SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. L-27396. September 30, 1974.]JESUSV.OCCEAand SAMUEL C.OCCEA,petitioners,vs. HON. PAULINO S.MARQUEZ, District Judge, Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch I,respondent.I.V. BINAMIRA, Co-Executor, Estate of W.C. Ogan, Sp. Proc. No. 423, CFI of Bohol,intervenor.JesusV.Occea& Samuel C.Occeain their own behalves.Hon.Paulino S.Marquezfor and in his own behalf.I.V.Binamirafor and in his own behalf as intervenor.D E C I S I O NANTONIO,Jp:In this petition for certiorari with mandamus, petitioners seek (1) to nullify the order of respondent Judge Paulino S.Marquezof the Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch I, in Sp. Proc. No. 423 entitled "In the Matter of the Testate Estate of William C. Ogan," in relation to petitioners' claim for partial payment of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00, dated November 2, 1966, fixing at P20,000.00 petitioners' attorney's fees, "which would cover the period March 1963 to December 1965," and directing its immediate payment minus the amount of P4,000.00 previously received by petitioners, and his second order, dated January 12, 1967, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration and modifying the November 2, 1966 order by deleting therefrom the above-quoted phrase; (2) to direct the said court to approve the release to them as attorney's fees the amount of P30,000.00 minus the amount of P4,000.00 already advanced to them by the executrix; and (3) to allow petitioners to submit evidence to establish the total attorney's fees to which they are entitled, in case no agreement thereon is reached between them and the instituted heirs.aisa dcThe gross value of the estate of the late William C. Ogan subject matter of the probate proceeding in Sp. Proc. No. 423 is more than P2 million. Petitioners, Atty. JesusV.Occeaand Atty. Samuel C.Occea, are the lawyers for the estate executrix, Mrs. Necitas OganOccea, and they had been representing the said executrix since 1963, defending the estate against claims and protecting the interests of the estate. In order to expedite the settlement of their deceased father's estate, the seven instituted heirs decided to enter into compromise with the claimants, as a result of which the total amount of P220,000.00 in cash was awarded to the claimants, including co-executor Atty. IsabeloV. Binamira, his lawyers and his wife. A partial distribution of thecorpusand income of the estate was made to the heirs in the total amount of P450,000.00. On November 18, 1966, the estate and inheritance taxes were completely settled by the executrix and the requisite tax clearance and discharge from liability was issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Payment of Attorneys' Fees, dated November 18, 1965, asking the court to approve payment to them of P30,000.00, as part payment of their fees for their services as counsel for the executrix since 1963, and to authorize the executrix to withdraw the amount from the deposits of the estate and pay petitioners. Three of the heirs, Lily Ogan Peralta, William Ogan, Jr. and Ruth Ogan, moved to defer consideration of the motion until after the total amounts for the executrix's fees and the attorney's fees of her counsel shall have been agreed upon by all the heirs. In July, 1966, five of the seven instituted heirs, namely, Lily Ogan Peralta, Necitas OganOccea, Federico M. Ogan, Liboria Ogan Garcia and Nancy Ogan Gibson, filed with the court a Manifestation stating that they had no objection to the release of P30,000.00 to petitioners as partial payment of attorney's fees and recommending approval of petitioners' motion.Their first motion dated November 18, 1965 being still unresolved, petitioners filed a second Motion for Payment of Partial Attorneys' Fees, dated July 5, 1966, praying for the release to them of the amount of P30,000.00 previously prayed for by them. Action on the matter was, however, deferred in an order dated August 6, 1966, upon the request of the Quijano and Arroyo Law Offices in behalf of heirs William Ogan, Jr. and Ruth Ogan for deferment until after all the instituted heirs shall have agreed in writing on the total attorney's fees. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration under date of September 12, 1966, asking the court to reconsider its deferment order and praying that payment to them of P30,000.00 be approved on the understanding that whatever amounts were paid to them would be chargeable against the fees which they and the instituted heirs might agree to be petitioners' total fees.On November 2, 1966, respondent Judge issued an order fixing the total fees of petitioners for the period March, 1963 to December, 1965 at P20,000.00. Petitioners moved to reconsider that order. On January 12, 1967, respondent issued an order not only denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration but also modifying the original order by fixing petitioners' fees for the entire testate proceedings at P20,000.00.Petitioners contend that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in fixing the entire attorney's fees to which they are entitled as counsel for the executrix, and in fixing the said fees in the amount of P20,000.00. The reasons given by petitioners in support of their contention are: (1) the motion submitted by petitioners for the court's resolution was only for partial payment of their attorney's fees, without prejudice to any agreement that might later be reached between them and the instituted heirs on the question of total attorney's fees, yet respondent Judge resolved the question of total attorney's fees; (2) considering that the only question raised by petitioners for the court's determination was that of partial attorney's fees, they never expected the court to make a ruling on the question of total attorney's fees; consequently, petitioners did not have the opportunity to prove the total fees to which they were entitled, and, hence, they were denied due process of law; (3) of the seven heirs to the estate, five had agreed to petitioners' motion for partial payment to them of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00, while the remaining two did not oppose the motion; (4) in his order, respondent Judge stated that he based the amount of P20,000.00 on the records of the case, but the amount of attorney's fees to which a lawyer is entitled cannot be determined on the sole basis of the records for there are other circumstances that should be taken into consideration; and (5) contrary to respondent Judge's opinion, the mere fact that one of the attorneys for the executrix is the husband of said executrix, is not a ground for denying the said attorneys the right to the fees to which they are otherwise entitled.Only Judge Paulino S.Marquezis named respondent in the present petition, for, according to petitioners, "no proper party is interested in sustaining the questioned proceedings in the Lower Court."In his Answer to the petition, respondent Judge alleged that (a) petitioners' proper remedy is appeal and not a special civil action, considering that there is already a final order on the motion for payment of fees; (b) petitioner Atty. SamuelOcceais the husband of executrix Necitas OganOccea, hence, SamuelOccea'specuniary interest now goes against the pecuniary interest of the four heirs he is representing in the special proceeding; (c) one reason why respondent Judge ordered the deletion of the phrase containing the period March, 1963 to December, 1965 from his November 2, 1966 order is that there are miscellaneous payments appearing in the compromise agreement and in the executrix's accounting which cover expenses incurred by petitioners for the estate; (d) co-executor I.V. Binamira should be included as party respondent to comply with Section 5, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; and (e) it is the duty of respondent Judge not to be very liberal to the attorney representing the executrix, who is at the same time the wife of said counsel and is herself an heir to a sizable portion of the estate, for respondent Judge's duty is to see to it that the estate is administered "frugally," "as economically as possible," and to avoid "that a considerable portion of the estate is absorbed in the process of such division," in order that there may be a worthy residue for the heirs. As special defenses, respondent Judge alleged that the seven instituted heirs are indispensable parties in this case; that mandamus cannot control the actuations of the trial court because they involved matters of discretion; and that no abuse of discretion can be imputed to respondent Judge for trying his best to administer the estate frugally.cdtOn the arguments that he had opposed in the lower court petitioners' motion for payment of partial attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00, and that since petitioners Samuel C.Occeaand JesusV.Occeaare the husband and father-in-law, respectively, of executrix Necitas OganOccea, the latter cannot be expected to oppose petitioners' claims for attorney's fees, thus leaving the co-executor as the lone party to represent and defend the interests of the estate, Atty. I.V. Binamira, who claims to be co-executor of the Ogan estate, filed with this Court on July, 1967, a Motion for Leave to Intervene, which was granted in a resolution of August 9, 1967. