Critically contrast the accounts of language acquisition

provided by Chomsky and Tomasello

Introduction

Learning a language is a cognizant process. New knowledge or language forms are represented in

the learner’s mind, in the form of rules and grammar and the process often involves error

rectification or error correction. Language learning involves formal instruction. Acquisition of

language, on the other hand, is a subconscious process of which the individual is not aware. One is

unaware of the process as it is happening and when the new knowledge is acquired, the acquirer

generally do not generally realize that he or she possesses any new knowledge. This is similar to the

process that children undergo when learning their native language. Acquisition requires meaningful

interaction in the target language, during which the acquirer is focused on meaning rather than form.

The concept of language acquisition refers to the method of natural assimilation, involving intuition

and subconscious learning, which is the product of genuine interactions between people where the

learner is a dynamic contributor. It is similar to the way children learn their native tongue, a

procedure that produces functional skills in the spoken language without theoretical knowledge.

This approach develops self confidence in the learner. Teaching and learning are viewed as activities

that happen in an individual psychological plane.

Language Acquisition Theory

Languages are complex, arbitrary, irregular phenomena, in constant random, full of uncertainties

and uncontrollable emotion. Even if some fractional knowledge about the execution of language is

accomplished it is not effortlessly transformed into communication skills. Parameters and

exclusions will make sense only if we have developed a concrete instinctive control of language in

its oral form when we have assimilated it.In language acquisition, however, the primary goal is

interaction between people, in which one functions as a catalyst and through which the other

(learner) selects his own route building his skill in a direction that interests him personally or

professionally. Instead of a syllabus, language acquisition provides human interaction. The

existence of the real representatives of the language and culture that one hopes to incorporate is

elemental. Language acquisition is more efficient than language learning for attaining functional

skill in a foreign language and the efficient teaching of a language isn’t that tied to a packaged

course of organized lessons. Efficient teaching is one that is personalized, based on the individual

skills of the facilitator in creating situations of genuine communication, focusing on the students’

interest and taking place in a bicultural atmosphere.

Language acquisition is the process by which the language capability develops in a human being.

First language (L1) acquisition concerns the development of language in children, while second

language (L2) acquisition focuses on language development in adults as well. Theorists such as

Skinner (1991) and Chomsky (1975) are often divided between emphasizing either nature or nurture

as the most explanatory factor for acquisition. One hotly debated issue is whether the biological

contribution includes capacities specific to language acquisition, often referred to as Universal

Grammar. For fifty years linguists Noam Chomsky (1975) and Eric Lenneberg (1964) have argued

for the hypothesis that children have innate language specific abilities that facilitate and constrain

language learning. “Man's language ability is due to a more general, deep-seated cognitive ability

characteristic of the species. ....” (Lenneberg,1964). Other researchers like Catherine Snow (1977),

Michael Tomasello (2005) have hypothesized that language learning results only from general

cognitive abilities and interaction between learners and their surrounding communities. Chomsky

(1975) originally put forward the idea that children have innate tendency for language acquisition.

He theorized that children were born with a language acquisition device (LAD) in their brains but

later developed the idea to that of Universal Grammar (UG), a set of flexible parameters and

inherent principles that are common to all human languages. According to Chomsky this UG allows

children to infer the structure of their native language from exposure to it.

Word Order

Learning word order is one of the major tasks during early language acquisition. Indeed, young

learners exhibit some knowledge of basic word order from their earliest multiword utterances

(Brown, 1973; Guasti, 2002). In the present paper, we investigate what cues and learning

mechanisms infants might use to acquire this structural property of their mother tongue.

There exist at least two main theoretical stances about how word order is acquired.

The constructivist (or lexicalist) view (Chang, Lieven, & Tomasello (); Tomasello, 2000) holds that

word order is learnt from frequently encountered examples in the input. According to this view,

young learners are sensitive to co-occurrence statistics in the language they hear, and their

early competence contains semi-abstract constructions derived from this statistical information. For

instance, from frequent occurrences of Can you see...?, Can you go...?, Can you eat...?, the infant

might construct the semi-general frame Can you X...?, where X is a placeholder for possible

substitutions, in this case, for certain verbs. Thus, this view claims that young learners have no

general and fully abstract representations of syntactic structure, including word order. Rather, their

knowledge is linked to specific lexical items or frames. This view, then, implies that learning word

order proceeds together with or after acquiring an initial lexicon, but not before.

