DOCUMENT ZSUME

02760 - [A1953030]

Improved Management of Computer Resources Needed to EnhanceMarine Co:ps' Efficiency and Effectiveness. LCD-76-124;B-163074. Jjy 11, 1977. 39 pp. + 5 appendices (10 pp.).

Report to the Congress; by Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General.

Issue Area: ilitary Preparedness Plans: Military Communicationsand Information Processing Needs (803); Automatic DataProcessing: Acquiring and Using Resources (102).

Coptact: Logistics arid Communications Div.Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense -

Military (except procurement & contracts) (051);Miscellaneous: Automatic Data Processing (1001).

Organization Concerned: Department of the Navy; Marine Corps.Congressional Relevance: House Committee on Armed Services;

Senate Committee on Armed Services; Congress.Authority: Federal Management Circular 74-5.

Many Marine Corps' administrative and tacticalinformation processes have been automated, and consequently,whether at an established base or deployed at a remote location,depend on the availability of computer support.Findings/Corclusions: The Corps has separate cou-terinstallations for its combat force and its service supportunits. Thus, it has arquired more computers than it needs, andtas developed separate systems for similar purposes. Theavailability of computer support has been impaired by fragmentedmanagement, lack of a comprehensive plan integratingadministrative and tactical information needs, and a superficialdetermination of user requirements. Critical shortcomings werenoted in the use of computer systems during emergencydeployment. The expenditure of at least $8 million annually tooperate separate force computer centers did not seem justifiedbecause the computers were not tested to meet the needs ofdeployment. Corrective actions initiated by the Corps inresponse to GAO recommendations were found to be generallyconsistent with these recommendations. Recommendations: TheSecretary of Defense should dizect the Secretary of the Navy andthe Commandant of the Marine Corps to: (1) implement a singleoffice for data processing management; (2) dev3lop an overallplan for integrating systems; (3) reconsider separation ofcomputer installations; (4) improve systems for meeting needs oflocal users; and (5) assure greater compliance with Governmentregulations related to data processing requirements, costevaluations, and competitive procurement. (Author/HTW)

°o REPORT T10 THE CONGRESS

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL

OF THE UNITED STATES

Improved Management OfComputer Resources NeededTo Enhance Marine Corps'Efficiency And EffectivenessDepartment of Defense

Many Marine Corps administrative and tacti-cal information processes have been automa-ted and consequently, whether at an estab-lished base or deployed at a remote location,depend on the availability of computer sup-port. However, the fragmented managementof its computer resources, the lack of a com-prehensive long-range plan integrating admini-strative and tactical information needs, and asuperficial determination of user require-ments have impaired the Corps' ability to pro-vide this type of support. The lack of ccmpu-ter support couid ultimately impair the Corps'ability to carry out assigned missions.

I LCD-76-124 JULY 11, 1977

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED TATlWASHINION. D.C. MU"

B-163074

To the President of the Senate and theSpeaker of the House of Representatives

This report discusses weaknesses in the planning andmanagement of the Marine Corps' automated data processingprogram. Because of these weaknesses, certain aspects ofthie automated data processing program do not adequately meetuser needs and could, therefore, hinder the Corps' opera-tional effectiveness during emergency situations.

Our review was made pursuant to the budget and Account-ing Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Audit-ing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 7).

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretariesof Defense and the Navy nd the Commandant of the MKrineCorps.

omptrol er Generalof the United States

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S IMPROVED MANAGEMENT OFREPORT TO THE CONGRESS COMPUTER RESOURCES NEEDED

TO ENHANCE MARINE CORPS'EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESSDepartment of Defense

DIGEST

Each year, the Marine Corps spends about$41 million for the design, development,procurement, installation, and operationof computers. Because the Corps has sep-arate computer installations for its com-bat force and its service support units, ithas acquired more computers than it needsand has developed separate systems forsimilar purposes.

Tile Corps' dependency on computer sup-port has increased to a point where itsoperational effectiveness is substan-tially affected by the .- ailability ofthis support. The transition from manualprocesses to automation has been managedby several staff agencies at Corps head-quarters, causing fragmented managemen-of computer systems development.

For example, the Corps did not have

--a single office responsible for coordi-nating all work in data processing andtelecommunications (see p. 5),

-- coordination and control needed to pre-vent separate systems for similar usesfrom being developed (see p. 9),

--overall planning to make sure that re-sources and competitive procurement areused effectively (see p. 13), and

-- control over standard systems needed toreduce costs and exchange informationfaster (see p. 18).

In addition, the Marine Corps has acquiredsome of its major systems without fully

OAr gl. Upon rmoval, the report LCD-76-124cower ate should be noted hereon.

i

determining user requirements for the dif-

ferent peacetime and combat conditionsunder which the users must operate. (Seep. 21.) The costs of alternatives werealso not evaluated. (See p. 31.)

As a result, some aspects of the data

processing program do not adequately meet

the Corps' needs. This could hinder the

Corps' effectiveness, especially duringemergency deployment of its combat forces,because the Corps is almost completelydependent o computer support whether atan established base or deployed to a re-mote location.

Some critical hortcomings of the com-puter systems are:

-- Automates data processing is not readilya:ailable to combat force commandersduring emergency deployment.

-- Whether thL combat force's conlputercaJ its shelter c he moved to a com-bat or emergency area has not beentested.

-- An adequate, self-contained power supply

is not available to run the computer in

a deployed situation. (See F. 22.)

The continued expenditure of at least $8million annually to operate separate force

computer centers does not seem justified,because the computers have not been testedto meet the needs of deployment. (See

pp. 12 and 25.)

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defensedirect the Secretary of the Navy and theCommandant of the Marine Corps to:

-- Effectively implement a single office au-

thorized to manage the planning, coordi-nating, and monitoring of all administra-tive and tactical data processing and

related telecommunications operations.

ii

-- Develop an overall, long-range plan inte-grating tactical, administrative, and re-lated telecommunications systems require-ments.

-- Reconsider the need to separate the Corps'combat force and service support unitcomputer installations.

-- Improve the effectiveness of the Corps'standard systems for meeting the needsof local users, including, where necessary,redesigning the systems.

--Make sure that there is greater compliancewith Government regulations in determiningthe Corps' data processing requirements,evaluation of costs and benefits avail-able from alternative courses of action,and competitive procurement of computerequipment, including the use of machine-transferable software.

In commenting on the report, the AssistantSecretary of the Navy (Financial Management)stated that several of GAO's recommendationshave merit and that the Marine Corps hadinitiated corrective action. (See p. 35and app. IV.)

The Marine Corps had identified some of itscomputer systems development problems. How-ever, prior to GAC s review, the solutions de-veloped and implemented by the Corps wereineffective in resolving problems, primarilybecause the Corps did not concentrate themanagement of its automated data processingprogram in a single office.

In addition, the Assistant Secretary saidthat there are two broad implications inthe report whicn are inappropriate and re-flect adversely on automated data processingmanagement by the Ccrps. The implicationsare that the Marine Corps

--has not effectively complied with Govern-ment reaulations on the acquisition of

IaaLrj~ iii~

computer resources and is overly dependenton one computer manufacturer and

--has not effectively identified or satisfieduser requirements.

The Assistant Secretary's statements tend tosuggest that Marine Corps policy is in com-pliance with Government regulations regard-ing the acquisition of computer equipment.GAO's review showed that the Corps, by itsprocurement policies and methods, had, ineffect, limited the type of free andopen competition contemplated by Governmentpolicy and regulations.

GAO's review also showed that the Corps also*,id not perform comprehensive user require-nent studies before spending millions ofdollars for computer systems. This is onereason why the systems o not ully meetthe information needs of Marine commandersand, as such, could hinder their operationaleffectiveness, especially during emergencydeployment situations.

The corrective actions initiated by theMarine Corps, particularly the ones re-lated to automated data processing pro-gram responsibility and planning, aregenerally consistent with GAO's reconmen-dations and if properly implemented,should improve the Corps' management ofits data processing resources. (Seep. 40 and app. IV.)

iv

Contents

Page

DIGEST

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION 1Mission and organization of theMarine Corps 1

Automated data processing in theCorps 2

Scope of review 3

2 MANAGEMENT OF THE AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSINGPROGRAM SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED TO IM-PROVE CONTROL OVER COMPUTER RESOURCES 5Fragmented management of the Corps'

ADP and telecommunications program 5Management control over program re-

sources should be improved 9

3 LONG-RANGE PLANNING COULD BE IMPROVED 13Progrdm planning criteria 13The Marine Corps' ADP programplanning process 14

Standard systems have not workedwell 19

4 NEED TO DETERMINE USER REQUIREMENTS 21Why determine user requirements? 21Force information system 22Source data automation 28

5 NEED TO PERFORM ECONOMIC STUDIES OFALTERNATIVES 30

Economic study criteria 30Adequate economic studies not beingperformed 31

6 CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AGENCYCOMMENTS, A OUR EVALUATION 34

Conclusi-- 34Recommei.n ns 35Agency c !nts and our evaluation 35

APPENDIX Page

I Marine Corps computer installations 40

II Marine Corps' deployment history, 1960-75 41

II Inside the relocatable computer shelter 44

IV Letter dated January 10, 1977, from theAssistant Secretary of the Navy 45(Financial Management)

V Principal officials responsible foractivities discussed in this report 49

ABBREVIATIONS

ADP Automated data processing

GAO General Accounting Office

ISM International Business Machines Corporation

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

MISSION AND ORGANIZATIONOF THE MARINE CORPS

An integral part of te Department of the Navy, thethe United States Marine Corps serves with the fleet inseizing or defending advanced bases and in conducting landand air-ground support operations regardless of when orwhere those operations take place. The Corps may be calledon to conduct these operations during a full-scale war oLin a combat eme,:encv. 'lo fulfill these duties, the Corpbis responsible for developing amphibious warfare doctrines,tactics, techniques, and equipment. In addition, the Corpsprovides security forces for naval shore installations andships and American ehassies, legations, and onsulates incountries throughout the worl.d.