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution of August 9, 1967 and an Opposition to "Motion for Leave to Intervene," contending that Atty. Binamira ceased to be a co-executor upon his resignation effective October 29, 1965. On August 15, 1967, Atty. Binamira filed Intervenor's Opposition to Petition (answer in intervention) traversing the material averments of the petition.On August 25, 1967, intervenor filed a Reply to Executrix's Opposition and Opposition to Executrix's Motion for Reconsideration. On September 18, 1967, intervenor filed Intervenor's Comments on Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 9, 1967. On September 21, 1967, petitioners filed against intervenor a Petition for Contempt asking this Court to hold intervenor in contempt of court. We required intervenor to comment thereon. On October 9, 1967, petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition for Contempt. Intervenor filed on October 20, 1967, Intervenor's Comments and Counter Petition, asking this Court to dismiss petitioners' motion for indirect contempt and instead to hold petitioners guilty of indirect contempt for gross breach of legal ethics. We deferred action on the contempt motion until the case is considered on the merits. On January 15, 1968, intervenor I.V. Binamira filed an Answer to Supplemental Petition. This was followed on February 12, 1968, by another Petition for Contempt, this time against one Generoso L. Pacquiao for allegedly executing a perjured affidavit dated December 20, 1967, to aid intervenor I.V. Binamira to escape liability for his deliberate falsehoods, which affidavit intervenor attached to his Answer to Supplemental Petition. On the same date, February 12, 1968, petitioners filed against intervenor a Second Supplemental Petition for Contempt. On February 19, 1968, petitioners filed Petitioners' Manifestation Re Documentary Evidence Supporting Charges.We shall now consider the merits of the basic petition and the petitions for contempt.IThe rule is that when a lawyer has rendered legal services to the executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust, his attorney's fees may be allowed as expenses of administration. The estate is, however, not directly liable for his fees, the liability for payment resting primarily on the executor or administrator. If the administrator had paid the fees, he would be entitled to reimbursement from the estate. The procedure to be followed by counsel in order to collect his fees is to request the administrator to make payment, and should the latter fail to pay, either to (a) file an action against him in his personal capacity, and not as administrator,1or (b) file a petition in the testate or intestate proceedings asking the court, after notice to all the heirs and interested parties, to direct the payment of his fees as expenses of administration.2Whichever course is adopted, the heirs and other persons interested in the estate will have the right to inquire into the value of the services of the lawyer and on the necessity of his employment. In the case at bar, petitioner filed his petition directly with the probate court.There is no question that the probate court acts as a trustee of the estate, and as such trustee it should jealously guard the estate under administration and see to it that it is wisely and economically administered and not dissipated.3This rule, however, does not authorize the court, in the discharge of its function as trustee of the estate, to act in a whimsical and capricious manner or to fix the amount of fees which a lawyer is entitled to without according to the latter opportunity to prove the legitimate value of his services. Opportunity of a party to be heard is admittedly the essence of procedural due process.What petitioners filed with the lower court was a motion forpartialpayment of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00 as lawyers for the executrix for the period February, 1963, up to the date of filing of the motion on or about November 18, 1965. Five of the seven heirs had manifested conformity to petitioners' motion, while the remaining two merely requested deferment of the resolution of the motion "until the total amount for Executrix's fees and attorney's fees of her counsel is agreed upon by all the heirs." The court, however, in spite of such conformity, and without affording petitioners the opportunity to establish how much attorney's fees they are entitled to for their entire legal services to the executrix, issued an order fixing at P20,000.00 theentireattorney's fees of petitioners.In his Order of January 12, 1967, respondent Judge explained:cdta"The records of this case are before the Court and the work rendered by Atty. SamuelOccea, within each given period, is easily visible from them; his work as revealed by those records is the factual basis for this Court's orders as to attorney's fees."Whatever attorney's fees may have been approved by the Court on October 28, 1965 were as a result of compromise and were with the written consent of all the heirs and of all the signatories of the compromise agreement of October 27, 1965. That is not so with respect to Atty.Occea'sthirty-thousand peso claim for fees; and so, this Court, after a view of the record, had to fix it at P20,000.00. The record can reflect what an attorney of record has done."In fixing petitioners' attorney's fees solely on the basis of the records of the case, without allowing petitioners to adduce evidence to prove what is the proper amount of attorney's fees to which they are entitled for their entire legal services to the estate, respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion correctable by certiorari. Evidently, such fees could not be adequately fixed on the basis of the record alone, considering that there are other factors necessary in assessing the fee of a lawyer, such as: (1) the amount and character of the services rendered; (2) the labor, time and trouble involved; (3) the nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the professional character and social standing of the attorney; and (8) the results secured, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not.4It should be noted that some of the reasons submitted by petitioners in support of their fees do not appear in the records of the case. For instance, they claim that in connection with their legal services to the executrix and to the estate, petitioner Samuel C.Occeahad been travelling from Davao to Tagbilaran from 1965 to March, 1967, and from Davao to Cebu and Manila from 1963 to March, 1967, and that in fact he and his family had to stay for almost a year in Dumaguete City. These claims apparently bear strongly on the labor, time and trouble involved in petitioners' legal undertaking, and, consequently, should have been subject to a formal judicial inquiry. Considering, furthermore, that two of the heirs have not given their conformity to petitioners' motion, the need for a hearing becomes doubly necessary. This is also the reason why at this stage it would be premature to grant petitioners' prayer for the release to them of the amount of P30,000.00 as partial payment of their fees.IIAs stated above, petitioners have filed petitions for indirect contempt of court against intervenor I.V. Binamira charging the latter of having made false averments in this Court.We have carefully considered these charges and the answers of intervenor, and, on the basis of the evidence, We conclude that intervenor I.V. Binamira has deliberately made false allegations before this Court which tend to impede or obstruct the administration of justice, to wit:1.To bolster his claim that the executrix, without approval of the court, loaned P100,000.00 to the Bohol Land Transportation Company, Inc., intervenor submitted as Annex 5 of his Answer to Supplemental Petition a so-called "Real Estate Mortgage" which he made to appear was signed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna and the executrix. The certification of the Deputy Clerk of Court (Annex A-Contempt) shows that what intervenor claims to be a duly executed mortgage is in reality only a proposed mortgage not even signed by the parties.2.Intervenor, in his Intervenor's Opposition to Petition, also stated that in December, 1965, the executrix, without the court's approval or of the co-executor's consent, but with petitioners' consent, loaned P100,000.00 to the Bohol Land Transportation Company, Inc. out of the estate's funds. The record shows that only P50,000.00 was loaned to the company to protect the investment