LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

SECTION 1. THE LEGISLATIVE POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHICH SHALL CONSIST OF A SENATE AND A HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE BY THE PROVISION ON INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM.

1.MARCOS VS COMELEC

Facts:March 8, 1995 – Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor.

March 23, 1995 – Montejo, incumbent of and candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that Marcos did not meet the residency requirement.

March 29, 1995 – Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy in the COMELEC‘s head office in Intramuros claiming that her error in the first certificate was the result of an ―honest misrepresentation‖ and that she has always ―maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.

April 24, 1995 – COMELEC Second Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a Resolution that found Montejo‘s petition for disqualification meritorious, Marcos‘ corrected certificate of candidacy void, and her original certificate cancelled.

May 7, 1995 – COMELEC en banc denied Marcos‘ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution drafted on April 24.

May 11, 1995 – COMELEC issued another Resolution allowing Marcos‘ proclamation to the office should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes. However, this was reversed and instead directed that the proclamation would be suspended even if she did win.

May 25, 1995 – In a supplemental petitition, Marcos declared that she was the winner of the said Congressional election.

Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to be a voter, and thus candidate, of the first district of Leyte.

Yes. It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which out to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution‘s residency qualification requirement (as intended by the framer‘s of the constitution)2. The confusion of the ―honest mistake‖ made when filed her Certificate of Candidacy can be attributed to the

fact that the entry for residence is immediately followed by the entry for the number of years and months in the residence where the candidate seeks to hold office immediately after the elections. This honest mistake should not be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District. The instances (i.e. when Marcos lived in Manila and Ilocos after marrying her husband) used by the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos were only actual residences incurred during their marriage; and as such, she was required to change residences and apply for voter‘s registration in these cited locations. When she got married to the late dictator, it cannot be argued that she lost her domicile of origin by operation of law stated in Article 110 of the CC3 and further contemplated in Article 1094 of the same code. It is the husband‘s right to transfer residences to wherever he might see fit to raise a family. Thus, the relocation does not mean or intend to lose the wife‘s domicile of origin. After the death of her husband, her choice of domicle was Tacloban, Leyte as expressed when she wrote the PCGG chairman seeking permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban and their farm in Olot, Leyte.

(2) WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying the plaintiff under Article 78 of the Omnibus Election Code had already lapsed, thereby transmitting jurisdiction to the House of Representatives.Yes. The mischief in petitioner‘s contention lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. In any event, Sections 62 As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution by Mr. Nolledo and Mr. Davide, and Mrs. Rosario and Mr. De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVETION July 22, 1986.3 The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.4 The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

(3) WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over the question of the petitioner‘s qualifications after the elections.No. The HRET‘s jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.

Puno, J. (Concurring):All her life, Marcos‘ domicile of origin was Tacloban. When she married the former dictator, her domicile became subject to change by law and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the CC. She has been in Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are within the First Congressional District of Leyte.

Francisco, J. (Concurring):Residence for election purposes means domicile. Marcos has been in Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are within the First Congressional District of Leyte.Romero, J. (Separate):Women‘s rights as per choosing her domicile after husband‘s death is evident in this case. Marcos‘ living in Leyte is sufficient to meet the legal residency requirement.

Vitug, J. (Separate):It seems unsound to vote for someone who has already been declared disqualified. The Court refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunal on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. Voted for dismissal.

Mendoza, J. (Concurring):The issue is whether or not the COMELEC has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. It has none and the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in an appropriate forum (not necessarily COMELEC, but the HRET).

Padilla, J. (Dissenting):Provisions in the Constitution should be adhered to. The controversy should not be blurred by academic disquisitions. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding the petitioner disqualified. And the law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted.

Regalado, J. (Dissenting):A woman loses her domicile of origin once she gets married. The death of her husband does not automatically allow her domicile to shift to its original. Such theory is not stated in any of the provisions of law.

Davide, Jr. J. (Dissenting):A writ of certiorari may only be granted if a government branch or agency has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The COMELEC‘s resolutions are within the scope and jurisdiction of this particular agency‘s powers. In agreement with Regalado, re: woman’s domicile.

2. Aquino v COMELEC

Facts:Agapito Aquino filed a Cert. of Candidacy to run for Rep in the 2nd district of Makati. However, Mateo Bedon ( Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP) filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the grounds that he lacked the residence qualification under Sec 6, Art 7 of the 1987 Consti. Hearings were conducted by the COMELEC and dismissed Bedon’s petition to disqualify.During the counting of votes, Aquino garnered more votes against Agusto Syjuco. Bedon then filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Aquino to which COMELEC agreed by issuing an Order. COMELEC then again issued another Order declaring Aquino to be disqualified due to the lack of constitutional qualification of residence.Hence, the petition for certiorari.

Issue: W/N COMELEC erred in deciding that petitioner lacked the constitutional req’ts for residence.

Held:No! Aquino failed to prove that he was a resident of the 2nd Legislative District of Makati for a period of one year at the time of election. His domicile of origin was in Concepcion, Tarlac. COMELEC said that the intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati is evident in his leasing a condo unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may give an indication that he intends to reside in Makati, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s domicile. Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for a year because he has other “residences” in Manila or Quezon City.Residence is synonymous with domicile -> place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home where he, no matter where he may be found eventually intends to return and remain (ruling in Co V Electoral Tribunal of House of Rep)

3. Coquilla vs COMELEC

FACTS:Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States.Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a material misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.ISSUE:Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.

RULING:No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for “two years” at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at bar, what is

involved is a false statement concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.

4. Pimentel vs. COMELEC GR 161658, Nov. 3, 2003 Facts: Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and makes it mandatory for candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other personalities, to undergo a drug test. Hence, Senator Pimentel, who is a senatorial candidate for the 2004 synchronized elections, challenged Section 36(g) of the said law.

Issue: is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office an unconstitutional imposition of additional qualification on candidates for Senator?

Held: Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government undergo a mandatory drug test is UNCONSITUTIONAL. Under Sec.3, Art. VI of the Constitution, an aspiring candidate for Senator needs only to meet 5 qualifications: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

5. JIMENEZ VS CABANGBANGFacts: Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of Congress.

HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.”The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.

6. OSMENA VS PENDATUN109 Phil. 863 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Parliamentary ImmunityFacts: In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.

7. Adaza v. Pacana135 SCRA 431

FACTS:Adaza is the governor of Misamis Oriental and Pacana is the vice-governor. Their respective term of office expires on March 3, 1986. Both parties ran in the Batasang Pambansa (BP)

elections in 1984 and respondent lost to petitioner. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as the governor. Petitioner has brought this petition to exclude respondent therefrom, claiming to be the lawful occupant of the position.

ISSUE:1) Whether or not a provincial governor who was elected as Mababatas Pambansa (MP) can exercise the functions of both simultaneously; and 2) whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the position of MP but lost, can continue serving as vice governor and subsequently succeed to the office of governor if said office is vacated.

