LASSWELL’S GARRISON STATE RECONSIDERED: EXPLORING A PARADIGM

SHIFT IN U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS RESEARCH

by

RONALD N. DAINS

A DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science

in the Graduate School of The University of Alabama

TUSCALOOSA, ALABAMA

2004

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank the staff of the United States Air Force Academy for the chance to

pursue this doctorate. Specific thanks go to Dr. Clay Chun, LtCol John Higgs, and Dr.

Charles Krupnick.

I am especially grateful to the following professors for being members of my

dissertation committee: Dr. John Beeler, Dr. Patrick Cotter, Dr. Harvey Kline, and Dr.

Stephen Borrelli. Their dedication to the art of education deserves much acclaim.

I particularly wish to thank Professor Donald M. Snow for accepting me into the

program on such short notice and without a background in political science. His patience

and guidance were immeasurably important to any success I might claim.

To Jan Pugh and Kathy Jones, the unsung heroes of ten Hoor Hall, go many,

many thanks. There would be far fewer graduates of this program were it not for their

guidance, encouragement, and occasional parenting of students.

Many thanks are owed to my mother, brother, and sisters for their unfailing

support. I only wish my father had lived to see this day; however, I rest comfortably

knowing he witnessed it all from a better place.

Thanks also to my in-laws. Letting me “sneak off” during family gatherings is the

only way this got finished.

The faith, prayers, and love of the men and women of New Beginning Family

Worship have been a special blessing.

iii

I owe everything to my dear wife and the three best kids in the world. Without

their love, support, and encouragement I would not have been able to complete this

degree. I thank God daily for each of them!

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the

official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense or the

U.S. Government.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iii

LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................ vii

LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... viii

ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... ix

1 INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................1

Statement of the Problem.........................................................................................3 Purpose of the Research...........................................................................................6 Significance of the Research....................................................................................9 Definition of Terms................................................................................................10 Assumptions...........................................................................................................14 Limitations .............................................................................................................14 Summary ................................................................................................................19 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................20 Introduction............................................................................................................20 Literature Review Format ......................................................................................21 The First Wave.......................................................................................................24 The Second Wave ..................................................................................................35 The Third Wave .....................................................................................................43 Summary ................................................................................................................39

v

3 METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................61 Theoretical Model..................................................................................................61 Design of the Study................................................................................................63 Income....................................................................................................................68 Safety .....................................................................................................................70 Deference ...............................................................................................................73 Summary ................................................................................................................75 4 TREND ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................77 Income Trend Analysis ..........................................................................................77 Income Trend Summary ........................................................................................84 Safety Trend Summary ..........................................................................................97 Deference Trend Analysis......................................................................................98 Deference Trend Summary ..................................................................................103 5 CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................105 Introduction..........................................................................................................106 Review of the Trend Analysis..............................................................................105 Implications..........................................................................................................109 Recommendations................................................................................................109 Summary ..............................................................................................................111 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................112 APPENDIX......................................................................................................................122

vi

LIST OF TABLES 1 Military and Civilian Percent Pay Increases and Average Annual Inflation Rates (Used for Figures 1 and 2) ...............................................................................123 2 U.S. Combat Deaths in Principal Wars and Conflicts (Used for Figures 3, 4, and 5) .................................................................................................................125 3 Post-All Volunteer Force U. S. Military Conflict and Homeland Terrorist Deaths (Used for Figures 6 and 7) .............................................................................126 4 Institutional Confidence (Used for Figures 8 and 9) .................................................127

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LIST OF FIGURES

1 Military-civilian pay increase and inflation rate trends ...............................................79 2 Military-civil service pay increase and ECI trends......................................................81 3 U. S. war and conflict deaths (Union and Confederate in Civil War) .........................88 4 U. S. war and conflict deaths (Union only in Civil War) ............................................88 5 U. S. military conflicts post-WWII to Gulf War I .......................................................90 6 Post-AVF U. S. military conflict and homeland terrorist deaths.................................94 7 Post-AVF U. S. military conflict and homeland terrorist deaths (not including 9-11 deaths)..................................................................................................................95 8 Institutional confidence (Federal Government) .........................................................101 9 Institutional confidence (12 categories).....................................................................102

viii

ABSTRACT

The plausibility of performing trend analyses of the political influence of the

United States’ military on value allocations of income, safety, and deference was

explored. This approach was taken to assess the viability of Harold D. Lasswell’s

garrison state construct in which he hypothesized that the trend of the world was that it

was evolving toward a time when virtually all aspects of governance would come under

military control (most notably in the value areas previously listed), even in democracies.

The study differs from previous civil-military research in that it attempts to quantify and

graphically display the trends in value allocations that may indicate such an evolution in

the United States. By adapting currently available data to this study, the extant trends in

income (annual percentage pay increases), safety (socialization of the threat of war as

indicated by trends in death rates), and deference (indicated by institutional confidence)

were developed. The findings provide a quantitative indication supportive of Lasswell’s

hypothesis; although the significance of the results is largely subjective. Moreover, the

study demonstrates that Lasswell’s call for trend analysis, to determine a state’s

movement on the continuum from a business state to a garrison state existence, is a valid

approach in the study of civil-military relations. Future studies should seek to refine

existing data or develop new databases to allow more rigorous statistical analyses.

ix

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Nearly two-thirds of a century has passed since the late Harold Lasswell’s (1941)

seminal work, “The Garrison State,” was published in the American Journal of Sociology.

His thesis provided a “developmental construct” that has proven useful in the scientific

study of world politics for several generations. Influenced by political and military events

in Germany and Soviet Russia during the Second World War, and especially the advent of

aerial bombardment, Lasswell’s thesis was that trends of the time pointed toward “a world

in which the specialists on violence [read soldiers] are the most powerful group in society”

(1941; 455). Arguably, the contextual basis of Lasswell’s claim is the underlying premise

for contemporary conceptualization of a military state, one reflecting Hitler’s Germany or

Stalin’s Soviet Union. These negative images of a garrison state have undoubtedly served

as motivation for civil-military relations research of the last half century--most notably in

regard to the proper political role of the uniformed military in a democracy such as the

United States. Moreover, Lasswell’s garrison state construct provided “… the first

conscious, systematic, and sophisticated theory of civil-military relations” (Huntington

1957, 346; see also Stanley 1997).

Scholars addressing Lasswell’s hypothesis have tended to focus on the postulated

methods through which the governing elite of a garrison state would wield power. These

methods are condensed into what Samuel Fitch terms “garrison state practices--

1

2

(1) centralization of power, (2) manipulation of international crises, and (3) restriction of

civil or political liberties in the name of security” (1985, 33).1 Scholars, most often through

case analyses of post-World War II politico-military history, have demonstrated that a

garrison state existence has not occurred in the United States, thus bringing the viability of

Lasswell’s garrison state construct into question. An example of a critique of the garrison

state construct is seen in Samuel P. Huntington’s charge that Lasswell’s hypothesis was

“unscientific,” thereby necessitating use of the term “construct”: a claim supported by

referring to the failed “bourgeois-proletariat formulation” of Marx and Engels (Huntington

1962, 79).2 Without fully debating the appropriateness of Huntington’s analogy, one could

argue that determining the accuracy of any prophecy occurs only through trend analysis of

appropriate indicators, or by case analysis at some future point in which history, as it

pertains to that particular prophecy, is considered complete. Support for the propriety of

using a construct was continually defended by Lasswell, as seen in his statement that “A

developmental construct characterizes a possible sequence of events running from a

selected cross-section of the past to a cross-section of the future” (1951d, 4); in other

words, a trend.

