Lei Guang - Conceptual Change and the Democracy Movement

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ElusiveDemocracyConceptual Change and the Chinese

Democracy Movement, 1978-79 to 1989

LEIGUANG

Universityof Minnesota

"Politics s acommunicativelyconstitutedactivity."This claim has

been takento heartby manyscholars who pay attention o linguisticactionsin politicalpractice(Habermas,1984;Ball andPocock, 1988:

1;Skinner,1988).Politics maybe aboutassertingone's rightsagainsta dominantpower or makingallocative decisions or organizingand

building coalitions for a common purpose.Undergirdingall these

activities are concepts, words, and speech that make possible the

asserting, the decision making, the organizing, and the coalitionbuilding.

With aneye to thesignificanceof thecommunicativedimensionof

politics,thisarticlerevisits two rhetorical itesof China'sdecade-long

democracymovementfrom 1978-79 to 1989. One is the DemocracyWall movementof the winter of 1978-79;the otheris the student-led

Pro-Democracymovement of 1989. On both occasions, democracywas the rallyingcause for tens of thousandsof participants.The word

minzhu-the closest Chinese translationof democracy-was repeat-edly invoked by the activists. In this article, I try to analyze and

understandhis centralconceptinthe contextof these two movements.

I retainthe Chinese wordminzhuwheneverpossible and use democ-

racy only when the wordminzhugets in the way of presentation.1

AUTHOR'S NOTE: l am indebted o Daniel Kelliherfordetailed commentsonearlier versions

of this article. I would also like to acknowledgethe comments and support of Lisa Disch,

RaymondDuvall,Jim

Johnson,Li

Lianjiang,Bruce

Lincoln,Liu

Qing,Bill

Seeley,and

WangDongmei. Thanksto RichardGunde,StanleyRosen, and two anonymousrefereesof Modem

Chinafor valuablesuggestions.

MODERN HINA,Vol.22No.4,October 996 417-447? 1996SagePublications,nc.

417



418 MODERNCHINA OCTOBER 996

Conceptually,democracy n itsChineseincarnations a mixtureof

many elements inheritedfromChinese historyand lifted out of theWesterndemocraticdiscourse.Given the rapidityand the extent of

conceptual change in China,any conceptualcontinuitiesin the case

of minzhu areall the moreremarkable.Discussingthesecontinuities

gives insight nto thedistinguishing haracteristics f theChinese dea

of minzhu.

Duringthedecadefrom1978-79to 1989,theconceptof minzhuas

reflected in popular protest movements underwent a qualitative

change.As old meaningswere lost and new ones weregained,and asemphasesshifted,peopleof 1989 spokea quitedifferent anguageof

minzhu from those of 1978-79.

MINBEN, DEMOCRACYAND MINZHU

The claim that the 1989 movementwas democratic s disputable

onseveralgrounds.Some authorshavesuggested hat heparticipants'vision of democracy representedonly personalisticand reactively

oppositionaldemands Solinger,1989:621-632). Othershavepointedout that hewaythe studentsorganizedhemselves was not democratic

at all (Lubman, 1989; Hunger strikers'declaration,cited in Wu

Mourenet al., 1989:552). Still othershaveargued hat hedemocracyactivists excluded peasantsfrom their vision and showed signs of

paternalisticelitism towardothersegmentsof society (Esherickand

Wasserstrom,1990:835-865; Jacobs,1991: 13; Shue, 1992: 157-168;Kelliher,1993:379-396;Walder ndGongXiaoxia,1993:1-29).Inspiteof all these counterclaims,nobodydisputesthe fact thatthroughoutthe movement,virtuallyall participantsnvokedone word-minzhu-

almostas if it were a mantra.As is typicalof politicalmovements n

modernChina, the 1989 democracymovement saw chargesmade,

speeches delivered, petitions signed, declarations issued, posters

posted,andslogans shouted.Democracy-minzhu-remained in the

center of this hubbub of activities. At the rhetorical evel at least,participantsn the movementheld minzhu o be theirgoal andsoughtto practiceit amongthemselves.2

Minzhu was also the most frequentlyused single word in the

activists' vocabularyduringthe 1978-79 DemocracyWallperiod.A



Guang/ ELUSIVEDEMOCRACY 419

contentanalysisof the majorunderground ublications henshows it

was used 173 times in Tansuo Exploration),260 timesin Siwu luntan(April5 Forum),and 255 times inBeijingzhichun(Beijing Spring)-

comparedwith 153,226, and 247 times,respectively, or the nextmost

popularword,renmin people)(LiuShengji,1984:161). InZhongguo

renquan(China's Human Rights), minzhuappeared80 times, next

only to renquan (human rights), which appeared 85 times (Liu

Shengji, 1984: 161).But whatdid the democracyactivistsreallymean when they cried

out minzhuin TiananmenSquare?Some participantsadmitted theirown ignoranceof the term. "I don't know exactly what democracy

[minzhu]is," one studentsaid, "butwe need more of it" (WuDunn,

1989).Anotherself-styled "professional evolutionary" eldthat"de-

mocracy[minzhu]primarilymeans a politicalsystemthat strivesfor

democracy[minzhu]" posteratBeijingNormalUniversity,quoted n

HanMinzhu, 1990: 142).Political scientists have done little to unpackthis centralconcept

to understandts differentmeaningsin the Chinesecontext. AndrewNathan(1985, 1989)has gone the farthest n emphasizingthe uniquefeaturesof Chinesedemocracybut hasstoppedshortof a full-fledged

conceptual analysis that aims at explicating the multiple meaningsattached o the termby the democracyactivists.

The Chinesewordminzhu s composedof two characters:min and

zhu.3Min in traditionalChinadenoted "thegoverned,""thepublic"or "the common people" in contrastto officialdom.This usage has

continued into the present in such expressionsas minyi (public [incontrastto official] opinions)and minxuan popularlyelected [ratherthan appointedby officials]). In the Communistparlance,however,min has acquireda class meaning.It came to stand for renmin(the

people), which at various stages of the People's Republic included,

according othe officialdefinition, heproletariat,hepoorpeasants, nd

othersocialelementssupposedly upportingheCommunist evolution.

The antithesisof renmin onsistsof so-calledclass enemies.

Thus the character min takes on two meanings when used incombinationwith zhu: it can denote the common people (vis-a-vis

officials) or people with a class distinction(vis-a-vis class enemies).As we can readilysee, both definitionsregardmin as a generic and

corporate term. Here, min does not denote "individual"(geren).




Rather, t refersto whatSunYat-sencalled"anyunifiedandorganized

body of men"(SunYat-sen,1981:39).However,mincan also denote"individuals."Since the rise of the

human rights discourse in the late 1970s, min as in minzhuhas

increasinglycome to be understoodas "individualcitizens." Sincesuch an understandingmoved away from the corporate/collectivedefinitionsof min,minzhu ould nowbe definedas"individual ights"or definedin such a waythat t wouldincorporate s legitimatepartialwelfarist demandsby individualsor groups of individuals.Such a

definition has allowed activists to assert their individual,oftentimesparochial nterests n the nameof minzhu.

Like min, the othercharacter hat makes up the term minzhu-

namely, zhu-also has multiplemeanings.These rangefrom quiteparticular enses-for example,yijia zhi zhu(family head)or zhuren

(master)-to a moregeneralsense. Inancienttimes, forexample,the

emperorwas calledthe zhuunderheaven,while hisdukes andprinceswereregardedas the zhuof landandgrain(Ci yuan, 1984:95). When

combined with min to formminzhu,zhuseems to take on two mean-ings that areslightlyyet importantly ifferent romeach other.In the

first sense, it can be used in combinations uch as zhuren master) n

contrast opuren(servant);nthesecond,it cansuggestwhat szhuyao

(primary) ncontrast o ciyao (secondary)."Master"meansbeingputin charge, while "primary"only means being taken seriously by,perhaps,someone who is in charge.The differentinterpretations f

the wordzhu thus invoke a qualitativedifference in the interpreters'

attitude owardthe masses.Combiningmin andzhu, we get minzhu.But we have to keep in

mind thatminhas three differentmeaningsor senses, while zhu has

only two. The variouscombinationsof the differentmeaningsof thetwo charactersyield differentconceptionsof the single termminzhu.

