Lawandnon-LawwithintheASEANEconomicCommunity

ClaudioDordi–LeonardoBorliniUniversitàCommerciale“L.Bocconi”-Milan

Summary

•  Background

•  MainfeaturesoftheASEANEconomicCommunity(AEC)

•  IntegraConwithoutinsCtuConalizaCon

•  Lawandnon-LawinAEC

•  Conclusions

Background•  ASEAN(1967)–APoliCcal/StrategicOrganizaCon

•  BangkokDeclara;on:5ar;cles!(nointerna;onalagreement!)

•  NoLegalPersonality(un;l2008)-EFTA!

•  Expandedcompetencesthroughanumberofbindingandnon-bindingacts(agreements,arrangements,declara;ons…)

•  WeakInsCtuConalSePng(inter-governmentalbodies-State)+Secretariat(members’driven)

•  EconomicIntegraCon(Notapriorityatthebeginning)•  Onlyin1992theASEANFTA–Since2002,severalASEAN+1FTAs

•  (1997)DecisiontoEstablishtheAECin2020

•  (2007)ASEANCharter(internaConallegalpersonality)–inforcesince2008

•  (2007)AcceleratetheEstablishmentoftheAECto2015

•  (2014)DelaysintheImplementaConofAECcommitments

•  (2015)CreaConofAEC–extendeddeadlinesforCMLV+ASEANblueprint2025

ASEANinbrief:basicdataCovers an area of 4.46million square kilometers (3% of the Earth’stotallandarea)–EU28:4.3millionA popula;on of approximately 622million people (9% of the worldpopula;on–50%under30–39%ineastAsiaand35%inEurope)2016:ASEANisAsia’s3rdmarketandworld’s6thNominalGDP:US$2.57trillion.EU18.5ASEAN Archipelagic Sea-lane contributes to 45% of the world seatrade(!)

ASEANinbrief(2):tradeandinvestment

MAIN TRADING PARTNERS (INTRAASEAN24%)China14%oftotaltrade,EU10%,Japan11.4%,USA8%MAIN INVESTMENT PARTNER (INTRAASEAN18%)EU:21%oftotalFDIs,Japan:10%.China:7%USA:10%AVERAGE TARIFF RATES ON IMPORTS(ASEANFTAs)0.68%ASEAN-6:0.05%CMLV:1.69%

TRADEBALANCE:+Japan(17bn.),USA(13.8),EU(18.4),Australia(15)

-China(24.6),Korea(15.5)VOLUMEOFTRADE(2.338bn.)Singapore (775 bn.), Thailand (458),Malaysia (415), Indonesia (380), VietNam(199)–EU(5.714)VERYOPENECONOMIES(TRADE/GDP)Singapore (298%), Viet Nam (161%),Malaysia(141)–EU(33.1%)

ASEANinbrief:developmentlevelandgrowth

•  ASEAN6andCMLV

•  Threedifferentcategoriesofmembers(GNIpercapita)–  Developed:Singapore(36.5k),Brunei(30.3)–  Middle income: Malaysia (7), Thailand (3.9), Indonesia (2.3),

Philippines(1.7),VietNam(1.1)–  Lowlevelincome:Lao(0.9),Cambodia(0.7),Myanmar(?)

•  Growthrate(+4.6%:2014)–  Brunei (-2.3), Indonesia (5.1), Lao (7.6),Malaysia (6),Myanmar (8.7),

Philippines(6.1),Singapore(2.9),Thailand(0.7),VietNam(6)

AEC–InsCtuConalBackground(beforetheCharter)

•  (1967)AnnualASEANMinisterialMeeCngsupportedbytheASEANStandingCommijee(Ambassadors,since1992GeneralDirectorsofeachMOFinchargeofASEAN)

•  (1976)ASEANSummit(HeadsofState)

•  (1975)ASEANEconomicMinisters

AEC–DecisionMaking+LegalProfiles(beforetheCharter)

