RENATO  CAYETANO,  petitioner,    vs.  CHRISTIAN  MONSOD,  HON.  JOVITO  R.  SALONGA,  COMMISSION  ON  APPOINTMENT,  and  HON.  GUILLERMO  CARAGUE,  in  his  capacity  as  Secretary  of  Budget  and  Management,  respondents.  

Renato  L.  Cayetano  for  and  in  his  own  behalf.  

Sabina  E.  Acut,  Jr.  and  Mylene  Garcia-­‐Albano  co-­‐counsel  for  petitioner.  

   

PARAS,  J.:p  

We  are   faced  here  with   a   controversy   of   far-­‐reaching   proportions.  While  ostensibly   only   legal   issues   are   involved,   the  Court's   decision   in   this   case  would   indubitably   have   a   profound   effect   on   the   political   aspect   of   our  national  existence.  

The  1987  Constitution  provides  in  Section  1  (1),  Article  IX-­‐C:  

There  shall  be  a  Commission  on  Elections  composed  of  a  Chairman  and  six  Commissioners  who  shall  be  natural-­‐born  citizens  of  the  Philippines  and,  at  the  time  of  their  appointment,  at  least  thirty-­‐five  years  of  age,  holders  of  a  college   degree,   and   must   not   have   been   candidates   for   any   elective  position   in   the   immediately   preceding   -­‐elections.   However,   a   majority  thereof,   including   the   Chairman,   shall   be  members   of   the   Philippine   Bar  who   have   been   engaged   in   the   practice   of   law   for   at   least   ten   years.  (Emphasis  supplied)  

The  aforequoted  provision  is  patterned  after  Section  l(l),  Article  XII-­‐C  of  the  1973  Constitution  which  similarly  provides:  

There   shall   be   an   independent   Commission   on   Elections   composed   of   a  Chairman   and   eight   Commissioners  who   shall   be   natural-­‐born   citizens   of  

the   Philippines   and,   at   the   time   of   their   appointment,   at   least   thirty-­‐five  years  of  age  and  holders  of  a  college  degree.  However,  a  majority  thereof,  including  the  Chairman,  shall  be  members  of  the  Philippine  Bar  who  have  been   engaged   in   the   practice   of   law   for   at   least   ten   years.'   (Emphasis  supplied)  

Regrettably,   however,   there   seems   to   be   no   jurisprudence   as   to   what  constitutes  practice  of  law  as  a  legal  qualification  to  an  appointive  office.  

Black  defines  "practice  of  law"  as:  

The   rendition   of   services   requiring   the   knowledge   and   the   application   of  legal   principles   and   technique   to   serve   the   interest   of   another   with   his  consent.  It  is  not  limited  to  appearing  in  court,  or  advising  and  assisting  in  the  conduct  of   litigation,  but  embraces   the  preparation  of  pleadings,  and  other   papers   incident   to   actions   and   special   proceedings,   conveyancing,  the  preparation  of  legal  instruments  of  all  kinds,  and  the  giving  of  all  legal  advice  to  clients.  It  embraces  all  advice  to  clients  and  all  actions  taken  for  them   in   matters   connected   with   the   law.   An   attorney   engages   in   the  practice   of   law   by   maintaining   an   office   where   he   is   held   out   to   be-­‐an  attorney,  using  a   letterhead  describing  himself  as  an  attorney,  counseling  clients   in   legal  matters,  negotiating  with  opposing  counsel  about  pending  litigation,   and   fixing   and   collecting   fees   for   services   rendered   by   his  associate.  (Black's  Law  Dictionary,  3rd  ed.)  

The  practice  of   law   is   not   limited   to   the   conduct  of   cases   in   court.   (Land  Title  Abstract  and  Trust  Co.  v.  Dworken,   129  Ohio  St.  23,  193  N.E.  650)  A  person  is  also  considered  to  be  in  the  practice  of  law  when  he:  

...   for   valuable   consideration   engages   in   the   business   of   advising   person,  firms,   associations   or   corporations   as   to   their   rights   under   the   law,   or  appears   in   a   representative   capacity   as   an   advocate   in   proceedings  pending   or   prospective,   before   any   court,   commissioner,   referee,   board,  body,  committee,  or  commission  constituted  by  law  or  authorized  to  settle  

controversies  and  there,   in  such  representative  capacity  performs  any  act  or  acts  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  or  defending  the  rights  of  their  clients  under   the   law.   Otherwise   stated,   one   who,   in   a   representative   capacity,  engages  in  the  business  of  advising  clients  as  to  their  rights  under  the  law,  or  while  so  engaged  performs  any  act  or  acts  either  in  court  or  outside  of  court   for   that   purpose,   is   engaged   in   the   practice   of   law.   (State   ex.   rel.  Mckittrick  v..C.S.  Dudley  and  Co.,  102  S.W.  2d  895,  340  Mo.  852)  

This  Court  in  the  case  of  Philippine  Lawyers  Association  v.Agrava,  (105  Phil.  173,176-­‐177)  stated:  

The   practice   of   law   is   not   limited   to   the   conduct   of   cases   or   litigation   in  court;   it  embraces  the  preparation  of  pleadings  and  other  papers  incident  to   actions   and   special   proceedings,   the  management  of   such  actions   and  proceedings  on  behalf  of  clients  before  judges  and  courts,  and  in  addition,  conveying.  In  general,  all  advice  to  clients,  and  all  action  taken  for  them  in  matters   connected   with   the   law   incorporation   services,   assessment   and  condemnation   services   contemplating   an   appearance   before   a   judicial  body,   the   foreclosure  of  a  mortgage,  enforcement  of  a  creditor's  claim   in  bankruptcy   and   insolvency   proceedings,   and   conducting   proceedings   in  attachment,  and  in  matters  of  estate  and  guardianship  have  been  held  to  constitute   law   practice,   as   do   the   preparation   and   drafting   of   legal  instruments,   where   the   work   done   involves   the   determination   by   the  trained   legal  mind  of  the   legal  effect  of   facts  and  conditions.   (5  Am.  Jr.  p.  262,  263).  (Emphasis  supplied)  

Practice  of  law  under  modem  conditions  consists  in  no  small  part  of  work  performed   outside   of   any   court   and   having   no   immediate   relation   to  proceedings   in  court.   It  embraces  conveyancing,  the  giving  of   legal  advice  on  a   large  variety  of   subjects,  and   the  preparation  and  execution  of   legal  instruments  covering  an  extensive  field  of  business  and  trust  relations  and  other   affairs.  Although   these   transactions  may   have   no   direct   connection  with   court   proceedings,   they   are   always   subject   to   become   involved   in  litigation.  They  require  in  many  aspects  a  high  degree  of  legal  skill,  a  wide  

experience   with   men   and   affairs,   and   great   capacity   for   adaptation   to  difficult  and  complex  situations.  These  customary  functions  of  an  attorney  or   counselor   at   law   bear   an   intimate   relation   to   the   administration   of  justice  by  the  courts.  No  valid  distinction,  so  far  as  concerns  the  question  set  forth  in  the  order,  can  be  drawn  between  that  part  of  the  work  of  the  lawyer   which   involves   appearance   in   court   and   that   part   which   involves  advice  and  drafting  of   instruments   in  his  office.   It   is  of   importance  to  the  welfare   of   the   public   that   these   manifold   customary   functions   be  performed  by  persons  possessed  of  adequate   learning  and  skill,  of   sound  moral  character,  and  acting  at  all   times  under   the  heavy   trust  obligations  to  clients  which  rests  upon  all  attorneys.   (Moran,  Comments  on  the  Rules  of  Court,  Vol.  3  [1953  ed.]   ,  p.  665-­‐666,  citing   In  re  Opinion  of  the  Justices  [Mass.],  194  N.E.  313,  quoted  in  Rhode  Is.  Bar  Assoc.  v.  Automobile  Service  Assoc.  [R.I.]  179  A.  139,144).  (Emphasis  ours)  

The   University   of   the   Philippines   Law   Center   in   conducting   orientation  briefing  for  new  lawyers  (1974-­‐1975)  listed  the  dimensions  of  the  practice  of  law  in  even  broader  terms  as  advocacy,  counselling  and  public  service.  

One  may  be  a  practicing  attorney   in   following  any   line  of  employment   in  the   profession.   If  what   he   does   exacts   knowledge   of   the   law   and   is   of   a  kind  usual  for  attorneys  engaging  in  the  active  practice  of  their  profession,  and  he  follows  some  one  or  more  lines  of  employment  such  as  this  he  is  a  practicing   attorney   at   law   within   the   meaning   of   the   statute.   (Barr   v.  Cardell,  155  NW  312)  

Practice  of   law  means  any  activity,   in  or  out  of   court,  which   requires   the  application   of   law,   legal   procedure,   knowledge,   training   and   experience.  "To   engage   in   the   practice   of   law   is   to   perform   those   acts   which   are  characteristics  of  the  profession.  Generally,  to  practice  law  is  to  give  notice  or   render  any  kind  of   service,  which  device  or   service   requires   the  use   in  any  degree  of  legal  knowledge  or  skill."  (111  ALR  23)  

The  following  records  of  the  1986  Constitutional  Commission  show  that  it  

has  adopted  a  liberal  interpretation  of  the  term  "practice  of  law."  

MR.   FOZ.   Before   we   suspend   the   session,   may   I   make   a   manifestation  which  I  forgot  to  do  during  our  review  of  the  provisions  on  the  Commission  on  Audit.  May  I  be  allowed  to  make  a  very  brief  statement?  

THE  PRESIDING  OFFICER  (Mr.  Jamir).  

The  Commissioner  will  please  proceed.  

MR.   FOZ.   This   has   to   do   with   the   qualifications   of   the   members   of   the  Commission   on   Audit.   Among   others,   the   qualifications   provided   for   by  Section   I   is   that   "They   must   be  Members   of   the   Philippine   Bar"  —   I   am  quoting   from  the  provision  —  "who  have  been  engaged   in   the  practice  of  law  for  at  least  ten  years".  

To  avoid  any  misunderstanding  which  would  result   in  excluding  members  of  the  Bar  who  are  now  employed  in  the  COA  or  Commission  on  Audit,  we  would   like   to   make   the   clarification   that   this   provision   on   qualifications  regarding  members  of   the  Bar  does  not  necessarily  refer  or   involve  actual  practice  of  law  outside  the  COA  We  have  to  interpret  this  to  mean  that  as  long   as   the   lawyers   who   are   employed   in   the   COA   are   using   their   legal  knowledge  or  legal  talent  in  their  respective  work  within  COA,  then  they  are  qualified  to  be  considered  for  appointment  as  members  or  commissioners,  even  chairman,  of  the  Commission  on  Audit.  

This  has  been  discussed  by  the  Committee  on  Constitutional  Commissions  and  Agencies  and  we  deem  it   important  to  take  it  up  on  the  floor  so  that  this   interpretation  may  be  made  available  whenever  this  provision  on  the  qualifications   as   regards   members   of   the   Philippine   Bar   engaging   in   the  practice  of  law  for  at  least  ten  years  is  taken  up.  

MR.  OPLE.  Will  Commissioner  Foz  yield  to  just  one  question.  

MR.  FOZ.  Yes,  Mr.  Presiding  Officer.  

MR.   OPLE.   Is   he,   in   effect,   saying   that   service   in   the   COA   by   a   lawyer   is  equivalent   to   the   requirement   of   a   law   practice   that   is   set   forth   in   the  Article  on  the  Commission  on  Audit?  

MR.   FOZ.  We  must   consider   the   fact   that   the  work  of  COA,  although   it   is  auditing,  will  necessarily  involve  legal  work;  it  will  involve  legal  work.  And,  therefore,   lawyers   who   are   employed   in   COA   now   would   have   the  necessary  qualifications   in  accordance  with  the  Provision  on  qualifications  under   our   provisions   on   the   Commission   on   Audit.   And,   therefore,   the  answer  is  yes.  

MR.   OPLE.   Yes.   So   that   the   construction   given   to   this   is   that   this   is  equivalent  to  the  practice  of  law.  

MR.  FOZ.  Yes,  Mr.  Presiding  Officer.  

MR.  OPLE.  Thank  you.  

...  (  Emphasis  supplied)  

Section  1(1),  Article  IX-­‐D  of  the  1987  Constitution,  provides,  among  others,  that   the   Chairman   and   two   Commissioners   of   the   Commission   on   Audit  (COA)  should  either  be  certified  public  accountants  with  not  less  than  ten  years   of   auditing   practice,   or   members   of   the   Philippine   Bar   who   have  been   engaged   in   the   practice   of   law   for   at   least   ten   years.   (emphasis  supplied)  

Corollary   to   this   is   the   term   "private   practitioner"   and   which   is   in  many  ways  synonymous  with  the  word  "lawyer."  Today,  although  many  lawyers  do   not   engage   in   private   practice,   it   is   still   a   fact   that   the   majority   of  lawyers   are   private   practitioners.   (Gary   Munneke,   Opportunities   in   Law  Careers  [VGM  Career  Horizons:  Illinois],  [1986],  p.  15).  

At   this   point,   it  might   be   helpful   to   define  private   practice.   The   term,   as  commonly   understood,   means   "an   individual   or   organization   engaged   in  the   business   of   delivering   legal   services."   (Ibid.).   Lawyers   who   practice  alone   are   often   called   "sole   practitioners."   Groups   of   lawyers   are   called  "firms."  The  firm  is  usually  a  partnership  and  members  of  the  firm  are  the  partners.   Some   firms  may   be   organized   as   professional   corporations   and  the  members  called  shareholders.  In  either  case,  the  members  of  the  firm  are   the  experienced  attorneys.   In  most   firms,   there  are   younger  or  more  inexperienced  salaried  attorneyscalled  "associates."  (Ibid.).  

The   test   that   defines   law   practice   by   looking   to   traditional   areas   of   law  practice  is  essentially  tautologous,  unhelpful  defining  the  practice  of  law  as  that  which   lawyers   do.   (Charles  W.  Wolfram,  Modern   Legal   Ethics   [West  Publishing  Co.:  Minnesota,  1986],  p.  593).  The  practice  of  law  is  defined  as  the  performance  of  any  acts  .  .  .  in  or  out  of  court,  commonly  understood  to  be  the  practice  of  law.  (State  Bar  Ass'n  v.  Connecticut  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  145   Conn.   222,   140   A.2d   863,   870   [1958]   [quoting   Grievance   Comm.   v.  Payne,  128  Conn.  325,  22  A.2d  623,  626  [1941]).  Because  lawyers  perform  almost  every  function  known  in  the  commercial  and  governmental  realm,  such  a  definition  would  obviously  be  too  global  to  be  workable.(Wolfram,  op.  cit.).  

The  appearance  of  a  lawyer  in  litigation  in  behalf  of  a  client  is  at  once  the  most  publicly  familiar  role  for  lawyers  as  well  as  an  uncommon  role  for  the  average  lawyer.  Most  lawyers  spend  little  time  in  courtrooms,  and  a  large  percentage   spend   their   entire   practice  without   litigating   a   case.   (Ibid.,   p.  593).  Nonetheless,  many   lawyers  do  continue  to   litigate  and  the   litigating  lawyer's  role  colors  much  of  both  the  public  image  and  the  self  perception  of  the  legal  profession.  (Ibid.).  

In  this  regard  thus,  the  dominance  of   litigation  in  the  public  mind  reflects  history,   not   reality.   (Ibid.).  Why   is   this   so?   Recall   that   the   late   Alexander  SyCip,  a  corporate  lawyer,  once  articulated  on  the  importance  of  a  lawyer  as  a  business  counselor  in  this  wise:  "Even  today,  there  are  still  uninformed  

laymen   whose   concept   of   an   attorney   is   one   who   principally   tries   cases  before   the   courts.   The  members   of   the  bench   and  bar   and   the   informed  laymen  such  as  businessmen,  know  that  in  most  developed  societies  today,  substantially   more   legal   work   is   transacted   in   law   offices   than   in   the  courtrooms.  General  practitioners  of   law  who  do  both   litigation  and  non-­‐litigation  work  also  know  that  in  most  cases  they  find  themselves  spending  more  time  doing  what  [is]  loosely  desccribe[d]  as  business  counseling  than  in  trying  cases.  The  business  lawyer  has  been  described  as  the  planner,  the  diagnostician  and  the  trial  lawyer,  the  surgeon.  I[t]  need  not  [be]  stress[ed]  that   in   law,   as   in   medicine,   surgery   should   be   avoided   where   internal  medicine   can  be  effective."   (Business   Star,   "Corporate   Finance   Law,"   Jan.  11,  1989,  p.  4).  

In  the  course  of  a  working  day  the  average  general  practitioner  wig  engage  in   a   number   of   legal   tasks,   each   involving   different   legal   doctrines,   legal  skills,   legal   processes,   legal   institutions,   clients,   and   other   interested  parties.  Even  the  increasing  numbers  of  lawyers  in  specialized  practice  wig  usually   perform   at   least   some   legal   services   outside   their   specialty.   And  even  within  a  narrow  specialty  such  as  tax  practice,  a  lawyer  will  shift  from  one  legal  task  or  role  such  as  advice-­‐giving  to  an  importantly  different  one  such   as   representing   a   client   before   an   administrative   agency.   (Wolfram,  supra,  p.  687).  

By  no  means  will  most  of  this  work   involve   litigation,  unless  the   lawyer   is  one  of  the  relatively  rare  types  —  a  litigator  who  specializes  in  this  work  to  the   exclusion   of  much   else.   Instead,   the  work   will   require   the   lawyer   to  have   mastered   the   full   range   of   traditional   lawyer   skills   of   client  counselling,   advice-­‐giving,   document   drafting,   and   negotiation.   And  increasingly   lawyers   find   that   the   new   skills   of   evaluation   and  mediation  are  both  effective  for  many  clients  and  a  source  of  employment.  (Ibid.).  

Most   lawyers  will  engage   in  non-­‐litigation   legal  work  or   in   litigation  work  that   is  constrained   in  very   important  ways,  at   least   theoretically,   so  as   to  remove   from   it   some   of   the   salient   features   of   adversarial   litigation.   Of  

these   special   roles,   the   most   prominent   is   that   of   prosecutor.   In   some  lawyers'  work  the  constraints  are  imposed  both  by  the  nature  of  the  client  and   by   the   way   in   which   the   lawyer   is   organized   into   a   social   unit   to  perform   that   work.   The   most   common   of   these   roles   are   those   of  corporate  practice  and  government  legal  service.  (Ibid.).  

In  several  issues  of  the  Business  Star,  a  business  daily,  herein  below  quoted  are   emerging   trends   in   corporate   law   practice,   a   departure   from   the  traditional  concept  of  practice  of  law.  

We   are   experiencing   today   what   truly   may   be   called   a   revolutionary  transformation   in   corporate   law  practice.   Lawyers   and  other  professional  groups,   in   particular   those   members   participating   in   various   legal-­‐policy  decisional   contexts,   are   finding   that   understanding   the   major   emerging  trends  in  corporation  law  is  indispensable  to  intelligent  decision-­‐making.  

Constructive  adjustment  to  major  corporate  problems  of  today  requires  an  accurate   understanding   of   the   nature   and   implications   of   the   corporate  law  research  function  accompanied  by  an  accelerating  rate  of  information  accumulation.   The   recognition   of   the   need   for   such   improved   corporate  legal   policy   formulation,   particularly   "model-­‐making"   and   "contingency  planning,"  has  impressed  upon  us  the  inadequacy  of  traditional  procedures  in  many  decisional  contexts.  

In  a  complex   legal  problem  the  mass  of   information  to  be  processed,   the  sorting   and   weighing   of   significant   conditional   factors,   the   appraisal   of  major   trends,   the   necessity   of   estimating   the   consequences   of   given  courses  of  action,  and  the  need  for  fast  decision  and  response  in  situations  of   acute   danger   have   prompted   the   use   of   sophisticated   concepts   of  information   flow   theory,   operational   analysis,   automatic   data  processing,  and   electronic   computing   equipment.   Understandably,   an   improved  decisional   structure  must   stress   the   predictive   component   of   the   policy-­‐making  process,  wherein  a  "model",  of  the  decisional  context  or  a  segment  thereof   is   developed   to   test   projected   alternative   courses   of   action   in  

terms  of  futuristic  effects  flowing  therefrom.  

Although   members   of   the   legal   profession   are   regularly   engaged   in  predicting   and   projecting   the   trends   of   the   law,   the   subject   of   corporate  finance  law  has  received  relatively  little  organized  and  formalized  attention  in   the  philosophy  of   advancing   corporate   legal   education.  Nonetheless,   a  cross-­‐disciplinary  approach  to  legal  research  has  become  a  vital  necessity.  

Certainly,   the   general   orientation   for   productive   contributions   by   those  trained  primarily  in  the  law  can  be  improved  through  an  early  introduction  to   multi-­‐variable   decisional   context   and   the   various   approaches   for  handling   such   problems.   Lawyers,   particularly   with   either   a   master's   or  doctorate   degree   in   business   administration  or  management,   functioning  at  the  legal  policy  level  of  decision-­‐making  now  have  some  appreciation  for  the   concepts   and   analytical   techniques   of   other   professions   which   are  currently  engaged  in  similar  types  of  complex  decision-­‐making.  

Truth  to  tell,  many  situations   involving  corporate  finance  problems  would  require   the   services   of   an   astute   attorney   because   of   the   complex   legal  implications  that  arise  from  each  and  every  necessary  step  in  securing  and  maintaining   the   business   issue   raised.   (Business   Star,   "Corporate   Finance  Law,"  Jan.  11,  1989,  p.  4).  

In  our   litigation-­‐prone  country,  a  corporate   lawyer   is  assiduously  referred  to  as  the  "abogado  de  campanilla."  He  is  the  "big-­‐time"  lawyer,  earning  big  money   and   with   a   clientele   composed   of   the   tycoons   and   magnates   of  business  and  industry.  

Despite  the  growing  number  of  corporate  lawyers,  many  people  could  not  explain  what   it   is   that   a   corporate   lawyer   does.   For   one,   the   number   of  attorneys  employed  by  a  single  corporation  will  vary  with  the  size  and  type  of  the  corporation.  Many  smaller  and  some  large  corporations  farm  out  all  their   legal   problems   to   private   law   firms.   Many   others   have   in-­‐house  counsel   only   for   certain   matters.   Other   corporation   have   a   staff   large  

enough  to  handle  most  legal  problems  in-­‐house.  

A  corporate   lawyer,   for  all   intents  and  purposes,   is  a   lawyer  who  handles  the   legal  affairs  of  a  corporation.  His  areas  of  concern  or   jurisdiction  may  include,  inter  alia:  corporate  legal  research,  tax  laws  research,  acting  out  as  corporate   secretary   (in   board  meetings),   appearances   in   both   courts   and  other   adjudicatory   agencies   (including   the   Securities   and   Exchange  Commission),  and  in  other  capacities  which  require  an  ability  to  deal  with  the  law.  

At  any  rate,  a  corporate  lawyer  may  assume  responsibilities  other  than  the  legal   affairs   of   the   business   of   the   corporation   he   is   representing.   These  include   such   matters   as   determining   policy   and   becoming   involved   in  management.  (  Emphasis  supplied.)  

In   a   big   company,   for   example,   one  may  have   a   feeling  of   being   isolated  from  the  action,  or  not  understanding  how  one's  work  actually  fits  into  the  work  of   the  orgarnization.  This  can  be   frustrating  to  someone  who  needs  to   see   the   results   of   his   work   first   hand.   In   short,   a   corporate   lawyer   is  sometimes  offered  this  fortune  to  be  more  closely  involved  in  the  running  of  the  business.  

Moreover,  a  corporate   lawyer's  services  may  sometimes  be  engaged  by  a  multinational  corporation  (MNC).  Some  large  MNCs  provide  one  of  the  few  opportunities  available  to  corporate  lawyers  to  enter  the  international  law  field.  After  all,  international  law  is  practiced  in  a  relatively  small  number  of  companies   and   law   firms.   Because   working   in   a   foreign   country   is  perceived   by   many   as   glamorous,   tills   is   an   area   coveted   by   corporate  lawyers.   In   most   cases,   however,   the   overseas   jobs   go   to   experienced  attorneys  while   the  younger  attorneys  do  their  "international  practice"   in  law  libraries.  (Business  Star,  "Corporate  Law  Practice,"  May  25,1990,  p.  4).  

This  brings  us  to  the  inevitable,  i.e.,  the  role  of  the  lawyer  in  the  realm  of  finance.  To  borrow  the  lines  of  Harvard-­‐educated  lawyer  Bruce  Wassertein,  

to  wit:  "A  bad   lawyer   is  one  who  fails   to  spot  problems,  a  good   lawyer   is  one   who   perceives   the   difficulties,   and   the   excellent   lawyer   is   one   who  surmounts  them."  (Business  Star,  "Corporate  Finance  Law,"  Jan.  11,  1989,  p.  4).  

Today,  the  study  of  corporate  law  practice  direly  needs  a  "shot  in  the  arm,"  so   to   speak.   No   longer   are   we   talking   of   the   traditional   law   teaching  method   of   confining   the   subject   study   to   the   Corporation   Code   and   the  Securities   Code   but   an   incursion   as   well   into   the   intertwining   modern  management  issues.  

Such   corporate   legal   management   issues   deal   primarily   with   three   (3)  types   of   learning:   (1)   acquisition   of   insights   into   current   advances  which  are  of  particular  significance  to  the  corporate  counsel;  (2)  an  introduction  to   usable   disciplinary   skins   applicable   to   a   corporate   counsel's  management   responsibilities;   and   (3)   a   devotion   to   the   organization   and  management  of  the  legal  function  itself.  

These  three  subject  areas  may  be  thought  of  as  intersecting  circles,  with  a  shared   area   linking   them.   Otherwise   known   as   "intersecting   managerial  jurisprudence,"  it  forms  a  unifying  theme  for  the  corporate  counsel's  total  learning.  

Some  current  advances  in  behavior  and  policy  sciences  affect  the  counsel's  role.   For   that   matter,   the   corporate   lawyer   reviews   the   globalization  process,   including   the   resulting   strategic   repositioning   that   the   firms   he  provides  counsel  for  are  required  to  make,  and  the  need  to  think  about  a  corporation's;  strategy  at  multiple  levels.  The  salience  of  the  nation-­‐state  is  being   reduced   as   firms   deal   both   with   global   multinational   entities   and  simultaneously   with   sub-­‐national   governmental   units.   Firms   increasingly  collaborate  not  only  with  public  entities  but  with  each  other  —  often  with  those  who  are  competitors  in  other  arenas.  