Or nlizationally, the Corps is composed of a combatforce and service support units. The rlationship betweenthese two major components is shown scheiatically in thediaaram on the following page. The combat force is calledthe Fleet Marine Forge and consists of three Marine Amphi-bious Forces. Each Marine Amphibious Force is made up ofan infantry division, an air ng, and related troops whoprovide combat service support functions, such as logistics,maintenance, and engineering. The needs of a particularcombat emergency situation determine tne size of the forcesthat will be deployed. This could be a unit of a hundred menor a full Marine Amphibious Force of about 50,000 men.

The Corps' service support units (referred to by theCorps as supporting establishment) recruit and train marines,provide logistical and equipment maintenance support to theFleet Marine Force when ioca'ed at established bases, andmaintain permanent oases, installations, and schools.

HEADQUARTERSUNITED STATES

MARINE CORPS

COMBAT FORCE |ERVICE SUPPORT 'JNITS(FLEET MARINE FORCE)

MARINE MARINE MARINEAMPHIBIOUS AMPHIBIOUS AMPHIBIOUS

FORCE FORCE FORCE

INFANTRY DIV. INFANTRY DIV. INFANTRY DIV.AIR WING AIR WING AIR ING

COMbAT SERVICE COMBAT SERVICE COMBAT SERVICESUPPORT TROOPS SUPPORT TROOPS SUPPORT TROOPS

AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING IN THE CORPS

Since many of the Corps' day-to-day administrative and

tactical inforvation applications have been automated, the

Corps is almost totally dependent on the availability of

computer support whether garrisoned at a permanent base or

deployed to a remote location in response to a war or combatemergency. Information applications include such functional

areas as personnel, logistics, finance and accounting, in-telligence data, fire and air support data, and other informa-

tion associated with administrative matters, whether used in

real or simulated combat operations. Applications such as

personnel, logistics, and finance and accounting may have ahigher priority and be processed ahead of other applications

at service support units. Conversely, the situation may re-verse itself in a real or simulated combat operation. For this

reason, the degree of workload mix in the processing of these

applications is based on the needs of its users at any time.

An impotart aspect of the Corps' mission is the ability

to effectively deploy men and materials to remote locations

on short notice. These deployments and the sustaining opera-

tions of the Marines are highly dependent on computer support.

2

Presently, separate automated ervice centers providecomputer support to the combat force and service supportunits. The Fleet Marine Force automated service centersuse computers to process various functional applications,such as supply, maintenance, and personnel. These applica-tions were developed under the force information system con-cept. This concept is intended to provide Corps commandersat all levels with an information system that contains bothadministrative and tactical information and responds to theirneeds regardless of whether they are located at a permanentbase or deployed in a war or combat emergency. Some of theseapplications are standard systems used throughout the Corps,while others are locally developed to meet the needs ofMarine Amphibious Force and Air Wing commanders. A totalof seven combat force automated service centers have beenestablished to support Fleet Marine Force components.

Similarly, the automated service centers used by theservice support units provide computer support to base,station, and depot commanders, as well as tenant commandsin the same geographic area. These centers generally processadministrative information systems which are similar to thoseprocessed n the combat force computers and which includefunctional areas, such as payroll, personnel, supply, andaccounting. Some of these functional applications arestandard systems used throughout the Corps and others arelocally developed.

While the Marine Corps has been spending only about-$41 million annually for the design, development, purchase,installation, and operation of computer information systems,the estimated cost in recent years for the Marine Corps it-self, including estimated amounts provided by the Navy, hasaveraged about $6.8 billion annually and for fiscal year 1977could exceed 7 billion. Thus, since without computers theCorps cannot function efficiently, effective computer supportis much more important than its annual cost of about $41 mil-lion would indicate.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

We evaluated the Corps' ability to provide this supportat an established base or at a remote location during a waror combat emergency. We reviewed Office of Management andBudget, General Services Administration, Department of De-fense, Department of the Navy, and Marine Corps circulars,guidelines, and rulations relating to automated dataprocessing (ADP) program management and planning. We alsoexamined pertinent records and documents at Marine Corps

3

headquarters, Washington, D.C., and at various Marine Corpsinstallations on the west and east coasts of the UnitedStates and interviewed responsible Marine Corps officials.

4

CHAPTER 2

MANAGEMENT O THE AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING

PROGRAM SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED TO IMPROVE CONTROL

OVER COMPUTER RESOURCES

The need for improved management of ADP programs withinthe Department of Defense has been of particular concernto the House Committee on Appropriations. In its Septem-ber 11, 1972, report (H. Rept. 92-1389), the Committee ex-pressed concern that the Department had not heeded its ad-vice, given several times, to establish a single officeresponsible for managing its data processing program. Itwas reported that management of the program continued tobe fragmented, especially in the area of systems relatedto tactical operations. The Committee recommended thatthe data processing program offices of the Office of theSecretary of Defense and their counterparts at the serviceheadquarters level be given control of the total programto insure the most efficient and economical use of com-puter resources. These offices were also to be responsi-ble for developing and coordinating long-range planning,to include Keeping abreast f industry developments, andproviding flexibility in Department ADP programs.

During war or combat emergency, computer support mustbe available to accompany the unit being deployed. Toprovide this support most effectively, the Corps shouldhave a single office responsible for the total ADP andtelecommunications program and for managing its computerresources. We found, however, that management of theCorps' administrative and tactical systems developmentefforts has been fragmented and has impaired the Corps'ability to effectively and efficiently provide neededcomputer support to its combat force and service supportunits.

FRAGMENTED MANAGEMENT OF THE CORPS'ADP AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROGRAM

The Corps' management of its ADP program has been frag-mented among five different offices with overlapping re-sponsibilities for the design, development, implementation,and operation of information systems. Coordination of ad-ministrative and tactical system development efforts waseither minimal or nonexistent. Consequently, these system

5

development efforts did not properly identify or consideruser information needs for those units that will dependon the computer for support. In addition, new computerequipment has been procured without assurance that it wasadequate to meet known and anticipated future informationneeds.

The five principal offices that had overlapping re-sponsibilities for the design, development, implementation,and operation of information systems were the InformationSystems Support and Management Division, the Plans and Op-erating Department, the Research and Studies Division, theTactical Systems Support Activity, and the Telecommunica-tions Division.

Information Systems Supportand Manaement D Tvsion

This division, hereafter referred to as the informationsystems division, was responsible for exercising centralizedcoordinating authority over the development, implementation,and support f information systems. This responsibilitywas to be fulfilled by coordinating, advising, and assistingthe headquarters staff agencies and Marine Corps commands intheir system development efforts. However, overlapping dutiesassigned to the other four offices rendered this division'sefforts ineffective.

Plans and Operations Department

This department was responsible for developing and man-aging the manual and automated systems for the operationsand readiness information requirements of the Commandantof the Marine Corps. Thus, this department was responsiblefor developing and managing automated systems that are re-sponsive to the Corps' operation and readiness informationrequirements for ground combat operations. However, thisresponsibility did not make clear whether the departmentwas to develop and manage adminstrative systems, tacticalsystems, or some combination of the two.

Research Development and Studies Division

This division was responsible for research and develop-ment requirements for information systems, particularlytactical information systems. To a great extent, this re-sponsibility was carried out by the Tactical Systems Sup-port Activity. There .as no requirement for the division

6

to coordinate its work with other offices responsiblefor administrative systems. Thus, there was no assurancethat development efforts by this division which may havebeen of value to nontactical system developments effortswere coordinated with the affected parties, or that systemdevelopment efforts by other offices were coordinated withthis division.

TacticalSystems Eeort Activity

This activity provided resources to develop and testtactical information systems. These systems include functionalareas, such as personnel, logistics, combat operations, intel-ligence data, and fire control information. Those few systemswhich are under development or are being field tested are tobe used in the 1980-90 time frame. As managed during our re-view, the Corps did not have any assurance that the work byother activities would be coordinated with and would not du-pl±-ate the efforts of this organization.

Telecommunications Division

This division was responsible for all matters relatedto providing telecommunications capabilities for administra-tive and tactical information systems. Inherent within thisresponsibility is the requirement to provide telecommunica-tions systems that are compatible with the Corps' adminis-trative and tactical systems and with those of other serv-ices. Because of the decentralized responsibilities of theother four offices, the Corps had no way :o assure itselfthat these telecommunications requirements were being ef-fectively and economically met.

Lack of a single ffice

Fragmented program management can occur when there isno central office to control information system developmentefforts. The lack of a single office responsible for theCorps' ADP program has led to the premature acquisition ofequipment (see p. 28) and the implementation and operationof systems that are not responsive to user needs (see p. 21).Systems that are not responsive to user needs cannot beconsidered successful systems no matter now well designedthey may be.

Problems associated with a recent test of computersillustrate the need for a single office to control infor-mation system development efforts. The information systems

7

division recently conducted a test using minicomputers tomeet the information needs of the combat force. This testwas conducte6 without participation by the Tactical Sys-tems Support Activity. Based on preliminary test results,these minicomputers will probably be purchased by theCorps. Since the Tactical System Support Activity didnot participate in these tests, its commanding officer ex-pressed concern that the planned procurement may not meetthe Corps' future tactical information needs as being de-fined and developed by his office. To minimize the pos-sibility of purchasing equipment that will r meet theneeds of its users, closer coordination is needed betweenthose offices developing administrative systems and thosedeveloping tactical systems.

Some of the problems and deficiencies noted in a May1975 headquarters staff study report relating to the lackof a single office for all Marine Corps ADP systems were:

-- There was no single coordinated approach to theplanning, development, procurement, operation, andlife cycle support of all Marine Corps ADP systemsto insure totally compatible administrative andtactical systems that work.

--There was no existing office for telecommunicationsand command and control system matters. The re-sponsibility was distributed throughout variousstaff agencies.

--There was no integrated telecommunications and com-mand and control master plan that establishes com-mon goals, design parameters, and operational con-cepts to guide the development of such systems.

