DOCUMENT RESOUE

00087 - k0590883]

Problems in Supportinq eapons Systems Produced by Other

Countries. B-173850; LCD-76-450. January 4, 1977. 34 pp.

Report to the Congress; by Elmer B. Staats, Ccptroller General.

Issue Area: acilities and Material Management (700); Federal

Procuremen- of Goods and ervices: Notifying the Congress of

Status of Important Procurement Programs (801);Military

Preparedness Plans: Logistic Support Planning for Major

Equipment (1905).Contact: Logistics and Communicatiols Div.

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense

Military (exci ;e procurement & contracts) (051).

Organization Concerned: Department of the Navy; epartm.ent of

Defense; Marine Corps.congressional Relevance: Congress; House Committee on Armed

Servicps; Senate Committee on Armed Services.

Lessons concerning logistics and maintenance problems

arising from the purchase of the British-built Harrier aircraft

system can be applied to future procurements o. weapons systems.

Findings/Conclusions: Kaintenance and l-gistic- su?port prr seas

resulted from inadequate and untimely planning and a lack ol

experience in purchasing weapons systems from othe- countries.

The Navy could not obtain necessary technical data from the

United Kindgom and could not establish a system to renair the

aircraft. Supply support in the United Kingdom was hindered by:

competition for available spare parts, British ien;_ors not

meeting delivery schedules, and poor turn-arcuL 4 time for items

repaired by British venders. Recommendations: in purchasing

foreign weapons systems, the Secretary of Defens'E should

promptly make logistic support analyses and develop maintenance

plans to support the system, provide for a ccntra :tor to support

the system until the military seLrvice can, and reqc ire that

supplemental guidelines be is*.ed for integrated Logistics

support planning. (Author/JJM)

cr)00CD

REPORT TO THE CONGRESSk

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL.7 F.

- .OF THE UNITED STATES

Problems In Supporting WeaponsSystems Produced 3yOther CountriesDepartment of Defense

Planning needs o be improved before weap-ons systems produced by other countries arepurchased. Lessons learned after purchasingthe British-built Harrier aircraft system can beapplied to future procurements.

The Secretary of Defense should take the leadin providing guidance specifically for systemsproduced by other countries.

LCD-76-450 JAN. , 1 9 7 7

COMPTPOEIIO R CUNIURAL OF TIE UNl SrATIWAaHINlTON. Uc.

B-173850

To the President of the Senate and theSpeaker of the House of Representatives

This report describes the maintenance and supply supportproblems encountered as a result of the Navy's acquisitionof the British-produced AV-8A Harrier V/STOL aircraft andsuggests procedures to be used to avoid similar problems infuture foreign procurements.

This review was done as a result of self-initiatedresearch. After discussions with MaLin- Corps officials,we decided that the low operational readiness level of theaircraft was due, in part, to providing logistics supportfor a foreign-produced system. In anticipation of futureforeign procurements, we have highlighted the unique supportproblems and have recommended procedures to be taken to avoidsinilar problems.

We made our review pursuant to the Budget and AccountingAct, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), the Accounting and Auditing Act of1950 (31 U.S.C. 67), and 10 U.S.C. 2313(b).

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretariesof Defense and the Navy.

Comptroller Generalof the United States

ContentsPage

DIGEST i

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION AD BACKGROUND 1Development of he Harrier 1Acquisition of the Harrier 1Congressional involvement 2

2 SUPPORT PLANNING FOR THE HARRIER 5ILS impact on the Harrier 5

Maintenance engineering analyses 8Contractor-provided logistics

support 11ILS guidance needed for foreign-producedsystems 11

3 PROBLEMS IN SUPPORTING THE HARRIER 12Readiness goals not achieved 12Maintenance support for the Harrier 15

Delays in developing depot mainte-nance capability 16

Technical data problems 17Shortage of parts, repairables, andmodification kits 18

Reduction of operating aircraft 19Actions to correct problem areas 20

4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 22

5 SCOPE OF REVIEW 25

APPENDIX

I Letter dated October 21, 1976, from theAssistant Secretary of Defense (Installa-tions and Logistics) 26

II Principal officials responsible for activi-ties discussed in this report 34

ABBREVIATIONS

GAO General Accounting Office

ILS integrated logistics support

NARFs naval air rework facilities

NORM not operationally ready because of maintenance

NORS not operationally ready because of supplies

V/STOL vertical or short takeoff and landing

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S PROBLEMS IN SUPPORTINGREPORT TO THE CONGRESS WEAPONS SYSTEMS PRODUCED

BY OTHER COUNTRIESDepartment of Defense

DIGEST

In lq6 9 the United States agreed to purchaseAV-8A Harrier aircraft from the United King-dom. By early 1976, 97 aircraft had beendelistered and 13 more were under contract.This was the first operational major weaponssystem purchased from another country.

The U.S. Marine Corps has used Harriers sinceApril 1971 but has continuously had mainte-nance and supply support problems with them.As a result, Harrier operational readiness(wher aircraft can be flown safely and per-form at least one primary mission) duringfiscal years 1975 and 1976 averaged 42 and41.4 percent, rspective'y. The establishedminimum goal was 60 percent. (See p. 15.)

Maintenance and logistics support problemsresulted from inadequate and untimely plan-ning and a lack of experience in acquiringand supporting systems from other countries.For example, the Marine Corps used supportdata from the United Kingdom, attempting toadapt it to the Navy support system ratherthan following the normal integrated logis-tics support plarning process, which requiresplanning well before a weapons system isused. (See p. 5.) Since U.S. and Britishmaintenance and supply support systems aredifferent, problems arose causing the Navydifficulty in developing maintenance andsupply support for the Harrier. (See p. 9.)

Instead of doing maintenance engineeringanalyse--3 key integrated lo3istics supportfunction--the Navy planned to use Britishdata to determine technical data require-ments, maintenance repair levels, and spare-and repair-part requirements. However, in1974 the Navy contracted or the necessaryanalyses. (See p. 10.)

Tear Shet. UJpon reeovat, the epot i LC 1--76-450cover date should be noted hereon

Because it could not obtain necessary technical

data from the United Kingdom, the Navy could

not set up a system to repair the aircraft.

Nearly 5 years after the Harrier entered the

fleet, the Marine Corps depot could repair

only about 30 percent--instead of the normal

90 percent--of the repairable components.(See p. 18.)

Since the Navy did not have plans good enough

to project the quantity of spare and repair

parts needed, specialized provisioning teamswere sent to the United Kingdon to do this.These teams were assisted by the British

vendors. The supply support was further ham-

pered by

--competition with the United Kingdom t,

available spare parts,

-- British vendors not meeting delivery sched-

ules for spare paLts, anc

--poor turnaround time for items repaired by

vendors in the United Kingdom. (Seep. 18.)