HELD:Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. A member of the BP may not hold any other office in the government. A public office is a public trust. A holder thereof is subject to regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions on his holding of more than one office. The contention that Pacana, as a mere private citizen, runs afoul of BP Blg. 697 which provides that governors, or members of sangguniang or barangay officials, upon filing a certificate of candidacy be considered on forced leave of absence from office. When respondent reassumed the position of vice-governor after the BP elections, he was acting within the law. Thus, the instant petition is denied.

8. PUYAT VS DE GUZMANFACTS:On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries (IPI), a private corporation, was held – six of the elected directors were herein petitioners that may be called the Puyat Group, while the other five were herein respondents, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.On 25 May 1979, the Acero Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings questioning the election.Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds the appearance of Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as counsel for the Acero group. Section 11, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before xxx any administrative body" and SEC was an administrative body. The prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance.When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned out that Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased on 15 May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for Php200.00, but the deed of sale was notarized only on 30 May 1979. He then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation, which motion was granted by the SEC Commissioner.ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in intervening in the SEC Case, is in effect appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.RULING:

The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez. He had acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of stock in IPI. He acquired them "after the fact", that is, on 30 May 1979, after the contested election of Directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed, and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for the Acero group, but which was objected to by petitioners Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body, which is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in the 1973 Constitution. Respondent Commissioner's Order granting Assemblyman Fernandez leave to intervene in the SEC Case was reversed and set aside

SECTION 16.1. THE SENATE SHALL ELECT ITS PRESIDENT AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ITS SPEAKER, BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL ITS RESPECTIVE MEMBERS. EACH HOUSE SHALL CHOOSE SUCH OTHER OFFICERS AS IT MAY DEEM NECESSARY.

2. A MAJORITY OF EACH HOUSE SHALL CONSTITUTE A QUORUM TO DO BUSINESS, BUT A SMALLER NUMBER MAY ADJOURN FROM DAY TO DAY AND MAY COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF ABSENT MEMBERS IN SUCH MANNER, AND UNDER SUCH PENALTIES, AS SUCH HOUSE MAY PROVIDE.

3. EACH HOUSE MAY DETERMINE THE RULES OF ITS PROCEEDINGS, PUNISH ITS MEMBERS FOR DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR, AND, WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF TWO-THIRDS OF ALL ITS MEMBERS, SUSPEND OR EXPEL A MEMBER. A PENALTY OF SUSPENSION, WHEN IMPOSED, SHALL NOT EXCEED SIXTY DAYS.

4. EACH HOUSE SHALL KEEP A JOURNAL OF ITS PROCEEDINGS, AND FROM TIME TO TIME PUBLISH THE SAME, EXCEPTING SUCH PARTS AS MAY, IN ITS JUDGMENT, AFFECT NATIONAL SECURITY; AND THE YEAS AND NAYS ON ANY QUESTION SHALL, AT THE REQUEST OF ONE-FIFTH OF THE MEMBERS PRESENT, BE ENTERED IN THE JOURNAL. EACH HOUSE SHALL ALSO KEEP A RECORD OF ITS PROCEEDINGS.

5. NEITHER HOUSE DURING THE SESSIONS OF THE CONGRESS SHALL, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER, ADJOURN FOR MORE THAN THREE DAYS, NOR TO ANY OTHER PLACE THAN THAT IN WHICH THE TWO HOUSES SHALL BE SITTING.

9. AVELINO VS. CUENCO (83. PHIL. 17)

FACTS:

Petition of quo warranto. Petitioner, Jose Avelino, asks the court to declare him the rightful senate president and oust the respondent, Mariano Jesus Cuenco.Feb 18, 1949; the request of senator Lorenzo Tanada to speak on the floor on Feb 21, 1949 was granted to formulate charges against the then senate president Avelino. On the day that Tanada was supposed to speak on the floor, Avelino delayed his appearance, did not immediately open the session, and read slowly the resolution of senator Sanidad and Tanada. When the session finally started, Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed with but senator Tirona, Avelino’s follower, opposed the motion because of the plan of Avelino’s group to delay the session to prevent Tanada from delivering his privilege speech. Suddenly, a disorderly conduct broke out in the senate gallery. Senator Pablo David, Avelino’s follower, moved for adjournment of session perhaps consistent with their ploy to prevent Tanada’s privilege speech. Sanidad opposed the motion and moved that it be submitted to a vote. Suddenly, Avelino banged the gavel, abandoned the chair, and walked out of the session hall followed by senator Francisco, Torres, Magalona, Clarin, David, and Tirona. Cuenco was designated to chair the session. Tanada was finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Sanidad’s resolution no. 68 was read and approved. Tanada yielded the chair to senate president pro-tempore Arranz. Then, Sanidad introduced resolution no. 67 entitled “Resolution declaring vacant the position of the president of the senate and designating the honourable Mariano Jesus Cuenco acting president of the senate.” Resolution no. 67 was approved.

ISSUES:

Does the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter? If it has, were resolutions nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?

DECISION:Petition dismissed. Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.

RATIO:

The court does not have any jurisdiction in view of the separation of powers and the constitutional grant to the senate of the power to elect its own president. The selection of the presiding officer affects only the senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change, or reinstate them. The petition to put back the petitioner to preside is

only acceptable if the majority of the senators want to, such remedy lies in the senate session hall and not in the supreme court.

Assuming that the court has jurisdiction, the session left by Avelino and presided by Arranz was a continuation of the session. Thus, the departure of the minority senators does not prevent the remaining majority senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.

10. Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 (1924)

F: The petitioner in this original petition for mandamus and injunction is Jose Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by the Governor General. to represent the 12th Senatorial District. The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the respondent Senators, On February 5,1924, depriving Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of 1 yr from 1/24 having been declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Sen. de Vera on the occasion of certain phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate regarding the credentials of Mr. Alejandrino. The burden of petitioner's complaint is that the resolution is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect.

Issue: WON the Supreme Court by mandamus and injunction may annul the suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official position?

Held.The general rule is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the gov't to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character w/c therefore pertains to their legislative functions and over w/c they have exclusive control.The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power.Precedents have held that where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.

11. US vs Pons

Facts: Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were

charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

12. ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA (277 SCRA 268)

FACTS:Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called “sin taxes” (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes, originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee report.THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?

MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.(Gavel)MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair called for the motion.MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.(It was 3:01 p.m.)(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o’clock, Wednesday, next week.THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o’clock, Wednesday, next week.On that same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and/or challenging the validity of RA 8240.ISSUES:Whether or not RA 8240 was passed in violation of rules of the House which will therefore be a violation of the Constitution.Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to look into the internal proceeding of the House.HELD:It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law. Petitioners claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano’s motion approved. But what happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel. Verily, the fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House making the passage of the bill to a law in accordance with the law. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of the bill. Therefore, no violation of the Constitution was shown.In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court has no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House as long as no violation of the Constitutional violation is shown.