•  UnCl2008(whenASEANCharterenteredintoforce)•  NoLegaland/orInterna;onalPersonality•  NoFormalAgreement

•  DecisionMakingProcess–“ASEANWay”•  Consulta;onsandConsensus•  Non-InterferenceinInternalAffairs•  RespectofSovereignty

•  SeelementofDisputes–NoRuleOriented•  BasedonDialogue,Consulta;onsandNego;a;ons

•  ASEANwasnotaMemberofanyAgreement•  OnlyASEANMemberStateswereContrac;ngPar;es

AEC–InsCtuConalBackground(afertheCharter)

•  ASEANSummit–TheheadsofStateas"supremepolicy-makingbody"(art7)

•  OtherInsCtuCons–•  ASEANCoordinaCngCouncilofForeignMinisters(art8)•  3ASEANCommunityCouncils(art9)–oneisAEC•  37subordinatedASEANSectorialMinisterialBodies(art10andAnnex1)•  Secretary-General (Doesn’t have own decision-making powers but shall"facilitate and monitor progress in the implementa;on of ASEANagreementsanddecisions”)(art11)

•  CommieeeofPermanentRepresentaCves(art12)•  ASEANIntergovernmentalCommissiononHumanRights(cf.art14)

AEC–DecisionMaking+LegalProfiles(afertheCharter)

•  Decision-MakingProcess–SCllBasedon“ASEANWay”(consultaConandconsensus)•  “ASEANminusx”procedureinimplementa;onofeconomiccommitments

•  Non-InterferenceandSovereigntysCllareFundamentalPrinciples

•  InternaConalOrganizaConwithLegalPersonality•  Yet,ASEANisNOTmemberofanyofthemorethan300“ASEAN-Agreements”(includingthoseconcludedAFTERtheCharter)

•  Art2oftheCharter–“ASEANanditsmemberStatesreaffirmtoadheretothefundamentalprinciplescontainedinthedeclara;ons,agreements,conven;ons,concords,trea;es…”•  Fundamentalprinciples•  Isitapost-accessionofASEANtoASEANinterna;onalagreements?•  EFTAsitua;on•  RULESOFPROCEDUREFORTHECONCLUSIONOFINTERNATIONALAGREEMENTSBY

ASEAN(2011)

AEC…(afertheCharter)

•  NOElementsof“SupranaConal”OrganizaCon–Differencesbetween“immuni;esandprivileges”forASEANGeneralSecretaryandPermanentRepresenta;ves(art19Charter)

•  NOPowerstoProduceSecondaryLaw–Harmoniza;onandmutualrecogni;onpromotedthroughinterna;onalagreements(e.g.MRAs)

•  NOClearSourcesofLaw(agreements,declara;ons,concordats,blueprints,etc.)andNoClearHierarchy(lertointerna;onallawandna;onallegalsystems)

•  NOASEAN“OwnResources”(fullydependantfromMembers).EachAMSshallcontributeequallytothebudget(Singaporevs.Lao…)

•  NoSupremacyof“ASEANAgreements”etc.onDomes;cLegisla;on(lertona;onallegalsystems)

•  Neither“DirectApplicability”nor“DirectEffect”(lertona;onallegalsystems)

•  NOCustomsUnion(nocommoncommercialpolicy)•  Nocleardis;nc;onbtwASEANandMScompetences(lertoadhocagreements)•  Nocommonexternaleconomic/tradepolicy•  Nopar;;onofcompetencesASEANvs.MS

AEC…(afertheCharter)

“TopDown”Law-MakingInsCtuCon–Pure“Inter-Governmental”or“DiplomaCc”

•  SameintheEU,butwithsupremacy,directapplicabilityanddirecteffect(especiallytheECJ)–inthe“goldenage”(70-90s)thecontribu;onofthe“bojomup”law-crea;onwasfundamental

•  Compliance–Monitoredonlythrough“sorlaw”commijees(Nosanc;ons,orenconflictofinterestsbtwmonitoringandmonitored–Nocompliancemechanisms)

•  ImplementaCon–LertoNa;onalins;tu;ons•  StrongAdherencetotheRuleofLaw(ar.2(2)lit.h)–“ruleoflaw”principlessome;mesenshrinedintheCons;tu;ons–Indonesia,Thailand,Vietnam)•  But:e.g.“transparencyinterna;onal”…

•  DisputeSeelement–Purely“State-State”(exceptACIA)andbasedondialogueandnego;a;ons–IsitpossibletoimplementaWTOlikesystem?WhyStatesshoulduseatoothlesssysteminsteadofaneffec;veone?

