Laura E. Smith-The Struggle for Western Sahara

This article was downloaded by: [Orta Dogu Teknik Universitesi]On: 22 June 2014, At: 06:53Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK

The Journal of North AfricanStudiesPublication details, including instructions for authorsand subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fnas20

The struggle for Western Sahara:What future for Africa's lastcolony?Laura E. SmithPublished online: 24 Jan 2007.

To cite this article: Laura E. Smith (2005) The struggle for Western Sahara: What futurefor Africa's last colony?, The Journal of North African Studies, 10:3-4, 545-563, DOI:10.1080/13629380500336854

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629380500336854

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all theinformation (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, orsuitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressedin this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not theviews of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content shouldnot be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions,claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilitieswhatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connectionwith, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fnas20

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/13629380500336854

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629380500336854

forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

The Struggle for Western Sahara: What Futurefor Africa’s Last Colony?

LAURA E. SMITH

This article looks at the status of the struggle for Western Sahara 30 years after the inception ofthe conflict. The self-determination referendum for the Saharawis is still no nearer to beingrealised after 14 years of political stalemate. However, events on the ground may prove signifi-cant for determining the future direction and character of the struggle. The North African regionhas now become a key component in the ‘war on terror’ and America’s imperial strategy forAfrica. This has been accompanied by a significant change in the role of Algeria (the mainbacker of the Saharawis) and the increased militarisation of the region, which is home to theSaharawi refugee camps. Unrest in the occupied territories is increasing and Saharawi protestsagainst Moroccan occupation are gaining more support and attention. The paper concludes thatthe threat of the Western Sahara conflict reverting to violence is now greater than ever.

Introduction

The decolonisation of the territory of Western Sahara has not been completed, almost

forty-two years after it was designated a non-self governing territory by the United

Nations Decolonisation Committee. The self-determination referendum, promised

to the Saharawi people in 1963, which would determine the status of the territory,

never took place. The Saharawis have lived as a divided people, some inside the

territory controlled by Morocco, others as refugees in neighbouring countries and

Europe, since the withdrawal of Spain and the invasion by Morocco in 1975.

The United Nations peace process has been stalled and the referendum delayed for

the last 14 years; the conflict and protracted refugee situation long forgotten in the

western world.

In May and June 2005 an uprising of public protest from within the Moroccan

controlled territory of Western Sahara caught the attention of the international media.

Protests from Saharawi civil rights groups and students protesting against human

rights violations were violently dispersed by the Moroccan security forces. Further

protests spread rapidly into other cities in Western Sahara and Morocco proper,

and many developed into pro-Saharawi independence demonstrations. The media

reported violent reprisals from the Moroccan authorities including serious human

rights abuses and disappearances during the course of two weeks of protests.

Laura E. Smith graduated with an MA in Peace Studies from Bradford University. She has worked exten-sively for the Western Sahara Campaign and also as an independent researcher amongst the Saharawipeople in the Tindouf refugee camps. She is currently engaged in research on the role of the privatesector in peace-building and conflict prevention.

The Journal of North African Studies, Vol.10, No.3–4 (September–December 2005) pp.545–563ISSN 1362-9387 print=1743-9345 onlineDOI: 10.1080=13629380500336854 # 2005 Taylor & Francis

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

Although the demonstrations were not the first to occur in the territory, these were

significantly larger, well organised and widespread and gained more attention from

outside Morocco than ever before. The events were the culmination of years of Sahar-

awi resistance to Moroccan colonisation. The open rejection of Moroccan rule

suggests that the 30-year long occupation has increased Saharawi demands for inde-

pendence and serves as a reminder that, although the conflict is deadlocked at the UN

level, the Saharawi struggle is still strong. Events on the ground may prove decisive

for the future of the conflict. Equally, the recent arrival of oil politics and changes in

the geopolitics of the region following the launch of the United States-led ‘war on

terror’ have added a new dimension to the conflict. While the militarisation and

increased US presence in the Sahara region suggests that the conflict may get more

attention in future from the US, the precise implications for movement towards a

settlement and the delivery of the referendum on self-determination that the Sahara-

wis have long been promised are still hard to define.

Forty-two years after the territory first appeared in the United Nations decolonisa-

tion files, the Saharawis’ struggle is still alive: this paper will attempt to explore the

current parameters within which it is waged.

Africa’s Last Decolonisation File

Despite the overwhelming backing of international law and several United Nations

General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions to support Saharawi self-determination,

Realpolitik rather than international law has dictated the course of the Western

Sahara conflict and with it the fate of the Saharawi people. It is 30 years since the

Saharawi independence struggle, set to reap the fruits of its labour, was betrayed

by Franco’s Spain and encountered a new colonial master. Africa’s last decolonisa-

tion file remains open at the United Nations (UN) and the struggle for Western

Sahara has earned it the unfortunate label of the ‘forgotten conflict’.

The right of the Saharawi people to self-determination was recognised by the UN

as early as 1963 when Western Sahara, then known as the Spanish Sahara, was desig-

nated a ‘non-self governing territory’.1 A UN mission sent to Western Sahara in May

1975 to assess the desire of the peoples of the territory noted an ‘overwhelming con-

sensus among Saharans within the territory in favour of independence and opposing

integration with any neighbouring country’.2 The UNGA requested that Spain begin

preparing for a referendum for the indigenous population, the Saharawi, to determine

their future. Instead, however, in Franco’s last hours, Spain signed the ‘Madrid

Accords’, a tripartite agreement dividing Western Sahara between Morocco and

Mauritania in return for valuable natural resource rights.3

In November 1975 350,000 Moroccan civilians crossed the border into Western

Sahara during the ‘Green March’, which aimed at reintegrating the ‘lost provinces

of the Sahara’.4 The march occurred in direct contravention of the 1975 International

Court of Justice (ICJ) opinion, which weeks before had ruled that, although ‘legal ties

of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the

territory of Western Sahara’ had existed at the time of Spanish colonisation, they

did ‘not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western

546 THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity’. The ICJ concluded

that ‘the Court has not found any legal ties of such a nature as might effect the appli-

cation of General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonisation of Western

Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and

genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory’.5

ICJ and UN resolutions called for the participants of the march to withdraw, but the

civilian influx quickly progressed to a military invasion. Thousands of Saharawis fled