13. Alejo Mabanag vs Jose Lopez Vito78 Phil. 1 – Political Law – Journal – Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: “Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.

14. CASCO PHILIPPINES CHEMICAL CO., INC. VS. GIMENEZ (7 SCRA 347)

FACTS:

There was enacted a Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Act. The Central Bank of the Philippines issued Circular No. 95 fixing the a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. Petitioner, Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc, engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues bought imported urea and formaldehyde which are main raw materials in the production of its products and has paid the margin fee. Thereafter, petitioner sought to refund the said margin fee pursuant to to Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board which declared that urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said sale. The Central Bank issued the corresponding vouchers for the refund but failed to give the money on the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board is not within the purview of the said RA.

The pertinent provisions of the Republic Act provide:The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provisions of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:X X XXVII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.

Petitioner contends that the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and formaldehyde. It shall be noted that the National Institute of Science and Technology has expressed that urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is a finished product distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde

ISSUE:

Whether or not Urea and Formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee.

HELD:

Denied the petition.

RATIO:

The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by the Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of a

bill before it was certified by the officers of the Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. The importation of urea and formaldehyde is not exempt from payment of margin fees being distinct and different from urea formaldehyde as provided in the law.

15. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance - 249 SCRA 635

FACTS:Petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines, Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association) seek reconsideration of the Court’s previous ruling dismissing the petitions filed for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Petitioners contend that the R.A. did not “originate exclusively” in the HoR as required by Article 6, Section 24 of the Constitution. The Senate allegedly did not pass it on second and third readings, instead passing its own version. Petitioners contend that it should have amended the House bill by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text of its own bill, so as to conform with the Constitution.

ISSUE:W/N the R.A. is unconstitutional for having “originated” from the Senate, and not the HoR.

HELD:Petition is unmeritorious. The enactment of the Senate bill has not been the first instance where the Senate, in the exercise of its power to propose amendments to bills (required to originate in the House), passed its own version. An amendment by substitution (striking out the text and substituting it), as urged by petitioners, concerns a mere matter of form, and considering the petitioner has not shown what substantial difference it would make if Senate applied such substitution in the case, it cannot be applied to the case at bar. While the aforementioned Constitutional provision states that bills must “originate exclusively in the HoR,” it also adds, “but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.” The Senate may then propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. Petitioners erred in assuming the Senate version to be an independent and distinct bill. Without the House bill, Senate could not have enacted the Senate bill, as the latter was a mere amendment of the former. As such, it did not have to pass the Senate on second and third readings.

Petitioners question the signing of the President on both bills, to support their contention that such are separate and distinct. The President certified the bills separately only because the certification had to be made of the version of the same revenue bill which AT THE MOMENT was being considered.

Petitioners question the power of the Conference Committee to insert new provisions. The jurisdiction of the conference committee is not limited to resolving differences between the Senate and the House. It may propose an entirely new provision, given that such are germane to the subject of the conference, and that the respective houses of Congress subsequently approve its report.

Petitioner PAL contends that the amendment of its franchise by the withdrawal of its exemption from VAT is not expressed in the title of the law, thereby violating the Constitution. The Court believes that the title of the R.A. satisfies the Constitutional Requirement.

Petitioners claim that the R.A. violates their press freedom and religious liberty, having removed them from the exemption to pay VAT. Suffice it to say that since the law granted the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. By granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.

Lastly, petitioners contend that the R.A. violates due process, equal protection and contract clauses and the rule on taxation. Petitioners fail to take into consideration the fact that the VAT was already provided for in E.O. No. 273 long before the R.A. was enacted. The latter merely EXPANDS the base of the tax. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the same rate, the taxing power having authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. It is enough that the statute applies equally to all persons, forms and corporations placed in s similar situation.

15. Tolentino v Sec. of FinanceFacts:- House of Rep. filed House Bill 11197 (An Act Restructuring the VAT System to Widen its Tax Base and Enhance its Admin., Amending for these Purposes…)- Upon receipt of Senate, Senate filed another bill completely different from that of the House Bill- Senate finished debates on the bill and had the 2nd and 3rd reading of the Bill on the same day- Bill was deliberated upon in the Conference Committee and become enrolled bill which eventually became the EVAT law.

Procedural Issue:(1) WoN RA 7716 originated exclusively from the House of Rep. in accordance with sec 24, art 6 of Consti(2) WoN the Senate bill violated the “three readings on separate days” requirement of the Consti(3) WoN RA 7716 violated sec 26(1), art 6 - one subject, one title rule.NOTE: This case was filed by PAL because before the EVAT Law, they were exempt from taxes. After the passage of EVAT, they were already included. PAL contended that neither the House or Senate bill provided for the removal of the exemption from taxes of PAL and that it was inly made after the meeting of the Conference Committee w/c was not expressed in the title of RA 7166

Held:(1) YES! Court said that it is not the law which should originate from the House of Rep, but the revenue bill which was required to originate from the House of Rep. The inititiative must ocme from the Lower House because they are elected in the district level – meaning they are expected to be more sensitive to the needs of the locality.Also, a bill originating from the Lower House may undergo extensive changes while in the Senate. Senate can introduce a separate and distinct bill other than the one the Lower House proposed. The Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the House bill, so long as action by Senate is withheld pending the receipt of the House bill.(2) NO. The Pres. certified that the Senate bill was urgent. Presidential certification dispensed the requirement not only of printing but also reading the bill in 3 separate days. In fact, the Senate accepted the Pres. certification(3) No. Court said that the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. It is also in the power of Congress to amend, alter, repeal grant of franchises for operation of public utility when the common good so requires.One subject rule is intended to prevent surprise upon Congress members and inform people of pending legislation. In the case of PAL, they did not know of their situation not because of any defect in title but because they might have not noticed its publication until some event calls attention to its existence.

15. TOLENTINO VS. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE Case Digest

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO VS. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 1994 Aug 25 G.R. No. 115455 235 SCRA 630 FACTS: The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.

The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) contends that the imposition of VAT on sales and leases by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision of “non-impairment of contracts.”

ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional on ground that it violates the contract clause under Art. III, sec 10 of the Bill of Rights.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court the contention of CREBA, that the imposition of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision of non-impairment of contracts, is only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical. It is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State's power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration.

Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and the Court does not understand it to make this claim. Rather, its position, as discussed above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be made by a general, but only by a specific, law.

Further, the Supreme Court held the validity of Republic Act No. 7716 in its formal and substantive aspects as this has been raised in the various cases before it. To sum up, the Court holds:

(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by Congress in the enactment of the statute;

(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes - beyond those prescribed by the Constitution - have been observed is precluded by the principle of separation of powers;

(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor interfere with the free exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to an education; and

(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is regressive, oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under the Contract Clause are prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of prospective relief by writ of prohibition. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal

Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.*****Tolentino vs. Secretary of FinanceFacts: These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."Issue: Does sales tax on bible sales violative of religious freedom?Held: No. The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its application to the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon."

The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution

SECTION 26.