The Navy began providing its own logisticalsupport after only 6 months, even though it

intended to have tb cont:actor provide sup-

port for 18 months. The Navy felt it could

do the job early--saving $5 million--and did

not want to invest the time to familiarize

the British contractor with U.S. maintenancephilosophy. (See p. 11.)

The Navy realizes that its first logistics

support planning was inadequate and has im-

proved maintenance and logistics support for

the Harrier fleet. Besides contracting for

maintenance engineering analyses, maintenance

plans, and technical data, the Navy has used

existing programs to help maintain the

Harriet. Also, a special transportation plan

was initiated to move Harrier parts morequickly. (See p. 20.)

ii

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defensemake certain that the following integratedlogistics support functions be completedwhen any weapons system produced by anothercountry is procured.

--Promptly make logistic support analyses anddevelop maintenance plans to support thesystem.

-- Provide for a contractor to support thesystem ur.til the military service can.

GAO also recommends that the Secretary ofDefense require that supplemental guidelinesbe issued for integrated logistics supportplanning involving the acquisition of weaponssystems built by another country. The guide-lines should provide for:

-- Assessing early the compatibility of themaintenance and supply support systems ofthe producer and the intended users, iden-tifying notable differences and their po-tential effects on the system.

-- Identifying early the technical data re-quirements necessary to develop ainte-nance skills and support capability andassessing early the availability of suchdata.

-- Assessing early the ability of foreignvendors to provide necessary parts andsupplies promptly.

--Determining whether the producer can pro-vide supply support for the system untilthe intended user can establish an ade-quate support system.

--Identifying early the problems expected intransferring support of the system fromcontractor to purchaser.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installa-tions and Logistics) agreed with the reportand said the lessons learned from the AV-8AHarrier program will be passed on to all

iii

associated with system acquisitions. He didnot, however, comment on whether the supple-mental guidelines advocated by GAO would beprepared.

The Navy agreed with GAO's recommendation tocomplete the integrated logistics supportfunctions when purchasing a system, but dis-agreed with the recommendation to issue sup-plemental guidelines on the logistics supportof a system produced by another country.Navy said existing instructions, though notgeared specifically to such procurements,meet the intent of the recommendation.

GAO does not agree that Navy instructionsmeet the intent of its recommendation.Existing instructions were tailored afterdomestic acquisitions and do not addressthe specifics included in the GAO recom-mendation.

The Secretary of Defense should take thelead in providing the necessary guidanceto deal specifically with supporting sys-tems produced by other courtries. (Seep. 24.)

iv

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The British-built AV-8A Harrier is a single engine,single seat aircraft capable of vertical or short takeoffand lancing (V/STOL). (See p. 4.) It is the free world'sfirst operational V/STOL fixed-wing aircraft and is intendedto provide support to ground troops. Hawker-Siddeley AviationLtd. is the airframe manufacturer and Rolls Royce Ltd. is theengine manufacturer.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE HARRIER

The Harrier was designed as a followup project to theHawker P.1127--a V/STOL aircraft 'Iuilt by Hawker-Siddeley--andwas first flown in October i960. awker-Siddeley producedthe Kestrel, a modified version o the P.1127, in 1965 througha program sponsored by the United States, the United Kingdom,and the Federal Republic of Germany. After evaluating thisprogram, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force each concludedthat the Kestrel was not suitable for their purposes. TheBritish proceeded with the program and developed the Harrie:.It became operational in the British Royal Air Force in 1969.

ACQUISITION OF THE HARRIER

The U.S. Marine Corps became interested in the Harrierafter a 1967 demonstration of the aircraft. 1,. 1968 theMarine Corps established a requirement for a V/STOL close-air-support aircraft, and in September of that year theSecretary of Defense approved a request for acquisition ofthe Harrier.

The United States began -he procurement process with amemorandum of understanding signed in October 1969, Thisdocument indicated the United States' intent to purchaseand the United Kingdom's agreement to sell the aircraft andrelated supplies and services.

The actual contract for Harrier production is betweenthe United Kingdom and Hawker-Siddeley. Individual lettersof offer and acceptance are negotiated annually by the US.Naval Air Systems Command and the United Kingdo.n's Ministryof Defense Procurement Executive. These letters serve inplace of a contract and establish hardware quantities anddetailed services, together with associated costs.

CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMeNT

Durinq congressional earings for the fiscal year 1970defense budget, the Department of the Navy requested $57 mil-lion to procure 12 Harriers and spare parts. At that timethe entire Harrier program called for procuring 114 aircraftover a 4-year period at a cost of $385 million. Later nego-tiatins changed the urchase terms to 110 aircraft over a5-year period. The Navy recommended procurement from theUnited Kingdom because it would:

-- Fill an immediate need since the United States wouldrequire approximately 2 years and $300 to $400 millionto develop a comparable V/STOL aircraft.

-- Provide impetus for US. industry to begin developinga V/STOL aircraft.

-- Provide a return on the $85 million U.S. investmentalready expended during the Kestrel development pro-gram.

-- Fulfill a special U.S. procurement commitment to pur-chase $50.5 million worth of British goods.

During these hearings the Navy advised the Congress thatcertain U.S. aircraft manufacturers were negotiating withHawker-Siddeley for a licene to build the Harrier in theUnited States.

The Congres, approved funding to procure 12 aircraftand initial spares in fiscal year 1970. At the same timecongressional direction indicated that Harrier poductionshould be transferred to the United States.

The Navy requested funds to procure 18 additionalHarriers in fiscal year 1971 and permission to transferHarrier production to McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft--the U.S.licensee of Hawker-Siddely. The Navy favored producing theHarrier through an American licensee, although a program toaccomplish this would require a longer period to complete andcost an estimated $623 million--$238 million more than theoriginal estimate for procurement from the United Kingdom.Numerous benefits of U.S. production were cited, such as

-- gold flow from the United States would be reduced,

2

-- the U.S. Treasury would receive tax dollars from theAmerican licensee,

-- the U.S. aerospace and related industries would hiremore workers,

-- V/STOL technology would be introduced to U.S. industry,

-- the United States would not have to rely upon theUnited Kingdom for logistics support.

The House Appropriations Committee turned down the Navyrequest for transferring Harrier production to the UnitedStates because of the higher cost. This position was upheldin a joint House and Senate Committee conference. Congres-sional direction was for procurement from the United Kingdomover a 5-year period at an estimated cost of $503.6 million.This congressional direction led to subsequent procurementrequests for the balance of 110 Harrier aircraft produced inthe United Kingdom.

At the time of our review, 97 aircraft had been deliveredand the remaining 13 were expected by March 1977. Two operat-ing squadrons and a training squadron of Harriers wre basedat the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, NorthCarolina, and another operating squadron was based in Iwakuni,Japan.

