Lesson 05: Speech Act Theory - 10 Mar 2016

Lesson 5Thu 10 March, 2016

Discourse as action

Speech act theory

Communication as action

A key dimension in the analysis of discourseis purpose (it is part of the CPPR framework and it largely determines genre).

Saying that discourse is purpose-driven meansthat we use language as a tool to perform actions(e.g. obtain information, conduct relationships, get things done, etc.).

The subfield of linguistic research that studies communication as action is called pragmatics.

Communication as action

All language is performative in some way!

Speech act theory: origins

This theory stems from ordinary language philosophy, a school of philosophy that flourished in England in the mid-20th century. Its proponents wanted to analyse philosophical problems by looking at ordinary language. For example, the ethical question of what is good/bad requires studying the way people apologise for bad behaviour.

Speech act theory focuses on the question of what people are doing when they use language.

Speech act theory

Consider the following two sentences. How are they different?

1. “It’s raining.”2. “I promise that I will give you one hundred dollars

tomorrow.”

Sentence 1 can be true or false. As for sentence 2, it is not possible to say that it is true or not true, because an act is being performed (the act of promising).

Speech act theory

John Austin first proposed the distinction between constatives (statements that can be true or false) and performatives (acts performed through language). However, he soon realised that in fact all expressions of language must be viewed as acts:

“Once we realize that what we have to study is not the sentence but the

issuing of an utterance in a speech situation, there can hardly be any

longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is performing an act.”

(Austin, 1976)

For instance, utterance 1 in the previous example could be a warning or a statement being made.

Speech act theory

Austin distinguished three kinds of action within each utterance:

Locution is the physical act of producing an utterance.

Illocution is the act that is performed by producing an utterance (e.g. giving an order).

Perlocution is the production of an (intended) effect through locution and illocution (e.g. the execution of the order by the addressee).

Speech act theory

Activity: identify locution, illocution and (possible) perlocution in the following examples.

1. “It’s a bit cold in here.”2. “Paris is a wonderful city.”3. “I didn’t mean that.”4. “You did your best.”5. “I’ll find you wherever you are.”6. “Be very careful.”7. “Anyone want some coffee?”

Speech act theory

The previous examples show that illocution and perlocution may vary depending on the context and the situation. The same locution may correspond to different illocutions and thus lead to different perlocutions. Look at the example below:

Locution of the speaker Illocution Uptake by the listener

“There’s a good movie tonight” Invitation “Okay, let’s go”

“There’s a good movie tonight” Advice “Okay, I’ll go there”

“There’s a good movie tonight” Excuse “Never mind”

“There’s a good movie tonight” Offer “Thank you!”

Speech act theory: classification

In speech act theory the illocution is the focus of attention. Language philosophers have tried to give an overview of all possible illocutions. John Searle (1969) proposed the following classification:

a) Declarations: speech acts that modify a state of affairs simply by being uttered.

Priest: “I pronounce you husband and wife.”

Referee: “You are out.”

Judge: “I sentence you to life imprisonment.”


b) Representatives: speech acts whereby speakers state what they believe to be the case or not.

“The Earth is flat.”

“It was a warm sunny day, I think.”

c) Directives: speech acts whereby speakers try to get listeners to do something.

“Please give me a cup of coffee.”

“Could you lend me a pen, please?”

“Don’t touch that.”


d) Commissives: speech acts whereby speakers commit themselves to some future action.

“I’ll be back.”

“We will do that.”

e) Expressives: speech acts whereby speakers express their attitude towards something.

“Well done, mate!”

“That’s interesting.”

“I’m sorry.”

Speech act theory

Among the intriguing problems with illocutions, there is one that has drawn special attention: the issue of successful illocutions. It is plain to see that certain minimum requirements must be met for an illocution to be successful (e.g. you cannot sentence somebody if you’re not a judge).

So the question is: what requirements should be met for a certain illocution to be successful?

John Searle (1969) and Jürgen Habermas (1981) have elaborated two approaches to this issue...

Searle’s approach: felicity conditions

Searle (1969) formulated four felicity conditions that illocutions must meet in order to be successful (i.e. felicitous). These are illustrated below in regard to the illocution to promise:

1st felicity condition: the propositional content condition

The act that the speaker commits him/herself to must be a future action to be performed by the speaker him/herself. One cannot make a promise for someone else or promise to do something that has already been done.


2nd felicity condition: the preparatory condition

This condition concerns those circumstances that are essential for the illocution to lead to the intended perlocution. In the case of promising, the content of the promise should not be a matter of course, and the promise must be advantageous to the addressee.