After a preliminary realignment in response to theMay 1975 staff study, overall tactical system coordinationresponsibility was moved from the Research, Development,and Studies Division to the Plans and Operations Depart-ment, which was designated the formal point of contact forall tactical system planning, concept review, and develop-ment coordination. The information systems division wasgiven responsibility for providing technical automateddata systems support for tactical systems development.No changes were felt necessary in the responsibilitiesof the Telecommunications Division. In addition to theseresponsibility changes, a coordinating committee wascreated with representatives from headquarters offices

8

to assis: the Plans and Operations Department in its tacticalcommand and control responsibilities. So, under this realign-ment, the Marine Corps still had no single office responsiblefor the total data processing and telecommunications program.

One problem area resulting from the lack of a single of-fice for these interrelated programs is the difficulty ofachieving compatible information processing systems. orexample, the headquarters staff report recognized that therealignment of tactical systems management responsibilitiesdid not establish a way to relate tactical and administrativeinformation systems. One alternative considered by the studyteam that would have satisfied the need to coordinate tacticaland administrative information systems was to make the infor-mation systems division the coordinator of tactical systemdevelopment. However, this alternative was rejected becauseit would greatly extend the authority and control of the in-formation systems d-ision beyond the scope of its basic mis-sion as a coordinating authority over the development, imple-mentation, and support of information systems.

Establishment of a single office

On November 1, 1976, because of the deficiencies identi-fied in our draft report issued August 4, 1976, and theheadquarters staff study report issued in May 3975, theCorps realigned its DP and telecommunications program re-sponsibilities. The newly created office is known as theCommand, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Divi-sion, and, if properly staffed and implemented, should helpimprove program management and resolve many of the problemsdescribed in this re-ort.

MANAGEMENT CONTROL OVER PROGRAMRESOURCES S--OULD BE IMPROVED

The Marine Corps maintains separate medium-scale com-puter installations to process management-type systems forits combat force and service support units. This separa-tion has resulted in the Marine Corps installing and main-taining excess computer capacity and in the development ofseparate systems for similar applications. (See p. 19.)

Figure 1 illustrates the concentration of Marine Corps'computer installations on the west coast. The minicomputerslisted represent planned installation.

9

NEVADA

ARIZONAMARINE CORPS SUPPLY CENTER

0 BARSTOW - 360/40 (BASE)

SOUTHEnN CALIFORNIA

/1_ MILES MARINE CORPS BASE29 PALMS - IBM 360/30 (BASE)

*LOS ANGELES /

/ \MARINE CORPS AIR STATIONEL TORO - IBM 360/50 (FORCE)

/ IBM 360/30 (BASE) /

MARINE CORPS BASE. CAMP PENDLETON(2) IBM 360/65 (FORCE AND BASE)(3) MINCOMPUTERS (BASE)

PACIFIC OCEAN \

MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT MARIE CORPS AIR STATION[ SAN DIEGO

IBM 360/40 (BASE) YLA - TERMINAL (BASE)(2) MINICOMPUTERS (BASE)MEXICO

Figure 1. Marine Corps West Coast Computer Installations

Excess computer capacity

The force computers have never been fully used ingarrison, and Corps officials recognize that the computershave excess capacity to meet increased workloads duringdeployment; however, te amount of excess capacity neededhas not been specifically determined. The service supportunit or base computers also have unused capacity. Forexample, during the 6 months preceding the initiation ofour fieldwork the force computer centers at Camp Pendletonand El Toro were idle and available for productive use anaverage of 27 hours and 64 hours per week, respectively,while the base computer center at Camp Pendleton was idleand available for productive use 44 hours per week. Theidle time does not include time for preventive maintenance,repairs, or other necessary down time. See appendix I forthe location of all base and force computer centers.

10

Marine Corps Bulletin 5230, dated December 3, 1974,presented the concept of consolidating Marine Corps auto-mated data processing service centers as being entirelyfeasible, with a west coast consolidation as the firststep. Further, the consolidation study effort was to con-sider both service support unit and force data processingrequirements. Consolidation of the service support unitand force data processing requirements could

-- provide for more efficient and cost-effective dataprocessing support,

-- minimize the duplication cf programming effort,

-- reduce the inventory of data processing equipmentand its associated maintenance costs,

-- make available data processing equipment for reuseby other Government installations,

-- reduce the number of data processing personnel re-quired, and

-- reduce the administrati% overhead at the local andheadquarters levels required to support separatedata processing centers.

The Marine Corps study team, however, excluded the con-solidation of service support unit and force data processingrequirements and recommended that the service support unitcomputer centers, with the exception of the one at Barstow,be consolidated through the use of telecommunications toan upgraded Camp Pendleton computer center. (See pp. 16 and32 for discussion of upgrade procurement.) The service sup-port unit computers at E Toro, San Diego, and Twenty-ninePalms were to be retained with less peripheral equipmentand operated in a reduced mode as remote job entry devices--a function not normally performed by this type of equipment.The consolidation will, in effect, increase the total dataprocessing capability in southern California.

The procurement of source data entry minicomputers forselected service support units will further increase thecomputer capacity. (See p. 28.) The Marine Corps plans toinstall five minicomputers, costing about $200,000 each, attwo of the southern California bases. Although these mini-computers will substantially increase the data processingcapability at each site, they were not considered in the

11

above consolidation decision. The total procurement is for

14 minicomputers with an option to purchase 12 more, to be

installed at various other supporting establishments.

We believe that the Marine Corps should have considered

both the service support unit and force data processing re-

quirements in the west coast consolidation study. The fea-

sibility of this is indicated by the fact that the force and

service support unit systems are processed by one data proc-

essing facility at Camp Foster, Okinawa. (See p. 2 for

economic analysis considerations.) Generally, Marine Corps

officials take the poitLion that th? Corps must maintain

separate force facilities for the -t Marine Force to

provide deployable computer supp;j cr operational respon-

siveness. Powever, as discussed in chapter 4. the force

computer installations as they exist will not meet the de-

ployment needs of the users.

Although we recognize that computer support is neces-

sary during a deployed situation, we believe that the sepa-

rate combat force and service support unit computers centers

should be consolidated since the combat force computer cen-

ters will not meet the deployment needs of the users. For

this reason, the continuing anneal cost required to maintain

separate combat force (about $8 million) and service support

unit (about $11 million) computer centers may not be justi-

fied.

In addition, the Corps has to strengthen its practices

regarding the development of long-range plans integrating

administrative and tactical information, the determination

of user requirements, and the performance of economic analy-

sis supporting the selection of the best alternative. These

issues are discussed more fully in subsequent chapters of

this report.

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CHAPTER 3

LONG-RANGE PLANNING

COULD BE IMPROVED

The absence over a period of years of a single office toachieve coordinated management of the ADP program has resultedin the development of long-range plans which do not (1) providea reliable means for coordinating and integrating system de-velopment activities, (2) provide a means for identifyingmeasurable program objectives, and (3) insure competitive pro-curement of computer and related equipment. Moreover, standardsystems planned and designed for use throughout the Corps havenot worked well.

PROGRAM PLANNING CRITERIA

The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Departmentof the Navy have provided the Marine Corps with extensiveguidance on the management of its ADP program, including theneed for effective overall long-range planning.

In February 1970, the Deputy Secretary of Defense ex-pressed concern about the invariable delays and cost overrunsthat were being encountered when developing expensive, complexdata processing systems. He informed the Secretaries of themilitary departments that there was an urgent and immediateneed to insure that the development, expansion, or implemen-tation of an automated data system goes forward only when theDepartment can be assured that planning, economic analysis,and system monitoring procedures are comprehensive and welldocumented. As a result of these needs, the Deputy Secretaryof Defense requested that long- and short-range plans and ob-jectives be developed for automated system development effortsby each of the military departments. Specifically, Departmentof Defense components were to critically review all automateddata systems prior to their further development, implementa-tion, or expansion. This was to be accomplished by evaluating,on a case by case basis, their procedures and documentationfor planning the system development activity, conductingeconomic analysis of alternative system development efforts,and evaluating and reviewing ongoing system development ef-forts. This critical review was intended to help each ofthe military departments identify those syste developmentactivities which should be continued, modified, or terminated.

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THE MARINE CORPS' ADPPROGRAM PLANNING PROCESS

Prior to 1969, overall Marine Corps ADP program planningwas limited to studies on information system support require-ments. In August 1969, a data systems support plan was issuedfor th, acquisition, distribution, and management of computerresources in the Fleet Marine Force and service support unitactivities, excluding tactical systems, for fiscal years 1970through 1972. This plan was to provide a tool to manageresources to gain maximum efficiency and economy. The planwas to be updated annually; however, a revised plan was notissued until January 1975.

At that time, the Marine Corps published its first 5-year automated data system plan (fiscal years 1975-80) inresponse to a 1971 Department of the Navy requirement. TheNavy established the requirement for a 5-year plan to helpofficials manage ADP resources so that managers could beprovided with effective support and overall Government ex-penditures minimized. The plan was to contain a descriptionof the conceptual and policy basis for the plans, a descrip-tion of the existing data processing environment, objectivesand goals, and the planned action necessary to achieve them.

Planning needs coordinationand integration

In addition to the administrative information systems inoperation or being developed f the Fleet Marine Force, tac-tical information systems are be.ng developed for future MarineCorps use. Although needed, the Corps has not developed anoverall plan to facilitate the interface and coordination re-quired to achieve proper integration of its tactical andadministrative information systems. For the most part, actionsto solve problems are being proposed, studied, and evaluatedon their own merits, with no long-range goal or plan towardwhich collective efforts can be directed.

We reviewed the Marine Corps' 5-year ADP plan and foundthat even though the plan addresses tactical system develop-ment, it does not provide an overall plan integrating thedevelopment of tactical and administrative information sys-tems with those systems presently installed or under develop-ment. Distinct overlaps exist between planned tactical andadministrative inform, ion systems and duplicate informationin these systems. The Tactical System Support Activity hasbeen developing systems which partially duplicate existingor planned information systems in support of the lower Fleet

14

Marine Force command levels. The duplicate systems include

the functional areas of supply, mainitenance, personnel, and

status of forces.