1. EVERY BILL PASSED BY THE CONGRESS SHALL EMBRACE ONLY ONE SUBJECT WHICH SHALL BE EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE THEREOF. 2. NO BILL PASSED BY EITHER HOUSE SHALL BECOME A LAW UNLESS IT HAS PASSED THREE READINGS ON SEPARATE DAYS, AND PRINTED COPIES THEREOF IN ITS FINAL FORM HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO ITS MEMBERS THREE DAYS BEFORE ITS PASSAGE, EXCEPT WHEN THE PRESIDENT CERTIFIES TO THE NECESSITY OF ITS IMMEDIATE ENACTMENT TO MEET A PUBLIC CALAMITY OR EMERGENCY. UPON THE LAST READING OF A BILL, NO AMENDMENT THERETO SHALL BE ALLOWED, AND THE VOTE THEREON SHALL BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, AND THE YEAS AND NAYS ENTERED IN THE JOURNAL.

16. PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO (227 SCRA 703)

FACTS:

This is a petition to declare the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 7354. The main target of this petition is Section 35 of RA 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation.

SEC. 35. Repealing Clause. – All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and regulation or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, republic acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087, and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice-President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.

These measures withdraw the franking privilege (free mail) from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The first objection is based on Art. VI, Sec. 26(1) of the Constitution, which provides that “Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” RA 7345 is entitled “An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its

Powers, functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith”. It is the submission of the petitioners that Sec. 35 of RA 7345 which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.

The second objection was that the second paragraph of the repealing clause was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200. It appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition violates Article VI Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, which provides that:

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately after, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

Petitioners stress that Section 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment.

The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause. It is alleged that RA 7345 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representative, COMELEC, former Presidents of the Philippines, widows of former Presidents, National Census and Statistics Office, and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices or officers. Equal protection of the laws, embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution, simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The respondents argue that the considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.

ISSUES:

Whether or not RA 7345 is unconstitutional on the grounds that:its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes [Article VI Sec. 26(1)];it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage [Article VI Sec. 26(2)]; and it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary [equal protection of laws in Article III Sec. 1].

HELD:

YES. The petition is partially granted. The franking privilege of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices shall be restored.

On the first objection, the title of the challenged act does not violate the Constitution. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. If the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. According to Cooley, author of Constitutional Limitations, “the repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject”. The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title.

On the second objection, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. The Court declines to look into the petitioners’ charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became RA 7354 and that the copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted in accordance with Article VI Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution.

On the third contention on equal protection of laws, the argument of the respondents that the considerable volume of mail of the Judiciary justifies the withdrawal of its franking privilege, is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all (like the widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly. The Court states, “at this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem”. The Court is unable to disagree with the respondents that Section 35 of RA 7345 represents a valid exercise of police power. On the contrary, the Court finds its repealing clause to be discriminatory and that it denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated.

In sum, the Court sustains RA 7345 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, the Court annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution that no person shall “be deprived of the equal protection of the laws”.

17. Astorga vs. Villegas

G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the Chief Executive, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress.Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essentialWhen courts may turn to the journal: Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the journal should be consulted.

FACTS:

House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives and then sent to the Senate for reading. During discussion at the Senate, Senator Tolentino and Senator Roxas recommended amendments thereto. Despite the fact that it was the Tolentino amendment that was approved and the Roxas amendment not even appearing in the journal, when Senate sent its certification of amendment to the House, only the Roxas amendment was included, not the Tolentino amendment. Nevertheless, the House approved the same. Printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Reps, the Speaker, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President, and sent to the President of the Philippines who thereby approved the same. The Bill thus was passed as RA 4065. However, when the error was discovered, both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures.

ISSUES:

Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into lawWhether or not the entries in the journal should prevail over the enrolled bill

RULING:

Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory

The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in

obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.

It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.

Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential.

When courts may turn to the journal

Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved

by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.

18. ABBAS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (166 SCRA 651)

FACTS:

Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution states that the Electoral Tribunal “shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court...and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the HOR, as the case may be.” On October 9, 1987, Petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections. The respondent tribunals was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) senators.

On November 17, the petitioner filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of the above case on the ground that all of them are interested parties, and respondents. This mass disqualification, in effect, would leave only the three Justices to serve as Members of the Electoral Tribunal. The Motion was denied and hence, this petition for certiorari.

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioners argue that considerations of public policy and norms of fair play and due process require the mass disqualification. Further, necessity dictates that an amendment of the Tribunal’s Rules of procedure permitting the contest to be decided by only three Members is a practicable and unconstitutionally unobjectable solution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a Senate Electoral Tribunal composed of only three (3) Justices of the SC is a valid Electoral Tribunal under the Constitution

HELD:

NO. The suggested device is unfeasible and repugnant to the Constitution.

REASONS:

Looking into the wording and intent of Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution, it is clear that in creating a Tribunal composed by Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, both “judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share the duty and authority of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the SET is 2 to 1 – an unmistakable indication that the “legislative component” cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.

The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of senators.

The framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal.

Refrain from participation must be distinguished from complete absence. Indeed, an individual Member of the Tribunal may recuse himself from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. But a Tribunal cannot legally function as such absent its entire membership of Senators or Justices.

19. LAZATIN VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (168 SCRA 391)

FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative of the first district of Pampanga in the May 11, 1987 elections. During the canvassing of the votes, respondent objected to the inclusion of certain election returns and brought the case to the COMELEC. On May 19, The COMELEC ordered the suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate, yet on May 27, petitioner was proclaimed the winner.

Respondent filed two petitions: a) to nullify the proclamation and b) prevent petitioner from taking office. However, the COMELEC did not act on the petitions. On June 30, petitioner assumed office.

On September 15, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. The Supreme Court set aside the revocation on January 25, 1988.

On January 28, Respondent received a copy of the Court’s decision and consequently filed an election protest with the HRET on February 8.

ARGUMENTS:

In moving to dismiss private respondent’s protest on the ground that it was filed late, petitioner cited Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code:

A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa...shall be filed...within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the results of the election.

Using the above rule, Petitioner argued that respondent had only until February 6 to file a protest.Since the protest was filed on February 8, the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over it.

However, the HRET argued that petitioner was able to file the protest on time, citing Sec. 9 of the HRET rules:

Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed...within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of these rules on November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made prior to the effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same may be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of proclamation.

Using the above rule, the HRET argued that respondent has up February 11 to file a protest. Since it was filed on February 8, the HRET ruled it was within the prescribed period and thus, had jurisdiction over the matter.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the protest

Whether or not the Supreme Court may conduct a Judicial Review of decisions/final resolutions of the HRET

HELD:

YES. The HRET has jurisdiction over the protest, as it was filed within the period prescribed by Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules.

NO, except for cases requiring the exercise of the Court’s “extraordinary jurisdiction.”