Concerning the prophetic nature of Lasswell’s construct, one need only peruse the

findings in the myriad books, articles, and papers dedicated to the study of civil-military

relations in the United States to realize that establishment of a garrison state has not yet

occurred. However, this does not negate the possibility that the United States may be

1 When one views Fitch’s condensed version of the characteristics associated with a garrison state, it is tempting to allege their existence in post-9/11 America. This study is concerned with the development and analysis of quantifiable indicators through which trends attributed to the development of a garrison can be discerned. Given that post-9/11 issues are still being unraveled, no attempt is made to follow daily news events. However, some information pertaining to recent acts of terrorism and military operations is used to facilitate analysis of available data and development of future research questions.

2 It is noteworthy that by the end of Huntington’s article he believed the world was indeed heading toward a garrison state existence (Huntington 1962).

3

moving rather insidiously toward an existence wherein the armed forces becomes the most

influential group in society.

The wealth of literature on civil-military relations, particularly that written in the

past sixty-plus years, reflects at least an academic interest and concern about the

maintenance of a proper relationship between military members and their civilian leaders.

This study steps away from the normal analysis of extant political characteristics via case

study by exploring the plausibility of quantifiable indicators that may be graphed so as to

show a rise or decline in the political influence of the uniformed services. In doing so,

potential movement toward a garrison state existence in the United States may be more

readily discerned and corrective or preventive measures considered if necessary.

Statement of the Problem

Explaining his interest in the garrison state construct, Jay Stanley stated that the

primary question of civil-military relations research is “… at what point will the military

elite of a society exercise undue influence on the policies of the government and the

organization of the society” (1997, 20; see also Gibson and Snider 1999). He then points

out that this is a “… significantly different question than when the military might

overthrow civilian government” (Stanley 1997, 20).3 As was previously discussed, it

seems that by focusing on the existence or nonexistence of the characteristics of a garrison

state, it is the latter interpretation of the central civil-military question to which most

scholars subcribe (Bland 1999; Burk 2002).

3 An example of concern about a coup d’état is discussed in the introductory chapter of Peter D. Feaver’s Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations. 2003. Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press. See also Bland 1999, and Burk 2002.

4

In a fairly recent piece concerned with Lasswell’s garrison state construct, Aaron

Friedberg makes the audacious claim “But Lasswell was wrong” (1992, 113). Focusing

primarily on the military-industrial complex,4 Friedberg supports his assertion by stating

that “Even under the intense pressures of its confrontation with the Soviet Union, America

did not transform itself into anything resembling a ‘garrison state’” (1992, 113). He posits

that as a result of the Cold War the United States became a “contract state” in comparison

to its “garrison state” enemy. Friedberg’s further claim that spending on arms could have

been much greater, and therefore more in line with the concept of a garrison state had the

United States adopted the Soviet model of state-run arms industry, is probably accurate.

However, it appears that calling the United States’ Cold War politico-military existence a

“contract state” versus a “garrison state” is merely manipulation of words or symbols, a

characteristic that Lasswell predicted would be prevalent in a garrison state (Friedberg

1992; Lasswell 1941). Apart from ideological and political arguments about the Cold War,

it appears that in this context a plausible distinction between the United States and the

Soviet Union is that the former used the seductive capacity of capitalism to fund weapons

production, and the latter used what many Americans viewed as the coercive practices of

communism.

The conclusions reached by Friedberg demonstrate the continued emphasis placed

on the characteristics associated with a garrison state in civil-military relations research.

Such treatment of the topic is not incorrect per se, but studies focusing primarily on time-

specific cases may overlook the existence of long-term trends in political influence

4 President Dwight D. Eisenhower coined the phrase “military-industrial complex” in his farewell speech, 17 January 1961. He was concerned that the combined political strength of the armed forces and private defense industry would become overbearing. This concern developed largely from recognition of the increasing tendency for America to rely on expensive, technologically advanced weaponry through which national security could be maintained (see especially, Eisenhower in Kozak and Keagle 1988; see also, Snow and Brown 2000, 227-28).

5

exercised by the armed forces. Analysis of trends is key to validation of Lasswell’s

overarching premise that the world “…is moving toward a system of garrison states”

(1941, 455, emphasis added; 1951d).

The previous discussion takes us back to Stanley’s premise that civil-military

relations research is primarily concerned with ascertaining when government policy may

become inordinately influenced by the uniformed services (1997; see also Gibson and

Snider 1999). Lasswell addressed the issue of influence in his original work wherein, after

elaborating on the characteristics associated with a garrison state, he posed the following

question, “How will the various kinds of influence be distributed in the state?” (1941, 463).

A cursory overview of what Lasswell meant by influence is instructive at this point.

Lasswell postulated that “influence is measured by control over values” (1941,

463). The specific values he analyzed, and those pertinent to this study, are income, safety,

and deference. He predicted that, in a garrison state, there would be an effort to equalize

income to some degree in order to maintain morale; the propensity for individuals to be

affected by war would be socialized (due to airpower no distinction could be made between

soldier and civilian in war); and deference (respect and power) would be bestowed on those

in the armed forces (Lasswell 1941).

It is from Lasswell’s query and conjecture that two questions for this study are

derived: (1) What indicators exist that may adequately demonstrate the influence of the

armed forces on the value allocations of income, safety, and deference? (2) What are the

trends of those indicators? By adopting an “itemistic” approach toward answering these

questions the research paradigm is shifted from the normal cross-sectional analysis of civil-

military relations to a more substantive prediction of the future based on trends in value

6

distribution (Lasswell 1941, 456; Lasswell 1951d). Such an approach is in keeping with

Lasswell’s intent.

Purpose of the Research

Evidence of concern about the influence of the military in the political processes of

the United States government, predominately that of higher ranking officers, is provided in

numerous texts. One example is Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State (1957).

Huntington expounds on the political influence of the military in general, but his discussion

of the political activity of the National Guard Association provides an example of policy

influence wielded by military organizations. Although this association is not a legislatively

established military organization such as the Army or Navy, it can be viewed as a proxy

military staff organization since its membership is predominately made up of current

members in the National Guards of the fifty states. Reflecting on the successful lobbying

efforts of the National Guard Association with the Eightieth Congress, a former association

president is cited as wondering whether “… any organization has been so successful in the

legislative field in so brief a period …” (Huntington 1957, 174-76). A public statement

such as this, which seems to flout the political influence of the military, is sure to raise the

eyebrows of politicians, academicians, and citizens alike who are interested in maintaining

civilian control of the military.