Marine Corps representatives have been expressing con-

cern about the lack of integration between tactical and

administrative information systems for several years. For

example, in an August 1972 force information system con-

ference report, it was pointed ot hat there is no longer

a clear distinction between tactical and administative in-

formation systems, since it can be said that the business

of the Marine Corps today is the skillful management cf

tactical amphibious warfare. Later, during a March 1975

data processing officer conference, the Director of the

information system division at Marine Corps headquarters

expressed concern about the lack of tactical and adminis-

trative information system integration and reemphasized the

need for this integration.

Measurable _oect ives reuired

for _rogram control

A 1971 Department of Defense memorandum establishing

guidelines for economic analysis stated that objectives should

(1) be expressed in terms of function, processes, and antici-

pated outputs related to an identified problem, (2) be related

to the performance of the organization's assigned mission, (3)

contain explicit criteria for measuring the effectiveness with

which the problem is to be solved, and (4) specify the time

frane in which the objectives are to be met. For example,

statements such as "the objective is to provide management

with more accurate and timely information," would not be

acceptable.

The Marine Corps' 5-year plan contains 15 objectives

for the first 2 years of the plan (fiscal years 1975 and 1976)

and 11 additional objectives for the full period of the 5-year

defense program. Most of these objectives are general and

do not provide a good basis for measurement. For example,

some of the objectives were to

-- continue to program for the update of computer hardware

in the Corps,

-- continue efforts to standardize and integrate Navy/

Marine Corps common systems, and

-- establish the capability for higher headquarters to

exercise command and control over deployed forces.

15

None of these objectives were expressed in terms of anticipatedoutputs, specific time frames for completion, or a criterionfor measuring accomplishments. More detailed objectivesshould be initially developed at the command level and ap-proved at Corps level.

Nonspecific and unmeasurable objectives were alsoidentified during a Naval Audit Service evaluation begun inDecember 1973 of the computer system at the First MarineAmphibious Force, Camp Pendieton, California. The AuditService found that the bjectives established by the MarineCorps in December 1971 were stated in such general termsand stipulated such general conditions that they could notbe meaningfully evaluated. The Audit Service recommendedthAt the Corps establish more definitive objectives for theFleet Marine Force computer systems. The Commandant of theMarine Corps did not concur with the Audit Service recommenda-tion and did nct address the question of being able to makea meaningful evaluation of the attainment of objectives.The Audit Service did not consider the Marine Corps' commentsresponsive to this recommendation.

Need for formal planning toinsure competitive procuremenL

The Marine Corps decided to achieve equipment standard-ization within its automated data processing program by pro-curing thL computers of a single manufacturer. This is gen-erzlly considered acceptable within the life cycle of thesystem. However, we believe that the standardization shouldbe the result of effective planning and that competitiveprocurement of a standa:d system should comply with good man-agement practice as provided for in Federal management cir-culars and Department of Defense directives.

Federal agencies are required to follow, to the extentpossible, a competitive procurement policy when obtainingcomputer equipment. This is stated in Federal ManagementCircular 74-5, which requires that systems specifications bedesigned to insure free and open competition to all responsi-ble suppliers, manufacturers, and vendors. In addition,Federal Property Management Regulation 101-32.4 requiresagencies to obtain full and complete competition in allcomputer acquisitions, including the renewal of leases andpurchases of installed and leased equipment.

As of January 15, 1975, the Marine Corps reported aninventory of 31 computer systems, costing more than $44million. Twenty-seven 84 percent) of the systems were

16

those of a single manufacturer. These computer systems wereobtained from several sources, including alternate privateindustry suppliers other than the manufacturer (third-partyvendors) and Federal agency release of existing computers(reutilization).

The Marine Corps' overdependence on a single equipmentmanufacturer can best be shown by comments from selectedcorrespondence:

-- The Department of the Navy in February 1973 statedthat management determination over a period of timehad effectively "locked in" the Marine Corps to asingle manufacturer's equipment.

-- The General Services Administration, in March 1973,questioned the Marine Corps' proposed sole sourceequipment selection for a force computer wherebythey were precluded from fully carrying out theirresponsibilties in connection with the procurementof computer equipment on a fully competitive basis.

In August 1975, we submitted a letter to the Departmentof Defense questioning the Marine Corps' justification forthe sole source selection of an IBM 360/65 for the CampPendleton base computer center and for its continued practiceof limiting competition during acquisition of computer sys-tems. A copy of the letter was also sent to the Administratorof General Services for review and comment.

The Department of the Navy response for the Secretaryof Defense, dated October 23, 1975, did not address thisissue--it classified the procurement action as an interimupgrade of equipment.

The General Services Administration response to us,dated September 19, 1975, stated that it had been aware ofand concerned about the Marine Corps' continued practiceof sole source computer equipment selection and had broughtthis matter to the attention of the Deputy Assistant Secretaryof Defense in March 1973. However, due to the claimed urgencyof this request and in order to meet the Marine Corps' mis-sion requirements, General Services proceeded with the award.This decision was based partly on a Marine Corps plan providedto General Services which specifies that follow-on requirementswill be satisfied by competitive acquisition.

Federal Management Circular 74-5 requires that, if aninterim upgrade is acquired noncompetitively the agency shall

17

commit itself to replace the complete system which theinterim equipment s a part of. Such an acquisition is tobe based on new specifications and to be accomplishedthrough a competitive procurement -ithin 2 years of theinitial acquisition. The agency and the General ServicesAdministration may agree to a longer period when there areunusual circumstances. The Marine Corps has no firm plansregarding the future (2 years) replacement of the servicesupport unit computer system other than a general statementabout the replacement of all IBM 360 computers beginningin 1979 (about 4 years from the acquisition).

The commitment by an agency to go competitive withina period not exceeding 2 years should be strictly enforcedby the General Services Administration, according to theHouse Committee on Government Operations. In addition, thiscompetitive procurement should be accompanied by major ef-forts to streamline and improve the ADP procurement system.

The Marine Corps' primary justification for the solesource selection of computer equipment is that they have astandard family of equipment so that they can avoid anypossible reprogramming and personnel training cost. However,Federal Management Circular 74-5 provides that, when consider-ing reprogramming costs, care must be taken to avoid biaseswhich may prejudice competition.

Reprogramming costs can be minimized by consideringthe use of computers which are designed to use IBM software(the software presently used by the Corps) with minimal re-programming effort. However, there are only two othnerbrands of computers designed specifically to use IBM soft-ware. Thus, competition would be limited to three computerequipment manufacturers and third-party vendors who handlethose brands.

If the Corps had generally planned to use softwarethat could be readily adopted to other computers, then theconversion costs to different computers could be minimized.This situation applies particularly to software used formaintaining data bases, because data bases represent aninformation resource and usually require substantial in-vestment.

We believe that formal planning for future systemsbased on valid user needs and the development of application(functional) compu ter programs using machine-transferable

18

software 1/ could result in more competitive acquisition ofcomputer equipment.

STANDARD SYSTEMS HAVE NOT WORKED ELL

The Marine Corps has developed standard systems to meetthe needs of the local users and field activities. However,since the standard systems have not been effective, localsystems have proliferated and field activities have spentmuch time attempting to make standard systems work properlyand suit their needs.

Department of the Navy policy requires automated systemsto be standardized as much as possible and that such systemsbe developed and maintained centrally. The purpose of thepolicy is to facilitate the interchange of information andpersonnel and to reduce the costs of system design, develop-ment, purchase, operation, and maintenance.

In its 5-year data processing plan issued in January1975, the Corps identified all of the standard systems andlocal systems implemented, being developed, and under con-ceptual design. The number of local systems shows that theCorps has a long way to go in developing standard systems tomeet users' needs. A schedule of the number of standardand local systems by functional area is provided below.

Functional Standard Localarea systems systems

Manpower 8 41Logistics 8 55Aviation 7 0Financial 15 55Operations 2 10Miscellaneous 0 23

Total 40 184

An example of a standard ;ystem not meeting the needsof the users is the fnancial management system being usedby the service upport units. The system was implementedto facilitate accounting, budgeting, and financial report-ing. It was to have provided the local manager with the

l/Machine-trancferable software can be used on the equipmentof more than one manufacturer without extensive recodingor recomlpiling.

19

capability to extract financial data for local managementneeds through local retrieval programs. However, as evidencedby comments made at a 1975 financial management seminar,local users have not been satisfied with the system. Some ofthe comments were as follows:

-- Locally developed compcter reports provide betterinf)rmatiorn that the standard system.

-- Portions of the system ,-utput are totally useless.

--The system creates poor nanagement tools and is almostuseless to cost center managers.

The resource cost and utilization system, another standardsystem, also has not met the needs of field activities. Itwas designed to collect, process, and produce computer utiliza-tion data for each of the automated service centers and thenprovide this information to Marine Corps headquarters and thelocal cc anders to assist them in managing data processingresource- However, local commanders have had to rely uponmanufacturdr-provided computer utilization monitoring systemsto satisfy their needs. For example, the resource cost andutilization system does not provide statistics for remote jobentry devices. During our review, the Marine Corps was pre-paring to replace the system with a new standard system.

The Corps has also been implementing standard systemsat its field activities before havina a fully operationalstandard system. As a result, field activities have spenta great deal of effort to make the system work. For example,based on supporting establishment conferences held in Apriland May 1973, it was concluded that between 70 and 90 percentof the local data processing programmer/analyst time is con-sumed writing local applications to make the standard systemswork properly. The Naval Audit Service also found this prob-lem during a 1975 audit of the data processing operationsof Camp Pendleton, California. The Audit Service found thatsubstantial field support effort on standard syrtems wasdraining local resources. It was concluded that to avoidfuture unnecessary and disruptive overloads on computer per-sonnel resources at the field activity level, the standardsystems should be adequately .ested and proved before dis-tribution to user activities.

20

CHAPTER 4

NEED TO DETERMINE USER REQUIREMENTS

The Marine Corps has developed and installed computersystems without adequately determining user needs. As aresult, millions of dollars have been spent for computersystems which do not fully meet the information needs ofMarine commanders and could, therefore, hinder their opera-tional effectiveness, especially during emergency deploy-ment situations.

WHY DETERMINE USER REQUIREMENTS?

