full price for a movie ticket for children between ages 7 and 12

1. Petitioners, who are managers of theaters in Butuan City, challenged the

constitutionality of the ordinance

2. Petitioners argued that the ordinance is void for being ultra vires and an invalid

exercise of police power

3. Respondent City of Butuan, on the other hand, argued for its validity on the ground of

the general welfare clause

ISSUE: WON the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power

HELD: No. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such

regulation must come within the bounds of reason, i.e. the regulatory ordinance must be

reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference

with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under

the guise of regulation, be reasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power.

A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business

should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property

rights. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own

way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that anyperson who did not approve should stay away.

The exercise of police power by the LGU is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of

the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable,

oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of a common right.

The ordinance in question clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for

even assuming that the interference is reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it was

fully shown that it was an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and

personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and undue restraint of trade, it cannot,

under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.



ESTATE OF FRANSCISCO V. CA, 199 SCRA 595 (1991)

FACTS: Francisco owned a Quonset building on a lot owned by the Philippine Ports Authority.

In January 1989, the spouse of Francisco was issued by a permit by PPA to occupy the lot

where the building stood for a period of 1 year. Francisco’s spouse was using the Quonset as

a storage for copra

1. Subsequently, the respondent mayor notified Tan Gin San (Francisco’s spouse) to

remove or relocate the Quonset building as part of the cleanup campaign of the

municipality

2.

Since petitioner refused to comply, respondent mayor ordered the demolition ofstructure

3. As such, petitioner filed an action for damages against respondent mayor. The trial

court held in favor of the respondent mayor

4. On appeal, CA reversed the same ruling that the Mayor was not vested with power

to order summarily and without any judicial proceeding, the demolition of the

Quonset building which was not a nuisance per se

5. Respondent argued that demolition was in the exercise of police power and for

reasons of health, safety and general welfare

ISSUE: WON respondent Mayor could summarily, without judicial process, order the

demolition of petitioner’s Quonset building

HELD: No. Respondents cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the

abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to nuisance per se

or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily

abated under the undefined law of necessity. The storage of copra in the Quonset is a

legitimate business. By its nature, it cannot be said to injurious to the rights of property, of

health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens, it may be proven so

in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not a nuisance per se warranting its summary

abatement without judicial intervention.

While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance, it cannot

declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The nuisance

can only be so adjudged by judicial determination.



CABRERA V. CA, 195 SCRA 314 (1991)

FACTS: The Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted a resolution to close off the old road

leading to the new Capitol Building and to give to the owners of the properties traversed by

the new road equal area

1. Pursuant to said resolution, Deeds of Exchange were executed by the Province of

Catanduanes to private respondents (owners of the properties traversed by the new

road). Portions of the closed road were given in exchange for their own adjacent

properties

2.

Petitioner filed a complaint to restore the closed road, alleging that the Deeds ofExchange were invalid

3. The trial court held in favor of the private respondent holding that the land in question

was not a declared public road but a mere passageway

4. Petitioner insists that Sec 2246 RAC is not applicable because the resolution is not an

order for the closure of the road in question but an authority to exchange it with

private properties. Since the public road was owned by the province in its

governmental capacity, it could not be the subject of a barter

ISSUE: WON the resolution closing the old road is valid

HELD: Yes. The authority of the provincial board to close that road and use or convey it for

other purposes is derived from RA 5185 in relation to Sec 2246 RAC. In the case of CebuOxygen & Acetylene Co v. Bercilles, the Court held that the closure of a city street is within

the powers of the city council. It sustained the subsequent sale of the land as being in

accordance not only with the charter but also with Art 422 NCC which provides that

―property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use, shall form part of the

patrimonial property of the State.‖

While it is true that the above cases dealt with city councils and not the provincial board,

there is no reason for applying the doctrine announced therein to the provincial board in

connection with the closure of provincial roads. The provincial board has the duty of

maintaining such roads for the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the province.

Moreover, this authority can be inferred from the grant by the national legislature of the

funds to the Province of Catanduanes for the construction of provincial roads.

The general rule is that one whose property does not abut on the closed section of a street

has no right to compensation for the closing or vacation of the street, if he still has

reasonable access to the general system of streets. But to warrant recovery in any such case

the property owner must show that the situation is such that he has sustained special

damages differing in kind, and not merely in degree, from those sustained by the public

generally.