Western Sahara to seek refuge in neighbouring Algeria. Morocco, using napalm and

cluster bombs against the Saharawi population,6 invaded from the north, while

Mauritania invaded from the south. The Polisario Front (‘Frente Popular para la

Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro’, hereafter ‘Polisario’), the Saharawi lib-

eration movement, created in 1973 to resist Spanish colonial rule, mounted a guerrilla

war against the invading armies. Mauritania was unable to sustain the war and with-

drew in 1979, leaving Morocco to take over their strongholds in the south.7 The effec-

tiveness of Polisario guerrilla tactics against Moroccan targets induced the Moroccans

to construct (with US and French funding) a heavily militarised wall – the berm,8

which to this day divides the territory of Western Sahara between the Moroccan

occupied area, comprising roughly 80 per cent, and the remaining Polisario controlled

area to the east, known as the ‘liberated zone’. With the 1,500-mile berm completed in

the 1980s, the conflict became a war of attrition. Unable to cross from one side of their

territory to the other, displaced Saharawi refugees organised themselves in camps near

the town of Tindouf in Algeria. For some 30 years this Saharawi refugee community

has remained cut off from Saharawis trapped in the territory occupied byMorocco. The

Polisario established the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) state in 1976,

which remains exiled in the refugee camps near Tindouf.9

In 1988 the UN intervened, negotiating a ceasefire and drawing up a peace plan in

collaboration with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Morocco and the

Polisario10 agreed to the UN-proposed 1991 Settlement Plan, the ultimate goal of

which was to organise a free and fair referendum on self-determination for the

people of Western Sahara, based on the 1974 Spanish census.11 The UN accordingly

established the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (known by its

French acronym MINURSO) to guarantee the exercise of the right to self-determi-

nation of the indigenous population.

The Referendum that Never Was

The referendum on self-determination ran into obstacles from the beginning. As

Chopra records:

MINURSO suffered from an unprecedented gap between the powers of the UN

assumed on paper and the means to exercise this authority in the field. Conse-

quently the peace process faltered at each critical phase of the timetable, during

the ceasefire and the identification of voters.12

In fact, the UN ceded control of the voter registration process to the parties, which,

as Human Rights Watch noted, ‘seriously jeopardised its fairness’.13 In addition to

THE STRUGGLE FOR WESTERN SAHARA 547

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

tightly controlling the identification process to the detriment of Saharawis, Morocco

obstructed the deployment of the UN operation and prevented its freedom of move-

ment within the territory.14 Morocco attempted to rig the voter list, first in 1991 by

moving 170,000 settlers into the territory and secondly by presenting a list two and

a half times the size of the population of the territory. Dates set for the referendum

went by as Morocco launched appeals against the final voter list. Hostilities

between the parties intensified and they refused to meet to discuss the faltering

peace process. By 1996 the resumption of war looked likely.

From Self-determination to the ‘Third Way’

Optimism prevailed in 1997 as the former US Secretary of State, James Baker III, was

introduced as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan.

Baker’s mandate was to get the identification process back on track and his high

profile status suggested that the UN was prepared to ensure the referendum take place.

Baker negotiated new criteria for voter identification via the ‘Houston Accords’ and

the final voter list was completed by 1999. Given that the list was close to the 1974

Spanish census figure, the predicted outcome of the referendum was a vote in favour

of Saharawi independence. However, Morocco launched 130,000 appeals against the

list, 95% of which were devoid of any legal or practical basis.15

The failure of the parties to agree on the identification process16 was cited as the

official reason for the delayed referendum, yet it was clear to many observers that

Morocco never intended to allow a referendum it could not be sure to win.

From 1999 the discourse within the UN began to shift as allusions to a ‘third way’

replaced references to the self-determination referendum. Indeed, the third way

appeared:

not because it was seen as a possible political solution to what was described as

a complex problem, but because both France and the United States came to the

conclusion that Morocco would never accept the results of a referendum, thus

implicitly recognising that a free and fair referendum would lead to Saharawi

independence.17

In subsequent Secretary General’s reports, the self-determination referendum – the

inalienable right of colonial peoples to determine their future – was now regarded

as a ‘winner-take-all system’ antithetical to conflict resolution. In his July 2000

report to the Security Council Kofi Annan acknowledged that negotiations had ‘dee-

pened the differences between the parties’,18 and made reference to a solution

whereby ‘each would get some, but not all of what they want’.19 The Secretary Gen-

eral’s references to an early, lasting and durable solution to the conflict seemed to

indicate that a new approach was necessary, in spite of the Settlement Plan,

Houston Accords and UN resolutions.20 Moroccan intransigence was being rewarded.

The ‘political solution’ was presented in the Draft Framework Agreement,

produced by James Baker in 2002. The Framework Agreement, as it is known, was

widely criticised as a thinly veiled proposal for the integration of Western Sahara

into Morocco under the label of autonomy. The plan anticipated the return of the


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

Saharawi refugees to Western Sahara for an interim period of five years after which a

referendum would take place. The choices at the ballot box would be independence,

continued autonomy, or integration into Morocco. The crux of this plan, however,

was the participation in the referendum of all the people residing in the territory of

Western Sahara prior to 1999. This would include the thousands of Moroccan settlers

who have been moved to the territory by Morocco since the Green March of 1975 and

who outnumber the Saharawis.

The Framework Agreement appeared to guarantee a vote for the integration of

Western Sahara into Morocco. Baker’s proposal met with disapproval from the UN

Security Council and outright rejection by Algeria and the Polisario, the latter

arguing that the participation of Moroccan settlers in the referendum vote made it

merely a referendum on ‘integration’.

Baker returned in 2003 with the ‘Peace Plan for the Self Determination of the

Western Sahara’ (known as ‘Baker II’), which claimed to offer some elements of

both the 1991 Settlement Plan and the 2002 Framework Agreement. The new plan

included some key differences such as the creation of a ‘Western Sahara Authority’,

which would be elected by the Saharawis identified on the 1999 UN voter list. This

elected body would have control over Saharawi affairs including local government,

law enforcement, economic development and industry for an interim period of five

years.21 However, the enduring feature was the participation in the final referendum

of all people residing in the territory before 1999, which would again include the

thousands of Moroccan settlers. Again, Baker’s proposal appeared to guarantee a

Moroccan victory.

Yet, after initially rejecting the plan, the Polisario surprisingly accepted Baker’s

Peace Plan as a ‘major concession and sacrifice’, but one that they were prepared

to work with.22 Morocco, however, rejected the plan, objecting to the creation of

the Western Sahara Authority and indeed to the very option of ‘independence’ as a

ballot box choice.23

The result of the UN Peace process in Western Sahara, which has lasted 14 years

at a cost of approximately US$10 billion, is a seemingly irresolvable impasse. The

task of organising a referendum on self-determination for the Saharawi people to

which Morocco will agree only in terms of its ‘territorial integrity and sovereignty’

and the omission of the option of ‘independence’ – the clear choice of the Saharawi

– is impracticable. The lack of an enforcement mechanism in the original peace plan

and the pro-Moroccan position of France and the US in the Security Council have

made a solution to the conflict even more elusive. Baker resigned, openly frustrated,

in August 2004, leaving yet another question mark over the whole process.24

Regional Stability and the Interests of the Main Powers

The mission to decolonise Western Sahara was impeded by the Moroccan grand plan

for its ‘southern provinces’ and complicated by the interests of the main powers

concerned. The US has provided considerable economic and military assistance to

Morocco since the 1975 invasion. The French government has long lasting and

strong connections to the Moroccan elite, the ‘makhzen’, and in particular the


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

monarchy. Both countries have officially supported the UN process to organise the

referendum, but then worked through the Security Council to promote the Moroccan

position. Spain’s failure to fulfil its colonial obligations to the Saharawis in 1975 has

been followed by a record of forsaking international law for political and economic

gain with Morocco, despite popular support for the Saharawi cause in Spain.

