Landmines: Legacy of conflict - A manual for development workers

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Landmines:

Legacy of Conflict

A MA NU AL FOR DEVELOPMENT W ORK ERS

Rae McGrath

Oxfam

UK and Ireland



© Oxfam 1994

A catalogue record for this book is available from the

British Library

ISBN 085598 264 0

Published by Oxfam, 274 Banbury Road, Oxford, 0X2 7DZD e s i g n e d and T y p e s e t by O x f a m D e s i g n D e p a r t m e n t

OX739/PK/94

Printed by Oxfam Print Unit on environment friendly paper

Oxfam is a registered charity No. 202918

Set in lOpt Melior and Franklin Gothic

This book converted to digital file in 2010



Dedication

This book is dedicated to the memory of Vincent Toiletwho worked selflessly for the victims of mines in NorthIraq and gained the respect and trust of his patients, theKurdish people, and his colleagues. Vincent wasmurdered in Iraq on 22 March 1993.



/ / the poor were being maimed and killed in suchnumbers by any other means — by disease, floods or

earthquake — it would be possible to raise relief fundsand organise international action to halt the carnage.The truth is that few understand the scale of theproblem: the human suffering, rural econom ic decline,and environmental devastation caused by landmines.This is not just a heartless lack of response it is alsofoolish negligence because the eventual cost to us allwill be far greater than the cost of eradicating the

mines:

An ass was travelling with a coarse

And unobliging horse,The latter carrying no weight at allBut his harness, while the poor ass was weighed downSo cruelly he staggered on the road.

He begged the horse to shoulder part of his load.

"My request is not unreasonable," he saidFor you half of my load would be child's play."The horse retorted "Nay!"....

After the donkey dropped deadThe horse saw his error; for in the endHe was made to pull a cartWith the same load plus the carcass of his friend.

Jean de la Fontaine

from a translation by James M ichie



Contents

Foreword viiPreface ix

1 An introduction to the landmines issue 1

2 The impact of mines on the community 30

3 Vulnerability and avoidance 38

4 When the worst happens:

minefield procedures 52

5 Action in the community 59

6 Solutions: local and global 65

Endnotes 72

Appendix 1 Mines: The explosive chain 75

Appendix 2

Mine-protection on project vehicles 77

Appendix 3 Statements on landmines by

hum anitarian organisations 78Appendix 4 Mines Advisory Group 81

Index 82





Foreword

Landmines have a significant impact on the work ofnon-governmental organisations (NGOs) in. many coun-tries throughout the world. They make relief and devel-opment activities difficult and hazardous, affecting

functions as diverse as emergency aid shipments, repa-triation of refugees, and longer-term economic recovery.The impetus behind this book is grounded in Oxfam'soverseas work, much of which is in areas affected orrecently affected by conflict. In recent years, Oxfamstaff have witnessed the suffering caused by mines inCambodia, Afghanistan, Iraqi Kurdistan, Somalia,Somaliland/north-west Somalia, Mozambique and

Angola. In Mozambique, an Oxfam staff member, IlidioCandieiro, was killed in Zambezia Province in February1993 when the vehicle in which he was travelling deto-nated an anti-vehicle mine.

Landmines are now such a serious problem that, aswell as supporting programmes to assist mine victimsand to clear mines in different countries, Oxfam is col-

laborating in the publication of this book to help peopleliving and working in mine-affected areas to avoid theever-present danger posed by mines. Oxfam is publish-ing the book as a joint initiative with Mines AdvisoryGroup (MAG), a humanitarian mine-clearance charitywith experience of mine-clearance operations andmines-awareness education programmes in many differ-ent countries. The author of the book is the Director of

MAG. Reliable advice on mine-avoidance is scarce, andthis book is designed to fill that gap.

The book presents an overview of the problemscaused by landmines, describes the most common typesof mine and how they are deployed, and provides prac-tical guidance and advice to fieldworkers; in particular,how to recognise and avoid hazardous areas.Information of this kind is essential for the safety of



viii • Landmines

anyone living and working in areas affected by land-

mines, and Oxfam is publishing this book in the hope ofsaving lives.There are six chapters: Chapter 1 introduces different

types of landmines, explains how they work, and showshow to recognise them. It illustrates how mines are usedin warfare, and the effect that a mine blast will have onthe human body. Chapter 2 examines the impact ofmines on the community. Chapter 3 looks at groups

within the community who are especially vulnerable tolandmine injuries, and goes on to give advice on howbest to avoid high risk areas. Chapter 4 tells readerswhat to do if the worst happens and they find them-selves in a minefield. Chapter 5 emphasises the impor-tance of education and good quality information anddata about landmines, and suggests ways in which aidworkers can contribute in these areas. Chapter 6 looksbriefly at local and global solutions to the problem oflandmine proliferation.

Whether used as a practical manual or a trainingresource, it is hoped that the issues raised and theguidelines presented will be of interest and value to awide range of people living and working in countriesaffected by the scourge of landm ines.

Oxfam Public Policy Department, March 1994



Preface

There is a frightening and illogical tendency amongexpatr ia te a id representa t ives working withcommunities in a mined environment to assume theirown indestructibility, often, at the same time, voicingconcern for the threat to the indigenous population. Itshould be superfluous to point out that no-one is

immune from the sudden and shocking horror ofa

mineexplosion: the only protection lies in understanding thethreat and adjusting your life accordingly. But there areno guarantees of safety, except, of course, that theforeign worker may select the final option and leave thecountry. For the indigenous community the choice isstarker: live with the mines or abandon your land; andoften not even that level of choice exists.

This book does not set out to make the reader anexpert, but to provide an understanding of the problemsof living and working in mine-affected countries, and ofthe realistic precautions which should be taken. Moreimportantly it seeks to advise the reader on how thecommunity can be assisted and what steps can be takento ensure the eventual eradication of the mines.



x • L a n d m in e s

Kompong Speu Hospital, Cambodia, November 1990. Sah Ban is

20 years old. He was wounded by a mine when he was working ina rice field in Tapong dis trict. With him is Dr Helsinky.



CHAPTER ONE

An introduction to the

landmines issue

In 1943 Christopher Buckley, the British war corre-spondent, was possibly the first person to express aspecial concern about landmines as a weapon. He wasworried '...because human qualities were not directlyinvolved'. That, he said, was the danger of mines

'...buried and invisible'.

1

Buckley might have becomethe first lobbyist against mines had he not, ironically,been killed by a mine in August 1950 while reportingon the Korean War.

Buckley identified the key properties of landmineswhich make them different from other weapons: theirpersistent and uncontrolled nature. Mines, once laid,are intrinsically different from all other weapons of war

because they cannot be recalled by the military when aceasefire is declared. Each mine must be disarmed,destroyed, or claim a victim. The Mines AdvisoryGroup lists thirty-three countries

2where landmines

constitute a major problem for the civilian population;the situation in five of those countries — Afghanistan,Angola, Cambodia, Iraq, Laos — must be categorised asan emergency on the basis of the scale of existing

casualties. There are also many countries in mainlandEurope, not included in this l is t , which have acontinuing problem with landmines laid during the firstand second world wars.

Two examples will serve to illustrate the sustain-ability of mines: Russia mounts annual mine-eradicationprogrammes during the spring and summer to clear

devices left from battles following the German invasion



2 • Landmines

during World War II; and in Laos farmers and their

families are still being killed and maimed by mineswhich were dropped from US aeroplanes more than 20years ago.

The victims of mines are predominantly members ofsubsistence rural communities, refugees or internallydisplaced people and nomadic groups. By definition, inthe post-combat period, 100 per cent of victims arecivilians — a fact often overlooked by apologists for

military mine-dissemination strategies. The deaths andinjuries caused to innocent people, and the denial ofground for agricultural and other civilian purposes as aresult of the presence of mines, makes it inevitable thatthe aid community must face up to the issue. Despitethe original military purposes of landmines, they nowrepresent a major block to development objectives, and

it is vital that aid workers in the field, Northern fundingdevelopment agencies, and al l those with aresponsibility for refugees have a comprehensiveunderstanding of the problem of mines.

History and development of the landmine

The first landmines were developed as a response to the

battle tank during World War I. These early mines werelarge and clumsy devices which could easily beremoved by opposing forces and redeployed against theminelayers ' own tanks. This weakness led to thedevelopment of the first anti-personnel mines, designedto prevent enemy soldiers from removing anti-tankmines. Some of these devices were primitive pressuredesigns while others, forerunners of the modern

bounding-mine, were comparatively sophisticated.Between 1918 and 1939 development of the mine

became a priority, and it was during this period that theanti-personnel mine began to gain acceptance amongmilitary strategists as a weapon in its own right. DuringWorld War II, as Christopher Buckley noted, mineswere widely deployed by all forces — in Poland and

Russia literally millions of devices were laid. During the



An introduction to the landmines issue • 3

Korean conflict the use of mines as a weapon to deny

large tracts of ground to the enemy and to channel anattacking force became accepted strategies. However,throughout this period, the deployment of minesremained largely controlled, targeted at soldiers, andlinked to specific military objectives — it was duringthe early 1960s that random dissemination of minesbegan.

The United States, initially in operations against the

Pathet Lao and later in vain attempts to close the HoChi Minh Trail, began air-dropping mines and sub-munitions

3on Laos as part of a nine-year bombing

campaign reported to have cost an average of twomillion dollars per day. Despite the scale of thisoperation, as with the campaign against Cambodia, theUnited States never formally declared war on Laos.Initially it was run as a covert CIA-controlled operation

employing the civilian airline, Air America. Aircrewsreferred to the mines as 'garbage', from the scale ofdeployment and random targeting. The long-termimpact of the US campaign can be judged by reportsfrom a single hospital in Xiang Khuoang Province that988 mine and sub-munitions casualties have beentreated since 1973.

4 The repatriation of H'mong refugeesto Xiang Khuoang Province is severely obstructed and,recently, one major donor has suspended a plannedrepatriation-linked project until the mine problem isaddressed. But Laos is just the first chapter of a humantragedy and ecological horror story.

Cambodia saw the first large-scale, random use of anti-personnel mines by opposing factions in a civil war, andVietnam was the setting for the first deployment of the

'butterfly' type of mine by US forces. The USDragontooth anti-personnel mine was designed to be air-dropped randomly over wide areas and was theforerunner of the USSR-manufactured PFM-1 'butterfly'mine. Both devices employ a 'wing' to assist in dispersal.Thus , by 1979 when the Soviet forces invadedAfghanistan, remote deliverance and random targeting ofmines were generally accepted, if not admitted, military



4 • Landmines

strategies. Neither was Asia the only continent affected

— mines were being widely disseminated in conflicts inAfrica and Central America. The seeds were being sownfor a long-term harvest of injuries and deaths.

It was in Afghanistan that the nature and scale of theproblem of mines was first recognised by aid agencies,and where the first large-scale eradication initiative wasmounted. But, even as the United Nations and otherhumanitarian agencies were attempting to find a

solution in Afghanistan, weapons designers wereworking on new mine systems based on the remote-delivery concept which had proved to be so hideously'successful' in Afghanistan.