The generativist view (Chomsky, 1995; Guasti, 2002), on the other hand, argues that language

acquisition relies on abstract prewired structural representations. Some of these hold universally true

for all languages (‘principles’) and thus need not be learned. Others (‘parameters’) specify choices

between possible structures, and languages vary as to which of the specified options they implement

(Rizzi, 1986). Language acquisition, then, amounts to setting the parameters to the value that

characterizes the target language, using overtly available cues in the input. For instance, the Head–

Complement parameter formalizes whether languages choose to place the Head of a syntactic

phrase first, and its Complement second; or the other way round. Japanese and Turkish, for instance,

are Complement–Head languages. This entails that they have Object–Verb (OV) order (1a),

postpositions (1b), complementizers that follow their subordinate clause (1c), just to mention a few

phrase types. Head–Complement languages, like English and Italian, on the other hand, have VO

order (2a), prepositions (2b), and complementizers that precede the subordinate clause (2c).

Transformational Grammar

The development of transformational grammaer can be traced by means of Chomsky’s

representative publications articulating the different grammatical models. Thus, Early

Transformational Grammar is associated with Syntactic Structures (1957), the Standard Theory with

Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965), Government and Binding Theory with Lectures on

Government and Binding (1981), Minimalism with The Minimalist Program (1995).A summary of

the theoretical machinery of Syntactic Structures can be described in this way: a set of phrase

structure rules generates a number of underlying phrase markers, which in turn provide the input for

a set of transformations (some obligatory and some optional) to apply to. These turn the phrase

markers into their pre&final shapes. The last step is carried out by morphophonemic rules, whose

function is to put some flesh on the structural skeleton. This account, of course, needs further

qualification. The rules of phrase structure expand the sentence into constituents. A transformation

“operates on a given string with a given constituent structure and converts it into a new string with a

new derived constituent structure” (Chomsky 1957:44).Furthermore, the order of application of

these transformations must be defined to allow later rules access to the output of earlier rules. The

insertion of the actual words is carried out by means of the phrase structure rules,while they are

transformed into utterances by the morphophonological rules of the model.

The model that came to be known as the Standard Theory was initiated by the publication of

Aspects of the Theory of Syntax in 1965. Generative grammar was defined as “a system of rules

that assigns structural descriptions to sentences” (Chomsky 1965:8). There are two essential

elements to the theory: deep structure —a modification of the concept of kernel sentences— and

surface structure —determining the phonetic interpretation of sentences. Surface structure (SS) is in

turn “determined by repeated application of (...) grammatical transformations to objects of a more

elementary sort” (Chomsky 1965:16). Chomsky summarizes the workings of his new model in this

way: “A grammar contains a syntactic component, a semantic component, and a phonological

component. The syntactic component consists of a base and a transformational component. The

base generates deep structures. A deep structure enters the semantic component and receives a

semantic interpretation; it is mapped by transformational rules into a surface structure” (1965:141).

In this model, it is claimed that “the deep structure of a sentence fully determines its meaning”

(Chomsky 1975:22), which implies that (i) sentences with the same meaning should share the

same deep structure, and that (ii) transformations do not change meaning. These claims were

collectively known as the Katz&Postal Hypothesis, which was eventually rejected when further

research showed that surface structure did play a role in the interpretation of sentences, and that

some transformations did change meaning, as the famous sentences show below.

(15) a. Everyone in Cormorant Island speaks two languages.

b. Two languages are spoken by everyone in Cormorant Island.

