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League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al.G.R. No. 176951, G.R. No. 177499 & G.R. No. 178056; 24 August 2010

Facts: The 11th Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.However,it did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. Subsequently, the12th Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 20 June 2001,amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual incomerequirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20million to P100million.Thereafter, 16 municipalities filed their individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills containeda common provision exempting all the 16municipalities from the P100million incomerequirement of RA 9009. The cityhood bills were approved by the House of Representatives and

the Senate, and lapsed into law without the Presidents signature. Said Cityhood Laws directedthe Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters ineach municipality approved of the conversion. Petitioners sought to declare the 16 CityhoodLaws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the equalprotection clause, lamenting that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities wouldreduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). On 18 November2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, declared the 16 Cityhood Laws to be inviolation of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that no city shall becreated except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code. TheSupreme Court held that since respondent municipalities did not meet the P100million incomerequirement under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, theCityhood Laws converting said municipalities into cities were unconstitutional. The SupremeCourt also declared the 16 Cityhood Laws to be in violation of the equal protection clause sincethere was no valid classification between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption fromthe P100million income requirement: (1) there was no substantial distinction between

municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11thCongress when RA 9009 was enacted and municipalities that did not have such pending bills;(2) the classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress was notgermane to the purpose of the law, which was to prevent fiscally nonviable municipalities fromconverting into cities; (3) the pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11thCongress limited theexemption to aspecific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009 a condition thatwould never happen again, violating the requirement that a valid classification must not belimited to existing conditions only; and (4) limiting the exemption only to the 16 respondentmunicipalities violated the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarlysituated; municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities could notconvert into cities. On 31 March 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, also by a majority vote,denied the respondent municipalities first motion for reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, theSupreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondent municipalities second motion forreconsideration. The 18 November 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recordedin the Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009.

However, on 21 December 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc reversed the 18 November 2008Decision and upheld the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws. The Court reasoned that:(1) When Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution speaks of the local government code, thereference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the LocalGovernmentCode (LGC) of 1991. It would be noted that at the time of the adoption of the 1987Constitution,Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC, was still in effect. Had the framers of the 1987Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, they would havereferred to BP 337. Also, they would not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a newLGC, as they did in Section 3, Article X of the Constitution. Accordingly, the criteria for creationofcities need not be embodied in the LGC. Congress can impose such criteria in a consolidated setoflaws or a single-subject enactment or through amendatory laws. The passage of amendatorylaws,such as RA 9009, was no different from the enactment of the cityhood laws specificallyexempting aparticular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the

exempting laws, effectively decreased the already codified indicators.(2) Deliberations on RA 9009, particularly the floor e xchange between Senators Aquilino P

Padilla vs. COMELEC

FACTS:Pursuant to RA 7155, creating the Municipality of Tulay na Lupa in the province of CamarinesNorte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-naLupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod,Bayan-bayn, Mataulang, Pag-asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in the Municipalty of Labo, someprovince, COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite was conducted throughout the municipality of Laboand majority voted against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa. Petitioner prayed

that the plebiscite conducted to set aside with the contention that such plebiscite was a completefailure.ISSUE:Whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality ofTulay na Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is valid.RULING:COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion and the result of the plebiscite rejecting thecreation of the new municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa is valid.It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted in the politicalunits directly affected, it means that residents of the political entity who would be economicallydislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently,what is contemplated by the phrase political units directly affected is the plurality of thepolitical units which would participate in the plebiscite.

Sema vs COMELEC

FACTS:The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province ofMaguindanao but it is not part or ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in aplebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1stlegislative districtcomprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to createprovinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM RegionalAssembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised ofthe municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now onlymade of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quoshould be retained however just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should becalled Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declarationfrom Congress as to Cotabatos status as a l egislative district (or part of any).Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato

(1st

district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislativedistrict and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rivalDilangalen was from there and D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under theConstitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gainslegislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect Cotabatois being deprived of a representative in the HOR. COMELEC maintained that the legislativedistrict is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district isnot affected and so is its representation.