Table 1 triesto capture hecomplexityandthe entanglednatureof

the Chinese concept minzhu.As we can see, at least six different

conceptionscan be articulated, ach drawing upona differentset of

meaningsof the two characters.Theyreflect the influence of diverseelements from Chinese history,Marxism,populism,and the liberal

democratic traditionprivileging individual liberty over collective

interests. In that sense, there is little correspondencebetween the

various notions of minzhuand Westernnotions of democracy.4The



Guang ELUSIVEDEMOCRACY 421

concept representedby theworddemocracy-in its Greekorigins,its

early modem transformationn the handsof Locke, Rousseau, andMontesquieu, ts modemmetamorphosisn the form of representative

governmentas envisionedby Mill andMadison,down to theradicali-

zation of democracyalong class lines in the writingsof Marx and

Engelsandthe ascendenceof humanrightsdiscourse nrecentyears-has followed a historicaltrajectorypeculiarto Westernculture. De-

mocracy has acquiredits meanings (and transformed hem in the

process)from thesecontexts.Therangeof meaning s huge.Thesame

is trueof Chinese minzhu.Thelatter,however,springs romadifferenttraditionandacquires ts meaningin a differentcontext.The ancient

teachings of Confucius and Mencius regardingthe importanceof

people'swelfareto the healthof theprincedom, hethousandsof yearsof tradition of remonstratingby intellectuals-cum-officials, he un-

even interjectionof Westerndemocratic deasattheturnof thecentury,the Communistrepresentation f a class-baseddemocracy-all this,

togetherwith the recentimportationof Westerndiscourseon human

rights,makesminzhuan amalgamof meaningsincorporating ariousstrandsof thought, entangledand hardlyamenable to a single inter-

pretation. n spiteof the impactof Western deas since the turnof the

century (Westernideas have served to popularizeminzhu tremen-

dously in China),minzhustill has to be understood, f understoodat

all, in its "internal rameworkof significance"(Womack,1991: 54).The following is ananalyticexercisethattries to mapout the different

conceptionsof minzhuin contemporaryChinabefore we proceedto

a historicalexaminationof the rhetoricof politicalactivists in 1978-79and in 1989.

The traditionalChinese conception (see Table 1, section 1) is

embodiedin the ideaof minben-treating the welfare of thecommon

people as thebasisof the wealthandpowerof thepolity.Itis reflected

in the classic Chinese statementmin wei bangben(people alone are

the basis of the state)andin Mencius'injunction hat"most mportantarethemin;next come the landandgrain;and ast,theprinces" Cihai,

1979:4130).5Such a conception,however,presupposesa distinctionbetween the ruler and the ruled, and exhorts the ruler to put the

commonpeople'sinterestaboveeverything lse to secure hekingdom.It ultimatelyenvisions a unity of interestbetween the governorand

the governed.Minben is very much a paternalistic dea. It seeks to



TABLE1: Conceptions of Minzhuin the Chinese Context

Min

Zhu Pingmin CommonPeople, Renmin(People,in

in Contrasto Officials) Contrast o ClassEnemies)

Zhuyao,Ben(primary, asis, 1. Minben:commonpeopleas 3. ChineseCommunistParty'sin contrast o secondary, thebasis,as someone whose welfare conceptionof minzhu: heforme

nonessential) is of primary mportance exploitedpeople (e.g., proletariaas the basis or as someonewhose

welfare is of primary mportance

Zhurenmaster,n contrast 2. Conceptionof minzhuby some 4. Marxistconceptionof minzhu:

to servant) of the 1978-79 activists:common the formerlyexploited people (e.g

peopleas themaster of theirown proletariat) ecomingthemaster

destiny;"self-controlby thecommon of theirown destiny;"class-base

people" controlof the state"




ensure the welfareof the commonpeople in orderto keep the rulers

in power,not to extend to the people autonomyandpowerof partici-pation in government.It is truethat, in the case of Mencius, he also

advocatedoverthrowof immoralrulerswho fail to securethe welfare

of the people. But his writingsare firmly in the genreof cautionaryadvice to princesabout the properway of governingtheirsubjects-thatis, practicingwangdao (the kingly way) and renzheng(humane

rule) (Lin Mousheng, 1942:29-59; Xiao Gongquan,1982).6

Many Chinesecommentatorswould regard his idea of minben as

a majorobstacleto minzhubecauseit does not ask foranythingmorethana passive people anda benignruler(LiuZehua,1986:25-33). It

does notcall for the participation f the ruledin the governingof the

polity. It stops shortof encouragingthe rulers to put the interestsof

the ruledahead of everythingelse. In this lattersense, minbendoes

allow common people to hold governmentofficials accountable for

their actions. Governmentactions endangeringthe welfare of the

common people, such as corruptionandbureaucratism, re likely to

draw the wrath of the people and so would be deemed as not inconformitywith the doctrineof minben.As we will see in examiningthe rhetoric of the Chinese democracyactivists, the idea of minben

has apparentlybeen incorporatednto theirconceptionsof minzhu.

The popular images associated with minzhu as minben consist of

enlightenedemperorsof thepastandpopularofficials like Bao Zhengof the Song dynasty who consistently protectedthe interests of the

commonfolk againstthe powerful.7

Besides thetraditionalChinesediscourse of minben,another nflu-ential strandof thoughtaffectingthe Chineseunderstandingf minzhu

comes from Marxism (see Table 1, section 4). Marx's vision of

democracy-exploited people rising up, smashingthe old state ma-

chine, andsupplanting t with proletariandictatorship-has capturedthe imaginationof Chinese youths since early in this century.Here,minhas acquireda class meaning:its ranksconsist of the proletariatand its allied classes that had been exploitedby the bourgeoisieand

other dominatingclasses. Zhu here indicates the people's desire tobecome themasterof theirown destinybydirectlyparticipatingnthe

managementandcontrolof thestate.The dominantmageof aminzhu

system is thatof the ParisCommune,which practicedradicalegali-tarianismandworking-class self-management.




As we will see, the model of the ParisCommuneinspired many

Chineseyouthsin theircall for minzhu n 1978-79.Theseyouthstookto heart radicalegalitarianismand the idea of self-government,al-

thoughthey did not necessarilysharethe view that min had a class

connotation.Theirswas a populistvision,concernedmorewithmin as

ordinary eoplethanmin asprogressive lasses(see Table1, section2).The Chinese CommunistParty(CCP) had its own twist on Paris

Commune-styleminzhuin the 1970s. The CCPespoused a certain

degree of egalitarianismand committeditself to mass mobilization

anda measureof direct local-levelparticipationn thegovernmentbythe people. But the CCP was more concerned with enacting mass-

regarding policies throughthe vanguardparty than with allowing

people direct controlof the policymakers.The goal was to mobilize

masssupport or the implementation f policy,not mass involvement

in itsformation.To theextentthat heCCPregardedmassparticipationmoreas a tool for achievingpolicy goals thanas an end in itself, the

party'sconceptionof minzhu borean importantaffinityto the tradi-

tional Chineseidea of minben.TheCCP'sconceptionof minzhuthusreflectedthe confluenceof bothMarxist deology andthe traditional

minbendoctrine(see Table1, section3).In the late 1970s,coincidingwith the end of the CulturalRevolution

(which had revealedthe vulnerabilityof individualsto the arbitraryexerciseof power)and PresidentCarter'spromotionof humanrightsin a majorreorientation f U.S. foreignpolicy,manyChinese came to

understandminzhu o havea very importantndividualisticdimension

(see Table1,section6). Giventhepredominantlyollective definitionof minin the Chinesepoliticaltradition,minzhuas "individual ights"marksa significantbreakwithpastdemocratic hinking n China.