Another noteworthy author concerned about elitism is C. Wright Mills (1957), who

published Power Elite in the same year as Huntington’s The Soldier and the State. Mills

saw no distinction between professions insofar as political influence was concerned. His

thesis was that the “power elite” were individuals who, by virtue of position, were able to

7

transcend the political and socioeconomic existence of most citizens resulting in increased

opportunities to influence policy. He believed that the domains of national power--

economic, political, and military--were interdependent, each one wielding influence over

the other two. The opinion of Mills most pertinent to this study is that those making up the

elite have more of the things valued by other citizens: money, power, and prestige.

A more recent example of the concern about military influence is an article by

Richard H. Kohn in the Naval War College Review. He does not view the possibility of a

coup d’état in the United States as the utmost concern, but sees instead the increasing

political clout of the military as being most problematic. Kohn believes the military’s

influence has risen to such a degree that as an institution “it can impose its own perspective

on many policies and decisions” (2002, 9). Based on the fact that each of the armed

services maintains legislative liaisons and public affairs staffs, the belief that the Joint Staff

is a very powerful entity in its own right, and the fact that the commanders-in-chief of the

various geographic regions appear to have more political recognition than the ambassadors,

Kohn posits that it is becoming increasingly accurate to view the military as arbiters of

foreign policy.5 If Kohn’s assertion has any validity one should also be concerned that the

military’s policy influence regarding international matters may spill over to domestic

policy issues as well.

This blurring of policy domains is addressed by Donald M. Snow wherein he

adopts the widely accepted term “intermestic” to describe a policy world that often deals

with aspects of both international and domestic prominence concomitantly (1999, 134; see

5 For more fully developed discourse concerning the policy process, size, structure, and budgetary aspects of the Defense and State Departments see Puzzle Palaces and Foggy Bottom: U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy-Making in the 1990’s and United States Foreign Policy: Politics Beyond the Waters Edge 2d ed., both by Donald M. Snow and Eugene Brown, 1994 and 2000 respectively. Concerning the issue of regional commanders, again see Snow and Brown (1994), and Christopher M Bourne’s piece entitled “Unintended Consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act” in the spring 1998 issue of Joint Force Quarterly.

8

also Kegley and Wittkopf 2001, 56). Snow (1999) points out that public awareness of the

government’s dealings in international issues should improve as the two issue domains are

increasingly intertwined. The question as to whether the general public has been made

more aware of international issues is left for other studies. However, amongst

academicians there appears to be a heightened awareness of the intermestic quality of

international and domestic policies, especially in the post-Gulf War period. Richard Kohn

discusses the breakdown in civilian control of the military and boldly proclaims that the

military’s “very size gave [it] unexpected influence over the nation’s [sic] foreign policy

and domestic affairs” (1994, para. 8).

The arguments of Huntington, Mills, and Kohn were predominately based on

synthesis of select instances or cases, and are unquestionably valuable to the body of

knowledge. However, Lasswell postulated that only by graphically depicting past trends

could a realistic forecast of future events be made (1941; 1951d). The major problem in

developing trend charts has been the difficulty in finding adequate and accurate quantitative

indicators of influence, a core task of this research effort.

Given that there are no universally accepted indicators of influence, this study, by

necessity, is more exploratory than explanatory in nature. The overarching goal is to assess

the validity of Lasswell’s predicted trends concerning military influence. To do so,

adequate indicators of influence relating to the Lasswellian factors of income, safety, and

deference must first be developed. By charting the values of each indicator, a more

accurate assessment of the United States’ movement toward or away from a garrison state

existence may be made. The conceptual emphasis of the last sentence is important. It does

not infer determination of a final, static state of being but rather a graphic depiction of a

9

dynamic progression to, or regression from, a hypothetical end-state (Lasswell 1941;

Stanley 1997).

Significance of the Research

If one goal of a democratic society is to maintain civilian control of the military in

order to prevent establishment of a garrison state, it follows that continuous tracking of

pertinent trends associated with such development is critical. The findings of this study are

especially important to such an enterprise given that widely accepted indicators of

influence are not known to exist.

This research endeavor is also important in that it reinforces a critical yet often

overlooked aspect of Lasswell’s original work. As previously mentioned, it seems

forgotten that the critical question that civil-military relations scholars should be asking is,

“… at what point will the military elite of a society exercise undue influence on the policies

of the government and the organization of the society? … [a] significantly different

question than when the military might overthrow civilian government” (Stanley 1997, 20;

see also, Clotfelter 1973; Gibson and Snider 1999). In view of the inordinate amount of

attention given to searching for attributes of a garrison state in society, it appears that most

scholars subscribe to the latter interpretation of the central civil-military question (see

Bland 1999; Burk 2002; Feaver 2003). Therefore, the primary significance of this study is

that it alters the paradigmatic approach toward the study of civil-military relations by

focusing on the former issue espoused by Stanley (1997): discerning when the military’s

political influence might be considered inappropriate or challenging to democratic

governance. Development and analysis of trends in military influence will improve the

10

potential to make such a contribution. Furthermore, by establishing criteria to aid in the

depiction of trends in military influence, future studies may be designed for more timely

and accurate assessment of the policy process.

The outcome of this research effort is made more relevant given the various

military conflicts and terrorist activities around the globe; the reality that military and

security issues seem to dominate executive and legislative activity; and the public display

of tensions in civil-military relations seen in the numerous congressional hearings about

military operations throughout the world, most notably the Middle East and Southwest

Asia regions. These examples, though not exhaustive, support the earlier assertion that

certain characteristics of a garrison state are evident in the post-9/11 United States. Again,

it is not the goal of this study to provide up-to-the-minute, adequate, and accurate analysis

of the current dynamic political environment relative to the garrison state construct.

However, data pertaining to recent terrorist activities and selected military operations in the

post-Gulf War period are presented to aid in the analysis and projection process.

Definition of Terms

An important aspect of any study is to ensure that what one writes about is

understood in proper context, and that certain terms hold the same meaning for those who

may read the results. This seems especially important in the often nebulous environment

of the social sciences.6

Total Deaths: The combination of “combat deaths” (killed in action or dead of

wounds) and “other deaths” (death from disease, privation, and accidents; and death

6 All dictionary definitions are placed in quotations and are taken from The New American Webster Handy College Dictionary. All other definitions are cited as necessary.

11

among prisoners of war) as indicated in the USCWC Statistical Summary: America’s

Major Wars.

Employment Cost Index (ECI): “A quarterly measure of the rate of change in

compensation per hour worked” (CBO 1999, 14). This study will only reference the

“wage and salary component” of the index which is “derived from estimates of average

straight-time hourly earnings in an occupation” (CBO 1999, 14).

Military: In its noun form the term simply means “the army.” In most writings

about civil-military relations the term is a broader reference to the various branches of

military service (Marine Corps, Navy, Army, and Air Force), either individually or

collectively. It is also used as an adjective defined as “pertaining to the army, a soldier,

or affairs of war; soldierly.” It is the adjective form that is most common in this study

since is does not overtly make a distinction between civilian employees of the

Department of Defense and uniformed members of the Armed Forces. Any use of the

noun form will be obvious to the reader and there is no distinction made between ranks in

the military. Synonyms that may be found throughout the study are armed forces, armed

services, military forces, military services, Pentagon, Department of Defense, and

defense department.