WeakIns*tu*onalFramework?ASEANMonitoringMechanism(AMS)•  HighLevelTaskForce(HLTF)onASEANEconomicIntegraCon–ProvidesstrategicinputstotheASEANEconomicMinisters(AEM)onthe;melyimplementa;onoftheBlueprint

•  AMSRelevantSectorialMinisterialBodies–Responsibleforimplemen;ngtheBlueprintandmonitoringthecommitments

•  TheASEANEconomicMinisters(AEM)(i.e.theMinisters-in-ChargeofEconomicIntegra;onintheCouncilofASEANEconomicCommunity)–Accountablefortheimplementa;onoftheBlueprint

•  ASEANSecretary-General–ReportstheprogressofAECtorelevantministerialmee;ngsandtheASEANSummit

•  ASEANscorecardasasystemtomonitortheimplementaConofAEC

Lawandnon-LawinAEC

•  ThreefoldlegaldimensionofAEC•  Systemofnego;atedprovisionsregula;ngeconomicrela;onsamongASEANmembers

•  Itisapan-ASEANnego;a;ngprocess.Statescommijedtoresorttothenego;a;ng-processmethodasaninstrumenttopromotethecrea;onofahighlyintegratedeconomicarea.Thenego;a;ng-processmethodmakespossiblethenecessarycoopera;onamongStatestoupgradesuchanintegra;onandforecastthesejlementofanydisputethatcanunderminetheplannedgoals

•  Ins;tu;onaldimension:AECleansontheASEANins;tu;onalframework

AEC:asystemofnego;atedprovisions.TheBlueprint

•  WhatistheASEANBlueprint2015-2025.Isitabindingdecision?

•  BlueprintandalltheAECdocumentsarenottrea;es,thereforetheyarenotlegallybinding(nowhereismen;onedthedeposittoUNfollowingart.102ofUNCharter,nomen;onofra;fica;on,StatesarereferredtoASEANmembersandnotcontrac;ngpar;es)

•  Blueprintshavebeenadoptedbythehighestauthori;esofASEANmemberswithasolemnprocedure

•  Decisionsadop;ngBlueprints(e.g.)featuredbysolemnlanguagestressingthehighpoli;calimportanceand,acontrario,theabsenceofanylegallybindingnature

AEC:asystemofnego;atedprovisions.TheBlueprint(2)

•  WhentheysignedtheDecisionsadop;ngtheBlueprints,theHighrepresenta;vesofASEANmembersdidnotreleaseanyofficialdeclara;onsdispellingdoubtsaboutthepoli;calorlegalnatureofthedecisions

•  Legaldoctrine:constantlyeludedthepointrepea;ngthatthesewerebindingdecisions

AEC:asystemofnego;atedprovisions.TheBlueprint(3)

•  Thereasonsofthispeculiarwayofproceedingsisthat,despitethehighpoli;calrelevanceofthecommitments,ASEANmembersmeantthatthecompliancewiththesecommitmentsisnotlegallyenforceable

•  However,thelackofcompliancemightbringaboutimportantpoli;calconsequences

•  Inotherwords,therulesforStateResponsibilityfortheillegalacts(includingcondi;ons,proceduresandconsequences)DONOTAPPLY

AEC:asystemofnego;atedprovisions.TheBlueprint(4)

•  AECcommitmentsandbindingobliga;onofinterna;onallaw

•  ProvidedthatAECcommitmentsarenotlegallyenforceable•  Theycanbelegallybindinginsofarastheyreproducethesamealreadyexis;nginterna;onalbindingprovision(doublenature)