The main preoccupation of both France and the US has been to ensure the stability

of the Moroccan regime. Morocco has been an important and valued western ally in

North Africa and a bulwark between the west and Islam. As Morocco’s strategic rel-

evance has declined since the Cold War, Morocco has attempted to reposition itself as

the US’s chosen ally in the post-9/11 world, taking tough action against Islamists in

Morocco.

The rise of Islamism in Algeria, which culminated in the cancellation of the 1992

elections (which would almost certainly have brought to power the first democrati-

cally elected Islamist government) and the ensuing civil war, strengthened Morocco’s

significance in the region for a while. It was believed that a referendum favourable to

the Saharawis would generate destabilising forces in Morocco, and lead to the poss-

ible overthrow of the Monarchy, with dire consequences for both US and French

interests.

The Moroccan claim to Western Sahara also has to be placed in the context of

Morocco’s domestic politics. On the eve of the Green March, King Hassan was

facing a challenging domestic situation and had experienced two attempted military

coups. The regaining of the ‘lost provinces of the Sahara’ diverted the attention of the

population, kept the armed forces occupied and significantly strengthened Hassan’s

domestic position in Morocco. This nationalist agenda was, and still is, popular

across political parties and with the general population.

After King Hassan’s death in 1999 the new King, Mohammed VI, came to power

with a modernising agenda, but hopes that this would include a change in Western

Sahara policy soon were dashed. The continuing importance of the Sahara question

to domestic politics cannot be underestimated. Mohammed VI, perceived as politi-

cally weaker than his father, adopted an uncompromising stance on the Sahara

issue to consolidate his authority. The US and France gave stronger support to the

new Monarch to ensure the stability of the transition.

For their part, the US and France have avoided imposing a solution to the Western

Sahara conflict that would be favourable to one party or the other. They have had to

balance their support for the integration of Western Sahara into Morocco with the

need to avoid the alienation of Algeria, the regional supporter of the Saharawis and

with whom both countries have important commercial ties.

Algeria has been a steadfast supporter of the Saharawis’ self-determination

struggle and their main economic, military and diplomatic backer since the Moroccan

invasion. Moroccan-Algerian relations have been beset by a number of both real and

potential conflict situations since the time of Algeria’s independence from France in

1962. The root of the dispute between the two countries is that Morocco’s Istiqlal map

of ‘Greater Morocco’ includes a claim to Algerian territory. The ‘sand war’ of 1963

and the subsequent ongoing border dispute between the two countries degenerated

further with Morocco’s occupation of the Western Sahara.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

Although Algeria has never been involved militarily in the Western Sahara

conflict, both the US and France have been careful not to promote a situation that

could lead to a direct confrontation between the two regional powers. The self-

determination referendum, they believed, had the potential to cause two destabilising

outcomes – that of the downfall of the Moroccan regime, or the outbreak of regional

war. The premium placed on the maintenance of regional stability explains the lack of

political will to ensure the success of MINURSO, which instead has been used as a

vehicle to ensure the containment of the conflict.25 The stalemate generated by

the failure of MINURSO to successfully organise and hold a referendum has at the

same time maintained a situation favourable to US and French interests in the

region. Thus, ironically, the UN mission to decolonise Western Sahara has proven

an effective way to avoid the potentially negative outcomes that the referendum for

the Saharawi could cause.

While the pursuit of regional stability by the main powers has allowed Morocco

the de facto control of Western Sahara, the question of the territory’s natural

mineral wealth is not without significance. The considerable investments made by

Morocco to harness the territory’s economic potential have been a key driver in per-

petuating the conflict situation: the phosphate reserves of Western Sahara ensure that

Morocco remains the world’s largest producer of phosphates, while the rich fishing

grounds off the Western Saharan coast are exploited by Moroccan boats.

Speculation as to the amount of oil onshore and offshore Western Sahara led to the

signing in 2001 of offshore oil reconnaissance contracts between Morocco and two

major oil multinational companies, Total (France) and Kerr McGee (US).26 Interest-

ingly, the timing of the contracts coincided with the French and US backed Frame-

work Agreement, which, as noted, appeared to guarantee the integration of

Western Sahara into Morocco. Rumours in the press of a James Baker/KerrMcGee connection raised suspicions that the involvement of big business and the

prospect of oil would seal the fate of the referendum. However, UN legal opinion

precluded ‘further exploration’, a reminder of the delicate legal and political situation

that subsequently led to Total’s withdrawal.27

North Africa After 9/11: a New Front in the ‘War on Terror’

In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the USA, the Bush administration

launched its ‘war on terror’, declaring that:

Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with

us or with the terrorists.28

Algeria, which had been embroiled in a domestic ‘war on terror’ against Islamists for

almost a decade, was one of the first states to offer empathetic support to the US, thus

ushering in a new era of US-Algerian political and military cooperation. During the

course of 2003–4 the US-Algerian military-intelligence services launched a new

front in the war on terror across most of the Sahara-Sahel region. US-Algerian

reports of terrorists ‘swarming’ across the Sahara and its vast, ‘unpoliceable’

border regions, albeit over-hyped and unverified29 provided the justification for a


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

US presence across the region in the form of the Bush administration’s Pan Sahel

Initiative (PSI).30

In addition to the stated goal of combating radical Islamism in the region, this

engagement is integral to the USA’s longer-term strategy in which Africa is

deemed essential to the future of US economic and security interests. The Cheney

Report highlighted the fact that Africa may constitute up to 25 per cent of the

USA’s oil supplies by 2020.31 The USA’s increasing dependency on foreign oil

means ‘energy security must be a priority of US trade and foreign policy’.32 9/11 pro-vided the architects of the US imperial strategy with a unique opportunity to gain

legitimacy for their militarisation and securitisation of the African continent. The cre-

ation of a new front in ‘war on terror’ in the Sahara is, as Keenan has emphasised:

a deception . . .designed to create the ideological conditions for the US’s ‘inva-

sion’ of Africa and the securing of US strategic national resources.33

The post 9/11 emergence of Algeria as the USA’s main regional ally has not only

changed the role and fortunes of Algeria significantly but has also added a new

regional dimension to the Western Sahara conflict.34

The Implications of Algeria’s New Status for the Saharawi Struggle

In the post-Cold War world, and now with the ‘war on terror’, Algeria has changed its

international image from a Third World champion of revolutionary struggle, to a

country opening to western investment and influence. An important question is

what the new US-Algerian relationship means for the future of the Saharawi struggle.