Determining user information requirements is an impor-tant prerequisite to effective computer system acquisitionbecause it allows the critical matching of information needswith the computer resources necessary to meet those needs.

Federal Management Circular 74-5, dated July 30, 1974(which supersedes the Office of Management and Budget Cir-cuiars A-54, dated October 14, 1961, and A-27, dated June 15,1964), and Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5236.1, datedDecember 17, 1971, provide policy guidance concerning theplanning and studies that should precede selecting and ac-quiring computer equipment. The regulations specificallystate that:

-- Identification of the data automation requirementsis the first action to be taken in the acquisitionprocess.

-- Determination of need shall be based upon well-documented general systems and/or feasibilitystudies.

The importance of determining user information require-ments is best summed up in a March 1973 statement by theMarine Coips Commandant: "* * * time, effort, and moneyspent to develop any system are worthless, unless the sys-tem produces the required results for the 'users' * * *."

Our examination of selected projects implemented orunder development showed that formal user requirementsstudies were not made before major system acquisitionswere begun.

21

FORCE INFORMATION SYSTEM

The force information system is a set of computer appli-cation programs that are intended to fulfill the informationneeds of the force commanders. The Marine Corps has spentmore than $9 million to develop and install its force infor-mation system concept for the Fleet Marine Force withoutmaking formal user requirement studies. As a result, thecomputer equipment and systems installed under the concepthave not adequately met the needs of force commanders, partic-ularly ding deployment. According to the assistant direc-tor of the information systems division, there were inade-quate time and resources available for formally determininguser requirements. (See app. I for the locations of theforce computers.)

Some of 'he more critical shortcomings of the systemare:

ADP support is not readily available to Fleet MarineForce commanders during emergency deployment situations.

Portability of the computer and its shelter (see p. 23)to a combat or emergency deployment situation is un-tested.

At the time of our review, n adequate self-containedpower supply was not available to run the computer ina deployed situation.

A discussion of each of these areas follows.

Suport_ durin9 _deployment limited

The need for computer support was evaluated in a MarineCorps sponsored study conducted by the Stanford ResearchInstitute and reported on in October 1974. According tothe study, it is impractical for a Fleet Marine Force tooperate with major automated data system support in garrisonand then revert to manual operation when deployed. It wasconcluded that the Fleet Marine Force is rapidly approach-ing the point where access to computers is mandatory forthe successful command and control of task force operations.

When a Marine Amphibious Force commander orders a unitto deploy, computer support is limited to shipboard updatingof computer files during the unit's movement to the objec-tive area. The small shipboard computers are not capable

22

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of processing the major force systems developed to operateon medium-scale IBM 36U computers. After reaching the ob-jective area, the unit moves ashore and establishes a logis-tics base on the beach. Except for operational aspects,such as air and naval gunfire support, the landing forceeventually separates itself from shipboard support. Atthis point, the only Marine Corps computer support in thearea is limited to dedicated Marina aviation computer sys-tems, which are eployed only if Marine air groups take artin the mission.

Even though the Corps is dependent on data processingto support logistics, manpowe, and financial managementfunctions, its capabilities fr providing that support todeployed commanders are liimitd to relocating the garrisonforce computer to the objective area. Marine AmphibiousForce officials advised us that this would only be done formajor deployments involving an entire amphibious force, and,even then, this support would not be available for 2 or 3months after the landing since it takes at least that longto relocate a service center. It should be noted that anentire amphibious force carries with it only enough suppliesfor a limited period of operation. Thus, compluter supportneeded in a deployed environment would not be vailable intime to help reprovision these troops.

Discussions with amphibious force officials and a re-view of Marine Corps deployment contingency plans disclosedthat, although nearly half of these plans would requireunits of less than amphibious force size to deploy, theCorps does not have computer resources available to supportthem. Further, the Marine Corps' 5-year data processingplan dated January 1975 indicates that the Corps may welldeploy less than Marj;ie Amphibious Forces size units. Forinstance, during the past 15 years the Marine Corps hasdeployed its forces seven times in emergencies. In six ofthese instances, the Corps deployed less than Marine Amphi-bious Force size units. (See ap. II for descriptions ofthe deployments.)

Even if the force computer is deployed, there is stilla srious gap in the automation cycle which is importantto the command and control of men and material. Unlikegarrison, deployed units are evered from a cntralizedcomputer service center and have no internal data processingor data entry capability. Currently, these units wouldhave to either (1) revert to manual means of accountingfor people and material or (2) depend on the naval message

24

and courier service to transmit data back to the large com-puter center. Both of these alternatives have proven tobe unacceptable. For example, based on Corps experience,if deployed units are engagedF the data and information re-quirements soon reach unmanageable proportions which cannotbe handled manually. Further, the naval message or courierservice has been unsatisfactory in meeting the combat com-mander's need for timely feedback of rocessed information.

System portability untested

The effectiveness of the force information system con-cept is ependent on providing mobile computer support todeployed units; yet, the Corps has never tested the feasi-bility of moving the force computer centers. No tests ofthe system's portability, vulnerability, or survivabilityhave been performed and the viability of this concept ofsupport has been questioned by Marine Amphibious Force offi-cials and service center directors.

Under the force information system concept, the Corpsgenerally plans to relocate a force computer center to sup-port a deployed unit of Marine Amphibious Force size orlarger. This would involve securing a safe area in whichto operate a relocated force computer center, dismantlingan established center, shipping the computer and shelterto the secured site, reassembling them, and making the sys-tem operational. The Marine Corps estimates this wouldtake about 2 or 3 months.

Discussions with Marine Amphibious Force officials in-dicated that even though it is physically possible to re-locate a computer center to support a deployed unit, it isan undesirable task and it would be very difficult to pre-pare a site, dismantle the "portable" shelter and computer,and reerect it. Some of the officials also believe theMarine Corps may be "putting all its eggs in one basket"by deploying one large computer system which could be "wipedout" in a single enemy attack. They believe it may be betterto obtain and deploy small mobile systems. That would im-prove the portability and survivability of data processingsupport. Computer center directors also believe it isphysically possible to relocate the centers. However, theywere more concerned with the portability and environmentalprotection offered by the "portable" shelter. Typicalproblems reported to Corps headquarters or discussed atuser conferences were as follows:

25

-- The relocatable computer shelters are completely un-suitable because they leak through the roof and thewalls and condensation formed at the airconditioningducts is sprayed into the module and onto the equip-ment. In addition, some shelters are not deployabledue to structural damage. Permanent roofs have beenbuilt over these shelters to prevent further damagefrom the weather.

-- Problems with the shelter can be isolated to twoareas: roof and sidewall leaks and vulnerability todust and dirt. These problems are intolerable ingarrison and conceivably would be greatly increasedin a deployed environment.

--Inadequacies of some of the shelters have resultedin two problems (1) the valuable computer equipmentis in danger of sustaining damage or possible totalloss and (2) the shelter, in its present condition,is no longer relocatable and, as such, can not sup-port a deployment.

--The shelter's plywood walls offer a distinct firehazard--even with flame-retardent paint.

As can be seen, these comments by Corps officials leave se-rious doubts concerning the successful relocation of theforce computer centers. (See app. III for additional pho-tographs of the relocatable shelter.)

Although the Marine Corps has recognized the undesir-ability of relocating the force computer centers, it hasprocured two additional shelters for about $422,600. Theseadditional shelters were procured because the existing hel-ters cannot be readily dismantled and reassembled. Theshelters will be held in prepositioned war reserve stockto meet contingency needs. The prepositioning of theseshelters will not appreciably alter the time required toprovide needed computer support in a deployed environment.

Power supply inadequate

At the time of our review, the force computer centersdid not have an adequate backup portable power supply toprovide garrison and deployed users with uninterrupted serv-ice when other sources of electric power are not available.In our opinion, having an adequate portable power supplyas a primary source of power is an absolute necessity for

26

effective data processing support. It is particularly criti-cal during deployment when other sources of power may not beavailable or dependable.

The necessity of such a portable power supply was recog-nized by the Corps when the relocatable computer center con-cept was established. The Marine Amphibious Force equipmentinventories for the force ccmputer centers were to includeelectrical power generators. However, although Marine Corpsheadquarters was to furnish the generators, they were nevermade part of the unit's actual inventory of equipment.

In 1974, 2 years after the initial procurement of theforce computers, the following comments were made at a forceinformation system users conference:

"There is currently no emergency backup powerfor the computer service center in garrisonand none is expected since it is normally pro-vided only to hospitals and communicationscenters. In addition, no specific organiza-tions or generators have been identified toprovide power to deployed force computercenters."

In May 1975, 3 years after the initial procurement ofthe computers, Marine Corps headquarters officials stated:

"The in garrison force computer centers arepowered by commercial electric power with noprovision for a backup power supply. Thepower source when deployed will be enginepowered generators, which will be kept inprepositioned war reserves until releasedby the force commander."

This indicates to us that during deployment emergen-cies, when data processing support will be critical to mis-sion effectiveness, the force computer center will beforced to compete with other organizations for power sources.In addition, the ability of the present war reserve genera-tors to adequately power the computer and the 14 environmen-tal control air-conditioners has never been tested and isquestionable even to Marine Corps headquarters officials.Because of this, the Corps has issued a contract to designand de!velop a generator which will adequately power thecomputer center.

27

Marine Corps solutions to shortcomings

Fleet Marine Force automated support was characterizedby Marine Corps headquarters in a May 1975 requirements doc-ument as inflexible, highly centralized, inadequate duringdeployments, and nonresponsive to lower echelon informationrequirements.

In an attempt to be more responsive to all commandlevels and to develop adequate deployable computer support,the Marine Corps is now spending additional funds to deter-mine user requirements and test the practicality of usingminicomputers to support deployed commanders. The Corpswill be performing studies to determine what computer sup-port the user actually needs during deployment and whatequipment will best fulfill those needs.

We believe this action is a step in the right direction;however, the cntinued expenditure of more than $8 millionannually to o rate separate force computer centers ishighly questionable because the installed computers do notadequately meet the deployment needs of the users.

