Lenkowski Jon] the Origin of Philosophy

8/3/2019 Lenkowski Jon] the Origin of Philosophy

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ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE LIBRARY

111111111111113 1696 00104 2264 1'HE ORIGIN OF PHILOSOPHYJon Lenkowski ,

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ataospher. to which the aotioR of law by fiat would be .. the. . - deliberati . . abeuwhat laws vould be best would h a ~ to playa premiaeat role. Bnt such a discussieacOuld oBly occur i f i t had already be s.ea that laws th.mselT.s are Rot etenal&ad ilmmtable. f i is realizatioa was also th e result of t r na l .. trade. l I t sltouldbe Roted tilat tb . two great lawginrs, Lycurgt1s aad Soloa, ltad t ran l l .d e x t . R s i ~ l y

somathiag waich vas thought to qualify ti t to be l .gislators.) Exposure to thediff .reat peopl.s arQUmd the M.d1terr..... seems to ban produc.d a spir i t of giTe-and-take, Ilot oBly with respect to goods, bnt perhaps more importantly with respectto at1steJIIS alld OpiRiollS. rids exposure produc.d I.B elltirely Uliprec.d .d opemtes8:reflectioa Oll the Tari . t i . s of vays of l i fe &ad traditioRs led R.cessarily to refl .ct io . oa 0. . 15 0WJl beliefs .. iRh.rited at1stOl!ll!l. ETanthing could aov be reflectedupoa &ad discussed - Ricil "aRt that i t was DO leRger immutabl H.ac. H.gel wiselyrearks (EUl. , Vorl.s. tl! ll.) tbat poli t ical b'eedOll od b'aedoa are iRs.parable, and that therefore pbilosophy oBly appears in history whera b'e. iRstitntioRsare formed.

III the same way that the physical layout of the Maditerran.aa .ncouraged t r a ~ l , i t also encouraged coloRizatioR. Miletus iR Io.ia in Asia Minor yas one of the f irs tof such Greek colonies. This land yas Greek-spenkinr, 'lnd W1 S peopled by Greeks whohad eolo,-,izad i t after fleeing :from marauding Dorians on the Greek mainland before1000 b.c. By the seTeDtb centur;r, Hilstus yas i tself already a metropolis, i t se l fsending out coloRies. Thales of Miletus se.RS to haTe taken advaatage of a l l the opportuaity this s. t t ing offered. Like most of yhat is supposed to be knOw. about him,his dates are coajectnral. His birth is probably so_vllere betve.. 636 od 6.24 b.c.(tais depeads .ll whether olle beli.Tas DiogeHs or Apollodorus), and lie l ind uati lapproxiaately 546 b.c. His aacestry was most probably Ioni.. amd therefore AtticlaccordiRg to Dioge s I , 23), though he may also have had some Pho.aiciaa bloodlaccording to Herodotus I , 170). He was in the eliTe trade - .a fact whieil obligedilm to t r a ~ l fairly wid.ly iR the . a s t .n J.I .di t . rra .... He seellls to han takaa fnll


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adTutag . of t l l is. Wll11. Tiai tug ~ l . s G P o t a m i a , A. appar.atly l .arll.d wilat tll. Babyloaius ka.w of astroa.. , . . Most of tllis vas math.matically imprecise ud baeed oaobs.rTatioaal r.cords, .oet of vilicil are questioaabl But it . was, as a CORs.qu.aa.,able to predict aa .c l ips. oa 27 . or 28. May, 585 b.c. u aportaat eaougll .Teatsiac. i t cllaaged tll. cours. of a war. He may .Tea itaTe vr i t t .a a t r .a t i s . oa .auticalastroaom7 - tllouga tllis is doubttul.

H. also traT.ll .d to Egypt aad l . ~ . d vllat tll.y ka.v of geom.try. H.r. b. s to lIaTe r ..ally coa. !ato Ilis ova .l . Ther . ar... t i t .r fiT . or six tll .or at t r i -but.d to Ilu. agaia, accordiag to wllo oa. belieTes. WlI.at oa. mast aotic. ia th . s .taeor is a .atll atical pr.ciaioa aad tll.eor.tical ~ n . r a l i t y aot preseat u uy Gftile so-call.d nappros!aat. area" forwulas of tite Egypti.a geometry. Esp.cially ia aistll..oreJII tllat tA . sid.s of . . , . similar triaagles are propertioaal, ve s.e a fUlly deT..loped ia t . r . s t u gea.rality. SO.etiting lik" tll. universal aeems to haTS been dis-covered.

, I t may, tan. , haT.. be ..n his SUCCaSs vi h mathematical generality that led him toto aeek for g .nerali t les elsevll.re as veIl . Hence his pronouaeements tAat th . arch.of a ll things is vater and tltat a l l things are ..asouled. As for tA. particular coat-..ats of these proaouaeameats agau coajectures. Listea to Aristotle: "Probablythe idea was suggeet.d to bim because tlla antria.at of eTerytll!ag eoataias moisture alSG beeause the seeds of eTerythin!,: haTe a moist nature." 983b) Alld:"Scm . say soul is diffused tbroughout the uaiTSrse, ud perhaps that is What Thalesmeaat il't saying a l l tbil'tgs are fUll of gods." \.Q!!. A!!. 41la)

This concludes my l ikely story. Notice ho;/' c o m p r c h e n s i b l ~ i t ' s a ll becomel '..Thy,then, do I s t i l l have th" na,;ging sense that sonethinr; is missil'lg Rot somethingin the detai ls of this account, but sometltag essential? \lItat I 've lost , or missedeolllJlletely, in lIY -"'tempt te raco.stl'll,"'" ....... " .... 4, ..rical aT _ is eTerTtbul!' ph11osooilical. I f r really pay attelltio!t to tllis, I s.e that this fa11m'e, .....ic . ",l"toria)lsof pllilosoplly ellstosarily settle for, is the laaTitabl . result of haTiag takea thequestioa of the origin of pllilosoplly to be a Ristorical questioft in the f i rst pI.ace.


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s rurt raor. , that .o t aaly t . i s , bnt aRy attempt to tara philosop.y iato a.?8Rt, fl8ally l .ads . . . wre - .ewh.r. at all .