Could there be negative consequences for the Saharawis, who rely on Algeria not only

for military and economic support, but also for their firm diplomatic backing and

unwavering commitment to the principle underlying the Saharawi struggle?

Reportedly, the Western Sahara was high on the agenda during the July 2001

meeting between Bouteflika and US officials in Washington, with Bouteflika possibly

being ‘encouraged’ to adopt a new, more pragmatic approach to the issue.35 During

Bouteflika’s second Washington meeting in November 2001, in which he met with

James Baker, it was rumoured that Bouteflika told Baker that ‘Algeria was no

longer opposed to the third way in (the) Western Sahara’.36

The remark made by retired General Major Khaled Nezzar, former Algerian

Minister of Defence, to newspapers in 2003 that ‘Algeria does not need another

state at its borders’37 exacerbated rumours that Algeria’s loyalty to the Saharawi

might be in question. His comments were countered by the government’s and

military’s reiteration of Algeria’s commitment to the Saharawis right to self-

determination and the UN settlement plan.

However, the Algerian about-turn in response to Baker II later in 2003 lent further

weight to the speculations. Ahmed Boukhari, Polisario representative to the UN,

made a clear reference to pressure from Algeria and Spain when saying that the

Polisario had decided to accept Baker II.38 From an original response in which

Algeria rejected the Baker Plan as eliminating ‘the very notion of the Saharawi


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

people’, Algeria returned to the table to accept Baker II as a ‘gamble for peace in the

Maghreb’.39 As Shelley suggests:

For Polisario, the bleaker assessment was that this was a signal that economic

and political pressures and trends . . . had finally convinced Algeria to transformits diplomatic stance on the Western Sahara from one founded on conviction to

something much more contingent.40

A pessimistic outlook is that Algeria could be pressured by the US and France, or

enticed by commercial deals and the possibility of regional hegemony, into making

a deal over the Polisario’s head. The dramatic improvement in relations with the

US has been accompanied (albeit to a lesser degree) by a development of closer

relations between France and Algeria. Meetings between Chirac and Bouteflika led

to the signing of the ‘Algiers declaration’ in March 2003.

In spite of the occasional ambiguity, however, Algeria has been constant in its

assertion that the Western Sahara issue is one of international legality and self-

determination to be resolved through the UN body.41 It is certain that the support

of Algeria for the Saharawi position reaches beyond that of pure self-interest; the

legitimacy of Algerian foreign policy hinges on the belief of self-determination of

people.42 Algeria’s colonial past and independence struggle have moulded the

nation’s identity and strong elements, especially within the dominant military

ranks, remain firmly committed to these ideals. Western Sahara, although a major

barrier to good relations between Algeria and Morocco, is one expression of the

deeper rivalry between the two countries. The distrust of Morocco traces back to

the 1963 ‘sand war’, and the fear of Moroccan irredentism is still strong among Alger-

ian policy makers and military figures.43

There are limited signs of Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement, but past trends

have seen relations regularly fluctuate between warm and cold. Early in 2005 two

meetings between Mohammed VI and Bouteflika were followed by the concrete

measure of withdrawing visa requirements by Algeria. However, Bouteflika was

snubbed by Mohammed VI in May 2005 when the King withdrew from the Arab

Maghreb Union (AMU) summit, perhaps to send an implicit message to the US

that the AMU cannot work without the resolution of the Western Sahara conflict.

The stability of the Maghrib rests on good relations between Morocco and Algeria

and hostility between the two has obstructed a natural process of regional integration

which would bring important economic and security benefits for the region and

western interests. The failure of the Arab Maghreb Union continues to stall the

creation of a lucrative market for US firms.44

It is unclear if Algeria and Morocco will settle their differences under pressure

from the US and France. It is crucial, however, for the Saharawis that Algeria con-

tinues to resist pressure from France, Morocco and the US to accept the Western

Sahara issue as a bilateral issue to be resolved between Morocco and Algeria. The

acceptance by all parties, including the Polisario, of the ‘political solution’ contained

in Baker II ensures that the seeking of autonomy, or a negotiated settlement of some

description, is likely to receive further negotiation. How realistic the ‘third way’ or

autonomy situation is will be dealt with later in this paper. An equally important


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

consideration is the position in which the Polisario currently finds itself, and if they

are able to concede any more than Baker II. The positive announcement in July

2005 of the release and return to Morocco of the remaining POWs detained by Poli-

sario in the refugee camps, under pressure from the international solidarity movement

for Western Sahara, is one that will have unnerved some of the more militant ranks

within Polisario.

The Possibility of a Return to Armed Struggle

A statement by the President of the SADR state, Mohammed Abdelaziz, in May 2005

suggested that a return to armed struggle is an option the Polisario are considering in

light of the continued UN deadlock.45 Such statements have not been uncommon;

however, this one is perhaps more striking as it occurs at the time of other significant

regional developments.

The April 2005 report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation concerning

Western Sahara, notes a ‘serious deterioration in compliance’ with the ceasefire

agreement.46 According to the report, Morocco has installed and upgraded radar

and surveillance along the entire length of the berm, on a smaller scale the Polisario

has deployed a unit of armed personnel with anti-aircraft weapons in the restricted

area east of the berm. The report requests the strengthening of MINURSO, which

presently stands at a mere 227 military observers.

In South Algeria/North Sahel, the militaries of regional governments are increas-

ing their presence and scope. Although the aim of the PSI (now known as the Trans-

Saharan Counter-Terror Initiative or PSI-TSCTI) is to ‘enhance regional peace and

security’, it is believed that the US initiative may backfire, fuelling existing tensions

in the region and could potentially attract radical Islamist groups to the area.

As Keenan points out:

The first and most apparent outcome of America’s PSI has been to increase the

political instability and insecurity of a region which, although politically

complex and fragile, was nevertheless relatively stable.47

The long-term sustainability of the protracted refugee situation in the midst of such

developments has to be questioned.

The Saharawi have nurtured a mild and tolerant form of Islam and have been com-

mitted to peaceful struggle since the ceasefire. Unfortunately, the Saharawi have not

been rewarded for adhering to peaceful diplomacy, with the result that frustrations are

running high. The Polisario military units languish idly at the desert front line whilst

the conflict is played out in the UN. The overwhelming opinion in the refugee camps

is that the Saharawi have been let down by the UN, and that the international commu-

nity – namely the US – cares only about ‘oil and Iraq’. The belief, especially among

the youths, is that attention is given only to violent struggles such as the Israel-

Palestine conflict, with such views being accompanied by a certain degree of

identification with the Palestinian struggle.48 Such feelings are compounded by the

increased access of the refugees to the outside world via media or study trips

abroad, which has created a situation of well educated youths, aware of international


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

events and increasingly aware of their relative marginalisation. Those Saharawis

fortunate enough to leave the camps for university places in Spain, Algeria or

Cuba, are destined to return to an existence in the camps of poverty and waiting.