Garrison: The noun form means “troops stationed in a fort or fortified town.”

The verb form means “to provide with or occupy as a garrison.” It seems that Lasswell

exercised literary license in using “garrison” as an adjective to modify the noun “state.”

Used in combination, “garrison state” simply refers to a society in which the most

powerful people are members of the defense establishment. Samuel Huntington points

out that Lasswell often used “garrison-police state” or “garrison prison state”

12

interchangeably with “garrison state” in order to emphasize that all specialists in violence

are included in the concept (1962, 81). For the purpose of this study only the military, as

defined above, is considered.

Influence: Although Peter Beckman wrote that “much of the political science

inquiry rests on some notion of influence,” (1974, 16) arriving at a clear-cut definition

remains problematic largely due to its tautological nature. Websters defines it as the

“power to control or affect others by authority, persuasion, example, etc.” As seen

below, power can be defined as influence. Beckman attempted to remedy the

tautological dilemma by arguing that the difference between power and influence is

similar to the distinction between coercion and persuasion (1974). The concept of power

is more appropriate when dealing with a coup d’état, and persuasion more accurate in

studying the more subtle issue of political influence. Samuel Finer defines political

influence of the military as “… the effort to convince civilian authorities by appealing to

their reason or their emotions” (quoted in Beckman 1974, 63). Since this study explores

the possibility that indicators of influence exist, it is logical to accept the latter definition,

especially since the focus is on policy outcomes. Should outright coercion exist, policy

decisions would be made by military personnel versus elected officials indicating, at the

extreme, that a coup d’état may have occurred.

Power: “Physical or mental strength or energy; influence; control.” As discussed

above, power and influence are often interchangeable. The term “power” is used in this

study when directly quoting another scholar, and even then an attempt is made to ensure

it is in context of persuasion rather than coercion.

13

Income: Although there are numerous special pays, incentives, bonuses, etc.

allowed by Congress, for the purposes of this study only the base pay of military

members, and the average salary of civil service (general schedule) employees is

considered.

Safety: To understand what is meant by “safety,” Lasswell’s original concept is

adopted, which states, “… there will be a strong tendency toward equalizing the

distribution of safety throughout the community (that is, negative safety, the socialization

of threat in modern war)” (1941, 463). He based his hypothesis on the fact that aircraft

were being used in ever increasing numbers in warfare, and that aerial bombardment

increased the propensity for both collateral damage and civilian casualties in war.

Deference: Lasswell stated that “To be deferred to is to be taken into

consideration by the environment” (1941, 463). He then split the concept into the two

distinct elements of power and respect. Power was measured in terms of participation in

decision making, and respect weighed in terms of “reciprocal intimacy” (Lasswell 1941,

463).

Military-Industrial Complex: A conceptualization of an environment wherein a

Congressional committee, an agency of the federal government, and a business or interest

group collaborate on the expenditure of public funds for various programs desired by the

agency and manufactured or provided by the private business; also referred to as an iron

triangle (Snow and Brown 2000).

14

Assumptions

The major assumption in this study is that analysis of aggregate level data in the

areas of income, safety, and deference over time is more indicative of the long-term

political influence of the military as an institution in comparison to traditional cross-

sectional studies, which may measure only the personal persuasive capability of a senior

Pentagon official whose tenure is limited.

Most studies of the influence of the military on policy decisions are qualitative

and utilize observations of the activities of individuals (normally high-ranking officers) to

make inferences about the level of influence of the armed forces as a whole (see, for

example, Mills 1957; Finer 1962; Bourne 1988; Weigley 1993; Kohn 1994; Avant, 1998;

Foster 1993; Roman and Tarr 2001). Such notable historic figures as MacArthur, Lemay,

Westmoreland, and Powell are but a few names easily associated with military influence

at the highest levels of government. However, in the daily exercise of their duties these

individuals would probably garner little attention because their positions mandated

involvement in the political process. Most often their names, and concomitantly the

armed services in general, became noteworthy in politics when controversial issues pitted

the military against civilian leadership and the ensuing debates became public

knowledge. The outcome of these debates, or rather the end product of the political

process, is what interests most people who desire to know which side “won.”

Limitations

The best explanation of the overarching limits involved in this study is provided

by Harold Lasswell:

15

The task of locating ourselves as talkers and writers in relation to the pyramids of safety, income, and deference is insuperable at present, since requisite information about the world is compiled in fragmentary form. Material units of income have been partially compared, and regional, social, and biopsychic traits of those receiving income have been sporadically studied. Rather few efforts have been made to cope with the more elusive pyramids of deference. The relatively simpler task of studying the man who gets killed in wars, revolutions, revolts, feuds, mobs, gang struggles and judicial administration is carried but a little way. (1977, 148)

Lasswell’s lament of the scarcity of data (thirty-six years after his original

publication) is echoed in this study. The problems involved with development of

acceptable indicators of influence, or control, over the three values—income, safety, and

deference—mirror the difficulty of definition as seen in a previous section. In a separate

study performed by Lasswell, he remarked on this very issue by stating that “The

moment anyone tries to pass from the ‘ambiguous’ to the ‘operational,’ empirical

questions arise” (1951a, 12; see also Beckman 1974). It is probable that ambiguity is a

primary inhibiting factor for most scholars wishing to tackle the trend analysis advocated

in Lasswell’s (1941) garrison state construct. As stated before, this study differs from

most in that it does not attempt to explain the reasons why the United States is not a

garrison state, but rather it seeks to determine whether there are any plausible indicators

of a trend toward such an existence.

Finding an acceptable indicator of political influence of the armed services over

incomes appears to be fairly straightforward, but only insofar as assessing those incomes

that policymakers directly control such as military and civil-service. This is a limited

approach compared to the expectations espoused in Lasswell’s original work. He

predicted the “moderation of huge differences in individual income, (flattening the

pyramid at the top, bulging it out in the upper-middle and middle zones) in reference to

16

income distribution of the society as a whole” (Lasswell 1941, 463). It seems logical that

for this to occur, a garrison state existence would be in place, thereby rendering moot any

effort to search for a trend. At this point in time the government only has direct control

of the pay for individuals in its employment. Although it does track the wages of United

States citizens, accurate comparisons are made difficult due to the categorization of

occupations; twenty-two major occupational groups were listed in the 2002 National

Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates report (U.S. Department of Labor 2002).

Lasswell’s concept of safety indicates that all members of a society will be

threatened by the prospect of war (1941). This assumption was based on the reality that

aerial bombardment increased the potential for civilians to become casualties of war on

par (at least hypothetically) with those in uniform. As stated previously, this hypothesis

was possibly more applicable to the threats posed by the nuclear arsenals maintained by

the superpowers during the Cold War. The twenty-first century offers yet another

application of the threat hypothesis in the increasing threat of global terrorism; it is open

to debate as to whether terrorist activity and actions taken to counter it warrant use of the

term “war.” One might also assert that utilizing private contractors to perform certain

missions of the military is indicative of socializing the inherent dangers of military

operations.