Chomsky's “Nativist” Paradigm

Chomsky states that the main task of linguistics is to explain how individuals bridge the gap –

Chomsky calls it a ‘chasm’ -- between what we ultimately know, and what we could have learned

from experience, even given optimistic assumptions about our cognitive abilities. Proponents of the

alternative 'nurture' approach accuse nativists like Chomsky of overestimating the complexity of

what children learn, underestimating the data they have to work with, and undue pessimism about

their abilities to extract information based on the input. Advocates of the experience-dependent

account highlight the availability of relevant cues in the input to children. These cues serve as the

basis for the generalizations that we form about language. These generalizations are formed using

general purpose learning mechanisms including distributional analysis, analogy, cut and paste

operations, and the like. The products of these learning algorithms are 'shallow' records which we

keep of their linguistic experience. These are piecemeal records of construction types (a.k.a.

templates/schemas/constructs) that encode linguistic patterns displayed by the input. Construction

types are concatenated sequences of category labels such as NP, V, neg, INF, P, etc., drawn from an

intuitively simple typology, and are learned solely from positive evidence (Pullum and Scholz 2002;

Goldberg 2003, 2006). When children’s, for example, generalizations extend beyond their

experience, the supposition is that this is just an instance of a completely general induction problem

that arises for all learning that involves projection beyond one’s experience (Cowie 1999).

According to Pullum and Scholz (2002), linguists need not suppose that children are innately

endowed with "specific contingent facts about natural languages." If the data available to children

are rich enough for them to determine the structures of human languages, given the right inferential

techniques, then appeals to innately specified principles are at best a useful crutch for theorists --

and at worst a source of erroneous claims about alleged 'gaps' between the facts concerning

particular human languages and the evidence available to children.

Tomasello's Experience Dependent Paradigm

According to the experience-dependent (a.k.a. usage-based) account, all human languages contain a

wide range of semi-idiosyncratic constructions that cannot be accounted for by universal, or innate

linguistic principles. On any account of language development, these 'peripheral' constructions must

admittedly be learned. According to the experience-dependent account, the same mechanisms that

children use to learn these constructions are also used to learn the core of phenomena of human

languages. The reasoning here is that the core phenomena of human languages are even more

regular, and occur more frequently than the idiosyncratic patterns. If so, then the core phenomena

should be even easier to learn (Goldberg 2006), with more frequently attested constructions being

mastered earlier than less frequently attested constructions according to Tomasello, 2003.

Tomasello (2003) also asserts that once children have mastered the core construction types, these

are merged into more and more complex patterns, until the language of the child approximates that

of an adult in the same linguistic community. On the experience-dependent approach, then, child

language is expected to match that of adults, more or less. Initially, child language will be a less

articulated version of the adult language, but children will gradually converge on the target

language.

On Tomasello's account, linguistic generalizations are based on information-structure, including

topic (matters of current interest), focus domain (what is newly asserted), and backgrounded

elements (e.g., presuppositions). The communicative function of a construction type is essential in

accounting for its distribution in a language. For example subjects are the default devices for

marking the topic of a clause. Once communicative function is taken into account, an explanation of

cross-linguistic generalizations follows. Such generalizations (recurrent patterns) are claimed to be

the by-product of general cognitive constraints, such as analogical processes, processing factors,

and discourse-pragmatic factors (Goldberg 2006). Nevertheless, the experience-dependent account

anticipates substantial variability among the constructions that appear in different human languages.

As noted, the experience-dependent account attempts to avoid the conclusions of nativists about the

innate specification of universal linguistic principles. On this account, children only (re)produce

linguistic expressions that they have experienced in the input, at least at the earliest stages of

language development. This proposal is called conservative learning If true, conservative learning

renders innate linguistic principles unnecessary for language learning. Language development

consists, instead, in developing constructions based on exposure to strings of words that learners

encounter in their experience. In his chapter on ‘‘acquiring linguistic constructions’’ Tomasello

(2006) puts social learning at the center: ‘‘the most fundamental process of language acquisition is

the ability to do things the way that other people do them’’ (p. 286). This suggests that learning to

talk with others is primarily a matter of conformity. Tomasello’s view provides an interesting

contrast to Chomsky’s (1965) claim that creativity (i.e., the ability to comprehend and produce

novel sentences) is at the heart of language. To explore this and related issues in linguistic studies, I

will use two unusual vantage points. The first is Gibson’s (1966,1979) ecological approach to

psychology; the second is the social psychology of Asch’s(1956) studies on disagreeing with a

unanimous majority. The view that emerges is that realizing values is central to language, and

neither creativity nor conformity, as usually understood, adequately captures the dynamics involved.