Landmines: some definitions

There are legal, technical and military definitionsrelating to mines and similar weapons. The purpose ofthis section is to define those weapons which areclearly mines, or have the same impact on non-combatants, the infrastructure, the environment andhumanitarian assistance programmes as do mines.

Anti-tank mines

These are mines, normally large in size and containingseveral kilograms of high explosive, which are designedto disable battle-tanks and other armoured militaryvehicles. They are most commonly buried severalinches below the road surface and activated by directpressure from the tank, which is transmitted through astriker assembly to a detonator which initiates the mainexplosive charge (see Appendix One). They may be of

metallic or plastic construction. The latter type, despitetheir large size, in some cases contain so little metal asto be detectable only by the most sensitive detectionequipment. Although usually hand-emplaced, someanti-tank mines are designed for remote deploymentfrom aircraft or by other means, such as artillery, mortaror rocket. Most recent and current developments focus

on remote surface dissemination.




Anti-vehicle mines

These devices are unlikely to have a separate militarycategory. They are either small anti-tank mines or largeanti-personnel mines, which may present a threat tocivilian traffic because they require less pressure toinitiate an explosion than does an anti-tank mine, andcontain a greater explosive charge than is commonlyassociated with anti-personnel mines.

Anti-personnel m inesFor practical purposes, this category of mine should beconsidered as including any device which conforms toone or more of the following descriptions:• A device designed to kill or injure persons who come

into contact with it through a purpose-designedfeature e.g. a direct pressure switch or a trip-wire.

• A device or piece of ordnance which , although its

primary purpose or design may not be to kill orinjure persons who contact or disturb the device, canbe deployed in such a manner as to achieve thateffect . Many sub-munit ions, commonly called'bomblets', become de facto anti-personnel mineswhen deployed in such a manner that they do notexplode on impact. This may be achieved bydeployment, either deliberately or otherwise, whichdoes not allow the arming cycle to be completed. Thegreat majority of devices encountered in Laos fallinto this category of anti-personnel mine.

• Any device, including an anti-tank mine, which isfitted with an anti-handling or anti-disturbancemechanism which is designed to kill or injurepersons.

• A device which, although not an anti-personnel mineitself, responds to the proximity, movement oractions of persons by activating mines or otherexplosive mechanisms in such a way as to kill orinjure them. The Soviet-manufactured VP-12 and VP-13 seismic mine-firing devices fall into this category.These definit ions may seem unduly legalist ic;

however, in the future it will become increasingly



L a n d m i n e s

BLU 63 (above) and BLU 24B (below). These US-manufactured

anti-personnel fragmentation mines are classified by manufactur-

ers and the military as sub-m unitions. They are air-delivered and,

regardless of their official designation, have the same random

and damaging impact on civilians as other anti-personnel mines.

The BLU24B was used widely in Laos and still claims victims

after more than 25 years. The BLU 63 was widely used in the

Gulf War by Coalition forces.




important for field staff of aid and development

agencies to be able to speak with authority about suchmatters . I t is , therefore, important that readersunderstand these definition of the various types ofmine, which are expressed in terms of their impact on acommunity, as opposed to the official definition formanufacturing, military or political purposes.

Booby-traps or improvised explosive devices (lEDs)

Devices or switches added to existing ordnance ormines which make them victim-activated rather thanimpact-activated, or victim-activated in a differentmanner from the original design. For instance, it hasbeen common practice in some theatres of war to buryanti-tank mines in conjunction with anti-personnelmines, thus effectively reducing the initiation pressureof an anti-tank mine to that of an anti-personnel mine.

The definition can be extended to any explosivematerial and switch employed in such a manner as tomake it victim-activated.

Having defined the various categories of mine it isnow necessary to examine the different types of devicesthat might be encountered within these categories.

Some mines may meet more than one set of criteria.

Landmines: characteristics

Mines may be typified by their mode of operation, theway they are activated, the dissemination method used,or a combination of these.

Mode of operationBlast: Where the blast effect

5of the explosive content of

the mine is the prime cause of the injuries sustainedby the victim.

Fragmentation: Where the mine contains a packing offragments, usually metallic, or a segmented outercasing which breaks up into fragments on explosion,which, when dispersed by the explosive force of the



8 • Landmines

mine, are the prime cause of injuries sustained by thevictim.

The M18A1 'Claymore' anti-personnel mine is a directional

device originally designed for ambush and defence . The glass-

fibre shell contains a pad of plastic explosive impregnated with

700 steel ball-bearings. When activated the ball fragmentation is

projected in a 60 degree arc to a height of two metres and an

effective range of 50 me tres. The M 18A1 can be fired remotely

by electric firing device or by tripwire . In Angola th is weapon and

identical copies have been deployed randomly using tripwires.

The mine measures 2 16m m x 35m m x 83mm high.

Bounding: A m ine, usua lly of the anti-perso nne lfragmentation type, which employs a primary chargedesigned to lift the mine to a pre-determined height(normally 1 — 1.5 metres) before the main charge isinitiated. Most bounding mines are activated by atripwire.

Type of activation mechanism

Pressure: A mine which is activated by direct pressurefrom above. Most anti-tank and many anti-personnelmines are of this type.

Tripwire: Mines employing this method of activationusually have a protruding switch from which atripwire or filament extends to a fixed object or, in




some cases, another mine. When the necessarypressure is applied, in any direction, to the tripwire apin is pulled out of the switch, releasing a strikerwhich is spring-propelled into a detonator initiatingthe explosive cycle. Some mines may have more thanone tripwire.

Pressure-release: A comparatively rare type ofactivation where a mechanism under pressure mustbe released to activate the mine.

Dissemination method

Hand-emplaced: Most mines can be hand-emplaced, inwhich case they are usually buried or camouflaged.

Mechanical-emplacement: Anti- tank and anti-personnel m ines, normally elements of modern minesystems, may be buried by special ly designedmachinery.

Remote-deployment: Most modern anti-personnel mines,and some anti-tank mines, are designed to bedelivered to their target area by remote means. Thismay be by aircraft or helicopter, artillery, mortar,rocket, or ground-based delivery system (such as theUK-manufactured Ranger system). The range of thesystem has a direct relationship to the ability of thedeployment force to maintain reasonably accurate

records. By definition, mines disseminated in thismanner are surface emplaced but may be camouflagedand extremely difficult to detect.

Scatterable: These mines are disseminated by remotemeans but are designed in such a way as to ensure aneffective dispersal pattern over a wide ground area.The Soviet PFM-1 'butterfly' is an example of this

type of device.Protection mechanisms

Another characteristic of modern mines, which makesthem even more dangerous, is the fact that many of themare equipped with protective mechanisms, which aredesigned to kill or injure personnel involved in mine-clearance operations. These range from sophisticated in-



10 • Landmines

built mechanisms to crude improvisations. The most

common of these protection mechanisms are:Tilt: a subsidiary firing mechanism which causes themine to explode when tilted to a pre-determinedangle. For example, the Chinese-manufactured 72Banti-personnel mine, described below, employselectronic circuitry which initiates detonation whenthe mine passes through 10 degrees from itsemplaced position.

Magnetic proximity: An inbuilt device designed tocounter mine-clearance operations. The magneticfield of a mine detector is sensed and, bypassing thenormal initiation cycle, causes the mine or anattached charge to explode.

Voltage drop: A method u sed to protect electronicdevices whereby the primary or subsidiary explosive

charge is activated when wires are cut or batteriesdisconnected.Light sensitivity: This anti-lift device normally takes the

form of a light sensitive cell in the base of an anti-tank mine which initiates the firing cycle when themine is removed from the ground — a process whichallows light to enter the cell.

Pressure-release mechanism: Normally a comparatively

crude arrangement where the weight of the mine isused to maintain pressure on the arming lever of agrenade from which the safety pin has been removed.Lifting the mine releases the lever and causes thegrenade to explode. There are many variations onthis kind of booby-trap, which are no less effectivebecause of their improvised nature.

Some common types of landmine

It is virtually impossible to compile a comprehensive listof mines especially when new mines are being developedand some mines, as yet unused, remain on the secret listof the design country. Mines Advisory Group recordsdescribe more than 300 landmines and switches, and thislist is not thought to be comprehensive. However, certain




devices are common to many of the countries where

mines represent a threat to non-combatants and anobstacle to emergency aid and development programmes.The following pages list and illustrate some of thesemines, beginning with those most widely deployed.

PMN blast anti-personnel mine

The PMN has probably killed and maimed more

civilians than any other mine. Originally manufacturedin the former Soviet Union,6

the mine has also beenproduced by Iraq and possibly by other countries. ThePMN is pressure-act ivated, hand-emplaced, andnormally buried, and is deployed in large numbers inAfghanistan, Cambodia, Northern Iraq/Kurdistan, Iran,Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, and many othercountries. The mine has a diameter of 112mm and is

56mm high.

PMN blast m ine.



12 • Landmines

Valmara 69 (VS69) anti-personnel bounding mine

Manufactured by Valsella of Brescia, Italy, and undercontract in several other states, the VS69 is a tripwire-operated bounding f ragmentat ion mine deployed inmany countries, especially Iraq, Iran, and Kuwait. Thedistinctive design with five fuse prongs protruding froma spherical dome makes this mine instantly recognisable.The centre prong has a hole through which is passed one

end of the tripwire, the other end being anchored to avertical stake or natural feature. Sometimes two or moreValmara 69s are interconnected by common tripwires. Asideways movement of the centre prong in excess of3mm initiates an explosion. In addition, the mine can bedetonated by direct downward pressure on the fuseprongs, normally caused by the victim standing on themine. Fragmentation material, normally in the form ofseveral hundred 6mm ballbearings or 4mm steel cubes,packed in the main body of the mine, is blasted over alethal range of 30 metres by a 420gm main charge afterthe inner mine casing has been projected upwards on a0.5 metre tether wire. The VS69 is normally buried,leaving only the fuse prongs visible, but may also beplaced on the surface (as is often the case in Iraq). The

diameter of the outer case is approximately 250mm.

Valmara 69 (VS69) bounding mine.




PMN-2 anti-personnel blast mine

The PMN-2 was designed as a successor to the PMN inthe Soviet armouries, and has been widely supplied towarring factions involved in the same theatres of combatas listed for the PMN. When visible, the mine is easilyrecognisable by the raised cruciform shape of thepressure plate situated on the top of a circular casingsimilar in size to the PMN. The PMN-2 is considerably

more complex than itspredecessor. It incorpor-ates a bellows system toovercome destruction byfuel-air explosives andsimilar military clearancemethods. The PMN-2,unlike the PMN, can only

be made safe using aspecial tool and at aconsiderable risk to the de-miner. The device isnormally destroyed in situ.It requires only 6kg ofpressure to initiate the

PMN 2 blast mine.

PMN-2.