The above five conceptionsthatI have chosento identifyindicate

the richness and complexity of the concept of minzhu.8They also

reflect the shapinginfluenceof the differentstrandsof traditionand

thoughtin Chinese history.But taxonomyis fraughtwith danger.In

reality, he idealtypesarenowhere nstantiatedwiththe sameartificial

analytic clarity. The various conceptions of minzhu overlap to aconsiderableextent. Any person'sidea of minzhumay be a mixture

of thevariousconceptions.Theconceptevolves asanyoneconceptionor a particularmixtureof certainconceptionsgains ascendenceover

anotherone or anotherset of conceptionalmixes. The mainpartof




thisarticleis anexerciseinexamining hedemocracyactivists'usages

of the term minzhuand in drawingout the conceptualassumptionsbehind them. In the following two sections, I first dwell on the

continuities hathave marked hedemocracymovements rom1978-79to 1989. I thenanalyzethe important hanges thatultimatelyset thetwo movementsapart.

CHINESEDEMOCRACY: ONCEPTUAL

CONTINUITIES ROM1978-79 TO 1989

The 1978-79 DemocracyWallmovementcame in theaftermathof

the Cultural Revolution. The ideological hegemony of the Mao era

was then graduallyyielding to a call for the "emancipationof themind." Consideredby Deng Xiaoping as an importantpreconditionfor "emancipating he mind,"minzhuwas put on the official Com-

munistParty agendafor the remainingdecades of the century(Deng

Xiaoping, 1984: 151-165). At the same time, however, a group ofyoung activists upstagedthe partyin the winter of 1978-79 by pub-

lishing a spate of independent ournalsdevoted to the discussion of

China's political system in general and the practice of minzhu in

particular.The movementstartedwith the posting of big- and small-characterposterson a 200-yard-longbrick wall at the intersectionof

Chang'anAvenue and XidanStreet n Beijing. Whatsprang romthisact has since become known to minzhuactivists as theXidanDemoc-

racy Wall movement. Ten years later,at the end of a decade-longnational struggle for economic reform and political liberalization,

Beijing students ed anotherpopularmovementthatcalledfor minzhu

and otherpoliticalreforms.Thismovement lastedbarelya monthanda half and, as the world knows, was violently suppressed by the

government in June 1989. This short-lived mass-basedprotesthassince becomepopularlyknown nthe Westas the 1989Pro-Democracymovement.9

Importantcontinuities in areasother thanconcepts exist betweenthe two movements.Some activists of the 1978-79 movementstayedon and were prominentleaders again in 1989.10 Some issues, like

freedom of the press and direct election of national leaders, werecommon to both movements. There were also continuities in the




tacticsemployedby theactivists who saw themselvesmore as remon-

strators rom withinthe systemthanopponentsof theparty-stateandwho largelyrenouncedviolence as a meansof achievingdemocratic

change (Nathan,1985: 24-26, 1989). At the conceptuallevel, there

were two particularly trong continuitiesbetween the movements:

their nationalistic orientation and their inadequateattentionto the

conflictive natureof interests.

First, both the Democracy Wall and the 1989 minzhu activists

regardedminzhumoreas an organizingprinciplefor nationaldevel-

opmentandprosperityhanapolitical principle orreconcilingdiffer-ent interestsandideologies thatmightwell retard conomicdevelop-ment in the shortrun.Minzhuwasdesirable,Chineseactivists seemed

to believe, becauseit representedhebestdevelopmental trategyfor

the Chinese nation. Such recognitionwas based on one key observa-

tion and a resultantbelief. The observationwas that the economic

powersof the worldall operatedundera democraticpolitical system.The resultantbelief wasthat,shouldChinaasanationwantto become

wealthy and powerful, it must first of all become politically demo-cratic(minzhu).Therelationshipbetweendemocracyandnationalism

can be highly problematic,of course; indeed,in historythe two have

often actedasopposingforces. Chinesedemocracyactivists,however,see a close connection:no democracy,nopowerandprosperity or the

nation."

In 1978-79,activists wereconvinced thatthe realizationof minzhu

was a necessaryconditionfor the four modernizations nshrinedby

the Deng regime. "From the standpointof modem history,"WeiJingshengconfidentlywrote, "we can see that the economies of all

well-run democracies[minzhuguojia] have developedfast andwith

increasingmomentumuntil a very high level has been reached....

We are fully justified in asserting that democracy [minzhu] is a

prerequisite for rapid economic modernization"(Wei Jingsheng,1980: 63). In a paragraphhat was typicalof the openingstatements

of all independentminzhu ournals,Minzhuyu shidai(Minzhuand the

Times)proclaimed:

Without osteringdemocracy minzhu],withoutprotectinghepeople'srightsandbuildingthecountry hroughdemocracy minzhu], t wouldbe impossible for any country to build itself into a thriving and

prosperous tate. A citizen's purposein demandingdemocracy[min-



Guang ELUSIVE DEMOCRACY 427

zhu] and humanrights s for the constructionof thecountryand forthe

prosperityof the entirenation.He shouldhave no other

objectivethan

this[Minzhuushidai,no.1,quotednTong,1980-1981: 5].

Suchlanguagepermeatedhewritingsof minzhuactivists n 1978-79.

Some of the rhetoricby 1989 activists was strikinglysimilar.In the

"NewMay4thManifesto,"studentsproclaimed hat"[W]eonly have

one goal: the modernizationof China"(quotedin WuMourenet al.,1989: 131). On this point, studentsdid not think that their views

differedfundamentally rom those of the government.In a "Letter o

Chinese acrossthe Nation,"a groupof studentspronounced hat"thesole objective of the tens of thousandsof college students s to build

up the nationthroughminzhu[minzhu iguo]."Andtheyclaimedthat

they sought "nothingother than the power and prosperityof the

Chinese nation"(quotedin WuMourenet al., 1989:324). Takingthe

power andprosperityof Chinaas theirgoal, Chinesestudents aulted

the existing political institutionsandlongedfor a minzhusystemthat

would facilitatemodernization.Priorto 1989, manystudentsblamed

whatthey perceivedto be thestallingof China'seconomyon the lackof political reform.To them, economic reformhad reached such an

impasse in the late 1980s thata breakthroughould only come about

with the implementationof a minzhusystem.Thus one of the persistent points in the Chinese conceptions of

minzhuhasbeen its nationalisticorientation;activistspromotedmin-

zhu because of its value to the nation. In this light, some minzhu

activists'emphasison individualrightsappeared o strikea discordant

note in the general discourse of minzhu. On closer analysis, thisdiscordance was not that serious.In the case of the DemocracyWall

movement,minzhuas individualrightshadfew advocatesbesidesWei

Jingsheng (Nathan, 1985: 106). In 1989, student activists, while

emphasizing the value of individual rights, were careful to let the

public know that their struggle for individualismwas not just to

promoteandprotect ndividual nterests."Wehave no selfish motives

or hidden ambitions"was the message students riedto convey to the

nation. "Ouractions . . . sprangfrom our patriotichearts,from our

pure and loyal love for our great motherland"(poster at BeijingAeronauticsInstitute,quotedin Han Minzhu, 1990:76). If modern-

ization of the countryneeded minzhuand if minzhuneeded individu-




alism, then the power and prosperityof China could not be secured

except through ndividualism.Thusthe seemingcontradiction n thediscourse on minzhu between the nationalisticorientationand the

emphasison individualismwas reconciled.

A second continuityconsists in the fact that,unlike the Westernnotionof democracy, he Chineseconceptof minzhu is not anchoredin a strongassumptionof the legitimacyof pluralisticandcontradic-

toryinterests.By the late 1980s,themythof unitarynterestshadbeen

shaken,and there was a tendencyto identifyminzhu with a certain

degree of political pluralism. But "interests"and conflict amonginterestshadyet to take centerstage in the Chineseconception.Two

consequencesfor the minzhumovementfollow from such a lack of

emphasison interests.First, activists tend to elevate minzhu to the

level of a moralprinciple nsteadof groundingt inconcrete nterests.

Second, when they do talk about interests,they are blind to anyconflict among them. Instead, they see Confucian values such as

cooperation, voluntarism,and general harmonyin any system of

minzhu(Xiao Gongquan,1982; Nathan,1985).In 1978-79, for example, minzhu activists called on their fellow

travelers o rise above their"personalnterests"andplunge into "the

struggleof reforming he society" along minzhuprinciples(Renmin

zhisheng,no. 3, quoted in Tong, 1980-1981: 36). Renouncingone's

personal, thus partial, interestsand embracingthe interests of the

whole was a moral act thataffirmed he highmoral value of minzhu.