Also,  the  nature  of  the  lawyer's  participation  in  decision-­‐making  within  the  

corporation  is  rapidly  changing.  The  modem  corporate  lawyer  has  gained  a  new  role  as  a  stakeholder  —  in  some  cases  participating  in  the  organization  and   operations   of   governance   through   participation   on   boards   and   other  decision-­‐making  roles.  Often  these  new  patterns  develop  alongside  existing  legal   institutions   and   laws   are   perceived   as   barriers.   These   trends   are  complicated   as   corporations   organize   for   global   operations.   (   Emphasis  supplied)  

The  practising  lawyer  of  today  is  familiar  as  well  with  governmental  policies  toward  the  promotion  and  management  of  technology.  New  collaborative  arrangements  for  promoting  specific  technologies  or  competitiveness  more  generally   require   approaches   from   industry   that   differ   from   older,   more  adversarial   relationships   and   traditional   forms   of   seeking   to   influence  governmental   policies.   And   there   are   lessons   to   be   learned   from   other  countries.  In  Europe,  Esprit,  Eureka  and  Race  are  examples  of  collaborative  efforts  between  governmental  and  business  Japan's  MITI  is  world  famous.  (Emphasis  supplied)  

Following   the   concept   of   boundary   spanning,   the  office  of   the  Corporate  Counsel   comprises   a  distinct   group  within   the  managerial   structure  of   all  kinds   of   organizations.   Effectiveness   of   both   long-­‐term   and   temporary  groups  within  organizations  has  been  found  to  be  related  to   indentifiable  factors  in  the  group-­‐context  interaction  such  as  the  groups  actively  revising  their   knowledge   of   the   environment   coordinating   work   with   outsiders,  promoting   team   achievements   within   the   organization.   In   general,   such  external  activities  are  better  predictors  of  team  performance  than  internal  group  processes.  

In   a   crisis   situation,   the   legal   managerial   capabilities   of   the   corporate  lawyer   vis-­‐a-­‐vis   the   managerial   mettle   of   corporations   are   challenged.  Current   research   is   seeking  ways   both   to   anticipate   effective  managerial  procedures   and   to   understand   relationships   of   financial   liability   and  insurance  considerations.  (Emphasis  supplied)  

Regarding   the   skills   to   apply   by   the   corporate   counsel,   three   factors   are  apropos:  

First   System  Dynamics.   The   field  of   systems  dynamics  has  been   found  an  effective   tool   for   new   managerial   thinking   regarding   both   planning   and  pressing   immediate   problems.   An   understanding   of   the   role   of   feedback  loops,  inventory  levels,  and  rates  of  flow,  enable  users  to  simulate  all  sorts  of   systematic   problems   —   physical,   economic,   managerial,   social,   and  psychological.   New   programming   techniques   now   make   the   system  dynamics   principles   more   accessible   to   managers   —   including   corporate  counsels.  (Emphasis  supplied)  

Second   Decision   Analysis.   This   enables   users   to   make   better   decisions  involving  complexity  and  uncertainty.  In  the  context  of  a  law  department,  it  can   be   used   to   appraise   the   settlement   value   of   litigation,   aid   in  negotiation   settlement,   and   minimize   the   cost   and   risk   involved   in  managing  a  portfolio  of  cases.  (Emphasis  supplied)  

Third  Modeling  for  Negotiation  Management.  Computer-­‐based  models  can  be  used  directly   by  parties   and  mediators   in   all   lands  of   negotiations.  All  integrated   set   of   such   tools   provide   coherent   and   effective   negotiation  support,   including   hands-­‐on   on   instruction   in   these   techniques.   A  simulation  case  of  an  international  joint  venture  may  be  used  to  illustrate  the  point.  

[Be  this  as  it  may,]  the  organization  and  management  of  the  legal  function,  concern  three  pointed  areas  of  consideration,  thus:  

Preventive   Lawyering.   Planning   by   lawyers   requires   special   skills   that  comprise  a  major  part  of  the  general  counsel's  responsibilities.  They  differ  from   those   of   remedial   law.   Preventive   lawyering   is   concerned   with  minimizing   the   risks   of   legal   trouble   and  maximizing   legal   rights   for   such  legal   entities   at   that   time   when   transactional   or   similar   facts   are   being  considered  and  made.  

Managerial   Jurisprudence.   This   is   the   framework   within   which   are  undertaken  those  activities  of  the  firm  to  which  legal  consequences  attach.  It   needs   to   be   directly   supportive   of   this   nation's   evolving   economic   and  organizational   fabric   as   firms   change   to   stay   competitive   in   a   global,  interdependent   environment.   The   practice   and   theory   of   "law"   is   not  adequate   today   to   facilitate   the   relationships  needed   in   trying   to  make  a  global  economy  work.  

Organization   and   Functioning   of   the   Corporate   Counsel's   Office.   The  general  counsel  has  emerged  in  the  last  decade  as  one  of  the  most  vibrant  subsets  of   the   legal  profession.  The  corporate   counsel  hear   responsibility  for  key  aspects  of  the  firm's  strategic  issues,  including  structuring  its  global  operations,   managing   improved   relationships   with   an   increasingly  diversified   body   of   employees,   managing   expanded   liability   exposure,  creating   new   and   varied   interactions  with   public   decision-­‐makers,   coping  internally  with  more  complex  make  or  by  decisions.  

This  whole  exercise  drives  home  the  thesis   that  knowing  corporate   law   is  not  enough  to  make  one  a  good  general  corporate  counsel  nor  to  give  him  a  full  sense  of  how  the  legal  system  shapes  corporate  activities.  And  even  if  the  corporate  lawyer's  aim  is  not  the  understand  all  of  the  law's  effects  on  corporate   activities,   he   must,   at   the   very   least,   also   gain   a   working  knowledge  of  the  management   issues   if  only  to  be  able  to  grasp  not  only  the   basic   legal   "constitution'   or   makeup   of   the   modem   corporation.  "Business  Star",  "The  Corporate  Counsel,"  April  10,  1991,  p.  4).  

The  challenge  for  lawyers  (both  of  the  bar  and  the  bench)  is  to  have  more  than   a   passing   knowledge   of   financial   law   affecting   each   aspect   of   their  work.   Yet,  many  would   admit   to   ignorance   of   vast   tracts   of   the   financial  law   territory.  What   transpires   next   is   a   dilemma  of   professional   security:  Will   the   lawyer   admit   ignorance   and   risk   opprobrium?;   or   will   he   feign  understanding  and  risk  exposure?  (Business  Star,  "Corporate  Finance  law,"  Jan.  11,  1989,  p.  4).  

Respondent   Christian   Monsod   was   nominated   by   President   Corazon   C.  Aquino  to  the  position  of  Chairman  of  the  COMELEC  in  a  letter  received  by  the   Secretariat   of   the   Commission   on   Appointments   on   April   25,   1991.  Petitioner   opposed   the   nomination   because   allegedly   Monsod   does   not  possess   the  required  qualification  of  having  been  engaged   in   the  practice  of  law  for  at  least  ten  years.  

On   June   5,   1991,   the   Commission   on   Appointments   confirmed   the  nomination  of  Monsod  as  Chairman  of  the  COMELEC.  On  June  18,  1991,  he  took  his  oath  of  office.  On  the  same  day,  he  assumed  office  as  Chairman  of  the  COMELEC.  

Challenging   the   validity   of   the   confirmation   by   the   Commission   on  Appointments   of   Monsod's   nomination,   petitioner   as   a   citizen   and  taxpayer,   filed   the   instant   petition   for   certiorari   and   Prohibition   praying  that   said   confirmation   and   the   consequent   appointment   of   Monsod   as  Chairman  of  the  Commission  on  Elections  be  declared  null  and  void.  

Atty.   Christian  Monsod   is   a  member  of   the  Philippine  Bar,   having  passed  the  bar  examinations  of  1960  with  a  grade  of  86-­‐55%.  He  has  been  a  dues  paying  member  of  the  Integrated  Bar  of  the  Philippines  since  its  inception  in  1972-­‐73.  He  has  also  been  paying  his  professional  license  fees  as  lawyer  for  more  than  ten  years.  (p.  124,  Rollo)  

After  graduating  from  the  College  of  Law  (U.P.)  and  having  hurdled  the  bar,  Atty.  Monsod  worked  in  the  law  office  of  his  father.  During  his  stint  in  the  World  Bank  Group   (1963-­‐1970),  Monsod  worked  as   an   operations   officer  for   about   two   years   in   Costa   Rica   and   Panama,   which   involved   getting  acquainted   with   the   laws   of   member-­‐countries   negotiating   loans   and  coordinating  legal,  economic,  and  project  work  of  the  Bank.  Upon  returning  to   the   Philippines   in   1970,   he  worked  with   the  Meralco  Group,   served   as  chief   executive   officer   of   an   investment   bank   and   subsequently   of   a  business   conglomerate,   and   since   1986,   has   rendered   services   to   various  companies  as  a  legal  and  economic  consultant  or  chief  executive  officer.  As  

former   Secretary-­‐General   (1986)   and   National   Chairman   (1987)   of  NAMFREL.  Monsod's   work   involved   being   knowledgeable   in   election   law.  He  appeared  for  NAMFREL  in  its  accreditation  hearings  before  the  Comelec.  In  the  field  of  advocacy,  Monsod,  in  his  personal  capacity  and  as  former  Co-­‐Chairman   of   the   Bishops   Businessmen's   Conference   for   Human  Development,   has   worked   with   the   under   privileged   sectors,   such   as   the  farmer  and  urban  poor  groups,   in   initiating,   lobbying   for  and  engaging   in  affirmative   action   for   the   agrarian   reform   law   and   lately   the   urban   land  reform  bill.  Monsod  also  made  use  of  his  legal  knowledge  as  a  member  of  the  Davide  Commission,  a  quast   judicial  body,  which  conducted  numerous  hearings  (1990)  and  as  a  member  of  the  Constitutional  Commission  (1986-­‐1987),  and  Chairman  of  its  Committee  on  Accountability  of  Public  Officers,  for  which  he  was  cited  by  the  President  of   the  Commission,   Justice  Cecilia  Muñoz-­‐Palma   for   "innumerable   amendments   to   reconcile   government  functions  with  individual  freedoms  and  public  accountability  and  the  party-­‐list  system  for  the  House  of  Representative.  (pp.  128-­‐129  Rollo)  (  Emphasis  supplied)  

Just  a  word  about  the  work  of  a  negotiating  team  of  which  Atty.  Monsod  used  to  be  a  member.  

In  a  loan  agreement,  for  instance,  a  negotiating  panel  acts  as  a  team,  and  which   is   adequately   constituted   to   meet   the   various   contingencies   that  arise  during  a  negotiation.  Besides  top  officials  of  the  Borrower  concerned,  there  are  the  legal  officer  (such  as  the  legal  counsel),  the  finance  manager,  and   an   operations   officer   (such   as   an   official   involved   in   negotiating   the  contracts)  who  comprise  the  members  of  the  team.  (Guillermo  V.  Soliven,  "Loan   Negotiating   Strategies   for   Developing   Country   Borrowers,"   Staff  Paper   No.   2,   Central   Bank   of   the   Philippines,   Manila,   1982,   p.   11).  (Emphasis  supplied)  

After  a  fashion,  the  loan  agreement  is   like  a  country's  Constitution;   it   lays  down  the  law  as  far  as  the  loan  transaction  is  concerned.  Thus,  the  meat  of  any  Loan  Agreement  can  be  compartmentalized   into  five  (5)   fundamental  

parts:   (1)  business   terms;   (2)  borrower's   representation;   (3)   conditions  of  closing;  (4)  covenants;  and  (5)  events  of  default.  (Ibid.,  p.  13).  

In  the  same  vein,   lawyers  play  an  important  role  in  any  debt  restructuring  program.   For   aside   from   performing   the   tasks   of   legislative   drafting   and  legal   advising,   they   score   national   development   policies   as   key   factors   in  maintaining  their  countries'  sovereignty.  (Condensed  from  the  work  paper,  entitled   "Wanted:   Development   Lawyers   for   Developing   Nations,"  submitted  by  L.  Michael  Hager,  regional   legal  adviser  of  the  United  States  Agency   for   International  Development,  during   the  Session  on  Law  for   the  Development  of  Nations  at   the  Abidjan  World  Conference   in   Ivory  Coast,  sponsored   by   the   World   Peace   Through   Law   Center   on   August   26-­‐31,  1973).  (  Emphasis  supplied)  

Loan   concessions   and   compromises,   perhaps   even   more   so   than   purely  renegotiation   policies,   demand   expertise   in   the   law   of   contracts,   in  legislation   and   agreement   drafting   and   in   renegotiation.   Necessarily,   a  sovereign  lawyer  may  work  with  an  international  business  specialist  or  an  economist   in   the   formulation   of   a   model   loan   agreement.   Debt  restructuring   contract   agreements   contain   such   a   mixture   of   technical  language   that   they   should   be   carefully   drafted   and   signed   only   with   the  advise  of  competent  counsel  in  conjunction  with  the  guidance  of  adequate  technical   support   personnel.   (See   International   Law   Aspects   of   the  Philippine   External   Debts,   an   unpublished   dissertation,   U.S.T.   Graduate  School  of  Law,  1987,  p.  321).  (  Emphasis  supplied)  

A   critical   aspect   of   sovereign   debt   restructuring/contract   construction   is  the   set   of   terms   and   conditions   which   determines   the   contractual  remedies  for  a  failure  to  perform  one  or  more  elements  of  the  contract.  A  good  agreement  must  not  only  define  the  responsibilities  of  both  parties,  but  must  also  state  the  recourse  open  to  either  party  when  the  other  fails  to  discharge  an  obligation.  For  a  compleat  debt  restructuring  represents  a  devotion  to  that  principle  which  in  the  ultimate  analysis  is  sine  qua  non  for  foreign   loan  agreements-­‐an  adherence  to  the  rule  of   law  in  domestic  and  

international   affairs   of   whose   kind   U.S.   Supreme   Court   Justice   Oliver  Wendell   Holmes,   Jr.   once   said:   "They   carry   no   banners,   they   beat   no  drums;   but  where   they   are,  men   learn   that   bustle   and   bush   are   not   the  equal   of   quiet   genius   and   serene  mastery."   (See  Ricardo   J.   Romulo,   "The  Role  of   Lawyers   in   Foreign   Investments,"   Integrated  Bar  of   the  Philippine  Journal,  Vol.  15,  Nos.  3  and  4,  Third  and  Fourth  Quarters,  1977,  p.  265).  

Interpreted   in   the   light   of   the   various   definitions   of   the   term   Practice   of  law".   particularly   the   modern   concept   of   law   practice,   and   taking   into  consideration   the   liberal   construction   intended   by   the   framers   of   the  Constitution,  Atty.  Monsod's  past  work  experiences  as  a  lawyer-­‐economist,  a  lawyer-­‐manager,  a  lawyer-­‐entrepreneur  of   industry,  a  lawyer-­‐negotiator  of  contracts,  and  a  lawyer-­‐legislator  of  both  the  rich  and  the  poor  —  verily  more   than   satisfy   the   constitutional   requirement   —   that   he   has   been  engaged  in  the  practice  of  law  for  at  least  ten  years.  

Besides  in  the  leading  case  of  Luego  v.  Civil  Service  Commission,  143  SCRA  327,  the  Court  said:  

Appointment  is  an  essentially  discretionary  power  and  must  be  performed  by   the   officer   in   which   it   is   vested   according   to   his   best   lights,   the   only  condition   being   that   the   appointee   should   possess   the   qualifications  required  by  law.  If  he  does,  then  the  appointment  cannot  be  faulted  on  the  ground   that   there   are   others   better   qualified   who   should   have   been  preferred.   This   is   a   political   question   involving   considerations   of   wisdom  which  only  the  appointing  authority  can  decide.  (emphasis  supplied)  

No  less  emphatic  was  the  Court  in  the  case  of  (Central  Bank  v.  Civil  Service  Commission,  171  SCRA  744)  where  it  stated:  

It  is  well-­‐settled  that  when  the  appointee  is  qualified,  as  in  this  case,  and  all  the   other   legal   requirements   are   satisfied,   the   Commission   has   no  alternative   but   to   attest   to   the   appointment   in   accordance  with   the  Civil  Service  Law.  The  Commission  has  no  authority   to   revoke  an  appointment  

on   the   ground   that   another   person   is   more   qualified   for   a   particular  position.  It  also  has  no  authority  to  direct  the  appointment  of  a  substitute  of  its  choice.  To  do  so  would  be  an  encroachment  on  the  discretion  vested  upon   the   appointing   authority.   An   appointment   is   essentially   within   the  discretionary   power   of   whomsoever   it   is   vested,   subject   to   the   only  condition  that  the  appointee  should  possess  the  qualifications  required  by  law.  (  Emphasis  supplied)  

The   appointing   process   in   a   regular   appointment   as   in   the   case   at   bar,  consists   of   four   (4)   stages:   (1)   nomination;   (2)   confirmation   by   the  Commission   on   Appointments;   (3)   issuance   of   a   commission   (in   the  Philippines,   upon   submission   by   the   Commission   on   Appointments   of   its  certificate   of   confirmation,   the   President   issues   the   permanent  appointment;  and  (4)  acceptance  e.g.,  oath-­‐taking,  posting  of  bond,  etc.  .  .  .  (Lacson  v.  Romero,  No.  L-­‐3081,  October  14,  1949;  Gonzales,  Law  on  Public  Officers,  p.  200)  

The  power  of  the  Commission  on  Appointments  to  give  its  consent  to  the  nomination   of   Monsod   as   Chairman   of   the   Commission   on   Elections   is  mandated  by  Section  1(2)  Sub-­‐Article  C,  Article  IX  of  the  Constitution  which  provides:  

The  Chairman  and   the  Commisioners   shall  be  appointed  by   the  President  with  the  consent  of  the  Commission  on  Appointments  for  a  term  of  seven  years   without   reappointment.   Of   those   first   appointed,   three   Members  shall  hold  office  for  seven  years,  two  Members  for  five  years,  and  the  last  Members   for   three   years,   without   reappointment.   Appointment   to   any  vacancy  shall  be  only  for  the  unexpired  term  of  the  predecessor.  In  no  case  shall   any  Member   be   appointed   or   designated   in   a   temporary   or   acting  capacity.  

Anent   Justice  Teodoro  Padilla's   separate  opinion,   suffice   it   to  say   that  his  definition  of  the  practice  of  law  is  the  traditional  or  stereotyped  notion  of  law  practice,  as  distinguished   from   the  modern  concept  of   the  practice  of  

law,   which   modern   connotation   is   exactly   what   was   intended   by   the  eminent   framers   of   the   1987   Constitution.   Moreover,   Justice   Padilla's  definition   would   require   generally   a   habitual   law   practice,   perhaps  practised   two  or   three   times   a  week   and  would   outlaw   say,   law  practice  once  or  twice  a  year  for  ten  consecutive  years.  Clearly,  this  is  far  from  the  constitutional  intent.  

Upon   the   other   hand,   the   separate   opinion   of   Justice   Isagani   Cruz   states  that  in  my  written  opinion,  I  made  use  of  a  definition  of  law  practice  which  really  means  nothing  because  the  definition  says  that  law  practice  "  .  .  .   is  what   people   ordinarily   mean   by   the   practice   of   law."   True   I   cited   the  definition  but  only  by  way  of  sarcasm  as  evident   from  my  statement  that  the   definition   of   law   practice   by   "traditional   areas   of   law   practice   is  essentially  tautologous"  or  defining  a  phrase  by  means  of  the  phrase  itself  that  is  being  defined.  

Justice  Cruz  goes  on  to  say  in  substance  that  since  the  law  covers  almost  all  situations,  most  individuals,  in  making  use  of  the  law,  or  in  advising  others  on  what  the  law  means,  are  actually  practicing  law.  In  that  sense,  perhaps,  but  we   should   not   lose   sight   of   the   fact   that  Mr.  Monsod   is  a   lawyer,  a  member   of   the   Philippine   Bar,   who   has   been   practising   law   for   over   ten  years.  This  is  different  from  the  acts  of  persons  practising  law,  without  first  becoming  lawyers.  

Justice   Cruz   also   says   that   the   Supreme   Court   can   even   disqualify   an  elected  President  of  the  Philippines,  say,  on  the  ground  that  he   lacks  one  or  more  qualifications.  This  matter,  I  greatly  doubt.  For  one  thing,  how  can  an  action  or  petition  be  brought  against  the  President?  And  even  assuming  that  he  is  indeed  disqualified,  how  can  the  action  be  entertained  since  he  is  the  incumbent  President?  

We  now  proceed:  

The   Commission   on   the   basis   of   evidence   submitted   doling   the   public  

hearings   on   Monsod's   confirmation,   implicitly   determined   that   he  possessed   the   necessary   qualifications   as   required   by   law.   The   judgment  rendered   by   the   Commission   in   the   exercise   of   such   an   acknowledged  power  is  beyond  judicial  interference  except  only  upon  a  clear  showing  of  a  grave  abuse  of  discretion  amounting  to  lack  or  excess  of  jurisdiction.  (Art.  VIII,  Sec.  1  Constitution).  Thus,  only  where  such  grave  abuse  of  discretion  is  clearly  shown  shall  the  Court  interfere  with  the  Commission's  judgment.  In  the   instant   case,   there   is   no   occasion   for   the   exercise   of   the   Court's  corrective   power,   since   no   abuse,  much   less   a   grave   abuse  of   discretion,  that  would  amount  to  lack  or  excess  of  jurisdiction  and  would  warrant  the  issuance  of  the  writs  prayed,  for  has  been  clearly  shown.  

Additionally,  consider  the  following:  

(1)  If  the  Commission  on  Appointments  rejects  a  nominee  by  the  President,  may  the  Supreme  Court  reverse  the  Commission,  and  thus  in  effect  confirm  the  appointment?  Clearly,  the  answer  is  in  the  negative.  

(2)   In   the   same   vein,   may   the   Court   reject   the   nominee,   whom   the  Commission  has  confirmed?  The  answer  is  likewise  clear.  

(3)   If   the  United   States   Senate   (which   is   the   confirming   body   in   the  U.S.  Congress)  decides  to  confirm  a  Presidential  nominee,  it  would  be  incredible  that  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  would  still  reverse  the  U.S.  Senate.  

Finally,  one  significant  legal  maxim  is:  

We  must  interpret  not  by  the  letter  that  killeth,  but  by  the  spirit  that  giveth  life.  

Take  this  hypothetical  case  of  Samson  and  Delilah.  Once,  the  procurator  of  Judea   asked   Delilah   (who   was   Samson's   beloved)   for   help   in   capturing  Samson.  Delilah  agreed  on  condition  that  —  

No  blade  shall  touch  his  skin;  

No  blood  shall  flow  from  his  veins.  

When  Samson   (his   long  hair   cut  by  Delilah)  was  captured,   the  procurator  placed   an   iron   rod   burning   white-­‐hot   two   or   three   inches   away   from   in  front  of   Samson's  eyes.   This  blinded   the  man.  Upon  hearing  of  what  had  happened   to   her   beloved,   Delilah   was   beside   herself   with   anger,   and  fuming   with   righteous   fury,   accused   the   procurator   of   reneging   on   his  word.  The  procurator  calmly  replied:  "Did  any  blade  touch  his  skin?  Did  any  blood   flow   from   his   veins?"   The   procurator   was   clearly   relying   on   the  letter,  not  the  spirit  of  the  agreement.  

In  view  of  the  foregoing,  this  petition  is  hereby  DISMISSED.  

SO  ORDERED.                                      

                                                                     

In  the  Matter  of  the  Petitions  for  Admission  to  the  Bar  of  Unsuccessful  Candidates  of  1946  to  1953;    ALBINO  CUNANAN,  ET  AL.,  petitioners.  

Jose  M.  Aruego,  M.H.  de  Joya,  Miguel  R.  Cornejo,  and  Antonio  Enrile  Inton  for  petitioners.  Office  of  the  Solicitor  General  Juan  R.  Liwag  for  respondent.  

DIOKNO,  J.:  

In   recent   years   few   controversial   issues   have   aroused   so   much   public  interest  and  concern  as  Republic  Act  No.  972,  popularly  known  as  the  "Bar  Flunkers'   Act   of   1953."  Under   the   Rules   of   Court   governing   admission   to  the   bar,   "in   order   that   a   candidate   (for   admission   to   the   Bar)   may   be  deemed   to   have   passed   his   examinations   successfully,   he   must   have  obtained   a   general   average   of   75   per   cent   in   all   subjects,  without   falling  below   50   per   cent   in   any   subject."   (Rule   127,   sec.   14,   Rules   of   Court).  Nevertheless,   considering   the   varying   difficulties   of   the   different   bar  examinations   held   since   1946   and   the   varying   degree   of   strictness   with  which   the   examination   papers   were   graded,   this   court   passed   and  admitted  to  the  bar  those  candidates  who  had  obtained  an  average  of  only  72  per  cent  in  1946,  69  per  cent  in  1947,  70  per  cent  in  1948,  and  74  per  cent  in  1949.  In  1950  to  1953,  the  74  per  cent  was  raised  to  75  per  cent.  

Believing   themselves   as   fully   qualified   to   practice   law   as   those  reconsidered   and   passed   by   this   court,   and   feeling   conscious   of   having  been   discriminated   against   (See   Explanatory   Note   to   R.A.   No.   972),  unsuccessful  candidates  who  obtained  averages  of  a  few  percentage  lower  than   those   admitted   to   the   Bar   agitated   in   Congress   for,   and   secured   in  1951  the  passage  of  Senate  Bill  No.  12  which,  among  others,  reduced  the  passing  general  average  in  bar  examinations  to  70  per  cent  effective  since  1946.   The   President   requested   the   views   of   this   court   on   the   bill.  Complying  with   that   request,   seven  members   of   the   court   subscribed   to  and  submitted  written  comments  adverse   thereto,  and  shortly   thereafter  the   President   vetoed   it.   Congress   did   not   override   the   veto.   Instead,   it  approved   Senate   Bill   No.   371,   embodying   substantially   the   provisions   of  

the   vetoed   bill.   Although   the   members   of   this   court   reiterated   their  unfavorable  views  on  the  matter,  the  President  allowed  the  bill  to  become  a   law  on  June  21,  1953  without  his  signature.  The   law,  which   incidentally  was  enacted  in  an  election  year,  reads  in  full  as  follows:  

REPUBLIC  ACT  NO.  972  

AN  ACT  TO  FIX  THE  PASSING  MARKS  FOR  BAR  EXAMINATIONS  FROM  NINETEEN  HUNDRED  AND  FORTY-­‐SIX  UP  TO  AND  INCLUDING  NINETEEN  

HUNDRED  AND  FIFTY-­‐FIVE.  

Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  Philippines  in  Congress  assembled:  

SECTION   1.   Notwithstanding   the   provisions   of   section   fourteen,   Rule  numbered   one   hundred   twenty-­‐seven   of   the   Rules   of   Court,   any   bar  candidate  who  obtained  a  general  average  of  seventy  per  cent   in  any  bar  examinations   after   July   fourth,   nineteen   hundred   and   forty-­‐six   up   to   the  August  nineteen  hundred  and  fifty-­‐one  bar  examinations;  seventy-­‐one  per  cent  in  the  nineteen  hundred  and  fifty-­‐two  bar  examinations;  seventy-­‐two  per  cent   in  the   in  the  nineteen  hundred  and  fifty-­‐three  bar  examinations;  seventy-­‐three   per   cent   in   the   nineteen   hundred   and   fifty-­‐four   bar  examinations;  seventy-­‐four  per  cent  in  the  nineteen  hundred  and  fifty-­‐five  bar   examinations   without   a   candidate   obtaining   a   grade   below   fifty   per  cent   in   any   subject,   shall   be   allowed   to   take   and   subscribe   the  corresponding   oath   of   office   as  member   of   the   Philippine   Bar:   Provided,  however,  That  for  the  purpose  of  this  Act,  any  exact  one-­‐half  or  more  of  a  fraction,  shall  be  considered  as  one  and  included  as  part  of  the  next  whole  number.  

SEC.  2.  Any  bar  candidate  who  obtained  a  grade  of  seventy-­‐five  per  cent  in  any  subject  in  any  bar  examination  after  July  fourth,  nineteen  hundred  and  forty-­‐six   shall   be  deemed   to  have  passed   in   such   subject   or   subjects   and  such   grade   or   grades   shall   be   included   in   computing   the   passing   general  

average   that   said   candidate  may   obtain   in   any   subsequent   examinations  that  he  may  take.  

SEC.  3.  This  Act  shall  take  effect  upon  its  approval.  

Enacted  on  June  21,  1953,  without  the  Executive  approval.  

After   its   approval,   many   of   the   unsuccessful   postwar   candidates   filed  petitions   for   admission   to   the   bar   invoking   its   provisions,   while   others  whose   motions   for   the   revision   of   their   examination   papers   were   still  pending   also   invoked   the   aforesaid   law   as   an   additional   ground   for  admission.   There   are   also   others   who   have   sought   simply   the  reconsideration   of   their   grades   without,   however,   invoking   the   law   in  question.   To   avoid   injustice   to   individual   petitioners,   the   court   first  reviewed   the  motions   for   reconsideration,   irrespective  of  whether  or  not  they  had  invoked  Republic  Act  No.  972.  Unfortunately,  the  court  has  found  no   reason   to   revise   their  grades.   If   they  are   to  be  admitted   to   the  bar,   it  must  be  pursuant  to  Republic  Act  No.  972  which,   if  declared  valid,  should  be   applied   equally   to   all   concerned  whether   they   have   filed   petitions   or  not.  A  complete  list  of  the  petitioners,  properly  classified,  affected  by  this  decision,  as  well  as  a  more  detailed  account  of  the  history  of  Republic  Act  No.  972,  are  appended  to  this  decision  as  Annexes  I  and  II.  And  to  realize  more   readily   the   effects   of   the   law,   the   following   statistical   data   are   set  forth:  

(1)  The  unsuccessful  bar  candidates  who  are  to  be  benefited  by  section  1  of  Republic  Act  No.  972  total  1,168,  classified  as  follows:  

1946          (August)   206   121   18  

1946          (November)   477   228   43  

1947   749   340   0  

1948   899   409   11  

1949   1,218   532   164  

1950   1,316   893   26  

1951   2,068   879   196  

1952   2,738   1,033   426  

1953      2,555          968          284  

                             TOTAL   12,230   5,421   1,168  

Of  the  total  1,168  candidates,  92  have  passed  in  subsequent  examination,  and  only  586  have  filed  either  motions  for  admission  to  the  bar  pursuant  to  said  Republic  Act,  or  mere  motions  for  reconsideration.  

(2)  In  addition,  some  other  10  unsuccessful  candidates  are  to  be  benefited  by   section  2  of   said  Republic  Act.   These   candidates  had  each   taken   from  two  to  five  different  examinations,  but  failed  to  obtain  a  passing  average  in  any   of   them.   Consolidating,   however,   their   highest   grades   in   different  subjects   in  previous  examinations,  with   their   latest  marks,   they  would  be  sufficient  to  reach  the  passing  average  as  provided  for  by  Republic  Act  No.  972.  

(3)  The  total  number  of  candidates  to  be  benefited  by  this  Republic  Acts  is  therefore   1,094,   of   which   only   604   have   filed   petitions.   Of   these   604  petitioners,   33   who   failed   in   1946   to   1951   had   individually   presented  motions   for   reconsideration   which   were   denied,   while   125   unsuccessful  candidates  of  1952,  and  56  of  1953,  had  presented  similar  motions,  which  are  still  pending  because  they  could  be  favorably  affected  by  Republic  Act  No.   972,   —   although   as   has   been   already   stated,   this   tribunal   finds   no  sufficient  reasons  to  reconsider  their  grades  

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY  OF  REPUBLIC  ACT  NO.  972  

Having   been   called   upon   to   enforce   a   law   of   far-­‐reaching   effects   on   the  practice   of   the   legal   profession   and   the   administration   of   justice,   and  because  some  doubts  have  been  expressed  as  to  its  validity,  the  court  set  the   hearing   of   the   afore-­‐mentioned   petitions   for   admission   on   the   sole  question  of  whether  or  not  Republic  Act  No.  972  is  constitutional.  

We   have   been   enlightened   in   the   study   of   this   question   by   the   brilliant  assistance  of  the  members  of  the  bar  who  have  amply  argued,  orally  an  in  writing,  on  the  various  aspects  in  which  the  question  may  be  gleaned.  The  valuable  studies  of  Messrs.  E.  Voltaire  Garcia,  Vicente  J.  Francisco,  Vicente  Pelaez   and   Buenaventura   Evangelista,   in   favor   of   the   validity   of   the   law,  and   of   the   U.P.   Women's   Lawyers'   Circle,   the   Solicitor   General,   Messrs.  Arturo   A.   Alafriz,   Enrique   M.   Fernando,   Vicente   Abad   Santos,   Carlos   A.  Barrios,  Vicente  del  Rosario,  Juan  de  Blancaflor,  Mamerto  V.  Gonzales,  and  Roman   Ozaeta   against   it,   aside   from   the   memoranda   of   counsel   for  petitioners,  Messrs.   Jose  M.  Aruego,  M.H.  de  Joya,  Miguel  R.  Cornejo  and  Antonio   Enrile   Inton,   and   of   petitioners   Cabrera,   Macasaet   and   Galema  themselves,  has  greatly  helped  us  in  this  task.  The  legal  researchers  of  the  court  have  exhausted  almost  all  Philippine  and  American  jurisprudence  on  the  matter.  The  question  has  been  the  object  of  intense  deliberation  for  a  long  time  by  the  Tribunal,  and  finally,  after  the  voting,  the  preparation  of  the  majority  opinion  was  assigned  to  a  new  member  in  order  to  place  it  as  humanly  as  possible  above  all  suspicion  of  prejudice  or  partiality.  

Republic  Act  No.  972  has  for  its  object,  according  to  its  author,  to  admit  to  the   Bar,   those   candidates   who   suffered   from   insufficiency   of   reading  materials   and   inadequate   preparation.   Quoting   a   portion   of   the  Explanatory  Note  of  the  proposed  bill,  its  author  Honorable  Senator  Pablo  Angeles  David  stated:  

The   reason   for   relaxing   the   standard   75   per   cent   passing   grade   is   the  tremendous   handicap  which   students   during   the   years   immediately   after  

the   Japanese   occupation   has   to   overcome   such   as   the   insufficiency   of  reading  materials  and  the   inadequacy  of  the  preparation  of  students  who  took  up  law  soon  after  the  liberation.  

Of   the   9,675   candidates  who   took   the   examinations   from   1946   to   1952,  5,236   passed.   And   now   it   is   claimed   that   in   addition   604   candidates   be  admitted   (which   in   reality   total   1,094),   because   they   suffered   from  "insufficiency  of  reading  materials"  and  of  "inadequacy  of  preparation."  

By   its  declared  objective,   the   law   is   contrary   to  public   interest  because   it  qualifies  1,094  law  graduates  who  confessedly  had  inadequate  preparation  for  the  practice  of  the  profession,  as  was  exactly  found  by  this  Tribunal  in  the   aforesaid   examinations.   The   public   interest   demands   of   legal  profession  adequate  preparation  and  efficiency,  precisely  more  so  as  legal  problem   evolved   by   the   times   become  more   difficult.   An   adequate   legal  preparation  is  one  of  the  vital  requisites  for  the  practice  of  law  that  should  be  developed  constantly  and  maintained  firmly.  To  the   legal  profession   is  entrusted   the   protection   of   property,   life,   honor   and   civil   liberties.   To  approve   officially   of   those   inadequately   prepared   individuals   to   dedicate  themselves  to  such  a  delicate  mission  is  to  create  a  serious  social  danger.  Moreover,   the   statement   that   there  was   an   insufficiency  of   legal   reading  materials  is  grossly  exaggerated.  There  were  abundant  materials.  Decisions  of   this   court   alone   in  mimeographed   copies   were  made   available   to   the  public  during  those  years  and  private  enterprises  had  also  published  them  in  monthly  magazines   and   annual   digests.   The  Official   Gazette   had   been  published   continuously.   Books   and   magazines   published   abroad   have  entered  without   restriction  since  1945.  Many   law  books,   some  even  with  revised   and   enlarged   editions   have   been   printed   locally   during   those  periods.  A  new  set  of  Philippine  Reports  began  to  be  published  since  1946,  which   continued   to   be   supplemented   by   the   addition   of   new   volumes.  Those  are  facts  of  public  knowledge.  

Notwithstanding   all   these,   if   the   law   in   question   is   valid,   it   has   to   be  enforced.  

The   question   is   not   new   in   its   fundamental   aspect   or   from   the   point   of  view   of   applicable   principles,   but   the   resolution   of   the   question   would  have  been  easier  had  an  identical  case  of  similar  background  been  picked  out  from  the  jurisprudence  we  daily  consult.  Is  there  any  precedent  in  the  long  Anglo-­‐Saxon   legal   history,   from  which   has   been  directly   derived   the  judicial  system  established  here  with  its  lofty  ideals  by  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  and  which  we  have  preserved  and  attempted  to  improve,  or  in  our  contemporaneous  judicial  history  of  more  than  half  a  century?  From  the  citations  of   those  defending  the   law,  we  can  not   find  a  case   in  which  the   validity   of   a   similar   law   had   been   sustained,   while   those   against   its  validity   cite,   among   others,   the   cases   of   Day   (In   re  Day,   54   NE   646),   of  Cannon  (State  vs.  Cannon,  240  NW,  441),  the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Massachusetts   in   1932   (81   ALR   1061),   of   Guariña   (24   Phil.,   37),   aside  from   the   opinion   of   the   President   which   is   expressed   in   his   vote   of   the  original  bill  and  which  the  postponement  of  the  contested  law  respects.  

This  law  has  no  precedent  in  its  favor.  When  similar  laws  in  other  countries  had  been  promulgated,   the   judiciary   immediately   declared   them  without  force  or  effect.   It   is  not  within  our  power   to  offer  a  precedent   to  uphold  the  disputed  law.  

To  be  exact,  we  ought  to  state  here  that  we  have  examined  carefully   the  case  that  has  been  cited  to  us  as  a  favorable  precedent  of  the  law  —  that  of   Cooper   (22  NY,   81),  where   the  Court   of  Appeals   of  New  York   revoked  the   decision   of   the   Supreme   court   of   that   State,   denying   the   petition   of  Cooper   to   be   admitted   to   the   practice   of   law   under   the   provisions   of   a  statute  concerning  the  school  of   law  of  Columbia  College  promulgated  on  April  7,  1860,  which  was  declared  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  to  be  consistent  with  the  Constitution  of  the  state  of  New  York.  

It  appears  that  the  Constitution  of  New  York  at  that  time  provided:  

They   (i.e.,   the   judges)   shall   not   hold   any   other   office   of   public   trust.   All  votes  for  either  of  them  for  any  elective  office  except  that  of  the  Court  of  

Appeals,   given   by   the   Legislature   or   the   people,   shall   be   void.   They   shall  not  exercise  any  power  of  appointment  to  public  office.  Any  male  citizen  of  the  age  of  twenty-­‐one  years,  of  good  moral  character,  and  who  possesses  the   requisite   qualifications   of   learning   and   ability,   shall   be   entitled   to  admission  to  practice  in  all  the  courts  of  this  State.  (p.  93).  

According  to  the  Court  of  Appeals,  the  object  of  the  constitutional  precept  is  as  follows:  

Attorneys,   solicitors,   etc.,   were   public   officers;   the   power   of   appointing  them   had   previously   rested   with   the   judges,   and   this   was   the   principal  appointing   power   which   they   possessed.   The   convention   was   evidently  dissatisfied  with  the  manner  in  which  this  power  had  been  exercised,  and  with   the   restrictions   which   the   judges   had   imposed   upon   admission   to  practice   before   them.   The   prohibitory   clause   in   the   section   quoted   was  aimed  directly  at  this  power,  and  the  insertion  of  the  provision"  expecting  the   admission   of   attorneys,   in   this   particular   section   of   the   Constitution,  evidently   arose   from   its   connection   with   the   object   of   this   prohibitory  clause.   There   is   nothing   indicative   of   confidence   in   the   courts   or   of   a  disposition  to  preserve  any  portion  of  their  power  over  this  subject,  unless  the   Supreme  Court   is   right   in   the   inference   it   draws   from   the  use  of   the  word   `admission'   in   the  action   referred   to.   It   is  urged   that   the  admission  spoken  of  must  be  by  the  court;   that   to  admit  means  to  grant   leave,  and  that   the  power  of  granting  necessarily   implies   the  power  of   refusing,  and  of   course   the   right   of   determining   whether   the   applicant   possesses   the  requisite  qualifications  to  entitle  him  to  admission.  

These  positions  may  all  be  conceded,  without  affecting  the  validity  of  the  act.  (p.  93.)  

Now,   with   respect   to   the   law   of   April   7,   1860,   the   decision   seems   to  indicate  that  it  provided  that  the  possession  of  a  diploma  of  the  school  of  law   of   Columbia   College   conferring   the   degree   of   Bachelor   of   Laws   was  evidence   of   the   legal   qualifications   that   the   constitution   required   of  

applicants  for  admission  to  the  Bar.  The  decision  does  not  however  quote  the  text  of  the  law,  which  we  cannot  find  in  any  public  or  accessible  private  library  in  the  country.  

In   the   case   of   Cooper,   supra,   to   make   the   law   consistent   with   the  Constitution   of  New  York,   the   Court   of   Appeals   said   of   the   object   of   the  law:  

The  motive   for  passing   the  act   in  question   is   apparent.  Columbia  College  being   an   institution   of   established   reputation,   and   having   a   law  department   under   the   charge   of   able   professors,   the   students   in   which  department  were  not  only   subjected   to   a   formal   examination  by   the   law  committee   of   the   institution,   but   to   a   certain   definite   period   of   study  before   being   entitled   to   a   diploma   of   being   graduates,   the   Legislature  evidently,  and  no  doubt  justly,  considered  this  examination,  together  with  the  preliminary   study   required  by   the  act,   as   fully  equivalent  as   a   test  of  legal   requirements,   to   the   ordinary   examination   by   the   court;   and   as  rendering   the   latter   examination,   to   which   no   definite   period   of  preliminary  study  was  essential,  unnecessary  and  burdensome.  

The  act  was  obviously  passed  with  reference  to  the  learning  and  ability  of  the  applicant,  and  for  the  mere  purpose  of  substituting  the  examination  by  the  law  committee  of  the  college  for  that  of  the  court.  It  could  have  had  no  other  object,  and  hence  no  greater  scope  should  be  given  to  its  provisions.  We  cannot  suppose  that  the  Legislature  designed  entirely  to  dispense  with  the   plain   and   explicit   requirements   of   the   Constitution;   and   the   act  contains  nothing  whatever  to   indicate  an   intention  that  the  authorities  of  the  college  should   inquire  as   to   the  age,   citizenship,  etc.,  of   the   students  before  granting  a  diploma.  The  only  rational  interpretation  of  which  the  act  admits   is,   that   it   was   intended   to   make   the   college   diploma   competent  evidence  as  to  the  legal  attainments  of  the  applicant,  and  nothing  else.  To  this  extent  alone  it  operates  as  a  modification  of  pre-­‐existing  statutes,  and  it  is  to  be  read  in  connection  with  these  statutes  and  with  the  Constitution  itself  in  order  to  determine  the  present  condition  of  the  law  on  the  subject.  

(p.89)  

x  x  x                      x  x  x                      x  x  x  

The   Legislature   has   not   taken   from   the   court   its   jurisdiction   over   the  question  of  admission,  that  has  simply  prescribed  what  shall  be  competent  evidence  in  certain  cases  upon  that  question.  (p.93)  

From  the  foregoing,  the  complete  inapplicability  of  the  case  of  Cooper  with  that  at  bar  may  be  clearly  seen.  Please  note  only  the  following  distinctions:  

(1)  The  law  of  New  York  does  not  require  that  any  candidate  of  Columbia  College  who  failed  in  the  bar  examinations  be  admitted  to  the  practice  of  law.  

(2)  The  law  of  New  York  according  to  the  very  decision  of  Cooper,  has  not  taken   from   the   court   its   jurisdiction   over   the   question   of   admission   of  attorney  at  law;  in  effect,  it  does  not  decree  the  admission  of  any  lawyer.  

(3)  The  Constitution  of  New  York  at   that   time  and   that  of   the  Philippines  are  entirely  different  on  the  matter  of  admission  of  the  practice  of  law.  

In   the   judicial   system   from  which   ours   has   been   evolved,   the   admission,  suspension,   disbarment   and   reinstatement   of   attorneys   at   law   in   the  practice   of   the   profession   and   their   supervision   have   been   disputably   a  judicial  function  and  responsibility.  Because  of  this  attribute,  its  continuous  and   zealous   possession   and   exercise   by   the   judicial   power   have   been  demonstrated  during  more  than  six  centuries,  which  certainly  "constitutes  the  most  solid  of  titles."  Even  considering  the  power  granted  to  Congress  by  our  Constitution  to  repeal,  alter  supplement  the  rules  promulgated  by  this  Court  regarding  the  admission  to  the  practice  of  law,  to  our  judgment  and   proposition   that   the   admission,   suspension,   disbarment   and  reinstatement   of   the   attorneys   at   law   is   a   legislative   function,   properly  belonging   to   Congress,   is   unacceptable.   The   function   requires   (1)  

previously  established  rules  and  principles,  (2)  concrete  facts,  whether  past  or   present,   affecting   determinate   individuals.   and   (3)   decision   as   to  whether   these   facts  are  governed  by   the   rules  and  principles;   in  effect,  a  judicial  function  of  the  highest  degree.  And  it  becomes  more  undisputably  judicial,  and  not  legislative,  if  previous  judicial  resolutions  on  the  petitions  of  these  same  individuals  are  attempted  to  be  revoked  or  modified.  

We  have  said  that  in  the  judicial  system  from  which  ours  has  been  derived,  the   act   of   admitting,   suspending,   disbarring   and   reinstating   attorneys   at  law   in   the   practice   of   the   profession   is   concededly   judicial.   A  comprehensive   and   conscientious   study   of   this   matter   had   been  undertaken   in   the  case  of  State  vs.  Cannon   (1932)  240  NW  441,   in  which  the  validity  of  a  legislative  enactment  providing  that  Cannon  be  permitted  to  practice  before  the  courts  was  discussed.  From  the  text  of  this  decision  we  quote  the  following  paragraphs:  

This   statute  presents   an  assertion  of   legislative  power  without  parallel   in  the  history  of  the  English  speaking  people  so  far  as  we  have  been  able  to  ascertain.  There  has  been  much  uncertainty  as  to  the  extent  of  the  power  of  the  Legislature  to  prescribe  the  ultimate  qualifications  of  attorney  at  law  has  been  expressly  committed  to  the  courts,  and  the  act  of  admission  has  always  been  regarded  as  a  judicial  function.  This  act  purports  to  constitute  Mr.   Cannon   an   attorney   at   law,   and   in   this   respect   it   stands   alone   as   an  assertion  of  legislative  power.  (p.  444)  

Under   the   Constitution   all   legislative   power   is   vested   in   a   Senate   and  Assembly.  (Section  1,  art.  4.)  In  so  far  as  the  prescribing  of  qualifications  for  admission   to   the   bar   are   legislative   in   character,   the   Legislature   is   acting  within   its   constitutional   authority   when   it   sets   up   and   prescribes   such  qualifications.  (p.  444)  

But  when   the   Legislature   has   prescribed   those   qualifications  which   in   its  judgment  will   serve   the  purpose  of   legitimate   legislative   solicitude,   is   the  power   of   the   court   to   impose   other   and   further   exactions   and  

qualifications  foreclosed  or  exhausted?  (p.  444)  

Under  our  Constitution  the  judicial  and  legislative  departments  are  distinct,  independent,  and  coordinate  branches  of  the  government.  Neither  branch  enjoys   all   the   powers   of   sovereignty   which   properly   belongs   to   its  department.  Neither  department  should  so  act  as  to  embarrass  the  other  in   the   discharge   of   its   respective   functions.   That   was   the   scheme   and  thought  of   the  people  setting  upon  the   form  of  government  under  which  we  exist.  State  vs.  Hastings,  10  Wis.,  525;  Attorney  General  ex  rel.  Bashford  vs.  Barstow,  4  Wis.,  567.  (p.  445)  

The   judicial  department  of   government   is   responsible   for   the  plane  upon  which   the  administration  of   justice   is  maintained.   Its   responsibility   in   this  respect  is  exclusive.  By  committing  a  portion  of  the  powers  of  sovereignty  to   the   judicial   department   of   our   state   government,   under   42a   scheme  which   it   was   supposed   rendered   it   immune   from   embarrassment   or  interference   by   any   other   department   of   government,   the   courts   cannot  escape   responsibility   fir   the  manner   in   which   the   powers   of   sovereignty  thus  committed  to  the  judicial  department  are  exercised.  (p.  445)  

The  relation  at  the  bar  to  the  courts  is  a  peculiar  and  intimate  relationship.  The  bar   is  an  attache  of  the  courts.  The  quality  of   justice  dispense  by  the  courts   depends   in   no   small   degree   upon   the   integrity   of   its   bar.   An  unfaithful  bar  may  easily  bring  scandal  and  reproach  to  the  administration  of  justice  and  bring  the  courts  themselves  into  disrepute.  (p.445)  

Through  all  time  courts  have  exercised  a  direct  and  severe  supervision  over  their  bars,  at  least  in  the  English  speaking  countries.  (p.  445)  

After  explaining  the  history  of  the  case,  the  Court  ends  thus:  

Our  conclusion  may  be  epitomized  as  follows:  For  more  than  six  centuries  prior   to   the   adoption   of   our   Constitution,   the   courts   of   England,  concededly   subordinate   to   Parliament   since   the   Revolution   of   1688,   had  

exercise  the  right  of  determining  who  should  be  admitted  to  the  practice  of  law,  which,  as  was  said  in  Matter  of  the  Sergeant's  at  Law,  6  Bingham's  New  Cases  235,  "constitutes  the  most  solid  of  all   titles."   If   the  courts  and  judicial   power   be   regarded   as   an   entity,   the   power   to   determine   who  should  be  admitted  to  practice  law  is  a  constituent  element  of  that  entity.  It  may  be  difficult  to  isolate  that  element  and  say  with  assurance  that  it  is  either  a  part  of  the  inherent  power  of  the  court,  or  an  essential  element  of  the  judicial  power  exercised  by  the  court,  but  that  it   is  a  power  belonging  to   the   judicial   entity   and   made   of   not   only   a   sovereign   institution,   but  made   of   it   a   separate   independent,   and   coordinate   branch   of   the  government.  They   took   this   institution  along  with   the  power   traditionally  exercise   to  determine  who  should  constitute   its  attorney  at   law.  There   is  no  express  provision  in  the  Constitution  which  indicates  an  intent  that  this  traditional   power   of   the   judicial   department   should   in   any   manner   be  subject  to  legislative  control.  Perhaps  the  dominant  thought  of  the  framers  of   our   constitution   was   to   make   the   three   great   departments   of  government  separate  and   independent  of  one  another.  The   idea  that   the  Legislature   might   embarrass   the   judicial   department   by   prescribing  inadequate   qualifications   for   attorneys   at   law   is   inconsistent   with   the  dominant   purpose   of   making   the   judicial   independent   of   the   legislative  department,  and  such  a  purpose  should  not  be  inferred  in  the  absence  of  express   constitutional  provisions.  While   the   legislature  may   legislate  with  respect   to   the   qualifications   of   attorneys,   but   is   incidental   merely   to   its  general   and   unquestioned   power   to   protect   the   public   interest.  When   it  does  legislate  a  fixing  a  standard  of  qualifications  required  of  attorneys  at  law  in  order  that  public  interests  may  be  protected,  such  qualifications  do  not  constitute  only  a  minimum  standard  and  limit  the  class  from  which  the  court   must   make   its   selection.   Such   legislative   qualifications   do   not  constitute  the  ultimate  qualifications  beyond  which  the  court  cannot  go  in  fixing   additional   qualifications   deemed   necessary   by   the   course   of   the  proper  administration  of  judicial  functions.  There  is  no  legislative  power  to  compel   courts   to   admit   to   their   bars   persons   deemed   by   them   unfit   to  exercise  the  prerogatives  of  an  attorney  at  law.  (p.  450)  

Furthermore,   it   is   an   unlawful   attempt   to   exercise   the   power   of  

appointment.   It   is   quite   likely   true   that   the   legislature  may   exercise   the  power   of   appointment  when   it   is   in   pursuance   of   a   legislative   functions.  However,  the  authorities  are  well-­‐nigh  unanimous  that  the  power  to  admit  attorneys   to   the  practice  of   law   is   a   judicial   function.   In   all   of   the   states,  except   New   Jersey   (In   re   Reisch,   83   N.J.   Eq.   82,   90   A.   12),   so   far   as   our  investigation  reveals,  attorneys  receive  their  formal  license  to  practice  law  by   their  admission  as  members  of   the  bar  of   the  court   so  admitting.  Cor.  Jur.  572;  Ex  parte  Secombre,  19  How.  9,15  L.  Ed.  565;  Ex  parte  Garland,  4  Wall.   333,   18   L.   Ed.   366;   Randall   vs.   Brigham,   7  Wall.   53,   19   L.   Ed.   285;  Hanson   vs.   Grattan,   48   Kan,   843,   115   P.   646,   34   L.R.A.   519;  Danforth  vs.  Egan,  23  S.  D.  43,  119  N.W.  1021,  130  Am.  St.  Rep.  1030,  20  Ann.  Cas.  413.  

