Lehman 2

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  • 8/2/2019 Lehman 2

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    FX CONCEPTSFX CONCEPTSGLOBAL MACRO RESEARCHGLOBAL MACRO RESEARCH

    CURRENCIES INTEREST RATES EQUITIES COMMODITIES

    To contact FX CONCEPTS New York: 1 (212) 554-6830; London: +44 20 7213 9600; Singapore: (65) 67352898; [email protected]

    MARKET INSIGHT REPORT

    Lehman 2.0

    February 16, 2012

    By John R. Taylor, Jr.

    Chief Investment Officer

    Global investors either have extremely short memories or they are far too concrete, as my wife thepsychologist would say. Saying that Greece is not a bank but a country means nothing. Almost allEuropeans argue that a default by the Greek government would now be more straightforward and notas significant as the collapse and bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, especially sincethe Eurozone, under the influence of the surplus countries, has effectively ring-fenced Greece from theother 16 members. Lehman was not a very large factor in the global banking scene with less than onequarter the capital of the biggest US banks and with assets below those of more than 100 banksaround the world. Greece might represent less than 3% of the GDP of the Eurozone, but when lined up

    against Lehman, Greece stands larger in its relevant market. Anyone can read the newspapers, blogs,and Internet scribblings before the Lehman collapse and see that the impact of its collapse was notexpected to be significant. Tim Geithner, then head of the New York Fed, worked to arrange theemergency liquidation of Lehmans assets and there were expectations that the company could be soldto Bank of America or Barclays, but the Bank of England vetoed a sale to Barclays and the USgovernment refused to lend any support to Bank of America in its effort to buy Lehman. Rereading thedocuments and remembering the situation as I set out for a weekend cruise on the Chesapeake, theworld was not worried. The market had already seen the rescues or restructuring of WashingtonMutual, Countrywide, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, so no one was worried. This looked like anotherBear Stearns, a manageable problem but this time the Bush administration was not interested in gettinginvolved let the market solve this, dont throw good money after the bad. So, what is the differencenow? The world is as blas about a Greek default or departure from the euro as it can be credit

    spreads are dropping, the other weak Eurozone sovereigns are financing themselves easily, andeveryone thinks the LTRO has solved the problem for the next year or two. Why should we worry aboutGreece? Who cares if their unemployment is 20.9% and climbing very fast, or that it is now in its fifthyear of declining GDP? Lets teach them a lesson!

    Hubris is at the heart of this. Everyone says this cannot happen we wont allow it. Says who? The EUsays: if it is written in an agreement, it must be totally correct, unchangeable, and followed at all costs.New realities cant intervene and no slippage is allowed. Why the Germans are so sure that they knowthe future is beyond me. They are fallible too, but they wont admit it, and the Greeks cant make thembudge. Havent they looked around? Santorini has a different economic and social cost structure thanWiesbaden. Humanity (and common sense) seems totally lacking in the negotiations with the Greeksand a violent backlash would be totally understandable. Why the countries that have been fattening uptheir current account surpluses selling products to Greeks, whom they should have known werebasically broke just as they always have been should be paid 100% on the euro is beyond me.Major losses should apply not only to sovereign borrowings but also to accounts receivable for cars,electronics, and other consumer goods. The market has not opened its eyes to the impact this Greekunraveling will have. The Eurozone will be mortally wounded and the world will suffer a significantrecession maybe as deep as 2008. European banks will lose much of their capital base and manyshould be bankrupt, but just as in the Lehman aftermath, the governments will try to save the banksand the banks bondholders, solvent or not. As the bank appetite for Eurozone sovereign paper will bedecimated, austerity will probably follow shortly, followed by deflation and uncontrollable moneycreation. The European recession should be one for the record books.

  • 8/2/2019 Lehman 2

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    Page 2

    FX CONCEPTSFX CONCEPTSGLOBAL MACRO RESEARCHGLOBAL MACRO RESEARCH

    CURRENCIES INTEREST RATES EQUITIES COMMODITIES

    To contact FX CONCEPTS New York: 1 (212) 554-6830; London: +44 20 7213 9600; Singapore: (65) 67352898; [email protected]

    CURRENCY Asia Long-Term View

    Does the USD/JPY Rally Have Any Legs?

    By Jonathan Clark

    Two weeks ago dollar/yen fell to itslowest level in 13 weeks beforereversing direction and climbing to itshighest level in 15 weeks. Althoughvolatility is rising, trading during thepast six months has taken place in arelatively narrow range by historicalstandards and it is difficult to be

    confident that dollar/yen is beginning asustained rally. Japanese monetaryofficials have contributed to thesideways trading as they entered themarket three times (red ellipses) toprevent dollar/yen from falling. Theupmove in late January was technical innature and resulted from breaking above the downtrend resistance from the peak in2007, but the rally lacked persistence and gave back its gains and more within a week ofthe peak. There is a significant risk that the upmove that began two weeks ago isalso technical and will falter in the next several weeks. Capital flows dominatecurrency trading and there is very little foreign capital in Japan so there isnt much todepart. If USD/JPY is to make a sustained upmove then domestic capital must leaveJapan seeking higher returns. Optimism has been rising since the fourth quarter of lastyear, but it isnt expected to persist as the global economy should slow in the monthsahead. In addition, the debt crisis in Europe discourages Japanese investment. Ifinterest rates were rising significantly in the liquid markets in Europe or the US versusJapan this could lead to capital outflows, but they have been stable. We are, therefore,not optimistic that dollar/yen will make a strong and sustained upmove and thelonger-term cycles are calling for a significant peak by early March and possiblysooner.

    Dollar/yen should strengthen into Monday of next week before forming a minor peakpulling back for a few days. The upmove should then resume into the start of the week

    of February 27 and this is the minimum timeframe for a significant peak. Our target forthis rally is the 79.75 area and, if seen, this should be a good place to take some profiton dollar positions. If this level breaks on a closing basis, the upmove will becomeextended into the week of March 5 and can reach 81.00 before forming a significantpeak, but this appears less likely. The longer-term cycles argue that by early Marchthe dollar/yen should turn lower and decline into the end of April or May, andpossibly longer. It should then fall back to its lows of several weeks ago and ourfurther objective is the 73.25 area.