The RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL AS APPLIED IN THE CASE OF Dante T. Tan vs. People of

Philippines & Other Supreme Court Cases on Speedy Trial 1

By : Atty. Antonio A. Ligon, CPA 2

I. Introduction

The right to a speedy trial is an ancient liberty. During the reign of HENRY II (1154–

1189), the English Crown promulgated the Assize of Clarendon, a legal code comprised

of 22 articles, one of which promised speedy justice to all litigants. In 1215 the Magna

Charta prohibited the king from delaying justice to any person in the realm.

The right to a speedy trial does not apply to every stage of a criminal case. It arises

only after a person has been arrested, indicted, or otherwise formally accused of a crime

by the government. Before the point of formal accusation, the government is under no

obligation to investigate, accuse, or prosecute a defendant within a specific amount of

time. Nor does the Speedy Trial Clause apply to post-trial criminal proceedings, such

as Probation and Parole hearings. If the government drops criminal charges during the

middle of a case, the Speedy Trial Clause does not apply unless the government later

refiles the charges, at which point the length of delay is measured only from the time of

refiling. However, the fairness requirements of the Due Process Clause apply during each

juncture of a criminal case, and an unreasonably excessive delay can be challenged under

1 This Paper was delivered before Business Law students, DLSU Graduate School of Business and will be submitted to the Lawyer’s Review for publication 2 The author is a practicing lawyer, managing partner of Ligon Solis Mejia Florendo & Cruz Law Firm . He Finished Public Sector Negotiation program in JFK School of Government in 2002. He served as Provincial Board Member of Bulacan from 2001 to 2004 and the IBP National office as Executive Director in 1990 . He is a professor of Commercial laws in De La Salle University

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this constitutional provision even if the delay occurs before formal accusation or after

conviction.

In the Philippine setting our organic and criminal laws expressly guarantee that in

all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to speedy trial. A speedy

trial is a trial conducted according to the law on criminal procedure and the rules and

regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. It can be one which

may be had as soon after indictment as the prosecution can with reasonable diligence

prepare for trial. And such trial is denied an accused person where through the

vacillation and procrastination of prosecuting officers, the accused is forced to wait

many months or years for trial.3

The primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of

an accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. The right of

an accused to speedy trial is not violated by mere postponement of scheduled hearings of

the case. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of

time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial. The right to speedy trial

allows reasonable continuance so as not to deprive the prosecution its day in court. 

II BACKGROUND OF THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL

The 1987 Philippine Constitution provides in Section 14 (2) of Article III, Bill

of Rights:

3 QUE VS. COSICO; PEOPLE VS. MARTELINO , G.R. No. 81861, September 8, 1989, 177 SCRA 410

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“ In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be

presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall

enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation

against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial,

to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory

process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the

production of evidence in his behalf. However, after

arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the

absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly

notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.”

It would appear historically, that the right to speedy trial provision have been

patterned from 6th Amendment of the US Constitution, as the Philippine was US territory

under December 10, 1898 to March 24, 1934. The Malolos Constitution, which was

drafted in 1899 by Revolutionary Government following its independence from Spain has

the earliest pronouncement on the right to speedy trial. Article 8, Title IV of the

Malolos Constitution provides:

“All persons detained shall be discharged of

delivered to the judicial authority within twenty four (24)

hours following the act of detention. All detentions without

the legal effect, unless the arrested person is duly

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prosecuted within seventy two (72) hours after delivery to a

competent court.

The accused shall be duly notified of such

proceeding within the same period.”

Rule 115, Section 1(h) and Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Procedure, in

relation to The Speedy Trial Act of R.A. 8493 (promulgated February 12, 1998) and

Supreme Court Circular 38-98, Implementing Guidelines of RA 8489 (August 11, 1998)

gave life to the spirit of the Right to Speedy Trial provided in Section 14 (2) of Article

III the 1987 Philippine constitution.

The right to speedy trial is a privilege of the accused. If he does not claim it he

should not complain. The spirit of the law is that the accused must go on record in the

attitude of demanding a trial or resisting delay if he does not do this , he must be deemed,

to have waived the privilege.

In the most recent case of Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.

(COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al.,

intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines4, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the right to a speedy trial is available only to an accused and is a peculiarly

criminal law concept, while the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be

4 G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.

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tapped in any proceedings conducted by state agencies. In this case, the appropriate right

involved is the right to a speedy disposition of cases, the recovery of ill-gotten wealth

being a civil suit. An examination of the petitioners’ arguments and the cited indicia of

delay would reveal the absence of any allegation that petitioners moved before the

Sandiganbayan for the dismissal of the case on account of vexatious, capricious and

oppressive delays that attended the proceedings. Petitioners are deemed to have waived

their right to a speedy disposition of the case. Moreover, delays, if any, prejudiced the

Republic as well. What is more, the alleged breach of the right in question was not raised

below. As a matter of settled jurisprudence, but subject to equally settled exception, an

issue not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

This paper will focused on the decision by the Supreme Court on Dante V. Tan

vs. People of the Philippines in view of the importance of the doctrines cited therein such

as the definition of the right to speedy trial, the inquiry as to whether or not an accused

has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification; and when is the

proper time to invoke the right to speedy trial

III The Case of Dante T. Tan Vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No.

173637, April 21, 2009

a. SUMMARY OF FACTS

On 19 December 2000, Dante Tan, along with other persons, was charged for his alleged

participation in employing manipulative devises in the purchases o Best World Resources

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Corporation (BW) shares. Tan was arraigned on 16 January 2001, and pleaded not guilty

to the charges. On 6 February 2001, the pre-trial was concluded, and a pre-trial order

set, among other things, the first date of trial on 27 February 2001. On 2 December

2003, Tan moved to dismiss the criminal case against him due to the prosecution’s

alleged failure to prosecute.  Claiming violation of his right to speedy trial, Tan faults the

prosecution for failing to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time and

without giving any excuse or justification for the delay.  According to Tan, he was

persistent in asserting his right to speedy trial, which he had allegedly done on several

instances.  Finally, he claimed to have been substantially prejudiced by this delay.

b. ISSUE(S):

(1) Whether or not there is a violation of the right to speedy trial of petitioner Dante

V. Tan

(2) When to envoke the right to speedy trial

c. DISCUSSION / DECISION

The Supreme Court, in ruling that there was no sufficient ground to conclude that the

prosecution is guilty of violating Tan’s right to speedy trial, found that:  

“ An accused’s right to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, is guaranteed in

criminal cases bu Section 14(2) of the Article III of the Constitution. The right to speedy

trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays ,in

its”salutary objective” being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the

anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined

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within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of

whatosoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on the

evolution of the righ to speedy trial , we reiterate the old legl maxim, “ justice delayed is

justice denied”. This oft- repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes,

much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right

to speedy trial”5

Following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution,Republic Act no.

8493, otherwise known as “The Speedy Trial Act of 1988” with aSection 6 of said Act

limiting the trial period to 180 days from the first day of trial.”6 Aware of the problems

resulting in the clogging of court dockets, the Court implemented the law by issuing

Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, which has been incorporated in the 2000 Rules of

Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 119.7

The Supreme Court in deciding against Tan relied on the following cases :

5 Page151-152, of Volume 158 of SCRA , Tan vs. People , G.R. No. 1736376 SECTION 6. Time limit for trial. — In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime, except those subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice or judge shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court.

7 Sec. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. – Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause. The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trail on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.

The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial.

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Corpuz v. Sandiganbagayan8:

“ The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the adminination of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or notis not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly,

expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a

system where justice is supposed tobe swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays

and depends upon circumstances. It secures the rights to the accused , but it does not

preclude the rights of public justice. Also it must be borne in mind that the rights given to

the accused by the Consititution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weaposn ; hence,

court are to give meaning to that intent.”9

The Court also applied the factors and the balance to consider which was used by

the Supreme Court in the People of the Philippines vs. Hernandez10: In the said case the

court said” A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused

necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial case on an ad hoc basis. In

determining whether the accused has been deprived of his rights to a speedy disposition

of the case and to speedy trial , four factors must be considered11:

(a) length of delay

8 G.R. NO. 162214, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRAS 294, 312-3139 G.R. NO. 162214, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRAS 294, 312-31310 G.R. Nos.154218 & 154372 499 SCRA 688, August 28, 2006,

11 BARKER VS. WINGO 407 US 514, 92 S.Ct.2182 (1972)

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(b) reason for delay

(c) defendant’s assertion of the right

(d) prejudice to the defendant

In Tan case, the court reiterated the doctrine stated in Santiago vs.