ISSUE:Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validlyLGUs.HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed bySection 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteriaestablished in the local government code and subject toapproval by a majority of thevotes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

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Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality orbarangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit mustfollow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflictwith any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political unitsaffected.There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution forCongress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local governmentunits. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislativebodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and providedno conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated toprovincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their

jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannotvalidly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that aprovince, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that inorder to have a legislative district, there must at le ast be 250k (population) in said district.Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Semas contention is untenable. Onthe other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creatinga legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislativedistricts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not citiesand provinces.

Abbas vs. COMELECG.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989Topics: nature of plebiscite,

constitutionality of RA 6734

Facts:A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan,wasscheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of RA 6734, entitled "AnAc tProviding for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao" (OrganicAct). These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the COMELEC fromconductingthe plebiscite; and (2) declare RA 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional. Theargumentsagainst R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorizedint o ei the r of the following: (a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and(b) that certainprovisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.Issue:Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic Act are unconstitutional.Held:The petition has no merit and the law is constitutional.1. Petitioner contends that the tenor of aprovision in the Organic Act makes the creationof a n a u t o n o m o u s r e g i o n a b s o l u t e , s u c h t h a t e v e n i f o n l y t w o

provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous reg ion would st i l l becreated composed of the two provinceswhere the favorable votes wereobtained. there is a specific provision int he T ra ns it or yP r o v i s i o n s ( A r t i c l e X I X ) o f t h e O r g a n i c A c t , w h i c h i n c o rp or a te s su bs t an t ia l ly t he s am e requirements embodied in the Constitution andfills in the details, thus:SEC. 13. The creati on of the Autonomo us Region in MuslimMin da na o sha ll take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by theconstituentunits provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscitewhichshall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than onehundredt w e n t y ( 1 2 0 ) d a y s a f t e r t h e a p p r o v a l o f t h i s A c t :Provided,T h a t o n l y t h e provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in

theAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities whichin the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remainthe existingadministrative determination, merge the existing regions. Thus, under the Constitution and R.A.No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shalltake effect only when approved by amajority of the votes cast by the constituent units in aplebiscite, and only those provinces andcities where a majority vote in favor of the OrganicAct shall be included in the

autonomo us r egion. The provinc es and cities wherein such amajority is not attainedshall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that evenif an autonomous region iscreated, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) citiesmentioned in Article II, section 1(2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. Thesinglep l e b i s c i t e c o n t e m p l a t e d b y t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d R . A . N o. 6 7 3 4 w i l l t h e r e f o r e b e determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomousregion in Muslim Mindanao and(2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A.No. 6734, shall compromiseit.2. The question has been raised as to what this majority means.Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or amajority in each of theconstituent units, or both? The 1987 Constitution provides: Thecreation of the autonomous region shall be effectivewhen approved by majority of the

votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite calledfor the purpose, provided that onlyprovinces, cities and geographic areas voting favourablyin such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. Itwillreadily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on thetotalmajority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituentunits andthe proviso underscores this.3. Petitioner avers that not all of the thirteen (13) provinces andnine (9) cities included inthe O rganic Act, possess such concurr ence in histor icaland cultural heritage ando th er r e l e v a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . B y i n c l u d i n g a r e a s , w h i c h d o n o t s t r i c tl y s h a r e t h e s a m e characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress hasexpanded the scope of theautonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to belimited.Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down thest an da rds by wh ich Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomousregion. Guided bythese constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas thatshare commonattributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's

discretion. Any review of thisascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law.4.Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violatestheconstitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centersona provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any conflict betweentheMuslim Code and the Tribal Code on the one had, a nd the national law on theotherh an d, t h e S h a r i ' a h c o u r t s c r e a t e d u n d e r t h e s a m e A c t s h o u l d a p p l y n at ional law. Pet i t ionersmaintain that the i s lamic law (Shari 'ah) i s der ivedfro m the Kor an, whic h make s it par t of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any"man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbassupports this objection by enumerating possibleinstances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein anapplication of national law might be offensiveto a Muslim's religiousconvictions.I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , n o a c t u a l c o n t r o v e r s y b e t w e e n r e a l l i t i ga n t s e x i s t s . T h e re a r e n o conflicting claims involving the application of national lawresulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this