I t looks as though we'l l .a?8 to make a completely 01 beginftimg - per.aps a.. kUd of begiaaial!; - :ia order to fiad


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In the seeond ehapter o f the }.'etaphysios Aristotle says: "For it i s by Iwnder-g that men botb nov and in the beginning began to philosophize." t982bl2-13) Phi l -

begins in wonder - l2!!1!n precisely wonder begin? We refer pbiloe-to vonder, bnt in so doing va must not forget that vonder i t s e l f may be canse

or wonder.Aristotle zoes OR to say in the same passage: "So they pllilosophized in order

eseape from ignor8llse . H \982bl':l-20) AIId: "Olle wllo is in perplexity and wonderhimself to be ignoraat. D \982bl7-18) To pailosopaiza is to seek to . s pe f ro .

AIId to \a!.ow tha t Oil . i s in a state o f i ~ o r .. e is to be i l l stat, , ' (Ifu d llOllder. The two s ta tes are the s.... Tlms, knowladge ignorallea . ad -

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r . l a t io . of pbilosoplly to perplexity aad wond.r - whiea .... tha t to pbi l -and to be in 'wo.d.r aBd perpl .xi ty are til. s.... Ia tba Th.a. tatus Soerates

th is as wall to Tlleodorusr II . s.ys tbat tha pllilosopher is H ignorant andin a l l tlaillgsr" \175b4-6) But sOll.thing elsa surfa s h.re in connection

wOllder i t s a l f . Aristot le spaaks of "on. who is in perplexity!!!!! wOllder". To beperPlaxity alld to wo.der are til . same. l To wonder is to be in p erplexi ty. The etus-

wit ss to th i s r He says, in respo.s. to Soerates ' statAB.nt of tbe puzzles ofn.d ltlllllbar:' "Alld by the gods, Soerates, I &lII perPlexed as sooa as I begin to woa-

er wbat oa ear ta tRes. things are d sOlletiaes when I begia to look into taem IbeeOllle dizz i .d . " \Tlleaet.l55c6-8l Socrates respoads: "This " , f fnt ion, to wonder,shows t a . t you are a pbilosopb.r ; for there is no other beginning of pllilosophy

tb is . It \ Tll.aet . 155dl-4lWe ean BarTel a t th i s , an d e.. so be led to ask wbetber wonder and tbe . ~ l -are tae s&ae.!,fe can mll!'T81 lt t s_ething - a thing of beauty or astoaisl:unent - because i t is

or uaiqne r We ..an b."oJlle . . .ptivated by it. SuClh a thing oould be ealled

indieat .sug le artiClle: Rer. {n passug that Ari "tot le l inks tile two par t ie ip l"s Ulld"r " \ J .... ',., /"( \ ' J .....o (J ~ 7 T 0 f ' ( ) I V r./c(vpa r WV' olE;ell yVO(v. tb."


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itwelld.rt'!1l.", but is t u s tllat woader i l l widell plliosoplly b e ~ s ? "CaptiTaUoa" is af i t word I t . r . beeaus. th . beltoldiag ot til . lIAl'ftllous is a Idnd ot b o a d a ~ . I t is as tudiag-s t1 l l , a e.ssatioa ot lIlotioa, a 7Td."7;'lfltior a r t Uoa iaduc.d trom without.Albertas M a ~ s , lIoweTer, ia lIis Coxmafttary 2! t ! ! Metaphysies 2! Aristot le, makestil. tol laviag obserTatioa:

"Now-the au . wllo is pnzzled sad weaders apparently does mot kBow. Heae. woad.ri s tile .0Vll_at ot th e 1II.. wbo does act kBow om his way to fiadillg out, toto tile bGttQll of that a t wlliell Ia. waders u d to determill. i t s eaus t I ~ ! ~ . , ' fr. 2, CII. 6)A l t l l o u ~ tile belloldillg o t the l I I&rT811Ol1S .. g in r ise to woader, they do act s.ell. tobe tile s.... W.ader - t . a t w o . d . ~ wiliell is id .a t i .a1 wi t . pnzzle.eat - is a

2 b:'JmOTe_at, a 1II0V8lHat il l tile oa. vllo i s pnzzled. Is it tb u a TTril.T ~ # r J indue.d t rcaI , I"witl lh"? Is is a7TrJ.()/lpt{ a t al l? Or i s it perltaps acvtFfffrl.., a being_t-work? OrIis tba t the peeu1iar ellaraeter of pl!tilosophy - tllat it is a Thl..1)?1'i. vltiea i s a tI /oa aa EVrer.!lI-? .3 Ia P . r i . l u , Sltakespeare lias Smoaides say: " ...Wonder, tllat is

killg of thougl t ts ." t II , i i i ,28) I:!I w e J I d ~ , :-""'., a way 9 { t l t r l ' l l t i : . ~ ? _ ] f ' " s . ~ i t Q'eu1d beextraordinary way of thinking. But in th is way would it be a ~ o v e m e n t . This is more

, Ithan to llIarTel or to be astonished. To wonder is to thilllk o l l 1 0 ~ , to think "withoutpassage":- to ' 'mon without moving" - u extraordinary way of thinking!

Wonder is illd d the most bafnillg of tldmgll, for it . a l l s forth i t se l f ; aad thiit does ill two ways: 1 . I t is T 1 ' r ; ( t i ~ o ' P " - une:xpeetable; i t is absolutely spoata . usabsolutely unmotiTated. !ad 2 . I t eauses us to wonder about i t s e l f .

What sa . aTOke wOllder? Aaoording to Aristotle, "00. a t f i r s t they wondered aboutthe strange ) ,-- out of place \ ~ r O ~ - things closest at hand, and then continuingin tl t is way step by step, they eame to be in perplexity about the greatest things,sueh as the affeotioas of th e mooa, and those of tile sun a d s tars , and about tb .corrlng-to-be of tile All ." t ~ . ';I82bl.3-17) 0.. eal l wonder about averytbing, aboutthe vbol . . 'rbis i s lIot surprising. We nov alraady trOl!! Hesiod \ Thao!!'. 780) tbat

2. Tbis is saen alearly ir we aoatrast i t witb. soasone l ike ~ . n o . M8no's torpor, hisimmobility - though i t may astonisil Aim - is anythillg vOlld.r.3. a tile Theaetetus(l55dl) Soerates il l fact rafars to TO' ~ r i . V f " ' . r E l ' ; ' i . a . , a l l activitas a rrlaO$ r -


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rhaumas i s the of fsp r ing o f rethys and Gea. 'tlonder i a the offspr ing o f the watersand tn e ear th . 'Jondar i s the offspr ing of the whole. I t i s from the whole tha twonder ar i see . I t i s the whole which eVokes wonder .2his means tha t the condit ionfo r wonder i s the being of the w b ~ l e , the having of a whole. I t i s only within thewhole, wi t i l in the framework o f the having of a w r ~ l e , tha t "lander Can ar i se. Andth i s means tha t wonder i s po ss i ble only for man.