Finding an acceptable indicator of safety poses the same limitations as does the

concept of deference. Short of public opinion polls, which might give some indication of

how people feel about their safety in relation to war, quantifying the propensity for

civilians to become casualties of war is problematic at best. Absent any widely accepted

data concerning casualty projections, one is forced to adapt. Comparison of military and

17

civilian casualty rates in past conflicts is adopted so as to provide empirical information

about each group. As with income and deference, the extant trends are analyzed to

determine the viability of the indicators and to make recommendations for future studies

and policies.

The very concept of deference posed by Lasswell is limiting. How does one

measure the degree to which any group is “taken into consideration” (Lasswell 1941,

463) in policy process? Whether deliberating on issues of force development or

employment; weapon systems procurement; or roles and missions of the various services,

policy makers seek the technical and professional advice of members of the armed forces.

This in itself connotes deference, but what does it mean?

Huntington wrote, “… it is extremely difficult to draw the line between the soldier

giving professional advice to Congress on what the country needs for its defense and the

soldier lobbying with Congress for the administration. The two roles are distinct in

theory but blended in practice” (1956, 691). This demonstrates the two-fold problem of

pitting the executive against the legislative branches with the military owing a certain

amount of allegiance to both (Huntington 1956). Similarly, both arms of government

exhibit deference to the military simply due to the fact the military is both obligated and

encouraged to participate in the political process.

To overcome the limitation in measuring deference a proxy must be used.

Although more fully discussed in the methodology section of this dissertation, it is

believed that trends in public opinion toward the armed forces offers the best, albeit

imperfect substitute. Basic support for this methodology comes from Samuel P.

Huntington and Philip E. Converse. Huntington wrote:

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In a democracy the policies of the government, including military policy, are shaped by public opinion. … Public opinion not only determines the level of military magnitude … it also tends to restrict, reduce, and limit that magnitude. … “Mass opinion’ is difficult to identify, much less measure. Public opinion polls have their limitations, but they are the best source available. (1961a, 235)

Philip Converse made note of studies by experts on public opinion such as Warren Miller

and Donald Stokes; Sidney Verba and Norman Nie; and Benjamin Page and Robert

Shapiro, wherein they demonstrated a “considerable degree of congruence between

popular opinion and policy outcomes” (1987, S52). Converse emphasized the point that

those scholars wrote of agreement between the issues of opinion and policy, which does

not imply any notion of causality. Notwithstanding this caveat, public opinion

concerning military issues appears to be the most appropriate source of data from which

trends can be developed and analyzed.

Due to the difficulties brought about by the subject itself and the lack of widely

accepted measurement criteria, this study is limited to analysis of military and civil-

service annual percentage pay increases from 1945 to 2004; combat casualty information

from 1941 to 1991 (data from the Revolutionary War to the 9/11 terrorist attack are

provided for context and comparison); and public opinion data concerning citizens’

feelings toward the military from 1973 to 2003. Together these data are assessed as to

their viability as indicators of the level of political influence the military services wield.

The policy process is complicated, and the political influence of the military is but

one variable requiring consideration. However, the data trends concerning the armed

services’ level of political clout should provide some indication of whether or not the

United States is moving toward a garrison state existence; that is to say, a situation in

which the military becomes increasingly influential.

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Summary

This reappraisal of Lasswell’s garrison state construct is undertaken to determine

whether indicators exist that may plausibly demonstrate, in a quantitative manner, the

influence the United States military brings to bear on policy-makers, and how that

influence has changed over time. In doing so, it shifts the emphasis in civil-military

relations research away from simply ascertaining whether or not characteristics attributed

to a garrison state exist at a specific point in time. The appropriateness of resurrecting

Lasswell’s garrison state as the contextual base for this study is best expressed in the

closing paragraph of his original work:

The function of any developmental construct, such as the present one about the garrison state, is to clarify to the specialist the possible relevance of his research to impending events that concern the values of which he approves as a citizen. Although they are neither scientific laws nor dogmatic forecasts, developmental constructs aid in the timing of scientific work, stimulating both planned observation of the future and renewed interest in whatever past events are of greatest probable pertinence to the emerging future. Within the general structure of the science of society there is place for many special sciences devoted to the study of all factors that condition the survival of selected values. This is the sense in which there can be a science of democracy, or a science of political psychiatry, within the framework of social science. If the garrison state is probable, the timing of special research is urgent. (Lasswell 1941, 468)

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Concern over undue influence by the military in American politics has existed since

the earliest days of the United States (Huntington 1956; Millis et al. 1958; Clotfelter 1973;

Beckman 1974). Of the myriad books, articles, and papers dedicated to the subject of

proper civil-military relations,7 Richard Kohn’s Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the

Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (1975) provides one of the

more comprehensive records about the origin of worry concerning a politically powerful

military. Kohn provides evidence of disparate views in his introductory chapter by

contrasting the beliefs held by Samuel Adams and John Hancock. Adams’ opinion was

that individual liberty would be jeopardized by the existence of a standing army. Hancock

believed that the goals of militia members matched those of the state, thereby mitigating

any anxiety about its members endangering their attainment. The fundamental ideas of

these two American forefathers helped form the base assumptions concerning civil-military

relations held by scholars, politicians, servicemen, and citizens in general (Kohn 1975).

As Russell Weigley points out in “The American Military and the Principle of

Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell (1993)” the nineteenth century’s relative

tranquility offered little in the way of challenges to the concept of civilian superiority 7 On the issue of “proper” civil-military relations, noted scholar Michael Desch opens one of his texts by stating “Civil-military-relations is a very complicated issue. Analysts disagree about how to define and measure civil-military relations as a dependent variable [for two reasons:] (1) Difficult to separate issues into neat piles of ownership. (2) We’re not sure what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ civ-mil relations” (Desch 1999, 3).

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and military subordination. Moreover, the need for the United States to maintain a large

standing army was not fully realized until the Cold War period following World War II.

Although the existing Cold War security threats were considered serious enough to

necessitate creation of a force-in-being, maintenance of such a force ran counter to long-

held views of democratic governance. Weigley also believes that the end of the Second

World War and subsequent Cold War era witnessed an increase in the number of political

decisions being made that blurred the boundaries between diplomacy and strategy. As

such, policy-making necessarily became an enterprise requiring collaboration between

political and military officials. Considering that a large standing army was still perceived

as a threat to freedom and the reality that the military appeared to be increasingly involved

and influential in the political decisions of the country, the original debate of Adams and

Hancock was revived.

Literature Review Format

This literature review follows the chronological development of the civil-military

relations literature. Borrowing from Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn’s Soldiers and

Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security (2001; see also

Langston 2003), it is arranged according to the “three waves” of modern scholarly debate

on civil-military relations in the United States. Incorporating the concept of waves or

distinct periods of research into the subject of civil-military relations does not imply that

there is an expectation of major differences between the periods that will spring forth from

the analysis of trends. Instead, the waves metaphorically capture the essence of a perceived

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rise and fall of scholarly interest in the subject; interest that is usually piqued by some

significant event or activity of an important person or group.

Further reason for approaching this literature review in a chronological manner

stems from the lack of a widely accepted theory of civil-military relations around which a

topical discourse may be more easily established. In “Core Issues and Theory in Military

Sociology,” Guy Siebold also decries the lack of a “core theory of military sociology”

(2001, 140-41). He further states that “without a center, there has been more of a

continuing dialogue than an accumulation of theoretical or practical evidence that one

might call knowledge of the sub-field” (Siebold 2001, 140-41). The format of this

literature review is demonstrative of that continuing dialogue.