REASONS:

Inapplicability of Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code to the case at bar: Under the 1973 Constitution, Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to petitions filed before the COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city official. Under the 1987 Constitution, it has ceased to be effective. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the HOR and the Senate in their respective Electoral Tribunals.

Exclusive character of the Electoral Tribunal’s Power: The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. The use of the word “sole” emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. It is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution.

It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. Following this principle, the HRET, in order to fully exercise its constitutional function may implement its own rules concerning the filing of electoral protests.

A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative branch has been exclusively granted to the legislative body itself. In the 1935 Constitution, this power was lodged to an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and specially created for that singular purpose. Under the 1973 Constitution, this delineation between the power of the Executive and the Legislature was blurred when jurisdiction over electoral contests was vested in the COMELEC, an agency with general jurisdiction over the conduct of election for all elective national and local officials. The 1987 constitution vested this jurisdiction back to the respective Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives.

Scope of the Supreme Court over decisions made by the HRET: So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests related to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall as a rule, not be reviewed by the Court. Its corrective power extends only to decisions and resolutions constituting a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the Electoral Tribunals.

20. BONDOC VS. PINEDA (201 SCRA 792)

FACTS:

Marciano Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Ermigidio Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party were rivals in the congressional elections held on May 11, 1987. Pineda was the proclaimed winner, but Bondoc filed a protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The said tribunal is composed of nine (9) members, 3 of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court, and the remaining six (6) are members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from political parties and party list. A decision has been reached by the HRET where Bondoc won over by Pineda; thus the LDP members in the tribunal insisted on a reappreciation of votes and recount of ballots delaying the finalization of the decision at least four months. The reexamination resulted in increase of Bondoc’s lead over Pineda from 23 to 107 votes. It shall be noted that Congressman Camasura, a member LDP, voted with the Supreme Court Justices to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest; hence, HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation No. 25 declaring Bondoc as the winner. Subsequently, Congressman Cojuanco informed Camasura and Bautista that the LDP expelled them from the party on the ground of betrayal to the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP. Thereafter, Cojuanco informed the House Speaker Mitra of the ouster of the said Congressmen and their decision to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Camasura to the HRET. The Tribunal issued a Resolution canceling the previous decision on the ground that without the vote of Congressman Camasura, who was relieved from the Tribunal, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Sec. 24 of the Rules of Tribunal, and therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.

A Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Bondoc seeking the following reliefs:1.) to annul the decision of HRET to withdraw the nomination of Camasura to the HRET.;2.) issue a writ of prohibition restraining whoever may be designated in place of Camasura fromassuming, ossupying, and discharging functions as a member of the HRET,;writ of mandamus ordering Camasura to return and discharge his functions as a member ofthe HRET;

In his answer, Pineda asserts that the Congress being the sole authority that nominates and elects the members of the HRET; hence, it has the power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in representation of the political parties materially changed.

ISSUE:

Whether of not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant party, change the party’s representation in the House Representatives Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the said tribunal in an election contest pending therein.

DECISION:

SC ruled in favor of Bondoc.

RATIO:

(Read Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution)

The tribunal was created to function as a non partisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Tribunal was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration and to transfer to that tribunal all powers in matter pertaining to contested election of its members. The Tribunal is a body separate from and independent from the legislature.

Resolution of House of Representatives violates the independence of HRET.

The Resolution of House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the HRET for disloyalty to LDP, because he cast a vote in favor of Nacionalista party, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the HRET to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. To sanction such interference would reduce the HRET as a mere tool for the advance ment of a party in power.

Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence—even independence from political party to which they belong. In expelling Camasura from HRET for that ground, the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Such resolution is therefore null and void.

Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.

Members of the HRET, as judges, are entitled to security of tenure, just as members of judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec 2.,Art VIII, 1987 Constitution). Membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for just cause, such as, expiration of the members’ congressional term of office, death, permanent disability, resignation from political party which he represents, formal affiliation with anither political party, removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. The records shows that Camasura has not formally affiliated with another political group; thus, his termination from HRET was not for valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.SECTION 18. THERE SHALL BE A COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS CONSISTING OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, AS EX OFFICIO CHAIRMAN, TWELVE SENATORS, AND TWELVE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ELECTED BY EACH HOUSE ON THE BASIS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION FROM THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS REGISTERED UNDER THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM REPRESENTED THEREIN. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE

COMMISSION SHALL NOT VOTE, EXCEPT IN CASE OF A TIE. THE COMMISSION SHALL ACT ON ALL APPOINTMENTS SUBMITTED TO IT WITHIN THIRTY SESSION DAYS OF THE CONGRESS FROM THEIR SUBMISSION. THE COMMISSION SHALL RULE BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL THE MEMBERS.

21. DAZA V. SINGSON (180 SCRA 496)

FACTS:From the May 1987 elections, Raul Daza was chosen as one of the members of the Commission on Appointments (CA) as a representative of the Liberal Party (LP).

In September 1988, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was organized resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives (HR). 24 members of the LP shifted to LDP resulting to the swelling of the latter with 159 members and leaving only 17 members with the former.

HR revised its representation in the CA withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly formed LDP in the person of Luis Singson.The petitioner challenges this reappointment and the court issued a TRO for Daza and Singson from serving in the CA.

ISSUE:

WON the reappointment of members of the CA is constitutional

HELD:

Yes. Petition Dismissed

RATIO:

Sec 18 Art VI of the constitution provides that there shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of, among others, 12 members of the HR elected by the House on the basis of proportional representation. Since there was a shift in the number of members of the LP to maintain proportional representation the House reconstituted CA and awarded LDP the seats.The petitioner argues that LDP is not a stable and permanent party so it is not entitled for seats in the CA. Court held that when COMELEC granted the registration of LDP as a registered political party, LDP is qualified to have seats in the CA maintaining proportional representation.

21. Lidasan vs. ComelecGR NO. L-280892

Petioner: BARA LIDASANRespondent: COMELEC

FACTS:

The Chief Executive signed the House Bill 1247 which is now known to be Republic Act 4790, “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur”. Such new Municipality includes 21 barrios, 9 of which are from Lanao del Sur, and the other 12 are from Cotabato. (From Lanao: Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,Dagowan,Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung and From Cotabato: Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,Tangabao,Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamawakan). The Comelec, prompted by the coming election adopted the resolution which provides for the barrios that will be included in Lanao del Sur. Apprised by this happening, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to the Comelec that the said resolution be suspended until clarified by the correcting legislation. But the Comelec stood by its own interpretation, and declared that the RA 4790 should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

This events triggered the original action for certiorari and prohibition filed by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. Affected by the implementation of RA 4790, Lidasan now questions the constitutionality of the said Act.

ISSUE:

Is Republic Act 4790 valid considering that such Act creates a Municipality which includes barrios from another province.