POMZ-type fragmentation anti-personnel mines

These mines first came into use during the 1930s andusually consist of a segmented cast body containing abursting charge, with a fuse igniter and detonator mount-ed on the top from which a tripwire extends. The whole

assembly is mounted on a thick wooden stake which isdriven into the ground. The most commonly-encounteredversions of these devices are the Soviet POMZ-2 andP0MZ-2M. Similar mines originate from Czechoslovakia,Yugoslavia, China, Egypt, and Korea. The effective rangeof this group of mines is 25 to 30 metres. They will prob-ably be found in one form or another in every countrywhere mines are a problem. A particular haza rd is caused



14 • Landmines

when mounting stakes are removed for f irewood or

become rotten. The body of the min e may then be buried,still live, and the tripwire become entangled in under-growth. The mine may then claim victims even amongcommunities who normally recognise and avoid stakemines. The Vietnamese B40 'ball mine', developed fromUS sub-munit ions dropped during the Vietnam war,which is common in Cambodia, is normally mounted ona metal stake. The body of the mine consists of a smooth

or vertically-segmented sphere.

POMZ-type fragm entation mine w ith tripwire .

VS-50 and TS-50 scatterable anti-personnel mines

These two p las t ic -bodied pressure mines a re smal l(90mm diameter x 45mm height) and virtually identical

in design and operation, although made by differentcompanies in I ta ly . The VS-50 is manufactured byValsella Meccanotecnica SpA of Brescia, the TS-50 ismade by Tecnovar Italiana SpA of Bari. Both mines havealso been produc ed by Chartered Industries of Singapore.A version of the TS-50 has also been produced in Egypt.Normally surface-laid, they can be scattered from aircraft,helicopters or by vehicle-mounted delivery systems.




VS-50 minimum metal plastic-cased scatterable mine.

SB-33 scatterable anti-personnel mine

This mine is irregular in shape and has a mottled

surface, which makes visual detection extremelydifficult. It can be buried or surface-laid, and isdesigned to be scattered from helicopters or ground-dispersal systems. It will operate when upside-down,and is waterproof. It weighs only 140gm and measures88mm x 32mm. The SB-33 is very common in NorthIraq/Kurdistan. Produced by BPD Difesa e Spazio srl ofRome, it is also made under licence in Spain, Greece,and Portugal.

SB-33 scatterable mine.



16 • Landmines

M16A1 and M16A2 bounding anti-personnelmines

Designed and manufactured in the USA, these minesare activated either by direct pressure or a tripwire, andbound to a height of one metre before the main burstingcharge detonates and the steel body of the inner casingshatters and forms the fragmentation which kills orinjures. These mines have been found in Afghanistan,

Angola, Cambodia, Iraq, Nicaragua, and many othercountries. M16 series mines are also produced inGreece, India, and South Korea.

M 16A1 (left) andM16A2 (right) bounding mine.

M14 blast anti-personnel mineThe M14 measures only 56mm (diameter) x 40mm(height), and is activated by direct pressure. The M14 isnormally buried. Because it is so small, it is extremelydifficult to identify visually. It is produced in India, anda copy has been made by Vietnam (MD82B). Otherversions are known to exist.




M14 blast mines.

OZM-series bounding anti-personnel minesThe OZM.OZM-3, OZM-4 and OZM-72 are Sovietmanufactured mines, and are similar in principle to theM16 series of US bounding mines. They have beenwidely used in conflicts throughout the world.

(0

I

Soviet-manufactured OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mine.



18 • Landmines

PMD box mines

Originally manufactured bythe Soviet Union, thesewooden blast mines aresimple in design, pressureoperated, and have beenwidely copied. They havebeen manufactured in large

numbers by China, Vietnam,and North Korea, and areoften locally manufacturedduring conflicts. Israel pro-duces the No.4 Mine, aplastic-cased copy of thePMD, which is used widelyin Southern Africa and Iraq.

PMD box mine.

PF M-1 scatterable anti-personnel mine

This is the notorious 'butterfly' mine, a plastic Sovietdevice which can be deployed by helicopter and mortar

fire. It is probable that hundreds of thousands of thesemines were scattered over rural areas of Afghanistan.Their irregular shape and colour (sand or green) makevisual detection difficult. The design of the PFM-1 isdictated by the need for each device to glide to optimisedispersal after release, and not, as has sometimes beenclaimed, to make the device attractive to children. Themine contains a liquid explosive charge and is activated

by pressure, which may be applied cumulatively. Thisfeature makes the mine particularly dangerous whenhandled, because the first person to touch it may onlyapply light pressure, insufficient to activate the device.But the next time it is handled, much less pressurewould be required to cause it to explode.




PFM1 plastic scatterable mine; the notorious 'butterfly' mine.

72A and 72B plastic anti-personnel mines

The Chinese 72A and 72B mines, widely deployed inCambodia, are externally identical although theypossess quite different propert ies. The onlydistinguishing characteristic is the different shape of thearming pin ring fitted to each version of the mine,which is disposed of at the time of deployment. The72A is virtually undetectable when buried, except withthe most sensitive detection equipment, otherwise it isan orthodox pressure-activated blast mine. The 72B,although easy to detect due to a metallic printedelectronic circuit, incorporates an anti-handling devicewhich activates the mine when it is tilted through ten

degrees. This mine can also, of course, be initiatednormally by direct pressure.

The mines described in detail above are just a sampleof the most commonly-used devices which exact a dailytoll in poor rural communities throughout thedeveloping world.



20 • Landmines

72A and 72B plastic blast mines.

The deployment of mines in armed conflict

Most military experts would argue that mines haveseveral clearly defined and justifiable roles in combat.

They are:• to protect military bases and key installations;• to channel or divert enemy forces;• to deny routes and key positions to the enemy;• to slow down enemy movement.

If mines are used for these specific purposes in acontrolled way, it should be possible for them to bemapped, recorded, and for minefields to be clearly

marked, by a responsible command structure. (It could,in fact, be argued that the objectives might all beachieved merely by marking an area as mined withoutactually laying any mines.) After hostilities have ceased,it should then be possible for mines to be cleared. Ifmines were only used according to these str ictguidel ines , there would be vir tual ly no civi l iancasualties. But the facts are clear: in more than 30




countries, the apparently random dissemination of

mines over large tracts of land constitute a majoremergency for the civilian population. What is thereason for this contradiction? What strategies have ledto the present crisis?

Military strategy demands more of the mine as aweapon in the modern theatre of war than indicated bythe four uses quoted above. To understand fully thetactics employed, and the reasoning which supports

those tactics, it is necessary to divide military usage oflandmines into two sub-categories of deployment:• use of mines in the conventional war scenario;• use of mines as part of insurgency and counter-insurgency campaigns.

This terminology has no bearing on the type, scale, orscope of any given conflict; rather, it relates to the wayin which the enemy force is perceived. For instance, the

second Gulf War would fall into the first category, aswould the Falklands (Malvinas) conflict, while theVietnam war and the Soviet/Afghan war fall within thesecond definition.

Mines in the conventional war scenario

The enemy force is perceived as an organised army

with rank structure, uniforms etc. This demands(according to the strategists) two additional tactical usesof mines:• 'Deep strike' deployment of mines into the enemy

rear areas targeting key junctions on main supplyroutes, supply dumps, loading areas, workshops, andheadquarters elements — essentially an assault onthe enemy's logistic and command infrastructure.

• 'Cut-off deployment of mines behind a retreating, orin front of an advancing, enemy force.Both these strategies involve the remote dissemination

of scatterable mines by fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters,artillery, rocket or mortar. There are no reliable methodsof accurately recording, mapping, or, immediately orsubsequently, marking such concentrations of mines. It isfor this reason that some military strategists believe that



22 • Landmines

the broad deployment of mines is not an acceptable

military strategy. Speaking at an ADPA Symposium on 9September 1993, former Marine Corps CommandantGeneral Alfred Gray, Jr, said:

We kill more Americans with our mines than we doanybody else. We never killed many enemy withmines... What the hell is the use of sowing all this[airborne scatterable mines] if you're going to move

through it next week or next month?... I know of nosituation in the Korean War, nor in the five years Iserved in Southeast Asia, nor in Panama, nor inDesert Shield/Desert Storm where our use of minewarfare truly channelised the enemy and broughtthem into a destructive pattern... In the broadersense, I'm not aware of any operational advantagefrom broad deployment of mines... I'm notdowngrading the need for the best [technology] inmine warfare, all I'm saying is we have manyexamples of our young warriors trapped by their ownminefields or by the [old] French minefields [inSoutheast Asia] we had examples even in DesertStorm.

7

Mines as part of insurgency and counter-insurgencycampaigns

The terms 'insurgent', 'guerilla', and 'terrorist' havebeen used by conventional military forces to describean enemy force which does not conform to acceptedmilitary norms. Often this simply means that the enemyforce have fewer resources (although possibly greaterpopular support) than the 'real' armies in the conflict. It

may also, as in the case of the US campaigns againstLaos and Cambodia, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,and the Iraqi anfal against the Kurds, be seen as a moreacceptable way to describe the opposition where war isbeing waged against an indigenous population.

It is this kind of war which has resulted in the mostinhuman and persistent use of mines, in the followingways:




• random and widespread mining of agricultural and

community land;• deliberate use of mines as anti-morale and terrorisingweapons aimed specif ical ly at the civil ianpopulation;

• mining of villages, water sources, religious shrines,graveyards, etc.The military forces involved use the fact that the

enemy are 'hiding in the community' to justify these

actions and, for that reason, do not feel restricted toattacking defined military targets since, working undersuch convenient operational definitions, virtuallyeverywhere becomes a justifiable target. The devastatingimpact of such tactical doublethink was well illustratedby the use of mines against the Mujahadeen by theSoviet and Afghan government armies. In some areasvirtually all mountain grazing land was remotely mined

and the whole agricultural infrastructure brought to ahalt by the large-scale mining of fields and irrigationsystems.

It is apparent that the mining of agricultural land inorder to restrict the supply of food to an enemy force(and also, by design or otherwise, the civilianpopulation at large) is generally regarded by military

strategists and field commanders engaged in suchconflicts as a 'normal' strategy. In addition, it is clearthat the use of mines as weapons of terror againstcivil ian populations is increasingly seen as anacceptable military tactic by both official and unofficialarmed forces. It may not be surprising that the Iraqigovernment have used this strategy against the Kurds inthe north of the country and the Shias in the south, or

that the Siad Bari regime used similar tactics inSomaliland/northern Somalia — such behaviour can beexpected from dictatorships. But it may be moresurprising that both British and Chinese training ofKhmer factions opposed to the Vietnamese-backedgovernment in Phnom Penh stressed the use of minesand booby-traps as anti-morale weapons targetedagainst the civilian infrastructure.



24 • Landmines

In the context of modern warfare mines cannot be

said to be 'targeted at the military' using any reasonabledefinition of the words, since the very design of thegreat proportion of mines, and the chosen methods ofdissemination, are such that civilian casualties andlong-term infestation of the land are inevitable ratherthan coincidental.