If, as frequently cited by Western governments and the media, terrorism is fed by

poverty and hopelessness, then the Saharawis in the refugee camps, where a tolerant

and democratic Islam has been nurtured in the context of poverty and deprivation, for

now at least, serve as an example that proves the contrary.

The talk of a return to armed struggle by Saharawis in the camps is more than a

rhetorical expression of their frustration. It is becoming increasingly difficult for

the Polisario government to persuade its militants to accept another UN delay. In

2004 a nationalist manifesto was distributed in the camps which challenged the lea-

dership on its lack of progress, its capitulation on the Baker II plan and promoted the

return to armed struggle as a means to solve the conflict.49 The manifesto prompted a

debate in the camps among ordinary Saharawis50 – and it must be recognised that,

whatever its negative consequences, if the goal is to gain international attention

to the ‘forgotten issue’ then a return to armed struggle remains a consideration.51

Saharawi Nationalism in the Camps: a Transfer to the Occupied Territory

A strong Saharawi national identity has grown in the camps during the years of exile.

The long delay in the UN peace process has been beneficial to Morocco in that it has

allowed time for the ‘Moroccanisation’ of the Western Saharan territory with the high

number of Moroccan settlers. The delay could have ensured also that the Saharawi

independence struggle, waged from the exile of the refugee camps, had died.

However, this has not been the case. On the contrary, the Saharawi refugee camps

near Tindouf have developed into a Saharawi state in exile, which has nurtured a

strong nationalist sentiment among the population. The Polisario Front has created

a state complete with democratic institutions, commercial districts, schools, hospitals,

official buildings, flags and currency. There is very limited visibility of aid agencies or

the United Nations in the camps and the Saharawis are in control of the everyday

functioning of camp life. Saharawi cultural traditions have been preserved and

indeed developed through art, music, language and education.

As San Martin has observed:

What is visible in the everyday life of the refugees is the political and

institutional structure of the POLISARIO. A nationalist structure that is con-

stantly reminding. . .the inhabitants of the camps – through a wide range of

symbolic elements – who they are: citizens of the Saharawi Arab Democratic

Republic.52

The result is a ‘state in waiting’, with institutional structures ready to be transferred to

Western Sahara. From conversations with the refugees in the camps it is clear that

there is a significant emotional attachment to the Saharawi state as they experience

it now, and a strong desire to reach the end goal of transporting this to an independent

Western Sahara. Given the strength of the Saharawi movement in the camps, it is no

surprise that the Moroccan government’s prediction of mass defections during the UN


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

sponsored family visits between Saharawis in the camps and Saharawis in the Mor-

occan controlled Western Sahara failed to materialise.

What are the implications of the return of nationalist Saharawi refugees to the

occupied territories under the terms offered, for instance, under the Baker II plan?

What would become of the Saharawi nationalist structure, or can autonomic con-

ditions in Morocco allow for the existence of an overt Saharawi nationalism?

These questions are especially important considering the growing display of nation-

alist sentiment among the Saharawis in occupied Western Sahara.

Saharawi Nationalism in the Occupied Territory

The assumptions that the Saharawi independence struggle would die out have been as

ill founded as the hope that the project of ‘Moroccanisation’ in the Occupied Terri-

tories would bring about the assimilation of Saharawis into the Moroccan polity.

The ‘Moroccanisation’ of Western Sahara has been successful to the extent that it

has managed to tip the demographic balance so that Moroccan settlers outnumber

Saharawis.53 The attempt to integrate the Saharawi population into this populace

has been less successful. After 30 years of occupation, social interaction between

the Saharawis and Moroccan settler communities is mostly limited to the commercial

level.54 Morocco’s developments in Western Sahara, including its programme to

attract and subsidise settlers, have not benefited Saharawis. A sharp division exists

between Morocan settlers and Saharawis in terms of employment opportunities and

living standards. Western Sahara has the lowest rate of economic activity and the

highest unemployment rate of any recorded region, with an estimated 90 per cent

of jobs provided by the state, many of which have been artificially created.55 A Sahar-

awi ‘underclass’ inhabits shantytowns in cities such as Layounne, Western Sahara’s

capital, comparable in deprivation to Sub-Saharan Africa.56

Occupied Western Sahara has been tightly controlled and kept under heavy surveil-

lance since the occupation began in 1975. US Republican diplomat Frank Ruddy has

compared Western Sahara in the early 1990s to the Apartheid era in South Africa

during the 1970–80s.57 The Moroccan policy of ‘disappearance’ began at the time

of the invasion and continued into the 1990s, and although cases of disappearance

decreased under international criticism, Freedom House reports, ‘the arbitrary arrest,

torture and ill-treatment of Saharawi militants in the disputed Western Sahara territory

continue’.58 In 2003 Amnesty International reported the imprisonment of several Sahar-

awi human rights and civil society activists for their peaceful views in favour of an inde-

pendent Western Sahara.59 Human rights protection by MINURSO in Western Sahara

has been non-existent; a habit that has continued since the UN first arrived to the ter-

ritory in 1975. As Shelley records, under such conditions the means of resistance

have been limited, at times reduced simply to the maintenance of a collective Saharawi

identity.60 The failure to invest in Saharawi human capital and years of repression and

human rights abuses has ensured the development and preservation of a Saharawi

nationalist sentiment inside the occupied territory.

Stories of human rights violations and repression in occupied Western Sahara

have filtered into the refugee camps over the years and have festered, developing


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

into a fear amongst the refugees that Morocco’s aim is to eradicate the Saharawi

identity.61 In Morocco the ‘Sahara question’ is a taboo subject and it is illegal for

the press to debate the question of Saharan independence. The official government

line is that the Saharawis are held as ‘captives’ in Tindouf by the Polisario

‘separatists’. ‘Separatist’ demonstrations in the occupied territories are denounced

as criminal acts fuelled by economic rather than political demands.62 The over-

whelming consensus among Moroccans is that the Sahara is Moroccan.

Virtually no groundwork has been laid by external agencies to build links between

Moroccan and Saharawi communities, and no preparation for the return of 165,000

refugees to the territories has been made. Recent attempts to establish contact

between the Saharawi residents of the camps and those in the occupied territory

have been the only activity that could be counted as contributing towards ‘confidence

building’ since the 1991 ceasefire.63

The return of 165,000 nationalist Saharawi refugees to join Saharawis in the occu-

pied territory will result in a strengthened Saharawi nationalism, which must co-exist

with the settler population and 200,000 Moroccan military personnel. The potential

for communal conflict in such a scenario is evident. Baker’s last proposal assigned

the Moroccan authorities the responsibility for national security in Western Sahara

during the five year transition period, including ‘the preservation of territorial integrity

against secessionist attempts, whether from within or outside the Territory’.64 Such a

clause could easily be interpreted by the Moroccan authorities as a carte blanche to

deem any overt expression of Saharawi nationalism a ‘threat to internal security’.