HELD:

RA 4790 is declared NULL and VOID. Constitutional requirement “no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill”. This provision imposes limitations upon the legislative power.Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogenoussubjects. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

These were all not complied with because the title of the Act provides that it is “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur”. The part which says “in the Province of Lanao del Sur” projects that it is just Lanao del Sur which is affected by the creation of Dianaton, where in truth it also affects barrios in two municipalities of Cotabato. Therefore, the Court finds the title deceptive for the Act has actually two purposes , and those are : 1.) to create the municipality of Dianaton allegedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig

and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

The title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. Thus, the limitations on the provision of one subject in a bill and the requirement as to the language of the bill were violated.

Removal of the barrios of Cotabato included in the new municipality of Dianaton will not treat the defects of the Act and shall still render the Act unconstitutional because the valid part is not independent of the invalid portion.

DISSENTING OPINION

Fernando, J.

The subject was the creation of the municipality of Dianaton and it was clearly embodied in thetitle.The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents.

23. PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSN., INC. VS. GIMENEZ (15 SCRA 479)

FACTS:

Philippine Constitution Association Inc, a non profit civic organization, duly incorporated under the Philippine law, filed a petition for preliminary injunction enjoining Auditor General of the Philippines and the disbursing officers of the House of Congress from “passing in audit vouchers and from countersigning the checks of treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator of former members of the House of Representatives of retirement and vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic Act No. 3836. Petitioner contends the following:

the provision for the retirement of the members and certain officers of Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill, in violation of Sec 2(1) of Art VI of the Constitution;the provision on retirement and gratuity is a circumvention of the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of the Congress during their term, contrary to Art VI, Sec 14. of the Constitutionthe provision is a class legislation because it allows members and officers of the Congress to retire after 12 years of service while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after 20 years of service.

the provision on sick and vacation leave is a another attempt of legislators to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General filed its answer and contends that:the grant of retirement pensions and benefits does not constitute forbidden compensation.the title of the law in question sufficiently complies with the provisions of the Constitutions which provides that “no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”the law does not constitute class legislationcertain indispensable parties were not included in the petitionthe petitioner has no standing to institute the actionthe payment of the commutable sick and vacation leave is not an indirect scheme to increase the salary.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioner has the legal standing to institute the petitionWhether of not the law in question is violative of the Constitution.

RULING:

1st point: Petitioner’s standing to institute the suit.The Petitioner can validly institute the suit. In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and they may, therefore, question the constitutionality pf statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys.

2nd point: Whether or not RA 3836 violates Sec 14, Art VI of the Constitution.The Constitutional provision in Section 14, Art Vi includes in the term of compensation “other emoluments”. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question . Most of the authorities and decided cases have regarded emolument as “the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services which is annexed to possession of an office, salary, fees, and perquisites. It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.

“No increase in said compensation shall take effect until the expiration of the full term of all members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase

Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and House of Representatives, to take effect upon approval of the said Act. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all Members of the Senate and the House of representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Sec 14, Art Vi of the Constitiution.

3rd point: Violation of equal protection clause.RA 3836 is patently discriminatory and therefore violate the equal protection clause. Firstly the said law grants retirement benefits to Senators and Members of the House of representatives who are elective officials, it does not include other elective officials such as governors of provinces and the members of the provincial boards and the elective officials of the municipalities and chartered cities.

Secondly, all members of the Congress under RA 3836 are given retirement vbenefits after serving 12 years, not necessarily continuous, whereas, most government officers and emplpyees aee given retirement benefits after 2o years .

In the third place, all government officials and employees are given only one retirement benefits irrespective of their length of service in the government, whereas, under RA 3836 Members of the Congress will b entitled to two retirement benefits or equivalent to six years of salary.

Lastly, RA 3836 grants retirement benefits to officials who are not members of the GSIS. Most grantees of the retirement benefits under various retirement laws have to be a member or must al least contribute a portion of their monthly salaries to GSIS

4th point: Title of the RA 3836 not germane to the subject matter. Par 1 Sec 21, Art VI of the Constitution provides:

No bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

Under Republic Act 3836, amending the first paragraph of Sec 12, subsection © of the Commonwealth Act 186, the retirement benefits are granted to members of the GSIS who have rendered at least 2o years of service regardless of age. This provision is related and germane to the subject of the Commonwealth Act 186. On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of RA 3836 refers to members of the Congress and to elective officers who are not members of the GSIS. To provide retirement benefits therefore, for these officials would relate to subject not germane to the Commonwealth Act 186.

In short, RA 3836 violates three constitutional provisions namely: the prohibition regarding increase in salaries of Members of the Congress; equal protection clause; and prohibition that the title of the bill shall not embrace more than one subject.

24. TOBIAS VS. ABALOS (239 SCRA 106)

FACTS:

This is a petition to render Republic Act No. 7675 unconstitutional. RA 7675 is also known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly urbanized City to be Known as the City of Mandaluyong”. Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district.

Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became RA 7675. Pres. Ramos signed it into the law on Feb. 9, 1994. Pres. Ramos signed RA 7675 into the law on Feb. 9, 1994. A plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994 where the people of Mandaluyong was asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under RA 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population.18,621 voted “yes” whereas 7,911 voted “no”. By virtue, of these results, RA 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.

Article VIII Sec.49 of RA 7675 provides:“As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election”.

Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Sec.49 of RA 7675 embraces two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2)the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. The second aforestated subject is not germane tot the subject matter of RA 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Thus, the “one subject-one bill” rule has not been complied with.

Petitioners assert that there is no mention of the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, which is allegedly violative of Article VI Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution.

Petitioners also argue that Section 49 has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI Sec. 5(1).

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 7675, specifically Artivle VIII Sec.49, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution:It contravenes the “one subject–one bill” rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Sec. 26(1) of the Constitution. Article VI Sec. 5(4) states “Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section”.Article VI Sec. 5(1) states the present limit of 250 members in the House of Representative.

HELD:

NO. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of RA 7675 necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. The constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article Vi Sec. 26(1) “should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject.

The contention that there is no mention of a census to show compliance with minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify the separation into two legislative districts of San Juan/Mandaluyong does not suffice to strike down the validity of RA 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional process, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts, At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.

As to the contention that Section 49 of RA 7675 in effect preempts the right of congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since the petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon, and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

A reading of the applicable provision, Article VI Sec. 5 (1) shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, “unless otherwise provided by law”. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by RA 7675 must be allowed to stand.

The petitioners’ additional argument that RA 7675 resulted in “gerrymandering”, which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worth of credence. Hon. Zamora’s constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

26. Bolinao Electronics Corporation vs Brigido Valencia

11 SCRA 486 – Political Law – Veto Power – Condition Attached to an Item

Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for operating even after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused damages to his department.ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by the refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.Note: This ruling, that the executive’s veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.

27. BENGZON V. DRILON (235 SCRA 630)

FACTS:

RA 910 was amended by RA 1797 which provides for the adjustment of salaries or retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. RA 3595 amended RA 1568 provided for identical benefits as RA 1797 provided for members of the Constitutional Commission. Retirement benefits to Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Justices. PD 578 was enacted by President Marcos which extended similar benefits to the members of the AFP.