',lander i s human but , to follow Hasiod, it has a divine or ig in . rhe connexionwhich rheaete tus makes bet',-leen \o[onder and perplexity leads 30crates not only to thef u ~ t h e r connexion o f 1:lOnder to the orig in of philosophy, but also to tha divineor ig in of ','lOnder. To r efer to i t s divine or ig in i s , ..a know from numerous passagea

4in Plato , to SUg6est t ha t no account can be given for it , and tha t i s to point toit 9 own perplexing character . ,'1onder i 9 sent to man from the god s. I t i 9 a I Id i vina

.... '"(a '3IEC,", flo O'ffl. ). But to be in wonder i s to be pe rp lexed, i s in Theaetetus Iword s l ito become dizzied!! . A t ruly strange i ronic and marvellous g i f t !

To ,,/Onder i s to be in perplexi ty . &It what exact ly i s it to be in perplexi ty?lsi the san:.e a s to II seek to e seap. from igno rance!! 7 Ari s te t 1e begin s the r . ~ e t aphy-s ics in the following way:

l 'All men by nature des i re to know. A sign of ' t h i s i s the del ight we f ind inour sensings; fo r evan apar t from the i r usefulness , sensings are del ighted infor themselves . l one , and aoove a l l others t ha t sensing which Comes ti1roughthe eyes fo r we prefer , s:J to speak, seeing to everything e l se . Theresson i s that , more than any other kind of sensing, seeing makes us knowand make s manifs s t many dif ference s ." (980822-27)Seeing earna i t a preeminence and i t s del ightfu lness from tne f ac t t ha t , ~ o r e

than any other ~ i n d o f sensing, tlmakes manifest many differences : ' . I t i s through,s ight t ha t !lmanynessll i s made most manifes t . out t:-:;at means tha t the del i Jh t (d,yo(1T?r'i s taken in the manynes8 i t s e l f . rha desi re to know makes its f i r s t appearar.ce a8the love of' manyness. I t i s the endless var ie ty of ' s ights t ha t f i r s t a t t r ac t s on e ISat t en t ion and in te r e s t . I t i s not simply the beauty of these s i 6h ts , but the i r Sgem-ingly endless changingness, tha t evokes on e IS i n t e r e s t . ene de l ign ts in tL:e on-:.icip-

c.... \ \ 1 ( ' I (I ' \ " .4. ~ 3 0 c r a t e e says a t Renublic I I , ;582d2-;;: " 0 10( To E:1oev'oCl) oTTn To! / I ' 1 v E ~ , 'C " . . \" ' " (" d "t I ' , ,. "'-1. Tf4'I TT(/../lrJ,.lWV .... or ',./8 on Know were :'.r.e t ru tn about anc-l .ent tn lngs l i e s II ).


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1 Iat ion of what i s to come. This d..'ft:(7T'ftSis at once "del ight" and I l love l i . The desirefo r knowledge f i r s t appears as the "love of novel sights" .

':le are reminded here immediately of the dis t inc t ion which Glaucon makes (?ep-I /.

ubl i c V, 475d, 476b) between r j , A o 7 J & ' { ~ ( " l o v e of novel s igh t s" ) and?I)?/CId.. ("loveo f hearing fo r mere passt ime") on the on e hand, a n d f l ) . ( ) r r O f / ~ on the othe r hand.He i s very hes i t an t to include the r p / ~ O " ~ O V f r a n d f / ' A { ~ O ( J { among the philo sophers.':lhy7 Because they run eround t rying to miss noth ing . rhey make no dis t inc t ion a3 tot he i r worth among the th ings tha t may be learned. ho learn ing i s worthier than anyother . This i s learning which occurs therefore in the complete absence of whet i sgood which ra i se s the que ation of whether it i s learning at a l l . 1;0 di st inct ioni s acknowledged between the l e ss important and the more important th ings. Yet therecogni t ion of t h i s difference between the higher and the lower i s the mark of thewi se man, and - though it sound sap aradox it i s doubtful \ofhether there Can celearning which i s not guided by wisdom. They are not philosophers because they donot learn with an eye toward wisdom; they f a i l to see the difference between thatl ~ a r n i n g ' .hich i s wise and t ha t which i s not. But most importantly: they are notphi losophers because t he i r "dasi re for knowledge" does not arise from a condit iono f self-consciou9 ignorance.

Ii' the love of novel sights i s the beginning of the desire for knowledge, tnenthe beginning of the desi re fo r knowledge i s not i t s e l f the beginning of pnilosophy,Philo sophy begins in wonder, but the love of novel sight sis mere curio si ty.

) 1 VCuriosi ty begets thinking which i a notGrl1"foV(perplexed), and as such i s arret{'( inder in i te ) - i . e . , i t has no natural end; i t has no goal. 2u t to i'fonder i s to thi!1kapore t ica l ly : it i s n o t ~ 1 T e l f ' V because wisdom i s the goal of philosophy, ho;/everult . imately aporet ic tha t wisdom may be. Curiosity and wonder are r.ot tne san:e.

In Being and rime, Heidegg.ar remarks that 1I curiosity i s concerned with theI

constant poss ib i l i ty of d i s t rac t ion . Curiosity has nothing to do , . 1 i t h ~ ~ ( / f 4 r t { V -- i'lith the beholding o f ent i t ies in wonder. ro wonder to the point 0= net understand-ing i s something in which i t has 3csolutely no int .erest ." (Sein und Zeit , 1 5 6 , p.1(2)


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1 know I 'm being very hard on cur ios i ty , bui; 1 muat t e l l you tha t I 'm doing so tomake a point, to emphasize th e difference and 1 th ink it i s a very grea t d i f -rerenoe between cur iosi ty and wonder. But 1 vlould probably not be inc l ined togo as fa r as Regel who character izes curiosity (because of its "rambling" -'aselei) as a disease . (Phi l . des Geistes , 148, Zusatz)

To wonder i s to be in perplexi ty. And if ' tha t i s not to be ident i f ied simplywith tha"desi re to know" (since the l a t t e r f ' i r s t appears as mere cur ios i ty) , wehavei;o a sk again : "that i s it to be in perp lexi ty ?