•  Example:BlueprinttariffcommitmentsreferringtothealreadyinforceCommonEffec;vePreferen;alTariffofASEANFTA

•  InthiswayASEANmembersrecognizeandemphasizetheimportanceandrenovatetheircommitmentstowardsthemen;onedrules(legalandnotonlypoli;calrelevance)

AEC:asystemofnego;atedprovisions.TheBlueprint(5)

•  NonbindinglegaleffectsofAECcommitments

•  Excludingbindinglegaleffectsdoesnotimplytheabsenceofanylegaleffect:wewouldimpoverishthelegaldimensionifwereducethelegalnaturetotheexistenceofbindingeffects

•  Inotherterms,anormcanperfectlyhavelegalrelevancewithoutcrea;nglegalbindingeffects

•  1.AnAECcommitmentwhichdoesnotduplicateanexis;nginterna;onallegalobliga;ons,despitenotbeinglegallyenforceable,hastheeffectofremovingthesubjectmajerfromthereserveddomainofmemberStates,makingitofinterna;onalconcern.ThereforeStatesinthesecasescannotinvoketheprincipleofnoninterven;onininternalaffairs

•  2.AECcommitmentslegalizethebehaviorofmemberstheyrequire.Inotherwords,thebehaviorofamemberconformingtoanAECcommitmentcannotbeconsideredillegalbyanotherASEANmemberevenifitisinviola;onofanexis;nginterna;onalnormsapplicabletothetwoStates.I.e.,inASEANmembersrela;onsinterna;onalrulesconflic;ngwithAECcommitmentsareimplicitlyrepealedortheyarewaived

•  3.AECcommitmentsmighthavearoleininterpre;nginterna;onallegalcommitmentsintermsofacquiescence,estoppel,renounceandacknowledgment

Pan-ASEANnego;a;ngprocess

•  LegalelementsofthePan-ASEANnego;a;ngprocess•  EvenifAECcommitmentsdonotproducebindinglegalobliga;ons,thenego;a;ngprocessisfullyregulatedbytherulesondiploma;crela;onsapplicabletointerna;onalconferences(e.g.privilegesandimmuni;esgrantedtopersonsofficiallyrepresen;ngstatesandac;ngexqualitateinanotherstate’sterritory)

•  i.e.thisisreallyapeculiarphenomenonasitenrichesinaquiteunpredictabledirec;onthedebateonsorlaw

•  AECmembersmustresorttothemosttradi;onalinterna;onallegalrules(diploma;claw)tocreatestructurestheycommijedtocreate(themonitoringprocess)

Ins;tu;onalDimension

•  AECdoesnotpersecreateanyins;tu;onbutitleansontheexis;ngASEANins;tu;onalframeworkwhichistheresultofaratherslowprogressfromthepoorlyins;tu;onalizedframework(1967-2008)toaninterna;onalorganiza;onequippedwithlegalpersonalitysincetheASEANcharter

•  E.g.themonitoringprocess

CONSEQUENCESOFTHEWEAKINSTITUTIONALANDLEGAL

FRAMEWORK…

(nextslide)

ASEAN

ASEANFTAsASEAN-6:0%99%CMLV:0-5%:98%

Thailand

Brunei

Malaysia

Singapore

VietNam

Philippines

Cambodia

Lao

Myanmar

Indonesia

China

SouthKorea

India

Japan

Australia/NewZealand

TransPacificPartnership

(US,Canada,Mexico,Peru

Chile,Japan,Peru,Aus,NZ))

EUFTAs

Russia,Kazakhstan,BelarusCUs

EFTAindividual

FTAs

Inforce

Concluded

OngoingNegoCaCons+TransPacific

OverlappingFTAs

•  OfenLackofCoordinaCngProvisions–(e.g.Vietnam-JapanFTAdoesnotcontainanyprovisiontocoordinatewithASEAN-JFTA)–ViennaConven;onontheLawofTrea;es