A soldier's viewpointOrdinary soldiers see war in a very different way fromthat of senior staff officers and strategists. It is obviousthat the soldier's use of mines, whether or not officiallysan ctione d, are relevant. A W estern infantrym an,recently interviewed, told a human rights researcher:

Once the fighting starts mines are part of my

personal insurance policy. They watch my backwhen I'm exposed, they take the bite out of asurprise attack on my position and they let me sleepat night. The only problem is that the other sidehave them too — down at our level everyone needsinsurance!

8

It was the same thinking which contributed to thescale of the mines problem in Iraq's northern border

areas with Iran. Soldiers from both sides, Iran and Iraq,built barriers of mines against the enemy: there arelocations where each side occupied high groundoverlooking narrow valleys and, each time an attack byone side was feared, the opposing forces literallypoured anti-personnel mines into no-man's-land. Themines still lie so densely that only a small percentage ofthe underlying ground surface is visible.

Afghan Mujahadeen learned mine warfare in thefield. Faced with a surfeit of anti-tank mines and veryfew anti-personnel mines, they soon began adaptingtheir anti-tank mines into very big anti-personneldevices. In Cambodia fighters used mines in such anindiscriminate manner that i t was not unusual todiscover that they were laying mines in an existingminefield.

9




The use of remotely delivered mines or sub-

munitions seems to distance soldiers from the reality oftheir activities and the potential effects of their actions.During the nine years that US aircrews bombed Laoscrew members referred to the BLU-series bomblets andmines they dropped as 'garbage'. There appears to havebeen no thought given to the potential and foreseeablelong-term impact of the operation, and some evidenceexists from MAG survey findings that Laos may have

been used as a conveniently secret testing ground forpreviously untried devices.

This distancing factor is also evident when onemilitary force trains another in the use of mines. A goodexample of this is the training provided by the UKSpecial Air Service to the Khmer NCR factions duringthe 1980's.

10The British Army has a reputation for

professionalism and what might be termed 'fair play';and yet no attempt was made to monitor the actualimpact of this training and, despite a clear linkagebetween training of insurgent factions and thedeployment of mines in Cambodia in such a way as tocause enormous numbers of civilian casualties, thetraining continued with the full endorsement of theMinistry of Defence and, presumably, of the soldiers

involved.

11

These examples have a relevance in evaluating themilitary arguments relating to the deployment of minesand call into question the degree of credibility of theofficial military position on this issue. More hopefully,there is considerable evidence that, when broughtphysically face to face with the actual effects of mineson civil ians, soldiers can be outspoken in their

condemnation of mines and may often undergo aremarkable change in perception. One common reactionamong ex-military engineers who become involved inhumanitarian mine-eradication operations is '...I had noidea about the consequences, I am glad I never laid aminefield myself...'

12



26 • Landmines

The effects of mines on the human body

There is a temptation to deal with this aspect solely as ahumanitarian issue which, as those who have witnessedthe impact of mines on the human frame would testify,it certainly is — but it is also a tech nica l issue , asdefined by the designers and manufacturers. Mines aremarketed like any other commodity and a part of thesales pitch is to emphasise the ability of a specific brand

of mine to cause serious injuries, rather than immediatedeath, for the following reasons:

• commitment of resources to evacuation of thecasualty;

• commitment of surgical and medical resources;• damage to morale of casualty's comrades.Of course, to achieve such aims the injuries must be of a

serious and preferably visually horrific nature.What happens in the seconds after a victim stands ona pressure mine? Most victims talk of calm, a period oftotal quiet and mental confusion, often mixed with agradually dawning realisation of a partly-severed limbor awareness of some seemingly unconnected detail —a nearby flower or sometimes another mine which thevictim notices in the vicinity. Real panic and fear only

begin when the casualty sees the reactions of family orfriends to his or her predicament. When children areinvolved the response can often be part icularlytraumatic; take the case of Sayed Mohammed, a 13-year-old Afghan:

...we were walking by the river when there was anexplosion. I was very confused and had fallendown. I stood up and then fell down again, I kept

trying to stand, there was smoke and dust and myfriend was crying and running. I couldn'tunderstand, I tried to stand up and startedshouting. My friend brought my father and he liftedme on to his back and took me to the village...I wasfrightened but the pain was not bad then. Later itwas bad. I did not know my leg had gone, I reallydid not know I had been badly hurt.

13




In terms of medical physics, what happens when a

victim stands on a mine is as follows: in the case of ablast device, the blast effect drives upwards deep intothe tissue of the leg, driving with it secondaryfragmentation — fragments of the mine casing andmechanism, earth, grass, parts of the casualty 'sfootwear, bone and flesh from the foot and ankle — areall driven high into the wound. Traumatic amputationof the lower leg is common, normally leaving the

separated part of the limb connected only by strands offlesh or muscle. Subsequent surgical amputation isnormally required from a higher site in the limb toensure that blast and fragmentation-affected tissue andbone is excised.

Secondary injuries can be very severe. Blindness andserious facial and chest or stomach injuries fromfragmentation are common, as is the loss of fingers.

Where the victim has been carrying some kind ofimplement, perhaps a hoe or mine-detector, seriousinjuries to that arm are often sustained. Sometimes thetissue of the forearm is stripped away, exposing thebone — such injuries may have a more serious long-term impact than the loss of the lower part of a leg.W hile a good pro sth esi s following a belo w -kne eamputation will allow farmers to work normally after aperiod of adjustment, a partially-paralysed arm or handmay make employment vir tually impossible in asubsistence community. Although larger blast anti-personnel mines may kill children, fatalit ies arenormally a consequence of the subsequent traumainvolved in evacuation to medical aid which may, insome cases, involve many hours or even days of

physically agonising travel. Fatalities also often occurwhen the victim is alone and dies from loss of blood orexposure. There is evidence that death in this way iscommon among shepherds, a particularly vulnerablegroup, many victims being as young as nine years of

Fragmentation mines, because they are normallyinitiated by a tripwire, usually involve multiple-victim



28 • Landmines

incidents. The lethal radius of such devices may be as

great as 30 metres and serious injuries may be caused topeople as far as 50 metres away from the explodingmine. The type of fragmentation may vary from steelballbearings or cubes, as in the case of the commonItalian mine, the Valmara 69, or shaped sections of castmetal, as with the POM-Z type of mine. Some mines aredesigned in such a way that the sheet-steel casing of thedevice is torn apart by the explosion, providing the

fragmentation. For the victims the results aredevastating and often fatal (but rarely instantaneouslyso), the fragments literally ripping through tissue,organs and bone and, where velocity is sufficientlymaintained, leaving a large, lacerated exit wound.Survivors may suffer multiple amputations, blindness,and secondary effects caused by damage to internalorgan s. A side-effect of the fragmen tation m ine ,particularly of the bounding variety, which is oftenoverlooked, is the shock caused to family and friends ofthe victim by the horrific nature of the injuries —simply, but graphically, described by an eleven-year-oldAfghan:

There had been some bombing and I went with mysister to bring the goats out of the field — we were

calling to the animals and she was singing a song—/ did not know the song but I was laughing becauseit was funny. Then there was a loud bang and lightand something knocked me down, I was frightenedand getting wet from the thing that had hit me.Then I saw my sister's shoe beside me and it wasattached to something but my sister was lying verystill by the animals, she was far away. It was very

frightening and I cried for my father.14

The little boy's sister was dead, but the boy sustainedonly minor physical injuries; the secondaryfragmentation which caused most of those injuriesincluded parts of his sister's body. It is impossible toassess the long-term psychological impact on the boyand unlikely, given the problems facing Afghanistan,that he will ever receive any help. The issue of the




mental trauma suffered by mines victims and their

families needs investigation and action by specialists inthis field.The surgical and recovery wards of hospitals in

mined regions bear witness to the effects of mineexplosions on the human frame: rows of amputees,disfigured faces, and sightless eyes. Few of thosecountries can afford any level of post-trauma supportfor victims, and prosthetic facilities, where they are not

provided by external aid agencies, tend to be of themost basic kind.

Mine v ict ims in a rehabi l i ta t ion ward in Angola. Laurinda

Chinginila (centre) lost both legs when she stepped on a UNITA

landmine.



CHAPTER TWO

The impact of mines on the

community

Main areas of impact

Any existing or recent combat zone must be assumed tocontain landmines. Aid workers must be fully aware ofthe potential impact of mines on their work from a

very early stage of emergency relief, repatriation andrehabilitation operations. The main areas of effect canbe summarised as follows:

Mined area Potential impact areas

Main routes Food and emergency aid shipments

Access to essential areasRepatriation of refugeesM ovem ent of aid w orkersGeneral trade and communicationsInternal security

Evacuation of injured/sick peopleElectoral process

Rural roads Access to essential areasand tracks Repatriation of refugees

Trade and communicationsRural social and cultural activitiesSurveys/needs assessmentsEvacuation of injured/sick peopleElectoral processMovement of aid workers



The impact of mines on the community • 31

Children's access to schools

Internal security

Rural Access to essential areas

agricultural Repatriation of refugeesareas and Resettlement of IDPsvillages Agricultural rehabilitation

Use of pasture

Repair and use of irrigation

systemsAccess to water sources

Play and recreation areas

Reconstruction

Access to fuel

Fishing

In addition, the laying of mines to deny access to key

facilities causes major disruption to the economy and

infrastructure. Railway lines, power supplies (in some

areas, all pylon bases are routinely mined), power

stations, road and rail bridges, dams, and wells and

pipelines for water and oil, are all likely targets for

strategically placed mines.

The list given above is intended as a guide to thepotential infrastructural impact of mines, but is not, of

course, comprehensive.

Subsistence agricultural communities

The effects of mines on low-income farming commun-

ities are devastating and long-term. It is important to

understand that these communities have to choosebetween staying and trying to survive despite the mines,

or abandoning their land and their livelihood. For most

people the latter option is not even a serious

consideration.

How these people live is by a process of continuous

risk assessment. Each area where tasks have to be

carried out is assigned one of three perceived levels of



3 2 • L a n d m in e s

When mines are laid on good agricultural or grazing land, as

here in Iraq, people have to risk their lives to gain a livelihood,

or abandon their land and face destitu tion.

risk: non-mined land; land believed to be non-mined;land known to be mined. However, unmined land maybe perceived as mined land by the community, on thebasis of evidence such as verbal reports from normallyrel iable sources, past incidents, or s ightings of

unidentified objects. Such land must normally besubject to clearance by de-mining teams beforecommunity confidence is re-established.

The actual risk depends on the local levels ofknowledge and how people approach the problem. Inmost communities there are several individuals, usuallyex-soldiers, who clear mines from priority land.Surprisingly often, these de-miners work without

payment and always at great personal risk. Normallythey develop considerable skill at dealing with minesbut, instead of destroying the devices they locate, theytend to de-fuse and collect them. This may result inenormous dumps of mines being established, oftenclose to residential areas.