cas e may not be cal led upon to res olv ewhat is merely a perceived potential conflictbetween the provisions the Muslim Code andnational law.5. According to petitioners, saidprovision grants the President the power to merge regions,a power which is not conferred by theConstitution upon thePresident.W h i l e t h e p o w e r t o m e r g e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e g i o n s i s n o t e x p r es s l y p r o v i d e d f o r i n t h e Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodgedwith the President to facilitatethe exercise of the power of general supervision over localgovernments. There is no conflictbetween the power of the President to merge administrativeregions with thec o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r i n g a p l e b i s c i t e i n t h e m e r g e r o f l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t u n i t s b e c a u s e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t o f a p l e b i s c i t e i n a m e r g e r e xpr es sl y a pp li es on ly to pr ov in ce s, ci ti es ,municipalities or barangays, not toadministrative regions.6. Every law has in its favor the presumption ofcons tit utio nal ity. Bas ed on the grou ndsraised by petitioners to challenge theconstitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds thatpetitioners have failed to overcome thepresumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is,therefore, inevitable

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MARIANO V. COMELECFacts:Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting TheMunicipalityof Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as unconstitutional.Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makationlyby special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a general reapportionment law to bepassed by Congresswithin 3 years following the return of every census. Also, the addition ofanother legislative district in Makati isnot in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution foras of the 1990 census, the population of Makati standsat only 450,000.Issue:

W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e a d d i t i o n o f a n o t h e r l e g i s l a t i v e d is t r i c t i n M a k a t i i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a lHeld:Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in thecharter of anew city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of notmore than 250 members,unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did notpreclude Congress from increasing itsmembe rshi p by pas sin g a law , othe r tha n ageneral reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done byCongress in enactingRA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makatis legislative district. Moreover, to holdthatreapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of allthe legislativedistricts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create aninequitable situation where a newcity or province created by Congress will be denied legislativerepresentation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive thepeople of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.Petitioner cannot insist that theaddition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec.5(3), Art. VI of the

Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.Saidsection provides that a city with a population of at le ast 250,000 shall have at least onerepresentative. Evengranting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at450,000, its legislative district may still beincreased since it has met the minimum populationrequirement of 250,000

Ordillo v. COMELEC

Facts: The people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga Apayao and the city of

Baguio cast theirvotes in a plebiscite held pursuant to RA 6766. The COMELECresults showed that the creation of the

Region was approved onlyby a majority of 5,899 votes in only the Ifugao Province and wasoverwhelmingly rejected by

148,676 votes in the rest of theprovinces and city abovementioned. Sec of Justice: considering theproviso that only the

provinces and city voting favorably shall beincluded in the CAR, the province of Ifugao, being the only provincewhich

voted favorably legally constitutes the CAR. As a result of this, Congress enacted RA 6861 which set the elections in the

CAR.Ordillo et al then filed a petition with the COMELEC to declare thenon-ratification of the Organic Act for the

Region. The presidentissued AO 160 declaring that the Cordillera Executive Board andCordillera Regional Assembly

and other offices created underEO220 are abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act. The petitioners

maintain that there can be no valid CAR as the Constitution and RA 6766 require that the said region be composedof

more than one constituent unit. They pray that the court declareCOMELEC Res. No. 2259 AO 160, and RA6861 as null

and void, andrestrain the respondents from implementing the same. They alsopray that it declare EO 220 constituting

the CEB and the CRA andother offices to be still in force and effect until another organic lawfor the Autonomous Region

shall have been enacted and dulyratified.Issue: WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province whichvoted

favorably for the creation of the CAR can, alone, legally andvalidly constitute such region. NO.