DACANAY V. ASISTIO, 208 SCRA 404 (1992)

FACTS: An ordinance was enacted by the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) designating

certain city and municipal streets, roads and open sites for flea markets.

1. Pursuant thereto, the Caloocan City Mayor opened up 7 flea markets in that city

2. Subsequently, Marquez as the OIC city Mayor of Caloocan, caused the demolition of

the market stalls in Heroes Del ’96, V. Gozon and Gonzales streets.

3. Private respondents who are leasing stalls in the said flea market, filed an action for

prohibition against the City of Caloocan4. The trial court found that the subject streets are of public dominion, hence outside of

the commerce of man

5. However, the new mayor (Asistio) did not pursue the policy of clearing and cleaning

up the city streets

6. As such, Dacanay, as resident and taxpayer, filed a complaint against Asistio and

Sarne (City Engineer)

ISSUE: May public streets or thoroughfares be leased or licensed to market stallholders by

virtue of a city ordinance or a resolution of the Metro Manila Commission?

HELD: No. There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which private respondents’ market

stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets. A public street is property for public usehence outside the commerce of man. Being outside of the commerce of man, it may not be

the subject of a lease or any other contract.

As stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public

street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them.

Such leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to

use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of the few

should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose health,

peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal

obligation to protect.



PLAZA II V. CASSION, 435 SCRA 294 (2004)

FACTS: Before the passing of LGC of 1991, the task of delivering basic social services was

dispensed by the national government through DSWD.

1. Butuan City, through its Sangguniangn Panlungsod passed a resolution providing for

the devolution of the DSWD to the City of BUtuan

2. Pursuant thereto, the city mayor signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with

DSWD for the latter’s services, personnel, assets and liabilities to be transferred to its

city counterpart3. By virtue of the same MOA, the city mayor (Plaza), issued an executive order

reconstituting the City Social Services Development Office (CSSDO), devolving or

adding thereto 19 national DSWD employees, and placing Tuazon as head of CSSDO

4. The CSSDO was originally headed by respondent Cassion. Because of such

development, respondents refused to recognizes Tuazon as their new head and

report at the DSWD building

5. Because of respondents’ refusal to report at the DSWD building, mayor Plaza issued

an order dropping respondents from the rolls

6. Respondents averred that their refusal to report for work is justified because EO is not

valid as it was issued without the prior approval by the Sanggunian in violation of Art

164, Rule XXII IRR of LGC

ISSUE: WON the city mayor may authorize the devolution of the DSWD without prior approval

of the Sanggunian

HELD: Yes. Sec 17 LGC authorizes the devolution of personnel, assets and liabilities, records of

basic services and facilities of a national government agency to LGUs. Under the LGC,

devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority

upon the various LGUs to perform basic functions and responsibilities.

As a consequence of the devolution of national agencies, EO 503 was enacted which

provides that the local chief executive shall be responsible for all devolved functions.

It is thus clear that petitioner Plaza is empowered to issue the EO in order to give effect to thedevolution decreed by the LGC. As the local chief executive of Butuan City, Plaza has the

authority to reappoint devolved personnel and may designate an employee to take charge

of a department until the appointment of a regular head, as was done by the mayor in this

case.



PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR V. CA, 222 SCRA 173 (1993)

FACTS: In 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur passed a resolution

authorizing the Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial

Capitol site in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural

crops and housing project for provincial government employees

1. Pursuant thereto, the province of Camarines Sur filed 2 separate cases for

expropriation against Ernesto San Joaquin and Efren San Joaquin

2.

San Joaquin moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of priceoffered for their property. They also questioned the validity of the resolution

3. In their answer, the province of Camarines Sur claimed it has the authority to initiate

the expropriation proceedings under Sec 4 and 7 LGC and that the expropriations

were for a public purpose

4. According to OSG, petitioner must first secure the approval of the DAR of the plan to

expropriate the lands of private respondents for use as a housing project

5. Petitioner maintained that its exercise of power of eminent domain cannot be

restricted by the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law

ISSUE: WON the expropriation of agricultural lands by LGUs is subject to the prior approval of

the DAR Secretary as the implementor of the agrarian reform

HELD: No. The Court held that the power of expropriation is superior to the power to distribute

lands under the land reform program. The expropriation of the property authorized by the

questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development

center would directly inure to the benefit and advantage of the people of Camarines Sur.