Farmers and herders usually attempt their ownsolutions to the problem — often burning grassland in




an effort to destroy the mines or even driving livestock

over minefields. Although these people fullyunderstand the danger of mines and their potential todestroy both individuals and. fragile rural economies,they initially have an unrealistically inflated confidencein these dangerous methods, often with tragic results.The practice of burning, in particular, is extremelydangerous because those mines left undestroyed,normally the majority, may be left in a highly unstable

condition. The use of animals to clear mines is oftensuggested as a means of large-scale clearance butusually by Westerners or city-dwellers rather than byagricultural communities, who have a better under-standing of the value of livestock. When used as atechnique by rural people, often nomadic herdsmen, itis less an attempt to clear mines en-masse than a self-preserving early-warning system. However, while mines

initiated by livestock may save many human lives, thenumber of mines casualt ies among herders andshepherds bears stark witness to the deficiencies of thisparticular early-warning system.

It is essential to understand, however, the primereasons why the above methods of clearing minefields(burning vegetation and herding livestock) are notmerely limited in effect but actually counter-productive. This is because, regardless of the result,neither the community nor subsequent mine-clearingteams are any better informed as to the situation thatexists following burning or livestock-herding. If there isa single explosion one can assume that the area inquestion is mined but, since, livestock do not applypressure to every square centimetre of land, and the

effectiveness of burning is dictated by the vegetation,types of device, weather and many other factors, that isthe limit of the knowledge gained. Such areas will stillrequire specialist clearance and, in the case of burnedland, that task wil l have been made much moredangerous. Some communit ies may assume thatburning or livestock herding has cleared all the minesor proved that the area in question is un-mined — such



34 • Landmines

assumptions are usually fatal. Aid workers must never

encourage or suggest these particular methods as asolution to the problem.The victims of mines in subsistence agricultural or

nomadic communities normally fall into one or morewell-recognised risk categories. These are:• People whose tasks demand continuous breaking of

new ground, for example, firewood collectors andlivestock herders. Many games played by children

are dangerous for this reason.• People whose tasks require the removal of vegetation,

for example, clearing overgrown farmland, cleaningirrigation canals, weeding gardens.

• People whose tasks require digging or hoeing ofearth, for example, ploughing, planting, road andtrack building and maintenance, digging irrigation

channels, house-building, gardening.• People travelling on recently unused or lightly-usedroads or tracks.

• People moving and working in areas where therehave been military posts, routes or installations, inorder to, for example, graze livestock, scavenge forvaluables, scrap metal or souvenirs in old militarypositions.

• Untrained people attempting to clear mines.• Children.

Susceptibility to mines may also be increased byseasonal factors. Heavy rains and flooding often uncoveror move mines causing an increase in mine incidents.Snow, which hides even surface-laid mines, has obviousimplications, as does the subsequent snow-melt.

Refugees

Repatriated refugees are especially vulnerable to mines,the major factors being:• time spent as refugee;• individual returnee's knowledge of the area;• specific knowledge of mines threat;

• contact with community in resettlement area;




• wealth of individual or family group.

Obviously the threat is greatest among refugees whohave spent many years away from their country. Incases such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola andMozambique, younger refugees may have been born inrefugee camps and never actually lived in their nativecountry. Even well-designed mine-education lessonswill have a limitation among such groups.

It is common practice for refugees to maintain some

contact with anyone remaining in their home area, andit is often the task of younger men to maintain thatcontact by travelling to their home villages. These menwill often develop a reasonable knowledge of the minethreat and inform their fellow refugees. However, thismay, in some cases, lead to unfounded rumours. Inextreme circumstances, heavily-mined areas may bereported as safe and vice versa. Fortunately, the passing

of such misleading information among refugee groups isuncommon.

There are some important lessons to be learned fromthe repatriation of Afghan refugees, especially regardingthe period immediately following initial resettlement.Regardless of the level of an individual's knowledgerelating to the danger of mines, there appears to be a

critical risk period lasting as long as two weeks duringwhich returnees may ignore even the most basic safetyconsiderations in order to undertake trivial tasks oreven to make gestures. Some Afghan returnees climbedmountains to view their home valley, or even to picnic,within days of being repatriated. All too often theresulting explosion led to a return to Pakistan byambulance. Children have climbed from vehicles and

run directly into fields within minutes of returning totheir homeland — with inevitable and tragic results. Itis a sobering reflection that most, if not all, of theserefugees had attended at least one mine-awarenesscourse of instruction in Pakistan. Attendance at suchcourses cannot be assumed to indicate understanding oreven interest. Although large numbers of refugees mayattend mines-awareness courses in refugee camps, this



36 • Landmines

is often because of their perception that all official

meetings and classes are linked to either rations orstatus, and must therefore be attended.UNHCR field staff and other personnel involved in

repatriation must be aware of the obstacle to physicalrepatriation and resettlement which the presence ofmines represents. There has been a tendency in the past,probably due to a poor understanding of the full impactof mines on rural communities, to see mines as an

obstacle to repatriation plans — a subtle but potentiallyfatal difference. Resettlement of heavily-mined areas mayhave to be delayed, but, as has been demonstrated inCambodia, once repatriation begins it is impossible todiscourage determined returnees from occupying the bestavailable fertile land, regardless of mine warnings. Forexample, the heavily-mined Ratanak Mondul District in

Battambang Province was off-limits to refugees despite itsreputation as a particularly fertile area. Returnees simplyignored the warnings because prime land is the majorconcern of returning refugees, whereas mines are anunknown quantity or a calculated risk. Ratanak Mondulprobably has a higher mine fatality and injury rate thanany area of comparable size in the world.

It may be simplistic to conclude that repatriation

should be delayed until land essential for returnees isclear of mines — the responses are all too obvious andprobably, to some extent , valid: spontaneousrepatriation will happen anyway; political, economicand social pressures wil l not al low a delay inrepatriation with mines as the sole reason; and, in anycase, the timescale involved in mine clearance is tooprolonged to make delaying repatriation until returnee

areas are cleared of mines a viable option.However valid these points are, they do not alter the

fact that returning refugees to mined areas, to landwhere the simplest daily tasks may have fatalconsequences, consti tutes a fai lure to meet theminimum requirements for organised repatriation underthe auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner

for Refugees.



The impact of mines on the com munity • 37

Internally displaced people

Displaced populations tend to fall within an aid-gap,outside the UNHCR mandate and often not benefitingfrom assistance to static communities. Displaced peopleare especially at risk from mines; often caught incombat areas and forced to farm land and grazelivestock in heavily mined zones, and, because theyhave often moved into an area where the problems, as

well as the environment, are new and uncertain,essential tasks such as fuel and water collection exposethem to even greater risks than static communities.

However, displaced people, by the very fact that theyhave lived with the threat of mines, are often a reliablesource of information about danger areas. A source that,because they fall outside the operational mandates ofmost aid agencies, commonly remains untapped.

Nomadic groups

Nomads may suffer dramatically as a consequence ofminefields. In Afghanistan, for instance, traditionalKuchi migration routes were temporarily closed ordiverted by the war but sometimes made permanently

unusable because of minelaying.

15

Livestock herding bynomadic groups may be a vital factor in post-combatrehabilitation but is a high-risk occupation, particularlyvulnerable to the effects of widespread remoteminelaying and the irresponsible deployment ofscatterable anti-personnel mines.

As with internally displaced people, nomads are aprime and reliable source of information on the location

of minefields.



CHAPTER THREE

Vulnerability and avoidance

A vic tim 's perspective

It is the random nature of large-scale mine dissemin-ation that makes mines so damaging to rural commun-ities, but certain groups and individuals within thosecommunities are critically vulnerable. This increasedvulnerability may be a consequence of the victim's

occupation, age, height, or intelligence.Vulnerability as a consequence of occupation hasbeen addressed in the previous chapter but it isessential for field staff to understand that, regardless ofoccupation, some members of the community faceincreased risk even in areas where mines are surfacelaid and, seemingly, easily visible.

The visibility of a mine is affected by a combination

of factors:• location• the colour of the mine• the size of the mine• the shape of the mine• surrounding vegetation• local distractions• the perception and state of mind of each potentialvictim.

If the mine is buried, obscured by overgrownvegetation, or perfectly camouflaged, the potentialvictim's control of his or her own fate is limited, oncethe initial decision to enter the mined area has beenmade, either in the knowledge or unaware of thepresence of mines. However, if the mine is located on

the surface or is initiated by a tripwire, each of the



Vulnerability and avoidance • 39

above visibility factors may have a role in deciding who

survives. The young, the very old, those with pooreyesight, and the mentally disadvantaged becomeextremely vulnerable in this situation.

An old person, particularly if burdened with a loadof wood, for instance, will commonly focus on theground, at most several feet, and often less, to the front.This gives less opportunity to react to a suspiciousobject by stopping or changing direction. It is often the

case, in addition, that elderly people simply do notrecognise a mine as being more suspicious than anyother object in a fast-changing world.

The mentally disadvantaged are likely to have a poorlydefined understanding of mines, their danger and theneed to avoid them. Such people may also fail torecognise mines if they happen to see one or mayactually attempt to handle or move devices.

Children, however, face the greatest risk, primarilybecause of their restricted vision of the ground ahead.Children are also most likely to be distracted by objectsor activity at the periphery of their vision; they mayspend comparatively long periods actually looking in adifferent direction to that in which they are movingand, of course, children may run for long periods and

change direction frequently, for no particular reason,without prior observation of the ground ahead. Theheight of a child is critical and may mean that a minewhich is clearly visible from several feet away to anadult, is actually impossible for the child to see until itis almost underfoot, particularly if the mine issurrounded by well-grown vegetation.

Mines as toys

It should first be emphasised that there is no evidenceand no probability that anti-personnel mines have everbeen purposely manufactured to look like toys or othereveryday objects. This has become a common rumour inwar-affected regions and may be used as deliberatepropaganda, as was the case in Afghanistan, where it



40 • Landmines

was an oft-repeated accusation against Soviet forces. In

some instances such rumours have been, carelessly orirresponsibly, given credence by aid workers. Thedanger of this type of rumour is the confusion and fearnaturally raised within the community, particularlyamong returning refugees. There is also a potentiallynegative impact on the collation of reliable data relatingto mine dissemination. Although there is no indicationthat anti-personnel mines have been deliberately made

in the shape of toys or other everyday objects, there issome evidence that individual soldiers, and possiblyun i t s , have booby-trapped chi ldren 's toys andhousehold objects, but nothing to suggest that theseactions have been initiated or even supported at ahigher military or political level.

Having excluded the l ikelihood of purpose-manufactured devices which resemble toys, it must besaid that some mines, because of their appearance, mayhave a particular attraction for children. The SovietPFM-1 'butterfly' mine, sown in massive numbers inAfghanistan, has none of the physical characteristicsnormally associated with a mine and may clearly attractattention from children. (There are technical designreasons for the shape of the PFM-1: the thick wing

contains the liquid explosive and the thin wing ensuresthat the mine glides after release from its container toobtain a wide area of coverage from each batch ofmines.) The unusual appearance of anti-personneldevices like the Italian VS-69 Valmara, a lethalbounding fragmentation mine, certainly arouses thecuriosity of children until they are made aware of thedeadly nature of the mine. Its danger is increased

because, since it is both tripwire-initiated and a direct-pressure device, a curious child may be killed withoutactually touching the mine itself.