Art. X Sec. 15 of 1987 Constitution: There shall be createdautonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and intheCordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities andgeographical areas sharing common anddistinctivehistorical and cultural heritage, economic and socialstructures, and other relevant characteristics within

theframework of this Constitution and the national sovereigntyas well as territorial integrity of the Republic ofthePhilippines.

The term region used in its ordinary sense means two ormore provinces. This is supported by the fact that the13regions into which the Philippines is divided foradministrative purposes are groupings of contiguousprovinces.Ifugao is a p rovince by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities,municipalities,and geographical areas.RA 6766 shows that Congress never intended that a singleprovince may constitute the autonomous region.Otherwise,we would be faced with the absurd situation of having twosets of provincial officials and another set ofregionalofficials exercising their executive and legislative powersover exactly the same small area. Such will result inanawkward predicament where there will be two legislativebodies: the Cordillera Assembly and theSangguniangPanlalawigan, exercising their legislative powers over theprovince of Ifugao.

RA 6766 provides for a Regional Planning andDevelopmental Board which has a provincial counterpart,the ProvincialPlanning and Developmental Coordinator. If ittakes only one person in the provincial level to perform suchfunctionswhile it takes an entire board to perform the samein the regional level, it could only mean that a larger areamust becovered at the regional level. The law also providesan allocation for 10MPhp for its initial organizationalrequirements.Such cannot be construed as funding only alone and small province. Moreover, the province of Ifugaomakes up only11% of the total population of the areaswhich were enumerated in the law.This case must be distinguished from the Abbas case whichlaid down the rule on the meaning of majority: whatisrequired by the Constitution is a simple majority of votesapproving the Organic Act in individual constituent unitsandnot a double majority of the votes in all constituent units puttogether, as well as the individual constituent units.There isnothing in the Abbas case that deals with the issue onwhether an autonomous region could exist despite thefactthat only one province or city is to constitute it

TAN VS. COMELEC

Facts: On 10 May 1992, Antonio Tan, as incumbent city Prosecutor of Davao City, wasdesignated by the Commission on Elections as Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers ofDavao City for the 11th May 1992 synchronized national and local elections conformably with theprovisions of Section 20(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 and Section 221(b) of the Omnibus ElectionCode. On the basis of the votes canvassed by the Board of Canvassers, Manuel Garcia wasproclaimed the winning candidate for a congressional seat to represent the 2nd District of DavaoCity in the House of Representatives.Senforiano Alterado, another candidate for the position, filed a number of cases questioning thevalidity of the proclamation of Manuel Garcia and accusing the members of the City Board ofCanvassers of unlawful, erroneous, incomplete and irregular canvass. Meanwhile, the electoralprotest of Alterado was dismissed by the HRET. The criminal complaint for Falsification ofPublic Documents and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Office ofthe Ombudsman was likewise dismissed on the ground of lack of criminal intent on the p art oftherein respondents. An administrative charge was instituted in the COMELEC against the City

Board of Canvassers, including Antonio Tan, for Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, GrossIncompetence and Acts Inimical to the Service. Tan moved to dismiss the administrativecomplaint against him for alleged lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC, he being under theExecutive Department of the government and that COMELECs power to deputize public officersbelonging to the executive department is for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honestelections. It does not include and comprehend administrative disciplinary jurisdiction overofficials belonging to the executive branch of government. That jurisdiction over deputizedexecutive officers cannot be deemed to include such powers as would allow e ncroachment intothe domain of the executive branch under guise of administering laws relative to elections. .Motion to dismiss was denied. Hence, this petition.Issue: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismissHeld: No. The COMELECs authority under Section 2(6-8), Article IX, of the Constitution isvirtually all-encompassing when it comes to election matters. The administrative case againstTan, taken cognizance of by, and still pending with, the COMELEC, is in relation to theperformance of his duties as an election canvasser and not as a city prosecutor. The COMELECsmandate includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate supervision and control overnational and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local lawenforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties

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relative to the conduct of elections. In order to help ensure that such duly deputized officials andemployees of government carry out their respective assigned tasks, the law has also providedthan upon the COMELECs recommendation, the corresponding proper authority (the Secretaryof the Department of Justice in the case at bar) shall take appropriate action, either to suspendor remove from office the officer or employee who may, after due process, be found guilty ofviolation of election laws or failure to comply with instructions, orders, decision or rulings of theCOMELEC. However, the COMELEC, prior to making its recommendation, must first satisfyitself that there indeed has been an infraction of the law, or of its directives issued conformablytherewith, by the person administratively charged. It also stands to reason that it is theCOMELEC, being in the best position to assess how its deputized officials and employeesperform or have performed in their duties that should conduct the administrative inquiry. To say

that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to look into charges of election offenses committed byofficials and employees of government outside the regular employ of the COMELEC would be tounduly deny to it the proper and sound exercise of such recommendatory power and, perhapsmore than that, even a possible denial of due process to the official or employee concerned.The COMELEC merely may issue a recommendation for disciplinary action but that it is theexecutive department to which the charged official or employee belongs which has the ultimateauthority to impose the disciplinary penalty. The law then does not detract from, but iscongruent with, the general administrative authority of the department of governmentconcerned over its own personnel.

NAVARRO VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: The National Statistics Office certified that Dinagat Islands population is 120,813. Itsland area is 802.12 square kilometers and its average annual income is P

82,696,433.23, ascertified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance. On October 2, 2006, the Presidentapproved into law R.A. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. On December 3, 2006, the

COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the provinceunder the LGC which yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With theapproval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province ofDinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials whotook their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronizedelections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office onJuly 1, 2007.Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro and other former politicalleaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before the SC a petition for certiorariand prohibition (G.R.No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 alleging that that the creation ofDinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, andwould unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincialterritory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area.Issue:Is R.A. No. 9355 constitutional?Suggested Answer:

February 10, 2010 RulingNo. The SC ruled that the population of 120,813 is below the Local Government Code (LGC)minimum population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. Neither did Dinagat Islands, with anapproximate land area of 802.12 square kilometers meet the LGC minimum land arearequirement of 2,000 square kilometers. The Court reiterated its ruling that paragraph 2 ofArticle 9 of theRules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, whichexempts proposed provinces composed of one or more islands from the land area requirement,was null and void as the said exemption is not found in Sec. 461 of the LGC. There is no disputethat in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing thesaid law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the termsand provisions of the basic law, held the Court. (GR No. 180050, Navarro v. Ermita, May

12, 2010)The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed theirrespective motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution dated May 12, 2010, theSupreme Court denied the said motions.April 12, 2011 RulingYes. InNavarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011), theHonorable Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act No. 9355 is as VALID and

CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election ofthe officials thereof are declared VALID.The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementingthe Local Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply wherethe proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands, is declaredVALID.According to the SC, with respect to the creation ofbarangays, land area is not a requisiteindicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities,and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e.,income, population, and land area, are p rovided for.But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1)or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section

442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or acomponent city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites forthe creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated underArticle 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.xxx There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities andmunicipalities, but not to provinces.In fact, considering the physical configuration of thePhilippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would formpart of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is,therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, butfellester.blogspot.com was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when theexemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended tocorrect the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislativeintent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

xxxConsistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine andmeaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospectivelocal government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results. Thestrict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province thatconsists of several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also consist ofislands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from theminimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of theLGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. fellester.blogspot.com This would meanthat Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguousland area over one composed of islands and negate the greater imperative of development ofself-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to theconstituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies

of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.xxx What is more, the l and area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a localgovernment unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, takinginto account its average annual income of P

82,696,433.23 at the time fellester.blogspot.com ofits creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times morethan the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The deliveryof basic services to its constituents has been proven p ossible and sustainable. Rather thanlooking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as merefaitaccomplicircumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a province, theymust be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming aprovince.( Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011)

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/180050.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/180050.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/180050.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/180050.htm