The   power   of   admitting   an   attorney   to   practice   having   been   perpetually  exercised  by  the  courts,  it  having  been  so  generally  held  that  the  act  of  the  court  in  admitting  an  attorney  to  practice  is  the  judgment  of  the  court,  and  an  attempt  as  this  on  the  part  of  the  Legislature  to  confer  such  right  upon  any   one   being   most   exceedingly   uncommon,   it   seems   clear   that   the  licensing  of  an  attorney   is  and  always  has  been  a  purely   judicial   function,  no  matter  where  the  power  to  determine  the  qualifications  may  reside.  (p.  451)  

In   that   same   year   of   1932,   the   Supreme   Court   of   Massachusetts,   in  answering  a  consultation  of  the  Senate  of  that  State,  180  NE  725,  said:  

It   is   indispensible  to  the  administration  of   justice  and  to   interpretation  of  the   laws   that   there  be  members  of   the  bar  of   sufficient  ability,  adequate  learning   and   sound   moral   character.   This   arises   from   the   need   of  enlightened   assistance   to   the   honest,   and   restraining   authority   over   the  knavish,   litigant.   It   is   highly   important,   also   that   the   public   be   protected  from   incompetent  and  vicious  practitioners,  whose  opportunity   for  doing  mischief   is   wide.   It   was   said   by   Cardoz,   C.L.,   in   People   ex   rel.   Karlin   vs.  Culkin,   242   N.Y.   456,   470,   471,   162   N.E.   487,   489,   60   A.L.R.   851:  "Membership   in   the   bar   is   a   privilege   burden   with   conditions."   One   is  admitted  to  the  bar  "for  something  more  than  private  gain."  He  becomes  

an  "officer  of  the  court",  and  ,like  the  court  itself,  an  instrument  or  agency  to   advance   the   end   of   justice.   His   cooperation   with   the   court   is   due  "whenever   justice   would   be   imperiled   if   cooperation   was   withheld."  Without   such   attorneys   at   law   the   judicial   department   of   government  would   be   hampered   in   the   performance   of   its   duties.   That   has   been   the  history   of   attorneys   under   the   common   law,   both   in   this   country   and  England.   Admission   to   practice   as   an   attorney   at   law   is   almost   without  exception  conceded  to  be  a  judicial  function.  Petition  to  that  end  is  filed  in  courts,  as  are  other  proceedings  invoking  judicial  action.  Admission  to  the  bar  is  accomplish  and  made  open  and  notorious  by  a  decision  of  the  court  entered   upon   its   records.   The   establishment   by   the   Constitution   of   the  judicial   department   conferred   authority   necessary   to   the   exercise   of   its  powers  as  a  coordinate  department  of  government.  It  is  an  inherent  power  of   such   a   department   of   government   ultimately   to   determine   the  qualifications  of  those  to  be  admitted  to  practice  in  its  courts,  for  assisting  in  its  work,  and  to  protect  itself  in  this  respect  from  the  unfit,  those  lacking  in  sufficient  learning,  and  those  not  possessing  good  moral  character.  Chief  Justice   Taney   stated   succinctly   and  with   finality   in  Ex   parte   Secombe,   19  How.   9,   13,   15   L.   Ed.   565,   "It   has   been   well   settled,   by   the   rules   and  practice  of   common-­‐law  courts,   that   it   rests  exclusively  with   the  court   to  determine  who   is   qualified   to   become   one   of   its   officers,   as   an   attorney  and  counselor,  and  for  what  cause  he  ought  to  be  removed."  (p.727)  

In   the   case   of   Day   and   others  who   collectively   filed   a   petition   to   secure  license  to  practice  the  legal  profession  by  virtue  of  a  law  of  state  (In  re  Day,  54  NE  646),  the  court  said  in  part:  

In   the   case   of   Ex   parte   Garland,   4   Wall,   333,   18   L.   Ed.   366,   the   court,  holding   the   test   oath   for   attorneys   to   be   unconstitutional,   explained   the  nature  of   the  attorney's  office  as   follows:   "They  are  officers  of   the  court,  admitted  as  such  by  its  order,  upon  evidence  of  their  possessing  sufficient  legal   learning   and   fair   private   character.   It   has   always   been   the   general  practice   in   this   country   to  obtain   this   evidence  by   an  examination  of   the  parties.   In   this   court   the   fact   of   the   admission   of   such   officers   in   the  highest   court   of   the   states   to  which   they,   respectively,   belong   for,   three  

years  preceding  their  application,  is  regarded  as  sufficient  evidence  of  the  possession   of   the   requisite   legal   learning,   and   the   statement   of   counsel  moving   their   admission   sufficient   evidence   that   their   private   and  professional  character  is  fair.  The  order  of  admission  is  the  judgment  of  the  court  that  the  parties  possess  the  requisite  qualifications  as  attorneys  and  counselors,  and  are  entitled  to  appear  as  such  and  conduct  causes  therein.  From  its  entry  the  parties  become  officers  of  the  court,  and  are  responsible  to   it   for   professional   misconduct.   They   hold   their   office   during   good  behavior,   and   can   only   be   deprived   of   it   for  misconduct   ascertained   and  declared  by   the   judgment  of   the   court  after  opportunity   to  be  heard  has  been   afforded.   Ex   parte   Hoyfron,   admission   or   their   exclusion   is   not   the  exercise   of   a  mere  ministerial   power.   It   is   the   exercise   of   judicial   power,  and   has   been   so   held   in   numerous   cases.   It  was   so   held   by   the   court   of  appeals   of   New   York   in   the   matter   of   the   application   of   Cooper   for  admission.   Re   Cooper   22  N.   Y.   81.   "Attorneys   and   Counselors",   said   that  court,  "are  not  only  officers  of   the  court,  but  officers  whose  duties  relate  almost   exclusively   to   proceedings   of   a   judicial   nature;   and   hence   their  appointment  may,  with  propriety,  be  entrusted  to  the  court,  and  the  latter,  in   performing   his   duty,   may   very   justly   considered   as   engaged   in   the  exercise  of  their  appropriate  judicial  functions."  (pp.  650-­‐651).  

We  quote  from  other  cases,  the  following  pertinent  portions:  

Admission   to   practice   of   law   is   almost   without   exception   conceded  everywhere  to  be  the  exercise  of  a  judicial  function,  and  this  opinion  need  not   be   burdened  with   citations   in   this   point.   Admission   to   practice   have  also   been   held   to   be   the   exercise   of   one   of   the   inherent   powers   of   the  court.  —  Re  Bruen,  102  Wash.  472,  172  Pac.  906.  

Admission  to  the  practice  of  law  is  the  exercise  of  a  judicial  function,  and  is  an   inherent   power   of   the   court.   —   A.C.   Brydonjack,   vs.   State   Bar   of  California,   281   Pac.   1018;   See   Annotation   on   Power   of   Legislature  respecting  admission  to  bar,  65,  A.L.  R.  1512.  

On  this  matter  there  is  certainly  a  clear  distinction  between  the  functions  of  the  judicial  and  legislative  departments  of  the  government.  

The   distinction   between   the   functions   of   the   legislative   and   the   judicial  departments   is   that   it   is   the  province  of   the   legislature   to  establish   rules  that   shall   regulate   and   govern   in   matters   of   transactions   occurring  subsequent   to   the   legislative  action,  while   the   judiciary  determines   rights  and  obligations  with  reference  to  transactions  that  are  past  or  conditions  that  exist  at  the  time  of  the  exercise  of  judicial  power,  and  the  distinction  is  a   vital   one   and   not   subject   to   alteration   or   change   either   by   legislative  action  or  by  judicial  decree.  

The  judiciary  cannot  consent  that  its  province  shall  be  invaded  by  either  of  the  other  departments  of  the  government.  —  16  C.J.S.,  Constitutional  Law,  p.  229.  

If  the  legislature  cannot  thus  indirectly  control  the  action  of  the  courts  by  requiring  of  them  construction  of  the  law  according  to  its  own  views,   it   is  very   plain   it   cannot   do   so   directly,   by   settling   aside   their   judgments,  compelling   them  to  grant  new  trials,  ordering   the  discharge  of  offenders,  or  directing  what  particular  steps  shall  be  taken  in  the  progress  of  a  judicial  inquiry.  —  Cooley's  Constitutional  Limitations,  192.  

In  decreeing   the  bar  candidates  who  obtained   in   the  bar  examinations  of  1946  to  1952,  a  general  average  of  70  per  cent  without  falling  below  50  per  cent   in   any   subject,   be   admitted   in   mass   to   the   practice   of   law,   the  disputed   law   is  not  a   legislation;   it   is   a   judgment  —  a   judgment   revoking  those  promulgated  by   this   Court   during   the   aforecited   year   affecting   the  bar   candidates   concerned;   and   although   this   Court   certainly   can   revoke  these  judgments  even  now,  for  justifiable  reasons,  it  is  no  less  certain  that  only  this  Court,  and  not  the  legislative  nor  executive  department,  that  may  be   so.  Any   attempt  on   the  part   of   any  of   these  departments  would  be   a  clear  usurpation  of  its  functions,  as  is  the  case  with  the  law  in  question.  

That  the  Constitution  has  conferred  on  Congress  the  power  to  repeal,  alter  or   supplement   the   rule   promulgated   by   this   Tribunal,   concerning   the  admission   to   the  practice  of   law,   is  no  valid  argument.  Section  13,  article  VIII  of  the  Constitution  provides:  

Section  13.  The  Supreme  Court  shall  have   the  power   to  promulgate   rules  concerning   pleading,   practice,   and   procedure   in   all   courts,   and   the  admission  to  the  practice  of  law.  Said  rules  shall  be  uniform  for  all  courts  of  the   same   grade   and   shall   not   diminish,   increase   or   modify   substantive  rights.   The   existing   laws   on   pleading,   practice   and   procedure   are   hereby  repealed  as  statutes,  and  are  declared  Rules  of  Court,  subject  to  the  power  of   the   Supreme   Court   to   alter   and  modify   the   same.   The   Congress   shall  have   the   power   to   repeal,   alter,   or   supplement   the   rules   concerning  pleading,  practice,  and  procedure,  and  the  admission  to  the  practice  of  law  in  the  Philippines.  —  Constitution  of  the  Philippines,  Art.  VIII,  sec.  13.  

It  will   be  noted   that   the  Constitution  has  not   conferred  on  Congress   and  this   Tribunal   equal   responsibilities   concerning   the   admission   to   the  practice   of   law.   the   primary   power   and   responsibility   which   the  Constitution   recognizes   continue   to   reside   in   this   Court.   Had   Congress  found  that  this  Court  has  not  promulgated  any  rule  on  the  matter,  it  would  have  nothing  over  which  to  exercise  the  power  granted  to  it.  Congress  may  repeal,  alter  and  supplement  the  rules  promulgated  by  this  Court,  but  the  authority   and   responsibility   over   the   admission,   suspension,   disbarment  and  reinstatement  of  attorneys  at  law  and  their  supervision  remain  vested  in  the  Supreme  Court.  The  power  to  repeal,  alter  and  supplement  the  rules  does  not   signify  nor  permit   that  Congress   substitute  or   take   the  place  of  this   Tribunal   in   the   exercise   of   its   primary   power   on   the   matter.   The  Constitution   does   not   say   nor   mean   that   Congress   may   admit,   suspend,  disbar   or   reinstate   directly   attorneys   at   law,   or   a   determinate   group   of  individuals  to  the  practice  of  law.  Its  power  is  limited  to  repeal,  modify  or  supplement   the  existing   rules  on   the  matter,   if   according   to   its   judgment  the   need   for   a   better   service   of   the   legal   profession   requires   it.   But   this  power   does   not   relieve   this   Court   of   its   responsibility   to   admit,   suspend,  disbar  and  reinstate  attorneys  at  law  and  supervise  the  practice  of  the  legal  

profession.  

Being  coordinate  and  independent  branches,  the  power  to  promulgate  and  enforce  rules   for  the  admission  to  the  practice  of   law  and  the  concurrent  power  to  repeal,  alter  and  supplement  them  may  and  should  be  exercised  with  the  respect  that  each  owes  to  the  other,  giving  careful  consideration  to  the  responsibility  which  the  nature  of  each  department  requires.  These  powers   have   existed   together   for   centuries   without   diminution   on   each  part;  the  harmonious  delimitation  being  found  in  that  the   legislature  may  and   should   examine   if   the   existing   rules   on   the   admission   to   the   Bar  respond  to  the  demands  which  public   interest  requires  of  a  Bar  endowed  with  high  virtues,  culture,   training  and  responsibility.  The   legislature  may,  by   means   of   appeal,   amendment   or   supplemental   rules,   fill   up   any  deficiency  that  it  may  find,  and  the  judicial  power,  which  has  the  inherent  responsibility   for   a   good   and   efficient   administration   of   justice   and   the  supervision  of   the  practice   of   the   legal   profession,   should   consider   these  reforms  as  the  minimum  standards  for  the  elevation  of  the  profession,  and  see  to   it   that  with   these  reforms  the   lofty  objective   that   is  desired   in   the  exercise   of   its   traditional   duty   of   admitting,   suspending,   disbarring   and  reinstating   attorneys   at   law   is   realized.   They   are   powers   which,   exercise  within   their   proper   constitutional   limits,   are   not   repugnant,   but   rather  complementary  to  each  other  in  attaining  the  establishment  of  a  Bar  that  would   respond   to   the   increasing   and   exacting   necessities   of   the  administration  of  justice.  

The   case   of   Guariña   (1913)   24   Phil.,   37,   illustrates   our   criterion.   Guariña  took  examination  and  failed  by  a  few  points  to  obtain  the  general  average.  A  recently  enacted  law  provided  that  one  who  had  been  appointed  to  the  position   of   Fiscal   may   be   admitted   to   the   practice   of   law   without   a  previous   examination.   The   Government   appointed   Guariña   and   he  discharged  the  duties  of  Fiscal   in  a  remote  province.  This  tribunal  refused  to  give  his  license  without  previous  examinations.  The  court  said:  

Relying  upon  the  provisions  of  section  2  of  Act  No.  1597,  the  applicant   in  

this   case   seeks   admission   to   the   bar,   without   taking   the   prescribed  examination,  on  the  ground  that  he  holds  the  office  of  provincial  fiscal  for  the  Province  of  Batanes.  

Section  2  of  Act  No.  1597,  enacted  February  28,  1907,  is  as  follows:  

Sec.  2.  Paragraph  one  of   section   thirteen  of  Act  Numbered  One  Hundred  and  ninety,  entitled  "An  Act  providing  a  Code  of  Procedure  in  Civil  Actions  and   Special   Proceedings   in   the   Philippine   Islands,"   is   hereby   amended   to  read  as  follows:  

1.   Those  who   have   been   duly   licensed   under   the   laws   and   orders   of   the  Islands  under   the   sovereignty  of   Spain  or  of   the  United  States  and  are   in  good  and  regular  standing  as  members  of  the  bar  of  the  Philippine  Islands  at   the   time  of   the  adoption  of   this  code;  Provided,  That  any  person  who,  prior  to  the  passage  of  this  act,  or  at  any  time  thereafter,  shall  have  held,  under   the   authority   of   the   United   States,   the   position   of   justice   of   the  Supreme  Court,   judge  of  the  Court  of  First   Instance,  or   judge  or  associate  judge   of   the   Court   of   Land   Registration,   of   the   Philippine   Islands,   or   the  position  of  Attorney  General,  Solicitor  General,  Assistant  Attorney  General,  assistant   attorney   in   the   office   of   the   Attorney   General,   prosecuting  attorney   for   the   City   of   Manila,   city   attorney   of   Manila,   assistant   city  attorney   of   Manila,   provincial   fiscal,   attorney   for   the   Moro   Province,   or  assistant  attorney  for  the  Moro  Province,  may  be   licensed  to  practice   law  in   the   courts   of   the   Philippine   Islands   without   an   examination,   upon  motion   before   the   Supreme   Court   and   establishing   such   fact   to   the  satisfaction  of  said  court.  

The  records  of  this  court  disclose  that  on  a  former  occasion  this  appellant  took,   and   failed   to   pass   the   prescribed   examination.   The   report   of   the  examining   board,   dated   March   23,   1907,   shows   that   he   received   an  average  of  only  71  per  cent  in  the  various  branches  of  legal  learning  upon  which   he   was   examined,   thus   falling   four   points   short   of   the   required  percentage  of  75.  We  would  be  delinquent  in  the  performance  of  our  duty  

to  the  public  and  to  the  bar,  if,  in  the  face  of  this  affirmative  indication  of  the  deficiency  of  the  applicant  in  the  required  qualifications  of  learning  in  the   law   at   the   time   when   he   presented   his   former   application   for  admission   to   the   bar,  we   should   grant   him   license   to   practice   law   in   the  courts   of   these   Islands,  without   first   satisfying   ourselves   that   despite   his  failure   to   pass   the   examination   on   that   occasion,   he   now   "possesses   the  necessary  qualifications  of  learning  and  ability."  

But  it  is  contented  that  under  the  provisions  of  the  above-­‐cited  statute  the  applicant  is  entitled  as  of  right  to  be  admitted  to  the  bar  without  taking  the  prescribed   examination   "upon   motion   before   the   Supreme   Court"  accompanied   by   satisfactory   proof   that   he   has   held   and   now   holds   the  office  of  provincial  fiscal  of  the  Province  of  Batanes.  It  is  urged  that  having  in   mind   the   object   which   the   legislator   apparently   sought   to   attain   in  enacting  the  above-­‐cited  amendment  to  the  earlier  statute,  and  in  view  of  the  context  generally  and  especially  of   the   fact   that   the  amendment  was  inserted   as   a   proviso   in   that   section  of   the  original  Act  which   specifically  provides  for  the  admission  of  certain  candidates  without  examination.  It  is  contented   that   this   mandatory   construction   is   imperatively   required   in  order  to  give  effect  to  the  apparent  intention  of  the  legislator,  and  to  the  candidate's  claim  de  jure  to  have  the  power  exercised.  

And   after   copying   article   9   of   Act   of   July   1,   1902   of   the   Congress   of   the  United  States,  articles  2,  16  and  17  of  Act  No.  136,  and  articles  13  to  16  of  Act  190,  the  Court  continued:  

Manifestly,   the   jurisdiction   thus   conferred   upon   this   court   by   the  commission  and   confirmed   to   it  by   the  Act  of  Congress  would  be   limited  and   restricted,   and   in   a   case   such   as   that   under   consideration   wholly  destroyed,   by   giving   the  word   "may,"   as   used   in   the   above   citation   from  Act   of   Congress   of   July   1,   1902,   or   of   any   Act   of   Congress   prescribing,  defining   or   limiting   the   power   conferred   upon   the   commission   is   to   that  extent  invalid  and  void,  as  transcending  its  rightful  limits  and  authority.  

Speaking  on  the  application  of  the  law  to  those  who  were  appointed  to  the  positions  enumerated,  and  with  particular  emphasis  in  the  case  of  Guariña,  the  Court  held:  

In   the   various   cases   wherein   applications   for   the   admission   to   the   bar  under  the  provisions  of  this  statute  have  been  considered  heretofore,  we  have   accepted   the   fact   that   such   appointments   had   been   made   as  satisfactory   evidence   of   the   qualifications   of   the   applicant.   But   in   all   of  those   cases   we   had   reason   to   believe   that   the   applicants   had   been  practicing  attorneys  prior  to  the  date  of  their  appointment.  

In  the  case  under  consideration,  however,  it  affirmatively  appears  that  the  applicant  was   not   and   never   had   been   practicing   attorney   in   this   or   any  other   jurisdiction  prior  to  the  date  of  his  appointment  as  provincial   fiscal,  and   it   further   affirmatively   appears   that  he  was  deficient   in   the   required  qualifications  at  the  time  when  he  last  applied  for  admission  to  the  bar.  

In  the  light  of  this  affirmative  proof  of  his  defieciency  on  that  occasion,  we  do  not  think  that  his  appointment  to  the  office  of  provincial  fiscal  is  in  itself  satisfactory   proof   if   his   possession   of   the   necessary   qualifications   of  learning  and  ability.  We  conclude  therefore  that  this  application  for  license  to  practice  in  the  courts  of  the  Philippines,  should  be  denied.  

In   view,   however,   of   the   fact   that  when   he   took   the   examination   he   fell  only  four  points  short  of  the  necessary  grade  to  entitle  him  to  a  license  to  practice;  and   in  view  also  of  the  fact  that  since  that  time  he  has  held  the  responsible   office   of   the   governor   of   the   Province   of   Sorsogon   and  presumably   gave   evidence   of   such  marked   ability   in   the   performance   of  the   duties   of   that   office   that   the   Chief   Executive,   with   the   consent   and  approval   of   the   Philippine   Commission,   sought   to   retain   him   in   the  Government  service  by  appointing  him  to  the  office  of  provincial  fiscal,  we  think   we  would   be   justified   under   the   above-­‐cited   provisions   of   Act   No.  1597  in  waiving  in  his  case  the  ordinary  examination  prescribed  by  general  rule,  provided  he  offers  satisfactory  evidence  of  his  proficiency  in  a  special  

examination  which  will  be  given  him  by  a  committee  of  the  court  upon  his  application  therefor,  without  prejudice  to  his  right,   if  he  desires  so  to  do,  to   present   himself   at   any   of   the   ordinary   examinations   prescribed   by  general  rule.  —  (In  re  Guariña,  pp.  48-­‐49.)  

It   is   obvious,   therefore,   that   the   ultimate   power   to   grant   license   for   the  practice   of   law   belongs   exclusively   to   this   Court,   and   the   law   passed   by  Congress  on  the  matter   is  of  permissive  character,  or  as  other  authorities  say,  merely  to  fix  the  minimum  conditions  for  the  license.  

The   law   in  question,   like   those   in   the   case  of  Day   and  Cannon,  has  been  found  also   to  suffer   from  the   fatal  defect  of  being  a  class   legislation,  and  that   if   it   has   intended   to   make   a   classification,   it   is   arbitrary   and  unreasonable.  

In   the   case   of   Day,   a   law   enacted   on   February   21,   1899   required   of   the  Supreme   Court,   until   December   31   of   that   year,   to   grant   license   for   the  practice  of  law  to  those  students  who  began  studying  before  November  4,  1897,  and  had  studied  for  two  years  and  presented  a  diploma  issued  by  a  school  of  law,  or  to  those  who  had  studied  in  a  law  office  and  would  pass  an   examination,   or   to   those   who   had   studied   for   three   years   if   they  commenced   their   studies   after   the   aforementioned   date.   The   Supreme  Court  declared   that   this   law  was  unconstitutional  being,  among  others,   a  class  legislation.  The  Court  said:  

This  is  an  application  to  this  court  for  admission  to  the  bar  of  this  state  by  virtue  of  diplomas  from  law  schools  issued  to  the  applicants.  The  act  of  the  general  assembly  passed   in  1899,  under  which  the  application   is  made,   is  entitled  "An  act  to  amend  section  1  of  an  act  entitled  "An  act  to  revise  the  law  in  relation  to  attorneys  and  counselors,"  approved  March  28,  1884,  in  force   July   1,   1874."   The   amendment,   so   far   as   it   appears   in   the  enacting  clause,  consists  in  the  addition  to  the  section  of  the  following:  "And  every  application   for   a   license  who   shall   comply  with   the   rules   of   the   supreme  court  in  regard  to  admission  to  the  bar  in  force  at  the  time  such  applicant  

commend   the   study   of   law,   either   in   a   law   or   office   or   a   law   school   or  college,   shall   be   granted   a   license   under   this   act   notwithstanding   any  subsequent  changes  in  said  rules".  —  In  re  Day  et  al,  54  N.Y.,  p.  646.  

.   .   .  After  said  provision  there   is  a  double  proviso,  one  branch  of  which   is  that   up   to   December   31,   1899,   this   court   shall   grant   a   license   of  admittance   to   the  bar   to   the  holder  of  every  diploma   regularly   issued  by  any   law   school   regularly   organized   under   the   laws   of   this   state,   whose  regular  course  of  law  studies  is  two  years,  and  requiring  an  attendance  by  the  student  of  at   least  36  weeks   in  each  of   such  years,  and  showing   that  the   student   began   the   study   of   law   prior   to   November   4,   1897,   and  accompanied   with   the   usual   proofs   of   good   moral   character.   The   other  branch  of  the  proviso  is  that  any  student  who  has  studied  law  for  two  years  in   a   law   office,   or   part   of   such   time   in   a   law   office,   "and   part   in   the  aforesaid  law  school,"  and  whose  course  of  study  began  prior  to  November  4,   1897,   shall   be   admitted   upon   a   satisfactory   examination   by   the  examining  board  in  the  branches  now  required  by  the  rules  of  this  court.  If  the  right  to  admission  exists  at  all,  it  is  by  virtue  of  the  proviso,  which,  it  is  claimed,  confers  substantial  rights  and  privileges  upon  the  persons  named  therein,  and  establishes  rules  of   legislative  creation  for  their  admission  to  the  bar.  (p.  647.)  