The 1999 and 2005 Saharawi ‘intifadas’

The pro-independence demonstrations of May–June 2005 in Western Sahara and

Morocco and the ensuing violence perpetrated by the Moroccan authorities against

Saharawis must be placed in the context of the last six years of developments of a

civil rights movement from within the occupied territory. The ‘intifada’ which

occurred there in 1999 marked the beginning of a movement within Western

Sahara to construct tentatively the contours of a Saharawi civil society.

The 1999 intifada started as a sit-in organised by students outside administrative

buildings in Layounne, and soon spread to other cities. Saharawi demonstrations

gained the support of other Saharawi civil rights groups, such as former phosphate

mine workers, unemployed professionals and the disabled. Significantly, the

ensuing weeks of spontaneous demonstrations were joined by impoverished ethnic

Saharawis from Morocco, brought into the Western Saharan territory to live in

tightly controlled camps and win the referendum for Morocco. The participation of

these supposedly ‘pro-Moroccan’ Saharawis in the demonstrations, according to

Toby Shelley, had a direct impact on the Moroccan decision to reject the Baker

II plan:

[It] shook the Moroccan authorities and contributed to a nervous rethinking of

the arithmetic of a referendum and the subsequent refusal to allow a vote even

under the massively favourable terms of the Baker II plan.65


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

In spite of violent retaliations from the Moroccan authorities, subsequent protests

have become more overtly nationalist, more widespread and frequent. Interestingly,

pro-Polisario demonstrations have spread north of the international border into

towns in Southern Morocco which have a high ethnic Saharawi population.66 One

of these towns, Assa, has been the most militant and is the home of Ali Tamek, the

human rights activist who became an Amnesty International prisoner of conscience.

Tamek is one of a new generation of Saharawi leaders to emerge from the 1999

intifada.

As a result of the 1999 uprising, which garnered a good deal of popular support, a

civil society began to emerge: families of the ‘disappeared’, previously not daring to

speak about their experiences, began to form groups, links were made between acti-

vists and human rights groups, and a committee of the unemployed was formed

(although it was closed down soon after and the organisers jailed).67 Students at uni-

versities in Morocco began to increase their activities through meetings and protests

on campuses. The Moroccan Human Rights Association (AMDH), began working

with pro-independence Saharawi activists, and the Moroccan NGO, Forum for

Truth and Justice (FTV), admitted a Sahara section, (although this was banned by

the Moroccan government in 2003).

The intifada of May–June 2005 is the culmination of the increased boldness and

organisation of activity which has been taking place in the years following the events

of 1999. The latest demonstrations had a significantly clearer pro-independence

element, were larger and more organised, and can explain why Morocco reacted

with an even harsher response than in 1999.

Morocco’s Need for an Exit Strategy

The 2005 events in Western Sahara and Morocco have further confirmed that the

‘third way’ option is a threat to the Moroccan state. A nationalist Saharawi commu-

nity, larger in numbers following the return of refugees from Tindouf, Mauritania and

elsewhere, is not going to accept an erosion of autonomy powers granted through the

‘third way’ option such as the Baker II plan. It is highly unlikely that a strengthened

Saharawi nationalist community can be guaranteed the freedom to express its identity

and nationalist views. Even if Morocco was able to guarantee the Saharawis’ auton-

omy this places Morocco in a difficult situation, in that any meaningful autonomy for

the Saharawis is highly likely to provoke demands for autonomy from other regions in

Morocco proper. Morocco has promised decentralisation to regions such as the Rif in

the north and Oued Noun in the south, and has persistently failed to deliver.68

The 2005 uprising occurs in the context of increased disillusionment with the situ-

ation in Morocco among ordinary Moroccans, notably increased poverty69 and a

clamp down on civil liberties since the Casablanca bombings of May 2003 which

were carried out by Islamists native to the slums of the city. Morocco’s fragile

domestic situation is reflected in the rise of radical Islam in recent years and that

some 100,000 Moroccans attempt to migrate to Europe each year. This situation

has been exacerbated by the cost of conflict in Western Sahara, which during the

1980s was estimated at being a drain on the Moroccan economy of between US$1


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

million and US$2 million a day.70 The costs of maintaining the occupation, including

the upkeep of the berm and 200,000 military personnel are still high.

It is only a matter of time beforeMoroccans begin to openly question the logic of the

continued occupation of Western Sahara. Although Morocco tries to control the infor-

mation that leaves the territory as well as the information given to ordinary Moroccans

it is becoming more of a challenge. One journalist, (sentenced to five years in jail for

insulting the king through a satirical article, but released after international pressure)

visited the refugee camps in 2004 and reported in aMoroccan newspaper that the Sahar-

awis there, contrary to Moroccan government propaganda, are not hostages. The impact

of the 2005 clashes will generate further debate among ordinary Moroccans and con-

tribute to the increase of pressure from within Morocco. In light of such circumstances,

the managed withdrawal of Morocco from the Western Sahara, with the help of the

international community, may be the only way for Morocco to save face and to

avoid the likelihood of more violence to come.

Western Saharan Oil and the US Position

The prospect of Western Saharan oil has added a further layer of complexity to the

conflict over Western Sahara. The Polisario responded to the 2001 Moroccan explora-

tion contracts with the announcement later that year of a similar exploration contract

between the SADR and Fusion Oil, an independent Australian oil company.

In April 2005 the Polisario held a conference in London and announced the licen-

sing bid for twelve offshore and onshore Western Sahara exploration licences. Some

companies have been dissuaded by the legal and political uncertainty of the situation,

but the act of announcing the bid in itself was important for the Polisario to present itself

as a credible future government of an independent Western Sahara. However, it might

also be regarded as a sign of the Polisario’s increasingly desperate bid for a solution.

Yet, the question as to the legality of the Moroccan oil contracts had the merit of

reaffirming the legal position of the Saharawis. The UN legal council ruled, in Feb-

ruary 2002, that the ‘principle of permanent sovereignty over resources’ lay with

the Saharawis as the indigenous people of the territory. Furthermore the ruling

stated that:

. . . if further exploration and exploitation activities were to proceed in disregardof the interests and wishes of the people of Western Sahara, they would be in

violation of the international law principles applicable to mineral resource

activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories.71

The ruling gave a boost to the Polisario position and to international campaigners

calling for the withdrawal of Total and Kerr McGee.72 The principle of ‘permanent

sovereignty over resources’ offers new grounds for pro-Saharawi campaigns and a

new theme on which to pin their struggle, as it places itself among issues pertaining

to indigenous peoples’ rights to land, which have gained increased attention in recent

years among the international NGO community.