•  (Intheprovisionalperiods)applicaConofdifferentregimestoproductsexportedfromthesamecountry(butorigina;ngindifferentcountries)

•  DifferentCerCficatesofOriginforSameProducts(dependingontheFTAregimeapplied)

•  ConflicCngDisputeSeelementProcedures

LackofanASEANCommonCommercialPolicy–Consequences

(nextslide)

FTA Details of Liberalization

ASEAN 6 + Vietnam and CML

CHINA – ASEAN

Normal Track 0% (2010) 0% (2015) (fuel pumps)

Sensitive Track 20% (2012) 0-5% (2018) 20% (2015) 0-5% (2020) (piston rings)

Highly Sensitive 50% (2015) 50% (2018) (motorcycles)

KOREA - ASEAN

Normal Track 0% (2010) 0% (2018 VN - 2020 CML)

Sensitive Track 20% (2012) 0-5% (2016) 20% (2015) 0-5% (2020)

Highly Sensitive 50% (2016) or by 20/50% (2016) 50% (VN 2021 – CLM 2024) or by 20/50% (VN2021 – CLM 2024)

ASEAN - INDIA

Normal (2 tracks) 0% (2013-2016) 0% (2018-2022)

Sensitive (3 tracks) 0-5% (2017-2020) 0-5% (2021-2024)

Highly Sensitive (3 Tracks)

Cut to 50% (2019); Cut by 50% (2019); Cut by 25% (2019)

ASEAN – AU - NZ

No Tracks specified. Gradual liberalization from 2009 to 2020; some products excluded

Gradual liberalization from 2009 to 2026; some products excluded

ASEAN - JAPAN

No Track specified Gradual liberalization from entry into force up to 11 years; some products excluded

Gradual liberalization from entry into force up to 11 yrs; some products excluded

ASEAN Free Trade Area

Inclusion List 0% (2010) 0% (2018)

Sens. and H.S. 0% (2010) 0% (VN 2018; L/M 2015; C 2017)

Exclusion List

Consequences…LackofanASEANCourt

•  NTBssCllrelevant(mutualrecogni;oninMRAsisverycomplicated)

•  TotalExclusionofIndividualsfromIntegraCon(Agreementsdonotgrantci;zensasystemofsubjec;verights)

•  Puretop-downlaw-makingandenforcingprocedures(DisputeSejlement)

•  DifficulttodevelopASEANlawthatisnotofa“diploma;c”source

•  NoUniformInterpretaConofASEANAgreements.•  RULESOFPROCEDUREFORTHEINTERPRETATIONOFTHEASEANCHARTER•  Art.2.1.Theinterpreta;onoftheASEANCharterbytheASEANSecretariatshallbenon-bindingand

non-authorita;veinnatureandshallnotbeconsideredasrepresen;ngtheviewofanyMemberStateorofASEANasanintergovernmentalorganiza;on.

•  Nodebatesregardingtheimportanceof“non-tradeissues”(buttheblueprint2025…)

•  ThethreedifferenttypesofDisputeSeelementSystemshaveneverbeenuClizedbyASEANmembers(TAC,enhancedandASEANgeneralmechanism)–ASEANpreferredtheWTOsystemintwocases

Conclusions…

IsthepresentinsCtuConalframeworkadequate?Ifnot,whatwouldbeanidealframework?

TheEUasaModel?(economicperspecCve)

CONS•  TotalGDP(2.57tn.USD2014–internaldemandinsufficient(?)–ASEANGDPpercapita4135USD)

•  IntraASEANTrade24%(EEC58-72–morethan50%)•  HugeEconomic-DevelopmentDifferences(Singaporevs.Lao)•  EEC–Crea;onofEnvironmentforNewProduc;onNetworks–inASEANProducConNetworksAlreadyExist(e.g.produc;onofJapanesecars)–promotedbyASEANFTA