Considering   the  proviso,   however,   as   an  enactment,   it   is   clearly   a   special  legislation,   prohibited   by   the   constitution,   and   invalid   as   such.   If   the  legislature  had  any   right   to  admit   attorneys   to  practice   in   the   courts   and  take  part  in  the  administration  of  justice,  and  could  prescribe  the  character  of   evidence   which   should   be   received   by   the   court   as   conclusive   of   the  requisite   learning   and   ability   of   persons   to   practice   law,   it   could   only   be  done  by  a  general  law,  persons  or  classes  of  persons.  Const.  art  4,  section  2.   The   right   to   practice   law   is   a   privilege,   and   a   license   for   that   purpose  makes  the  holder  an  officer  of  the  court,  and  confers  upon  him  the  right  to  appear   for   litigants,   to   argue   causes,   and   to   collect   fees   therefor,   and  creates   certain  exemptions,   such  as   from   jury   services   and  arrest  on   civil  process  while  attending  court.  The  law  conferring  such  privileges  must  be  general  in  its  operation.  No  doubt  the  legislature,  in  framing  an  enactment  

for   that   purpose,   may   classify   persons   so   long   as   the   law   establishing  classes   in   general,   and   has   some   reasonable   relation   to   the   end   sought.  There   must   be   some   difference   which   furnishes   a   reasonable   basis   for  different   one,   having   no   just   relation   to   the   subject   of   the   legislation.  Braceville  Coal  Co.  vs.  People,  147  Ill.  66,  35  N.E.  62;  Ritchie  vs.  People,  155  Ill.  98,  40  N.E.  454;  Railroad  Co.  vs.  Ellis,  165  U.S.  150,  17  Sup.  Ct.  255.  

The   length   of   time   a   physician   has   practiced,   and   the   skill   acquired   by  experience,  may   furnish  a  basis   for  classification   (Williams  vs.  People  121  Ill.   48,   II   N.E.   881);   but   the   place   where   such   physician   has   resided   and  practiced   his   profession   cannot   furnish   such   basis,   and   is   an   arbitrary  discrimination,   making   an   enactment   based   upon   it   void   (State   vs.  Pennyeor,  65  N.E.  113,  18  Atl.  878).  Here  the  legislature  undertakes  to  say  what   shall   serve   as   a   test   of   fitness   for   the   profession   of   the   law,   and  plainly,  any  classification  must  have  some  reference  to  learning,  character,  or  ability  to  engage  in  such  practice.  The  proviso  is  limited,  first,  to  a  class  of   persons  who   began   the   study   of   law   prior   to  November   4,   1897.   This  class   is   subdivided   into   two   classes   —   First,   those   presenting   diplomas  issued   by   any   law   school   of   this   state   before   December   31,   1899;   and,  second,  those  who  studied  law  for  the  period  of  two  years  in  a  law  office,  or  part  of  the  time  in  a  law  school  and  part  in  a  law  office,  who  are  to  be  admitted  upon  examination  in  the  subjects  specified  in  the  present  rules  of  this   court,   and   as   to   this   latter   subdivision   there   seems   to  be  no   limit   of  time   for   making   application   for   admission.   As   to   both   classes,   the  conditions   of   the   rules   are   dispensed   with,   and   as   between   the   two  different   conditions   and   limits   of   time   are   fixed.   No   course   of   study   is  prescribed  for  the  law  school,  but  a  diploma  granted  upon  the  completion  of  any  sort  of  course  its  managers  may  prescribe  is  made  all-­‐sufficient.  Can  there  be  anything  with  relation  to  the  qualifications  or  fitness  of  persons  to  practice   law  resting  upon  the  mere  date  of  November  4,  1897,  which  will  furnish  a  basis  of  classification.  Plainly  not.  Those  who  began  the  study  of  law  November  4th  could  qualify  themselves  to  practice  in  two  years  as  well  as   those  who   began   on   the   3rd.   The   classes   named   in   the   proviso   need  spend  only  two  years  in  study,  while  those  who  commenced  the  next  day  must   spend   three  years,  although   they  would  complete   two  years  before  

the   time   limit.   The   one   who   commenced   on   the   3rd.   If   possessed   of   a  diploma,   is   to   be   admitted   without   examination   before   December   31,  1899,  and  without  any  prescribed  course  of  study,  while  as  to  the  other  the  prescribed   course   must   be   pursued,   and   the   diploma   is   utterly   useless.  Such   classification   cannot   rest   upon   any   natural   reason,   or   bear   any   just  relation  to  the  subject  sought,  and  none  is  suggested.  The  proviso  is  for  the  sole   purpose   of   bestowing   privileges   upon   certain   defined   persons.   (pp.  647-­‐648.)  

In  the  case  of  Cannon  above  cited,  State  vs.  Cannon,  240  N.W.  441,  where  the   legislature   attempted   by   law   to   reinstate   Cannon   to   the   practice   of  law,   the   court   also   held   with   regards   to   its   aspect   of   being   a   class  legislation:  

But   the   statute   is   invalid   for   another   reason.   If   it   be   granted   that   the  legislature   has   power   to   prescribe   ultimately   and   definitely   the  qualifications  upon  which  courts  must  admit  and  license  those  applying  as  attorneys   at   law,   that   power   can   not   be   exercised   in   the   manner   here  attempted.  That  power  must  be  exercised  through  general  laws  which  will  apply  to  all  alike  and  accord  equal  opportunity  to  all.  Speaking  of  the  right  of  the  Legislature  to  exact  qualifications  of  those  desiring  to  pursue  chosen  callings,  Mr.   Justice   Field   in   the   case   of  Dent.   vs.  West   Virginia,   129  U.S.  114,  121,  9  S.  Ct.  232,  233,  32  L.  Ed.  626,  said:  "It  is  undoubtedly  the  right  of  every  citizen  of  the  United  States  to  follow  any  lawful  calling,  business  or  profession  he  may  choose,  subject  only  to  such  restrictions  as  are  imposed  upon   all   persons   of   like   age,   sex,   and   condition."   This   right  may   in  many  respects   be   considered   as   a   distinguishing   feature   of   our   republican  institutions.  Here  all  vocations  are  all  open  to  every  one  on  like  conditions.  All  may  be  pursued  as  sources  of  livelihood,  some  requiring  years  of  study  and  great  learning  for  their  successful  prosecution.  The  interest,  or,  as  it  is  sometimes   termed,   the   "estate"   acquired   in   them  —   that   is,   the   right   to  continue  their  prosecution  —  is  often  of  great  value  to  the  possessors  and  cannot  be  arbitrarily  taken  from  them,  any  more  than  their  real  or  personal  property   can   be   thus   taken.   It   is   fundamental   under   our   system   of  government   that   all   similarly   situated   and  possessing   equal   qualifications  

shall   enjoy   equal   opportunities.   Even   statutes   regulating   the   practice   of  medicine,  requiring  medications  to  establish  the  possession  on  the  part  of  the   application   of   his   proper   qualifications   before   he  may   be   licensed   to  practice,   have   been   challenged,   and   courts   have   seriously   considered  whether  the  exemption  from  such  examinations  of  those  practicing  in  the  state   at   the   time   of   the   enactment   of   the   law   rendered   such   law  unconstitutional  because  of  infringement  upon  this  general  principle.  State  vs.   Thomas   Call,   121   N.C.   643,   28   S.E.   517;   see,   also,   The   State   ex   rel.  Winkler  vs.  Rosenberg,  101  Wis.  172,  76  N.W.  345;  State  vs.  Whitcom,  122  Wis.  110,  99  N.W.  468.  

This  law  singles  out  Mr.  Cannon  and  assumes  to  confer  upon  him  the  right  to   practice   law   and   to   constitute   him   an   officer   of   this   Court   as   a  mere  matter   of   legislative   grace   or   favor.   It   is   not   material   that   he   had   once  established   his   right   to   practice   law   and   that   one   time   he   possessed   the  requisite  learning  and  other  qualifications  to  entitle  him  to  that  right.  That  fact   in   no  matter   affect   the   power   of   the   Legislature   to   select   from   the  great   body   of   the   public   an   individual   upon   whom   it   would   confer   its  favors.  

A   statute  of   the   state  of  Minnesota   (Laws  1929,   c.   424)   commanded   the  Supreme   Court   to   admit   to   the   practice   of   law   without   examination,   all  who  had  served  in  the  military  or  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  during  the  World  War   and   received   a   honorable   discharge   therefrom   and   who  (were   disabled   therein   or   thereby   within   the   purview   of   the   Act   of  Congress   approved   June   7th,   1924,   known   as   "World  War   Veteran's   Act,  1924  and  whose  disability   is  rated  at   least  ten  per  cent  thereunder  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  this  Act."  This  Act  was  held  |unconstitutional  on  the  ground  that  it  clearly  violated  the  quality  clauses  of  the  constitution  of  that  state.  In  re  Application  of  George  W.  Humphrey,  178  Minn.  331,  227  N.W.  179.  

A  good  summary  of  a  classification  constitutionally  acceptable  is  explained  in  12  Am.  Jur.  151-­‐153  as  follows:  

The   general   rule   is   well   settled   by   unanimity   of   the   authorities   that   a  classification  to  be  valid  must  rest  upon  material  differences  between  the  person  included  in  it  and  those  excluded  and,  furthermore,  must  be  based  upon   substantial   distinctions.   As   the   rule   has   sometimes   avoided   the  constitutional   prohibition,   must   be   founded   upon   pertinent   and   real  differences,  as  distinguished  from  irrelevant  and  artificial  ones.  Therefore,  any  law  that  is  made  applicable  to  one  class  of  citizens  only  must  be  based  on   some   substantial   difference   between   the   situation   of   that   class   and  other  individuals  to  which  it  does  not  apply  and  must  rest  on  some  reason  on   which   it   can   be   defended.   In   other   words,   there   must   be   such   a  difference  between  the  situation  and  circumstances  of  all  the  members  of  the  class  and  the  situation  and  circumstances  of  all  other  members  of  the  state  in  relation  to  the  subjects  of  the  discriminatory  legislation  as  presents  a   just   and   natural   cause   for   the   difference   made   in   their   liabilities   and  burdens  and   in   their   rights  and  privileges.  A   law   is  not  general  because   it  operates  on  all  within  a  clause  unless  there  is  a  substantial  reason  why  it  is  made  to  operate  on  that  class  only,  and  not  generally  on  all.   (12  Am.  Jur.  pp.  151-­‐153.)  

Pursuant  to  the  law  in  question,  those  who,  without  a  grade  below  50  per  cent  in  any  subject,  have  obtained  a  general  average  of  69.5  per  cent  in  the  bar  examinations   in  1946  to  1951,  70.5  per  cent   in  1952,  71.5  per  cent   in  1953,   and   those   will   obtain   72.5   per   cent   in   1954,   and   73.5   per   cent   in  1955,  will   be   permitted   to   take   and   subscribe   the   corresponding   oath   of  office   as   members   of   the   Bar,   notwithstanding   that   the   rules   require   a  minimum   general   average   of   75   per   cent,   which   has   been   invariably  followed   since   1950.   Is   there   any  motive   of   the   nature   indicated   by   the  abovementioned  authorities,   for   this   classification   ?   If   there   is   none,   and  none  has  been  given,  then  the  classification  is  fatally  defective.  

It  was   indicated   that   those  who   failed   in  1944,  1941  or   the  years  before,  with   the   general   average   indicated,   were   not   included   because   the  Tribunal  has  no  record  of  the  unsuccessful  candidates  of  those  years.  This  fact   does   not   justify   the   unexplained   classification   of   unsuccessful  candidates  by   years,   from  1946-­‐1951,   1952,   1953,   1954,   1955.  Neither   is  

the   exclusion   of   those   who   failed   before   said   years   under   the   same  conditions  justified.  The  fact  that  this  Court  has  no  record  of  examinations  prior  to  1946  does  not  signify  that  no  one  concerned  may  prove  by  some  other  means  his  right  to  an  equal  consideration.  

To   defend   the   disputed   law   from   being   declared   unconstitutional   on  account  of  its  retroactivity,  it  is  argued  that  it  is  curative,  and  that  in  such  form   it   is   constitutional.   What   does   Rep.   Act   972   intend   to   cure   ?   Only  from   1946   to   1949   were   there   cases   in   which   the   Tribunal   permitted  admission  to  the  bar  of  candidates  who  did  not  obtain  the  general  average  of  75  per  cent:   in  1946  those  who  obtained  only  72  per  cent;   in  the  1947  and  those  who  had  69  per  cent  or  more;  in  1948,  70  per  cent  and  in  1949,  74  per  cent;  and  in  1950  to  1953,  those  who  obtained  74  per  cent,  which  was  considered  by  the  Court  as  equivalent  to  75  per  cent  as  prescribed  by  the  Rules,  by  reason  of  circumstances  deemed  to  be  sufficiently  justifiable.  These   changes   in   the   passing   averages   during   those   years   were   all   that  could  be  objected  to  or  criticized.  Now,  it  is  desired  to  undo  what  had  been  done  —  cancel  the  license  that  was  issued  to  those  who  did  not  obtain  the  prescribed  75  per  cent  ?  Certainly  not.  The  disputed   law  clearly  does  not  propose   to   do   so.   Concededly,   it   approves   what   has   been   done   by   this  Tribunal.  What  Congress   lamented  is  that  the  Court  did  not  consider  69.5  per   cent   obtained   by   those   candidates   who   failed   in   1946   to   1952   as  sufficient   to   qualify   them   to   practice   law.   Hence,   it   is   the   lack   of   will   or  defect  of   judgment  of   the  Court   that   is  being  cured,  and  to  complete  the  cure  of  this  infirmity,  the  effectivity  of  the  disputed  law  is  being  extended  up   to   the   years   1953,   1954   and   1955,   increasing   each   year   the   general  average  by  one  per  cent,  with  the  order  that  said  candidates  be  admitted  to   the   Bar.   This   purpose,  manifest   in   the   said   law,   is   the   best   proof   that  what   the   law   attempts   to   amend   and   correct   are   not   the   rules  promulgated,   but   the  will   or   judgment   of   the   Court,   by  means   of   simply  taking   its  place.  This   is  doing  directly  what  the  Tribunal  should  have  done  during  those  years  according  to  the  judgment  of  Congress.  In  other  words,  the   power   exercised   was   not   to   repeal,   alter   or   supplement   the   rules,  which  continue  in  force.  What  was  done  was  to  stop  or  suspend  them.  And  this   power   is   not   included   in   what   the   Constitution   has   granted   to  

Congress,  because   it   falls  within  the  power  to  apply  the  rules.  This  power  corresponds  to  the  judiciary,  to  which  such  duty  been  confided.  

Article  2  of  the  law  in  question  permits  partial  passing  of  examinations,  at  indefinite  intervals.  The  grave  defect  of  this  system  is  that  it  does  not  take  into  account  that  the  laws  and  jurisprudence  are  not  stationary,  and  when  a  candidate  finally  receives  his  certificate,   it  may  happen  that  the  existing  laws   and   jurisprudence   are   already   different,   seriously   affecting   in   this  manner  his  usefulness.  The  system  that  the  said  law  prescribes  was  used  in  the  first  bar  examinations  of  this  country,  but  was  abandoned  for  this  and  other   disadvantages.   In   this   case,   however,   the   fatal   defect   is   that   the  article   is   not   expressed   in   the   title   will   have   temporary   effect   only   from  1946  to  1955,  the  text  of  article  2  establishes  a  permanent  system  for  an  indefinite   time.   This   is   contrary   to   Section   21   (1),   article   VI   of   the  Constitution,  which  vitiates  and  annuls  article  2  completely;  and  because  it  is   inseparable   from  article  1,   it   is  obvious   that   its  nullity  affect   the  entire  law.  

Laws  are  unconstitutional  on  the  following  grounds:  first,  because  they  are  not   within   the   legislative   powers   of   Congress   to   enact,   or   Congress   has  exceeded   its   powers;   second,   because   they   create   or   establish   arbitrary  methods  or  forms  that  infringe  constitutional  principles;  and  third,  because  their  purposes  or  effects  violate  the  Constitution  or  its  basic  principles.  As  has  already  been  seen,  the  contested  law  suffers  from  these  fatal  defects.  

Summarizing,  we  are  of  the  opinion  and  hereby  declare  that  Republic  Act  No.  972  is  unconstitutional  and  therefore,  void,  and  without  any  force  nor  effect  for  the  following  reasons,  to  wit:  

1.   Because   its   declared  purpose   is   to   admit   810   candidates  who   failed   in  the   bar   examinations   of   1946-­‐1952,   and   who,   it   admits,   are   certainly  inadequately  prepared  to  practice  law,  as  was  exactly  found  by  this  Court  in   the   aforesaid   years.   It   decrees   the   admission   to   the   Bar   of   these  candidates,  depriving  this  Tribunal  of  the  opportunity  to  determine  if  they  

are  at  present  already  prepared  to  become  members  of  the  Bar.  It  obliges  the  Tribunal   to  perform  something  contrary  to  reason  and   in  an  arbitrary  manner.   This   is   a   manifest   encroachment   on   the   constitutional  responsibility  of  the  Supreme  Court.  

2.  Because  it  is,  in  effect,  a  judgment  revoking  the  resolution  of  this  Court  on   the   petitions   of   these   810   candidates,  without   having   examined   their  respective   examination   papers,   and   although   it   is   admitted   that   this  Tribunal  may  reconsider  said  resolution  at  any  time  for  justifiable  reasons,  only   this  Court  and  no  other  may  revise  and  alter   them.   In  attempting  to  do  it  directly  Republic  Act  No.  972  violated  the  Constitution.  

3.   By   the   disputed   law,   Congress   has   exceeded   its   legislative   power   to  repeal,   alter   and   supplement   the   rules   on   admission   to   the   Bar.   Such  additional   or   amendatory   rules   are,   as   they   ought   to   be,   intended   to  regulate  acts  subsequent  to   its  promulgation  and  should  tend  to   improve  and  elevate  the  practice  of  law,  and  this  Tribunal  shall  consider  these  rules  as   minimum   norms   towards   that   end   in   the   admission,   suspension,  disbarment  and  reinstatement  of   lawyers   to   the  Bar,   inasmuch  as  a  good  bar  assists  immensely  in  the  daily  performance  of  judicial  functions  and  is  essential   to  a  worthy  administration  of   justice.   It   is   therefore  the  primary  and   inherent   prerogative   of   the   Supreme   Court   to   render   the   ultimate  decision  on  who  may  be  admitted  and  may  continue  in  the  practice  of  law  according  to  existing  rules.  

4.   The   reason   advanced   for   the   pretended   classification   of   candidates,  which  the  law  makes,   is  contrary  to  facts  which  are  of  general  knowledge  and  does  not  justify  the  admission  to  the  Bar  of  law  students  inadequately  prepared.  The  pretended  classification  is  arbitrary.  It  is  undoubtedly  a  class  legislation.  

5.  Article  2  of  Republic  Act  No.  972  is  not  embraced  in  the  title  of  the  law,  contrary  to  what  the  Constitution  enjoins,  and  being  inseparable  from  the  provisions  of  article  1,  the  entire  law  is  void.  

6.   Lacking   in   eight   votes   to   declare   the   nullity   of   that   part   of   article   1  referring  to  the  examinations  of  1953  to  1955,  said  part  of  article  1,  insofar  as  it  concerns  the  examinations  in  those  years,  shall  continue  in  force.  

 R  E  S  O  L  U  T  I  O  N  

Upon  mature  deliberation  by   this  Court,  after  hearing  and  availing  of   the  magnificent  and  impassioned  discussion  of  the  contested  law  by  our  Chief  Justice  at  the  opening  and  close  of  the  debate  among  the  members  of  the  Court,  and  after  hearing  the   judicious  observations  of  two  of  our  beloved  colleagues  who  since  the  beginning  have  announced  their  decision  not  to  take  part  in  voting,  we,  the  eight  members  of  the  Court  who  subscribed  to  this  decision  have  voted  and  resolved,  and  have  decided  for  the  Court,  and  under  the  authority  of  the  same:  

1.  That  (a)  the  portion  of  article  1  of  Republic  Act  No.  972  referring  to  the  examinations   of   1946   to   1952,   and   (b)   all   of   article   2   of   said   law   are  unconstitutional  and,  therefore,  void  and  without  force  and  effect.  

2.   That,   for   lack   of   unanimity   in   the   eight   Justices,   that   part   of   article   1  which   refers   to   the  examinations   subsequent   to   the  approval  of   the   law,  that   is   from   1953   to   1955   inclusive,   is   valid   and   shall   continue   to   be   in  force,  in  conformity  with  section  10,  article  VII  of  the  Constitution.  

Consequently,  (1)  all  the  above-­‐mentioned  petitions  of  the  candidates  who  failed  in  the  examinations  of  1946  to  1952  inclusive  are  denied,  and  (2)  all  candidates  who  in  the  examinations  of  1953  obtained  a  general  average  of  71.5  per   cent   or  more,  without  having   a   grade  below  50  per   cent   in   any  subject,  are  considered  as  having  passed,  whether  they  have  filed  petitions  for   admission   or   not.   After   this   decision   has   become   final,   they   shall   be  permitted   to   take   and   subscribe   the   corresponding   oath   of   office   as  members  of  the  Bar  on  the  date  or  dates  that  the  chief  Justice  may  set.  So  ordered.  

IN  THE  MATTER  OF  THE  INTEGRATION  OF  THE  BAR  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES.  

R  E  S  O  L  U  T  I  O  N  

   

PER  CURIAM:  

On  December  1,  1972,  the  Commission  on  Bar  Integration  1  submitted  its  Report  dated  November  30,  1972,  with  the  "earnest  recommendation"  —  on  the  basis  of  the  said  Report  and  the  proceedings  had  in  Administrative  Case  No.  526  2  of  the  Court,  and  "consistently  with  the  views  and  counsel  received  from  its  [the  Commission's]  Board  of  Consultants,  as  well  as  the  overwhelming  nationwide  sentiment  of  the  Philippine  Bench  and  Bar"  —  that  "this  Honorable  Court  ordain  the  integration  of  the  Philippine  Bar  as  soon  as  possible  through  the  adoption  and  promulgation  of  an  appropriate  Court  Rule."  

The  petition  in  Adm.  Case  No.  526  formally  prays  the  Court  to  order  the  integration  of  the  Philippine  Bar,  after  due  hearing,  giving  recognition  as  far  as  possible  and  practicable  to  existing  provincial  and  other  local  Bar  associations.  On  August  16,  1962,  arguments  in  favor  of  as  well  as  in  opposition  to  the  petition  were  orally  expounded  before  the  Court.  Written  oppositions  were  admitted,  3  and  all  parties  were  thereafter  granted  leave  to  file  written  memoranda.  4  

Since  then,  the  Court  has  closely  observed  and  followed  significant  developments  relative  to  the  matter  of  the  integration  of  the  Bar  in  this  jurisdiction.  

In  1970,  convinced  from  preliminary  surveys  that  there  had  grown  a  strong  nationwide  sentiment  in  favor  of  Bar  integration,  the  Court  created  the  Commission  on  Bar  Integration  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  the  advisability  of  unifying  the  Philippine  Bar.  

In  September,  1971,  Congress  passed  House  Bill  No.  3277  entitled  "An  Act  Providing  for  the  Integration  of  the  Philippine  Bar,  and  Appropriating  Funds  Therefor."  The  measure  was  signed  by  President  Ferdinand  E.  Marcos  on  September  17,  1971  and  took  effect  on  the  same  day  as  Rep.  Act  6397.  This  law  provides  as  follows:  

SECTION  1.  Within  two  years  from  the  approval  of  this  Act,  the  Supreme  Court  may  adopt  rules  of  court  to  effect  the  integration  of  the  Philippine  Bar  under  such  conditions  as  it  shall  see  fit  in  order  to  raise  the  standards  of  the  legal  profession,  improve  the  administration  of  justice,  and  enable  the  Bar  to  discharge  its  public  responsibility  more  effectively.  

SEC.  2.  The  sum  of  five  hundred  thousand  pesos  is  hereby  appropriated,  out  of  any  funds  in  the  National  Treasury  not  otherwise  appropriated,  to  carry  out  the  purposes  of  this  Act.  Thereafter,  such  sums  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  same  purpose  shall  be  included  in  the  annual  appropriations  for  the  Supreme  Court.  

SEC.  3.  This  Act  shall  take  effect  upon  its  approval.  

The  Report  of  the  Commission  abounds  with  argument  on  the  constitutionality  of  Bar  integration  and  contains  all  necessary  factual  data  bearing  on  the  advisability  (practicability  and  necessity)  of  Bar  integration.  Also  embodied  therein  are  the  views,  opinions,  sentiments,  comments  and  observations  of  the  rank  and  file  of  the  Philippine  lawyer  population  relative  to  Bar  integration,  as  well  as  a  proposed  integration  Court  Rule  drafted  by  the  Commission  and  presented  to  them  by  that  body  in  a  national  Bar  plebiscite.  There  is  thus  sufficient  basis  as  well  as  ample  material  upon  which  the  Court  may  decide  whether  or  not  to  integrate  the  Philippine  Bar  at  this  time.  

The  following  are  the  pertinent  issues:  

(1)  Does  the  Court  have  the  power  to  integrate  the  Philippine  Bar?  

(2)  Would  the  integration  of  the  Bar  be  constitutional?  

(3)  Should  the  Court  ordain  the  integration  of  the  Bar  at  this  time?  

A  resolution  of  these  issues  requires,  at  the  outset,  a  statement  of  the  meaning  of  Bar  integration.  It  will  suffice,  for  this  purpose,  to  adopt  the  concept  given  by  the  Commission  on  Bar  Integration  on  pages  3  to  5  of  its  Report,  thus:  

Integration  of  the  Philippine  Bar  means  the  official  unification  of  the  entire  lawyer  population  of  the  Philippines.  This  requires  membership  and  financial  support  (in  reasonable  amount)  of  every  attorney  as  conditions  sine  qua  non  to  the  practice  of  law  and  the  retention  of  his  name  in  the  Roll  of  Attorneys  of  the  Supreme  Court.  

The  term  "Bar"  refers  to  the  collectivity  of  all  persons  whose  names  appear  in  the  Roll  of  Attorneys.  An  Integrated  Bar  (or  Unified  Bar)  perforce  must  include  all  lawyers.  

Complete  unification  is  not  possible  unless  it  is  decreed  by  an  entity  with  power  to  do  so:  the  State.  Bar  integration,  therefore,  signifies  the  setting  up  by  Government  authority  of  a  national  organization  of  the  legal  profession  based  on  the  recognition  of  the  lawyer  as  an  officer  of  the  court.  

Designed  to  improve  the  position  of  the  Bar  as  an  instrumentality  of  justice  and  the  Rule  of  Law,  integration  fosters  cohesion  among  lawyers,  and  ensures,  through  their  own  organized  action  and  participation,  the  promotion  of  the  objectives  of  the  legal  profession,  pursuant  to  the  principle  of  maximum  Bar  autonomy  with  minimum  supervision  and  regulation  by  the  Supreme  Court.  