The first wave of literature can be attributed to the period following the Korean War

and ends roughly at the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) concept in 1973. One

of the primary concerns during this era was the proper role of a large standing army; a

concern made more prominent since military members (especially officers) were

considered to be far more conservative than the general population, resulting in an

ideological gap between the two groups. In view of these ideological differences, the crux

of the debate was the issue of maintaining civilian control of the armed forces in a

democracy. Although the issue of political influence of the that was at the center of the

early research.

A second wave of writings picks up with the post-conscript military in 1973 and

continues through the first Gulf War. This wave of literature centered on problems

resulting from the Vietnam War and the end of conscription. The war appeared to fuel an

enmity between the military and civilian sectors of society causing the ideological gap to

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grow. Adoption of the AVF required the armed forces to compete with the civilian sector

and civil service for qualified personnel. This resulted in what is commonly referred to as

the self-selective nature of the armed forces, which is alleged to have further exacerbated

existing differences between the two groups. These differences would cause some to be

even more concerned that the growing military bureaucracy might seek primarily to satisfy

its own bureaucratic needs and wants potentially at the expense of the society it served. As

a bureaucracy, it can only be expected that the military would seek to increase its influence

among policy-makers in order to improve its capacity to obtain scarce resources.

The first-wave debate concerning disparate values held by military members in

comparison to society at large was resurrected in the 1990s, launching a third round of

scholarly interest in civil-military relations. Impetus for the revived concern about the

civil-military gap is attributed partly to the fall of the former Soviet Union; fundamental

changes in use of the military abroad (couched in terms of the debate over roles and

missions); and what some authors considered to be a war of cultures in the United States

(Ricks 1997; Feaver and Kohn 2001). In this period the emphasis on the political influence

of the military on policy comes to the forefront, most notably in regard to the political

activities of General Colin Powell, which were often seen as inappropriate (see Weigley

1993; Kohn 1994; Avant, 1998; Foster 1993; Roman and Tarr 2001; Feaver and Kohn

2001; Feaver 2003).

In effect, evidence of a cyclical interest in civil-military relations over the past half-

century lends some credence to the overarching concern at the core of this study. At issue

is the desire to determine whether there are some plausible indicators of political influence

of the military on policy that can be graphed to demonstrate their historical trend. The

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primary goal then becomes the ability to discern whether there is a gradual movement

toward or away from the creation of a garrison state. To do so, we must first attempt to

understand what the research can tell us about the issue of civil-military relations as it

relates to the possibility that the military institution is becoming more influential in politics.

The First Wave

“The Garrison State” (Lasswell 1941) is not normally attributed to any of the three

waves of twentieth-century literature concerning civil-military relations. However, it can

be argued that the garrison state construct established the theoretical and conceptual base

for modern study of civil-military relations (Huntington 1957; Stanley 1997). The gist of

the garrison state hypothesis has been discussed previously but merits emphasis.

The majority of research addresses the expected end-state characteristics of the

garrison state, or what Lasswell referred to in the abstract to his article as “methods” the

ruling elite would use to govern society (1941, 455). He predicted that the military elite of

such a society would be skilled in management practices normally ascribed to businessmen.

A skill of critical importance would be the ability to manipulate symbols so as to maintain

morale and positive relations with the citizens. He was of the opinion that unemployment

would be abolished, at least in the mind of the general public, and that most of the violence

in society would be aimed at its less skillful members along with those who openly express

their disdain for the power elite. It was also believed that government would somehow

create a degree of parity in income levels; ostensibly to maintain the morale of the citizens

in the midst of unrest created by an increasing sense of peril. Lastly, Lasswell believed that

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authority would be “dictatorial, governmentalized, centralized, [and] integrated (1941,

455).

Lasswell used the majority of his thesis to expand on the methodologies of

governance used by the elite in a garrison state, but he also reflected on the manner in

which influence8 would be manifest in such a society. Influence, in this context, was

viewed as a measure of control the military would exercises over the values of income,

safety, and deference (Lasswell 1941; Lasswell 1951c).

By changing the central point of his thesis, Lasswell (1941) was, in essence,

signaling the reader to recognize that an outright coup d’état was not necessary for the

establishment of a garrison state. As Lasswellian scholar Jay Stanley noted, “… weakening

of civil supremacy can occur within an effective democratic structure” (1997, 23; see also

Huntington 1962). For this reason it is instructive to view the garrison state construct in

terms of a continuum. There is the “business state” beginning and the assumed “garrison

state” ending (Lasswell 1941, 463)

Ideally, demonstration of movement along that continuum would be accomplished

by performing multiple, cross-sectional assessments of the trends in development of the

characteristics of a garrison state. Unfortunately, previous research appears to have been

focused more on determining whether the expected characteristics of a garrison state were

present at a point in time specified by the researcher. Although it is purely conjecture, this

approach to the subject may have been used because the characteristics of a garrison state

8 Lasswell’s concept of influence was first documented in Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, originally published in 1936, wherein he wrote, “The study of politics is the study of influence and the influential. … The influential are those who get the most of what there is to get. Available values may be classified as deference, income, safety. Those who get the most are the elite; the rest are mass” (Lasswell 1951c; emphasis in the original).

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appear to be dichotomous in nature; they either do or do not exist, which greatly hinders

use of trend analysis to determine movement along the development continuum.

In view of the previous discussion, Lasswell’s (1941) seminal work appears to be

rightly considered the genesis of twentieth-century theory on civil-military relations.

However, the debate between Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz in the mid-fifties is

often regarded as a catalyst in the resurgence in research about civil-military relations. The

fundamental issue of the Huntington-Janowitz debate concerned the appropriate model for

civilian control of the armed forces.

Many scholars refer to Huntington’s, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and

Politics of Civil-Military Relations as his seminal work on the topic. However, prior to that

book, Huntington published an article in the American Political Science Review entitled

“Civilian Control and the Constitution.” In this study Huntington claimed that “… the

American Constitution in the twentieth century obstructs the achievement of civilian

control” (1956, 676). He posited that the writers of the Constitution viewed control of the

military more in context of its employment rather than complete and total control of every

aspect of day-to-day operations. The framers appeared to be more fearful of military force

misused by politicians than of political capability wrongly used by officers of the armed

forces (Huntington 1956). He supported this notion by referring to the Constitutional

division of responsibility for the military between the legislative and executive branches of

government. Huntington maintained that it is the separation of powers that actually “…

foster[s] the direct access of the professional military authorities to the highest levels of

government” (1956, 682). In effect, it appears that the Constitution invites the military into

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politics, which by its very nature necessitates development of the capability to influence

those people involved in policy-making decisions.