3rd felicity condition: the sincerity condition

The speaker must honestly be willing to fulfill the promise.


4th felicity condition: the essential condition

This is the condition that separates the illocution in question from other illocutions. In the case of promising, this means that the speaker takes upon him/herself the responsibility of carrying out the act stated in the content of the promise.

If any of these four conditions is not met, the illocution is infelicitous.


Activity: spell out the four felicity conditions for the following speech acts:

Propositional content condit.

Preparatory condition

Sincerity condition

Essential condition

Request the requested act is a future act of the hearer

1) the speaker believes the hearer can perform the requested act; 2) the hearer would not perform the requested act without being asked

the speaker genuinely wants the hearer to perform the requested act

the utterance counts as an attempt by the speaker to have the hearer do an act




Sincerity condition

Essential condition

Order the ordered act is a future act of the hearer

i) the hearer has the ability to perform the ordered act; ii) the hearer has the obligation to perform the ordered act

the speaker genuinely believes that the act should be performed by the hearer

the utterance counts as an attempt by the speaker to oblige the hearer to carry out the act




Sincerity condition

Essential condition

Warning it is about a future event

1) the speaker believes the event will occur and be harmful to the hearer; 2) the speaker believes that it is not obvious to the hearer that the event will occur

the speaker genuinely believes that the event will be harmful to the hearer

the utterance counts as an attempt by the speaker to have the hearer recognize that a future event will be harmful

Habermas’ approach: validity claims

According to Habermas (1981), speakers implicitly claim that their illocutions are valid in terms of truth, sincerity and legitimacy. An illocution is only successful when the hearer acknowledges the validity claims made by the speaker.

Teacher to student: “Could you bring me a glass of water?”

The student can refuse this request as invalid on the basis of:

Truth, i.e. the teacher knows that I cannot do that.Sincerity, i.e. the teacher does not really want any water.Legitimacy, i.e. the teacher has not right to ask me that.

Illocutions in discourse

Often the utterance itself provides an indication of the intended illocution. Below are a few examples of explicit illocutions:

“I request that you put out your cigarette”“Are you going to put out that cigarette or not?”“Would you please put out your cigarette?”

Searle (1969) calls these indications IFIDS: illocutionary force indicating devices. They may relate to verbs, word order, intonation, accent, as well as other linguistic elements.


Sometimes, however, illocutions are implicit. In order to link the right illocution to a locution, one needs to have sufficient knowledge (a) of the discourse situation, (b) of the relation between the participants, (c) of the world.

“Can you stop by in a minute?”

This interrogative possesses the illocutionary intent of a request (see felicity conditions). However, it must be interpreted as an order when it is uttered by a supervisor to a subordinate. This requires knowledge of (a) and (b).


Another example:

“Your left eye has brownish-yellow spots.”

This can be viewed as a simple statement, but it can also be intended as a warning if the situation being described could be viewed as dangerous. This requires some knowledge of the world (c), namely, that the pigmentation of the white portion of the visible eyeball could indicate a pathology.

Direct vs indirect speech acts

Take a look at this cartoon:

Wally (deliberately) misunderstands an indirect request for action as a direct request for information. The joke can be explained with reference to direct vs indirect speech acts.


Direct speech acts: when the syntactic form of the locution corresponds to the intended illocution.

1. “Hey move out of the way!” (imperative = order/request)

Indirect speech acts: when the syntactic form of the locution does not correspond to the illocution.

2. “Do you have to stand in front of the TV?” (interrogative locution

intended to be a request)

3. “You’re standing in front of the TV.” (declarative locution intended to

be a request)


Activity: The following are indirect speech acts. Why?

1. A: “I’m so tired.”B: “I’ve made some coffee.”

2. A: “Don’t you think it’s a bit cold in here?”(B closes the window)

3. A: “I think I owe you an apology.”B: “I think you do.”

Gradation of speech acts

The same speech act (e.g. a request to shut the window) can be realised in a variety of ways, from direct to indirect:

Direct “Shut the window!”

Indirect “Could you shut the window?”

“I’d be grateful if you’d shut the window.”

“It’d help to have the window shut.”

“It’s getting cold in here. Shall we keep out the draught?”

Very indirect “Now, Jane, what have you forgotten to do? Brrr!”

This is very much connected to aspects of politeness, which will be discussed later on in the course.

Documents

Lesson 05: Speech Act Theory - 10 Mar 2016