The  purposes  of  an  integrated  Bar,  in  general,  are:  

(1)  Assist  in  the  administration  of  justice;  

(2)  Foster  and  maintain  on  the  part  of  its  members  high  ideals  of  integrity,  learning,  professional  competence,  public  service  and  conduct;  

(3)  Safeguard  the  professional  interests  of  its  members;  

(4)  Cultivate  among  its  members  a  spirit  of  cordiality  and  brotherhood;  

(5)  Provide  a  forum  for  the  discussion  of  law,  jurisprudence,  law  reform,  pleading,  practice  and  procedure,  and  the  relations  of  the  Bar  to  the  Bench  and  to  the  public,  and  publish  information  relating  thereto;  

(6)  Encourage  and  foster  legal  education;  

(7)  Promote  a  continuing  program  of  legal  research  in  substantive  and  adjective  law,  and  make  reports  and  recommendations  thereon;  and  

(8)  Enable  the  Bar  to  discharge  its  public  responsibility  effectively.  

Integration  of  the  Bar  will,  among  other  things,  make  it  possible  for  the  legal  profession  to:  

(1)  Render  more  effective  assistance  in  maintaining  the  Rule  of  Law;  

(2)  Protect  lawyers  and  litigants  against  the  abuse  of  tyrannical  judges  and  prosecuting  officers;  

(3)  Discharge,  fully  and  properly,  its  responsibility  in  the  disciplining  and/or  removal  of  incompetent  and  unworthy  judges  and  prosecuting  officers;  

(4)  Shield  the  judiciary,  which  traditionally  cannot  defend  itself  except  within  its  own  forum,  from  the  assaults  that  politics  and  self-­‐interest  may  

level  at  it,  and  assist  it  to  maintain  its  integrity,  impartiality  and  independence;  

(5)  Have  an  effective  voice  in  the  selection  of  judges  and  prosecuting  officers;  

(6)  Prevent  the  unauthorized  practice  of  law,  and  break  up  any  monopoly  of  local  practice  maintained  through  influence  or  position;  

(7)  Establish  welfare  funds  for  families  of  disabled  and  deceased  lawyers;  

(8)  Provide  placement  services,  and  establish  legal  aid  offices  and  set  up  lawyer  reference  services  throughout  the  country  so  that  the  poor  may  not  lack  competent  legal  service;  

(9)  Distribute  educational  and  informational  materials  that  are  difficult  to  obtain  in  many  of  our  provinces;  

(10)  Devise  and  maintain  a  program  of  continuing  legal  education  for  practising  attorneys  in  order  to  elevate  the  standards  of  the  profession  throughout  the  country;  

(11)  Enforce  rigid  ethical  standards,  and  promulgate  minimum  fees  schedules;  

(12)  Create  law  centers  and  establish  law  libraries  for  legal  research;  

(13)  Conduct  campaigns  to  educate  the  people  on  their  legal  rights  and  obligations,  on  the  importance  of  preventive  legal  advice,  and  on  the  functions  and  duties  of  the  Filipino  lawyer;  and  

(14)  Generate  and  maintain  pervasive  and  meaningful  country-­‐wide  involvement  of  the  lawyer  population  in  the  solution  of  the  multifarious  

problems  that  afflict  the  nation.  

Anent  the  first  issue,  the  Court  is  of  the  view  that  it  may  integrate  the  Philippine  Bar  in  the  exercise  of  its  power,  under  Article  VIII,  Sec.  13  of  the  Constitution,  "to  promulgate  rules  concerning  pleading,  practice,  and  procedure  in  all  courts,  and  the  admission  to  the  practice  of  law."  Indeed,  the  power  to  integrate  is  an  inherent  part  of  the  Court's  constitutional  authority  over  the  Bar.  In  providing  that  "the  Supreme  Court  may  adopt  rules  of  court  to  effect  the  integration  of  the  Philippine  Bar,"  Republic  Act  6397  neither  confers  a  new  power  nor  restricts  the  Court's  inherent  power,  but  is  a  mere  legislative  declaration  that  the  integration  of  the  Bar  will  promote  public  interest  or,  more  specifically,  will  "raise  the  standards  of  the  legal  profession,  improve  the  administration  of  justice,  and  enable  the  Bar  to  discharge  its  public  responsibility  more  effectively."  

Resolution  of  the  second  issue  —  whether  the  unification  of  the  Bar  would  be  constitutional  —  hinges  on  the  effects  of  Bar  integration  on  the  lawyer's  constitutional  rights  of  freedom  of  association  and  freedom  of  speech,  and  on  the  nature  of  the  dues  exacted  from  him.  

The  Court  approvingly  quotes  the  following  pertinent  discussion  made  by  the  Commission  on  Bar  Integration  pages  44  to  49  of  its  Report:  

Constitutionality  of  Bar  Integration  

Judicial  Pronouncements.  

In  all  cases  where  the  validity  of  Bar  integration  measures  has  been  put  in  issue,  the  Courts  have  upheld  their  constitutionality.  

The  judicial  pronouncements  support  this  reasoning:  

—  Courts  have  inherent  power  to  supervise  and  regulate  the  practice  of  law.  

—  The  practice  of  law  is  not  a  vested  right  but  a  privilege;  a  privilege,  moreover,  clothed  with  public  interest,  because  a  lawyer  owes  duties  not  only  to  his  client,  but  also  to  his  brethren  in  the  profession,  to  the  courts,  and  to  the  nation;  and  takes  part  in  one  of  the  most  important  functions  of  the  State,  the  administration  of  justice,  as  an  officer  of  the  court.  

—  Because  the  practice  of  law  is  privilege  clothed  with  public  interest,  it  is  far  and  just  that  the  exercise  of  that  privilege  be  regulated  to  assure  compliance  with  the  lawyer's  public  responsibilities.  

—  These  public  responsibilities  can  best  be  discharged  through  collective  action;  but  there  can  be  no  collective  action  without  an  organized  body;  no  organized  body  can  operate  effectively  without  incurring  expenses;  therefore,  it  is  fair  and  just  that  all  attorneys  be  required  to  contribute  to  the  support  of  such  organized  body;  and,  given  existing  Bar  conditions,  the  most  efficient  means  of  doing  so  is  by  integrating  the  Bar  through  a  rule  of  court  that  requires  all  lawyers  to  pay  annual  dues  to  the  Integrated  Bar.  

1.  Freedom  of  Association.  

To  compel  a  lawyer  to  be  a  member  of  an  integrated  Bar  is  not  violative  of  his  constitutional  freedom  to  associate  (or  the  corollary  right  not  to  associate).  

Integration  does  not  make  a  lawyer  a  member  of  any  group  of  which  he  is  not  already  a  member.  He  became  a  member  of  the  Bar  when  he  passed  the  Bar  examinations.  All  that  integration  actually  does  is  to  provide  an  official  national  organization  for  the  well-­‐defined  but  unorganized  and  incohesive  group  of  which  every  lawyer  is  already  a  member.  

Bar  integration  does  not  compel  the  lawyer  to  associate  with  anyone.  He  is  free  to  attend  or  not  attend  the  meetings  of  his  Integrated  Bar  Chapter  or  vote  or  refuse  to  vote  in  its  elections  as  he  chooses.  The  body  compulsion  to  which  he  is  subjected  is  the  payment  of  annual  dues.  

Otherwise  stated,  membership  in  the  Unified  Bar  imposes  only  the  duty  to  pay  dues  in  reasonable  amount.  The  issue  therefore,  is  a  question  of  compelled  financial  support  of  group  activities,  not  involuntary  membership  in  any  other  aspect.  

The  greater  part  of  Unified  Bar  activities  serves  the  function  of  elevating  the  educational  and  ethical  standards  of  the  Bar  to  the  end  of  improving  the  quality  of  the  legal  service  available  to  the  people.  The  Supreme  Court,  in  order  to  further  the  State's  legitimate  interest  in  elevating  the  quality  of  professional  services,  may  require  that  the  cost  of  improving  the  profession  in  this  fashion  be  shared  by  the  subjects  and  beneficiaries  of  the  regulatory  program  —  the  lawyers.  

Assuming  that  Bar  integration  does  compel  a  lawyer  to  be  a  member  of  the  Integrated  Bar,  such  compulsion  is  justified  as  an  exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the  State.  The  legal  profession  has  long  been  regarded  as  a  proper  subject  of  legislative  regulation  and  control.  Moreover,  the  inherent  power  of  the  Supreme  Court  to  regulate  the  Bar  includes  the  authority  to  integrate  the  Bar.  

2.  Regulatory  Fee.  

For  the  Court  to  prescribe  dues  to  be  paid  by  the  members  does  not  mean  that  the  Court  levies  a  tax.  

A  membership  fee  in  the  Integrated  Bar  is  an  exaction  for  regulation,  while  the  purpose  of  a  tax  is  revenue.  If  the  Court  has  inherent  power  to  regulate  the  Bar,  it  follows  that  as  an  incident  to  regulation,  it  may  impose  a  membership  fee  for  that  purpose.  It  would  not  be  possible  to  push  through  an  Integrated  Bar  program  without  means  to  defray  the  concomitant  expenses.  The  doctrine  of  implied  powers  necessarily  includes  the  power  to  impose  such  an  exaction.  

The  only  limitation  upon  the  State's  power  to  regulate  the  Bar  is  that  the  

regulation  does  not  impose  an  unconstitutional  burden.  The  public  interest  promoted  by  the  integration  of  the  Bar  far  outweighs  the  inconsequential  inconvenience  to  a  member  that  might  result  from  his  required  payment  of  annual  dues.  

3.  Freedom  of  Speech.  

A  lawyer  is  free,  as  he  has  always  been,  to  voice  his  views  on  any  subject  in  any  manner  he  wishes,  even  though  such  views  be  opposed  to  positions  taken  by  the  Unified  Bar.  

For  the  Integrated  Bar  to  use  a  member's  due  to  promote  measures  to  which  said  member  is  opposed,  would  not  nullify  or  adversely  affect  his  freedom  of  speech.  

Since  a  State  may  constitutionally  condition  the  right  to  practice  law  upon  membership  in  the  Integrated  Bar,  it  is  difficult  to  understand  why  it  should  become  unconstitutional  for  the  Bar  to  use  the  member's  dues  to  fulfill  the  very  purposes  for  which  it  was  established.  

The  objection  would  make  every  Governmental  exaction  the  material  of  a  "free  speech"  issue.  Even  the  income  tax  would  be  suspect.  The  objection  would  carry  us  to  lengths  that  have  never  been  dreamed  of.  The  conscientious  objector,  if  his  liberties  were  to  be  thus  extended,  might  refuse  to  contribute  taxes  in  furtherance  of  war  or  of  any  other  end  condemned  by  his  conscience  as  irreligious  or  immoral.  The  right  of  private  judgment  has  never  yet  been  exalted  above  the  powers  and  the  compulsion  of  the  agencies  of  Government.  

4.  Fair  to  All  Lawyers.  

Bar  integration  is  not  unfair  to  lawyers  already  practising  because  although  the  requirement  to  pay  annual  dues  is  a  new  regulation,  it  will  give  the  members  of  the  Bar  a  new  system  which  they  hitherto  have  not  had  and  

through  which,  by  proper  work,  they  will  receive  benefits  they  have  not  heretofore  enjoyed,  and  discharge  their  public  responsibilities  in  a  more  effective  manner  than  they  have  been  able  to  do  in  the  past.  Because  the  requirement  to  pay  dues  is  a  valid  exercise  of  regulatory  power  by  the  Court,  because  it  will  apply  equally  to  all  lawyers,  young  and  old,  at  the  time  Bar  integration  takes  effect,  and  because  it  is  a  new  regulation  in  exchange  for  new  benefits,  it  is  not  retroactive,  it  is  not  unequal,  it  is  not  unfair.  

To  resolve  the  third  and  final  issue  —  whether  the  Court  should  ordain  the  integration  of  the  Bar  at  this  time  —  requires  a  careful  overview  of  the  practicability  and  necessity  as  well  as  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  Bar  integration.  

In  many  other  jurisdictions,  notably  in  England,  Canada  and  the  United  States,  Bar  integration  has  yielded  the  following  benefits:  (1)  improved  discipline  among  the  members  of  the  Bar;  (2)  greater  influence  and  ascendancy  of  the  Bar;  (3)  better  and  more  meaningful  participation  of  the  individual  lawyer  in  the  activities  of  the  Integrated  Bar;  (4)  greater  Bar  facilities  and  services;  (5)  elimination  of  unauthorized  practice;  (6)  avoidance  of  costly  membership  campaigns;  (7)  establishment  of  an  official  status  for  the  Bar;  (8)  more  cohesive  profession;  and  (9)  better  and  more  effective  discharge  by  the  Bar  of  its  obligations  and  responsibilities  to  its  members,  to  the  courts,  and  to  the  public.  No  less  than  these  salutary  consequences  are  envisioned  and  in  fact  expected  from  the  unification  of  the  Philippine  Bar.  

Upon  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  variously  argued  that  in  the  event  of  integration,  Government  authority  will  dominate  the  Bar;  local  Bar  associations  will  be  weakened;  cliquism  will  be  the  inevitable  result;  effective  lobbying  will  not  be  possible;  the  Bar  will  become  an  impersonal  Bar;  and  politics  will  intrude  into  its  affairs.  

It  is  noteworthy,  however,  that  these  and  other  evils  prophesied  by  

opponents  of  Bar  integration  have  failed  to  materialize  in  over  fifty  years  of  Bar  integration  experience  in  England,  Canada  and  the  United  States.  In  all  the  jurisdictions  where  the  Integrated  Bar  has  been  tried,  none  of  the  abuses  or  evils  feared  has  arisen;  on  the  other  hand,  it  has  restored  public  confidence  in  the  Bar,  enlarged  professional  consciousness,  energized  the  Bar's  responsibilities  to  the  public,  and  vastly  improved  the  administration  of  justice.  

How  do  the  Filipino  lawyers  themselves  regard  Bar  integration?  The  official  statistics  compiled  by  the  Commission  on  Bar  integration  show  that  in  the  national  poll  recently  conducted  by  the  Commission  in  the  matter  of  the  integration  of  the  Philippine  Bar,  of  a  total  of  15,090  lawyers  from  all  over  the  archipelago  who  have  turned  in  their  individual  responses,  14,555  (or  96.45  per  cent)  voted  in  favor  of  Bar  integration,  while  only  378  (or  2.51  per  cent)  voted  against  it,  and  157  (or  1.04  per  cent)  are  non-­‐commital.  In  addition,  a  total  of  eighty  (80)  local  Bar  association  and  lawyers'  groups  all  over  the  Philippines  have  submitted  resolutions  and  other  expressions  of  unqualified  endorsement  and/or  support  for  Bar  integration,  while  not  a  single  local  Bar  association  or  lawyers'  group  has  expressed  opposed  position  thereto.  Finally,  of  the  13,802  individual  lawyers  who  cast  their  plebiscite  ballots  on  the  proposed  integration  Court  Rule  drafted  by  the  Commission,  12,855  (or  93.14  per  cent)  voted  in  favor  thereof,  662  (or  4.80  per  cent)  vote  against  it,  and  285  (or  2.06  per  cent)  are  non-­‐committal.  5  All  these  clearly  indicate  an  overwhelming  nationwide  demand  for  Bar  integration  at  this  time.  

The  Court  is  fully  convinced,  after  a  thoroughgoing  conscientious  study  of  all  the  arguments  adduced  in  Adm.  Case  No.  526  and  the  authoritative  materials  and  the  mass  of  factual  data  contained  in  the  exhaustive  Report  of  the  Commission  on  Bar  Integration,  that  the  integration  of  the  Philippine  Bar  is  "perfectly  constitutional  and  legally  unobjectionable,"  within  the  context  of  contemporary  conditions  in  the  Philippines,  has  become  an  imperative  means  to  raise  the  standards  of  the  legal  profession,  improve  the  administration  of  justice,  and  enable  the  Bar  to  discharge  its  public  responsibility  fully  and  effectively.  

ACCORDINGLY,  the  Court,  by  virtue  of  the  power  vested  in  it  by  Section  13  of  Article  VIII  of  the  Constitution,  hereby  ordains  the  integration  of  the  Bar  of  the  Philippines  in  accordance  with  the  attached  COURT  RULE,  effective  on  January  16,  1973.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PETITION  FOR  LEAVE  TO  RESUME  PRACTICE  OF  LAW,    BENJAMIN  M.  DACANAY,  petitioner.  

R  E  S  O  L  U  T  I  O  N  

CORONA,  J.:  

This  bar  matter   concerns   the  petition  of  petitioner  Benjamin  M.  Dacanay  for  leave  to  resume  the  practice  of  law.  

Petitioner  was  admitted  to  the  Philippine  bar  in  March  1960.  He  practiced  law   until   he   migrated   to   Canada   in   December   1998   to   seek   medical  attention   for   his   ailments.   He   subsequently   applied   for   Canadian  citizenship   to   avail   of   Canada’s   free  medical   aid   program.  His   application  was  approved  and  he  became  a  Canadian  citizen  in  May  2004.  

On  July  14,  2006,  pursuant  to  Republic  Act  (RA)  9225  (Citizenship  Retention  and   Re-­‐Acquisition   Act   of   2003),   petitioner   reacquired   his   Philippine  citizenship.1  On  that  day,  he  took  his  oath  of  allegiance  as  a  Filipino  citizen  before  the  Philippine  Consulate  General  in  Toronto,  Canada.  Thereafter,  he  returned   to   the   Philippines   and   now   intends   to   resume   his   law   practice.  There   is   a   question,   however,   whether   petitioner   Benjamin   M.   Dacanay  lost  his  membership   in   the  Philippine  bar  when  he  gave  up  his  Philippine  citizenship  in  May  2004.  Thus,  this  petition.  

In  a   report  dated  October  16,  2007,   the  Office  of   the  Bar  Confidant   cites  Section  2,  Rule  138  (Attorneys  and  Admission  to  Bar)  of  the  Rules  of  Court:  

SECTION   2.   Requirements   for   all   applicants   for   admission   to   the   bar.   –  Every  applicant  for  admission  as  a  member  of  the  bar  must  be  a  citizen  of  the  Philippines,  at  least  twenty-­‐one  years  of  age,  of  good  moral  character,  and  a   resident  of   the  Philippines;   and  must  produce  before   the  Supreme  Court  satisfactory  evidence  of  good  moral  character,  and   that  no  charges  against  him,   involving  moral   turpitude,  have  been   filed  or   are  pending   in  

any  court  in  the  Philippines.  

Applying   the   provision,   the   Office   of   the   Bar   Confidant   opines   that,   by  virtue  of  his  reacquisition  of  Philippine  citizenship,   in  2006,  petitioner  has  again  met   all   the   qualifications   and   has   none   of   the   disqualifications   for  membership  in  the  bar.   It  recommends  that  he  be  allowed  to  resume  the  practice  of  law  in  the  Philippines,  conditioned  on  his  retaking  the  lawyer’s  oath   to   remind  him  of  his  duties  and   responsibilities  as  a  member  of   the  Philippine  bar.  

We  approve  the  recommendation  of   the  Office  of   the  Bar  Confidant  with  certain  modifications.  

The   practice   of   law   is   a   privilege   burdened   with   conditions.2   It   is   so  delicately  affected  with  public  interest  that  it  is  both  a  power  and  a  duty  of  the  State  (through  this  Court)  to  control  and  regulate  it  in  order  to  protect  and  promote  the  public  welfare.3  

Adherence  to  rigid  standards  of  mental  fitness,  maintenance  of  the  highest  degree  of  morality,  faithful  observance  of  the  rules  of  the  legal  profession,  compliance   with   the   mandatory   continuing   legal   education   requirement  and  payment  of  membership  fees  to  the  Integrated  Bar  of  the  Philippines  (IBP)  are   the  conditions   required   for  membership   in  good  standing   in   the  bar  and  for  enjoying  the  privilege  to  practice  law.  Any  breach  by  a  lawyer  of  any  of  these  conditions  makes  him  unworthy  of  the  trust  and  confidence  which  the  courts  and  clients  repose  in  him  for  the  continued  exercise  of  his  professional  privilege.4  

Section  1,  Rule  138  of  the  Rules  of  Court  provides:  

SECTION  1.  Who  may  practice  law.  –  Any  person  heretofore  duly  admitted  as  a  member  of  the  bar,  or  thereafter  admitted  as  such  in  accordance  with  the   provisions   of   this   Rule,   and   who   is   in   good   and   regular   standing,   is  entitled  to  practice  law.  

Pursuant  thereto,  any  person  admitted  as  a  member  of  the  Philippine  bar  in   accordance   with   the   statutory   requirements   and   who   is   in   good   and  regular  standing  is  entitled  to  practice  law.  

Admission   to   the   bar   requires   certain   qualifications.   The   Rules   of   Court  mandates   that   an   applicant   for   admission   to   the   bar   be   a   citizen   of   the  Philippines,  at  least  twenty-­‐one  years  of  age,  of  good  moral  character  and  a   resident   of   the   Philippines.5   He   must   also   produce   before   this   Court  satisfactory  evidence  of  good  moral  character  and  that  no  charges  against  him,  involving  moral  turpitude,  have  been  filed  or  are  pending  in  any  court  in  the  Philippines.6  

Moreover,  admission  to  the  bar  involves  various  phases  such  as  furnishing  satisfactory  proof  of  educational,  moral  and  other  qualifications;7  passing  the   bar   examinations;8   taking   the   lawyer’s   oath9   and   signing   the   roll   of  attorneys  and  receiving  from  the  clerk  of  court  of  this  Court  a  certificate  of  the  license  to  practice.10  

The   second   requisite   for   the   practice   of   law   ―   membership   in   good  standing   ―   is   a   continuing   requirement.   This   means   continued  membership  and,  concomitantly,  payment  of  annual  membership  dues   in  the   IBP;11   payment  of   the   annual   professional   tax;12   compliance  with   the  mandatory   continuing   legal   education   requirement;13   faithful   observance  of  the  rules  and  ethics  of  the  legal  profession  and  being  continually  subject  to  judicial  disciplinary  control.14  

Given  the  foregoing,  may  a  lawyer  who  has  lost  his  Filipino  citizenship  still  practice  law  in  the  Philippines?  No.  

The   Constitution   provides   that   the   practice   of   all   professions   in   the  Philippines  shall  be   limited   to  Filipino  citizens  save   in  cases  prescribed  by  law.15  Since  Filipino  citizenship   is  a   requirement   for  admission   to   the  bar,  loss   thereof   terminates   membership   in   the   Philippine   bar   and,  consequently,   the   privilege   to   engage   in   the   practice   of   law.   In   other  

words,   the   loss  of  Filipino  citizenship   ipso   jure   terminates   the  privilege  to  practice  law  in  the  Philippines.  The  practice  of  law  is  a  privilege  denied  to  foreigners.16  

The  exception  is  when  Filipino  citizenship  is  lost  by  reason  of  naturalization  as  a  citizen  of  another  country  but  subsequently  reacquired  pursuant  to  RA  9225.   This   is   because   "all   Philippine   citizens   who   become   citizens   of  another   country   shall   be   deemed   not   to   have   lost   their   Philippine  citizenship   under   the   conditions   of   [RA   9225]."17   Therefore,   a   Filipino  lawyer  who  becomes  a  citizen  of  another  country  is  deemed  never  to  have  lost   his   Philippine   citizenship   if   he   reacquires   it   in   accordance   with   RA  9225.   Although   he   is   also   deemed   never   to   have   terminated   his  membership   in   the   Philippine   bar,   no   automatic   right   to   resume   law  practice  accrues.  

Under  RA  9225,   if  a  person   intends  to  practice  the   legal  profession   in  the  Philippines   and   he   reacquires   his   Filipino   citizenship   pursuant   to   its  provisions   "(he)   shall   apply   with   the   proper   authority   for   a   license   or  permit   to   engage   in   such   practice."18   Stated   otherwise,   before   a   lawyer  who  reacquires  Filipino  citizenship  pursuant  to  RA  9225  can  resume  his  law  practice,   he   must   first   secure   from   this   Court   the   authority   to   do   so,  conditioned  on:  

(a)  the  updating  and  payment  in  full  of  the  annual  membership  dues  in  the  IBP;  

(b)  the  payment  of  professional  tax;  

(c)  the  completion  of  at  least  36  credit  hours  of  mandatory  continuing  legal  education;   this   is   specially   significant   to   refresh   the  applicant/petitioner’s  knowledge  of  Philippine  laws  and  update  him  of  legal  developments  and  

(d)  the  retaking  of  the  lawyer’s  oath  which  will  not  only  remind  him  of  his  duties  and   responsibilities  as  a   lawyer  and  as  an  officer  of   the  Court,  but  

also   renew   his   pledge   to   maintain   allegiance   to   the   Republic   of   the  Philippines.  

Compliance   with   these   conditions   will   restore   his   good   standing   as   a  member  of  the  Philippine  bar.  

WHEREFORE,   the   petition   of   Attorney   Benjamin   M.   Dacanay   is   hereby  GRANTED,   subject   to   compliance   with   the   conditions   stated   above   and  submission  of  proof  of  such  compliance  to  the  Bar  Confidant,  after  which  he  may  retake  his  oath  as  a  member  of  the  Philippine  bar.  

SO  ORDERED.                                              

                                                                     

RE:  APPLICATION  FOR  ADMISSION  TO  THE  PHILIPPINE  BAR,  

vs.  

VICENTE  D.  CHING,  applicant.  

R  E  S  O  L  U  T  I  O  N  

   

KAPUNAN,  J.:  

Can   a   legitimate   child   born   under   the   1935   Constitution   of   a   Filipino  mother  and  an  alien  father  validly  elect  Philippine  citizenship  fourteen  (14)  years  after  he  has  reached  the  age  of  majority?  This  is  the  question  sought  to  be  resolved   in  the  present  case   involving  the  application  for  admission  to  the  Philippine  Bar  of  Vicente  D.  Ching.  

The  facts  of  this  case  are  as  follows:  

Vicente  D.   Ching,   the   legitimate   son   of   the   spouses   Tat   Ching,   a   Chinese  citizen,  and  Prescila  A.  Dulay,  a  Filipino,  was  horn  in  Francia  West,  Tubao,  La   Union   on   11   April   1964.   Since   his   birth,   Ching   has   resided   in   the  Philippines.  

On  17  July  1998,  Ching,  after  having  completed  a  Bachelor  of  Laws  course  at   the   St.   Louis  University   in   Baguio   City,   filed   an   application   to   take   the  1998  Bar   Examinations.   In   a  Resolution  of   this  Court,   dated  1   September  1998,   he   was   allowed   to   take   the   Bar   Examinations,   subject   to   the  condition   that   he   must   submit   to   the   Court   proof   of   his   Philippine  citizenship.  