SOURCE DATA AUTOMATION

The Marine Corps initiated a $2.8 million procurementof source data entry computer systems without fully deter-mining the needs of all potential users. At the time ofthe procurement, the Corps had no assurance that sourcedata automation was feasible or needed.

On December 30, 1975, the Department of dhe Navy awardeda contract to acquire 14 small-scale computer systems at acost of about $200,000 each. The computer systems will beused to automate portions of the data input function at se-lected Marine Corps service support units.

The Corps in February 1975 requested prospective serv-ice support unit users to determine their need for the com-puters and to submit the following justification informationby April 30, 1975: the functions and applications wheresource data automation can be used, the system design andflow charts to allow comparison between like systems atdifferent locations, the rough estimates of economic justi-fication, and the type of devices needed to meet their re-quirements. However, the request for proposal was issued

28

before Marine Corps headquarters received all the justifi-cation packages. At the time the equest for proposal wasissued, headquarters had received only 3 out of 6 justifi-cation packages from those organizationj selected to receivethe 14 sytems.

29

CHAPTER 5

NEED TO PERFORM

ECONOMIC STUDIES OF ALTERNATIVES

The Mrine Corps has been purchasing data processingequipment without either thoroughly performing required

economic studies or adequately considering all available

alternatives in satisfying user requirements. As a result,

the Corps has spent substantial resources for data proces-sing equipment without the added assurance that the most

effective service was obtained at the least cost.

ECONOMIC STUDY CRITERIA

Office cf Management and udget policies and guide-

lines, Federal Property Management Regulations, and Depart-ment of Defense and Marine Corps regulations require that

well-documented economic studies be performed prior toacquiring data processing equipment. The studies are toinclude

-- a detailed comparative cost analysis for the exist-

ing and proposed system and

-- an evaluation of benefits and costs of the proposed

system design and cost implications of alternativesfor satisfying data processing and communicationrequirements.

In addition, Federal Property Management Regulations (Sub-

part 101-32.11) require a data communications study todetermine the need or types of computer equipment to be ac-

quired when remote terminals are to provide data input andobtain data output.

Accordingly, the study results should provide a sound

Dasis for selecting an alternative which will provide thehighest practical degree of effectiveness, efficiency, andoperational economy.

We have reported to the Congress on this issue ofeconomic analysis for automated data processing systems.For example, in our report "Ways to Improve Management of

Automated Data Processing Resources: Department of theNavy" (LCD-74-110, Apr. 16, 1975), we recommended that theSecretary of the Navy issue more definitive guidance for

30

making economic analyssa and establish a program for educat-ing the field organizations in economic analysis techniques.Further, the guidance should require that the economic analy-sis be performed before systems are submitted for review andapproval by higher management. Provision should also be madefor obtaining appropriate assistance from the Naval AuditService in evaluating the analysis before it is submittedfor approval.

ADEQUATE ECONOMIC 5.UDIESNOT BEING PERFORMED

Fleet Marine Force computeracquisition

The Marine Corps has acquired approximately $9 millionin Fleet Marine Force computer equipment, beginning in 1972,without making an adequate economic study of alternativeways to providing servicp to the users. According to Corpsofficials, the only econinic analysis studies performed priorto the medium-scale computer acquisitions were for the feasi-bility of automating the force supply and maintenance func-tions. These functions were two of several potential appli-cations to be operated on the computer. No studies wereperformed of alternative ways of satisfying the data proces-sing equipment requirements.

The Marine Corps had originally attempted to acquireits force computers through inclusion in the World Wide Mili-tary Command and Contir.l System procurement plan of the Of-fice of Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, when the full re-quest could not be met, a plan was adopted to use computersbeing released by Defense activities participating in theprocurement plan (reutilization). Although economic justi-fications were required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff toacquire computers through their progr.,.a, once the reutili-zation plan was approved the Corps made no effort to econo-mically justify the selected alternative. Further, onlythe first two computers were acquired under the reutiliza-tion plan--the remaining five were purchased commercially.

Prior to approval of the reutilization plan, one forcecommander proposed an alternative solution which may haveprovided a more cost-effective means of satisfying userneeds. He suggested that the Corps upgrade the servicesupport unit installation to accommodate force ingarrisonrequirements and maintain contingency capability for de-ployment. However, no detailed economic analysis of thisalternative was made. Corps headquarters officials commented

31

that this alternative was not studied since the action wasconsidered inferior to that of maintaining separate forceand service support unit computer facilities to supporttheir distinct missions.

West coast consolidat ion acquisition

During our review, the Marine Corps replaced an IBM360 model 50 with a model 65 computer to begin implementinga west coast consolidation plan at Camp Pendleton, Califor-nia, without making thorough economic studies of alterna-tives.

In September 1974, a Marine Corps staff study revealedthat significant benefits could be obtained through theconsolidation of several of its west coast data processinginstallations. With the current state of the art in datacommunications, it was recognized that serious considera-tion needed to be given to consolidating some of the sevencomputer installations in southern California. (See p. 10for a map of the computer installations.) Consequently,consolidation was recommended for four of the installations,to be accomplished through an upgrade of the Camp Pendleton'sservice support unit computer so that the workload of theother three installations could be processed on a centralcomputer through remote terminals. The consolidation wasto eliminate at least 21 personnel and save approximately$230,000 annually.

The staff study was primarily concerned with determin-inc the size of a compatible computer needed to processthe combined workload of the four installations. The needfor a computer the size of an IBM 360/65 was determined bySimulating a typical 8-hour workload for each installation.Current wordloads and workload scheduling were assumed bythe Corps to be valid and each command was to be providedequivalent data processing capability and support as wasreceived before the consolidation.

To implement the consolidation, the Marine Corps de-cided to downgrade existing IBM 350/30 and 40 computersto operate as remote terminals, even though less expen-sive and possibly more appropriate trmral equipmentmay have been available to provide comparable performancefor remote job entry processing. As a result of this andthe Marine Corps' failure to adequately evaluate otheravailable alternatives, we sent a letter to the Secretary

32

of Defense, suggesting that specific questions be resolvedbefore the consolidation. Some of the questions were:

-- Would a revalidation of workload and data processingrequirements result in a reduction of work to bedone?

--Could the performance of existing facilities be im-proved through rescheduling, software changes, im-proved work center procedures, or extended shiftoperations?

--Is the point-to-point concept of teleprocessing themost cost-effective alternative?

-- Can minicomputers front-end the installed base com-puter at Camp Pendleton sufficiently to handle theinput and output processing workload for some ofthe overhead or supervisory functions, such as com-munication and data management?

-- Is n IBM 360 computer best for teleprocessing needsin light of increased communication capabilitiesassociated with new lines of processors?

-- Can the resources of the Corps' force automated serv-ice centers be used, in the interim, until appropriatecost-benefit studies have been conducted and decisionsmade concerning the use of source data automation whichwill employ minicomputers?

In addition, the letter pointed out that the MarineCorps, although requested, could not provide a formal dataprocessing and communications study which evaluated the otheravailable alternatives suggested by these questions. Conse-quently, we expressed our opinion that the Corps had notanswered the questions in a manner that would justify theconsolidation as the optimum cost-benefit approach.

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Manage-ment) replied to our letter by concluding that the MarineCorps' consolidation plan was the "most efficient and costeffective alternative for the interim satisfaction of validsupport requirements." However, the Navy's reply did notaddress the questions raised in our letter and appears tohave allowed the procurement on the basis of being an in-terim upgrade before implementing a new computer hardwareconcept for the i980s, a concept for which the Marine Corpshas no firm plans.

33

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS,

AGENCY COMMENTS, AND OUR EVALUATION

CONCLUSIONS

The Marine Corps' dependency on automated data process-

ing support has increased to a point where its operationaleffectiveness is substantially affected by the availabilityof that support. Even though the Corps has recognized thatfragmented program management has not produced a well-

coordinated data processing program, it was hesitant to placetotal program management under a single office as recommendedby the House Committee on Appropriations.

We believe the Corps can improve the management of itsdata processing and telecommunications programs by establishinga single office with responsibility and appropriate author-ity for total program management and developing a coordinatedlong-range plan integrating tactical, administrative, andtelecommunications systems requirements. Also, with a singleoffice more emphasis can be directed toward assuring conform-ance with Government regulations dealing with the determina-tion of user requirements, the use of standard systems, theperformance of economic analysis of alternatives, and com-petition during equipment acquisitions.

User requirement studies, if properly performed, givemanagement a basis for deciding how an automated systemshould be developed to meet the ultimate user's needs.System design problems and program changes always occurduring the development of a new system; however, ith properuser requirement studies, they can be minimized.

The Corps did not perform formal user requirementstudies before spending millions of dollars to develop adeployable automated data system for its Fleet Marine Forceunits. Deployable computer support is needed when a unitis called to meet an emergency situation outside the conti-nental United States. To date, the Corps has achieved limitedsuccess in providing this support and, as a result, has in-itiated a major project to test the feasibility f providingan alternate means of support. Also, they are determininguser needs, the best method or meeting those needs. andhow to do so within available resources. We believe theseare steps in the right direction; however, the continuedexpenditure of at least $8 million a year for the operation

34

of several separate medium-scale computer centers--which inall likelihood will not meet the needs of deployed commanders--does not appear advantageous.

The Corps has not been performing adequate economicanalysis of alternative ways of meeting user needs and, whenacquiring equipment, has not obtained full competition.Therefore, it has no assurance that the most cost-effectivemethod to provide service was used or that the lowest costwas obtained when procuring the computer equipment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense directthe Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the MarineCorps to:

-- Effectively implement a single office authorized tomanage the planning, coordinating, and monitoring ofall administrative and tactical data processing andrelated telecommunications operations.

-- Develop an overall, long-range program plan, integrat-ing tactical, administrative, and related telecommun-ications systems requirements.

--Reconsider the need to separate the Corps' combatforce and service support unit computer installations.

-- Improve the effectiveness of the Corps' standard sys-tems for meeting the needs of the local users, includ-ing, where necessary, redesigning the systems.