However, the most insidious threat arises from theinventive nature of children and their abil i ty,particularly in poor communities, to put the mostmundane and unlikely objects to good use for theirentertainment. This is a global phenomenon well-



Vulnerability and avoidance • 4 1

illustrated even in the UK and Ireland and the US,where children used to make carts out of orange boxesand pram wheels. In regions where mines have beenwidely disseminated they become a familiar sight tochi ldren , and a casual at t i tude to mines is oftenencouraged by the irresponsible behaviour of soldiersand other adults, who may disarm16 mines and leavethem carelessly on view or even allow children tohandle them. The results are well illustrated by the

photograph below of a little boy in Iraqi Kurdistanproudly playing with his home-made truck — the rearwheels made from VS-50 anti-personnel mines with anail driven through them to form the axle.

<

Children often make their own toys from what they can f ind.

Here, the wheels of the truck are made from Italian anti-tank and

anti-personnel mines.

This lack of sensible respect for mines may be partlya result of children's naturally adventurous and carelessnature — but a contributory factor is undoubtedly theattitude of adults, often the child's own parents, whothemselves often pay little regard to the danger of minesand may even disarm them and keep them in andaround their houses.




For children, like this child in Somalia, mines can become famil-

iar, everyday objects, stored in and around their homes.

As a visitor to many aid agency offices in minedcountries, the author could add the observation thatfield staff who use disarmed fragmentation mines aspaper-weights are hardly encouraging a realistic respectfor the danger of mines among the community in which

they work. 'Practice what you preach' should certainlybe the rule, particularly among agencies who workclosely with children.

Mines as tools

Subsistence communities rarely waste any opportunity toput what occurs naturally or incidentally to good use;

this is part of a necessary survival mechanism. The factthat there may be an element of danger or even selfish-ness in such redeployment of resources is either unrecog-nised or ignored. So, for instance, in Cambodia, triangu-lar plastic or metal mine warning signs were removedfrom minefield perimeters and used as roofing tiles.

However, the use of landmines as tools would seem aparticularly inexplicable practice until consideration is




given to the fact that their wide dissemination can lead

to a reduction of any fear or respect on the part ofindividuals, often despite continuing mine-relatedfatalities and injuries. In addition, some men will havelearned to use mines in unconventional ways whileserving as soldiers.

Probably the most common civilian use of mines is asa fishing tool: mines are thrown into rivers or pondsand detonated, and the ensuing explosion causes a

pressure wave which kills fish or damages their swim-bladders. The fish can then be netted when they float tothe surface. The large number of injuries and deathsfrom this practice arise either when the mines areinitially removed from the minefield or when attemptsare made to detonate them. The author on one occasiondissuaded a group of teenagers from detonating an anti-tank mine containing six kilograms of explosive, which

they had placed in a shallow stretch of river, bydropping large rocks onto it from a small bridge directlyabove the device. The resulting explosion, had theybeen successful, would have undoubtedly demolishedthe bridge and killed the boys. This was an extremecase, but, nonetheless, it is not uncommon for accidentsto happen simply because people have no conception ofthe power of explosives or the lethal ranges of differentdevices.

Another common, and less innocent, use of mines isas a method of protecting property or establishing landrights. (At least one senior aid official has also boastedthat his home in Cambodia was protected by mines;

17a

more irresponsible, immoral and dangerous action ishard to imagine.) It will probably be difficult (and may

be risky) for aid workers to dissuade people from takingthis kind of action, but every opportunity should betaken to discourage the practice and those who cannotbe persuaded to remove the mines should at least beencouraged to mark their location. The argumentshould be pu t that th is will effectively discouragepeople from trespassing, and there will be less risk ofkilling a friend, relative, or child accidentally.



44 • Landmines

Farmers may attempt to use mines as blasting devices

to open up channels for irrigation, remove tree roots, orsplit large rocks on their land. All these, and similar,activities carry an extremely high risk and, in mostcases, will be unsuccessful.

Avoiding mines: risk areas

The first step in avoidance is understanding the

different types of minefield, and which areas are likelyto be particularly dangerous. There is a tendency tothink of minefields as rectangular, well-defined piecesof ground (a perception that military spokesmen tend toencourage), whereas minefields fitting such a definitionare the exception rather than the rule. For this reason,there follows a non-military guide to the different typesof minefields which are likely to be encountered; mostfields will fall into more than one category.

Visible minefields

A simple way of describing areas where the mines, orsome of the mines, are scattered on the surface of theground or mounted on stakes.

Concealed minefields

Areas where mines are buried, camouflaged orconcealed by growth of vegetation.

Marked m inefields

Areas laid with mines, either visible or concealed,where someone has placed signs warning of danger butwhere the perimeter or expanse of the minefield is not

delineated.

Fenced minefields

In the best case these are mined areas where the outsideperimeter is clearly delineated by some form of fencinginterspersed or marked with mine warning signs. Suchminefields will, most likely, have been fenced at thesame time as they were laid, or been fenced by specialist




mine-clearance agencies or military authorities at a later

date. Where local communities have fenced minefieldsthemselves it is safest to assume that the perimeter ismarked inaccurately.

Where minefields were laid and marked during awar, the clarity and reliability of visible marking willobviously deteriorate with the passage of time. In anextreme case, only a specialist would be likely torecognise the significance of a strand of partially

concealed, rusting barbed wire.

Mined buildings, objects or facilities

There are many reasons to suspect mining aroundbuildings in areas that have seen military activity. Mineslaid inside buildings are comparatively rare and, whenthey occur, normally take the form of booby-traps. Besuspicious of buildings that are known to have beenoccupied by soldiers — if in doubt simply stay awayfrom such buildings. Any structure that has been used asa defensive position by troops is likely to have mines laidto the front and flanks (note that the front in this contextis the direction of the enemy soldiers faced by thedefenders). An obvious indication would be abandonedand damaged vehicles or tanks or the remains of soldiers

or animals. Buildings, particularly purpose-built militaryobservation posts, at the summit of hills or mountains,should be assumed to be surrounded by mines on allsides. In such cases there will be one or more safe-lanesfor access, but this is likely to be marked in a mannerknown only to the defenders of the position.

Any building or structure which contains (orcontained) vital equipment, such as power stations,

radio stations, warehouses or government offices, islikely to be surrounded by mines, leaving only a singleentrance approach un-mined. The base of all electricpylons will also be mined.

All bridges in former battle zones and on approachroads to important towns will be mined, normally onboth banks and at the base of the bridge supports. Notethat, if any level of military activity still exists, the



46 • Landmines

approach to the bridge, and the bridge crossing, is likely

to be mined during the hours of darkness. If you areforced to travel in these conditions you should find outthe procedure for approaching bridges from militaryauthorities, if this is feasible.

It is sensible to assume railways are protected byminefields on either side of the track. Signals, crossings,and goods yards are especially likely to be mined.Airports and airstrips in battle zones, especially where

the facility has been under regular attack or threat ofincursion, will have been mined. (Note that someairstrip perimeters may be mined even in countries thathave not been at war.)

Dead ground

'Dead ground' is a military term for any expanse ofground which could provide cover for attacking troopswithin range of a held position or strong-point. So, forinstance, a trench or, more likely, an irrigation canalclose to a military post would be considered deadground by the defenders of the post. A standard militarystrategy is to mine all dead ground which is seen topresent a potential threat to the defence of a givenposit ion. For this reason great caution must be

exercised when approaching canals and ditches andsimilar land.

Mined battlefields

One of the problems faced by anyone attempting toidentify danger areas in a mined region is the lack ofwhat the military call 'intelligence'; especially when themines were laid during a battle (or series of battles)

several years, or even decades, before. All those rustingentanglements of barbed wire, for instance, wereoriginally put there for a specific military purpose: somemay have marked the perimeter of minefields, butwithout a knowledge of the specific military action, it isimpossible to make any assumptions.

However, if you intend to work in the region it isvital to assess such areas, at least temporarily, as either




safe or unsafe. Such decisions are made even more

difficult when the area in question is prime agriculturalland or an ideal site for an irrigation or resettlementproject — but these considerations are of the utmostimportance, being actually life-saving, or life-threatening, so it is essential to understand that minedbattlefields may cover whole valleys and adjacent hillsand screes.

Any area which has been fought over by opposingforces, where each side has established strongdefensive positions and especially where thosepositions and the ground separating them havechanged hands, must be suspected to be heavily mined.This is especially true of lowlands separating heavily-defended hill positions.

Avoiding mines: basic rules

For the new arrival or traveller in a region which issuspected to be mined, it is also essential to followsome basic rules if mines are to be avoided. (That doesnot mean that the long-term resident in mined regionsshould not follow these rules, but the author has foundthat such people often become careless or, even worse,consider themselves immune from the effects of minesby virtue of their 'field experience'!)

The folowing warning cannot be repeated too manytimes:

Mines are indiscriminate. All you have to do is initiatethem, no-one is immune.

Rule one: ask questions

• in each new area to determine if it is mined• when travelling — keep asking• talk to other agencies, especially:

de-mining agenciessurgical hospitals/surgeons (ICRC)



48 • Landmines

prostheses workshopsconstruction agencies

• before leaving safe roads ask:local people, especially farmers and herdsmen andboys.

Rule two: if you are in any doubt — turn back!

While it is important to ask local people, you should

not follow them blindly; they often know less than theyclaim, may simply be foolhardy, or may have becomeused to the presence of mines and take them forgranted. (In 1988 in Afghanistan the author was led formiles along precarious dykes through fields which theMujahadeen claimed were mined. Later, when the areawas surveyed prior to mine clearance, the author washorrified to discover that those fields were, for the most

part, un-mined while the edges of the dykes he hadwalked on contained hundreds of mines.)

A common mistake made by expatriate aid workers isto assume that their interpreters have a comprehensiveknowledge of all the danger areas in the country,regardless of the fact that the interpreter may have spentmost of his or her life in the city. While it is vital to

follow Rule One — gathering as much information aspossible by asking anyone who may have reliableknow ledge — the final re sponsib ility for your ownsafety is your own!

Rule three: never travel in high-risk areas for non-essential reasons.

This may sound superfluous advice, but, judging by thenumber of aid workers who 'go exploring' in places likeAfghanistan and Cambodia, it is advice which needs tobe given. It is important to be aware that places ofinterest in peacetime are often of strategic value inwartime. It is also standard guerilla practice to use minesas a method of destroying the infrastructure — this islikely to include tourist attractions and cultural or




religious centres. Never go near old military positions,

emplacements or buildings: they are almost certain to bemined.Surveys in mined environments should be well

planned with defined aims and should involve onlyessential personnel. Rough mapping of known andsuspected mined areas should be part of all surveyreports.

It goes (or should go) without saying that agencies

should avoid establishing aid or rehabilitation initiativesin mined areas when a by-product of such projects willbe an increase in the target community's vulnerability tomines. Obvious examples are:• establishing rehabilitation or returnee centres close tominefields;• sinking deep wells near to mined grazing land; .• rebuilding or building houses, schools or clinics

close to minefields.(It should be pointed out that all the above are examplesof actual recent activities.)