3

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4

CHAPTER 2

SUPPORT PLANNING-FOR THE-HARRIER

The Department of Defense uses the integrated logisticssupport (ILS) concept in acquiring defense equipment to makecertain that adequate and timely logistics support will beavailable. ILS was set forth in 1964 to reduce the cost ofweapnnp system ownership through a concentrated logisticsmapngement program in the early phase of a system's lifecycle. It tries to identify in a systematic and orderlymanner the functions which must be performed to operate andmaintain new systems and the resources needed to perform thosefunctions. The ILS concept, when applied to the acquisitionprocess, normally is applied throughout program initiation,full-scale development, and production deployment. (Seefig. 1A.)

However, the introduction of the Harrier into the MarineCorps inventory did not follow the normal ILS pattern. In-stead of completing the ILS steps in the systematic mannershown in steps 1 through 3 of figure 1A, the entire ILS pro-gram for the Harrier was compressed into one step. (Seefig. 1B.) Because of this compression some significant ILSsteps were not completed and others were not timely. As aresult, maintenance and supply problems were created whichadversely dffected the operational readiness and maintain-ability of the Harrier fleet.

I.S IMPACT ON THE HARRIER

Since the Harrier was an aircraft developed by the Brit-ish and acquired after it had became operational in the BritishRoyal Air Force, the Navy initially anticipated getting muchof the logistics support from the United Kingdom. The Navyalso recognized that this unique acquisition would mean thatILS planning probably would not follow the normal process.Therefore, the Navy decided it would have to find a way toassimilate information and support from the United Kingdomand its prime contractor into an abbreviated ILS program,even though it might not lend itself to the accepted Navyway of doing business.

5

NAVY WEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITIONAND ILS PLANNING EVENTS

· Conceptual Stw* Vlidtion/Advanced

Development Stage* Integrated

Logistics SupportManagement PlanFormulated (note a)

Production-DeploymentPhase I Full Scale Development

* Production Stage Phae* Deployment/ * Maintnnce

Operational Stlge Engineering AnalysisOperational~~~~ ~ ~Pfonnd (nota ai)Interim Support not Period (not a * lMuintenoe Plsns

Prpiodd (notnote a)* Provisioning Daet

Obtained (note a)Technical DtObtained (note a)

a ILS Planning Event

Figure 1A

6

COMPRESSION OFILS PLANNING EVENTSHARRIER ACQUISITION

Production - DeploymentPhase

* Production Stage* Deployment/

Operational Stage* Integrated Logistics

Support Management Plane Maintenance Engineering

Analysis* Maintenance Plans* Provisioning Dta· Technical Date* Inte m Support Period

,o '

Figure 1B

7

Maintenance engineering analyses 1/

A major problem arose early in the ILS program from theconstraint of compressing all ILS steps into the production-deployment stage. This problem concerned one of the mostimportant elements of ILS planning--maintenance engineeringanalyses. (Maintenance engineering analyses systematicallyidentify maintenance requirements and resources needed tosupport the weapons system.)

The prime contractor normally conducts maintenanceengineering analyses during the full-scale development phaseof the acquisition cycle. As a product of maintenance anal-yses, the contractor also normally provides comprehensivemaintenance plans for each significant subsystem of the wea-pons system. Some information identified by these plansconcerns

-- extent of maintenance to be performed at each of thethree maintenance levels--organizational, intermediate,and depot;

-- expected failure rate o each subsystem or component;

--identification of parts, tools, and test equipment re-quired for maintenance;

--identification and desrription of all technical datanecessary for maintenance tasks; and

-- identification of all spare and repairable parts andthe frequency with which parts should be needed.

Since the Navy did not have its own prime contractor toconduct maintenance engineering analyses and provide detailedmaintenance plans, it attempted to substitute informationfrom the British Government, Hawker-Siddeley, and various sub-contractors as a basis from which to plan maintenance andlogistics support for the Harrier.

As shown on the following page, a basic difference inmaintenance levels exists between the United States andthe United Kingdom. This difference precluded the Navy from

1/Maintenance engineering analyses was the term used for thisILS step at the time the Harrier was purchased. The termwas subsequently changed to logistic support analyses, butis basically the same function.

MAINTENANCE LEVELS FORU.S. AND BRITISH WEAPONS SYSTEMS

DEPOT -- maintenance functions to in FOURTH LINE - maintenance whichdlude major repair and overhaul; normally requires the facilities of a main base.performed by contractors or large depot Such maintenance includes major repairsmaintenalice activities using primarily and reconditioning. This work is carried

4 civilian employees. Maintenance data out by contractrs Maintenance dataO developed by contractor for use by depot maintained by cntracto-q. O

maintenance activity.

IE THIRD LINE -- maintenance beyond m>30 __ _ second line servicing which comprises P'0O INTERMEDIATE -- maintenance func- such activities as salvage, clibration,Z INTERMEDIATE -- maintenance func- and specified repair to components.

b maintnancr pctivity. by contractors. -I

SECOND LINE -- maintenance functions edP. \performed by a military activity with the .Z \ use of ground and special test equipment. _~i FMaintenance data in the hands of oper- Z ating units. Z

n ORGANIZATIONAL -- relatively simple Zm maintenance functions performed by mili- 1r tary operating units to support their daily - relatively simple main-m FIRST LINE -- relatively simp!e main- M< operations. Maintenance data developed <m by ontrctor for u by oprting unit. tenance functions performed by military Mr by contractor for use by operating unit. operating units to support their d ru operating units to support their daily r

operations. Maintenance data in thehands of operating units.

U.S. NAVY BRITISH ROYAL AIR FORCE

9

getting information necessary to adequately plan maintenanceand logistics support for the Harrier.

In the case of the Harrier, the Navy did not envisionthe differences in maintenance philosophy or the impact thismight have on establishing maintenance capabilities at thevarious levels. After recognizing that necessary technicaldata was not in the hands of the British Royal Air Force,the Navy requested that the information be provided byHawker-Siddeley and its subcontractors. Hawker-Siddeleyagreed, but subcontractors refused because they consideredthe information proprietary. The Navy could do little be-cause the memorandum of understanding only provided that theUnited Kingdom would provide technical data to the extent itwould not incur liability to others.

Another part of the ILS program that was adversely af-fected by the lack of adequate maintenance plans was initialprovisioning for spares and repair parts. Since the Navydid not have provisioning data of its own, the initialHarrier spare and repairable parts lists were developed byspecialized provisioning teams conducting onsite, indepthitem selections with the assistance and engineering guidanceof the respective British vendors. This provisioning effortwas further hampered by the different maintenance philoso-phies of the Royal Air Force and the Navy.

Follow-on provisioning also presented problems. TheNavy attempted to get parts-use data from the Royal AirForce but found that use data was maintained by the vendorsthat provided maintenance. When the Navy attempted to obtainuse data from the vendors, it was confronted with problemssimilar to those encountered in attempting to obtain technicaldata.