In  compliance  with  the  above  resolution,  Ching  submitted  on  18  November  

1998,  the  following  documents:  

1.  Certification,  dated  9  June  1986,  issued  by  the  Board  of  Accountancy  of  the  Professional  Regulations  Commission  showing  that  Ching   is  a  certified  public  accountant;  

2.  Voter  Certification,  dated  14   June  1997,   issued  by  Elizabeth  B.  Cerezo,  Election   Officer   of   the   Commission   on   Elections   (COMELEC)   in   Tubao   La  Union  showing  that  Ching  is  a  registered  voter  of  the  said  place;  and  

3.  Certification,  dated  12  October  1998,  also  issued  by  Elizabeth  B.  Cerezo,  showing  that  Ching  was  elected  as  a  member  of  the  Sangguniang  Bayan  of  Tubao,  La  Union  during  the  12  May  1992  synchronized  elections.  

On  5  April   1999,   the   results  of   the  1998  Bar   Examinations  were   released  and  Ching  was  one  of  the  successful  Bar  examinees.  The  oath-­‐taking  of  the  successful   Bar   examinees   was   scheduled   on   5   May   1999.   However,  because   of   the   questionable   status   of   Ching's   citizenship,   he   was   not  allowed  to  take  his  oath.  Pursuant  to  the  resolution  of  this  Court,  dated  20  April   1999,   he  was   required   to   submit   further   proof   of   his   citizenship.   In  the  same  resolution,  the  Office  of  the  Solicitor  General  (OSG)  was  required  to  file  a  comment  on  Ching's  petition  for  admission  to  the  bar  and  on  the  documents  evidencing  his  Philippine  citizenship.  

The  OSG   filed   its   comment   on   8   July   1999,   stating   that   Ching,   being   the  "legitimate  child  of  a  Chinese  father  and  a  Filipino  mother  born  under  the  1935   Constitution   was   a   Chinese   citizen   and   continued   to   be   so,   unless  upon   reaching   the   age   of  majority   he   elected   Philippine   citizenship"   1   in  strict   compliance   with   the   provisions   of   Commonwealth   Act   No.   625  entitled   "An   Act   Providing   for   the   Manner   in   which   the   Option   to   Elect  Philippine   Citizenship   shall   be   Declared   by   a   Person  Whose  Mother   is   a  Filipino  Citizen."  The  OSG  adds   that  "(w)hat  he  acquired  at  best  was  only  an  inchoate  Philippine  citizenship  which  he  could  perfect  by  election  upon  reaching  the  age  of  majority."  2   In  this  regard,  the  OSG  clarifies  that  "two  

(2)   conditions   must   concur   in   order   that   the   election   of   Philippine  citizenship  may  be  effective,  namely:  (a)  the  mother  of  the  person  making  the  election  must  be  a  citizen  of  the  Philippines;  and  (b)  said  election  must  be  made  upon  reaching  the  age  of  majority."  3  The  OSG  then  explains  the  meaning  of  the  phrase  "upon  reaching  the  age  of  majority:"  

The   clause   "upon   reaching   the   age   of   majority"   has   been   construed   to  mean  a  reasonable  time  after  reaching  the  age  of  majority  which  had  been  interpreted  by  the  Secretary  of  Justice  to  be  three  (3)  years  (VELAYO,  supra  at   p.   51   citing   Op.,   Sec.   of   Justice   No.   70,   s.   1940,   Feb.   27,   1940).   Said  period   may   be   extended   under   certain   circumstances,   as   when   a   (sic)  person  concerned  has  always  considered  himself  a  Filipino  (ibid.,  citing  Op.  Nos.  355  and  422,  s.  1955;  3,  12,  46,  86  and  97,  s.  1953).  But  in  Cuenco,  it  was   held   that   an   election  done   after   over   seven   (7)   years  was   not  made  within  a  reasonable  time.  

In   conclusion,   the   OSG   points   out   that   Ching   has   not   formally   elected  Philippine  citizenship  and,  if  ever  he  does,  it  would  already  be  beyond  the  "reasonable  time"  allowed  by  present  jurisprudence.  However,  due  to  the  peculiar  circumstances  surrounding  Ching's  case,  the  OSG  recommends  the  relaxation   of   the   standing   rule   on   the   construction   of   the   phrase  "reasonable   period"   and   the   allowance   of   Ching   to   elect   Philippine  citizenship   in   accordance  with   C.A.   No.   625   prior   to   taking   his   oath   as   a  member  of  the  Philippine  Bar.1âwphi1.nêt  

On   27   July   1999,   Ching   filed   a   Manifestation,   attaching   therewith   his  Affidavit   of   Election   of   Philippine   Citizenship   and   his   Oath   of   Allegiance,  both  dated  15  July  1999.  In  his  Manifestation,  Ching  states:  

1.  I  have  always  considered  myself  as  a  Filipino;  

2.  I  was  registered  as  a  Filipino  and  consistently  declared  myself  as  one  in  my  school  records  and  other  official  documents;  

3.   I   am   practicing   a   profession   (Certified   Public   Accountant)   reserved   for  Filipino  citizens;  

4.   I   participated   in   electoral   process[es]   since   the   time   I   was   eligible   to  vote;  

5.   I   had   served   the   people   of   Tubao,   La   Union   as   a   member   of   the  Sangguniang  Bayan  from  1992  to  1995;  

6.   I   elected   Philippine   citizenship   on   July   15,   1999   in   accordance   with  Commonwealth  Act  No.  625;  

7.  My  election  was  expressed   in  a   statement   signed  and   sworn   to  by  me  before  a  notary  public;  

8.   I   accompanied   my   election   of   Philippine   citizenship   with   the   oath   of  allegiance  to  the  Constitution  and  the  Government  of  the  Philippines;  

9.  I  filed  my  election  of  Philippine  citizenship  and  my  oath  of  allegiance  to  (sic)  the  Civil  Registrar  of  Tubao  La  Union,  and  

10.  I  paid  the  amount  of  TEN  PESOS  (Ps.  10.00)  as  filing  fees.  

Since  Ching  has  already  elected  Philippine  citizenship  on  15  July  1999,  the  question   raised   is   whether   he   has   elected   Philippine   citizenship  within   a  "reasonable   time."   In   the   affirmative,  whether   his   citizenship   by   election  retroacted  to  the  time  he  took  the  bar  examination.  

When   Ching   was   born   in   1964,   the   governing   charter   was   the   1935  Constitution.   Under   Article   IV,   Section   1(3)   of   the   1935   Constitution,   the  citizenship   of   a   legitimate   child   born   of   a   Filipino   mother   and   an   alien  father  followed  the  citizenship  of  the  father,  unless,  upon  reaching  the  age  of   majority,   the   child   elected   Philippine   citizenship.   4   This   right   to   elect  Philippine   citizenship   was   recognized   in   the   1973   Constitution   when   it  

provided   that   "(t)hose   who   elect   Philippine   citizenship   pursuant   to   the  provisions   of   the   Constitution   of   nineteen   hundred   and   thirty-­‐five"   are  citizens   of   the   Philippines.   5   Likewise,   this   recognition   by   the   1973  Constitution  was   carried   over   to   the   1987   Constitution  which   states   that  "(t)hose   born   before   January   17,   1973   of   Filipino   mothers,   who   elect  Philippine   citizenship   upon   reaching   the   age   of   majority"   are   Philippine  citizens.   6   It   should   be   noted,   however,   that   the   1973   and   1987  Constitutional   provisions   on   the   election   of   Philippine   citizenship   should  not   be   understood   as   having   a   curative   effect   on   any   irregularity   in   the  acquisition  of   citizenship   for   those   covered  by   the  1935  Constitution.   7   If  the  citizenship  of  a  person  was  subject  to  challenge  under  the  old  charter,  it   remains  subject   to  challenge  under   the  new  charter  even   if   the   judicial  challenge   had   not   been   commenced   before   the   effectivity   of   the   new  Constitution.  8  

C.A.  No.  625  which  was  enacted  pursuant  to  Section  1(3),  Article  IV  of  the  1935   Constitution,   prescribes   the   procedure   that   should   be   followed   in  order   to  make   a   valid   election   of   Philippine   citizenship.   Under   Section   1  thereof,   legitimate   children  born  of   Filipino  mothers  may  elect  Philippine  citizenship  by  expressing  such   intention  "in  a  statement   to  be  signed  and  sworn   to   by   the   party   concerned   before   any   officer   authorized   to  administer  oaths,  and  shall  be  filed  with  the  nearest  civil  registry.  The  said  party  shall  accompany  the  aforesaid  statement  with  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  Constitution  and  the  Government  of  the  Philippines."  

However,  the  1935  Constitution  and  C.A.  No.  625  did  not  prescribe  a  time  period  within  which  the  election  of  Philippine  citizenship  should  be  made.  The   1935   Charter   only   provides   that   the   election   should   be  made   "upon  reaching  the  age  of  majority."  The  age  of  majority  then  commenced  upon  reaching  twenty-­‐one  (21)  years.  9  In  the  opinions  of  the  Secretary  of  Justice  on   cases   involving   the   validity   of   election   of   Philippine   citizenship,   this  dilemma  was   resolved  by  basing   the   time  period  on   the  decisions  of   this  Court  prior   to   the  effectivity  of   the  1935  Constitution.   In   these  decisions,  the  proper  period  for  electing  Philippine  citizenship  was,  in  turn,  based  on  the   pronouncements   of   the   Department   of   State   of   the   United   States  

Government   to   the   effect   that   the   election   should   be   made   within   a  "reasonable   time"   after   attaining   the   age   of   majority.   10   The   phrase  "reasonable  time"  has  been   interpreted  to  mean  that  the  election  should  be   made   within   three   (3)   years   from   reaching   the   age   of  majority.   11  However,  we  held   in  Cuenco  vs.   Secretary  of   Justice,   12   that   the   three   (3)  year  period  is  not  an  inflexible  rule.  We  said:  

It  is  true  that  this  clause  has  been  construed  to  mean  a  reasonable  period  after   reaching   the   age   of  majority,   and   that   the   Secretary   of   Justice   has  ruled   that   three   (3)   years   is   the   reasonable   time   to   elect   Philippine  citizenship   under   the   constitutional   provision   adverted   to   above,   which  period  may  be  extended  under  certain  circumstances,  as  when  the  person  concerned  has  always  considered  himself  a  Filipino.  13  

However,  we  cautioned  in  Cuenco  that  the  extension  of  the  option  to  elect  Philippine  citizenship  is  not  indefinite:  

Regardless  of  the  foregoing,  petitioner  was  born  on  February  16,  1923.  He  became  of  age  on  February  16,  1944.  His  election  of  citizenship  was  made  on  May  15,  1951,  when  he  was  over  twenty-­‐eight  (28)  years  of  age,  or  over  seven   (7)   years   after   he   had   reached   the   age   of  majority.   It   is   clear   that  said  election  has  not  been  made  "upon  reaching  the  age  of  majority."  14  

In  the  present  case,  Ching,  having  been  born  on  11  April  1964,  was  already  thirty-­‐five  (35)  years  old  when  he  complied  with  the  requirements  of  C.A.  No.  625  on  15  June  1999,  or  over  fourteen  (14)  years  after  he  had  reached  the   age   of   majority.   Based   on   the   interpretation   of   the   phrase   "upon  reaching  the  age  of  majority,"  Ching's  election  was  clearly  beyond,  by  any  reasonable   yardstick,   the   allowable   period   within   which   to   exercise   the  privilege.   It   should   be   stated,   in   this   connection,   that   the   special  circumstances  invoked  by  Ching,  i.e.,  his  continuous  and  uninterrupted  stay  in  the  Philippines  and  his  being  a  certified  public  accountant,  a  registered  voter   and   a   former   elected   public   official,   cannot   vest   in   him   Philippine  citizenship   as   the   law   specifically   lays   down   the   requirements   for  

acquisition  of  Philippine  citizenship  by  election.  

Definitely,   the   so-­‐called   special   circumstances   cannot   constitute   what  Ching  erroneously   labels   as   informal  election  of   citizenship.  Ching   cannot  find  a  refuge  in  the  case  of  In  re:  Florencio  Mallare,  15  the  pertinent  portion  of  which  reads:  

And  even  assuming  arguendo  that  Ana  Mallare  were  (sic)  legally  married  to  an  alien,  Esteban's  exercise  of  the  right  of  suffrage  when  he  came  of  age,  constitutes  a  positive  act  of  election  of  Philippine  citizenship.   It  has  been  established   that   Esteban   Mallare   was   a   registered   voter   as   of   April   14,  1928,  and  that  as  early  as  1925  (when  he  was  about  22  years  old),  Esteban  was   already   participating   in   the   elections   and   campaigning   for   certain  candidate[s].  These  acts  are  sufficient  to  show  his  preference  for  Philippine  citizenship.  16  

Ching's   reliance   on   Mallare   is   misplaced.   The   facts   and   circumstances  obtaining   therein  are  very  different   from  those   in   the  present  case,   thus,  negating   its   applicability.   First,   Esteban   Mallare   was   born   before   the  effectivity   of   the   1935   Constitution   and   the   enactment   of   C.A.   No.   625.  Hence,   the   requirements   and   procedures   prescribed   under   the   1935  Constitution  and  C.A.  No.  625  for  electing  Philippine  citizenship  would  not  be  applicable  to  him.  Second,  the  ruling  in  Mallare  was  an  obiter  since,  as  correctly  pointed  out  by  the  OSG,  it  was  not  necessary  for  Esteban  Mallare  to  elect  Philippine  citizenship  because  he  was  already  a  Filipino,  he  being  a  natural  child  of  a  Filipino  mother.  In  this  regard,  the  Court  stated:  

Esteban   Mallare,   natural   child   of   Ana   Mallare,   a   Filipina,   is   therefore  himself  a  Filipino,  and  no  other  act  would  be  necessary  to  confer  on  him  all  the   rights   and   privileges   attached   to   Philippine   citizenship   (U.S.   vs.   Ong  Tianse,  29  Phil.  332;  Santos  Co  vs.  Government  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  42  Phil.   543,   Serra   vs.   Republic,   L-­‐4223,   May   12,   1952,   Sy   Quimsuan   vs.  Republic,   L-­‐4693,   Feb.   16,   1953;   Pitallano   vs.   Republic,   L-­‐5111,   June   28,  1954).  Neither  could  any  act  be  taken  on  the  erroneous  belief  that  he  is  a  

non-­‐filipino  divest  him  of  the  citizenship  privileges  to  which  he  is  rightfully  entitled.  17  

The   ruling   in   Mallare   was   reiterated   and   further   elaborated   in   Co   vs.  Electoral  Tribunal  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  18  where  we  held:  

We   have   jurisprudence   that   defines   "election"   as   both   a   formal   and   an  informal  process.  

In  the  case  of  In  re:  Florencio  Mallare  (59  SCRA  45  [1974]),  the  Court  held  that   the  exercise  of   the   right  of   suffrage  and   the  participation   in  election  exercises   constitute   a   positive   act   of   election   of   Philippine   citizenship.   In  the  exact  pronouncement  of  the  Court,  we  held:  

Esteban's  exercise  of  the  right  of  suffrage  when  he  came  of  age  constitutes  a  positive  act  of  Philippine  citizenship.  (p.  52:  emphasis  supplied)  

The  private  respondent  did  more  than  merely  exercise  his  right  of  suffrage.  He  has  established  his  life  here  in  the  Philippines.  

For   those   in   the   peculiar   situation   of   the   respondent   who   cannot   be  excepted   to   have   elected   Philippine   citizenship   as   they   were   already  citizens,  we  apply  the  In  Re  Mallare  rule.  

xxx  xxx  xxx  

The   filing   of   sworn   statement   or   formal   declaration   is   a   requirement   for  those  who   still   have   to   elect   citizenship.  For   those   already   Filipinos  when  the  time  to  elect  came  up,  there  are  acts  of  deliberate  choice  which  cannot  be   less   binding.   Entering   a   profession   open   only   to   Filipinos,   serving   in  public   office   where   citizenship   is   a   qualification,   voting   during   election  time,  running  for  public  office,  and  other  categorical  acts  of  similar  nature  are  themselves  formal  manifestations  for  these  persons.  

An  election  of  Philippine  citizenship  presupposes  that  the  person  electing  is  an  alien.  Or  his  status  is  doubtful  because  he  is  a  national  of  two  countries.  There   is   no   doubt   in   this   case   about  Mr.  Ong's   being   a   Filipino  when   he  turned  twenty-­‐one  (21).  

We   repeat   that   any   election   of   Philippine   citizenship   on   the   part   of   the  private  respondent  would  not  only  have  been  superfluous  but  it  would  also  have   resulted   in   an   absurdity.   How   can   a   Filipino   citizen   elect   Philippine  citizenship?  19  

The  Court,  like  the  OSG,  is  sympathetic  with  the  plight  of  Ching.  However,  even   if  we   consider   the   special   circumstances   in   the   life  of  Ching   like  his  having  lived  in  the  Philippines  all  his  life  and  his  consistent  belief  that  he  is  a   Filipino,   controlling   statutes   and   jurisprudence   constrain   us   to   disagree  with   the   recommendation  of   the  OSG.  Consequently,  we  hold   that  Ching  failed  to  validly  elect  Philippine  citizenship.  The  span  of  fourteen  (14)  years  that   lapsed   from   the   time  he   reached   the  age  of  majority  until   he   finally  expressed  his  intention  to  elect  Philippine  citizenship  is  clearly  way  beyond  the  contemplation  of  the  requirement  of  electing  "upon  reaching  the  age  of  majority."  Moreover,   Ching   has   offered  no   reason  why  he  delayed  his  election   of   Philippine   citizenship.   The   prescribed   procedure   in   electing  Philippine  citizenship  is  certainly  not  a  tedious  and  painstaking  process.  All  that   is   required   of   the   elector   is   to   execute   an   affidavit   of   election   of  Philippine   citizenship   and,   thereafter,   file   the   same  with   the  nearest   civil  registry.   Ching's   unreasonable   and   unexplained   delay   in   making   his  election  cannot  be  simply  glossed  over.  

Philippine   citizenship   can  never   be   treated   like   a   commodity   that   can  be  claimed   when   needed   and   suppressed   when   convenient.   20   One   who   is  privileged  to  elect  Philippine  citizenship  has  only  an  inchoate  right  to  such  citizenship.   As   such,   he   should   avail   of   the   right  with   fervor,   enthusiasm  and  promptitude.  Sadly,  in  this  case,  Ching  slept  on  his  opportunity  to  elect  Philippine   citizenship   and,   as   a   result.   this   golden   privilege   slipped   away  from  his  grasp.  

IN   VIEW   OF   THE   FOREGOING,   the   Court   Resolves   to   DENY   Vicente   D.  Ching's  application  for  admission  to  the  Philippine  Bar.1âwphi1.nêt  

SO  ORDERED.                                                                

MARCIANO  P.  BRION,  JR.,  petitioner,    vs.  FRANCISCO  F.  BRILLANTES,  JR.,  respondent.  

QUISUMBING,  J.:  

In   this   petition   for   disbarment,   complainant  Marciano   Brion,   Jr.,   charges  the  respondent,  Atty.  Francisco  Brillantes,  Jr.,  of  having  willfully  violated  a  lawful  order  of  this  Court   in  A.M.  No.  MTJ-­‐92-­‐706,  entitled  Lupo  Almodiel  Atienza   v.   Judge   Francisco   F.   Brillantes,   Jr.1   The   decretal   portion   of   our  resolution  in  Atienza  reads:  

WHEREFORE,  respondent  is  DISMISSED  from  the  service  with  forfeiture  of  all   leave  and   retirement  benefits   and  with  prejudice   to   reappointment   in  any   branch,   instrumentality   or   agency   of   the   government,   including  government-­‐owned   and   controlled   corporations.   This   decision   is  immediately  executory.  

SO  ORDERED.2  

Respondent’s   dismissal   in   the   aforesaid   case   was   ordered   after   he   was  found  guilty  of  Gross  Immorality  and  Appearance  of  Impropriety  during  his  incumbency  as  presiding  judge  of  the  Metropolitan  Trial  Court,  Branch  20,  Manila.  

Petitioner   now   avers   that   respondent   violated   our   decree   of   perpetual  disqualification  imposed  upon  him  from  assuming  any  post  in  government  service,   including   any   posts   in   government-­‐owned   and   controlled  corporations,   when   he   accepted   a   legal   consultancy   post   at   the   Local  Water   Utilities   Administration   (LWUA),   from   1998   to   2000.   Said  consultancy   included   an   appointment   by   LWUA   as   6th   member   of   the  Board   of   Directors   of   the   Urdaneta   (Pangasinan)   Water   District.   Upon  expiration   of   the   legal   consultancy   agreement,   this   was   subsequently  renewed  as  a  Special  Consultancy  Agreement.  

Petitioner   contends   that  while   both   consultancy   agreements   contained   a  proviso   to   the   effect   that   nothing   therein   should   be   construed   as  establishing   an   employer-­‐employee   relationship   between   LWUA   and  respondent,  the  inclusion  of  this  proviso  was  only  a  ploy  to  circumvent  our  order   barring   respondent   from   appointment   to   a   government   agency.  Petitioner   points   out   in   reality,   respondent   enjoys   the   same   rights   and  privileges  as  a  regular  employee,  to  wit:3  

1.   Issuance  of  LWUA  properties  such  as  a  cellular  phone  with  accessories,  as  evidenced  by  the  covering  Property  Issue  Slips  with  respondent  signing  as  "Accountable  Employee";4  

2.  Official   travel   to   various   places   in   the   country   as   shown  by  Reports   of  Authorized  Travel  kept  by  LWUA’s  General  Services  Division5  and  Report  of  Travel  accomplished  by  respondent  himself;6  

3.   Designation   as   supervising   officer   over   other   LWUA   employees   as  brought  to  light  by  written  instructions  personally  signed  by  respondent;7  

4.   Attendance   in  water   district   conventions   and  meetings   held   in   various  provinces;8  

5.   Membership   in   several   sensitive   LWUA   committees   such   as   the  Prequalification,   Bids,   and   Awards   Committee   (PBAC),   Build-­‐Operate-­‐Transfer   (BOT)   Committee,   among   others,   with   receipt   of   corresponding  honoraria  as  borne  out  by  various  Disbursement  Vouchers;9  

6.  Sitting  at  meetings  of  the  LWUA  Board  of  Trustees  as  evidenced  by  the  minutes  of  such  meetings;10  and  

7.  Receipt  of  Productivity  Incentive  Bonus  in  1999.  

Petitioner   submits   that   all   of   the   foregoing   constitute   deceitful   conduct,  gross  misconduct,  and  willful  disobedience   to  a  decree  of   this  Court,   and  

show  that  respondent  is  unfit  to  be  a  member  of  the  Bar.  

In   his   comment,11   respondent   admits   the   existence   of   the   Legal  Consultancy   Contract   as   well   as   the   Special   Consultancy   Contract.  However,   he   raises   the   affirmative   defense   that   under   Civil   Service  Commission   (CSC)  Memorandum  Circular  No.   27,   Series  of   1993,   services  rendered   pursuant   to   a   consultancy   contract   shall   not   be   considered  government  services,  and  therefore,  are  not  covered  by  Civil  Service  Law,  rules  and  regulations.  

Further,   says   respondent,   according   to   the   same   Memorandum   Circular  issued   by   the   Commission,   consultancy   contracts   do   not   have   to   be  submitted  to  the  Commission  for  approval.  With  respect  to  his  designation  as   the   6th   Member   of   the   Board   of   Directors   of   the   Urdaneta   Water  District,   respondent   reasons  out   that   the   same   is  not  a   "reappointment",  which   is  prohibited  by  our   ruling   in  Atienza,  as   said  designation   is  not  an  organic   appointment   to   a   LWUA   plantilla   position.   Hence,   according   to  respondent,   the   CSC   need   not   pass   approval   upon   his   temporary  designation.  

Respondent   also   argues   that   all   the   members   of   the   Urdaneta   Water  District   Board,   especially   the   6th   Member,   who   comes   from   the   LWUA,  assumed   such   functions   merely   by   virtue   of   a   designation   and   only   in  addition   to   their   regular   duties.   In   any   event,   says   respondent,   his  designation   as   6th   Member   was   revoked   in   April   2000   and   the   Special  Consultancy   Contract  was   pre-­‐terminated  on  April   30,   2000.   It   has   never  been   renewed   since   then.   With   respect   to   his   use   of   LWUA   properties,  respondent   admits   receiving   the   cellular   phone   unit   but   insists   that   he  merely   borrowed   it   from   one   Solomon   Badoy,   a   former   LWUA   Board   of  Trustees  Member.  

In   our   Resolution   of   February   19,   2001,   we   referred   this   case   to   the  Integrated   Bar   of   the   Philippines   (IBP)   for   investigation,   report   and  recommendation.   The   IBP   Commission   on   Bar   Discipline   found   that  

respondent   willfully   violated   a   lawful   order   of   this   Court   and  recommended  that  respondent  be  suspended  from  the  practice  of  law  for  one  (1)  year  and  fined  ten  thousand  (P10,000)  pesos.  

There  is  no  question  that  the  LWUA  is  a  government-­‐owned  and  controlled  corporation,   created   by   virtue   of   Presidential   Decree  No.   198.12   As   such,  our   ruling   in   the   Atienza   case,   A.M.   No.  MTJ-­‐92-­‐706,   which   categorically  prohibits   respondent’s   appointment   to   any   position   in   any   government-­‐owned   and   controlled   corporation,   clearly   encompasses   and   extends   to  LWUA  positions.  

In   the   instant   case   the   respondent   does   not   deny   the   petitioner’s  allegations.13  Instead,  he  offers  the  existence  of  Memorandum  Circular  No.  27,   Series   of   1993   (MC   No.   27,   s.   1993)   to   exculpate   himself   from   the  charge   against   him.   However,   it   does   not   escape   our   attention   that   the  very   Memorandum   Circular   that   respondent   cites   before   this   Court  provides  that  the  duties  enumerated  in  the  consultancy  contract  are  mainly  advisory  in  nature.14  

Without  belaboring  the  definition  of  "advisory,"15  it  appears  obvious  to  us  that   the   tasks   and   duties   that   respondent   performed   pursuant   to   the  consultancy   contract   cannot,   by   any   stretch   of   imagination,   be   deemed  merely  advisory  in  nature.  