PROS•  AllEconomiesareGrowingFast•  InvestmentandCapitalareRapidlyIncreasing•  ASEAN–A“hub”forWorldProducCon+producConnetworks•  Low“Intra-Trade”–DuetoexisCngNTBsandlowuseofASEANpreferences•  ASEANArchipelagicSea-Lane–45%oftheWorldSeaTrade•  VeryOpenEconomies(Trade/GDP)–Singapore(298%),VietNam(161%),Malaysia(141)–EU(33.1%)

TheEUasaModel?(legalperspecCve)

CONS•  Founder6EECStates–CommonLegalTradiConsandComparableDevelopmentintheImplementaCon/EnforcementofLegalActs

•  EECMembers–LongTradiConinApplyingthe“RuleofLaw”

•  ASEANMembersNotReadytoGiveUpSovereignty–(ASEANCourt,SecondaryLaw,Primacy,DirectApplicabilityandDirectEffectarenotconsistentwithfullsovereigntyofMembers)

•  Non-InterferenceinInternalAffairs—S;lloneofthekeyprinciplesinASEAN(Strongcomplianceproceduresareinconsistentwithnoninterference)

•  CommonCommercialPolicy–NotForeseeableYet

•  CustomsUnion–NotForeseeableYet

•  EUisa“unique”case(?)

TheEUasaModel?(legalperspecCve)

PROS

•  PossibletoAchievebejerintegra;onintheMedium-LongTerm

•  MSDevelopmentofaModernAdministraConandanEfficientCourtSystemwithhighqualifiedcivilservantsandjudges

•  ASEANCharter–OnlyConcludedin2007(Itisthe“realstart”)•  Exis;ngClearStepsTowards“InsCtuConalizaCon”•  PlantoPromotean“ASEANCompeCConLaw”

•  Policyof“RegionalCohesion”–DevelopedDirectlyinASEANFTAsandIAI•  Stepstoimprovecompliance(e.g.RULESFORREFERENCEOFNON-COMPLIANCETOTHEASEANSUMMIT)

•  Stepstoimproveuniforminterpreta;on(e.g.2012RULESOFPROCEDUREFORTHEINTERPRETATIONOFTHEASEANCHARTER)

Presentchallenges

•  Thelevelofu;liza;onofexis;ngFTAsiss;lllow:why?•  Rulesoforigin•  Administra;veburden•  Lowpreferen;almargin

•  The“Spaghexbowl”syndrome•  Differentcer;ficates,standard,etc.toexportindifferentcountries(duetotheASEAN+1FTAsasseparatedagreements)

•  Riskofrestric;verulesoforigininTPPandEU-VietNamFTAs•  E.g.the“Yarnforward”ruleoforiginfortex;lesinTPP

SelectedASEANmembersasinvestmenthub?

•  Inves;nginaspecificASEANcountry(forEUcompanies,especiallyinthecountrieslinkedbyEU-FTAs,i.e.Malaysia,Singapore,ThailandandVietNam)allows:•  Freeaccess(0%customstariffsanddecreasingnon-tariffbarriers)toallthemainworldtradingpartners(e.g.ASEAN,China,Japan,Korea,Australia,EU,US…)

•  Adequateprotec;onofinvestment(IIAs)•  MaintainanhighEuropeanValueAddedinthefinalproducts(rulesoforigininASEANFTAsarebasedon35%/40%ofregionalcontent)–exportcomponentsatreducedor0%customstariffs

•  Accesstostrategicsuppor;ngindustries•  Lowwageslevel(mediuminThailandandMalaysia,LowinVietNamandIndonesia)

•  Services?(Financial,Transport,Communica;on,etc.)–dependsontheoutputofFTAnego;a;ons

Casestudy:compara;vetariffsadvantages–Automo;vesector(peaktariffs)

ExporCngcountry

China India Japan WTO-MFN

ASEAN+FTA+TPP

ASEANNOEU-TPP

Impor;ngCountry

Indonesia 20-60

max50–2015

20-60

5-40-2021

20-60

ExcludedfromFTA

20-60 0-5 0-5

China 14-25

14-25 14-25 5 5

EU 10(WTO) 6,5(GSP)

100?