Activistsadopting he Marxistconceptionof minzhusoughtto restore

the sovereignty of the people; those embracingthe rights-centeredconception eulogized abstractrightsof existence. The most explicitinterest-basedconceptionof minzhu came in the form of the tradi-

tional Chinese notion of minben in which minzhu was defined as

active concernfor the welfareof thepeople.But hereagain,people'swelfare was definedin collective terms.Withoutpartialityandplural-

ity, such collective welfare could easily attain the status of a moral

imperative o bechampioned. n 1989,such moralisticunderstandings

of minzhucontinued. ntellectualactivistsshunned"specialrightsandinterests"and claimedto be "spokesmen ortheentire nation and the

vanguardof social justice" (posterat People's University,quotedin

Han Minzhu, 1990: 35). Throughan ultimate act of self-sacrifice,

hungerstrikers ntendedto use their wisdomand actionsto make the




government"feel ashamed"in face of the moral force of minzhu

activists (Hungerstrikers'declaration,quotedin Wu Mouren et al.,1989: 553). As a Westernjournalistobserved, in Chinese politics,minzhu was "as much a moral issue as a political one" (WuDunn,

1989).When minzhu activists did acknowledgethe importanceof partial

and individualistic nterests, heyseemed to adopta verybenignview

and envisionaharmonious elationship mongthem.Minzhuactivists

wanted to believe that once minzhu was achieved, people would

naturallycooperate for the common good. This was clear in thethoughtof DemocracyWall activists who saw minzhuas "acoopera-tive system"that"recognizes heequal rightsof all humanbeingsand

resolves all socialproblems n thebasisofcooperation"WeiJingsheng,1980:65). Again, in 1989, minzhu activists wantedto adopt"aspiritof toleranceandcooperation"and thus defined democraticpoliticsas

"politicswithoutenemies and without hementalityof hatred"Hungerstrikers'declaration,quoted n WuMourenet al., 1989:550-551). No

fundamentalconflict of interest was recognized.Minzhu became asymbol of harmonyof interests instead of a means for reconcilingdifferences.

ELUSIVEDEMOCRACY: ONCEPTUAL

CHANGESFROM 1978-79 TO1989

Despitethe two fundamental ontinuities n the conceptof minzhudiscussedabove,therewere mportantonceptual hangesduringdecadethatseparatedheDemocracyWallmovementof 1978-79fromthe 1989

protestmovement. Semantic identity-that minzhuwas proclaimedby both movements-does not entail conceptual continuity-thatminzhu as used in 1978-79 and 1989 referredto the same thing.Conceptual discontinuitypoints towardlargerdifferences in the na-

ture of the two democracymovements.

Thesocial,economic,andpoliticalcontexts withinwhich these twomovements took place could not have been moredifferent.In 1978,in the wake of the CulturalRevolution,China was still in the gripof

a tightlycontrolledcommandeconomyandaninterventionistadmin-

istrativestate.To minzhuactivists,thepressingconcern thenwas how




to paredown the colossal state machineandto makeeconomic and

political decision makingan accountableprocess. It was a time ofreopeningto the outside worldafterdecades of isolation.Contempo-

rarynon-MarxistWestern deas, such as the idea of humanrights,

beganto trickleintothe publicconsciousness of certainsegmentsof

the Chinesepopulation.Furthermore, ecause no newpoliticalvision

had exerteda hegemonicinfluencein the nation, t was also a time of

openedpossibilitiesin politics.Adecadelater, nthe midstof economic liberalization ndagradual

retreatfrom a commandeconomy, the Chinese governmentseemedto have convinced its people of the virtue of the market n regulatingeconomicactivity.Almostsimultaneously,however,bykeepingto the

old rigid political system (or one perceivedas such by students),it

openedupthepoliticalfront or contestationand attackby disaffected

intellectualsandordinary itizens. As we will see, inthis environment

animportant hangeoccurred n the minzhudiscourse: t shifted from

both political and economic criticism of the governmentto almost

purelypoliticalcriticism.12 hus,as much as theywereconstitutiveofthesehistoricalcontexts,debateson minzhu n thesetwoperiodswere

shapedbythechangingnatureof the Chinese stateandthenewpoliticsof marketreform.

FROMDIVERSITY O UNIFORMITY

The winterof 1978-79wascertainlya timeof ideologicalcontention

in China.Readingthe postersthat covered the DemocracyWall,onecannotbut be struckby thediversityof the viewsexpressedon minzhu,

ranging romMarxistanalysis o theWesternhuman ightsdiscourse.

Most of thepostersand ournalarticleson minzhuof thistimewere

written n line with the dominantpoliticaldiscourse-Marxism of the

late 1970s. People like WangXizhe and ChenErjintriedto distill a

theoryof minzhu romMarx'swritingsor fromcontemporary racticein the Communist countries (Wang Xizhe, 1983a: 51-85, 1983b:

66-85; Chen Erjin, 1984). Minzhu,as one commentatorput it, was"peoplebecomingmastersof theirown lives" (ZhouXun, 1983:241).Socialist minzhushould"notonly affirmpeople's rightto speakout

[on public affairs],but moreimportantly, houldallow the people to

manage state affairs" by electing representativesand supervising




leaders at various levels (Zhou Xun, 1983: 249). In their calls for

minzhu, those who adopteda Marxistperspectivewere most con-cerned with the alienationof the CCP from thepeopleandthegrowingbureaucratismwithin thegovernment.Theirmost commonreferences

were to Marx'sdiscussion of theParisCommuneandtheYugoslavian

worker-management ystem. WangXizhe calledon theparty o regu-late its relations with people according to "the principlesof Paris

Commune"(WangXizhe, 1983a:53). LuMin, in anarticle nBeijingzhi chun (Beijing Spring), talked about abolishing "the system of

appointingcadres"andestablishinga minzhusystem "modeledafterthe Paris Commune"(Lu Min, 1980: 72). Chen Erjinidentified the

principlesof the ParisCommune as one of the three sources of "the

proletarian-democraticminzhu] system" (Chen Erjin, 1984: 15).Whatattractedhesepeopleto the ParisCommune,as one of themputit, was the power of controlover elected leaders(thepowerof recall

was mentionedfrequently)and the egalitarianwage structureunder

which leaders werepaidno more thanordinaryworkers Beijing yige

tielu gongren,1983:124-127).Thecontemporaryxampleof Yugoslavia,with its workers'self-governmentsystem in public enterprises,also

attractedthe attention of many minzhu activists. In their vision,minzhu meantnotonly citizens'participationbut a degreeof positive

public controlover state affairs.

While most of the writings during this period were couched in

Marxist erminologyandanalysis,therealsoappeared distinctstrand

of thought focusing on human rights and the protectionof human

individuality.Well-knownrepresentatives f this approachwere WeiJingsheng, the formerpublisherof Tansuo(Exploration),and Ren

Wandingof the HumanRights League.WeiJingshengsuggestedthat

minzhu was a system in which "all men have an equalpolitical rightto fight for the rightof existence" (Wei Jingsheng, 1979: 309). He

claimed thatthe theoryof dictatorshipof the proletariat"deniedthe

right of individuals in a society to satisfy their differentgoals and

wishes" (WeiJingsheng,1979:304). He wrote:

Society is composedof different ndividualsand,according o natural

instincts, each individualexists independently.People's sociality is

formed of the common characterand common interests of manydifferent individuals.... People's sociality dependson individualityjustas humansocietiesnecessarilydependontheexistenceof individu-




als.... People'sindividualityenjoyspriorityovertheirsociality [Wei

Jingsheng,1980:

57].