-- Make sure there is greater compliance with Governmentregulations regarding the determination of user dataprocessing requirements, the evaluation of costs andbenefits available from alternative courses of action,and the competitive acquisition of computer equipmentincluding the use of machine-transferable software.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

By letter dated January 10, 1977 (see app. IV), theAssistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management),on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, commented on ourfindings and recommendations. He acknowledged that severalof our recommendations have merit and that the Marine Corpshas initiated appropriate corrective action. However, the

35

Marine Corps takes exception to the presentation in thereport of problems previously identified by the Corps asthough they are GAO audit disclosures. In addition, theAssistant Secretary said that there are two broad im-plications in the report which are inappropriate and re-flect adversely on ADP management by the Corps. The im-plications are that the Marine Corps

-- has not effectively complied with Government regula-tions on the acquisition of computer resources and isoverly dependent on one computer manufacturer and

--has not effectively identified or satisfied userre uirements.

The Assistant Secretary stated that the most significantimplication concerns compliance with Government regulationson the competitive acquisition of computer resources. Hestated that while 27 of the Corp's 31 central processing unitsare manufactured by a single manufacturer, it should be notedthat many of these were purchased from third-party vendors(alternate private industry suppliers other than the manufac-turer) or through reutilization of computers released byanother Federal agency, and they are not necessarily equippedwith the same brand of peripheral equipment. He also statedthat it is inaccurate to imply that the Marine Corps is overlydependent on one manufacturer and pointed out that duringfiscal year 1975, only 5 percent of the Corps' prrocurementdollars were spent with the selected manufacturer and thatfigure dropped to 2 percent during fiscal year 1976.

Our review showed that by procuring the computers ofa single manufacturer from 19. _o 1974, the Marine Corps'procurements have in varying uerees resulted in less thanthe free and open competition contemplated by Governmentpolicy and regulations. The Corps acquired seven medium-scaleIBM 360 computers for its force automated service centers,two of which were acquired through the reutilization of com-puters released by another Federal agency. The remainingfive were obtained through third-party vendors. However, theMarine Corps' past and present policy is to assign personnelequally to combat force and service support units. Since theCorps had acquired IBM computers for its service support units,it selected IBM for its force omputers so that it couldstandardize its systems and applications software and thetrainina of data processing personnel. The Corps was alsoconcerned with finding a vendor who would provide maintenanceservice in combat areas. Confident that, based on the main-tenance support it provided during the Vietnaa conflict,

36

IBM would provide such service, the Corps apparently did notevaluate the potential combat support capability of othervendors. This policy, as implemented by the Corps, has theeffect of limiting full and free competition as contemplatedby applicable law and regulations.

No economic analysis studies were performed of alter-native ways of satisfying the force ADP requirements. Theonly studies made before the force computer acquisitionswere for the feasibility of automating the force supply andmaintenance functions and a computer simulation analysis todetermine the appropriate IBM 360 computer needed. We believethat while there is limited competition in the acquisitionof specified make and model computer equipment through third-party vendors, it is clearly not the full and free competi-tion contemplated by applicable law and regulations.

Federal Management Circular 74-5, which is one of theimplementing mechanisms of the Brooks Act, requires that ef-fective planning and economic analysis precede the selectionof computer resources. After a competitive selection, webelieve there should be no objection to requiring that theselected brand of hardware be used for the life of the des-ignated ADP system.

We further believe that the Assistant Secretary's ref--erence to fiscal year 1975 and 1976 procurement data isnot illustrative of nondependence on one computer manufac-turer for ADP support. The major computer systems operatedby the Fleet Marine Force and supporting establishment ac-tivities were acquired before fiscal year 1975 and re-quired, over the years, a substantial investment in softwareto operate them.

We recognize that the Marine Corps has made recent im-provements in the competitive procurement of ADP resources.The Marine Corps acquired 14 small-scale computer systemsat a cost of about $200,000 each. Through the competitiveprocurement process, the Corps was able to save about $1.4million over the estimated cost of the small-scale computersystems. We believe that the Corps could also realize sub-stantial savings on future procurements if they are completedin a fully competitive manner.

The Assistant Secretary said our report implies thatuser requirements can be completely defined at the outsetand will remain static during the several years the systemis being developed. He stated that the Corps has defined

37

user requirements several times during a particular systemsdevelopment cycle a has experienced several levels of usersatisfaction.

We recognize that user requirements do not remain staticand must be refined during a system's life cycle. However,determining current and projected information requirementsthrough comprehensive studies is an important prerequisiteto etfective computer system acquisition because it helpsidentify the computer resources necessary to meet the cur-tent and projected user needs. Our review showed that theCorps did not perform formal user requirement studies beforespending millions of dollars for computer systems which donot fully meet the information needs of Marine commanders,and as such, could hinder their operational effectiveness,especially during emergency deployment situations. Many ofthe present shortcomings of the force computer system mayhave been identified and avoided or corrected in a moretimely manner had comprehensive user requirement studiesbeen made. Therefore, our principal criticism was not thatthe Marine Corps changes its requirements during systems de-velopment. Rather, the Corps had lot adequately establishedinitial requirements before making its decision to purchase.

The need to perform comprehensive user requirementstudies is also reflected in the Corps' planning ani develop-ment of standard systems. Our review shows tat the MarineCorps has not been entirely effective in developing standardsystems to meet the needs of local users. The Marine Corpshas developed 40 standard systems, while there are 184 localsystems in many of the same functional areas. The number oflocal systems suggests that the Corps should improve in theirplanning and development of standard systems to meet userneeds.

The Assistant Secretary also said that, during thereview, we were provided with internal documentation ofseveral problems previously identified by the Marine Corps.Solutions which had been developed and implemented were alsoidentified. He said that some of the prior problems havebeen identified in the report as though they are audit dis-closures and, accordingly, the Marine Corps takes exception.

Our intent was not to obscure the fact that the MarineCorps had identified some of its own problems. We agree withthe Assistant Secretary that the Corps had recognized someof its problems and was taking steps to correct them. How-ever, before our review, solutions developed and implementedby the Corps were ineffective in resolv -, :u wn problems

38

primarily because the Corps did not concentrate the manage-ment of its automated data processing and telecommunicationsprogram into a single office. After our audit and the is-suance of a draft of this report, the Corps established onNovember 1, 1976, a single office to be responsible for thisprogram. This office is known as the Command, Control,Communications and Computer Systems Division, and, if properlystaffed and implemented, it should help resolve many of t ·

problems described in this report and help improve programmanagement.

With regard to our recommendations, the Assistant Secre-tary stated that:

-- The Marine Corps implemented on November 1, 1976, theintegration of command and control, operations, tele-communications, and information system functions tofacilitate the consolidation of resources and improvethe management of data processing and telecommunica-tions.

-- rhe development of a long-range program plan integrat-ing all tactical, administrative, and telecommunica-tions systems requirements will follow as a matterof course, upon implementation of the consolidationeffort referred to above.

-- The Corps has instituted an active investigation ofthe feasibility of selective consolidation of forceand service support unit computer centers.

-- The Corps has taken action to improve the effectivenessof standard systems by establishing the source dataautomation program and the central design and programingactivity concept, which, when fully implemented, willbe more responsive to the needs of local users.

-- The Corps has not only taken action but continues toreview policy to assure compliance with establishedGovernment regulations regarding the determinationof user data processing requirements, tht evaluationof costs and benefits available from alternativecourses of action, and the competitive acquisitionof computer equipment.

These actions, particularly the ones related to ADPprogram responsibility and planning, are generally consistentwith our recommendations and, if properly implemented, shouldimprove the Corps' management of its data processing resources.

39

APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

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APPENDIX II APPENDIX II

MARINE CRS DEPLOYMENT HISTORY

1960-75

Location Date Unit s ze Description

Thailand 1961-62 Unuer Marine When a civil war in Laos threateneaAmphibious Force to spill over into Thailand, a Marine

helicopter squadron was deployed toThailand in March 1961 to providelogistical support to the government.The following year, U.S. forces landeato bolster Tnailand against possibleaggression Dy Communist guerrilas fromLaos. Marines began landing at Udornon May 16, 1962, in what was intenuedto be a show of force. Phased with-drawals of Marines began in late June,and by July 31, 1962, all Marine com-bat elements had left Thailand.

Cuba Oct.-Dec. Under Marine In October 1962, the United States an-1Y62 Amphibious Force nounced a buildup of Soviet arms in

size Cuba. The first Marine units werealerted by about October 19. Marineunits from the west coast sailed throughthe Panama Canal ana remained on boardsnips in the Caribbean. Other unitswere air lifted to Guantanamo. Eastcoas air and ground units were aeployedto various Caribbean areas and to Floridaaor were alerted for possible eployment.By the end of December, the crisis hadended and Marine units had returned tohome bases.

Dominican April-June Under Marine In April 1965 the ruling DominicanRepublic 1965 Amphibious Force junta toppled and leftists attemptedsize a takeover. American lives were en-

dangered, and Dominican military leadersasked the United States for help. Ma-rines began landing on April 28, 1965,to guard the U.S. Embassy and to pro-tect Americans and aid in their evacua-tion. As tensions eased in Santo Domingo,the Marines began withdrawing. The lastMarine unit left the Dominican Republicon June 5, 1965.

41

APPENDIX II A"PENDIX II

Location Date Unit size Description

Vietnam 1962-7j Above Marine For years the Republic of VietnamAmphibious Force wat being threatened y Viet Congsize insurgents who had the active sup-

port of North Vietnam. Marinehielicopcer squadrons began deploy-ing to Vietnam on a rotating basisin April 1962. Marine ground unitsbegan entering Vietnam in early1965. Marine units continued to bedeployed to Vietnam as the war in-creased in intensity until the Ma-rines reached a peak strength ofabout 84,000 men. In 1969, Presi-dent Nixon announced the phasedwithdrawal of the United Statesforces from Vietnam. By November1969, one Marine division and ele-ments of the aircraft wing had beenpulled out. In April 1971, the re-maining Marine division and most ofthe wing a.id support units left thecountry. One year later, in April1372, two Marine aircraft groups weredeployed to Thail&nd and Vietnam forrenewed air operations against theCommunists. The cease-fire agreementwas reached in January 1973, and alAmerican forces were withdrawn by theend of March 1973.