of the estate therein, and that the same was granted pursuant to a joint motion signed, among others, by intervenor, and approved by the court.3.To discredit petitioner Samuel C.Occeaand his wife, the executrix, intervenor stated in his Intervenor's Opposition to Petition that less than a month after the loan of P100,000.00 had been granted to the transportation company, petitioner Samuel C.Occeawas elected president by directors of his own choosing in the Bohol Land Transportation Company, Inc., insinuating that in effect the executrix loaned to her husband the said sum of money. The certification of the corporate secretary of the Bohol Land Transportation Company, Inc. (Annex D-Contempt) states that petitioner Samuel C.Occeawas not the president of the company at the time, nor did he act as president or treasurer thereof, and that the president was Atty. Vicente de la Serna. This last fact is also shown in intervenor's own Annex 5 of his Answer to Supplemental Petition.4.In intervenor's Opposition to this petition for certiorari, he stated that contrary to the executrix's statement in the 1965 income tax return of the estate that an estate income of P90,770.05 was distributed among the heirs in 1965, there was in fact no such distribution of income. The executrix's project of partition (Annex E-Contempt) shows that there was a distribution of the 1965 income of the estate.5.To discredit petitioners and the executrix, intervenor alleged in his Intervenor's Opposition to Petition that petitioners caused to be filed with the court the executrix's verified inventory which failed to include as assets of the estate certain loans granted to petitioner Samuel C.Occeain the sum of P4,000.00 and to the executrix various sums totalling P6,000.00. The letters written by the late W. C. Ogan to his daughter, the executrix (Annexes F, G. and H-Contempt), show that the said sums totalling P10,000.00 were in reality partly given to her as a gift and partly for the payment of certain furniture and equipment.6.Intervenor, in order to further discredit petitioners and the executrix, stated in his Reply to Executrix's Opposition and Opposition to Executrix's Motion for Reconsideration that the executrix and petitioners refused to pay and deliver to him all that he was entitled to under the compromise agreement. The receipt dated October 29, 1965, signed by intervenor himself (Annex I-Contempt), shows that he acknowledged receipt from petitioner Samuel C.Occea, lawyer for the executrix, the sum of P141,000.00 "in full payment of all claims and fees against the Estate, pursuant to the Agreement dated October 27, 1965.7.In his Reply to Executrix's Opposition and Opposition to Executrix's Motion for Reconsideration, intervenor alleged that he signed Atty.Occea'sprepared receipt without receiving payment, trusting that Atty.Occeawould pay the amount in full, but later Atty.Occeawithheld Chartered Bank Check No. 55384 for P8,000.00 drawn in favor of intervenor and P15,000.00 in cash. A receipt signed by intervenor I.V. Binamira (Annex K-Contempt) shows that he acknowledged receipt of the check in question in the amount of P8,000.00 "intended for Mrs. Lila Ogan Castillo . . ." Anent the sum of P15,000.00 in cash, Annex J-Contempt (Reply to the Opposition for Authority to Annotate Interest, etc. filed by intervenor with the probate court) shows that intervenor, as movant, himself had alleged that "no check was issued to movant, but withdrawn amount of P15,000.00 was included in purchasing Manager's Check No. 55398 for the Clerk of Court (deposit) for P75,000.00," for the said amount was voluntarily extended by intervenor as a favor and gesture of goodwill to form part of the total cash bond of P75,000.00 deposited with the Clerk of Court, as shown by a receipt signed by Atty. Samuel C.Occea(Annex K-11-Contempt) which forms part of the record in the court below.8.In his intervenor's Comments and Counter-Petition, intervenor denied the truth of petitioners' claim that intervenor had voluntarily and willingly extended the sum of P15,000.00 as a favor and gesture of goodwill to form part of the P75,000.00-deposit. In the Opposition to Motion of Executrix for Reconsideration of Order of February 19, 1966, dated April 16, 1966 (Annex K-2-Contempt), intervenor had, however, admitted that "out of the goodness of his heart . . . in the nature of help," he had "willingly extended as a favor and gesture of goodwill" the said sum of P15,000.00.9.To impugn the claim of petitioner Samuel C.Occeathat he stayed in Dumaguete City for almost one year to attend to the affairs of the estate, intervenor, in his intervenor's Opposition to Petition, alleged that said petitioner's stay in Dumaguete City was not to attend to the affairs of the estate, but to enable him to teach in Silliman University. The certification of the Director of the personnel office of Silliman University, dated December 4, 1967 (AnnexV-Contempt) is, however, to the effect that their "records do not show that Atty. Samuel C.Occeawas teaching at Silliman University or employed in any other capacity in 1963, or at any time before or after 1963."The foregoing are only some of the twenty-one instances cited by petitioners which clearly show that intervenor had deliberately made false allegations in his pleadings.We find no rule of law or of ethics which would justify the conduct of a lawyer in any case, whether civil or criminal, in endeavoring by dishonest means to mislead the court, even if to do so might work to the advantage of his client. The conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness. It is neither candid nor fair for a lawyer to knowingly make false allegations in a judicial pleading or to misquote the contents of a document, the testimony of a witness, the argument of opposing counsel or the contents of a decision. Before his admission to the practice of law, he took the solemn oath that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor wittingly or willingly promote or sue any false, groundless or unlawful suit, and conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to courts as well as to his clients. We find that Atty. Binamira, in having deliberately made these false allegations in his pleadings, has been recreant to his oath.cdiThe charges contained in the counter-petition for indirect contempt of intervenor I.V. Binamira against petitioners have not been substantiated by evidence, and they must, therefore, be dismissed.We note that no further action was taken on the petition for contempt filed by petitioners against Generoso L. Pacquiao, who executed the affidavit attached to intervenor's Answer to Supplemental Petition, the contents of which petitioners claim to be deliberate falsehoods. The said respondent Pacquiao not having been afforded an opportunity to defend himself against the contempt charge, the charge must be dismissed.WHEREFORE, (1) the petition for certiorari is granted, and the courta quois directed to hold a hearing to determine how much the total attorney's fees petitioners are entitled to, and (2) Atty. IsabeloV. Binamira, who appeared as intervenor in this case, is hereby declared guilty of contempt and sentenced to pay to this Court within ten (10) days from notice hereof a fine in the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00). Costs against intervenor.Fernando, Barredo, FernandezandAquino, JJ.,concur.|||(Occea v. Marquez, G.R. No. L-27396, [September 30, 1974], 158 PHIL 249-263)EN BANC[G.R. Nos. L-10236-48. January 31, 1958.]THEPEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellant,vs. EUSTACIODELUNA, ET AL.,defendants-appellees.Solicitor General Ambrosio PadillaandSolicitor Felicisimo R. Rosetefor appellant.Luis F. Gabinetefor appellee EustaciodeLuna.Pedro B. Ayudafor appellee Estela R. Gordo.Alejandro P. Captulofor appellees Angelo T. Lopez and Alawadin I. Bandon.Franciscodela Fuentefor appellee Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez.Bienvenido Peraltafor appellee Abraham C. Calaguas.Santos L. Parina, Generosa H. Hubilla, Maria Velez y Estrellas, Jaime P. Marco, Roque J. Briones, Balbino P. FajardoandEmilio P. Jardinico, Jr.,in their own behalf.SYLLABUS1.BAR FLUNKERS; OATH AS LAWYERS BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC CONSTITUTES CONTEMPT OF COURT. Although know that they did not pass the bar examination. Although they sought admission to the Bar under the Bar Flunkers Act, they were subsequently notified of the resolution of the Supreme Court denying their petitions. This notwithstanding, they took their oaths as lawyers before a notary public and formally advised the Court, not only of such fact, but, also that they will practice in all courts of the Philippines.Held:The oath as lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law and may taken only before the Supreme Court by those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice. The resolution of the Supreme Court denying appellees' petition for