It is true that LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when

expressly authorized by the legislature. It is also true that in delegating the power to

expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the

exercise thereof by the local governments. While such delegated power may be a limited

authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of delegated

power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other

legislations.

Sec 9 BP 337 (Old LGC) does not intimate in the least that LGUs must first secure the approval

of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-

agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise,

there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the

expropriation of agricultural lands by LGUs to the control of DAR.



CITY OF ILOILO V. LEGASPI, 444 SCRA 269 (2004)

FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Iloilo City enacted an ordinance granting the City

Mayor to institute expropriation proceedings on the lot registered in the name of Manuela

Yusay

1. The Mayor wrote the heirs of Yusay making a formal offer to purchase their property

for the purpose of converting the same as an onsite relocation for the poor and

landless residents of the city in line with the city’s housing program2. The expropriation proceedings were subsequently terminated due to the apparent

refusal of private respondents to sell the property

3. The Mayor then filed a complaint for eminent domain against private respondents

ISSUE: WON the petitioner’s expropriation proceedings can prosper

HELD: Yes. Petitioner has the irrefutable right to exercise its power of eminent domain. It being

a local government unit, the basis for its exercise is granted under Sec 19 RA 7160:

Sec. 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive and

acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or

purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of justcompensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided,

however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and

definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted:

Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the

property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with

the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property

based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally,

That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper

court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

The requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a complaint for

expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalentto fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on

its current tax declaration.31 Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of a writ

of possession becomes ministerial.

CAB: Petitioner avers that the Amended Complaint it filed complies with both requisites, thus

entitling it to a writ of possession as a matter of right and the issuance thereof becoming

ministerial on the part of the lower court even without any hearing. On the other hand,

private respondents allege that the Amended Complaint is not sufficient in form and

substance since it failed to allege compliance with the mandatory requirements for the

exercise of the power of eminent domain for purposes of socialized housing.

Sec 1 of Rule 67 ROC reads: Section 1. The complaint. – The right of eminent domain shall beexercised by the filing of a verified complaint which shall state with certainty the right and

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/nov2004/gr_154614_2004.html#fnt31






purpose of expropriation, describe the real or personal property sought to be expropriated,

and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part hereof

or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest of each defendant. If

the title to any property sought to be expropriated appears to be in the Republic of the

Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or

doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real

owners, averment to that effect shall be made in the complaint.

The Court finds the Amended Complaint sufficient in form and substance, and the amount of

P2,809,696.50 deposited with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo is equivalent 15% of the fair

market value of the property sought to be expropriated per current tax declaration.

BASCO V. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991)

FACTS: PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable to Government to regulate and

centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.

1. Petitioners are questioning the validity of PD 1869. In particular, they contend that PD

1869

a. constitutes a waiver of right of the city of Manila to impose taxes and legal

fees;b. the exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of the principle of local

autonomy

ISSUE: WON the City of Manila can impose taxes on PAGCOR

HELD: No.

1. The City of Manila, being a mere municipal corporation, has no inherent right to

impose taxes. The Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power

or the municipality cannot assume it. It follows then that its power to tax must always

yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the State itself

which has the inherent power to tax.

2.

The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. Congress has thepower to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative

powers. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over LGUs. And if Congress can

grant the City of Manila the power tax certain matters, it can also provide for

exemptions or even take back the power.

3. The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling has lon g been

revoked. As early as 1975, the power of LGUs to regulate gambling through the grant

of franchise, licences or permits was withdrawn by PD 771 and was vested exclusively

on the National Government. Therefore, only the National Government has the

power to issue licenses or permits for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the

power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of

licenses or permits is no longer vested in the City of Manila

4.

LGUs have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR isa GOCC with an original charter. All of its shares are owned by the National

Government. Moreover, PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate

gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of

an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the

Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise,

its operation might be burdened, impeded or subject to control by a mere LGU.

5. The power of LGUs to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which the

Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an operative law until

amended, repealed or revoked, its exemption clause remains an exception to the

exercise of the power of LGUs to impose taxes and fees. It cannot, therefore, be

violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.



6. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the Constitution means

decentralization. It does not make LGUs sovereign within the state or an imperium in

imperio

OLIVAREZ V. MARQUEZ, 438 SCRA 679 (2004)

FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC questioning the assessment and levy made

by the Office of the City Treasurer of Paranaque on pet itioners’ properties

1. Petitioners alleged that they received a final notice from the Office of the City

Treasurer on their real estate delinquencies2. They protested the assessment and sought reinvestigation on the grounds:

a. Some of the taxes being collected have already prescribed and may no

longer be collected as provided under Sec 194 LGC

b. Some properties have been double taxed/assessed

c. Some properties being taxed are no longer existent

d. Some properties are exempt from taxation as they are being used

exclusively for educational purposes

e. Some errors made in the assessment

3. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that RTC had no jurisdiction over

tax assessment matters

4. Petitioners argued that the trial court had jurisdiction since the issue raised pertains to

the authority of respondents to assess and collect real estate taxes

ISSUE: WON the trial court has jurisdiction to try the case involving the authority of the city

treasurer to impose and collect real estate taxes

HELD: No. Under the doctrine of primacy of administrative remedies, an error in the

assessment must be administratively pursued to the exclusion of the ordinary courts whose

decisions would be void for lack of jurisdiction.

The LGC of 1991 sets forth the administrative remedies available to a taxpayer or real

property owner who is not satisfied with the assessment or reasonableness of the real

property tax sought to be collected.

Should the taxpayer/real property owner question the excessiveness or reasonableness of

the assessment, Sec 252 LGC provides that the taxpayer should first pay the tax due before

his protest can be entertained. There shall be annotated on the tax receipts, ―paid under

protest.‖ It is only after the taxpayer has paid the tax due that he may file a protest in writing

within 30 days from the payment of the tax to the Provincial, City or Municipal Treasurer, who

shall decide the protest within 60 days from receipt. In no case is the local treasurer obliged

to entertain the protest unless the tax due has been paid.

If the local treasurer denies the protest or fails to act on it within the 60-day period, the

taxpayer may then appeal or directly file a verified petition with the LBAA within 60 days from

the denial of the protest or receipt of the notice of assessment.



If the taxpayer is not satisfied with the decision of LBAA, he may elevate the same to the

CBAA. An appeal may be taken to the CBAA by filing a notice of appeal within 30 days from

the receipt thereof. From the CBAA, the dispute may be taken to CA by filing a verified

petition for review under Rule 43 ROC.

CAB: The authority of the assessor is not being questioned. Despite petitioners’ protestations,

the petitioner filed before the trial court involves the correctness of the assessments, whichare questions of fact that are not allowed in a petition for certiorari, prohibition and

mandamus.

BULACAN V. CA, 299 SCRA 442 (1998)

FACTS: In 1998, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bulacan passed a provincial ordinance

which provides an imposition of 10% tax on the fair market value of per cubic meter onordinary stones, sand, gravel and other quarry resources extracted from public lands or from

beds of seas, lakes, rivers, streams and other public waters within its territorial jurisdiction

1. Pursuant thereto, the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan assessed private respondent

Republic Cement for extracting limestone, shale and silica from several parcels of

private land in the province

2. Republic Cement contested the assessment on the ground that the Provincial

Treasurer had no authority to impose taxes on quarry resources extracted from

private lands. The Provincial Treasurer denied the same.

3. In the interim, the Province of Bulacan issued a warrant of levy against Republic

Cement allegedly because of its unpaid tax liabilities. Negotiations between

petitioner and Republic Cement resulted in a temporary agreement whereby by

Republic Cement shall pay under protest 50% of the tax assessment

ISSUE: WON the Provincial Government could impose and/or assess taxes on quarry

resources extracted from private lands

HELD: No. A province has no authority to impose excise taxes on quarry resources extracted

since the same are already taxed by the National Government under Sec 151 NIRC. Thus a

province may not ordinary impose taxes on stones, gravel, earth and other quarry resources

when the same are already taxed under the NIRC. However, the province can impose a tax

on stones, gravel, earth and other quarry resources extracted from public land because it is

expressly empowered to do so under LGC.

Documents

LGU Creation, Power, Attributes Digests