Two months later, PD 644 was issued by President Marcos repealing Section 3-A of RA 1797 and RA 3595. Under PD 1638, President Marcos restored the readjustment of the retirement benefits of enlisted men and officers. A later decree, PD 1909 was also issued providing for the readjustment of the pensions of members of the AFP who are retired prior to Sept. 10, 1979. adjustment for retirement benefits was not restored for retired Justices of Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of the repealed provisions of RA 1797 and RA 3595 which President Aquino vetoed.

Believing that Congress Act was trying to circumvent her veto back in 1990, the President vetoed some of sections she believed would bring back RA 1797.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Presidential veto of items in the GA Act providing for adjusted retirement benefits for members of the judiciary is constitutional?

HELD:

No, not known to President Aquino, PD 644 never became law because it was not published prior to its promulgation in accordance to the ruling in Tanada v. Tuvera. Therefore, it follows that RA 1797 continues to be in effect not having been repealed by PD 644. In vetoing the said sections Pres. Aquino is in effect vetoing RA 1797 which was passed 35 years prior to that date.

Also, the invalidity of PD 644 was ruled upon with finality by the Supreme Court and a veto of the said items in the GA Act is tantamount to a reversal of that decision. Clearly, the President has no power to do both. For it to do so would be to give it legislative powers to repeal laws as well as allow it to diminish the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary by dictating how its money should be spent in spite of its powers of augmentation. The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is not absolute. The power to disapprove any item in the GA Act does not grant the authority to veto a part of the item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.

Petition granted. The questioned veto is set aside as illegal and unconstitutional.

28. Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006A report by Charles Aguilar

FACTS:On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project).On September 28, 2005, the President then issued Executive Order 464, “Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes,” which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.

ISSUES:Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; andWhether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

HELD:

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch; it is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.Yes. Although there are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in investigations in Congress necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern.Yes. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication.It has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Due process requires that the people should have been apprised of its issuance before it was implemented.

Validity of Sections 1 and 2(a)The Supreme Court declared Section 1 and Section 2(a) of Executive Order 464 valid while Sections 2(b) and 3 are void. Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1 is limited only to appearances in the question hour. Under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive SecretaryOn Section 2(a) No infirmity, can be imputed to as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege.Unconstitutionality of Sections 2 (b) and 3Section 3 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.Whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the President has not reversed such determination. There is an implied claim of privilege, which implied claim is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof.The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is invalid as it is merely implied. It does not provide for precise and certain reasons for the claim, which deprives

the Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case.

The salient provisions of the Executive Order 464 are as follows:SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. –(a) Nature and Scope. – The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest.Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order, including:Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order:Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege;Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and

Such other officers as may be determined by the President.SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. 29. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEEMARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITYG.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.ISSUE:Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?

HELD:The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly

manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

31. ABAKADA, et al. vs. Ermita

Facts: They argue that the VAT is a tax levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services, which cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the exempted delegation as the latter refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on goods or merchandise imported or exported. Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., further contend that delegating to the President the legislative power to tax is contrary to republicanism. They insist that accountability, responsibility and transparency should dictate the actions of Congress and they should not pass to the President the decision to impose taxes. They also argue that the law also effectively nullified the President’s power of control, which includes the authority to set aside and nullify the acts of her subordinates like the Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance.Facts:1. RA 9337: VAT Reform Act enacted on May 24, 2005.2. Sec. 4 (sales of goods and properties), Sec. 5 (importation of goods) and Sec. 6 (services and lease of property) of RA 9337, in collective, granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain:a. whether by 12/31/05, the VAT collection as a percentage of the 2004 GDP exceeds 2.8% orb. the nat’l gov’t deficit as a percentage of the 2004 GDP exceeds 1.5%

3. If either condition is met, the Sec of Finance must inform the President who, in turn, must impose the 12% VAT rate (from 10%) effective January 1, 2006.4. ABAKADA maintained that Congress abandoned its exclusive authority to fix taxes and that RA 9337 contained a uniform proviso authorizing the President upon recommendation by the DOF Secretary to raise VAT to 12%.5. Sen Pimentel maintained that RA 9337 constituted undue delegation of legislative powers and a violation of due process since the law was ambiguous and arbitrary. Same with Rep. Escudero.6. Pilipinas Shell dealers argued that the VAT reform was arbitrary, oppressive and confiscatory.7. Respondents countered that the law was complete, that it left no discretion to the President, and that it merely charged the President with carrying out the rate increase once any of the 2 conditions arise.

Issue: WON there was undue delegation – No.

Ratio:1. Constitution allows as under exempted delegation the delegation of tariffs, customs duties, and other tolls, levies on goods imported and exported. VAT is tax levied on sales of goods and services which could not fall under this exemption. Hence, its delegation if unqualified is unconstitutional.2. Legislative power is authority to make a complete law. Thus, to be valid, a law must be complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy and it must fix a standard, limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable.3. No undue delegation when congress describes what job must be done who must do it and the scope of the authority given. (Edu v Ericta)4. Sec of Finance was merely tasked to ascertain the existence of facts. All else was laid out.5. Mainly ministerial for the sec to ascertain the facts and for the president to carry out the implementation for the vat. They were agents of the legislative dept.6. No delegation but mere implementation of the law.

SECTION 25.

1. THE CONGRESS MAY NOT INCREASE THE APPROPRIATIONS RECOMMENDED BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT AS SPECIFIED IN THE BUDGET. THE FORM, CONTENT, AND MANNER OF PREPARATION OF THE BUDGET SHALL BE PRESCRIBED BY LAW. 2. NO PROVISION OR ENACTMENT SHALL BE EMBRACED IN THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL UNLESS IT RELATES SPECIFICALLY TO SOME PARTICULAR APPROPRIATION THEREIN. ANY SUCH PROVISION OR ENACTMENT SHALL BE LIMITED IN ITS OPERATION TO THE APPROPRIATION TO WHICH IT RELATES.

3. THE PROCEDURE IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS SHALL STRICTLY FOLLOW THE PROCEDURE FOR APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS FOR OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES. 4. A SPECIAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL SHALL SPECIFY THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT IS INTENDED, AND SHALL BE SUPPORTED BY FUNDS ACTUALLY AVAILABLE AS CERTIFIED BY THE NATIONAL TREASURER, OR TO BE RAISED BY A CORRESPONDING REVENUE PROPOSAL THEREIN.

5. NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED AUTHORIZING ANY TRANSFER OF APPROPRIATIONS; HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE HEADS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS MAY, BY LAW, BE AUTHORIZED TO AUGMENT ANY ITEM IN

THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES FROM SAVINGS IN OTHER ITEMS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE APPROPRIATIONS. 6. DISCRETIONARY FUNDS APPROPRIATED FOR PARTICULAR OFFICIALS SHALL BE DISBURSED ONLY FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES TO BE SUPPORTED BY APPROPRIATE VOUCHERS AND SUBJECT TO SUCH GUIDELINES AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED BY LAW. 7. IF, BY THE END OF ANY FISCAL YEAR, THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE FAILED TO PASS THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL FOR THE ENSUING FISCAL YEAR, THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW FOR THE PRECEDING FISCAL YEAR SHALL BE DEEMED RE-ENACTED AND SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE AND EFFECT UNTIL THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL IS PASSED BY THE CONGRESS.