It was not until 1974--over 3 years after receiving thefirst operational Harrier--that the Navy decided that main-tenance and logistics support for its Harriers could not beadequately provided by the United Kingdom, Hawker-Siddeley,and the existing Navy support program. Consequently, inSeptember 1974 the Navy contracted with McDonnell-DouglasAircraft to perform 218 maintenance engineering analyses onproblem components. McDonnell-Douglas was also required todevelop related maintenance plans, which the Navy hopedwould improve maintenance capabilities and logistics support.

10

Contractor-provided logistics support

Normally for 18 to 24 months after initial delivery, theaircraft manufacturer furnishes required logistics support.This is called the interim support period. (See fig. 1A.)

Hawker-Siddeley prepared a plan under which it wouldprovide logistics support for an 18-month period after thefirst 12 Harriers were delivered. However, before fullyimplementing the Hawker-Siddeley plan, the Navy decided itcould reduce the investment of time required to completelyfamiliarize the British contractor with the U.S. maintenancephilosophy and save $5 million by early transfer to Navysupport. The Navy subsequently decided to move to Navysupport after only a 6-month period.

The Navy later realized that it was unable to effectivelyprovide the logistics support normally provided by the con-tractor. The lack of an adequate contractor-provided interimsupport period further contributed to continuing logisticssupport problems.

ILS GUIDANCE NEEDED FORFOREIGN-PRODUCED SYSTEMS

Both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Navyhave issued extensive guidance on the development of ILS formajor systems. However, because most of the system acquisi-tions are made from domestic suppliers, the guidance is basedon domestic experience and does not reflect the peculiaritiesassociated with acquisition from foreign governments/organiza-tions. As the United States moves toward greater interdepend-ence with the allies, foreign acquisition, no doubt, willtake on added importance, accentuating need for more explicitguidance to deal specifically with foreign acquisitions.

As discussed in this chapter, the Navy encountered prob-lems because the foreign producer could not provide adequatemaintenance engineering analyses to develop maintenance plans.Problems also arose because the Navy decided on early transferto Navy support rather than completing the contractor interimsupport period. These problems along with those discussedin the following chapter, which relate to obtaining necessarytechnical data and necessary parts and supplies from foreignvendors in a timely manner, cause us to believe that existingguidance is not adequate to deal with supporting foreign-produced systems.

11

CHAPTER 3

PROBLEMS IN SUPPORTING THE HARRIER

The inadequacy of Navy's planning efforts and insufficientexperience in acquiring and supporting foreign-produced systemshas resulted in (1) unmet minimum operational readiness goals,(2) complicated and ineffective maintenance and supply support.and (3) a reduction of the number of aircraft desired. TheNavy is trying to cope with these problems and has taken actionswhich have improved the overall readiness and maintainabilityof the Harrier fleet.

READINESS GOALS NOT ACHIEVED

Navy squadrons classify aircraft into three majorcategories--operationally ready, not operationally readybecause of supplies (NORS), and not operationaliy readybecause of maintenance (NORM). An aircraft is consideredoperationally ready when it can be safely flown and can per-form at least one of its primary missions.

The Navy has a peacetime readiness goal of 60 percentfor tactical aircraft (including the Harrier). Although theMarine Corps has been operating the Harrier since April 1971,the Second Marine Aircraft Wing, which operates three of thefour Harrier squadrons, has not achieved its readiness goal.As the chart on page 13 shows, monthly readiness levels fromJanuary 1974 through March 1976 ranged from 22 to 55 percent.

The overall operational readiness level is determinedfrom the NORM and NORS readiness levels. The Navy does nothave any separate goals for these two readiness categories,but as a combined total they should not exceed 40 percent.As the chart on page 14 shows, from January 1974 throughMarch 1976, the monthly rate for NORS aircraft ranged from22 to 57 percent and averaged 42 percent. In addition, theNORM aircraft rate ranged from 12 to 38 percent and averaged25 percent. Thus, the combined average monthly rate of air-craft not operationally ready was 67 percent--well above theacceptable 40 percent level.

In commenting on our report, the Navy stated that ouranalysis focused on the operational readiness of SecondMarine Aircraft Wing AV-8A aircraft and did not address theoperations of the AV-8A squadron that has been deployed tothe First Marine Aircraft Wing since August 1974. The Navyresponse showed that this squadron sustained an average

12

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operationally ready rate of 70.7 percent during fiscal year1975 and 48.2 percent during fiscal year 1976 while deployed.

i: qree that this one squadron had a higher operation-ally - rate but feel it should be recognized that thissquadr represented only about one-fourth o the total air-craft in the fleet. The Navy provided operationally readyrates for all AV-8A aircraft, which showed an average readi-ness rate of 42 percent in fiscal year 1975, 41.4 percent infiscal year 1976, and 40.6 percent in July 1976. While theseaverage rates are slightly higher than the readiness ratesindicated by our analysis, they are still well below theestablished 60-percent minimum goal.

The low readiness levels for the Harrier aircraft havehad a direct effect on the number of flight-hours availablefor pilot proficiency. To maintain flying proficiency ofits pilots, the Second Marine Aircraft Wing has flying re-quirements of 17 hours a month for squadron pilots and10 hour- a month for experienced staff pilots. However, theWing reported that Harrier pilots have rarely been able toly the required hours. For example, the pilots met the

rer,uirement for oly 1 month in 1974, and none of the first11 months of 1975. Thus, the Wing's proficiency may bejeopardized.

The Marine Corps' inability to attain readiness goalsfor the Harrier has been primarily caused by problems in themaintenance and supply support systems. Many of these prob-lems can be directly attributed to the uniqueness of thisprocureiinc and the lack of adequate support planning.

MAINTENANCE SUPPORT FOR THE HARRIER

The Harrier is under the same organizational, inter-mediate, and depot maintenance system as other Navy andMarine Corps aircraft.

Organizational maintenance involves relatively simplefunctions necessary to support daily operations. Such func-tions include inspecting and servicing equipment and re-placing defective parts. Individual squadrons are respon-sible for organizational maintenance.

Irntermediate maintenance provides more complex support,including calibrating equipment, repairing or replacingequipment, and providing technical assistance to squadrons.

15

At Cherry Point, one intermediate maintenance activity servesthe three Harrier squadrons.

The most extensive maintenance is done at the depotlevel. Overhaul and major repair of aircraft, engines, com-ponents, and related support equipment is included underthis category. Depot maintenance is normally performed bythe aircraft corporations that built the aircraft, commer-cial contractors which specialize in aircraft rework, and thesix naval ir rework facilities (NARFs) located throughoutthe country. Cherry Point is the designated NARF for depotmaintenance of the Harrier.