Such daringassertions of individuality against society struck a

sympatheticchord among people who had suffered the capriciousabuse of powerby both leaders and "themasses"during he Cultural

Revolution.RenWanding, or example,had builtup an organization

centering solely on concernwith humanrights.The NineteenPoints

of his HumanRights League broke new ground by calling on the

governmentto respect citizens' civil liberties and their economic

rights Zhongguo enquanongmen,1983:288-292).InWeiJingsheng'sand Ren Wanding'sconception, minzhu was predicatedupon the

political primacyof rights. Minzhu was thus less about achieving

positive control over governmentalpolicies than aboutcarvingout a

realm of freedom for individualsagainstthe power of the state and

society.Suchindividualismalso affirmed heequalityof everyperson.Mixed with the Marxistdiscourseof minzhu and the languageof

"rights"was the traditionalChinese idea of minben. As I have sug-

gested,this idea assumesthe existence of a collectiveentitycalled min

(people)whose interestsare in thecustodyof thegovernment. Here,minis understoodn corporate,not individualistic, erms.)A unityof

interestis positedbetween the min and their rulers.A good govern-ment, a governmentthat upholds the principleof minbenand thus

deserves the name of minzhu, is one that strives to maximize the

collective welfareof thepeople.Such a corporatist,welfaristconcep-tion of minzhufoundexpressioneven in WeiJingsheng'sostensiblyindividualist anguage.For WeiJingsheng, ndividual nterestswould

naturally onvergeoncetheywere allowedtheopportunityodevelop

freely.Eventually, ndividualsandsocietywould be in harmony Wei

Jingsheng,1980:58). Thus a minzhusystem, by allowing individual

development,promotesharmonyandenhances he collective welfare

of the people.For otheractivists,a participatoryminzhusystem also

enhancespeople'swelfare because it mobilizes"thewisdom, talents

andcreativespiritof all membersof society"in the people's interest

(Gong Min, 1980:233).If all threeconceptionsof minzhu-Marxist, rights-centered,and

traditionalwelfarist-were significantly present in the DemocracyWallperiod,that did not seem to be the case in 1989. It seems that




after a decade of contendingwith each other,one of them had won

out. Andthatone privilegedhumanrightsmore thananythingelse. Inthe 1989 Pro-Democracy movement, one could find few, if any,discussions of minzhubased on Marx'sanalysis of the Paris Com-

mune. Images of ParisCommune-styleminzhuand the Yugoslaviansystemwerenotconjuredupatall in anymajormasspublication.Norwere issues of economicdemocracysuch asworkplacecontrolcentralto the discussion. Welfarist conceptions were generally criticizedbecausetheylentthemselvesto use byeven autocraticgovernments.13

Instead, he Western dea of humanrightswasrepeatedlynvoked,andminzhu was frequentlydefined in termsof suchrights.An open letter

signed by intellectualsat the beginningof 1989 called on the govern-mentto releaseall political prisoners n aneffort to "conformwiththeworld's generaltrend that humanrightsare increasinglyrespected"(ChangChen-pang, 1989: 1). This call was important n setting the

general agenda for the minzhu activists. Many minzhu activists,

including people like Fang Lizhi who did not participatedirectly in

the movementbut whose ideas hadapowerful nfluenceonthestudentactivists, defined minzhu explicitly in terms of humanrights: "The

core of minzhu is recognitionof the basic rightsof all citizens, whoform oursociety as a whole. Itmeans thattheirbasicrightsas citizensand humanbeings should notbe somethingconferred romabove but

somethingwe arebornwith"(FangLizhi, 1988:83).

Following FangLizhi,ChaiLingdeclared hat"minzhu s a natural

right"(quotedin WuMouren et al., 1989:565). This was echoed by

overseas activists like Ni Yuxian,who claimed that "minzhu is therecognition by each personof equal rightsin beinga human.Minzhuis to ensurethe inviolabilityof these rights through egislation" (NiYuxian, 1989: 16). Some activists recognizeda difference betweenhumanrightsand minzhu.Buttheyagreed hat, nChina,humanrightshadto come firstbeforeminzhucouldbe realized DingChu,1989:21).In the springof 1989, humanrightsseemedto havecapturedmost ofthe imaginativemindsamongpro-democracyactivists.'4

FROMSUBSTANTIVEMINZHUTOPROCEDURALMINZHU

Thediversityof views on minzhu n thelate 1970sdid notprecludea common emphasison the substantiveaspectof a minzhusystem."5




As I have suggested, inspiredby the ParisCommunemodel and the

Yugoslavianexperience,activists then were concernedwith directcontrol of the decision-makingprocess and with the practice of

minzhu in the economic realmas well. To the extent thatthey were

concerned with proceduralmatters in safeguardingminzhu, theyremainedcognizantof the limitsof mereproceduralism-namely, it

may or may not lead to empowermentof the people in bothpoliticaland economic realms. Proceduremay be necessary,but it did not

define minzhuin andby itself for the activists.To preventthe CCP

from becoming the people's master,WangXizhe asserted,people'spower needed to be institutionalized o supervise the party (WangXizhe, 1983a:53). ChenErjinproposedthatthe monopolyof power

by the partybe replacedby theprincipleof "allpowerto thepeople"in a proletarian-minzhuystem. Under such a system, "consent and

ratificationby all workers would have to be sought on any matter

concerning hecreationof structures f power, he formulation f legalcodes, and the appointmentand dismissal of officeholders"(Chen

Erjin,1984: 174). Directcontrol,rather han the guaranteeof proce-duralrules, was the goal. To achieve such control,Chen Erjin sug-

gesteda "systemof conferencesof people'sdelegates"throughwhich

reallegislativeandsupervisorypowerwouldbe placedinthepeople'shands.

Sometimes, this emphasison political power and controlby the

peoplewas cast in thelanguageof rights.As one activistput t,minzhu

included"therightof individual itizenstohaveanimpactonsociety"

and "to takepart n themanagement f state andsocial affairs" Siwuluntan,quoted n Li Yizhe etal., 1983:182-183).In a socialistsystem,the meansof productionareowned but notdirectlycontrolledby the

people. This separationof ownershipandcontrol necessitatesa min-

zhusystemwhereby hepeoplecouldcontrol,notjustnominallyown,the means of production(see, e.g., Shi Huasheng, 1983: 167-181;Chen Erjin, 1984). They could only achieve this economic control

through control over the cadres (Lu Min, 1980: 76). Thus many

broadsidesby minzhuactivists were directedagainstthe cadre ap-pointmentsystem, the bureaucratism f stateorgans,and the aliena-

tion of the CCP frompopularcontrol.

If substantiveminzhu s definedby thegoal of empoweringpeople

politically and economically, proceduralminzhuemphasizesestab-




lishinga set of "correct" ulesandprocedures orpoliticians.By 1989,

minzhu activists were moreconcernedwith how leaders werechosenthan with who werechosen,withhowdecisions were made than with

what decisions were made."It is not importantwho is in power andwho is removed from power," Liu Xiaobo and his fellow hungerstrikersdeclared."[W]hat s important s the mannerin which onecomes to power and loses one's power. Appointing someone to a

position of powerorremovinghimfrom it withoutobservingminzhu

procedures only leads to autocracy"(quoted in Wu Mouren et al.,

1989: 552). To these minzhuactivists, the removal of Hu Yaobangfrom power two yearsbeforehadviolated minzhuprocedures.Theyrecalledthat none of the partysecretaries-general,ince the foundingof the CCP,left office in the good gracesof the party.Later into the

movement, they had reasonto fear that an unpleasantfate awaited

ZhaoZiyang. Putting ntoplacea set of procedural ules would serve

to curb the arbitrary xercise of power by the partyelders.

Not only did these activists thinkthat officials should be selected

andpromoted(or demoted)according o minzhuprocedures,buttheyalso thoughtit necessaryto constrainthese officials, once they were

in power, by anelaboratesystemof institutionalchecks andbalances.

In this context, it is not difficult to see the appeal of the American

political system.If theDemocracyWall activists had wanted o secure

minzhuby returning egislativepowerto thepeopleandby havingthe

people check andsupervisethegovernment throughelections,refer-

enda,etc.), minzhuactivists in 1989triedto arriveat a formula-a set

of institutionalarrangements ndprocedures-through which differ-ent government institutionswould check and counterbalanceoneanother see HanMinzhu,1990:34).As LiuXiaobo andhiscolleagueswrote,in languagereminiscentof Madison in FederalistNo. 10: "The

essence of minzhuconsists in checks andbalances. We would ratherhave ten devils who can counter-balance ne another hanone angelin possession of absolutepower.... We believe that the actual reali-

zation of minzhu politics lies in the minzhu natureof the process,

meansandproceduresof politicaloperation" Hungerstrikers'decla-ration,quotedin WuMourenet al., 1989:551-552). Theemphasison

rules and proceduresshareswith the rights-centeredconception ofminzhuthe overall thrustof political liberalism.