The constructivist (or lexicalist) view (Chang, Lieven, & Tomasello (in press); Tomasello,2000)

holds that word order is learnt from frequently encountered examples in the input.According to this

view, young learners are sensitive to co-occurrence statistics in the language they hear, and their

early competence contains semi-abstract constructions derived from this statistical information. For

instance, from frequent occurrences of Can you see...?, Can you go...?, Can you eat...?, the infant

might construct the semi-general frame Can you X...?, where X is a placeholder for possible

substitutions, in this case, for certain verbs. Thus, this view claims that young learners have no

general and fully abstract representations of syntactic structure, including word order. Rather, their

knowledge is linked to specific lexical items or frames. This view, then, implies that learning word

order proceeds together with or after acquiring an initial lexicon, but not before. The generativist

view (Chomsky, 1995; Guasti, 2002), on the other hand, argues that language acquisition relies on

abstract prewired structural representations. Some of these hold universally true for all languages

(‘principles’) and thus need not be learned. Others (‘parameters’) specify choices between possible

structures, and languages vary as to which of the specified options they implement (Rizzi, 1986).

Language acquisition, then, amounts to setting the parameters to the value that characterizes the

target language, using overtly available cues in the input. For instance, the Head–Complement

parameter formalizes whether languages choose to place the Head of a syntactic phrase first, and its

Complement second; or the other way round. Japanese and Turkish, for instance, are Complement–

Head languages. This entails that they have Object–Verb (OV) order (1a), postpositions (1b),

complementizers that follow their subordinate clause (1c), just to mention a few phrase types.

Head–Complement languages, like English and Italian, on the other hand, have VO order (2a),

prepositions (2b), and complementizers that precede the subordinate clause (2c).

Returning to the question raised about Tomasello’s (2006) claim about social learning being central

to language. The fundamental ecological task in acting and perceiving is to realize values. Social

solidarity with those who speak to us and listen to us in caring ways is a crucial dimension of why

and how we speak at all. As Hodges and Geyer’s reinterpretation of the Asch experiments reveals,

agreement with others may be less an act of conformity than it is an act of coordinating multiple

values and multiple relationships in creative ways. A values-realizing,

ecological approach suggests that neither rule-governed creativity nor social conformity

captures the heart of language. The phenomena often described in terms of conformity (Carr, this

issue) might better be conceptualized in terms of sharing. Tomasello et al. (2005) propose that what

di erentiates the social and linguistic interactions of humans and chimpanzees is sharing. Apes ff

perceive the intentionality of others, but provide no evidence of wanting to share intentions

with other apes or with humans. The phenomena often described in terms of conformity might

better be conceptualized in terms of sharing. Tomasello et al. (2005) propose that what

di erentiates the social and linguistic interactions of humans and chimpanzees is sharing. Apes ff

perceive the intentionality of others, but provide no evidence of wanting to share intentions with

other apes or with humans. it is interesting to note that Kanzi, perhaps the most accomplished

of the language-trained apes, ‘‘does not negotiate over meaning or support the other collaboratively

in the communication process’’ (Tomasello et al., 2005, p. 686), citing Greenfield and Savage-

Rumbaugh, 1991). They suggest that both apes and autistic children appear to lack ‘‘the motivation

or capacity to share things psychologically with others’’ (p. 687). From an ecological perspective,

the more basic issue may be that there is a lack of caring for the other and their well-being, which

entails some larger sense of values (i.e., what is good for the other). The creativity of conversation

is less about generating new syntactic combinations than jointly acting to create new possibilities

for action that are faithful to ‘‘old’’ responsibilities. Language is precocious and not just for

children. Adults and children are always trying to say what they cannot yet formulate properly.

Language is a means by which humans try to create the conditions that will make it possible for

them to act better than they are. Human narratives yearn for change, not just constancy. The

invitation quality of language, its power to encourage humans to share and to care, leads to the

hypothesis that language is a perceptual system in Gibson’s (1966) sense. Language is a

fundamental means of probing what I earlier called dialogical arrays. Language uses gestures that

are heard, seen, or felt by others (and the self) to explore the social environment as a means of

ascertaining its directions and intentions. Also language explores vicariously the varying

perspectives of others on the physical layout and its intentional possibilities (i.e., a ordances). ff

Language, as a perceptual system, helps us to explore (just as walking around and looking, or

poking, sni ng, and handling do) where we are and where best to go next. Why have we not ffi

thought of language as a mode of perception? One possible reason is that language appears to have

no has no dedicated sensory anatomy. However, a central reason for Gibson’s (1966) positing of

perceptual systems was to challenge the traditional assumption that perceiving was tied to specific

anatomical structures. A visual system may include legs. Similarly, a linguistic perceptual system

may make use of hands and eyes, as well as ears and vocal tracts, and not just those of one person.