Huntington (1957) introduced the concepts of subjective and objective civilian

control of the military. Subjective control equaled civilianization of the military, “making

them the mirror of the state,” which purportedly obligates its senior members to participate

in the political process. Objective control is equated to militarization of the military:

“making them the tool of the state,” which requires the military to refrain from politics

(Huntington 1956, 678). Referring to such issues as industrialization, technological

development, and increasing population, Huntington (1956) believed that subjective control

became outdated in the nineteenth century due to societal changes that necessitated

professionalization of the military, especially the officer corps. Because of these

environmental changes, the relationship between military and civilian leaders was altered in

that subjective control gave way to objective control; the military were allowed to focus on

honing the skills necessary to wage modern war and became primarily advisors to the

politician in such matters. Ideally, civilian leaders would maintain objective control over

the military by granting the military a large degree of autonomy in their area of expertise.

By obeying the decisions of political leaders, notwithstanding any debate or disagreement,

the military demonstrate their professionalism, which bolsters the viability of objective

civilian control (Huntington 1956). Fortunately or unfortunately, the objective control of

the military witnessed in the 1800s would not remain intact through the middle of the

twentieth century.

In his study of civil-military relations in the period between 1946 and 1955,

Huntington (1957) claimed that servicemen wielded far greater influence on modern

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society than they did during the Second World War (see also Mills 1957). His conclusion

was based on evidence of the increased use of officers in government positions normally

held by civilians, development of connections between officers and businessmen, and

heightened respect and familiarity of popular or heroic servicemen demonstrated by public

opinion polls (Huntington 1957; see also Mills 1957; Gallup 1972; Feaver and Kohn 2001).

In view of the issues cited above, Huntington (1957) questioned whether the

newfound political and economic power of the military was simply a fleeting reaction to

the outcome of World War II, or whether a fundamental shift had occurred in the reception

of military advice on the part of civilian leaders. In trying to determine which of the two

was correct, Huntington argued that “The political influence of a group is even more

difficult to judge than their formal authority” (1957, 88). Regardless of the reason, a

reciprocal feeling of respect existed between the two groups who, prior to the war,

displayed a hefty amount of mutual animosity. In fact, the relationship between the

military, defense-related industry, and congressional committees became so strong that

President Eisenhower cautioned the nation about its possible negative ramifications

concomitantly coining the term “military-industrial complex”9 (Eisenhower 1961; Snow

and Brown 2000). However, Huntington viewed the relationship between the military,

civil industry, and the government in a positive light. He wrote that “In general, the

defense businesses supported for economic reasons the same military policies which the

[military] officers supported for professional reasons” (Huntington 1957, 366). In a sense

the military-industrial complex was seen as a win-win proposition for the country in

matters of national security. In spite of the potentially positive aspects of the tripartite

9 The military-industrial complex is only referred to as matter of historic context. It is beyond the scope of this study to address the plethora of information concerning the topic.

29

relationship, the issue raised a few eyebrows concerning the prospect for indiscriminate

influence of the military, defense industries, or a combination thereof on policy-makers

which may result in less than optimum policy decisions.

If Huntington is considered a proponent of objective control of the military, then

Morris Janowitz can be pegged to its antithesis: subjective control. Writing The

Professional Soldier just a few short years after Huntington’s The Soldier and the State,

Janowitz analyzed the political changes in the military profession. One of Janowitz’s

hypotheses was that the increasing managerial and political responsibilities required of a

large government organization such as the United States military were diminishing its

members’ “self-image and sense of honor” (1960, 12). The military was becoming

civilianized, the effects of which would be debated for years to come.

Janowitz believed that due to the decreasing need for technical skill in the military

profession, military leaders took on a more managerial, or business-like role, which caused

the development of an increasingly political persona. This characteristic was further driven

by the tendency to intertwine aspects of external and internal politics. Internal politics was

seen as the attempt to influence “legislative and administrative decisions regarding national

security policies and affairs,” and external politics as the “consequences of military action

on international balance of power” (Janowitz 1960, 12). The military’s involvement in

politics seemed to be in keeping with the other government agencies; all of them exhibit a

high degree of self-preservation and personal interest that is endemic to bureaucratic

politics.

Although the above scenario seems to depict a natural evolution in the civil-military

relationship, involvement of military personnel in either domestic or foreign policy

30

decisions had not previously been lauded. For example, Janowitz found the military

derided for being politically inept and segregated from society, yet simultaneously charged

with exercising undue influence on public opinion and the foreign policy process. If

Janowitz was writing on the very same topic today he could probably make an even

stronger claim; the military has become increasingly adept in politics, and is considered a

key broker in foreign policy.10

In his epilogue, Janowitz justified his support for subjective control, or

civilianization of the military. He believed the military was becoming a constabulary force

versus a garrison force for three reasons. First, the armed forces were maintaining a

constant state of readiness. Second, the use of minimum force necessary to accomplish its

mission had become the rule rather than the exception. Third, and last, by adopting a more

protective or deterrent stance, it was more conducive to diplomatic efforts in international

relations versus portraying itself as only being concerned about assuring victory by

projecting its overwhelming power. By developing into a constabulary force, members of

the military would serve because of personal convictions about the morality and legitimacy

of the military mission, as compared to serving for reasons of national honor and survival

found in a garrison state, or to accomplish certain career milestones as occurs in political

democracies. However, Janowitz does not address how subjective control of the military

would curb the inherent bureaucratic nature to influence the decisions of policy-makers

upon which the military would rely for support and funding. On its face, subjective control

appears to increase the potential for increasing the political influence of the military.

10 See Christopher M. Bourne. 1998. “Unintended Consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.” Joint Force Quarterly (spring) 18: 99-108. The basic slant of Bourne’s piece is that creation of the positions of regional commanders-in-chief who are directly under the President in the operational chain of command, and raising the importance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has ostensibly undermined the importance of diplomacy along with the authority and influence of the Secretaries of Defense and State on presidential decisions.

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A very cogent depiction of the increasing political influence of the military is found

in C. Wright Mills’ The Power Elite (1957). Echoing Huntington, Mills emphatically

stated, “But they [the military] are now more powerful than they have ever been in the

history of the American elite” (1957, 198; see also Kohn 1994). He felt that the senior

officers in the military were more able to exercise their power because they often controlled

the definition of reality concerning military issues and foreign affairs. This capacity was

augmented when a senior officer was given the position of ambassador or special envoy to

some foreign country. Likewise, their frequent dealings with senior elected officials, and

sometimes lengthy assignments to the Washington D.C. area, helped some officers develop

the personal ability to raise policy issues above the political fray (see Gibson and Snider

1999). In Mills’ view the “power elite” was comprised of corporate heads, politicians, and

military leaders; the three were interdependent. What seemed to impact Mills most was the

notion that the influence of the armed services was trumping the diplomatic capability of

the United States at a point in history when, arguably, diplomacy seemed the only hope to

abate the threat of nuclear war.

After reading Mills’ account, one might question the appropriateness of any

intervention of the military into the political processes of the state. Walter Millis, Harvey

Mansfield, and Harold Stein wrote that

The civil and military elements in our society have become so deeply intermeshed that neither the uniformed officers nor the administrative bureaucracy nor the representative legislature speak from any firm, independent position of principle or policy. (1958, 412)

It would appear that Millis and his coauthors were decrying the inability to separate issues

between military and civilian domains in the United States. Instead, they were simply

elucidating the political reality that the country’s place in the world had evolved;

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isolationism was no longer an option. Democracy demanded provision for defense of the

sovereign as well as promotion of the general welfare of its people. This required

development of a relationship based on reciprocity between civilian leaders and the

military. The ensuing challenge would be for both agencies to maintain a balanced

approach in their dealings with the other group.