Closely associated with these maintenance functions isthe supply of necessary spare and repair parts. The AviationSupply Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is responsible forprocuring, cataloging, and distributing Navy and Marine Corpsaviation spare parts and equipment throughout the world.

Maintenance and supply support for the Harrier has notbeen without problems. Some of the more serious problemshave concerned developing a depot maintef nce capability,transferring and using technical data, md obtaining partsand modification kits.

Delays in developing depotmaintenance capability

Normally, after being in operation for 2 years, a arriershould be processed through depot maintenance. The firstHarrier was sent to the NARF in February 1973. This aircraftwas inducted as a prototype and, while the NARF expected toconplete maintenance in 100 to 120 workdays, it actually re-quired 243 workdays. NARF officials attributed this delay totechnical data problems and shortages of parts and modifica-tion kits, which precluded the NARF from establishing an ade-quate depot maintenance capability.

The next two aircraft were scheduled for depot mainte-nance during fiscal year 1974, but only one could be com-pleted because technical data problems and parts shortageswere still present.

In the first quarter of fiscal year 1975, three air-craft were placed into the depot maintenance process; how-ever, once again the NARF was unable to complete mainte-nance due to a lack of parts an6 modification kits. Theseaircraft were scheduled to return to the Second Marine

16

Aircraft Wing after maintenance and certain modificationswere completed. Since modifications were not completed,the Wing refused to accept th'em back into the operationalfleet, and the aircraft wete placed in outside storage atthe NARF. (As of January 1976, two of the three were stillin outside storage. See p. 19 for details concerning air-craft in outside storage.) Depot maintenance for five addi-tional aircraft scheduled for fiscal year 1975 was canceledbecause of shortages of parts and modification kits.

The missing modification kits were only required forthe first 30 aircraft delivered. Since these modificationkits were still unavailable at the beginning of fiscal year1976, the NARF began working on aircraft which did not re-quire modifications. As scheduled, the NARF processed fiveaircraft through depot maintenance during :he first half offiscal year 1976. The time to perform maintenance on theaircraft exceeded estimates by an average of only 15 work-days. NARF officials attributed this success to (1) takingneeded parts from newly received aircraft and installing theparts on aircraft further along in the maintenance process(backrobbing) and (2) obtaining parts from sources outsidethe normal supply system.

Technical data problems

To provide required maintenance support for the Harrier,the Marine Corps must have compleea, accurate, and understand-able technical data. Manufaccurers usually provide publica-tions of technical data as part of contract provisions. How-ever, at all maintenance levels the Marine Corps experiencedproblems using technical data it had been provided. Theproblems have resulted to some extent because of differencesbetween British and U.S. terminology. Some examples of thesedifferences follow.

U.S. terminology British terminology

wing main planedoor panelwrench spannerflashlight torchplexiglass perspex

Because of the terminology differences, U.S. maintenancepersonnel had problems understanding and using informationin British technical publications. Moreover, officials atCherry Point said that technical publications provided for

17

organizational maintenance were not geared to the skill levelnormally associated with the Marine Corps maintenance activi-ties. As a result McDonnell-Douglas was contracted to re-write the technical publications for the Marine Corps organi-zational maintenance level.

%he impact of the technical data problem is also evidentat the depot maintenance level. The Cherry Point NARF hasencountered many difficulties in obtaining necessary tech-nical data. NAPF officials told us that in domestic air-craft acquisitions, the NARF would develop the capability torepair at least 90 percent of repairable components in1-1/2 to 2 years after initial involvement with the contrac-tor. By December 1975, the Marine Corps had the Harrierabout 5 years. Yet, the Cherry Point NARF could repaironly 366 of 1,213--30 percent--of the repairable componentsof a Harrier. The NARF lacked technical data on 289 of theremaining 847 repairable components.

Shortage of parts, repairables,and modification kits

Parts shortages have been a problem for the Harrier.The manufacturer needs parts for production aircraft, andthe Royal Air Force and the Marine Corps need parts forsupply and maintenance support. According to aviation supplyoffice officials responsible for Harrier supply support, thiscompetition for spare parts has been a major contributor tolong delays the Marine Corps has experienced in getting spareparts. Supply office officia's also said that this problemcould be aggravated when Spain begins to need spare parts tosupport Harriers it has purchased.

Parts shortages have also hampered engine overhaul andrepair by causing work stoppages on the depot maintenance ofthe Pegasus F402 engine used in the Harrier. The expectedtime for an F402 engine overhaul is 64 days, but the averageactual time on 21 overhauls has been about 155 days. SinceFebruary 1975, supply shortages have caused 11 work stoppagesranging from 14 to 87 days.

Another problem concerning Harrier aircraft involvesrepairable components. Since the Cherry Point NARF cannotrepair many components, they are sent to contractors in theUnited States or the United Kingdom. However, these con-tractors have not been adhering to delivery schedules forret rning components and turnaround time has been as longas years.

18

Supply office officials said the long turnaround time isdue, in part, to parts being stripped or damaged by CherryPoint personnel. For example, a supply office item managersaid the repair turnaround time for the Harrier's receiver-transmitter had been increased due to the vendor's receiptof the item in a "cannibalized" condition. The vendor re-ported that five out of seven transmitters were missingpower, amplifier, or generator modules when received forrepair. It took the vendor up to 130 days to repair andieturn cannibalized transmitters, whereas uncannibalizedtransmitters were repaired and returned in about 50 days.

The lack of modification kits has adversely affecteddepot maintenance operations and the aircraft assigned tosquadrons. As shown below, 14 operating aircraft were up to19 months overdue for depot maintenance as of January 1976,but will not be worked on until modification kits arereceived.

Months Number ofoverdue aircraft

6 17 1

12 213 415 318 219 1

REDUCTION OF OPERATING AIRCRAFT

In addition to adversely affecting the readiness of air-craft in the operational fleet, maintenance support problemshave resulted in a reduction of the number of aircraft in thefleet. The first 12 Harriers delivered to the Marine Corpsare no longer in the operating fleet. Two have crashed, twoare used for testing, and the remaining eight are beingstored at the Cherry Point NARF.

These eight aircraft, valued at approximately $21 mil-lion, were transferred from the operational fleet during1975 because they required depot maintenance and modifica-tions. Limited depot maintenance, at a cost of $124,000, wasperformed on two of the aircraft. However, since modifica-tion kits had not been received by early 1976, all depotmaintenance on the eight aircraft was suspended.

19

Since arriving at the NARF, these eight aircraft havebeen stored outside in an unfenced area. Parts are notsupposed to be remove rom these aircraft without priorapproval of the Nava_ r Systems Command. Althnlah suchapproval has not been granted, personnel from the NARF andFrom Cherry Point's operating squadron have removed and ex-changed parts from these aircraft.