FROMUNITARY OLITICSTO POLITICAL LURALISM

The emphasison minzhuprocedures eflectedthe pro-democracyactivists'concern that society containedwithin it conflicting plural-istic interestsand that these interestscould be best accommodatedor

reconciled hroughprocedural ules.Comparedwiththinking n 1978-

79, this somewhat hesitant recognition of the plurality of social

interests was a new phenomenon, indicatingthat the meaning of

minzhuhadundergoneanother hangeduring heinterveningdecade.

During 1978-79, activists agreed that minzhu meant letting the

people be the masterand lettingtheir interestsreign supreme.There

was little theorizing,however, of what exactly those interests con-

sisted in. For those writing in the Marxisttradition, he proletarianclass interestwas the unifyingforce. The proletariat ossessed inter-

ests by virtueof its position in the relationsof production.Forthose

who stressedhuman ndividuality,minzhu wouldencourage"volun-

tarycooperation amongindividuals]on thebasisof freedomand the

formationof relativelyhomogeneous nterests"WeiJingsheng,1979:

305). Suchpeople seemedto expectunified interests o emergefrom

thegood natureof humanbeings.All activists,whatever heirparticu-lar notionof interest,triedto look for unitary nterests(yizhi liyi) to

anchor heirconceptionof minzhu.Therewas no mentionof potentialconflict among equally legitimateinterests.ChenErjin, or example,

proposed the establishment of "a dual CommunistParty system"underwhich one partywould function as a kind of opposition.But

bothof hispartieswould be Communistnnatureand "share he same

interest and only differ from each other in strategiesand policiestowardthe consensual attainmentof common goals" (Chen Erjin,1984:167-174).This view of unityof interestwas sharedbyLiJiahua,who believed that in a minzhusystem, people "will sharethe same

views andprinciplesand have identical deals.In lofty and harmoni-

ous unity,they will produce, ive, think, invent,pioneer,andexplore

together"(Li Jiahua,1980:272).Ten

yearslater,with the rise of the discourseof individual

rights,the myth of unity of interestsbegan to be shaken.Minzhu was no

longertakento be predicateduponunified butamorphous"people'sinterests."Rather,the pluralistic natureof interests began to be

acknowledged.Since unified interestsgave rise to the centralization




of power,pluralistic ntereststhus called for political pluralism.Ren

Wanding,a veteranof the DemocracyWall movementand anactivistin 1989, held that the old system "mustbe supplantedby a pluralistic

social-politicalstructure,a pluralisticdemocracy[minzhu],a plural-istic culture,anda pluralisticnation" RenWanding,1990: 122-123).Activists linkedpoliticalpluralismwithminzhu,so muchso thattheyclaimed that "withoutpolitical pluralization,minzhu politics will

forever remainempty talk" (Han Hua, 1990: 110). Thus in 1989,minzhuandpluralismbecameintertwined, upplantingheconceptof

minzhu basedon unitarypolitics that was current n the late 1970s. Itmust be pointed out, however, that calls for political pluralismre-

mainedbased on a vaguenotion of interests.There was littleconcrete

analysis of the differentinterestspossessed by differentsegments of

society in the writingsof minzhuactivists.Inthissense, the discourse

of minzhuremained argelydisconnectedfrom concrete discussions

of interestsin spite of the emphasison political pluralism.It can be

argued hatminzhuactivistsembracedpluralismbecauseit is regarded

by most Westerntheorists as essential to democracyand because,comparedwithunitarypolitics, it allows some spaceforraising ssues

of individualrights.

FROM POPULISMTOELITISM

While the 1989 activists acknowledgedthe pluralityof interests,

they did not believe that all the people know what their interests are

and thatall interestsareworthyof equalconsideration. t may be thecase, manyactiviststhought, hatcertaingroupsof peopleareincapa-ble of perceivingtheir own interestsor thattheypossess intereststhat

are inimical to minzhu.Under such circumstances, hey furtherar-

gued, certainpeople or groupsof people maybe excludablefrom the

minzhu system, either because they have not achieved the level of

collective consciousness of theirinterests(as in the case of illiterate

peasants)or because their interestspose a threat o the smooth func-

tioning of the democraticsystem (as in the case of militantworkers).I would arguethatfrom 1978-79 to 1989, the conceptof minzhu had

taken an elitist, and in that sense, exclusionaryturn,moving from a

moreor less populistconceptto an elitist notionthatexcluded a sizable




portionof the populationas yet unfit for minzhu(Perry,1991: 129-

146;WalderandGongXiaoxia, 1993:1-30; Kelliher,1993:379-396).The populismof the minzhu idea in 1978-79 was manifestedin

severalways. First,minzhuwas then definedin broadlyparticipatoryterms.To be sure,it was not to be extendedto class enemies,even in

the view of manyminzhuactivists.But class was becomingless and

less importantor activists.Inanycase,as I havenoted,when extended

to thepeople-including workers,peasants,and intellectuals-minzhu

would involve the active participation f the masses in the manage-

ment of stateaffairsafterthe fashionof the ParisCommunemembers."Intellectualshave aninstinctualdemand orminzhu,"Xu Wenli,the

publisherof Siwu luntan,wrote. "But with the improvement n their

cultural ife, workersandpeasantsare also expressinga strongdesire

to be their own masters"(Ou Pulei, 1983:228). In 1978-79, exceptfor class enemies, nobody was countedout as not readyor unfit for

minzhu.

Second,DemocracyWallactivistsdidnot narrow heirvision tothe

politicalrealm.Theyalsostressed heimportancef economicminzhu,somethingthat was of direct and immediateconcernto the general

population.To theaverageperson,economicminzhumeantnarrowingthe wage differences between cadres and workers, and allowing

ordinary conomicagents(workers,peasants,etc.) some controlover

theallocationof resourcesandmanagement f theproductionprocess."Wenotonlyneedpoliticalminzhu,buteconomicminzhuandminzhu

in the productionprocess" (Zhou Xun, 1983: 253). Such populist

concernswith economic welfare of the masseswere also reflectedinthe activists'call for humanrights.The NineteenPointsof the Human

Rights League, for example, included not just such rights as "the

freedomto go in andout of foreignembassiesto obtainpropagandamaterials,the freedom to talk to foreign correspondents,and the

freedomto publishworks abroad,"but such welfaristprovisionsas

the assuranceof "basic oodrations or thepeasants"and"governmentwelfare for unemployed workers" (Zhongguo renquan tongmen,

1983:291).Finally, the idea of minzhu was populistbecause it stressed the

organizationof a democraticsystemat thegrassroots evel. The need

for economic minzhu had promptedmany people to look to the

Yugoslavianexperience-workers' self-managementat the factory




level. In thecountryside,minzhuactivistshopedthatpeasants'"natu-

ral sense of theirown best interestswould suffice to producewithinthem both a burningdesire for democracy[minzhu]and a genuine

ability to makea properchoice of 'good housekeepers' or the [pro-duction] team"(Chen Erjin, 1984: 187). Such grassrootsminzhuat

theteam,brigade,andcommune evels wasconsidered o benecessaryto solve the problemof "blindcommandismof the lordly leaders"

(ZhouXun, 1983:253).The populist tendency of the DemocracyWall movement partly

reflectedthecompositionof the activists.Most wereordinary actoryworkers. Some had spent quite a few years in the countryside as

sent-down youth during the CulturalRevolution. Compared with

these people, the 1989 studentsandintellectualsbelongedto a privi-

leged class. Not surprisingly,heirviews of minzhuhad an elitisttone.