The propriety of civilian involvement in military matters should not normally be an

issue prompting debate. However, military interposition on domestic or foreign political

issues is often seen as inappropriate and problematic, especially when it appears that the

military position is adopted. Gene Lyons, one of the early researchers in civil-military

relations, saw little reason for concern about military influence on policy. He believed that

“without firm agreement on priorities, there is little reason to expect that the military can

control government policy even if civilian authorities abdicate responsibility for basic

decisions” (Lyons 1961, 53). Although he uses the term control, it is arguably difficult to

control that which one exercises little influence over. More importantly, Lyons’ comment

implies that civilian leaders often allow policy decisions to be made by uniformed officers.

This may be true in occasional circumstances, but such a situation is more likely to occur at

a lower level of decision making (operational or tactical) than at the strategic or national

policy level. What is more likely is the military member using his or her expertise in an

effort to alter or reinforce a policy-maker’s decision at those higher levels of policy

formulation. But Lyons’ concern was exactly opposite that just considered.

Lyons was primarily concerned about the perceptible diminution of the policy

maker’s acceptance of the uniformed military’s professional expertise on technical issues.

To explain his concern Lyons offered the following thought:

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Professionalization is taking other forms as well—the influence of career executives in the development of major policy decisions, innovations in administration which have brought outside experts into government through a variety of institutional devices, and a growing interest in military affairs among civilians outside government. (1961, 59)

It appeared to Lyons that the military was becoming more civilianized and the

civilians more militarized. The lines of distinction between military and civilian were

being blurred largely due to the rapid advancements in technology, especially in the area of

nuclear weapons. A key point made by Lyons was that the policy process favored those

who had long-term careers in specific policy areas, whether they were a civilian or military

member. Perhaps due to the assignment rotation policies of the military, the advantage

often went to the civilian. Lyons quotes a senior military officer as saying, “… the Civil

Service employees … in the Department of Defense … probably have more impact [read

influence] on decision making … than any other individual or group of individuals,

military or civilian” (1961, 59). Although it appears correct to make distinctions between

the military and civil service, one could argue that in the process of formulating defense

policy, the two entities collectively represent a politically powerful defense establishment;

a conglomeration of individuals; separate smaller internal government agencies; and

interdependent private industry capable of wielding a formidable degree of influence on the

political process.

The author noted most for his approach toward the issue of the military as an

“independent political force” was Samuel E. Finer (1962, 4). In his widely acclaimed

book, The Man on Horseback, Finer indicated that not many scholars attempt to

differentiate the manner in which military intervention (or influence) in politics occurs.

The common belief is that military intervention happens via forceful coup d’état.

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However, Finer postulated that “…the modes of military intervention are as often latent or

indirect as they are overt or direct. [Furthermore,] the phenomenon appears … distinctive,

persistent, and widespread” (1962, 4).

To explain himself, Finer proffered four methods through which the military could

intervene in politics: influence, blackmail, displacement, and supplanting. The most benign

of the four is the constitutionally approved means of influence; simply providing advice

and information as appropriate and allowed by the law and structure of the government.

Another type of influence, more malignant in nature, would be via collusion with, or

competing against, civil authorities. The second method of intervention—blackmail—can

also take on collusive or competitive characteristics. It can also manifest itself as outright

intimidation or complete uncooperativeness. Being uncooperative, or worse, purposively

failing to accomplish the military mission can qualify as displacement, the third type of

intervention. Lastly, and most severe, is the actual supplanting of the government. This

normally occurs by violent means commonly referred to as a coup d’état. If military

intervention in politics is as common as Finer asserts, then the question remains: Is such

activity appropriate?

Finer addresses that very question by claiming that

There is a common assumption, an unreflecting belief that it is somehow ‘natural’ for the armed forces to obey the civil power. … But no reason is adduced for showing that civilian control of the armed forces is, in fact, ‘natural.’ Is it? Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely to ask why they ever do otherwise. (1962, 5)

Finer’s basic philosophy was that from a position of morality, civilian agencies and the

armed forces should be considered coequal in their right to influence political leaders in a

democracy. He believed that “Any imbalance in military influence in politico-military

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affairs is the fault of civilian leadership” (Finer 1962, 146). The critical question that

remains unanswered throughout the early literature is: What indicators would one analyze

to determine whether an imbalance in political influence existed? Interestingly and perhaps

even prophetically, Finer’s philosophy would be at the core of a several decades-long and

arguably continuous debate about the appropriate balance in civil-military relations.

The Second Wave

The second round of research in civil-military relations came about in the waning

years of Vietnam and continued through the fall of the Soviet Union. Alleged catalysts of

changing civil-military relations were: perceived mismanagement of the Vietnam conflict;

awareness that ending the draft resulted in the view of military service as an occupational

choice versus a moral or civic obligation; a divergence between ideologies and values held

by military members and those of society; and realization on the military’s part that they

now had to compete with the civilian sector (including the civil service) for qualified

personnel.

One of the more prominent texts of this era was Charles Moskos’ anthology, Public

Opinion and the Military Establishment. The book dealt with issues facing the military

establishment as a result of dynamic societal and world events. Moskos illuminated a key

problem of the ongoing debate concerning the military’s proper role by stating:

Public discussion on the role of the military in American society is too often dominated by either antimilitary polemicists or apologists of the warfare state. If our society is ever to fulfill its democratic promise, the relationships between its civilian and military structures require especially informed and sustained attention. (1971, xvi)

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As had been the case when Lasswell (1941) penned his initial concept of the garrison state,

through the early writings on civil-military relations discussed previously, the Moskos

(1971) study found that both citizens and academics defined the military in one of two

manners. At one end of the spectrum were those who believed the military to be a

reflection of the state wholly subordinated to its elected leaders. On the opposite side were

people who focused on the different values held by the military as compared to society with

special concern about the military’s influence on civilian leadership. It appeared that the

issue of civil-military relations was often addressed as a zero-sum game rather than the true

give-and-take reality of politics in a democracy.

The reality of the political process in Washington D.C., as it relates to civil-military

relations and the military’s ability to influence policy, was captured rather well in James

Clotfelter’s, The Military in American Politics. His assessment of the civil-military

relationship was that

Civilian control of the military, while a general concern of congressmen, can be a conscious day-to-day goal of the Defense Department. The prize is determination of [read influence on] defense policy: Who decides between rival military strategies, which entails substantially different internal allocation of resources; who decides on the advice to be given the President and Congress on prospective foreign policies and weapons policies; and who controls implementation of these policies by the nation’s [sic] largest bureaucracy. (1973, 183; see also Beckman 1974)

Although Clotfelter’s description of the relationship is plausible, it leaves one with the

impression that the resultant policy process becomes a winner-take-all endeavor.

Fortunately, the framers of the constitution established a tripartite system of political

control in our democracy that should alleviate the fear of any one agency