admission to the Bar implied, necessarily, a denial of the right to take said oath, as well as prohibition of the taking thereof. By taking oaths before a notary public, appellees expressed clearly their intent to, and did, in fact, challenge and defy the authority of the Supreme Court to pass upon and settle, in a final and conclusive manner, the issue whether or not they should be admitted to the bar, as well as, embarrass, hinder and obstruct the administration of justice and impair the respect due to the courts of justice and the Supreme Court, in particular, in violation of section 3, subdivision (b) of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Such acts, therefore, constitute contempt of court.2.CONTEMPT OF COURT; MEANS BY WHICH CONTEMPT MAY BE COMMITTED: "HOLDING OUT TO THE PUBLIC AS ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW"; CASE AT BAR. The lower court is, seemingly, under the impression that appellees could not be guilty of contempt of court unless they actually engaged in the practice of law or "held out to the public" as lawyers "by means of circulars." Such view is inaccurate, for "assuming to be an attorney . . . and acting as such without authority," is, only one of the means by which contempt of court may be contempt of court may be committed, under said Rule 64, section 3, of the Rules of Court. Besides by taking "the oath of office 3, of the Rules of Court. Besides by taking "the oath of office as attorney-at-law" and notifying the Supreme Court that they had done so and would "practice law in all courts of the Philippines that they had done so and would "practice law in all courts of the Philippines", the appellees had, for all intents and purposes, held out to the public" as such attorney-at-law (U.S.vs.Ney and Bosque, 8 Phil. 146).3.id.; id.; jurisdiction OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE TO TRY AND PUNISH THE CONTEMPTS AT BAR. If the contemptuous acts were committed not against the Court of First Instance where the amended informations for contempts were filed, but against the Supreme Court, does the former court have jurisdiction to try and punish said contempts? In the first place, according to said information, the act charged were committed in contempt of the Supreme Court, as well as of all other courts of the Philippines,including the Court of First Instance of Manila.In the second place, pursuant to Section 44 of theJudiciary Actof 1948, courts instance have original jurisdiction over criminal cases, in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, ora fine of more than two thousand pesos.Inasmuch as a fine not exceeding P1,000 may be imposed in the cases of contempt under consideration, it follows that the same is within the original jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the Supreme Court, in view of the inherent power of the latter to punish those guilty of contempt against the same.4.ID.; ID.; CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF LOWER COURT AND SUPREME COURT; COURT AGAINST WHOM THE ACT WAS COMMITTED HAS PREFERENTIAL RIGHT. In the vent of concurrent jurisdiction over the cases of contempt of court, the court against whom the act of contempt was committed has the preferential right to try and punish the guilty party. However, the court concerned (the Supreme Court in the present case) may elect not to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over the acts of contempt in question, as it did in the present case, when the said court referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation and appropriate action. In such a case the Court of First Instance of Manila may not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction over the case.D E C I S I O NCONCEPCION,Jp:This is an appeal, taken by the prosecution, from an order, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, granting a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant in each one of the above entitled cases, for lack of jurisdiction and, also, upon the ground that the facts alleged in the amended informations, filed in said cases, do not constitute the crime of contempt of court with which said defendants (EustaciodeLuna, Jaime P. Marco, Santos L. Paria, Estela R. Gordo, Angelo T. Lopez, Generosa H. Hubilla, Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez, Abraham C. Calaguas, Roque J. Briones, Alawadin I. Bandon, Balbino P. Fajardo, Maria Velez y Estrellas and Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr.) are charged. It is alleged in said amended informations that, on or about the 22nd day of December, 1954, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the person accused in each one of these cases". . . well knowing that he has not passed the bar examination and was not in any way authorized to take his oath as a lawyer and after having been duly informed and notified that certain portions ofRepublic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, are unconstitutional and therefore void and without force and effect, and that all the petitions of the candidates including the accused who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952, inclusive, for admission to the bar were refused and denied by the Resolution of the Honorable, the Supreme Court, promulgated on March 18, 1954, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and contemptuously disobey and resist in an insolent and defiant manner the said Resolution of the Supreme Court directed to him and each and everyone of the petitioners, and perform acts constituting improper conduct and manifestations that tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in all courts of the Philippines and impair the respect to and attack the authority and dignity of the Honorable, the Supreme Court and all other inferior courts by then and there, without being lawfully authorized to do so, taking an oath as a lawyer before a notary public and making manifestations to that effect before the Honorable, the Supreme Court."After quoting from Rule 64, section 4, of the Rules of Court, the pertinent part of which reads:"Where the contempt . . . has been committed against a superior court or judge, or against an officer appointed by it, the chargemaybe filed with such superior court . . . ." (Italics our.)and from the Corpus Juris Secundum, the rule to the effect that"It is a well-established rule thatthe power to judge a contempt rest exlusively with the court contemned and that no court is authorized to punish a contempt against another.Accordingly, disobedience of the order of a state court is not punishable as for contempt by a court of another state or by a federal court."the lower court concluded that the contemptuous act allegedly committed by appellees herein "was committed not against" said court "but against the Supreme Court of the Philippines" and that, accordingly, the Court of First Instance of Manila "has no jurisdiction to try and punish" the appellees herein.This conclusion is untenable. The above-quoted provision of the Rules of Court is permissive in nature. It is merely declaratory of the inherent power of courts to punish those guilty of contempt against the same. It does not declare that jurisdiction of the court concerned to so punish the guilty party isexclusive. Indeed, in promulgating said Rules of Court, this Court could not have validly denied to other Courts, to which the jurisdiction may have been vested by statute, the right to exercise said authority, for the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, under Article VIII, section 13, of the Constitution, is limited to the promulgation of "rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," and does not extend to the determination of the jurisdiction of the courts of justice in the Philippines. In fact, section 2 of said Article VIII of the Constitution explicitly ordains that "Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts," thereby implying, necessarily, that such power is withheld from the Supreme Court. Needless to say, the aforesaid view, quoted from Corpus Juris Secundum, is good law only"unless otherwise provided by statute"(17 C.J.S., 81), and such statute, providing "otherwise", exists in the Philippines.Moreover, the amended informations specifically allege that the defendants herein did "perform acts constituting improper conduct and manifestations that tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in all courts of the Philippines and impair the respect to and attack the authority and dignity of the Honorable, the Supreme Court and all other inferior courts."To put it differently the acts charged were committed, according to said amended informations, in contempt of the Supreme Court, as well as of "all other courts of the Philippines,"including the Court of First Instance of Manila.Thus, the very authorities cited in the order appealed from do not justify the same.Again, section 236 ofAct No. 190and section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court