The recent oil finds in neighbouring Mauritania will no doubt increase the pressure

for a resolution of the legal position regarding Western Sahara. In the meantime,


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

however, the US company Kerr McGee has signed a further six months contract with

Morocco, committing itself to riding out the UN peace process in spite of increasingly

well coordinated campaigns from the international solidarity movement for Western

Sahara.

The increased profile of the US in the Sahara region and the prospect of oil may

place the Western Sahara issue higher on the agenda of the US, but as yet the position

of the US is ambiguous. The UN legal ruling on the oil contracts provoked a statement

of US policy on the Western Sahara. In response to a question from Republican

Congressman Joe Pitts regarding the Free Trade Agreement with Morocco, US

Trade Representative Robert Zoellick stated:

sovereignty of Western Sahara is in dispute . . . The United States and many

other countries do not recognise Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.

[And] the FTA will cover trade and investment in the territory of Morocco as

recognized internationally and will not include Western Sahara.73

In spite of its obvious historic support for the integration of Western Sahara into

Morocco, the US has not been willing to forsake international law entirely to give

legitimisation to Morocco’s occupation. In addition to the balancing act with

Algeria, the pro-Saharawi lobby in the US Congress, comprising both Republicans

and Democrats, which has consistently supported the Saharawis’ right to self-

determination, has been an important factor.

In fact, the Polisario has received curious support from elements from the Repub-

lican right74 and it is possible that some of this support is linked to the question of oil

and governance. A priority for the US in countries where strategic interests are con-

cerned is to ensure that ‘friendly’ regimes are in power. A Western Sahara governed

by an increasingly unstable Morocco facing the threat of Islamic fundamentalists

rising to power may be less attractive to some members of the US congress than an

independent Western Sahara governed by a regime that has proven thus far to be

moderate, peaceful and cooperative.

US plans for the future of Western Sahara remain unclear, and depend on the strat-

egy for the region as a whole. Given the dramatic change in the role and involvement

of the US in North and West Africa over the last three years, the position of the US is

complex and as yet uncertain.75

Conclusion

The question of Western Sahara is one of international legality. In spite of Morocco’s

ideological position, it is a decolonisation issue that has yet to be resolved through the

United Nations. Unfortunately however, the last few years of UN negotiations have

succeeded in turning the issue into a negative ‘zero-sum’ game, which has resulted

in a drawn out political process and which now has to find a compromise. The

UNSC has extended the mandate of MINURSO once again until October 2005.

As the political stalemate continues, the increasingly lengthy status quo situation

favoured by Morocco and supported by the powers has certain repercussions.

Although Realpolitik dominates the Western Sahara conflict, the Saharawis are far


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

from passive observers of their fate. Events on the ground will prove crucial for deter-

mining the future character of the struggle and there is no doubt that the threat of the

Western Sahara conflict reverting to violence is greater than ever.

After the last 14 years of peaceful struggle through diplomatic means for an issue

that has the clear backing of international law, to reduce this conflict to violence and

loss of life would be a betrayal of the Saharawis’ right to self-determination and the

principle of self-determination itself.

NOTES

1. The right of self-determination is inscribed in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence ofColonial countries and Peoples, contained in Resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960.

2. D. Seddon, ‘Polisario and the struggle for the Western Sahara: Recent Developments, 1987–1989’,Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE) 45–46 (Summer 1989), pp. 133–142.

3. The transfer of power to Morocco and Mauritania through the ‘Madrid Accords’ had no legal validityand the agreement was never recognised by the United Nations. Spain remains the official administra-tive power of Western Sahara.

4. The Green March, orchestrated by King Hassan (with the support of US Secretary of State HenryKissinger), was fuelled by the Istiqlal movement’s ‘Greater Morocco’ thesis. This nationalist thesis,developed by the Istiqlal party which won independence from France in 1956, includes claims toMauritania, parts of Algeria and Mali and the Spanish Islands of Ceuta and Melilla, as well asWestern Sahara.

5. http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/isasummary751016.htm6. The International Committee of the Red Cross confirmed the use of napalm in the Moroccan attacks

against Saharawi civilians. D. Seddon, ‘Morocco and the Western Sahara’, ROAPE 38 (1987),pp. 24–47.

7. A peace agreement was signed between Mauritania and the SADR in Algiers in 1979, in whichMauritania withdrew from the ‘unjust war in Western Sahara’ and relinquished all claims to theWestern Sahara territory. Ibid.

8. Seddon (note 6), p. 28, describes the formidable ‘berm’ as consisting:

of sandbanks, between six and eight feet high for the most part, protected by barbed wire and mine-fields, intermittent artillery placements and observation posts, and equipped with electronic groundsensors and radar equipment to detect movement up to several miles in the desert outside. . .mannedalong its entire length, with protective dug-outs and more elaborate underground quarters for thetroops concerned.

9. A rough estimate of the number of Saharawis living in the territory controlled by Morocco suggests90,000 Saharawis, whilst approximately 165,000 Saharawis live in the refugee camps. T. Shelley,Endgame in the Western Sahara: What future for Africa’s last colony (London: Zed Books 2004), p. 88.

10. The Polisario Front was recognised as the representative of the people of the Western Sahara in UNGAresolutions of November 1979 and 1980.

11. Spain conducted a census of the territory in 1974, by request of the UNGA, which identified 73,497indigenous Saharawis. J. Chopra, ‘Decolonizing Western Sahara’, L’Ouest Saharien 1(1998).

12. Ibid. p. 143.13. The fact finding mission undertaken by Human Rights Watch in 1995 concluded that:

Morocco, which is the stronger of the two parties both militarily and diplomatically, has regularlyengaged in conduct that has obstructed and compromised the fairness of the referendum process.‘Western Sahara, Keeping it Secret, The United Nations Operation in the Western Sahara’, HumanRights Watch (1995), p. 4.

14. As Chopra (note 11), p. 143, notes:

Morocco refused to cooperate or even permit deployment of the operation or its freedom of move-ment: of the 1695 military and 1600 civilian personnel called for by the mission, never more than375 military observers, headquarters and support unit staff reached the field.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

15. Y. Zoubir and K. Benabdullah-Gambier, ‘Morocco, Western Sahara and the Future of the Maghrib’,Journal of North African Studies 9/1 (2004), pp. 49–77.

16. Morocco attempted to expand the electoral role to tip the balance in its favour by including populationslinked indirectly to the territory which would not be permitted under the original voter criteria. ThePolisario argued that the 1974 census was the only basis for the accurate definition of people withthe legitimate right of self-determination. Chopra (note 11), p. 145.