In Theaei;ei;us, Socrates spends some time in a digress ion with Theodorus (172-177) , in which he i s carefu l to di st ingui sh the way of philo sophy f'rom the way of 'content ious arguing. 'iii th in t h i s converaation he gives us a descr ip t ion of ticephi losopher , a descr ipt ion which i s playfully modelled on Thales, and especia l ly ontee reputed fac t o f Tha les ' having fal len into an open p i t or well . , ';Ie want to seeif t r . is descr ip t ion helps us to understand what i t means to be in perp lexi ty .

The re levant texi; i s 1 7 ~ c 7 - 1 7 4 e 5 . rhere are nine dis t inguishable charac ter i z -at ions o f the phi losopher . 1 wil l mention jus t the f i r s t of these:

He doe en It know way k ago ra , Q.!. the whereabout 9 of' tr.e court 92:-the senate. (175c7-


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i s to begin to phi lo sophize .To be a philo sopher i s to be in perplexi ty about a l lordinary unders tanding takes fo r granted as clear and i n t e l l i g i ble .

'ile can make t h i s po in t even more fo rce fu l ly : In the midst of th i s doscussionwith Theodorua, Socrates re la tes the story of fua les ' having f a l l en into a '.


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t h i s means it presupposes within the philosopher himself a pr ior non-phi losophiccond i t ion . r ha t means: a pr io r condit ion of naive acceptance and t r u s t . So not onlyi s wonder possib le only for man; it i s possible only insofar as man already has awo r ld .

fut t h i s too needs c la r i f ica t ion ; fo r the world does not af te r e l l disappearor become radica l ly t ransf igured with the f a l l into perplexi ty. rhe world does notsuddenly change and become unrecognizable. Things go on exactly 8e before. Cur pas -sive expectancies concerning the general flow of things remain ful ly operative andundi sappointed. I wil l borrow an expression from 3dmund Eusserl , and say tha t ,al though I have acquired the non-natural - i. e ., philo sophical - po sture, thetyp ica l i ty o f the world and of our experience of the world remaina ent irely unaf -fected by t h i s . Husserl comes to mind especial ly in th is context because there i9no one in modern t imes - and 1 who has devoted as much attention tothe problem o f the beginning of philosophy. Le t me quote one short passage from theGartssian !-':editations:

I'r"ieanwhile the world experienced in thi s ref lect ively grasped l i f e goes onbeing fo r me (in a cer ta in manner) 'experienced' as before, and Ilith jus t thecontent i t has at any particular t ime. It goes on appearing 8S i t ha s appearedbeforej t116 only dif ference i9 that I, 9S ref lect ing pti losopnical ly , no longerkeep in ef fec t (no longer accept) the natural bel ieving involved in exper ienc-ing the world though tha t bel ieving to o i s a t i l l there and ;;rasped by myno t i cing re;;ard." (pp. 19-20)So everything remains recognizable and famil iar . ,"hat becomes transformed, !:ow-

ever , i s t h i s fami l ia r i ty i t s e l f . I t i s th is famil iar i ty i t ae l f -which now bcon:esstrange. ;/e need not rest here with paradox: This lIfamiliarityll has two aspects ,''''hich coincide but are not th e same. ;Ie are from ths outset I l a t nome r1 in the world.rha t means: not only i s there always a cer ta in re; ;ulari ty about the "orld, at l eas ta8 to i t s genera l s ty le , but tne world i s also :'roill tile outse t there for us as simply

immediately (not t h r o ~ ; ; h some II symbolic" sy stem, u n t ~ 3 r e a t i c a l l y , naivelyunderstood. 3very encounterable objectivity has no t only a t"'.::cical 'cut also adetar:::r..inate meaning or sense. rha '!lorio i-:0831r, as tr_s universal, rl..ost co:r.pr-3[].ensivecontext of a ll tt ings, of all the particulats wittin i t , i s therety the universal


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context of senae in which aach par t icu lar , delimited, or pa r t i a l sense i s located .:;;ach p a r t i a l or delimited aense i s such only by vir tue of i t s being found, located,within t h i s comprehensive context of a l l aense. The world i s the universa l contaxtof a l l sense. I t i s a "meaning-context"; it i s the universa l meaning-context. de have

from the outse t , accordingly, a cer tain understanding of the world such, as awhole; from the outaet the world whole has fo r us a cer tain sense. This i s themost pregnant sense of " fami l ia r i ty" . Though t h i s "underatanding" remain. fo r themost par t non-thematic , we are never without i t ; we always move within th i s horizono f understanding. This horizon of understanding i s our world. To "have" a 'world, to"be a t helme" in the world, to have a comprehensive, all-encompassing context of mean-ing and sense, of unders tandabi l i ty a l l of th i sis to say the same th ing: Theworld i s the comprahensi ve context of meaning and sense.-----

To " f a l l in to perplexi ty" i s to lose one ' s footing, to lose one ' s ground. Fa l l -ing into parplexi ty involves the slipping-away of tha t o t a l i t y of what i. accepted andtaken absolutely for granted by everyday understanding. 'This i a captured nicely by theGerman word, Un-heimlichkei t , because of i t s double aense of "homelessness" and "s trangnesa", "uncannineas". One i s no longer "at home"; a l l t ha t i s famil iar ( in the das ig-nated sense) becomes st range. To " fa l l into perplexity" meana tha t the world comes asa whole to lose i t a in -se-e t -per -se understandabi l i ty . That means: it ceases to holdsway as ult imate ly val id and independent. I t i s no longer simply "understood". In fac t ,it i s only now tha t the question o f underatanding, of the wor ld 's unders tandabi l i ty ,becomes a t a l l an i s sue . The world now presents i t s e l f as !!2. longer in-dependent , butas in need of grounding, in need of explanat ion. All the "par ts" of the world a l lthings and eventa, inc luding ourselvea though they remain, and remain ss recogniz-ably the same as before , though they r e ta in , tha t i s , t he i r typical i ty never thelesbecome st range. They become no longer simply understood or understandable. hen we saytha t the ground sl ip s away, then, we mean that what sl ip s away i s the of the\ ~ o r l d : i . e . , the world i t s e l f , as the comprehensive context of meaning. './hat s l ips away