provide that a person guilty of any of the acts of contempt defined, respectively, in section 232 of said Act and section 3 of said Rule 64, "may be fined not exceeding one thousand pesos, or imprisoned not more than six months." Pursuant to section 44 of the RevisedJudiciary Actof 1948 (RepublicAct No. 296), courts of first instance have original jurisdiction over criminal cases "in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, ora fine of more than two thousand pesos."Inasmuch as a fine not exceeding P1,000 may be imposed in the cases of contempt under consideration, it follows that the same are within the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila, although such jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the Supreme Court, in view of the inherent power of the latter to punish those guilty of contempt against the same.It may not be amiss to add that, in the event of such concurrent jurisdiction over cases of contempt of court, it would be a good practice to acknowledge the preferential right of the court against which the act of contempt was committed to try and punish the guilty party. However, insofar as appellees herein are concerned, on February 3, 1955, this Court passed and promulgated a resolution of the following tenor:"The Court received from Pedro B. Ayuda a communication of the following tenor:REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSUPREME COURTMANILA"IN-RE ATTORNEYS WHO TOOK THE OATH BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC UNDER THE PROVISIONS OFREPUBLIC ACT No. 972."Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez"Pedro B. Ayuda"Alawadin I. Bandon"Abraham C. Calaguas"Balbino P. Fajardo"Claro C. Gofredo"Estela R. Gordo"Generoso H. Hubilla"Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr."Angelo T. Lopez"EustaciodeLuna"Jaime P. Marco"Santos L. Paria"Florencio P. Sugarol, and"Maria Velez y Estrellas. Attorneys.xxx xxx xxx"MANIFESTATION"COMES NOW the undersigned for and in representation of the above-named attorneys and to this Honorable Court, hereby respectfully makes manifestation that they have taken the oath of office as Attorneys-at-Law on December 22, 1954 before Mr. Anatolio A. Alcova, a Notary Public in and for the City of Manila, with office at R-201 Regina Building, Escolta, Manila, in pursuance of the provisions ofRepublic Act No. 972;"There are attached to this manifestation seventeen (17) copies of the oath of office as Annexes 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F', 'G', 'H', 'I', 'K', 'L', 'M', 'N', 'O', 'P', and 'Q'."Messrs, Alejandro P. Capitulo, Claro C. Gofredo, and Florencio P. Sugarol of the group took the bar examinations in August, 1954. They also had taken their oath before this Honorable Tribunal, January 20, 1955."This manifestation is made for all legal effects as they will practice law in all the Courts of the Philippines."Manila, Philippines, January 28, 1955.(Sgd.) PEDRO B. AYUDAIn his own behalf and on behalf of the others in his capacity as president of the 1946 - 1952 BAR EXAMINEES ASSOCIATION, 2034 Azcarraga, Manila."It appearing that the persons mentioned, except Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol, have not passed the Bar Examinations, it was resolved:"A.To refer the matter to the Fiscal, City of Manila for investigation and appropriate action in connection with Section 3 (e), Rule 64;"B.As Pedro Ayuda has assumed to be an attorney without authority, he is given 10 days from notice hereof, within which to explain why he should not be dealt with for contempt of this Court;"C.The notary public Anatolio A. Alcoba, member of the Bar, who has illegally administered the oath to the said persons in disregard of this Court's resolution denying them admission to the Bar (except Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol), is hereby given ten days to show cause why he should not be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law;"D.The clerk of Court is directed to furnish copy of this resolution to the Court of Appeals and to all courts of first instance, the Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission, and the Department of Justice;"E.As to Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol, proper action will be taken later in their respective cases." (pp. 36-37, rec., G. R. No. L- 10245.)It is clear, from the foregoing resolution, that this Court did not intend to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over the acts of alleged contempt committed by appellees herein and that we preferred that the corresponding action be taken by the City Fiscal of Manila in the Court of First Instance of Manila. In fine, the latter had no justification whatsoever in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction over the cases at bar.The next question for determination is whether the acts charged in the amended informations constitute contempt of court. After quoting the allegation of said amended informations to the effect that the defendant in each one of the instant cases". . . did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and contamptuously disobey and resist in an insolent and defiant manner the said Resolution of the Supreme Court directed to him, and each and everyone of the petitioners and perform acts constituting improper conduct and manifestations that tend directly and indirectly to impede obstruct or degrade the administration of justice . . ."the lower court had the following to say:"From this allegation, there is no hint whatsoever that any command, order or notification from the judicial court or any non- judicial person, committee or body clothed by law with power to punish for contempt has been disobeyed or violated by the herein accused. Moreover, there is nothing shown in the resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court of March 18, 1974 directing the accused not to take their oath as lawyers. The mere fact of taking an oath by any person as a lawyer does not make him automatically a lawyer without having completed the requirements prescribed by the Supreme Court for the admission to the practice of law. It is necessary before his admission to the Bar that he passes the required bar examinations and is admitted by the Supreme Court to practice law as attorney. Our statutes punish as criminal contempt one 'assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as such without authority.' (par. F. Rule 64, Rules of Court.) The mere taking of oath as lawyers by herein accused, in the humble opinion of this Court, is not tantamount to practice law. However, if this had taken one step further, as for example, after taking their oaths, they have held out themselves as lawyers to the public, received cases for litigants, appeared before any court of justice personally or by filing pleadings therewith, would be considered that they are really engaged in the practice of law. These accused have not committed any of these acts as enunciated by our Supreme Tribunal in the case of Bosque and Ney, 8 Phil., 146, nor have they disobeyed or defied any command, order or notification of this Court or of the Honorable Supreme Court. What they have done only was the taking of their oath as lawyers before a notary public who was not authorized by law to take their oath as lawyers, as the latter can only aware as such before the Supreme Court or any member thereof."Pursuant to the above stated reasons, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that no criminal contempt has been committed by the herein accused before this Court and neither before the highest Tribunal of this land."The aforementioned quotation from the amended informations is, however, incomplete. It did not include the allegation to the effect that the defendant in each one of the cases at bar took his "oath as a lawyer before a notary public" and filed the manifestation transcribed in the resolution above quoted,"well knowing that he has not passed the bar examination and was not in any way authorized to take his oath as a lawyer and after having been duly informed and notified that certain portions ofRepublic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, are unconstitutional and therefore void and without force and effect, and that all the petitions of the candidates including the accused who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952, inclusive, for admission to the bar were refused and denied by the resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court, on March 18, 1954, . . .."In other words, appellees knew that they did not pass the bar examination. Although they, likewise, sought admission to the Bar under the provisions ofRepublic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, they were subsequently notified of the resolution of this Court denying said petition. Inasmuch as the oath as lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law and may be taken only, before the Supreme Court, by those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice, the resolution denying the aforementioned petition of appellees herein, implied, necessarily, a denial of the right to take said oath, as well as a prohibition of or injunction against the taking thereof. When, this notwithstanding, appellees took the oath before a notary public, and formally advised this Court, not only of such fact, but also, that "they will practice in all the courts of the Philippines," they, accordingly, disobeyed the order implied, and resisted the injunction implicit, in said resolution, thus violating section 232 ofAct No. 190, which declares in part:"A person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished as for contempt:"1.Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge."and section 3, subdivision (b), Rule 64, of the Rules of Court, which is identical.This case is, in principle, analogous to that of U.S.vs.Ney and Bosque (8 Phil., 146), which involved two lawyers, an American, C.W. Ney, and a Spaniard, Juan Garcia Bosque, who sent out a circular, signed "Ney and Bosque", stating that they had established an office for the general practice of law in all courts of the Islands and that Bosque would devote himself especially to consultation and office work relating to Spanish Law. Accused of contempt of court, both were convicted as charged, although upon different grounds. As regards the Spaniard, it was held that a former order of this Court denying his admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, on account of alienage, "was directly binding upon him;" that the aforementioned circular "amounted to an assertation of his right and purpose" to engage in such practice of law; and that "consequentlythe conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made in a proceeding to which he was a party."As regards Ney, he was found guilty of "misbehaviour" committed by "an officer of the court."Likewise, by their aforementioned acts, as set forth in the amended informations, appellees herein expressed clearly their intent to, and did, in fact, challenged and defy the authority of this Court to pass upon and settle, in a final and conclusive manner, the issue whether or not they should be admitted to the bar, as well as, embarrass, hinder and obstruct the administration of justice and impair the respect due to the courts of justice in general, and the Supreme Court, in particular. Thus, they performed acts constituting an "improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice," in violation of section 3, subdivision (b) of said Rule 64.". . .Acts which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity, affront its majesty, or challenge its authority constitute contempt of court.". . .. (12 Am. Jur. 395.)The lower court is, seemingly, under the impression that appellees could not be guilty of contempt of court unless they actually engaged in the practice of law or "held out to the public" as lawyers "by means of circulars." Such view is inaccurate, for "assuming to be an attorney . . . and acting as such without authority," is, onlyoneof the means by which contempt of court may be committed, under said Rule 64, section 3, of the Rules of Court. At any rate, by taking "the oath of office as attorney-at-law" and notifying the Supreme Court that they had done so and would "practice law in all courts of the Philippines", the appellees had, for all intents and purposes, "held out to the public" as such attorneys-at-law (U.S.vs.Ney and Bosque,supra).Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed, and let the records of these cases be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision. It is so ordered.Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., EndenciaandFelix, JJ.,concur.|||(People v. De Luna, G.R. Nos. L-10236-48, [January 31, 1958], 102 PHIL 968-979)SECOND DIVISION[A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000.]LESLIEUI,complainant,vs.ATTY. IRISBONIFACIO,respondent.SYLLABUS1.LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; PRACTICE OF LAW; A PRIVILEGE. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics.2.ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR ADMISSION. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are: a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines; b. a resident thereof; c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age; d.a person of good moral character; e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court; f. possess the required educational qualifications; and g. pass the bar examinations.AEDCHc3.ID.; ID.; POSSESSION OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER MUST BE CONTINUOUS. Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held "If good moral character is asine qua nonfor admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royongvs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865). A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community."4.ID.; ID.; ID.; LAWYERS MUST HANDLE THEIR PERSONAL AFFAIRS WITH GREAT CAUTION. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondentAtty.Bonifaciothat when she met CarlosUi, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of CarlosUi, she left him. . . . The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about CarlosUi's personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him. Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with CarlosUi, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that CarlosUihad children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if CarlosUiand this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, CarlosUinever lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering respondent's allegation that CarlosUiwas very open in courting her. All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs.6.ID.; DISBARMENT; GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT; BELIED BY RESPONDENT'S ACT OF IMMEDIATELY DISTANCING HERSELF FROM A MARRIED MAN UPON DISCOVERING HIS TRUE CIVIL STATUS. However, the fact remains the her relationship with CarlosUi, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." Respondent's act of immediately distancing herself from CarlosUiupon discovering his true status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and high moral standard of the legal profession. Complaint's bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complaint, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. This herein complaint miserably failed to do.7.ID.; DUTY OF LAWYERS; TO ADHERE UNWAVERINGLY TO THE HIGHEST STANDARDS OF MORALITY. It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.8.REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE AND HIGHLY IMPROBABLE FOR A LAWYER TO FORGET THE YEAR OF HER MARRIAGE. On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to believed the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by CarlosUi. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable. Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when she haspersonal knowledgeof the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.D E C I S I O NDE LEON,JR., Jp:Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment againstAtty. IrisBonifaciofor allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L.Ui, husband of complainant, LeslieUi.The relevant facts are:On January 24, 1971 complainant LeslieUimarried Carlos L.Uiat the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City1and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamedUi. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband, CarlosUi, was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondentAtty. IrisBonifaciowith whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.cdaCarlosUiadmitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of CarlosUi. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with CarlosUiand alleged, however, that everything was over between her and CarlosUi. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end.However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, CarlosUi, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with CarlosUibut to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondentAtty. IrisBonifaciobefore the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant's husband, CarlosUi. In her Answer,2respondent averred that she met CarlosUisometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that CarlosUihad children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one of their trips abroad, CarlosUiformalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985.3Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with CarlosUi. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and CarlosUiwanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together.4prcdIn 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was surprised when she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of CarlosUi. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of CarlosUi, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law firm5she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife of CarlosUiagain came to her office, demanding to know if CarlosUihas been communicating with her.It is respondent's contention that her relationship with CarlosUiis not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered CarlosUi's true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that CarlosUinever lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L.Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents' funds.6By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.In her Reply7dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly well that CarlosUiwas married to complainant and had children with her even at the start of her relationship with CarlosUi, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with CarlosUi.LibLexDuring the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband, CarlosUi, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:Complainant's evidence hadprima facieestablished the existence of the "illicit relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same evidence however show that respondent CarlosUiwas still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila and they, admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had beenprima facieestablished by complainant's evidence, this same evidence had failed to evenprima facieestablish the "fact of respondent's cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the complainant's evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S.vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).LexLibIt is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed9on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and CarlosUilived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission10wherein she charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to CarlosUion October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage11duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between CarlosUiand respondentAtty. IrisBonifaciowas October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by CarlosUiwas within the wedlock.12It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation ofArticles 18313and 18414of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.LexLibIn her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),15respondent averred that she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of CarlosUi, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.Respondent filed her Memorandum16on February 22, 1995, and raised the lone issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:(i)Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral character for the practice of the legal profession; and(ii)Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an immoral manner.17In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and not LeslieUibecause she did not know that CarlosUiwas already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with CarlosUi. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of CarlosUiwas that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship.18cdllOn the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to CarlosUitook place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and CarlosUigot married before complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to CarlosUiin June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was CarlosUiwho testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of CarlosUion this matter.Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with CarlosUi, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage,19does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by LeslieUiagainst respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged20and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice21to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with CarlosUi. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with CarlosUiin good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with CarlosUiwhom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.dctaiIn the Memorandum22filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant LeslieUi, she prayed for the disbarment ofAtty. IrisBonifacioand reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondent's mother, Mrs. LindaBonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs.Bonifaciowas the Branch Manager.23It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that CarlosUiwas a married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum,24respondent stated that complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of CarlosUito complainant. The allegation that her mother knew CarlosUito be a married man does not prove that such information was made known to respondent.Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that:In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by CarlosUi, the latter represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human experience.Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of CarlosUi, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother,Atty. TeodoroBonifacio, Jr. CarlosUiand respondent only talked to each other because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.xxx xxx xxx"Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:LLphilRESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit.Atty. IrisBonifaciois REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty.We agree with the findings aforequoted.The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:a.he must be a citizen of the Philippines;b.a resident thereof;c.at least twenty-one (21) years of age;d.a person of good moral character;e.he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court;f.possess the required educational qualifications; andg.pass the bar examinations.25(emphasis supplied)Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held: If good moral character is asine qua nonfor admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royongvs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).26cdtaiIn the case at bar, it is the claim of respondentAtty.Bonifaciothat when she met CarlosUi, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of CarlosUi, she left himSimple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about CarlosUi's personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with CarlosUi, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that CarlosUihad children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if CarlosUiand this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, CarlosUinever lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering respondent's allegation that CarlosUiwas very open in courting her.prcdAll these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with CarlosUi, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.27Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.28We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards."29Respondent's act of immediately distancing herself from CarlosUiupon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.30This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by CarlosUi. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when she haspersonal knowledgeof the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.LexLibWHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondentAtty. Iris L.Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.SO ORDERED.Bellosillo (Acting C.J.), Mendoza, QuisumbingandBuena, JJ.,concur.