Cambodia April '7o Under Marine As government troops continued toEvacuation Amphibious Force pull back under increasing attacks

size from Khmer Rouge insurgents, it be-came apparent that the Cambodian gov-ernment's chances of survival wereslight. Shortly before the fall ofPhnom Penh, the Cambodian capital, theUnited States decided to evacuate theremaining Americans, including theambassador. On April 12, 1975, Marinehelicopters landed a ground securityforce which formed a defensive peri-meter as the civilians boarded the air-craft. All evacuees and Marines werebrought out of Cambodia.

Vietnam March- Under Marine Communist attacks increased in in-Evacuation April Amphibious Force tensity in the latter part of March,

1975 size forcing the Saigon government to aban-don the northern half of the country.

42

APPENDIX II APPENDIX II

Location Date Unit size Description

A large fleet of American transportships arrivec off the South Vietna-mese coast and began ferrying refugeesand government troops from threatenedareas. y April 1, 1975, 30,300 to0J,U00 people manageu to escape from

tne city of Da Nang by sea. A fewweeks later, as Viet Cong and ortnVietnamese troops surrounaeu the SoutiVietnamese capital of Saigon, theUnited States deciued that the finalevacuation of their citizens and en-dangered Vietnamese woulu have to takeplace mmcoiately. Marines evacuatedthousands of people in the operationon Aril 2-3'O.

A.ayagquez lay 175 Under -larlne On May 2, 1975, the S.S. MayaguezIncident Ampnibious Force was seized by Cambodian gunboats and

size towed to Koh Tang Island irrtne (ultof Thailand. Two days later Marineswere landed from Air Force nelicopterson the beaches of Koh Tang and boaroedthe aandoned Mayaguez. The cewwas released shortly thereafter andthe arines returned to their units.

43

APPENDIX III APPENDIX III

INSIDE THE RELOCATABLE COMPUTER SHELTER

Computer Console

Magnetic Tape Drives

44

APPENDIX IV APPENDIX IV

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYOFFICE OF THE SECRETARYWASHINGTON D C O350

10JlN .:77Mr. Fred J. Shafer, DirectorLogistics and Communications DivisionU.S. General Accounting OfficeWashington, D. C. 20548

Dear Mr. Shafer:

This is in reply to your letter of August 4, 1976to Secretary Donald Rumsfeld regarding your draft report"Need to Improve Planning and Management of the MarineCorps Automated Data Processing Activities" (OSD Case#4145-A). The Department of Defense's reply is attached.

Sincerelyj

G. D. ":IS -811ASSISTANT sCCRrTA 0 TH NA-.'

( fuNAN7 AT. EjNAGEM1.KTF

Attachment

45

APPENDIX IV APPENDIX IV

Department of the Navy Replyto

GAO Draft Report of 4 August 1976on

Need o Improve Planning and Management ofthe Mar. Corps Automated Data Processing Program

(OSD Case # 4145)

1. Introduction. This memorandum summarizes the Department ofthe iNavy comments on the GAO draft report on the Marine CorpsAutomated Data Processing Program.

2. Summary of the Navy Position. The audit was commenced inApril 1975 with the primary focus being the Marine Corps WestCoast Data Processing Installations. The scope of the reviewexpanded during the review to include total Marine Corps ADPactivities. During the review, GAO was provided with internaldocumentation of several problems previously identified by theMarine Corps. Solutions which had been developed and implementedwere also provided. Some of the prior problems have been identi-fied in the report as though they are audit disclosures andaccordingly the Marine Corps takes exception. There are, how-ever, other suggestions which have merit and the Marine Corpshas initiated appropriate corrective action. Also, there aretwo broad implications in the report which reflect adversely onADP management by the Corps. It is believed that these impli-cations are inappropriate and, in fact, the Marine Corps hasmanaged ADP resources in an exemplary fashion.

It is this latter area which is addressed first and commentson specific recommendations will follow.

3. Broad Implications. The most significant implication con-cerns compliance with government regulations on the acquisitionof computer resources. The GAO implies that the Marine Corpshas not complied with regulations on the competitive acquisitionof Automated Data Processing Equipment (ADPE). Specifically, thereport contends that 27 of the 31 Marine Corps "Computer Systems"are manufactured by IBM. While it is true that 27 of the 31Marine Corps central processing units were manufactured by IBM,it should be noted that many of these mainframes were purchasedfrom third-party vendors or through reutilization and they arenot necessarily equipped with IBM peripheral equipment. Since1972 this is true of all mainframes acquired. Peripheraldevices such as disk drives, tape drives, etc., are comprisedof plug-to-plug compatible components manufactured and acquiredthrough various manufacturers. All of these components werechosen on the basis of cost to benefit regardless of manufacturer.

46

APPENDIX IV APPENDIX IV

Therefore, it is inaccurate to imply that the Marine Corps isoverly dependent on IBM. In this regard, during FY 1975, onlyfive percent of the Marine Corps procurement dollars were spentwith IBM, that figure dropped to two percent in FY 1976.

It has been through the extensive use of third-party vendorsand reutilization of computers declared excess by other govern-ment agencies that the Marine Corps has achieved a higher levelof standardization with a resultant "hard dollar" savings for thetaxpayer. Solid business management, as practiced by the MarineCorps, dictates that the most cost effective alternative bechosen after consideration of all available alternatives. TheMarine Corps actively supports both the word and the spirit ofFederal Management Circular 74-5; and, furthermore, usescompetitive procurement as the preferred alternative until goodand sufficient economic, operational, or technical reasons pre-clude its use. The point is well supported by the recent SDAprocurement for the Supporting Establishment and by the currentformal planning for reequippage in the future.

A second issue in the report is the implied lack of identi-fication and satisfaction of user requirements. The reportimplies that user requirements can be completely defined at theoutset and will remain static during the several years the sys-tem is being developed. If this were the case, user satisfactionwould be easy to attain. In reality, the Marine Corps has defineduser requirements several times during a particular systemsdevelopment cycle and has experienced several levels of usersatisfaction. At various stages in this cycle decisions must bemade based on the facts known at that point in time. This is theprocedure the Marine Corps has used and it is believed that thehighest level of user satisfaction was attained at the time oftne action.

4. Specific Recommendations. In view of the above and otherfacts, the response to specific recommendations follow:

a. Recommendation. "Establish a single office with themanagement responsiTIity ALd authority for planning, coordination,and monitoring all data processing and telecommunications efforts."

Comment. Recommend deletion of recommendation. Theintegration of command and control, operations, telecommunications,and information systems functions was implemented on 1 November1976 as the result of internal Marine Corps studies begun in 1973.This integration will facilitate the consolidation of resourcesand improve the Marine Corps management of data processing andtelecommunications.

47

APPENDIX IV APPENDIX IV

b. Recommendation. "Develop an overall long-range programplan, integrating all tactical, management information, and tele-communications system requiements."

Comment. It should be recognized that this plan willfollow, as a matter of course, upon implementation of the con-solidation effort referred to above. Therefore, this commentshould be deleted.

c. Recommendation. "Reconsider the Marine Corps positionregarding the separation of its Fleet Marine Force and supportingestablishment in-garrison computer installations, which has re-sulted in the acquisition of excess computer capacity and thedevelopment of separate systems for similar applications."

Comment. Recommend this statement be deleted in itsentirety. Recently, due to advances in the technical method-ology of providing ADP support to deployed FMF units, and therefinement of ADP support requirements of those units, theMarine Corps has instituted an active investigation of the feasi-bility of selective base ASC-FASC consolidation. Prior to thisreport, on 14 November 1975, the 3rd FASC and Camp Butler con-solidation was implemented and a study is underway now for fur-ther consolidation of Marine installations.

d. Recommendation. "Take action to improve the effective-ness of Marine Corps standard systems to meet the iieeds of localusers."

Comment. Recommend this statement be deleted in itsentirety. In aWdition to the comments provided in the para-graph above, the Marine Corps has taken action in the form ofthe Source Data Automation Program and the Central Design andProgramming Activity concept which when fully implemented willbe more responsive to the needs of local users.

e. Recommendation. "Take action to assure compliance withestablished Government regulations regarding the determinationof user data processing requirements, the evaluation of costsand benefits available from alternative courses of action, andthe competitive acquisition of c.omputer equipment."

Comment. Recommend deletion of the entire recommendation.The Marine Corps not only has taken action, but continues to re-view policy, to see that compliance with Government regulationsis assured.

48

APPENDIX V APPENDIX V

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR

ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

Tenure of officeFrom To

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:Dr. Hrold Brown Jan. 1977 Present

Donald H. Rumsfeld Nov. 1975 Jan. 1977James R. Schlesinger June 1973 Nov. 1975William P. Clements, Jr. (acting) May 1973 June 1973

Elliot L. Richardson Jan. 1973 Apr. 1973

Melvin R. Laird Jan. 1969 Jan. 1973

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE(COMPTROLLER):

Fred P. Wacker Sept. 1976 PresentTerence E. McClary June 1973 Sept. 1976Donald R. Brazier (acting) Jan. 1973 June 1973Robert C. Moct Aug. 1968 Jan. 1973

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:W. Graham Clayton, Jr. Feb 1977 PresentGary D. Penisten (acting) Feb. 1977 Feb. 1977Joseph T. McCullum Feb. 1977 Feb. 1977

David R. MacDonald Jan. 1977 Feb. 1977J. William Middendorf II Apr. 1974 Jan. 1977John W. Warner May 1972 Apr. 1974John H. Chafee Jan. 1969 Apr. 1972

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY(FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT):Gary D. Penisten Oct. 1974 PresentRear Admiral Sam H. Moore Apr. 1974 Oct. 1974Robert D. Nesen May 1972 Apr. 1974Frank Sanders June 1971 Apr. 1972

Charles A. Bowsher Dec. 1967 June 1971

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS:General Louis H. Wilson July 1975 PresentGeneral Robert E. Cushman, Jr. Jan. 1972 June 1975General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr. Jan. 1968 Dec. 1971

49