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i s our unders tanding.To f a l l into perplexi ty i s to come to no longer under at and any th ing . , i e 10 se

our ground s , the th ings which ul t imately ground our understanding. I t i s these"ground ail whereby our understanding i s guided, ',


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The "ground a" to which I have been refer r ing, then, turn out to oe the "what-nesses" of th ings , which account for aU things and the i r in te r re la t ions whichi s to say: fo r world. To say tha t they account fo r everything i s to say tha t

, '/ . Ithey are the a.f' I - the pr inc ip les - of everything. The whatnesses ere theI ) I

tffUTIoI r l . f X ~ ' , th e f i r s t and ul t imate pr inciples. rhey are th e pr inc ip les o f every-thing which means not only of th ings , but also o f the counterpart o f th ings ,unders tanding. The pr inc ip les are a t work not only in th ings , but also in our und-ers tanding. They at once make th ings) I in te l l ig ib le , and cause understanding to be.From the viewpoint o f the rJ.f,;(!I(C , the world and understanding are counterpar ts of

) /each other , expressing the double being-at-work of the ri./,'XIA( The f ac t tha t Plato

) I .J Iand Aristot le cel led these c(,X;(1 interchangably " f ( ~ ' " and ",/"?f"-" r e f l ec t s not'\ Ithe dfXr ' but also i t s pecul iar doubleness. I t s being at oncenly the pr ior i ty o f

,a V O ~ 1C11 and an C l 0'5 i s exact ly ref lec ted in the correspondence between understandingand the world. "Understanding" i s the noet ic

) (i s the e ide t ic expression o f the ol(''/A t , .I'

I t i s , then, these rJf)(A , the "whatnesses"

) "expression of the


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has become preblemat ic ence again understandable? The tu rn to' these i s a tu rn to'something determinate, and it must therefere be guided .!It something. But whatceuld give such guidance, if net the whatness ef tha t which has beceme preblema-t i c? ',ii thout a knowledge - however non-thematic e f th i s, how ceuld we knowtha t the th ing in ,


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":Ihen we do lose our "understanding"of something ( i . e . , of its whatness) , 'HesuPpo se t ha t we continue to under stand other th ings in fac t , th ings at large.And indeed, the loss of "understanding" of the par t icu lar th ing compels us toto other th ings ( i . e . , to other whatnessea) which we suppo se we understand tor efer it to these in order to "locate" what has ceased to be simplY "understood", inorder to re t r ieve our underatanding of what ha a become a probelm, to become onceagain "a t home" with it, to render it once again famil iar . ;,hat has become !:!-understood thus reveals , in i t s !:!.-understandability, tha t it i s not scmething i so la ted ,but has esaent ia l , i n t r in s i c connexions with other th ings . This i s , of course, someth ing we always "knew", though it i s perhaps only now for the f i r s t time tha t we takenot ice o f i t at a l l . And nei ther i s t ha t to which we now tu m something i sc la ted ;t h i s too presents i t s e l f rather as essent ia l ly interconnected with other th ings , i nc -luding the problematic whatneas we have jus t referred to it. In thua turning to theseo the r th ings , we find ourse lVa a referred ever beyond them. ':Ie come to aee tha t thedif f icu l ty with which we began i a fa r more extensive than we had at f i r s t aeen. '"ediacover the i rony of our search: tha t each advance presents to us yet fur ther ob-s tac lea . '.ie come to see tha t the self-lhich we di scovered in our examinat ion of e f f i c ien t causal i ty - viz . , t ha t insofar a3 the now problematic tl: ing does


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continue to give us "bearings", we must a t i l l understand it, with the resu l t tha t noperplexi ty occurs . Here, however, the matter i s somewhat d i f f e r en t : ',ie lose our und-eratanding o f something e .g . , what i t means to be a "humsn being". Though we con-t inue to "know" tha t a human being i s an animal, and therefore t ha t the whatness o fhuman being i s connected with the whatness of animal, we are now aware tha t we do notknow how they are connected, tha t we do not understand the preci se nature o f tha t-- .connexion (indeed, t h i s connexion, having now become problematic , for the f i r s t t imebecomes thematic fo r us ) , though we ha d always thought we did understand t h i s .

l 'his br ings di rec t ly to mind two notable casea in the dialogues of th i s inCipientsel f -awareness: At 80b, Meno confesses t ha t he had alway s thought he kne'. "hathuman excel lence ie , but now can ' t answer th i s quest ion. At Sophist 244a, the s t ranger

,,Isay s tha t we had a l l along thought we knew what being (1'0 f j l ) i a, but are now perp lexed, ,( , r r o p ? K I l ~ V ) about it. This event in the Sophist i s especia l ly per t inent here . ,ie, aswell as the Stranger and Theaete tus , are brought to t h i s insight tha t we are indeedperl?.1exed about being - and are brought therewith to the i n i t i a l themat izat ion ofbeing in the f i r s t place by the inner logic of the movement of th inking from thei n i t i a l queat ionabi l i ty o f "the sophist"

Io f a rt ( - r f , , ~ ) , o f the image-making artthence o f non-being ( , . ~ ) . l 'hough they

through the quest ionabi l i ty of inquiry (l,1Ui, I( ~ i l I ) ~ O T T " I I K ~ ) , o f falsehood ('f1lbO$), anabecome perplexed about the whatnesa o f being,

the i r tu rn to jue t t h i s bespeaks the i r recognit ion o f the central i ty of the , .hatnesso f being, its cent ra l connexion with everything they have been ta lk ing about from thebeginning. This i s clear not only from an examination of the whole ser i es of themestha t led them to the themat izat ion of being, but al so from the i:nmed i ate context of244a, as well as from what fol lows t h i s passage: rhe immediate context has to do withthe claim o f certain o f the physical philosophers t ha t the only th ings t ha t are the"hot" and the "cold"; and the s t ranger ' s and rheaetetus ' insight i s tha t they do notexplain what the !l are !! means. 'Their own thematic discussion of ' t t i s question (244b sq . )leads them through an uncovering o f the / If ive "greatest Classes" (ft&y,(TI- '('-V1), to the