|||(Ui v. Bonifacio, A.C. No. 3319, [June 8, 2000], 388 PHIL 691-708)EN BANC[A.C. No.944. July 25, 1974.]FLORANARIDO,complainant,vs.ATTORNEY JAIME S.LINSANGAN,respondent.R E S O L U T I O NFERNANDO,Jp:The spectacle presented by two members of the bar engaged in bickering and recrimination is far from edifying, although it is understandable, if not justifiable, that at times zeal in the defense of one's client may be carried to the point of undue skepticism and doubt as to the motives of opposing counsel. Some such reflection is induced by these two administrative cases wherein respondents Jaime S.Linsanganand Rufino B. Risma, who represented adverse parties in a workmen's compensation case, did mutually hurl accusation at each other. The charge against respondentLinsanganfiled by a certain FloraNaridois that he violated the attorney's oath by submitting a perjured statement. When required to answer, not only did he deny the complaint but he would also hold respondent Risma accountable for having instigated his client, the complainant, FloraNarido, to file a false and malicious complaint resulting in what respondentLinsangancalled "embarrassment, humiliation and defamation" of a brother in a profession.On September 9, 1971, this Court referred the above administrative cases to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. Such report and recommendation was submitted on May 31 of this year.1.Insofar as the first case against respondent Jaime S.Linsanganis concerned, the report contains the following: "In support of her complaint filed with this Honorable Court, complainantNaridoheavily relies on the refusal of respondentLinsanganto withdraw despite warning the affidavit of Milagros M. Vergel de Dios . . ., which affidavitNaridoclaims to be perjured. . . Mrs.Naridoand Atty. Risma threatened Atty.Linsanganwith disbarment should he insist in offering the affidavit of Mrs. Vergel de Dios."1Nonetheless, such affidavit was filed. It was found as a fact that there was nothing improper in presenting such affidavit, its alleged falsity not being proven. Even if it were otherwise, still there was no showing of respondent having violated his attorney's oath for submitting a perjured affidavit. Thus the report continues: "With respect to the other allegations in the affidavit, suffice it to say that there is no evidence showing Atty.Linsangan'sawareness of the falsity thereof, assuming arguendo that they are indeed false. As testified by Atty.Linsanganhe has no intention whatsoever of misleading any court or judicial body, or of violating his attorney's oath."22.As for the charge against Attorney Risma, the report stated the following: "This administrative complaint stemmed from the belief of Atty.Linsanganthat Atty. Risma 'by virtue of his financial interest in the Award,' instigated the filing of Administrative Case No. 944 'in order to accomplish a short cut in winning a case even by intimidation or unfounded threats, by depriving a party of due process and at the expense, embarrassment, humiliation, and defamation of his undersigned brother-respondent.' . . . It seems unkind to allude evil motive to Atty. Risma. It is perhaps more apt to state that Atty. Risma's missionary zeal to fight for the rights of his clients triggered him into filing Administrative Case No. 944. We should admire Atty. Risma's dedication in championing the cause of the poor. Mrs.Narido, his client, is a destitute woman. She needed every centavo of the award. To her, any delay in the payment thereof meant grave injustice; it meant deprivation and starvation. Faced with the dilemma of his client, Atty. Risma had to rise to the challenge. In view of this, it is more in keeping with Christian precepts to say that it must have been the plight of Mrs.Narido rather than his alleged financial interest that compelled Atty. Risma to advise his client to file the case against Atty.Linsangan. . . . There being no direct evidence to show the alleged bad faith of Atty. Risma in advising his client to file Administrative Case No. 944 against Atty.Linsangan, the benefit of the doubt should be resolved in favor of Atty. Risma. Consequently, the charge of instigating the filing of 'disbarment proceedings against a brother attorney with improper motives and without just ground' necessarily fails."33.From the above, it was the recommendation that on such charges, both respondents should be exculpated. It being shown in the investigation, however, although it was not one of the charges in the counter-complaint filed against him that respondent Risma would seek to collect fifteen per cent of the recovery obtained by his client, contrary to the explicit provision in the Workmen's Compensation Act allowing only a maximum of ten per cent and that only where the case is appealed, there was likewise a recommendation for admonition or reprimand. The aptness of such a penalty was predicated on the fact that respondent Risma had not received a single centavo from the client. Moreover, it was clear such contract for attorney's fees would not be enforced. In the meanwhile, he had been serving his poverty-stricken client faithfully and well, even advancing some of the necessary expenses. What was recommended commends itself for acceptance.4.This further observation is not amiss. The two respondents would be well-advised to heed these words from Justice Laurel, announced in Javierv. Cornejo:4"It should be observed, in this connection, that mutual bickerings and unjustifiable recriminations, between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this court."55.One last word. The report submitted by the Solicitor General is characterized by thoroughness and diligence, but its quality would have been improved had there been on the part of the Solicitor concerned a more adequate grasp of notable opinions of this Court on legal ethics from Justice Malcolm on, thus obviating the need for reliance on secondary authorities, both Philippine and American.WHEREFORE, the complaint in Administrative Case No. 944 against respondent Jaime S.Linsanganis dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent Rufino B. Risma in Administrative Case No. 1025 is exculpated from the charge of having instigated the filing of an unfounded suit. He is, however, admonished to exercise greater care in ascertaining how much under our law he could recover by way of attorney's fees. The contract entered into between him and his client as to his being entitled to fifteen per cent of the award granted her in a workmen's compensation suit is declared to be of no force and effect, the penalty imposed being that of admonition merely only because he had made no effort to collect on the same and had even advanced expenses for a poor client. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the records of both respondents.Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muoz PalmaandAquino, JJ.,concur.|||(Narido v. Linsangan, A.C. No. 944 (Resolution), [July 25, 1974], 157 PHIL 87-92)EN BANC[A.C. No.219. September 29, 1962.]CASIANO U.LAPUT,petitioner,vs.ATTY. FRANCISCO E. F.REMOTIGUE, ATTY. FORTUNATO R. PATALINGHUG,respondents.Casiano U.Laputin his own behalf.F.E.F.Remotiguein his own behalf.F. R. Patalinghugin his own behalf.SYLLABUS1.ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES FOR UNETHICAL CONDUCT; APPEARANCE AS COUNSEL AFTER CLIENT HAS DISMISSED FORMER COUNSEL NOT IMPROPER. A lawyer was dismissed by his client because the latter no longer trusted him. In his stead the client contracted the services of another lawyer, who, to safeguard the interest of his client, prepared the papers for the revocation of the power of attorney previously executed in favor of the first lawyer. After the second lawyer had filed his appearance in court, the first lawyer voluntarily withdrew as counsel and, simultaneously, filed a motion for the payment of his attorney's fees. Held: The appearance of the second lawyer is not unprofessional, unethical or improper; the first lawyer's voluntary withdrawal as counsel and his filing of a motion for the payment of his fees amounted to an acquiescence to the appearance of the second lawyer.D E C I S I O NLABRADOR,Jp:This is an original complaint filed with this Court charging respondents with unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting cases and intriguing against a brother lawyer, and praying that respondents be dealt with accordingly.The facts which led to the filing of this complaint are as follows: In May, 1952, petitioner was retained by Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera to handle her case (Sp. Proc, No. 2-J) in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Testate Estate of Macario Barrera". By January, 1955, petitioner had contemplated the closing of the said administration proceedings and prepared two pleadings: one, to close the proceedings and declare Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera as universal heir and order the delivery to her of the residue of the estate and, second, a notice for the rendition of final accounting and partition of estate. At this point, however, the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera refused to counter-sign these two pleadings and instead advised petitioner not to file them. Some weeks later, petitioner found in the records of said proceedings that respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug had filed on January 11, 1955 a written appearance as the new counsel for Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera. On February 5, 1955 petitioner voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as counsel for Mrs. Barrera. On February 7, 1955, the other respondent, Atty. Francisco E. F.Remotigue, entered his appearance, dated February 5, 1955.Complainant here alleges that the appearances of respondents were unethical and improper for the reason that they had nursed the desire to replace the petitioner as attorney for the estate and the administratrix and, taking advantage of her goodwill, intrigued against the preparation of the final inventory and accounting and prodded Mrs. Barrera not to consent to petitioner's decision to close the administration proceedings; that before their appearance, they brought petitioner's client to their law office and there ma