Rule four: keep to well-used roads and trackswherever practical.

This is one of those rules that is far easier to make thanto keep, especially if you are serious about workingwith rural communities in a post-war environment. It isstill a good rule to live by, in conjunction with RuleOne.

Walk in single file and keep to the same path as thelead person. If it is practical you should keep up to 20metres between each person, but a distance of at least

ten metres would limit casualties in the event of anexplosion.Never drive vehicles off a road or track onto the

verges in any area which might be mined. The militaryoften clear roads and tracks of mines but they rarelyclear the verges, and these are almost certain to containmines if the carriageway itself was ever mined.

Never wander off a road or track to urinate or defecate:



50 • Landmines

either cross your legs or learn to hide your shyness! (It is

an unpleasant, but nonetheless useful, hint to rememberthat areas full of fresh human excrement are likely to befar safer places to use than those private and previouslyunused spots that modesty may prefer.)

Rule five: never touch, move or approach minesor suspect objects.

There is a tendency for some aid workers to develop abelief in their immunity to the effects of explosives; orat least this is the impression given by several years ofretrieving mines and ordnance from the homes andoffices of otherwise sane and dedicated professionals.Another danger of such behaviour is the bad examplegiven to local communities, especially children.

Rule six: be alert!

While it is true that mine victims rarely see a mine andthen proceed to stand on it, it is probable that many seeclues to the presence of mines that could have savedthem from death or injury. It was their failure torecognise these clues which was the critical factor.

Why do victims fail to notice mines or tripwires?There are several answers to this question:• the mines are buried;• the mines are deliberately camouflaged;• the mines are naturally camouflaged by overgrown

vegetation;• the victim is looking in a different direction.

There are many indications of the presence of mines

referred to in innumerable pamphlets and papers. Somepieces of advice, such as '...look out for hollows in theground...' and '...steer clear of circular growths ofvegetation...' are so vague as to have limited practicalvalue. Other advice is more useful, but everythingdepends on the traveller maintaining a high level ofalertness at all times while moving in an area which isknown or suspected to be mined.




To be constantly on the look-out for tell-tale signs is

not easy, especially when the purpose of travelling inthe area may be to assess needs for aid projects orsimilar tasks. It should be recognised, too, that alertnessin itself will not make you safe although it willcertainly make you safer.

Clues to the presence of mines include:• unusual colours or shapes: be suspicious of exposed

round edges — they rarely occur in nature ; dirty-

yellow and green objects; and metallic or plasticsurfaces. But remember that not all mines are round— some are oblong and made of wood.

• taut, partly buried or entangled thin-gauge wire orfilament (similar to fishing line). Never pull wires.

• wooden stakes, especially if seen inconjunction withwire;

• animal remains, remnants of footwear, or any similarsigns that may indicate that something or someonehas fallen victim to a mine;

• battlefield relics such as bu nk ers , barbe d w ireentanglements , ammuni t ion dumps , he lmets ,destroyed vehicles, abandoned weapons, etc;

• buildings which may have been used for militarypurposes or occupied during a battle.



CHAPTER FOUR

When the worst happens:

minefield procedures

Facing facts

There is a great deal of nonsense both taught andbelieved about the dangers of minefields, and the

author does not wish to add to the generalmisunderstanding by giving an impression that thischapter conveys anything more than some possibilitiesof achieving the best result in the worst of situations. Ifyou or a colleague stray into a minefield the probableconsequence will be death or severe injury —avoidance, as covered in the previous chapter, is thebest, and only reasonably certain, defence against a

mine accident.Some minefield specialists are reluctant to teach

even the techniques involved in probing for mines aspart of general mine-awareness training. This is oftenthought to be a form of trade-protectionism but actuallythe unwilllingness stems from the very real fear that anysuch teaching may encourage the less cautious to takeunnecessary chances in the belief that they have theskill to escape from a mined location. A little learningcan, indeed, be deadly dangerous. It needs a good dealof skill and experience even to be sure that you are nolonger in a minefield; and the skills of dealing withspecific devices and situations in a minefield cannot betaught or learned on a casual basis. A minefieldoperative learns his skills initially in dummy minefields

but hones those skills by on-the-job training, under



Minefield procedures • 53

expert supervision in live minefields. The author

assumes that readers will be sufficiently sensible tounderstand that the techniques explained in thischapter are for use in emergencies only, as a life-savingstrategy.

Recognising an emergency

The two most likely scenarios which would indicate

you are in a minefield are either that an explosionoccurs or a mine is found. From that moment survivaldepends on many factors; but you must always assumethe worst situation — that you are in a minefield: minesare rarely laid singly. The most important first responsemust be to stop all movement and warn everyone in thevicini ty to do the same. This response must beim m ediate — there may only be inches betw een

individual devices and, although you may have sighteda mine on the surface, others are likely to be buriedclose by.

Summary:

Stop all movement immediately.Warn other people immediately.

Escape

(Dealing with anyone who has been injured by a minewould naturally be an immediate priority but, for thesake of clarity, this is dealt with in a later section.)Before anyone moves it is imperative to identify the lastsafe ground over which you have travelled. In some

cases this may be clear — a well-used track is obviouslysafe ground. However, particularly if your route hastraversed large expanses of open country, it may belittle better than a guess.

The next step is to identify a route to safe ground.Obviously the safest option is to retrace your stepsexactly, but this may only be possible in soft ground,grassland, or where you have followed a clearly visible



54 • Landmines

route or ground feature. As a general rule, you should

always go back over ground you have already traversedrather than attempt to escape in any other d irection.

If you are in a group, one person should take controlof evacuating the group from the minefield. Only oneperson should move at a time. Keep at least ten metresand, if possible, 20 me tres, betw een each person.

Summary:

Identify safe ground.Identify safest route back to safe ground.Put one person in charge.Only one person moving at a time.

Observe safety distances.

Movement

The safest method of movement would be to retraceyour footsteps exactly back to safe ground, and this mayprove possible in some kinds of terrain, such as softmud; but , real is t ical ly, such condit ions must beconsidered the exception rather than the rule. In themajority of cases you are most likely to be sticking asclosely as possible to the route you remember, and

retracing the route must be done step-by-step,examining the ground minutely as you proceed and,when in a group, warning the person behind of anyobstacle or route deviation. This process must not berushed, and everyone should avoid any temptation tobunch together. The leader of the party must keep firmcontrol of the group, and ensure that information ispassed clearly, and that no-one panics.

Summary:

Retrace your route as close ly as possible.Stay alert and move with caution: never rush.Maintain safety distances.Keep control and pass on critical information.Never panic.




Probing

It would be reasonable to ask what happens if there isno obvious safe exit route, if you reach a point whereyou simply cannot remember what path you took, or ifyou find a mine on what you thought was a safe exitroute. The only possible solution then is to probe formines — a slow, painstaking and potentially dangeroustask.

Probing is simply a technique designed to identifyobjects below ground level which might bemines, usinga suitable probe. Although probes used by specialistsare often purpose-made, the most suitable improvisedtool is a strong knife with a minimum four-inch bladelength.

Every square centimetre must be probed, so the firstpriority is to decide the minimum width of clearance

along the escape lane. This should be no wider thannecessary to enable each person to negotiate the lane,remembering that probing must be carried out in theprone or crouching position. A shoulder-width laneshould allow safe passage.

Working methodically, the probe is carefully used topierce the ground at an angle of 30 degrees. Whenever

the probe meets resistance, the earth is carefullyscraped away to expose the obstruction. In most casesthis will be a stone or similar harmless object, in whichcase methodical probing continues.

If the object is a mine (or a suspicious object) youmust stop moving the earth as soon as the identificationhas been made.

Summary:Never attempt to remove or move the m ine.Never try to lever the m ine out of the ground.

Warn others and try to mark the site simply, usingsmall stones or a similar method. Probing should thenrecommence cautiously to bypass the mine. It should beunderstood that such an escape may take many hours.



56 • Landmines

Summary:

Decide on width of safe lan e.Probe methodically every square centimetre at 30degrees.Expose any object which presents a resistance to the

probe.Mark and bypass mines and suspicious objects.

Continue methodical probing until safe ground is

reached.

Obviously, you should not wait until an emergencyarises to begin looking for a suitable tool for probing;inevitably there would be no such thing available. Farbetter that you adopt a personal policy of alwayscarrying a strong sheath-knife when travelling.

Rescue

It is extremely common for people (particularly familyand friends) to be killed or injured while attempting torescue mine victims from a minefield. The task isespecially dangerous for a number of reasons, not leastthat rescuers are more concerned for the welfare of theinjured person than for their own safety. It is alsopossible that the initial explosion may have disturbed,

exposed, or made unstable other devices in the vicinity.The victim's body may be concealing untriggeredmines.

If the casualty is conscious it is important to reassurehim or her and to warn against any attempts to move orcrawl away from the site of injury. It may also bepossible to instruct the victim to apply a tourniquet tostop the bleeding. Family members and friends must be

dissuaded from attempting to enter the minefield; thismay be difficult since they are likely to be distraughtand hard to reason with.

The decision to attempt a rescue yourself should onlybe made if the victim is alive, and if no specialist mineteams can be called to the scene within a reasonabletime.




Rescue technique

Always establish and mark a safe approach route to thecasualty by probing (as described above), whereverpossible following the entry route of the victim. Takewound dressing with you.• Stop about two metres short of the casualty and make

a close visual inspection of his or her immediatesurroundings. Look for visible mines and tripwires.

• You must now clear a space around the casualtysufficient to allow you to administer emergency firstaid and to lift or otherwise move the casualty.Explain this to the casualty — do not rush, it willserve no purpose to further injure or kill the casualty,and will mean that someone else must risk their livesto rescue both of you.

• The casualty may be hysterical in which case youmust calm him or her, but, especially in the case ofamputation, she or he is likely to be traumatised andmay be unusually calm. Check visually and probecarefully under the victim's limbs and clothing formines.

• Give emergency first aid — bleeding may be stoppedby direct or indirect pressure; however, since the

casualty may have to be dragged or carried forconsiderable distances, a tourniquet is usually theonly practical method of stopping bleeding. A recordshould be kept and attached to, or marked on, thecasualty, recording times when the tourniquet wasoriginally applied and subsequently re-applied. Thetourniquet should be loosened at intervals to avoidthe onset of gangrene, and should not be applied

unnecessarily high above the wound site. Lessserious wounds should be dressed, if possible, usingclean material or wound dressings.

• No definitive rules can be given for extricating thecasualty from the minefield, except to stress that yoursurvival and that of your patient depends on your notstraying out of the area you have cleared. A child orlight person may best be lifted into the 'fireman's lift'



58 • Landmines

position on the shoulders. A larger person may need

to be pulled along the escape lane, in which casearms and limbs should be immobilised. A secondrescuer may be called and the casualty be placed in alitter or carried between both rescuers. Much willdepend on the local situation and the material andhelp available.

• Having been successfully rescued, the patient mustbe taken without delay to the nearest surgical facility.