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subsequent di scussion which t u rns out to be a mirror image of the lihole "preliminary"discusa ion, moving in reverse order from being to non-being (256d sq. ) to falsehood

I(259d sq. ) to the image-making a r t (264c sq . ) to TI'I", in general (264d sq.) . Apartfrom other th ings , th i s s igni f ies tha t the connexions among these th ings ( i . e . , amongthese whatnesses) , tr.ough having become pro blematic, have been preserved. The movementof re fe r ra l of one theme ( therefore: one whatness) to the next exhibi ts , at each step,the inc ip ien t recogni t ion of the non-independent i . e . , problematic char acter ofwhat they take as the ir theme. The fact that the discussion subsequent to their thematictreatment of being and the greatest claases i s a mirror-image of the "preliminary" d i s -cussion which leads to the thematization of being, s igni f ies among other things tha t ,with the ar t icu la t ion of the problem of being (with the disclosure of i t s ult imetelyapore t ic "s t ruc ture" ) , there i s nowhere e l se to move to , but back to where they hadbegun, and along the very same path they had then taken.

Thus these connexion. among the whatneases, as well as our recognition of them,remain, though they are now no longer .imply "understood". The whatnesses and the i rinterconneotednesses remain what they were end yet , on the side of understanding,they have now revealed themselves to be indeed strange I the whatnesses ahow themselvesto be non-independent, and the i r interconnectedne sa e s too are opened up which i sto say: they too reveal themselves to be problematic. In fac t , even what i t means to bea "connectednesa", a "connexion", i s no loger under.tood, i. problematic.

So: even though the now problematic whatnes. Can be immediately and automaticallyreferred to one or more other whatnesaes, it does not thereby immediately cease to bea problem. -rhis movement of referral to yet ever other whatnesses i s of necessity .!l-t inuous , and it i s jus t th i s which const i tutes the f a l l into perplexi ty . The inherentlogic of t h i s movement of re fe r ra l forces one constantly onward, un t i l one reaches thepoint where, though re fe r ra l s t i l l remains imperative, there i s nothing l e f t to whichtha t re fe r ra l can be made. The inCipient apori a of a cer tain whatna ss nece ssi t a te sitre fe r ra l to ever other whatnesaes, co-implicating from the outset a ll whatnesses in i t s


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un-unders tandabi l i ty . The movement o f re fer ra l (as exhibited paradigmatical ly inthe Sophis t ) reveals the thorough-going in terconnectedness o f a l l whatnesses. The factt ha t , in the attempt to ret r ieve the understandabil i ty o f the or ig ina l whatness, th iar e f e r r a l movea through ever othe r whatneaaes un t i l one reachea a dead end which i s

~ ! . demand to proceed, ahows t h s t i t i a th i s thorough-going interconnectedness o f!ll whatnesaes tha t i s involved in the f a l l into perplexi ty : there i s nothingto which to t u rn . rhe f a l l into perplexity i s radica l and t o t a l : it i s the loss ofa l l bear ings , a l l grounda

This can be formulated in yet another way: In the language of Republic 510b-511c,oomething becomea a problem i . e . i t reveals i t s e l f to be non-independent and thera

'" (fore to be merely a lI1To1Je(I$' to have been eo a ll along, whereas we had alway B upto now (however non-thematica l ly) understood it to be in-se-e t=per-se understandableand therefore as i t s e l f a n ~ f X . ( , as i t a ~ ~ f X { ' as independent, as in and o f i t s e l f i n t e l l i g ib l e . The ael f - revelat ion of i t s non-independence, of i t s merely"hypothet-i ca l" character , i s a t once i t a ae l f - re fer ra l to acmething elae (another whatnesa) ,acmething which at f i r s t appears in and of i t s e l f in te l l ig ib le and therefore t rulyindependent and ul t imate ly grounding. But because the whatne sa with \;hich we beganhaa become problematic, even though it refers i t s e l f to - and therefore dirac ts oura t ten t ion to another whatness for i t s grounding, i t s connexion with t h i s secondwhatness also a t once becomes un-underatood. - rhia rendera the second whatnesB prob-lematic (aince it i s now unclear how it ia connected with the f i r s t ) , and leada th ink-ing beyond it to locate tha t which would ground the connexion between the f i r s t andthe aecond whatnesa. In othe r word a, the aecond whatneas, which had, ,[hen we were

) If i r a t refer red to it, eppeared to be in and o f i t a e l f i n t e l l i g ib l e , as i t a " , , ( j ~ , ) V Inow too reveals i t s e l f to be merely "hypothatical" and to require a ground, an 0(( ,,"I.

rhia necesar i ly leads us beyond i t s e l f to locate tha t which would ground i!!. as wellas the f i r s t whatness. But t ha t to which we are now referred (some thi rd wnatness)presents the same d i f f i cu l ty , revealing i t s at f i r s t apparently archeic charac ter to


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be in t ru th merely hynothet ica l , and therefore revealing the need to go beyond i t toi t a ground. And ae on.

Thi a matter i a aemewhat complex and involvea more than merely a aucce asi ve, I ,'.,1\',t ransformat ion o f ~ f X r J . 1 into'Uf(C


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r ad ica l and t o t a l : we no longer understand anything. In view of the thorough-goingin terconnectedness of a l l whatnesses it can be said tha t in the f a l l in to perplexi tywe lose our understanding of the world a9 a whole. Though the world continues to be"there", it i s lo s t on the aide of understanding. E:arlier, I character ized "theworld" as a thorough-going interconnectedne9s of a ll whatnesses, and therefore as acomprehensive, all-encompassing context of meaning and understanding a charac ter -

/i za t ion completely consi s ten t with the ancient understanding of the Wo rld as a j( C'S"/"O'an ordered whole; a character iZat ion , in fac t , by which alone th i s concept of the

/world as a j\afMO{ becomes at a l l in te l l ig ib la , aince "order" bespeaks thorough-goingin terconnectedness which i s , in turn , in te l l ig ib le only by reference to thewhatnesses o f th ings .