10 6,5(GSP)0?

6,5(GSP)

USA 2.5-25 0 2.50?

2.5 2.50?

2.50?

Expor;nginselectedcountries:Advantagesofexpor;ngfromMalaysia,Singapore,ThailandandVietNamwhenalltheFTAswillbe

fullyimplemented(basedonpeaktariffs)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Adv.VsChinaAdv.VsIndiaAdv.VsJapanAdv.VsWTO

Produc;onnetworkoftheautoindustryinASEAN(TsukamotoandADB)

Japan

-Investmentpolicy

-Hi-technologyparts

Malaysia

-Enginecomputers

-CKDcomputers

-Steeringlinks

Philippines

-Transmissions

-Front-Wheeldriveshars

-Clutch

-IDPartsandexhaust

Thailand

-Finishedcars

-Dieselengines

-Stampingparts

-Plas;c/resinparts

-Steeringcolumns

Indonesia

-Gasolineengines

-CKDparts

-Transmissions

-Balljoint

Tradeflows

Investment

Japan–automo;ve:ASEANasaproduc;vehubtosa;sfyASEANmarket

•  FinishedcarsinThailand•  ExportedtoASEAN-FTAsmarket(mainly)

Importers Exportedvaluein2012(bnUSD) Traderegime

World 5.7Indonesia 1.5 FTAAustralia 0.9 FTAJapan 0.7 FTAPhilippines 0.6 FTAMalaysia 0.4 FTARussia 0.2 WTOLao 0.2 FTA

Furtherdevelopment

•  TPP:4ASEANcountriesinvolved(Vietnam,Singapore,Brunei,Malaysia)

•  RCEP:ASEAN+6FTAs(upgradeoftheASEAN+1x6)–China,Korea,Japan,India,AustraliaandNewZealand

•  WillRCEPandTPPhaveanimpactontheins;tu;ons,legalandeconomicbackgroundofASEAN?

•  WhatarethemainchallengesforASEANderivingfromRCEPandTPP?

Furtherdevelopments:RCEP(mainfeatures)–TPP(wellknown)

•  Both:reduce“spaghexbowl”effect•  Insteadof6ASEAN+1FTAanASEAN+6FTAs

–  Uniformrulesoforigin–  Uniform/harmonizedstandardsandtechnicalregula;ons

–  Singlecustomswindows–  Possibilityofcumula;ngvalueaddedfromdifferenttradepartners(ASEANAND6,nowisASEANand1)

–  Limita;onsofproductsexemptedfromliberaliza;on–  Newgenera;onofFTAs(!)

– TheASEANcentrality– Thedeteriora;onofASEAN-Chinadiploma;crela;ons

TPP:aproblemforASEANintegra;on?

•  AffectASEANsolidarityandhinderinternalcoopera;on•  SomeASEANMSsarereluctanttojoinTPPforthecommitmentsinIPRs,compe;;onandSOEs

•  Newentrantsshallnego;ateonbilateralbasis(long...)andaccepttheregulatoryprovisionsalreadyagreed

•  6ASEANnonTPPmembersisatreattointernalintegra;on•  E.g.harmoniza;onofIPRs(hugegapsamongmember–TPPhighrequirementsburdenforthe4ASEANbutalsowidenthegapswiththeother6)

•  Incen;vesformoredevelopedASEANnonTPPmemberstoaccede(Indonesia,Philippines,Thailand)

•  LessASEANdevelopedcountrieswillsufferfromdiversionoftradeandreloca;onofvaluechain–increasinggap

TPP:influenceonASEANins;tu;onalandlegalframework?

•  TPP:“ruleoflaw”,precisecommitments,regulatoryframeworkinmanysectors,bindingandefficientdisputesejlement(State-State),Secretariat(?)

•  RCEP:arelessdevelopedASEANmembershappytopar;cipate?

TheASEANEconomicCommunity

QuesCons?