NARF officials have objected to storing the Harrieraircraft at the NARF because storage space is inadequate andsecurity is limited. The officials explained that under cur-rent conditions, continued storage is detrimental to theseaircraft. Hydraulic seals, fuel tanks, and gaskets aredeteriorating, and the aircraft are corroding. Also, thelimited depot maintenance previously performed on two air-craft may have to be repeated.

Naval Air Systems Command officials advised us thatafter our fieldwork had been completed the Cherry Point NARFreceived the modification kits and in June 1976 began workingon a Harrier from storage. They plan to work on one aircraftper quarter if the necessary funds are available.

ACTIONS TO CORRECT PROBLEM AREAS

The Navy realized there might be problems in providingmaintenance and logistics support for the Harrier. While itdid not foresee all the problems that have arisen, intensi-fied management has improved Harrier operational readiness.

In addition to contracting with McDonnell-Douglas formaintenance engineering analyses, maintenance plans, anddevelopment of technical data. the Navy has used existingmaintenance support programs designed to help improve theoperational readiness f any system.

The Component Pilot Rework program has been used since3972 to assist the Cherry Point NARF to develop the capabil-ity to rework or overhaul Harrier components concurrent withthe assumption of support responsibility of the end articlesfor the Harrier program. The program includes determiningwhether components can be economically overhauled, providingfor necessary hardware and software procurements, and estab-lishing configuration control of all procured elements.

The Closed Loop Aeronautical Management Program was alsoused for the Harrier. This program uses intensified manage-ment techniques to monitor and control spare, repairable

20

assemblies as they move through the various phases ef

logistics support. In this way the program attempts tomaximize the availability of ready-for-use spare assemblies.

The Navy also implemented a transportation plan designed

specifically for Harrier parts. The Harrier Movement Plan

was used to insure visibility and expedited movement ofmaterial, It spac'fies how all Harrier material is to be

shipped between countries. In addition, it calls for using

freight forwarders and foreign carriers when necessary and

for close monitoring and full ocumentation of materialshipments.

A comparison of the transit times for different methods

of moving parts shows the improvement in supply support as a

result of the Harrier Movement Plan.

Average days in transit(January to April 1975)

DefenseCommer- trans Air par-

Movement cial air system cel post

From/to plan (note a) (note a) (note a)

Cherry Point/London 3.0 5.2 11.1 13.1London/Cherry Point 3.3 6.3 11.4 9.4Cherry Point/Iwakuni,

Japan 5.0 6.1 10.2 16.1Iwakuni, Japan/Cherry Point 4.0 5.1 10.0 14.0

a/Transit time based on surveys of past performance.

21

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Harrier is the first attempt by the United Statesto purchase major "off-the-shelf" weapons systems from aforeign ally. Consequently, it is not surprising to findunique problems which have seriously degraded the system'sdeployed readiness.

Operational readiness levels during 1974 and 1975 rangedfrom 22 to 43 percent, while the Navy has an established mini-mum goal of 60 percent for the Harrier when operating in apeacetime environment. Only in the early months of 1976--5 years after introduction into the operational fleet--hasthe Second Marine Aircrart Wing, which includes three of thefour Harrier squadrons, experienced operational readinesslevels more nearly approaching the established minimum goal.

The primary causes for Harrier aircraft readiness dif-ficulties stem from inadequate integrated logistics supportplanning and a lack of specific guidance and experience inacquiring and supporting foreign-produced weapons systems.Introduction of the Harrier into the Marine Corps inventorydid not follow the normal ILS planning process. iLy ILSfunctions were compressed into a single phase of the acquisi-tion cycle, rather than being completed in a timephased sys-tematic approach normally envisioned for a weapon system ac-quisition. Because of this compression, maintenance engineer-ing analyses were not performed, maintenance plans were notprepared, and other ILS functions were not timely. Thesedifficulties contributed heavily to inadequate supply supportand inability to establish adequate maintenance capability.

Other problems involved the different maintenance andsupply support systems of the United States and the UnitedKingdom, inability of foreign vendors to provide necessaryparts and supplies in a timely manner, inability of foreigncontractors to supply all necessary support, and the transferof support from a foreign contractor to the U.S. Marine Corps.

When the Navy realized it could not obtain the necessarymaintenance support from the British contractors, it con-tracted ith McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft to perform necessarymaintenance support analyses and to develop a maintenanceplan that would improve both maintenance capability andlogistics support. This effort will further improve thereadiness of the Harrier. The Navy has also been using

22

existing maintenance support programs as a further means ofimproving Harrier readiness.

In order that additional procurements, if any, of for-eign developed systems will be less likely to encounter prob-lems, such as those experienced on the Harrier, we recommendthat the Secretary of Defense make certain that the follow-ing ILS functions are completed when any foreign-producedweapons system is procured.

--Timely performance of logistic support analyses(formerly maintenance engineering analyses) anddevelopment of maintenance plane for supportingthe system.

--Provision for a contractor interim support perioduntil the military activity which will have theoperational system can develop complete supportcapability.

The experience gained on this first program to acquirea foreign-produced system also indicates a need for addi-tional guidance to deal with the unique features of procur-ing a foreign-produced system that can adversely affect ILSfor the system's life cycle. We recommend that as a minimumthe Secretary of Defense require that existing ILS guidancebe supplemented for a foreign-produced system to provide for:

-- An early assessment of the compatibility of maintenanceand supply support systems of the foreign producer andthe intended user which identifies significant differ-ences and their potential impact on providing supportfor the system.

--An early (1) identification of technical data require-ments necessary to develop maintenance skills andsupport capability and (2) an assessment of accessi-bility to necessary technical data.

-- An early assessment of the ability of foreign vendorsto provide necessary parts and supplies in a timelymanner.

--A determination of the likelihood of a foreign producerbeing able to provide supply support for the systemuntil the intended user can establish an adequatesupport system.

23

-- An early identification of problems which might beexpected in 3ferring support of the system from aforeign contractor to the purchaser of the system.

In commenting on this recommendation, the Navy said itconsiders that existing Naval Material Command Instructionsdated June 1975 fulfill our intent. The Navy agreed thatthe instructions do not specifically reference foreign-produced ystems, but added that cheir purpose is to providepolicy and guidance for all acquisition programs.

We believe the problems identified in this report weredue, in part, to the lack of specific guidance in developingan ILS program to support a foreign-produced system. It isevident that existing ILS guidance was tailored after domes-tic acquisitions and further that there are unique charac-teristics associated with acquiring foreign-produced systemssuch as those identified in this report, which are not spe-cifically addressed in the current guidance.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations andLogistics) agreed with this report and said the lessons learnedfrom the AV-8A Harrier program will be passed on to all asso-ciated with system acquisitions. He did not, however, commenton whether the supplemental guidelines would be prepared.

We believe the Secretai n.se should take the leadin providing the necessary guidanc deal specifically withILS for foreign-produced systems.