32. GARCIA VS. MATA (85 SCRA 208)

FACTS:Eusebio Garcia is a reserve officer on active duty of the Armed Forces of the Philippines until his reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2332. At the time of reversion, Petitioner held the rank of Captain. On June 18, 1955, the date when Republic Act No. 1382 took effect, petitioner had a total of 9 years, 4 months and 12 days of accumulated active commissioned service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; On July 11, 1956, the date when Republic Act 1600 took effect, petitioner had an accumulated active commissioned service of 10 years, 5 months and 5 days in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; Petitioner’s reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960 was pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 2334, and such reversion was neither for cause, at his own request, nor after court-martial proceedings; From 15 November 1960 up to the present, petitioner has been on inactive status and as such, he has neither received any emoluments from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor was he ever employed in the Government in any capacity; As a consequence of his reversion to inactive status, petitioner filed the necessary petitions with the offices of the AFP Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, and the President, respectively, but received reply only from the Chief of Staff through the AFP Adjutant General. The petitioner brought an action for "Mandamus and Recovery of a Sum of Money" in the court a quo to compel the respondents Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to reinstate him in the active commissioned service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to readjust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his reversion to inactive status basing his allegations on Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.ISSUE:Whether or not the Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is constitutional.HELD:Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines provides:“After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for more than two years

during any period of five consecutive years: PROVIDED, That hereafter reserve officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on active duty for more than two years on the date of the approval of this Act except those whose military and educational training, experience and qualifications are deemed essential to the needs of the service, shall be reverted to inactive status within one year from the approval of this Act: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated commissioned service who are still on active duty at the time of the approval of this Act shall not be reverted to inactive status except for cause after proper court-martial proceedings or upon their request; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any such reserve officer reverted to inactive status who has at least five of active commissioned service shall be entitled to a gratuity equivalent to one month's authorized base and longevity pay in the rank held at the time of such reversion for every year of active commissioned service; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any reserve officer who receives a gratuity under the provisions of this Act shall not except during a National emergency or mobilization, be called to a tour of active duty within five years from the date of reversion: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the Secretary of National Defense is authorized to extend the tour of active duty of reserve officers who are qualified military pilots and doctors; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any savings in the appropriations authorized in this Act for the Department of National Defense notwithstanding any provision of this Act to the contrary and any unexpended balance of certification to accounts payable since 1 July 1949 regardless of purpose of the appropriation shall be made available for the purpose of this paragraph: AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, That the Secretary of National Defense shall render a quarterly report to Congress as to the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph.”The said provision has no relevance or pertinence whatsoever to the budget in question or to any appropriation item contained therein, and is therefore proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par. 2

of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein; and any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to such appropriation.A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails to disclose its relevance or relation to any appropriation item therein, or to the Appropriation Act as a whole. It was indeed a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition against "riders" to the general appropriation act. The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 5 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines which provided that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." This constitutional requirement nullified and rendered inoperative any provision contained in the body of an act that was not fairly included in the subject expressed in the title or was not germane to or properly connected with that subject. if a provision in the body of the act is not fairly included in this restricted subject, like the provision relating to the policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of the AFP, such provision is inoperative and of no effect.Upon the foregoing dissertation, Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines was declared as unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative. Being unconstitutional, it confers no right and affords no protection. In legal contemplation it is as

though it has never been passed. Petitioner no longer having legal basis for such claims, his petition was denied.33. Aglipay v. RuizGR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.

Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.

Held: Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored “the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,” they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere.

Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an event considered of international importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to the country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a map of the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.”

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs. 34. Garces Vs. Estenzo 104 SCRA 510G.R. L-53487May 25, 1981

Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:

a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.

b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saint’s feast day.

These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the church’s property since church funds were used in its acquisition.

Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.

Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.

Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a layman’s custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the council’s funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some

religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.

35. LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE [14 SCRA 292; NO.L-19201; 16 JUN 1965]

Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount was spent for such purpose.

On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960. Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee'sgift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest.

Issue: Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the Parish priest at the time of donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did not have juridical personality as the constitutional exemption for religious purpose is valid.

Held: Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section 22(3) Article VI of the Constitution contemplates exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties as Property taxes contra distinguished from Excise taxes The imposition of the gift tax on the property used for religious purpose is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not a property by way of gift inter vivos.

The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the imposition of the donee's tax on the property donated to the church for religious purpose.

35. LLADOC V CIR & CTAGR 19201 June 16, 1965 14 SCRA 293Paredes, J.:

FACTS:MB Estate of Bacolod City donated Php 10,000 in cash to Fr. Ruiz, then the Parish Priest of Victorias, who was the predecessor of petitioner. MB Estate filed their donor’s gift tax but petitioner is on protest regarding donee’s tax claiming that assessment of gift tax against the Catholic Church is against the law; that when the donation was made. He was not yet the parish priest.ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner should be liable for assessed donee’s gift tax dontated.

RULING:A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment of Constitution… “exempt from taxation” as employed in the Constitution should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. And there being no clear, positive or express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of petitioner, the exemption herein must be deniedRUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO [39 PHIL 660; NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]

Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor.

In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty pf abode. Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines.

“Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

36. Lung Center of the Philippines vs. Quezon City and Constantino Rosas

G.R. No. 144104 June 29, 2004

FACTS:

The Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity which owns a parcel of land in Quezon City. Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the Philippines. The ground floor is being leased to a canteen, medical professionals whom use the same as their private clinics, as well as to other private parties. The right portion of the lot is being leased for commercial purposes to the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the government.

Petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from realty taxes amounting to about Php4.5 million, predicating its claim as a charitable institution. The city assessor denied the Claim. When appealed to the QC-Local Board of Assessment, the same was dismissed. The decision of the QC-LBAA was affirmed by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, despite the Petitioners claim that 60% of its hospital beds are used exclusively for charity.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to exemption from realty taxes notwithstanding the fact that it admits paying clients and leases out a portion of its property for commercial purposes.

HELD:

The Court held that the petitioner is indeed a charitable institution based on its charter and articles of incorporation. As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution.

Despite this, the Court held that the portions of real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. (strictissimi juris) Moreover, P.D. No. 1823 only speaks of tax exemptions as regards to: income and gift taxes for all donations, contributions, endowments and equipment and supplies to be imported by authorized entities or persons and by the Board of Trustees of the Lung Center of the Philippines for the actual use and benefit of the Lung Center; and taxes, charges and fees imposed by the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof with respect to equipment purchases (expression unius est exclusion alterius/expressium facit cessare tacitum).