In the f a l l into perplexi ty , then, we lose on the side of understandingthe world as a whole, the whole context or framework of meaning which ordinar i lyguides our understanding, from '#hich our understanding ordinsr i ly takes i t s bearings;we 10 se t ha t horizon of understanding within which we ordinar i ly ahlay s move.: le 10 se,in fact{the very context-character of th i s context . There is , on the side of understaning, a thorough-going di s- integrat ion of the interconnectedne9S of a l l whatnesses:things cease to have an understsnding-reference to other th ings . There i9 a breakdownin the integratedness of the whole; there i s , on the side of understanding, a break-down of the whole i t s e l f . The whole ceases, for understanding, to be a whole. Thiscontext , normally thoroughly "clo sed", self-contained, thoroughly integrated, now"opens up", dis - in tegra tes . Aa a congequence of th i s , th ings cease, on the side of

Iunderstanding, to be "parts" (rOflJ)of a "whole", but "break up" into a mere manine9SThings go on jus t as before, but now they are accompanied by our consciousness of I1Gtknowing how or why they do eo . This i9 the e9gence of the faU into perplexi ty .

'rhe wholeness of tree l1hole necessari ly bespeaks l imi ts , determinat ions, in termsboth of ult imate encompas6edness or enclosedness, and systemetically ordered per tswi th in . In the f a l l into perplexity these are 10 s t . The internal interconnectednesses


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o f pa r t s are l oe t in the sense tha t they become unclear ; the ul t imate encompassednessi s 10 at in the sense t ha t tha t se l f - re fer ra l of a pro blematic whatness to ever otherwhatnesses to resolve i t s e l f , f inal ly terminates in yet a fur ther demand to proceed,opening up thereby the "outer boundaries" of the whole, end reveal ing thereby i t s u l t

'\ c.l,imate non-independence. 'rhe whole (1', ()f.oV ) reve r t s to a mere" All" CrC 17;V ), in which.... '"\ , ....the in terconnectednesses of"T1... 7T:J..vrJ. and the ul t imate unders tadabi l ity of both -rJ. IT.J.

"and - r ~ Tr.i.V are ab.ent . In the f a l l in to perplexi ty , the whole become. inde terminate ,un-l imited , l imi t - l e s s , and t h i . "openness" i. indeed revealed as something u l t i ca te

and t h i s in two sense . : 1. external ly , for the whole i s not H . e l f par t o f a l a rge rwhole to which it could then be raferred , and thereby located and ret r ieved; and 2 .

) in te rna l ly , because of the breakdown and col lapse of the "bound." separating the rXf!.J..from each other , Iand therafore the breakdown and opening up of the 1I.fX,< I themsel ve sIn t h i s wey does the "breakdown" of the whole amount to the disc losure o f i t s ul t imatenon-independence and ul t imate openness. rhe aporet ic t ru th of the whole thus disclosed,.tu rns out to be the l e a s t expectable o f th ings : the whole i s - aporet ica l ly - the",if-i '

And hera one must ask in passing: Is th i s what Anaximander discovered? viz . , t,-ult imacy o f t h i s opennesa, boundlessness (O(1f"z/fc'l); tha t it i s in i t s ultimacy , h a t t:c

, I" l imi t - l ess" i s the"ground" of everything - tha t ul t imately boundlessness (-'O',[T,itt.'under l ie s everything.

In th i s way, then, the inc ip ient aporia of a single ",hatness produces an, opening uo f the whole. :211i8 ' lIhatneas now presents i t s e l f to us as solLat?::ir:g strange, and n:oreovas something; ',fe cannot simplY r efer to something else (some o t ta r ,."l;atr:"388) to obvi9teits st rangeness . 'rhe interconnectedneSs8s of a l l whatnesses having ther.1selv8s no'''' ce-come problemat ic , we Can no longer depend upon tha t se l f - r e f e r r a l 0:' one '-"hatness toother s , which would ordinar i ly in such circumstances serve to resolve the inco.';:iep.t d ir i cu l ty , thereby preserving ar.d sustaining the hol i s t ic character of the Itlhole. 7r:i9se l f - r e f e r r a l , thcugh it remains (the intercor.r.ectadnesses ren:ain, t::;Qu;h proc13matno'. show. i t s e l f to lead nov/here, to go no di st ance at a l l toward re so 1vin:; the pro blen


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- ,

of tha t whatness about which we f i r s t became perplexed. Cur recognition tha t a l l what-nesses have been co-implicated from the outse t in the aporia of a single one, now forceus to remain with, to remain before, t h i s par t icu lar vrhatness, to keep it before us- though we no longer understand it and thus su stain the tension of knovring andnot knowing in which i t involves us. I t presents i t s e l f to us indeed as a tension,. andin two senses: Firs t of a l l , it presents i t s e l f both as what it i s , and yet as some-thing unclear; for it i s prec ise ly what- i t - is tha t has now become unclear . filat i sone tension. The second tens ion re la tes mere obviously to us, to understanding: a l -though we remain in contac t with th i s whatness, th i s contact has become d ~ s t a n t i a t e d orstretChed opened up without breaking ent i rely so tha t we now "have" th i s what-ness have it befo re u a and yet do not know what it i s tha t we now have.

In thus suddenly becoming for the f i r s t time problematic, th i s whatness a t oncebecomes fo r the f i r s t time thematic for us. In becoming problematic, it fo r the f i r s ttime awakens our thematic in te r e s t5 in i t se l f . I t i s in i t s f i r s t becoming somethingproblematic, strange, tha t our at t en t ion i s f i r s t called to th is whatness. ',/e behold

. , , Ith i s whatneas now in an a t t i tude of ~ i l o l f ' " ' ' "-.7(OP1T1r([)V - a posture of beholding/apore t i ca l ly . Inseparably embodied in th ia baholding are the arche 's having become

thematic, as well as i t s having become problematic. This i s to say t ha t t h i s beholdingembodie s the af o re-mentioned tens ion between knowing and not knowing. And tha t i s to

) Isay t h a t the po sture of ~ W ( f " " 0< TfQf'1T1/(a v' - of beholding aporet ical ly i s thesel f-format ion of .!! quest ion.

A que etion, so fo rmed, and embody ing in th i s way the tension between knowing andnot knowing, i s not simply some sort of "thought-object", over and against us; it i sfa r r a ther a s ta te of tension within us. As a tension, the quest ion ca l l s upon us ,awakens us , sets thinking in motion. A question, so formed, const i tutes i t s e l f as ademand. I t i s th i s demsnd tha t the que stion make s upon us, whi ch prompted me at theoutset to characterize wonder as a ! l t h i n k i n g ~ 1 1 o f w s 11 - witr..out passage; 8S a l Imove-ment without t r ans i t ion" . The que st ion sets thinking in motion, but th i s motion i s

5. This not ion of "thematic in te r e s t " i s taken from Busserl . Cf. :i:rfahrung und Urtei l , f20at passim.


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"without passage": Here thinking i s unable to proceed, and yet unable to r es t .question i s a dynamic tension within us in 0 ther wo rd s, a demand upon us.