24

CHAPTER 5

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Our review of the logistics and maintenance problemsencountered by the U.S. Marine Corps in the support of theBritish-produced Harrier aircraft included:

--An examination of congressional hearings, Defensedirectives, and Navy instructions which explain inte-grated logistics support and contain policies andprocedures.

-- Discussions with officials connected with the Harrieraircraft and a review of documents at the Naval AirSystems Command.

--An analysis of readiness and maintenance statisticsfor Harriers at the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station,Cherry Point, North Carolina, and discussions withMarine aviation officials.

-- Discussions with officials and a review of documentsat the Naval Air Rework Facility.

--Discussions with officials and a review of documentsat the Aviation supply Office, Philadelphia,Pennsylvania.

--Review of contracts and discussions with officials ofMcDonnell-Douglas Aircraft.

25

APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTAn SECRTARY OF DWI SEWAHINGTON, D. C. 20301

MISA"J100Tmjn MLOM0 fIUISALAImS de tOlu

Mr. Fred J. Shafer, DirectorLogistics and Communications DivisionUnited States General Accounting OfficeWashington, D. C. 20548

Dear Mr. Shafer:

This is in reply to your letter of August 10, 1976 to Secretary Rumsfeldforwarding copies of your draft report, OSD Case No. 4430, "Problemswith Providing Integrated Logistics Support to Foreign Produced WeaponsSystems." We agree with your recommendations and consider that theywould help alleviate like problems encountered in any acquisition offuture foreign produced systems.

Department of Defense Directives are intended to apply to program manage-ment for foreign produced weapons systems as well as U.S. systems anddelineate the responsibility of carrying out the integrated logisticssupport program as an integral part of the acquisition process. Thesemanagement policies require a complete system approach for planning,analyzing, designing and managing the logistics support acquisition andinclude, timely performance of maintenance engineering analyses, provisionsfor interim contractor support and assessment of contractor performance incarrying out the logistic support approach. Further, we will assure thatService regulations and instructions are equally applicable to both foreignand domestic purchases to prevent future problems such as found in theHarrier acquisition.

The lessons learned from this program will be passed on to all associatedwith system acquisitions. In this way, future Program Office personnelmay be made aware of the unique problems encountered in acquiring foreignproduced systems. Upon receipt of the final report, we will assure thatdistribution is made throughout the Department of Defense for that purpose.

We have attached Navy comments for your consideration in finalizing thisreport.

Sincerely,

NK A HRON

Attachment Asstt Secrtary of DetenseDepartment of Navy (Inutalaon and LogIetir.)Comments

26

APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYOFICE OF THE4 SECReTARY

WASHINGTON. . C. 0350S

MEMORANDUM FOR TE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE(INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS)

Subj: GAO Draft Report, Problems with Providing IntegratedLogistic Support for Foreign Produced Weapons Systems(OSD Case 4430)

Ref: (a) ASTSECDEF(COMPT)(A) memo of 17 Aug 1976

Encl: (1) Department of the Navy comuents on subjectReport

Enclosure (1) is forwarded in accordance with reference(a).

4; of Xh NiaY27][don & Lonis)

I><s*r· ~ . 27

APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

Department of the Navy Comments

on

AO Draft Report of 10 August 1976

on

Problems with Providing Integrated Logistic

Support for Foreign Produced Weapons Systems, Code 947197

(OSD Case 4430)

I. GAO Findings and Conclusions

The General Accounting Office (GAO) made an analysis ofreadiness and maintenance statistics for the Second MarineAircraft Wing AV8A aircraft (the Harrier) at Marine Corps AirStation, Cherry Point, North Carolina. The GAO states thatSecond Marine Aircraft Wing AV8A aircraft operational readi-ness levels during 1974 and 1975 ranged from 22 to 43 percentwhile operating in a peace time environment. It wasn't untilthe early months of 1976, five years after the introductionof the AV8A into the operational units, that Second MarineAircraft Wing Harriers experienced operational readiness levelsmore nearly approching the established minimum goal.

GAO concludes the primary causes for the readiness diffi-culties stem from inadecuate ILS planning and a lack of ex-perience in acquiring and supporting foreign produced weaponsystems. Further, the introduction of the AV8A into the MarineCorps did not follow the normal ILS planning process. Key ILSfunctions were compressed into the deployment and/Dr operationalphase of the acquisition cycle. Because of this compression ofILS functions, maintenance engineering analyses and maintenanceplans were not prepared. This contributed to the inadequatemaintenance capability. Additional factors were the differentmaintenance and supply support systems of the United States andUnitei Kingdom; the inability of foreign vendors to providenecessary parts and supplies in a timely manner; the problemsassociated with foreign contractors providing complete contractorsupport and the eventual transition of support from a foreigncontractor to the military service operating the system.

GAO states that while the Navy did not foresee all theproblems that have arisen, intensified management of theseproolens has improved the operational readiness, maintainabilityand logistic support of the aircraft.

28

APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

II. GAO Recommendations and Comments

GAO makes the following recommendations to SCDEF to takenecessary action to ensure that additional procurements offoreign developed weapon systems, if any, will be less likelyto encounter problems experienced by the AV8A.

*Recommendation 1 - As a minimum, the following ILS func-ti.ons must be completed when foreign procurement of a system.s involved:

(a) timely performance of mintenance engineering analyseswith resultant maintenance plans for supporting thesystem.

(b) provision for a contractor interim support period untilsuch time as the military activity, which will have theoperational system, can develop complete supportcapability.

Recommendation 2 - Existing ILS guidance be supplemented fora foreign produe--system as follows:

(a) an early assessment of the compatibility of maintenanceand supply support systems between the foreign producerand intended user with identification of significantdifferences and potential inpact on providing supportfor the system.

(b) an early identification of technical data requirementsnecessary to develop maintenarce skills and supportcapability with assessment of accessibility to necessarytechnical data.

(c) an early assessment of the ability of foreign vendorsto provide necessary parts and supplies in a timelymanner.

(d) a determination o the likelihood of a foreign producerbeing able to provide interim contractor supply supportfor the system until the user can establish an adequatesupport system.

(3) an early identification of problems which might beexpected in transitioning support of the system from aforeign contractor to the military service operatingthe system.

29

APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

The Department of the N'avy full), concurs with GAOrecommcndation 1 above. ;.ith regard to rcor.:endation 2, weconsider that exist:r.g Naval Mlaterial. Cor,Mn1nd Instructions4000.20B, "Integrated Lo.istic Support Plainning Policy" and4105.1A, "Contractor/Early Support for nc.: eapons andequipment; utilization of' fulfil] te GAO intent. Ilhilenot specifically referenci,'g eithcr foreigi, or U. S. producedsystems, their purpose is to provide polic) and guidance for allacquisition programs indeyndently of i:he iler they be U. .,foreign, involve engineering developiment, or are "off-the-shelf."