The students claimed that their "sacred mission is to uphold the

people'sinterests"posteratBeijingUniversity, uoted nHanMinzhu,1990: 75) and "to liberate people from the constraints of feudal

ideology" ("New May 4th Manifesto,"quotedin Wu Mourenet al.,1989: 131). They hoped "to win the understandingand supportof

society at large,"butthey did not want to enlist the active supportof

the masses forfearof endangering"socialstabilityandpricestability"

(posterat People's University, quotedin HanMinzhu, 1990:73). As

students, heyclaimed to standon a moralhigh ground n fightingfor

the interestsof the people becausethey thoughtof themselves as the

least self-interestedgroup in society. As intellectuals,they clung to

theillusorybeliefthat heyremained he"onlyhopefor theresurgenceof the Chinese nation"(big characterposter,quotedin HanMinzhu,1990:283). As FangLizhiputit, "It'supto theintellectualsas a class,with their sense of social responsibility,their consciousness about

democracy, and their initiative to strive for the rights, to decidewhetherthe democratic[minzhu]systemcan surviveanddevelop in

a given society" (FangLizhi, 1988: 85).Unlike DemocracyWallactivists who embraceda populist,inclu-

sive vision of minzhu, activists in 1989 were content to practice a"limited"minzhu.To some extent,theirelitistpositionreflected their

confidence thatthey would be "in"the systemas power-holders n a

democraticsociety. A small-characterposter put it this way: "Cer-

tainly, at least urbancitizens, intellectuals, and Communist Party




membersare as readyfor democracy[minzhu]as anyof the citizens

who alreadylive in democratic[minzhu]societies. Thus,we shouldat least implementcompletedemocracy minzhu]withintheCommu-

nist Partyandwithinthe urbanareas"(posterat People's University,

quotedin HanMinzhu,1990:35). The 1989 activistsexpressedonlyhorrorat the prospectof a minzhusystem that would give peasants

equalvoting rights.As VivienneShuepointsout,the aim of reformas

seen by minzhu activists like FangLizhi is "to achieve greatervoice

for people like themselves-educators, culturedpeople,peoplededi-

cated to modernization, o progressand to the gradual process ofguidedpopularenlightenment hat will eventuallytake the dangerof

political reform out of democracy"(Shue, 1992: 163). One of the

greatest roniesof theminzhumovement n 1989,therefore, s that he

studentactivistsacknowledged he fundamentalprocedural) qualityof citizens on the one hand and tried to "keepdemocracysafe from

the masses"on the other(Kelliher,1993:379).

CONCLUSION

It is almost a misnomer to call minzhu movements in China

movements for "democracy."Chinese minzhuand Westerndemoc-

racy overlap in the degree thatthey have engaged each otherin the

course of Chinese history in the last hundredor so years. Chinese

political activists have selectively absorbed some ideas from the

Westerndemocratic radition, eworkedothers,andmixed them withdifferentelementsof the indigenouspoliticaltradition.Theresult s a

highly complex amalgamopento multiple nterpretations. o regardminzhu anddemocracyas the sameoverlooksthe differenthistorical

trajectorieseachconcepthastraveledand the differentcontextsfrom

whicheach gains its meanings.Inthatsense, minzhu s not reducible

to the equivalentof democracy n the West.

This pointsto the age-olddilemmaplaguingstudentsof compara-

tive politics-the problemof "conceptstretching"in comparativeanalysis. In his seminal work on concept formationin comparative

politics, GiovanniSartoriadvisedus to climbup or down "the adder

of generality"in our attempts o locate a stableconcept that is both

meaningful in reference (along the dimension of "intention")and




applicableto all the cases understudy (along the dimensionof "ex-

tension") (Sartori,1970: 1033-1053). But Sartori'sattemptstill dis-counts the historicaland culturalembeddedness of meaningassoci-

ated with a certainconcept. It neglects the interpretivedimension of

concept formationin specific contexts, while assuming fixed trans-

culturalboundariesandproperties or a certainconcept.16EdwardSaid's approachto a comparativeanalysis of ideas and

concepts is moreprovocative.In his "TravelingTheory,"Said asked

"whetherby virtue of having moved from one place and time to

anotheran idea or a theorygains or loses in strength,and whetheratheory n one historicalperiodandnationalculturebecomesaltogetherdifferentfor anotherperiodor situation" Said, 1982: 41). To obtain

a truly contextual analysis of traveling theories or concepts, Said

advises us to look notonly at the initial circumstancessurrounding

particular oncept'semergence na discoursebutalso attheconditions

of receptivity o andadaptation f thisconcept n otherhistorio-cultural

settings.As theoriesor conceptstravel,they are transformed.Partof

my purpose in this article is to demonstratethe conceptual distinc-tion between democracy and minzhu as a result of such traveling.It is importantto understand he historical and cultural embedded-

ness of minzhu and the uniquefeatures of the Chinese democracymovements.

Not only is minzhudifferentfromdemocracy,as a concept it has

been remarkablymalleable.Althoughthe activistsof 1978-79 and of

1989 used the sameword-minzhu-they were not speakingentirely

the same language. When activists in the 1978-79 DemocracyWallmovementmouthed"minzhu,"heycould havehad in mindaMarxist,a rights-centered,or a welfaristconception.By 1989, the discursive

terrainhad narrowedconsiderably o a version of minzhuthatempha-sized proceduralarrangements nd individualrights.Wemaywell do

an injusticeto both movements f, in invokingminzhuto characterize

them,we fail to appreciate he crucialdifferences betweenthem. It is

equally important, f not moreso, to markthe changes as well as to

note the continuities.17Finally,theconceptualcontinuitypointstowarddistinctiveChinese

characteristicsassociated with the notion of minzhu. Scholarshave

long noted the nationalistic orientationand the moralisticstance of

Chinese minzhu activists as well as their inattentiveness o concrete




interests Schwartz,1964;Nathan,1985;Pye, 1990:331-347). Inspite

of the recent endency o emphasize ndividualrightsandparticularis-tic interests,minzhuactivists still helddear the hopethatindividual-

ism would eventuallyconfer on China wealth and power and that

particularisticnterestswouldeventuallyharmonize.

Taken together,both the conceptual change and the continuityduring he last decadedo not bode well forChinesepolitics.As China

strugglesto achieve minzhu,minzhucontinues to elude the Chinese.Chinese minzhu is still encumberedby the notion that it should

facilitate nationaldevelopmentandthat,preciselyfor thatreason,itbecomes a moral cause to champion.Here, the questionis whether

minzhu,however it is conceptualized,cancompetesuccessfullywith

other,more sinister deologies like neoauthoritarianismrneoconser-vatism.Furthermore,hehighly charged,moralistic one of thedebatearound minzhu means that any compromise between antagonisticforcesinfutureminzhumovementswill be hard o secure.On theother

hand,minzhu in China seems to continuegravitating oward a more

liberalnotionof democracy.Minzhuhas becomeless substantive, essparticipatoryndpopulisticovertheperiod rom1978-79 to 1989.But

without firm groundingin an individualist cultureand in concrete

interests,minzhumayonly bear a superficialresemblance o democ-

racyas we have come to understand t in the West.

NOTES

1. Throughout his article, I retain the originalChinese wordminzhuwhenever possibleoverthepopular ranslation emocracy.While Iam moreconcernedwith theconceptualchangein Chinapertaining o the idea of minzhu,I also arguethat the wordminzhuand its closest

Westerncounterpart, emocracy,arenot coterminous n meaningand reference.Thusminzhu

is somethingthat is closest to whatdemocracyrefers to in the Westandyet is never identical

with it. Eachconceptcarrieswith it uniquehistoricalandculturalbaggagethatprevents tsbeing

completely interchangeablewiththe other.However, or thepurposeofpresentation, frequentlyresortto democracyor democratic nstead of the slightlyawkwardminzhu. substitutedemoc-

racyforminzhu, orexample,when I referto arecognizedpoliticalevent, like the"DemocracyWall movement"of

1978-79,orwhenI need to use the

conceptas a

modifier,as in "democratic

practice."I also use democracy nstead of minzhuwhen I cite English-language ources,even

if they are translations rom Chinese. In the lattercase, I attachminzhu n bracketsrightafter

usingthe worddemocracy.2. In the "New May 4th Manifesto,"for example, studentsclaimedthatthey wanted to

carryforward heMay4th spiritof minzhuand science. Prior o the realizationof minzhu n the




whole society,students elt itnecessarythat hey practiceminzhuoncampus,amongthemselves

(WuMourenet al., 1989: 131-132).