Other reasons for not thinking of language as perceptual are that it is viewed as a conveyance

(Tomasello et al., 2005) and a code. The former claim assumes that meaning is predetermined and

equally available to all. The latter claim is that the meaning is secret and requires a special

interpretive framework beyond the code. However, from an ecological perspective, language is not

merely public, nor merely private. It makes o erings (i.e., a ordances) and those o erings can ff ff ff

become gifts (i.e., useful), but only if the recipient engages in the requisite and complementary

work entailed in dialogue.

Conclusion

Tomasello (2000) defends the conservative learning model of language acquisition, for verbs.

Essentially, young children’s productions of verb forms are limited to forms that they have

previously encountered in the input, at least for children younger than three. After 3, children start

to form more abstract adult-like linguistic categories. When children make 'errors', these are purged

from children's grammars by (direct or indirect) negative evidence (lack of understanding,

corrective feedback),entrenchment (being drowned out by the frequency of a different expression),

and preemption(e.g., adult recasts using an alternative expression). These usage-based mechanisms

assume the role played by innate constraints on the nativist account (Cowie 1999; but cf. Crain and

Pietroski 2001, 2002).Whereas the experience-based account of language acquisition speaks of 'core

phenomena', the nativist account speaks of core grammar. The nativist solution to Plato’s Problem

supposes that children are biologically fitted, as part of the human genome, with a universal

grammar (e.g., Chomsky 1965, 1975, 1986). The Universal Grammar account views language

acquisition as, at least in part, the by-product of a domain-specific computational mechanism.

Universal Grammar contains the core principles of language, i.e., principles that are manifested in

all human languages. In addition, Universal Grammar spells out particular ways in which human

languages can vary. These points of variation are called parameters. Taken together, the principles

and parameters of Universal Grammar establish the boundary conditions on what counts as a

possible human language. Children are seen to navigate within these boundaries in the course of

language development. The universal principles enable children to rapidly and effortlessly acquire

any human language without formal instruction and despite the considerable latitude in the

experiences of different children. As noted earlier, according to nativists, children's linguistic

knowledge is vastly underdetermined by their experience. Concrete instances of ways in which

children's linguistic knowledge is underdetermined by their experience are called poverty of

stimulus arguments. Based on a series of such arguments, nativists have concluded that children are

innately endowed with certain linguistic knowledge, namely the principles and parameters of

Universal Grammar.

Michael Tomasello's account of language development, and hence of human linguistic uniqueness,

differs strongly from the Chomksyan version that is currently dominant in the field of linguistics.

Tomasello claims that human language is not due to a genetic endowment unique to the species

Homo sapiens, but rather, that humans have certain non-language-specific cognitive and

interpersonal capacities that lead them to become full participants in the social use of language. In

his current theory, individuals of any species would require the general capacities of intention-

reading, relevance assumptions, role reversal imitation, and pattern-finding in order to develop a

language. Because these capacities are not conceived of as specifically and autonomously linguistic

– but rather as social and cognitive in nature – their presence or absence in prelinguistic human

infants and nonhuman apes can be tested for using the experimental methods of developmental

psychology and cognitive science. Based on such tests, Tomasello has concluded that whereas

human children possess all of the capacities that he deems necessary for language acquisition, there

is limited or negative evidence for chimpanzees' capacities to act helpfully, assume helpfulness in

others, form joint goals, and construct and conform to group expectations. This thesis raises a

degree of skepticism towards Tomasello's claims, citing the growing body of evidence against his

specific research findings involving both apes and humans. It further suggests that his overall

account of the necessary capacities for language development is both unverified and unverifiable,

and that therefore the issue of human linguistic uniqueness is still an open question.

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