It should be noted tat the tiintenance Enrgincering Analysisprocess addressed under rccommend;:icn 1 has been supersededby the Logistic Support Ar.nalysis process described in Appendix Dof NAVMJAT Instruction 4000.20B.

With regard to foreign procurements by the U. S., includingthose on a government-to-government basis, all agreements shouldbe sufficiently explicit to assure that DOD ILS requirementscan, in fact, be fulf. realized and tilat differernces betweenforeign and U. S. support practices will not become an impedimentto a successful acquisition program.

The GAO analysis focused on the operational readiness ofSecond iarine Aircraft ing AV8A aircraft exclusively and didnot address the operations of the AV8A squ;adron th has beendeployed to the First 'larine Aircraft Wling in WestPac sinceAugust 1974. This squadron sustained an average operationallyready rate of 70.7% during FY 1975 and 48.2% during FY 1976while deployed. The readiness date for all Marine Corps AV8Aaircraft operations are as follows:

OR FSC NORS NOMi UTIL

FY 75 42.0 33.9 38.7 19.6 19.7FY 76 41.4 30.8 32.2 23.9 22.7

Jul 76 40.6 29.9 38.5 20.9 20.0

NOTE: OR - Operationally Ready (percent)FSC - Full Systems Capability (pcrcent)NORS Not Operatier-ally Ready, Supply (percent)NORMI Not Opcratic,!lly Ready, :'.aiJtenance (percent)UTIL - Utili-ation (verage flight lh0ors per aircraft

assigned pr ::onth)

30

APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

III. Discussion - The following comments apply to th6 pagesadd paragraphs of the report:

Page 2 (Digest), Para. (4)

Regarding inadequacy of provisioning approach apply:

Although maintenance plans were not available to theprovisioning team, the varied types of data presented by theBritish contractors did not hamper the range selection forthe Harrier items. As will be pointed out in later comments,some U. S. Navy provisioning actions p eded those of he-AF. In all cases, engineering assistance was provided by theJK prime vendors; therefore, the differences in the utiliza-tion of the aircraft by the RAF and USMC had little or no

effect on the selection of repair parts. The absence ofmaintenance engineering analyses and maintenance plans did not

significantly hinder the efforts of the provisioning team, and

the item selection was consistent with existing USKC main-tenance practices.

Pages 14, 15, and 16 - Maintenance levels for U. S. andBritish Weapons Systems

The chart should be revised to reflect the proper fourlevels of British maintenance as defined below:

Levels of Maintenance

The levels of maintenance for aircraft servicing in the

Royal Air Force are first line through fourth line, with thefirst line representing the lowest echelon (organizational)for maintenance servicing/repair. Such four lines of servicingare as follows:

(1) First line servicing consists of those tech-nical processes which must be carried out on an aircraft inuse to maintain it fit for flight from day to day. The workcomprises arming, disarming, flight servicing and scheduledservicing compatible with the servicing system in use, compli-ance with Special Technical Instructions (STI) and ServicingInstructions (SI) of a simple nature, diagnosis of random de-fects and rectification of those which are within t capacityof the limited technical resources provided. This work isaccomplished by the skilled tradesman supported by a smallnucleus of technicians, and such work does not normally requirethe use of costly test equipment or special working acilitiesto workshop standards.

(2) Second line servic.ing consists of those tech-nical processes which must be carried out under qualifieddirection on aircraft which are temporarily out of use, tomake them fit for use again. This line comprises minor and

31

APPEDIX I APPENDIX I

major servicing weapon preparation, embodiment of pres-cribed modification- compliance with STIs and SIs and recti-fication of random defects beyond the capacity of First lineservicing. The majority of this work is done by the advancedtradesman and requires the use of ground and special test equip-

ment and facilities equivalent to the normal station workshopstandards.

(3) Third line servicing consists of those tech-

nical processes which are normally beyond the resources ofSecond line servicing and comprises such specializedprocesses as salvage, repair on site, storage servicing,specified repair to components, calibration, test and embodi-ment of prescribed modifications.

(4) Fourth line servicing consists of those tech-

nical processes which require the facilities of a main base.Such servicing includes major repairs, reconditioning andgeneral engineering. For economic reasons a proportion ofthis work is carried out by contractors.

NOTE: At the time of the U. S. Navy provisioningeffort, the RAF had finalized provisioningdeterminations for first and second lineservicing only.

It was therefore necessary, for most of thevendor systems/repairable items, to initiallyselect the repair parts required for depotrework.

The Navy not only envisioned the differencesin.maintenance philosophy but provisioned inadvance of the RAF to achieve support for thehigher level of maintenance. This was accom-plished by specialized provisioning teams con-ducting on-site, in depth item selections withthe assistance and engineering guidance of therespective British Vendors.

The Ministry cf Defense, Procurement Executive, UK and

British contractors have been extremely positive in theirattempts to correct the Marine Corps AV8A supply situation.The innate differences of tte U. S. and U. K. aircraft produc-

tion and support systems are the problems, not a specific lack

of cooperation by the British personnel. The AV8A supplysupport situation is still not fully recovered and only by

the requisite funds and extraordinary management actions will

the AV8A supply support become totally satisfactory.

32

APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

The AVIB aoquisition and dvelopment program is orenormally structured, with adequate funCing and appropriatetime for implimenting complete ILS planning. This, in con-junction with a U. S. prime contractor (McDonnell-DouglasCorporation), will ensure that the introduction and operationof the AVSB will be supportable by established Navy procedures,although a significant portion of the aircraft systems will besubcontracted with the U. K.

33

APPENDIX II APPENDIX IT

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS'RESPONSIBLE-FOR

ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN-THIS-REPORT

....----Tenure-of officeFrom To

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:Donald H. Rumsfeld Nov. 1975 PresentJames R. Schlesinger July 1973 Nov. 1975William P. Clements, Jr.

(acting) Apr. 1973 July 1973Elliott L. Richardson Jan. 1973 Apr. 1973Melvin R. Laird Jan. 1969 Jan. 1973

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE(INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS):Frank A. Schrontz Feb. 1976 PresentJohn J. Bennett (acting) Mar. 1975 Feb. 1976Arthur I. Mendolia June 1973 Mar. 1975Hugh McCullough (acting) Jan. 1973 June 1973Barry J. Shillito Jan. 1969 Jan. 1973

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:J. William Middendorf June 1974 PresentJ. William Middendorf (acting) Apr. 1974 June 1974John W. Warner Apr. 1972 Apr. 1974John H. Chafee Jan. 1969 Apr. 1972

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS:General Louis H. Wilson, Jr. July 1975 PresentGeneral Robert E. Cushman, Jr. Jan. 1972 July 1975General Leonard L. Chapman, Jr. Jan. 1968 Jan. 1972

34