3. Inthe following, I will first look at the meaningsof the two Chinesecharactersmin and

zhuseparatelybeforetakingupthecompoundwordminzhu.Minzhu s asyntheticcompound-thatis, themeaningof thecompoundcan be syntheticallyderivedfrom thetwo morphemesmin

(people, individuals)andzhu(master,primary).Thetwo morphemesn thiscase arealso words

bearingindependentmeanings.Differentunderstandings f the elements affect the meaningof

the compoundas well. This is unlikeothercompoundssuch as mingbai(understand)n which

the two morphemesming(clear)andbai (white) bearmeaningsnotsyntheticallyrelatedto the

compound.Mingbai s, therefore,notamenableto the same kind of analysisas I haveattemptedhere. I want to thankRichardGunde andStephenWangfordrawingmy attention o this point.

4. The Westernnotion of democracyalso has a broad,fuzzy, and frequentlycontested

semanticrange.It is as rich,varied,andcomplex as minzhu s in China. But for the purposeofthisarticle,which tries toexamineminzhu,notdemocracy, t sufficestopointoutthatdemocracy

(demos-kratia), specially its liberalvariant, s predicatedupon(1) individualcitizens tryingto

(2) ruleor exercise effective control over their own lives. It drawson theindividualist radition

in the West and contains the elementarymeaningof "ruleby citizens themselves"(Pateman,

1970; MacPherson, 1976; Held, 1987; Dahl, 1989). For a short historical account of the

conceptualevolution of democracy,see RaymondWilliams (1976). It is important o keep in

mind that minzhu anddemocracyare two equally complex concepts that are importantlynot

coterminous n meaning.It is also fair to say,I believe, that oward he 1980s,the liberalvariant

of the Westerndemocraticdiscourse,signifiedmostof all in practiceby the Americanpolitical

system and the riseof Thatcherism ndReaganomics,hadconsolidated ts gripon the imagina-tion of much of the Westernpopulation.It is not surprising o see that the dominantunder-

standingsof Westerndemocracyby the Chinese minzhu activists also gravitated oward sucha

liberal view.

5. InEnglish,minbencan be translatedas "foundation" r "basis"of a polity.The essence

of minben is captured by the famous analogy drawn by Xunzi, the ancient Chinese sage

philosopher:"thepeopleare like the waters[ina river],and theruler, heboat.Justas thewaters

can supportthe boat, they can also cause it to capsize" (Ci hai, 1979: 4130). The river-boat

analogy emphasizes the importanceof people's consent that alone can keep the boat of

governance floating.To secure thatconsent,the rulerhas to give utmostattention o the welfare

of the ruled, f not to theirempowermentn theprocessof governing ZhangQiyun, 1981;Feng

Tianyu,1991).

6. For the thinkingof Confucius,Mencius,andXunzion theprimacyof people'sinterests,

see Xiao Gongquan 1982) and Lin Mousheng(1942: 29-59). SunYat-senalludedto Mencius'

position in his lectures on Sanminzhuyi (Sun Yat-sen,1981).7. Bao is a legendary figurein Chinatoday.As the primeminister(zai xiang) of a Song

dynasty emperor,Bao was known for his selfless devotion to the imperialcourt,strict enforce-

ment of legal codes againstcorruptofficials, and consistentprotectionof the commonpeople'sinterests.

8. A sixthlogical combinationof min andzhuwouldyield a weak libertarian onceptionof

minzhu.Itis libertarian ecauseit privilegesindividualwelfare and nterests; t is weakbecause

individuals areonly regardedas holdingimportantwelfare claims againstthe collective or thestate but not bearingabsoluterights againstthe latter as in the strongKantian ense. I did not

detectany strongcurrentof thinkingalong this line in the contextsI amstudying.9. Thenamingof these two movementsas, respectively, he"DemocracyWall movement"

and the"Pro-Democracymovementof 1989"is notof courseuniversallyaccepted.The Chinese

government,forexample,has labeledthe latteras "counterrevolutionaryurmoil" fangeming




baoluan), while calling the former the "DemocracyWall Incident"(minzhuqiang shijian).

Euphemismsikeshijian(incident) n Chinesecarrya negativeconnotation.Peoplein mainland

Chinanowadaysrefer to the 1989 movementas liu si (June4) or 89 minyun(89 popularor

democracy movement) or 89 dongluan (89 turmoil). Many Westerners refer to it as the

"Tiananmen quarestudentmovement"or the"1989protestmovement."

10. Forexample,two organizersof the 1978-79DemocracyWallmovement,WangJuntao

and Ren Wanding,were again very active in 1989. Both were imprisonedafter the latter

movement.

11. For a historicalperspectiveon this,see Nathan's 1985) chapter"LiangQichaoandthe

Chinese DemocraticTradition."

12. In 1989, inflation was one of the subthemesrunningthroughthe movement. It was

especiallyof concern to the ordinaryworkers Walder ndGong Xiaoxia, 1993). But the issue

was marginaln influencing heconceptualdebateson minzhu hat argelycenteredonpolitical,noteconomic,democracy.

13.Presumably,ven anautocratic overnment ouldclaim to look after hepeople'swelfare

as itsprimary bjective.Afterall,the ideaof minbenoriginatednfeudalChina nwhich relations

betweentheemperorand his subjectswere far fromdemocratic n any othersense of the word.

14. The discursivehegemony of the "rights-centered"otionof minzhucame aboutfor a

numberof reasons,not the leastof which is the economic andpoliticalliberalizationn China

that has delinkedpolitics from economics (hence the almost exclusive emphasisof "rights"discourseonpolitical rights)andhas substituted ndividual ntrepreneurshipor classhegemony(hencetheemphasison individualsrather hanclassidentities).See, however,therift withinthe

movementbetween workersand students WalderandGongXiaoxia, 1993).15. By stressingthe commonalityof the diverseconceptionsof minzhu n the late 1970s,I

am notarguing or thesingularity, s in the 1980s,of theminzhudiscourseas such.Inthe 1970s,

minzhuremaineda contestedconceptwithmultiplemeanings hatnevertheless haredcommon

characteristics.

16.In a recentarticle,David CollierandJamesMahon 1993) trytosalvageSartori's riginalformulationof theproblemby identifyingtwo additional ategoriesof conceptsandproposing

ways of adaptingthem in comparativeresearch.The two additionalcategories of conceptsinclude a categoryof conceptsthat bear a familyresemblance o one anotheranda categoryof

radialconceptsthatsharesome centralcore elements.LikeSartori,however,Collierand Mahon

still tryto identifycertain nvariableproperties relementsdefinitive of a certainconceptacross

cultures; n otherwords,they have not taken ntoaccountthecontextuallyembeddednatureof

politicalconcepts.Theirmodificationdoes not touch on the lack of an interpretivedimension

in Sartori'soriginalframework.

17. ManyChinese,includingmany democracyactivists,areinclinedto see a continuity n

the minzhuprojectrunningfrom the May4th movementto 1978-79 andon to 1989. I would

arguethatNathan'sexcellent historicalanalysisof Chinesedemocracyalso runsthe dangerof

imaginingthe samecontinuityby datingthe democratic"tradition"o as far back as 1895 and

by emphasizingthecontinuityrather hanthechangesthat traditionhasundergone ince then.

REFERENCES

BALL, TERENCE and J.G.A. POCOCK(1988) ConceptualChange and the Constitution.

KansasCity:Univ. Press of Kansas.








WUDUNN, S. (1989) "Democracyn China,writemorality."New YorkTimes(April28): A6.

XIAO GONGQUAN [Hsiao Kung-ch'uan] 1982) Zhongguozhengzhisixiang shi (A Historyof Chinese PoliticalThought).Taibei:Lianjingchubanshiye gongsi.

ZHANG QIYUN [ed.] (1981) Zhonghuada baike quanshu(Chinese Encyclopedia).Taibei:

Zhongguowenhua daxue chubanbu.

Zhongguo renquantongmen [Chinese Human Rights League] (1983) "Zhongguo renquan

xuanyan19tiao"(The 19-pointdeclaration f the Chinesehumanrights eague), pp.288-292

in Li Yizhe et al. (1983).ZHOU XUN (1983) "Minzhuqiang iang hechuqu" (WhitherDemocracyWall),pp. 241-254

in Li Yizhe et al. (1983).

Lei Guangis a Ph.D. candidateinpolitical science at the Universityof Minnesota.

Documents

Lei Guang - Conceptual Change and the Democracy Movement