Garchitorena12t “In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are

required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of

the scheduled hearings of the case.  A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved

is clearly insufficient, and particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances

peculiar to each case.” Tan’s objection to the prosecution’s stand that he gave an implied

consent to the separate trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 is belied by the records of the

case.  No objection was interposed by his defense counsel when this matter was discussed

during the initial hearing. Tan’s conformity thereto can be deduced from his non-

objection at the preliminary hearing when the prosecution manifested that the evidence to

be presented would be only for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832.  His failure to object

to the prosecution’s manifestation that the cases be tried separately is fatal to his case. 

The acts, mistakes and negligence of counsel bind his client, except only when such

mistakes would result in serious injustice.  

The Court added citing Solar Team Entertainment Inc. vs. Judge How 13that

"Moreover, although periods for trial have been stipulated, these periods are not

absolute.  Where periods have been set, certain exclusions are allowed by law.  After all,

this Court and the law recognize that it is but a fact that judicial proceedings do not exist

12 G.R. No. 109266, 2 December 1993, 228 SCRA 214, 22113 393 Phil 172, 184; 338 SCRA 511 (2000)

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in a vacuum and must contend with the realities of everyday life.  In spite of the

prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the fundamentally

recognized principle is that the concept of speedy trial is a relative term and must

necessarily be a flexible concept”14.

"As to the assertion that delay in the presentation of evidence for Criminal Case No.

119830 has prejudiced Tan because the witnesses for the defense may no longer be

available at this time, suffice it to say that the burden of proving his guilt rests upon the

prosecution.  Should the prosecution fail for any reason to present evidence sufficient to

show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, Tan will be acquitted.  It is safely entrenched in

our jurisprudence that unless the prosecution discharges its burden to prove the guilt of an

accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf.  

"In the cases involving Tan, the length of delay, complexity of the issues and his failure

to invoke said right to speedy trial at the appropriate time tolled the death knell on his

claim to the constitutional guarantee. More importantly, in failing to interpose a timely

objection to the prosecution’s manifestation during the preliminary hearings that the

cases be tried separately, one after the other, Tan was deemed to have acquiesced and

waived his objection thereto.

"The old adage that justice delayed is justice denied has never been more valid than in

our jurisdiction, where it is not a rarity for a case to drag in our courts for years and years

and even decades.  It was this difficulty that inspired the constitutional requirement that

the rules of court to be promulgated by the Supreme Court shall provide for a simplified

14 Id

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and inexpensive procedure for the speedy trial and disposition of cases.  Indeed, for

justice to prevail, the scales must balance, for justice is not to be dispensed for the

accused alone."15

IV Relevance of Tan vs. People vis-à-vis Other cases in Speedy Trial

The case of Tan vs. People is unlike the Lumanlaw vs. Peralta, Jr.16 wherer the

Court ruled “Given the length and the unreasonableness of the majority of the delays, a

violation of the right of petitioner speedy trial becomes manifest. Almost two years

elapsed from the filing of the information against him until the filing of this Petition;

incredibly he has not been arraigned. An arraignment takes, at the most ten minutes of the

court’s business and does not normally entail legal gymnastics. In the Tan case, the

accused was arraigned right after an information was filed. As observed in the

Lumalaw case, where there are unwarranted delays in the conduct of the arraignment of

an accused, he has the right to demand, -- through the writ of mandamus—expeditious

action from all officials tasks with the administration of justice –he may not only demand

that his arraignment be held but, ultimately that the information against him be dismissed

on the ground of the violation of his right to speedy trial. The protection of people’s civil

liberties overwhelmes all of procedure.

15 Justice Isagani Cruz, Philippine political Law, p. 292

16 February 13, 2006 G.R.No. 16495482 SCRA 396

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In deciding the case of Tan vs. People , the court is mindful of the doctrine

enunciated in Uy vs. Adriano17 which defined Speedy trial” as a relative term and

necessary a flexible concept. In determining whether the right of the accused to a speedy

trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the

proceedings. Indeed, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not

suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which,

after all , do not exist in a vacuum.

The passage of time alone, without a significant deprivation of liberty or

impairment of ability to properly defend oneself, is not absolute evidence of prejudice.

The right to speedy trial is not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense

caused by passage of time; the interest is protected primarily by the due process clause

and the statutes of limitations.

The principle applied by the Court in   Churchille v. Mari and the People of the

Philippines vs. Hon. Rolando L. Gonzales et. al18 cannot be made applicable to Tan vs.