An   adviser   does   not   exercise   supervisory   powers   over   LWUA   employees  nor  does  he  issue  written  instructions  to  them.  An  adviser  is  not  entitled  to  a  seat   in  such  vital  LWUA  committees   like  PBAC  and  the  BOT  Committee.  Also,  respondent’s  continuous  receipt  of  honoraria  for  sitting  as  a  member  of   certain   LWUA  Committees,   particularly   the   BOT   Committee,   belies   his  claim  that  he   is  a  mere  consultant  for  the  LWUA.  The  evidence  on  record  clearly   shows   that   the   LWUA   Office   Order   implementing   National  Compensation   Circular   No.   75-­‐9516   refers   to   payments   of   honoraria   to  officials/employees  in  consideration  of  services  rendered.  

Most   telling,   in   our   view,   is   respondent’s   acceptance   of   his   1998  Productivity   Incentive   Bonus   (PIB).   The   Board   of   Trustees   Resolution  No.  26,  Series  of  1999,  of  the  LWUA,17  which  governed  the  release  of  the  PIB,  limited   the  entitlement   to   said  bonus  only   to   "officials"   and   "employees"  (permanent,  temporary,  casual,  or  contractual)  of  LWUA.  

In   sum,  we   find   that   for   all   intents   and  purposes,   respondent   performed  duties   and   functions   of   a   non-­‐advisory   nature,   which   pertain   to   a  contractual  employee  of  LWUA.  As  stated  by  petitioner  in  his  reply,18  there  is  a  difference  between  a  consultant  hired  on  a  contractual  basis  (which  is  governed  by  CSC  M.C.  No.  27,  s.  1993)  and  a  contractual  employee  (whose  appointment   is   governed,   among   others,   by   the   CSC   Omnibus   Rules   on  Appointment   and   other   Personnel   Actions).   By   performing   duties   and  functions,   which   clearly   pertain   to   a   contractual   employee,   albeit   in   the  guise  of  an  advisor  or  consultant,  respondent  has  transgressed  both  letter  and  spirit  of  this  Court’s  decree  in  Atienza.  

The   lawyer’s   primary   duty   as   enunciated   in   the   Attorney’s   Oath   is   to  uphold   the  Constitution,  obey   the   laws  of   the   land,  and  promote   respect  for   law  and  legal  processes.19  That  duty  in   its   irreducible  minimum  entails  obedience  to  the  legal  orders  of  the  courts.  Respondent’s  disobedience  to  this   Court’s   order   prohibiting   his   reappointment   to   any   branch,  instrumentality,   or   agency   of   government,   including   government   owned  and  controlled  corporations,  cannot  be  camouflaged  by  a  legal  consultancy  or  a  special  consultancy  contract.  By  performing  duties  and  functions  of  a  contractual   employee   of   LWUA,   by   way   of   a   consultancy,   and   receiving  compensation  and  perquisites  as  such,  he  displayed  acts  of  open  defiance  of  the  Court’s  authority,  and  a  deliberate  rejection  of  his  oath  as  an  officer  of  the  court.   It   is  also  destructive  of  the  harmonious  relations  that  should  prevail   between   Bench   and   Bar,   a   harmony   necessary   for   the   proper  administration   of   justice.   Such   defiance   not   only   erodes   respect   for   the  Court  but  also  corrodes  public  confidence  in  the  rule  of  law.  

What   aggravates   respondent’s   offense   is   the   fact   that   respondent   is   no  

ordinary  lawyer.  Having  served  in  the  judiciary  for  eight  (8)  years,  he  is  very  well   aware  of   the   standards  of  moral   fitness   for  membership   in   the   legal  profession.   His   propensity   to   try   to   "get   away"   with   an   indiscretion  becomes   apparent   and   inexcusable   when   he   entered   into   a   legal  "consultancy"  contract  with  the  LWUA.  Perhaps  realizing   its  own  mistake,  LWUA   terminated   said   contract  with   respondent,   but   then   proceeded   to  give   him   a   "special   consultancy."   This   travesty   could   not   be   long   hidden  from  public  awareness,  hence  the  instant  complaint  for  disbarment  filed  by  petitioner.   Given   the   factual   circumstances   found   by   Commission   on   Bar  Discipline,  we  have  no  hesitance   in  accepting  the  recommendation  of  the  Board  of  Governors,  Integrated  Bar  of  the  Philippines,  that  respondent  be  fined   and   suspended   from   the   practice   of   law.   The   Code   of   Professional  Responsibility,   Rule   1.01,   provides   that   a   lawyer   shall   not   engage   in  unlawful,  dishonest,   immoral  or  deceitful   conduct.   For  violating   the  Code  as  well  as  transgressing  his  oath  as  an  officer  of  the  court,  his  suspension  for  one  (1)  year  and  a  fine  of  ten  thousand  (P10,000)  pesos  are  in  order.  

WHEREFORE,   respondent  Atty.   Francisco  Brillantes,   Jr.,   is   found   liable   for  having   willfully   violated   a   lawful   order   of   this   Court   in   our   decision   of  March  29,  1995  rendered  in  A.M.  No.  MTJ-­‐92-­‐706,  entitled  Lupo  Almodiel  Atienza  vs.  Judge  Francisco  F.  Brillantes,  Jr.  He  is  hereby  SUSPENDED  from  the   practice   of   law   for   one   (1)   year   and   ordered   to   pay   a   FINE   of   Ten  Thousand  (P10,000.00)  Pesos,  with  a  STERN  WARNING  that  a  repetition  of  the  same  or  similar  conduct  shall  be  dealt  with  more  severely.  Let  a  copy  of  this  Decision  be   furnished  to   the  Bar  Confidant  and  the   Integrated  Bar  of  the  Philippines  and  spread  on  the  personal  records  of  respondent  as  well  as   circulated   to   all   courts   in   the   Philippines.   This   decision   is   immediately  executory.  

SO  ORDERED.            

DOLORES  C.  BELLEZA,  Complainant,    vs.  ATTY.  ALAN  S.  MACASA,  Respondent.  

R  E  S  O  L  U  T  I  O  N  

Per  Curiam:  

This  treats  of  the  complaint  for  disbarment  filed  by  complainant  Dolores  C.  Belleza   against   respondent   Atty.   Alan   S.   Macasa   for   unprofessional   and  unethical   conduct   in   connection   with   the   handling   of   a   criminal   case  involving  complainant’s  son.  

On  November  10,  2004,  complainant  went  to  see  respondent  on  referral  of  their  mutual  friend,  Joe  Chua.  Complainant  wanted  to  avail  of  respondent’s  legal  services  in  connection  with  the  case  of  her  son,  Francis  John  Belleza,  who  was  arrested  by  policemen  of  Bacolod  City  earlier  that  day  for  alleged  violation  of  Republic  Act  (RA)  9165.1  Respondent  agreed  to  handle  the  case  for  P30,000.  

The   following   day,   complainant   made   a   partial   payment   of   P15,000   to  respondent   thru   their   mutual   friend   Chua.   On   November   17,   2004,   she  gave  him  an  additional  P10,000.  She  paid  the  P5,000  balance  on  November  18,   2004.   Both   payments   were   also   made   thru   Chua.   On   all   three  occasions,  respondent  did  not  issue  any  receipt.  

On   November   21,   2004,   respondent   received   P18,000   from   complainant  for   the  purpose  of  posting  a  bond  to  secure  the  provisional   liberty  of  her  (complainant’s)   son.   Again,   respondent   did   not   issue   any   receipt.   When  complainant   went   to   the   court   the   next   day,   she   found   out   that  respondent  did  not  remit  the  amount  to  the  court.  

Complainant   demanded   the   return   of   the   P18,000   from   respondent   on  several   occasions   but   respondent   ignored   her.   Moreover,   respondent  failed  to  act  on  the  case  of  complainant’s  son  and  complainant  was  forced  

to  avail  of  the  services  of  the  Public  Attorney’s  Office  for  her  son’s  defense.  

Thereafter,  complainant  filed  a  verified  complaint2  for  disbarment  against  respondent   in  the  Negros  Occidental  chapter  of  the   Integrated  Bar  of  the  Philippines   (IBP).   Attached   to   the   verified   complaint  was   the   affidavit3   of  Chua  which  read:  

I,  JOE  CHUA,  of  legal  age,  Filipino  and  resident  of  Purok  Sawmill,  Brgy.  Bata,  Bacolod  City,   after  having  been   sworn   to   in   accordance  with   law,  hereby  depose  and  state:  

1.   That   I   am   the   one  who   introduce[d]  Mrs.   Dolores   C.   Belleza   [to]   Atty.  Alan  Macasa  when  she  looked  for  a  lawyer  to  help  her  son  in  the  case  that  the  latter  is  facing  sometime  [i]n  [the]  first  week  of  November  2004;  

2.  That  by   reason  of  my  mutual   closeness   to  both  of   them,   I   am   the  one  who   facilitated   the   payment   of   Mrs.   DOLORES   C.   BELLEZA   to   Atty.   Alan  Macasa;  

3.  That  as  far  as  I  know,  I  received  the  following  amount  from  Mrs.  Dolores  Belleza  as  payment  for  Atty.  Alan  Macasa:  

Date   Amount  November  11,  2004   P15,000.00  A  week  after   10,000.00  November  18,  2004   5,000.00  4.  That  the  above-­‐mentioned  amounts  which  I  supposed  as  Attorney’s  Fees  were  immediately  forwarded  by  me  to  Atty.  [Macasa];  

5.  That  I  am  executing  this  affidavit  in  order  to  attest  to  the  truth  of  all  the  foregoing  statements.  

x  x  x                      x  x  x                    x  x  x4  

In   a   letter   dated   May   23,   2005,5   the   IBP   Negros   Occidental   chapter  transmitted   the   complaint   to   the   IBP’s   Commission   on   Bar   Discipline  (CBD).6  

In  an  order  dated   July  13,  2005,7   the  CBD  required   respondent   to  submit  his  answer  within  15  days  from  receipt  thereof.  Respondent,   in  an  urgent  motion   for   extension   of   time   to   file   an   answer   dated   August   10,   2005,8  simply   brushed   aside   the   complaint   for   being   "baseless,   groundless   and  malicious"  without,  however,  offering  any  explanation.  He  also  prayed  that  he  be  given  until  September  4,  2005  to  submit  his  answer.  

Respondent   subsequently   filed   urgent   motions9   for   second   and   third  extensions  of   time  praying   to  be  given  until  November  4,  2005   to  submit  his  answer.  He  never  did.  

When  both  parties  failed  to  attend  the  mandatory  conference  on  April  19,  2006,  they  were  ordered  to  submit  their  respective  position  papers.10  

In  its  report  and  recommendation  dated  October  2,  2007,11  the  CBD  ruled  that   respondent   failed   to   rebut   the   charges   against   him.   He   never  answered  the  complaint  despite  several  chances  to  do  so.  

The  CBD  found  respondent  guilty  of  violation  of  Rule  1.01  of   the  Code  of  Professional  Responsibility  which  provides:  

Rule  1.01  –  A   lawyer  shall  not  engage   in  unlawful,  dishonest,   immoral,  or  deceitful  conduct.  

It  also  found  him  guilty  of  violation  of  Rules  16.01  and  16.02  of  the  Code  of  Professional  Responsibility:  

Rule  16.01  –  A  lawyer  shall  account  for  all  money  or  property  collected  or  received  for  or  from  the  client.  

Rule   16.02   –   A   lawyer   shall   keep   the   funds   of   each   client   separate   and  apart  from  his  own  and  those  others  kept  by  him.  

The  CBD   ruled   that   respondent   lacked   good  moral   character   and   that  he  was   unfit   and   unworthy   of   the   privileges   conferred   by   law   on   him   as   a  member   of   the   bar.   The   CBD   recommended   a   suspension   of   six  months  with   a   stern   warning   that   repetition   of   similar   acts   would  merit   a   more  severe   sanction.   It   also   recommended   that   respondent   be   ordered   to  return   to   complainant   the  P18,000   intended   for   the  provisional   liberty  of  the  complainant’s  son  and  the  P30,000  attorney’s  fees.  

The  Board  of  Governors  of   the   IBP  adopted  and  approved  the  report  and  recommendation   of   the   CBD   with   the   modification   that   respondent   be  ordered   to   return   to   complainant   only   the   amount   of   P30,000  which   he  received  as  attorney’s  fees.12  

We   affirm   the   CBD’s   finding   of   guilt   as   affirmed   by   the   IBP   Board   of  Governors  but  we  modify   the   IBP’s   recommendation  as   to   the   liability  of  respondent.  

Respondent  Disrespected  Legal  Processes  

Respondent   was   given   more   than   enough   opportunity   to   answer   the  charges  against  him.  Yet,  he  showed  indifference  to  the  orders  of  the  CBD  for  him   to   answer   and   refute   the  accusations  of  professional  misconduct  against   him.   In   doing   so,   he   failed   to   observe   Rule   12.03   of   the   Code   of  Professional  Responsibility:  

Rule  12.03  –  A   lawyer   shall  not,  after  obtaining  extensions  of   time   to   file  pleadings,  memoranda   or   briefs,   let   the   period   lapse  without   submitting  the  same  or  offering  an  explanation  for  his  failure  to  do  so.  

Respondent   also   ignored   the   CBD’s   directive   for   him   to   file   his   position  paper.   His   propensity   to   flout   the   orders   of   the   CBD   showed   his   lack   of  

concern  and  disrespect  for  the  proceedings  of  the  CBD.  He  disregarded  the  oath  he   took  when  he  was  accepted   to   the   legal  profession  "to  obey   the  laws   and   the   legal   orders   of   the   duly   constituted   legal   authorities."   He  displayed  insolence  not  only  to  the  CBD  but  also  to  this  Court  which  is  the  source  of  the  CBD’s  authority.  

Respondent’s  unjustified  disregard  of  the  lawful  orders  of  the  CBD  was  not  only   irresponsible   but   also   constituted   utter   disrespect   for   the   judiciary  and  his   fellow   lawyers.13  His  conduct  was  unbecoming  of  a   lawyer  who   is  called  upon   to  obey  court  orders  and  processes  and   is  expected   to   stand  foremost   in   complying   with   court   directives   as   an   officer   of   the   court.14  Respondent   should   have   known   that   the   orders   of   the   CBD   (as   the  investigating   arm   of   the   Court   in   administrative   cases   against   lawyers)  were  not  mere   requests  but  directives  which   should  have  been  complied  with  promptly  and  completely.151avvph!1  

Respondent  Grossly  Neglected  The  Cause  of  His  Client  

Respondent  undertook   to  defend   the   criminal   case  against   complainant’s  son.  Such  undertaking  imposed  upon  him  the  following  duties:  

CANON  17  –  A  LAWYER  OWES  FIDELITY  TO  THE  CAUSE  OF  HIS  CLIENT  AND  HE  SHALL  BE  MINDFUL  OF  THE  TRUST  AND  CONFIDENCE  REPOSED  IN  HIM.  

CANON  18  –  A  LAWYER  SHALL  SERVE  HIS  CLIENT  WITH  COMPETENCE  AND  DILIGENCE.  

x  x  x                      x  x  x                    x  x  x  

Rule  18.03  –  A  lawyer  shall  not  neglect  a  legal  matter  entrusted  to  him,  and  his  negligence  in  connection  therewith  shall  render  him  liable.  

x  x  x                      x  x  x                    x  x  x  

CANON  19  –  A  LAWYER  SHALL  REPRESENT  HIS  CLIENT  WITH  ZEAL  WITHIN  THE  BOUNDS  OF  THE  LAW.  

A   lawyer   who   accepts   the   cause   of   a   client   commits   to   devote   himself  (particularly  his  time,  knowledge,  skills  and  effort)  to  such  cause.  He  must  be   ever   mindful   of   the   trust   and   confidence   reposed   in   him,   constantly  striving   to   be   worthy   thereof.   Accordingly,   he   owes   full   devotion   to   the  interest   of   his   client,   warm   zeal   in   the   maintenance   and   defense   of   his  client’s   rights   and   the   exertion   of   his   utmost   learning,   skill   and   ability   to  ensure  that  nothing  shall  be  taken  or  withheld  from  his  client,  save  by  the  rules  of  law  legally  applied.16  

A   lawyer  who  accepts  professional  employment   from  a   client  undertakes  to   serve   his   client   with   competence   and   diligence.17   He   must  conscientiously   perform   his   duty   arising   from   such   relationship.   He  must  bear  in  mind  that  by  accepting  a  retainer,  he  impliedly  makes  the  following  representations:   that   he   possesses   the   requisite   degree   of   learning,   skill  and   ability   other   lawyers   similarly   situated  possess;   that   he  will   exert   his  best  judgment  in  the  prosecution  or  defense  of  the  litigation  entrusted  to  him;   that  he  will   exercise   reasonable   care   and  diligence   in   the  use  of   his  skill  and  in  the  application  of  his  knowledge  to  his  client’s  cause;  and  that  he   will   take   all   steps   necessary   to   adequately   safeguard   his   client’s  interest.181avvphi1  

A   lawyer’s   negligence   in   the   discharge  of   his   obligations   arising   from   the  relationship  of  counsel  and  client  may  cause  delay  in  the  administration  of  justice   and   prejudice   the   rights   of   a   litigant,   particularly   his   client.   Thus,  from   the   perspective   of   the   ethics   of   the   legal   profession,   a   lawyer’s  lethargy   in  carrying  out  his  duties   to  his  client   is  both  unprofessional  and  unethical.19  

If   his   client’s   case   is   already   pending   in   court,   a   lawyer   must   actively  represent   his   client   by   promptly   filing   the   necessary   pleading   or   motion  and   assiduously   attending   the   scheduled   hearings.   This   is   specially  

significant  for  a  lawyer  who  represents  an  accused  in  a  criminal  case.  

The   accused   is   guaranteed   the   right   to   counsel   under   the   Constitution.20  However,   this   right   can   only   be   meaningful   if   the   accused   is   accorded  ample  legal  assistance  by  his  lawyer:  

...   The   right   to   counsel   proceeds   from   the   fundamental   principle   of   due  process  which  basically  means   that  a  person  must  be  heard  before  being  condemned.   The   due   process   requirement   is   a   part   of   a   person's   basic  rights;  it  is  not  a  mere  formality  that  may  be  dispensed  with  or  performed  perfunctorily.  

The  right  to  counsel  must  be  more  than  just  the  presence  of  a  lawyer  in  the  courtroom  or  the  mere  propounding  of  standard  questions  and  objections.  The   right   to   counsel   means   that   the   accused   is   amply   accorded   legal  assistance  extended  by  a  counsel  who  commits  himself  to  the  cause  for  the  defense  and  acts  accordingly.  The  right  assumes  an  active  involvement  by  the   lawyer   in   the   proceedings,   particularly   at   the   trial   of   the   case,   his  bearing   constantly   in   mind   of   the   basic   rights   of   the   accused,   his   being  well-­‐versed   on   the   case,   and   his   knowing   the   fundamental   procedures,  essential  laws  and  existing  jurisprudence.21  

—  ∞  —  ○  —  ∞  —  

[T]he   right   of   an   accused   to   counsel   is   beyond   question   a   fundamental  right.   Without   counsel,   the   right   to   a   fair   trial   itself   would   be   of   little  consequence,   for   it   is   through  counsel   that   the  accused  secures  his  other  rights.   In   other   words,   the   right   to   counsel   is   the   right   to   effective  assistance  of  counsel.22  

The  right  of  an  accused  to  counsel  finds  substance  in  the  performance  by  the  lawyer  of  his  sworn  duty  of  fidelity  to  his  client.23  Tersely  put,  it  means  an   effective,   efficient   and   truly   decisive   legal   assistance,   not   a   simply  perfunctory  representation.24  

In   this   case,   after   accepting   the   criminal   case   against   complainant’s   son  and   receiving   his   attorney’s   fees,   respondent   did   nothing   that   could   be  considered   as   effective   and   efficient   legal   assistance.   For   all   intents   and  purposes,   respondent   abandoned   the   cause   of   his   client.   Indeed,   on  account   of   respondent’s   continued   inaction,   complainant   was   compelled  to   seek   the   services   of   the   Public   Attorney’s   Office.   Respondent’s  lackadaisical   attitude   towards   the   case   of   complainant’s   son   was  reprehensible.  Not  only  did  it  prejudice  complainant’s  son,  it  also  deprived  him  of  his  constitutional  right  to  counsel.  Furthermore,  in  failing  to  use  the  amount   entrusted   to   him   for   posting   a   bond   to   secure   the   provisional  liberty  of  his  client,  respondent  unduly  impeded  the  latter’s  constitutional  right  to  bail.  

Respondent  Failed  to  Return    His  Client’s  Money  

The   fiduciary   nature   of   the   relationship   between   counsel   and   client  imposes   on   a   lawyer   the   duty   to   account   for   the   money   or   property  collected  or  received  for  or  from  the  client.25  

When  a   lawyer  collects  or   receives  money   from  his   client   for  a  particular  purpose  (such  as  for  filing  fees,  registration  fees,  transportation  and  office  expenses),  he  should  promptly  account   to   the  client  how  the  money  was  spent.   If   he   does   not   use   the   money   for   its   intended   purpose,   he   must  immediately   return   it   to   the   client.26   His   failure   either   to   render   an  accounting  or  to  return  the  money  (if  the  intended  purpose  of  the  money  does  not  materialize)   constitutes  a  blatant  disregard  of  Rule  16.01  of   the  Code  of  Professional  Responsibility.27  

Moreover,  a  lawyer  has  the  duty  to  deliver  his  client’s  funds  or  properties  as  they  fall  due  or  upon  demand.28  His  failure  to  return  the  client’s  money  upon  demand  gives  rise  to  the  presumption  that  he  has  misappropriated  it  for  his  own  use  to  the  prejudice  of  and  in  violation  of  the  trust  reposed  in  him  by  the  client.29   It   is  a  gross  violation  of  general  morality  as  well  as  of  professional  ethics;  it  impairs  public  confidence  in  the  legal  profession  and  

deserves   punishment.30   Indeed,   it   may   border   on   the   criminal   as   it   may  constitute  a  prima  facie  case  of  swindling  or  estafa.  

Respondent   never   denied   receiving   P18,000   from   complainant   for   the  purpose  of  posting  a  bond  to  secure  the  provisional  liberty  of  her  son.  He  never  used  the  money  for   its   intended  purpose  yet  also  never  returned  it  to   the   client.  Worse,  he  unjustifiably   refused   to   turn  over   the  amount   to  complainant  despite  the  latter’s  repeated  demands.  

Moreover,  respondent  rendered  no  service  that  would  have  entitled  him  to  the  P30,000  attorney’s  fees.  As  a  rule,  the  right  of  a  lawyer  to  a  reasonable  compensation  for  his  services  is  subject  to  two  requisites:  (1)  the  existence  of  an  attorney-­‐client  relationship  and  (2)  the  rendition  by  the  lawyer  of  services  to  the  client.31  Thus,  a  lawyer  who  does  not  render  legal  services  is  not  entitled  to  attorney’s  fees.  Otherwise,  not  only  would  he  be  unjustly  enriched  at  the  expense  of  the  client,  he  would  also  be  rewarded  for  his  negligence  and  irresponsibility.  

Respondent   Failed   to   Uphold   the   Integrity   and   Dignity   of   the   Legal  Profession  

For   his   failure   to   comply  with   the   exacting   ethical   standards   of   the   legal  profession,  respondent  failed  to  obey  Canon  7  of  the  Code  of  Professional  Responsibility:  

CANON  7.  A  LAWYER  SHALL  AT  ALL  TIMES  UPHOLD  THE   INTEGRITY  AND  THE   DIGNITY   OF   THE   LEGAL   PROFESSION   AND   SUPPORT   THE  ACTIVITIES  OF  THE  INTEGRATED  BAR.  (emphasis  supplied)  

Indeed,  a  lawyer  who  fails  to  abide  by  the  Canons  and  Rules  of  the  Code  of  Professional  Responsibility  disrespects  the  said  Code  and  everything  that  it  stands  for.  In  so  doing,  he  disregards  the  ethics  and  disgraces  the  dignity  of  the  legal  profession.  

Lawyers   should   always   live   up   to   the   ethical   standards   of   the   legal  profession  as  embodied   in   the  Code  of  Professional  Responsibility.  Public  confidence   in   law  and   in   lawyers  may  be  eroded  by  the   irresponsible  and  improper  conduct  of  a  member  of  the  bar.32  Thus,  every  lawyer  should  act  and  comport  himself  in  a  manner  that  would  promote  public  confidence  in  the  integrity  of  the  legal  profession.33  

Respondent  was  undeserving  of  the  trust  reposed  in  him.  Instead  of  using  the  money  for  the  bond  of  the  complainant’s  son,  he  pocketed  it.  He  failed  to  observe  candor,  fairness  and  loyalty  in  his  dealings  with  his  client.34  He  failed   to   live  up   to  his   fiduciary  duties.  By  keeping   the  money   for  himself  despite   his   undertaking   that   he   would   facilitate   the   release   of  complainant’s   son,   respondent   showed   lack   of   moral   principles.   His  transgression  showed  him  to  be  a  swindler,  a  deceitful  person  and  a  shame  to  the  legal  profession.  

WHEREFORE,  respondent  Atty.  Alan  S.  Macasa  is  hereby  found  GUILTY  not  only   of   dishonesty   but   also   of   professional   misconduct   for   prejudicing  Francis   John  Belleza’s   right   to   counsel   and   to   bail   under   Sections   13   and  14(2),  Article   III   of   the  Constitution,   and   for   violating  Canons  1,   7,   17,   18  and   19   and   Rules   12.03,   16.01,   16.02,   16.03   and   18.03   of   the   Code   of  Professional   Responsibility.  He   is   therefore  DISBARRED   from   the  practice  of  law  effective  immediately.  

Respondent   is   hereby   ORDERED   to   return   to   complainant   Dolores   C.  Belleza   the   amounts   of   P30,000   and   P18,000   with   interest   at   12%   per  annum  from  the  date  of  promulgation  of   this  decision  until   full  payment.  Respondent  is  further  DIRECTED  to  submit  to  the  Court  proof  of  payment  of  the  amount  within  ten  days  from  payment.  Failure  to  do  so  will  subject  him  to  criminal  prosecution.  

Let  copies  of  this  resolution  be  furnished  the  Office  of  the  Bar  Confidant  to  be   entered   into   the   records   of   respondent   Atty.   Alan   S.  Macasa   and   the  Office  of  the  Court  Administrator  to  be  furnished  to  the  courts  of  the  land  

for  their  information  and  guidance.  

SO  ORDERED.