The being of a question i s not primari ly i t s verbal izat ion or l inguis t ic form-u1ation. These merely express it. The being of a question res ides in t ha t noet ic

, Idispos i t ion or posture of 7JtkJfr.'Vd,!T0f1T1kf)V', embodying the tens ion between knowingand not knowing. This posture i t s e l f i s ident i ca l with the question, fo r i t i s onewi th the se lf - formation of the 'iue s t ion .

Here I am helped by Hans-Georg Gademer. Let me ' iuote you a passage from the sec-ond p ar t o f Truth and Method. He say s I

"Any speech whi ch intend a to open up 0 r la y bare eomething, require a fo rcingopen th ia very th ing through the ' iueat ion. To queation means to bring intothe open. 'rlhat i s questioned must be put in suspension or brought into unse t t l edness . ':;:very (genuine) 'iue stion only acquire s i t s sense by passingthrough such unsett1edne sa, in which it become a an '2.E2!! que st ion. ",verygenuine question demands th i s openness."(",iahrheit und Metb.ode, p. 345)

I t i s , as I 've argued, a certain whatne aa tha t come s to be in que st ion whichi s to say tha t t h i s noet ic poature I em deacribing i s a re la t ionship which understand-ing has to t h i s whatnesa. I have already dascribed our aporetic re la t ionship to t h i swhatnesa a s a thematic "having" which i s at once a not knowing what it i s tha t we haveThi s ind ica te s tha t the 'iue s t ion tha t eo forms i t s e l f i s not ju st any 'iue s t ion . Ineofaas it i s the whatnasa of eomething which has become a problem for Us the whatne s si t s e l f , which we cannot r efer to anything else to reeolve the prob1am the 'iue stionwhich eo forms i t s e l f must express juat th i s relat ionship; ineof'ar as our noet ic a t-

"" J It i tude of ?J.,fu>fi- 1iI c{lTOf7f1KOV arises in the already indicated manner, jus t precise lyfrom a whetne"s become problematiC, it must be jus t t h i s whatness i t s e l f which i s re -f l ec ted in the se lf - formation of the ' illeation.

The whatneases of th ings the whatnesaes of th ings precise ly because they are) /

the JfX1-' in whose terms a l l things are understood; a l l th ings are retarrable to , arsubsumable under, these whatnesses for the i r unaerstanding i . e . , not only a ll parti cu lara and a l l re la t ions among part iculars , bu t indeed the whola matrix of in tercon-nectedneSS6S which we cal l our flworld ll Hence an encounter with 8 strange or unfamilia


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objec t immediately forma in ua the qUeation,"',ihat i s i t ?" , whose reoolut ion involvesthe r e f e r r a l of the ob jec t to the appropriate whatnesses. But where do we stand whenthese whatnesaea themselvea have become strange?

A ,tlhatnesa becomes strange, problematic. Thinking i9 set in motion, yet t h i s

thinking without passage. ',ie are unable to r e s t , and yet unable to pro-ceed. '.Ie have th i s whatne aa now befo re us though we are now aware tha t we do notany longer know what it i s tha t we have before us - t h i s whatneaa i s . The pre -thematic famil iar i ty w n ~ c n we had always had with th i s whatneaa now gives way to a, 'posture o f 7Jwff7v ol.nOf7 (l1({)V Having th i s ' .hatnesa before me in th i s way, and un-able to move anywhere, I must ask it - as I would have to ask o f any strange objec t

what i t i s . The quest ion which thus forms i t s e l f in our noetic posture of z . 9 ; [ W ( E ~ V ) 1iLiTO!1rl/


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a l l the o the r poss ible quest ions which the categories express. rh i s i s to say ' any anda l l quest ions which can be asked of anything are ult imately and necesarily refer rableto the primary and cent ra l quest ion, the "',vhat is" quest ion.

I have already had occasion to refer to a cer tain passage from Hans-Georg Gadamer'Truth and Method, where he ind ica tes tha t the being o f something f i r s t comes to l igh tin the que s t ioning about it tha t it i s the gue s t ion I


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/1,unaccountable) and if we understand th i s phrase, "the being of beings", accordingly,we can say tha t wonder - the f a l l into perplexi ty.-;1each being, the "what i s" of each being, i t s ' ~ 6 5

brings us before the being o f

This transcendence which wonder brings about does not resu l t in the collapse o fa l l the beings into a mere homogeneoua unity in which a ll difference disappears . Inbeing brought before the being o f beings, wonder brings ua before what i s i r reduciblyan e ide t ic manifold, a range of whatnessea. Nor, in turn , i s our transcendence o f thesewhatnesaes (we are , a f te r a l l , now before them i . e . , beyond them) simply the moveto some th ing beyond them; th i s move i s far rathar from the sa whatne sse s taken asindependent, to these aame whatnesses taken as no longer merely independent; it i s themove to t he i r ul t imate .!!Q!!-independence. 6 ' ,londer i9 t he , ( , fX{ of philosophy because i ti s tha t r ad ica l and all-encompassing transcendence which i s at once coth a thematiza-

and a revelat ion of the essent i a l ly aporet ic innernesa of the being tha t i s them-at i zed . I t i s in jus t t h i s way tha t , in tranacending the ' ,


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in deta i l i s the task fo r which th i s lecture has been only a prologue.

* * *Let me conclude by way of an epilogue: I began th i s lecture Iii th a l ikely sto ry .

'ly point , of course, Was to t ry to persuade you how barren and ultimately unin teres t -ing such an account mu at be, . ince it cannot help but de stroy ju at lihat i t set s outto understand. But I now notice tha t , in my attempt to place before you the essent ialor ig in of philo sophy, I to o have had to give you a eo r t of reconstruct ion . .'U'ld Itherefore cannot end, without at leas t posing to myself the g,uestion, lihethertoo has been a l ikely s tory .

Thank you.

2

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Lenkowski Jon] the Origin of Philosophy