People, considering that in the Churchille case, the private respondent had already been

deprived of his liberty on two occasions. First, during the preliminary investigation

before the MCTC, when he was incarcerated from November 18, 2004 to March 16,

17

October 27, 2006, G.R. No. 159098 505 SCRA 625

18 G.R. No. 187728, September 12, 2011

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2005, or a period of almost four months; then again, when an Information had already

been issued and since rape is a non-bailable offense, he was imprisoned beginning June

27, 2008 until the case was dismissed on January 16, 2009, or a period of over 6

months.  Verily, there can be no cavil that deprivation of liberty for any duration of time

is quite oppressive.  Because of private respondent's continued incarceration, any delay in

trying the case would cause him great prejudice.  Thus, it was absolutely vexatious and

oppressive to delay the trial in the subject criminal case to await the outcome of

petitioners' petition for transfer of venue, especially in this case where there is no

temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction issued by a higher court

against herein public respondent from further proceeding in the case.

          Hence, the Court does not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial

court in dismissing the case against private respondent for violation of his constitutional

right to speedy trial.        

        

V CONCLUSIONS

Right to speedy trial is a way to prevent prosecutors from substantially delaying a

trial without valid reason and it provides substantial protection to the constitutional right

of the accused.

The prosecution of offenses is a matter of public interest and it is the duty of the

government or those acting in its behalf to prosecute all cases to their determination

without oppressive, capricious and vexatious delay. The Constitution does not say that

the right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is

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commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases

commenced by private individuals. Where once an accused is prosecuted criminally, he is

entitled to a speedy trial, it is irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in

which it is authorized to be commenced.19

The government should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in

the administration of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of the court to see

that the criminal proceedings against the accused come to an end that they be

immediately discharged from the custody of the law.20

The ordinary scenario in a courtroom would be a bunch of lawyers trying to

outwit each other during the entire proceeding at the expense of accused’s right to

speedy trial of the case. In this regard, the accused must assert his right to speedy trial of

his case and his failure to invoke the aforesaid right at appropriate time tolled the death

knell on his claim to the constitutional guarantee.21.

As seen in Tan vs. People and in other cited cases, the of the accused to have a

speedy trial is violated not only when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for

and secured, but also when, without good cause or justifiable motive, a long period of

time is allowed to elapse without having his case tried.

The right to speedy trial is not understood to have been waived or abandoned by

the accused when he or his attorney fails to urge the trial of the case. Such a waiver or

abandonment may be presumed only when the postponement of the trial has been

19 RECTO VS. AQUINO, 66 Phil 217, 233-234 20 CONDE VS. RIVERA AND UNSON, 45 Phil 65121 SANTIAGO VS. GARCHITORENA, G.R. No. 109266, 2 December 1993, 228 SCRA 214, 221.

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sought and obtained by the accused himself or by his attorney. The practice of

permitting the promotor fiscal, after filing the informations, to be idle and to allow

criminal cases instituted by him to remain inert in the files of the court for a long or

indefinite period of time and even for years, is a pernicious practice unjust to the accused.

Such practice violates the fundamental right of the accused to have a speedy trial, is

contrary to the public interest, and detrimental to the speedy administration of justice.22

The right of an accused to a speedy trial is not, however, violated by the mere

postponement of scheduled hearings of the case. Unjustified postponements which

prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the

accused to speedy trial.23

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VI REFERENCES

22 KALAW VS. APOSTOL and ALCAZAR, 64 PHIL 852, DUTERTE VS. SANDIGAN BAYAN,G.R. 130191, April 27, 1998, 289 SCRA 721, 94 SCAD 16123 PEOPLE VS. LEVISTE G.R. NO. 104386, March 28, 1996 citing PEOPLE VS. TAMPAL, 244 SCRA 202

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Sixth Amendment, The United States Consitution

Malolos Consittution

Section 14 (2) of Article III, Bill of Rights 1987 Consitution of the Philippines

The Speedy Trial Act 0f 1988 , Republic Act No.8493

Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 [dated August 11, 1998][Implementing the Provisions of Republic Act No. 8493, Entitled "An Act to Ensure a Speedy Trial ofAll Criminal Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes”

Rule 115, Section 1(h) and Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Procedure, Rules of Court of the Philippines es

2000 Rules of Criminal procedure , Rules of Court of the Philippi

Feldman, Steven D. 1996. "Twenty-fifth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Speedy Trial." Georgetown Law Journal 84 (April).

Dante T. Tan, Petitioner vs. People of the Philippines, 586 SCRA 139

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