17. Zoubir and Benabdullah-Gambier (note 15), p. 54.18. United Nations Security Council Report of the Secretary General on the Situation concerning Western

Sahara, S/2000/683, 12 July 2000.19. Ibid.20. Zoubir and Benabdullah-Gambier (note 15), p. 55.21. United Nations Security Council Report of the Secretary General on the situation concerning Western

Sahara, S/2003/565, 23 May 2003, Annex II.22. Ibid. Annex III.23. Ibid.24. See James Baker’s interview with PBS in which he stated:

The closer we got to implementing [the peace plan] the more nervous I think the Moroccans gotabout whether they might not win that referendum.Interview with James Baker, Wide Angle, Public Broadcasting Service (PBS)TV, 19 August 2004.

25. A. Sola Martin, ‘The contribution of critical theory to new thinking on peacekeeping: lessons fromMINURSO’ Working paper 15 (Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies, Univer-sity of Bradford 2005).

26. Morocco has no known domestic oil reserves.27. United Nations Security Council, S/2002/161,12 February 2002.28. George W. Bush, ‘Address to a joint Session of Congress and the American People’, 20 September

2001, www.whitehouse.gov.29. J. Keenan, ‘Terror in the Sahara: the implications of US imperialism for North and West Africa’,

ROAPE. 31/101(2004), pp. 475–496.30. The terrorist threat in the Sahara gave cause to send some 1000 US Special Forces under the Pan-Sahel

Initiative (PSI), into the Sahelian states of Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad in January 2004 to trainlocal military units in counter-terrorism. The PSI was expanded in 2005 to include Morocco, Algeria,Tunisia and Senegal and renamed the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). Althoughdenied by the US, this military presence also includes the securement of US basing rights, notably thenew military air base being constructed at Tamanrasset in southern Algeria. Ibid.

31. ‘Reliable, Affordable and Environmentally Sound Energy for America’s Future’, Report of the nationalEnergy Policy Group, May 2001. http://www.whitehouse.gov

32. Ibid. p. xv.33. Keenan (note 29). Keenan argues that most of the terror incidents in the Sahara-Sahel have been

fabricated by US and Algerian military-intelligence services.34. Ibid. Algeria has shifted its status from ‘international pariah’ in the eyes of the west to the US’s main

regional ally under the PSI-TSCTI. The Algerian military gains access to the high tech military tech-nology which it has been seeking to replenish its supplies.

35. Zoubir and Benabdullah-Gambier (note 15), p. 61.36. Ibid. p. 62.37. Ibid. p. 62.38. Note 21. Annex III.39. Ibid. Annex III.40. Shelley (note 9), p. 41.41. Algeria has shown consistent support for self-determination struggles such as the former Portuguese

colonies and the struggle against Apartheid in South Africa.42. Zoubir and Benabdullah-Gambier (note 15).43. As one Algerian journalist stressed, the area of Tindouf which hosts the Saharawis has strong emotional

ties within the Algerian military and this alone rules out ever abandoning the Saharawis. (Interviewwith the author, April 2005).

44. However, it should be noted that the two countries have avoided the Western Sahara issue poisoningrelations at all levels. Morocco and Algeria have been careful not to jeopardise economic relations,such as the gas pipeline that links Spain to Algeria via Morocco. Zoubir and Benabdullah-Gambier(note 15).


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

45. www.arso.org46. Report of the Secretary General on the situation concerningWestern Sahara, 19 April 2005, S/2005/254.47. J. Keenan, ‘Political destabilisation and Blowback in the Sahel’, ROAPE 31/102 (2004), pp. 691–703.48. Interviews undertaken by the author in the Saharawi refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria, March 2003.49. P. San Martin, ‘Briefing: Western Sahara: Road to Perdition?’, African Affairs, 103/413 (2004),

pp. 651–660.50. Although the Polisario leadership claims that they are not concerned and know the identity of the

‘secret’ group nonetheless, it demonstrates that there are elements among the Sahararwis willing totake drastic measures to break the impasse.

51. A violation of the ceasefire would be designed to send a political message to the US and Europe, as it isunlikely that a return to armed conflict would be supported by Algeria. However, the repercussions ofsuch action would be severe, especially in the event of Moroccan retaliation. It should be rememberedhowever, that Polisario fighters on the front line are still in a situation of war and their readinessto return to armed combat in the advent of failure to resolve the conflict by diplomatic means iswell-voiced.

52. P. San Martin, ‘From Refugees to Citizens: Nationalism and Identity in the Saharawi Refugee Camps’,paperpresented at the II UEA Saharan Studies Programme Conference: The Sahara: Past, Present andFuture, University of East Anglia, Norwich, 22–24 June 2004. (Also published in this volume).

53. Estimates of the size of the population of Western Sahara vary but most suggest that non-Saharawismake up about three-quarters of the population, excluding the military.

54. Shelley (note 9), p. 83.55. Ibid.56. Ibid. p. 86.57. Note 45.58. ‘Countries at the Crossroads: A Survey of Democratic Governance: Morocco’, Freedom House (April

2004). http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/crossroads/2004/Morocco2004.pdf59. Amnesty International Report 2003, http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/index-eng.60. The reproduction of the ‘resistance identity’ involves the maintenance of cultural and ethnic signifiers

through the use of Hassaniya dialect, diet, traditional dress, teaching desert skills to children and choos-ing to pray outside rather than in a mosque. Shelley (note 9), p. 110.

61. Note 48.62. Shelley (note 9), p.110.63. In 2004 the UNHCR began a pilot phase of visits between the camps and occupied areas for family

members that have been divided, some since the beginning of the conflict.64. Note 21, annex II.65. T. Shelley, ‘Burden or benefit? Morocco in the Western Sahara’, text of a lecture given at the Middle

East Studies Centre, Oxford University, 18 February 2005.66. Historically Western Sahara begins where the mountains end, but this area was carved by the colonial

powers, leaving a large area of Western Sahara in Morocco from the late 1950s. Many towns insouthern Morocco have large ethnic Saharawi populations.

67. Shelley (note 9).68. Shelley (note 65).69. Official unemployment rates in Morocco in 2000 were 21.5 per cent, GNP per capita 1999 was $3,000,

adult literacy 48 per cent. Shelley (note 9), p. 52.70. Shelley (note 9), p. 54.71. Note 27.72. After one such successful campaign the Norwegian government demanded the Norwegian company

TGS-Nopec withdraw from a contract with Total and issue a public apology. Note 45.73. Letter from the US Trade Representative to Congressman Joe Pitts, 22 July 200474. One example is John Bolton, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, and who was the first President

of the Association of Jurists for Western Sahara in the mid 1990s. Although not explicitly pro-Polisariohe has been a firm supporter of the UN decolonisation and self-determination mandates (in spite of hisreputation as a notorious critic of the UN body).

75. For further discussion refer to J. Keenan, ‘Waging War on Terror: the implications of America’s “newimperialism” for Saharan peoples’, in this volume.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ort

a D

ogu

Tek

nik

Uni

vers

itesi

] at

06:

53 2

2 Ju

ne 2

014

Documents

Laura E. Smith-The Struggle for Western Sahara