First aid should be kept to the minimum required tostop serious bleeding and keep the casualtybreathing. Never suture wounds or attempt otheradvanced medical aid. Do not be tempted to wait forthe most comfortable method of travel if this isuncertain or may take time: use the best transportthat is available and leave instructions for any better(faster) vehicle to follow you when it arrives.

This kind of rescue is a very high risk undertaking andno-one is obliged to take such action. It is stronglyrecommended that the removal of corpses fromminefields is only undertaken by properly-equipped,specialist teams.



CHAPTER FIVE

Action in the community

Educating the community

Aid workers can perform a critical role in limitingcasualties among the indigenous community by makinguse of their direct contact with families throughmedical, resettlement, agricultural, education, andsimilar activities.

Every opportunity should be taken to warnvulnerable groups about the danger of mines, and postercampaigns should be mounted without delay. Expertadvice should be taken before such posters areprinted.

18

Simple warnings should be inserted into al leducational material aimed at vulnerable communities;

however, s imple should not be confused withsimplistic; subsistence farmers, for instance, will bewell aware of the danger in their fields but equallyunderstand that their survival depends on their abilityto farm their land. It will serve no purpose to tell suchcommunities not to go into mined areas— they have nochoice, and will disregard such advice. Messagesshould be educational and realistic: warning against

disturbing wires or attempting to disarm mines. One ofthe most important roles which can be performed by aidorganisations is to dissuade communities fromremoving minefield markings and fencing; even partialsuccess in this would dramatically speed eventualminefield eradication.

It is important to gain access to women and children,most of whom will be engaged in highly mine-




Mines Advisory Group staff giving out exercise books and pencils

to children in Penjwen village in northern Iraq. The books carry a

mines-awareness message.

vulnerable occupations such as collecting firewood,herding livestock, collecting war scrap and, in the caseof children, simply playing. People working alone areparticularly at risk. Many mine victims die because they

are by themselves and there is no-one else nearby to gofor help; many young livestock herders die fromexposure and loss of blood following an immobilisingbut, under normal circumstances, non-fatal mine injury.The key messages should be:

Never touch mines or munitions.

Keep to well-used paths.

Warn each other wh en you see a m ine.Try not to travel or work alone: work in pairs orgroups.

Never disturb loose or taut wires.

Avoid areas where people or animals have been

injured.

Communities should be encouraged to use a



Action in the community • 6 1

|o

Marked minefield, Battambang, Cambodia.

standardised and safe method of marking minedlocations, such as skull and crossbone signs on adjacenttracks, stone cairns, etc. They should not, however, betempted to mark too closely the edges of minefields orindividual mines.

Collecting data

Eventually, mines will have to be eradicated if life is toreturn to normal, and this long-term and complex taskcan be assisted greatly by the early collation of relevantdata.

The most important primary intelligence data forminefield surveyors are:• the location of visible mines;

• the location of mine incidents.Maps and military information are much lower on ascale of reliability than such primary data since both areunarguable evidence that mines exist in a given area.Many aid agencies are ideally placed to collate suchinformation and produce vital source data for subsequentmine-eradication programmes. For instance, medical andprostheses centres should take the following actions:



62 • Landmines

Differentiate, at admission time, between mine

victims and other patients.Include the following questions in their admissionformalities for mine victims:1 Name, gender and age of casualty; civilian or

combatant.2 Accurate location of explosion.3 Type of injuries.4 Number of others killed or injured in the same

incident.5 Nearest village to incident.6 What the casualty was doing at time of incident

(planting, herding, playing etc.).7 Other incidents in that specific area in the

previous twelve months.8 Date of incident/date of admission.

Agencies can also produce secondary aids such asincident cluster maps which can be circulated toother organisations as safety guides. Care should betaken only to enter data that is based on actualincidents or sightings by reliable witnesses. It is farbetter to have a very accurate cluster map with a fewdots than to have an impressive but fictional, andtherefore dangerous, showpiece!

Where several agencies have access to qualityinformation it may be helpful for one organisation totake on the task of dealing w ith all data centrally.Information about risk areas, mined roads, andincidents can be included as a regular section inagency newsletters or, in a heavily-mined region, adedicated 'Mines Newsletter' could be published.Agricultural and veterinary organisations should

keep records of livestock killed or injured by minesand produce similar incident cluster maps assuggested above. It will also be useful for theeventual planning of mine-eradication projects ifthese organisations maintain a register or map ofmined arable and pastoral land.



Action in the comm unity • 63

Other community assistance ideas

Local teachers, mullahs, priests and doctors should beencouraged to warn their communities about the dangerof mines and to discourage adults from keeping minesor mine cases in their houses. Where women's groupsexist they should be included in discussions about themost effective ways of spreading mine-awarenessmessages to children.

It is particularly important to dissuade communitiesfrom attempting to clear mines themselves. Althoughthis may seem a laudable and community-spirited thingto do, it will actually make eventual clearance ofminefields a far more difficult and dangerous task.Casual clearance is rarely conducted in a methodicalfashion, so that minelaying patterns, where they exist,will be broken. In addition, because such clearance is

unl ikely to be comprehensive, the community ,believing an area cleared of mines, may begin using atract of land which they have previously avoided, onlyto suffer unecessary casualties caused by mines thathave been missed.

It is unlikely that all such activities can be dis-couraged because there will be considerable support for

them among the community. It is difficult to argue thecase for stopping all mine clearance by untrained peopleand waiting for a professional team to carry it out whenthe community feel this may never happen. Oneapproach is to try and divert some of these local de-min-ers to the task of marking known minefields rather thanattempting to clear them. More persistent, and possiblyeffective, de-miners should at least be discouraged from

storing disarmed mines close to villages and, preferably,persuaded to destroy them at a remote site rather thanstore them where they may be stolen and relaid or causea safety hazard for the community. Most village de-min-ers disarm rather than destroy mines and remove them tocentral dumps (often close to their house) which maycontain thousands of mines. This is common practicebecause such men establish their credibility in the com-



64 • Landmines

munity by the number

mines they have clearedrather than on the qualityof their work. Such dumpsoften contain live, fully-armed mines which havemerely been carried care-fully from the minefield.Although some men invol-

ved in this work may befully-trained specialists,there is a marked tendencyfor work to be conductedin a haphazard and danger-ous manner and few suchexperts avoid injury ordeath for long.

All community leadersshould be encouraged tokeep records of minescasualties, and a simplereporting format could bedesigned which might thenbe submitted to the organisation whose task it is to keep

central records for the region.

Deminer, Somalia. Random

mine c lea rance can makeeventual eradication more dif-

f i cu l t and dangerous , and

should not be encouraged by

aid agencies.

Caution

It is very important that aid workers do not makeuneducated or rash commitments to communities.Mine-clearance agencies often find that communitieshave unreal is t ic expectat ions of mine-clearance

operations, sometimes believing that whole districts canbe cleared of mines in a matter of weeks. All too oftensuch hopes have been raised by aid workers. It servesno good purpose to deceive communities, even with thebest of intentions; they have a right to know that, inmost cases, when mine-clearance operations begin itwill take many months and possibly years to returntheir land to full use.



CHAPTER SIX

Solutions: local and global

There are over 30 countries where anti-personnel minesare the cause of serious problems for the civilianpopulation. In at least five (Afghanistan, Cambodia,Angola, Mozambique and Northern Iraq/Kurdistan),mines are arguably the most serious obstacle to returningthose countries to normality. Repatriation of refugees andinternally displaced people, reconstruction, and therehabilitation of rural infrastructure are all profoundlyaffected by the presence of mines. An effective andlasting solution to the problem must both addressimmediate needs and look to the future by:

• eradicating exist ing mines and assist ing minevictims;

• acting on the root of the problem, the indiscriminateuse of mines made possible by the global trade in

anti-personnel mines. Finally, the only solution maybe the ultimate abolition of these weapons.

The local solution: eradicating mines

The large-scale eradication of landmines is acomparatively new, developing technology, different inconcept to the traditional military engineering task of

'breaching' i.e. making a path through a minefield.Breaching is a battlefield tactic, is conducted at speed,aims merely for an 'acceptable' level of clearance, andtherefore expects some loss of life and injury both duringand after the clearance operation. In contrast, the aim ofhumanitarian mine clearance is to decontaminate minedland by locating and destroying all mines, and makeessential land 100 per cent safe for the community. There



66 • Landmines

can be no compromise of that aim, even though it may be

impossible to attain in some areas. Nor can there be anyacceptable loss of life or injury, neither among teamsduring clearance operations nor among the community atlarge following clearance; although, as with totalclearance, such standards may, in reality, beunattainable.

The steps towards humanitarian-based eradication ofmines are:

19

• community and technical survey by specialists• identification of priority tasks and locations• selection of indigenous trainees• training of clearance teams.

Training consists firstly of classroom lectures ontheory and basic methods, followed by practicaltraining in dummy minefields. The trainees areintroduced by stages into live minefields and liveclearance, under expert supervision.

Community mine-awareness projects should be anintegral part of the overall mine-eradication initiative,and indigenous field education officers should betrained specifically for this role.

Training session on mine-clearance being run by Mines Advisory

Group specialist in Laos.



Solutions: local and global • 67

Since clearance operations are likely to last for many

yearsit is

clearly preferable thata

levelof

specialistsupervision, support and advice remains available to

indigenous teams for as long as possible. Internationalagencies involved in mine-eradication programmeshave also a secondary responsibility to ensure that the

teams they have trained continue to destroy mines and

do not disarm and store, sell, or otherwise dispose of

them.

International donors have special responsibilitieswhen funding de-mining activities not only to ensurethat the funded agency destroys all mines and prioritisesclearance on the basis of sound humanitarian principles,but also that it provides for the adequate protection of

indigenous teams.20 Donors should be prepared to

provide funds which are sufficient to equip all de-minerswith approved helmets, visors and protective waistcoats.

It is not uncommon for UN and NGO field reports to

include recommendations such as '...mechanisedtechniques should be used for mine clearance in thisarea'. The justification is normally that such an approachwill be ' quicker ' or 'more effective' than manual

Mines Advisory Group de-miner, with appropriate protective cloth-

ing and headgear, northern Iraq.



68 • Landmines

clearance. Simplifications of this type are not only based

on ignorance but, in the hands of funding officers withlittle understanding of the technicalities of de-mining,may be harmful and prove massively wasteful of valuablefunding. It is imperative that those involved have anunderstanding of the resources available for de-miningand how these can be most effectively employed withinhumanitarian de-mining initiatives.

There are three elements integral to the eradication of

mines:• detection• disarming (only when in-si tu destruction is

impossible or unsafe) and subsequent destruction• in-situ destruction.

Mines are most effectively detected by a combinationof electronic detection and manual probing. Dogs (nor-mally labradors, Belgian shepherds or alsatians) speciallytrained to respond to the scent of explosives, may beused in some circum-stances as a supportingresource. Dogs are depen-dent on the skill of theirhandlers, and their abilityto sniff out explosives is

also affected by weatherconditions; they shouldonly be worked for a max-imum of four hours perday. High technologytechniques for detectingmines over wide areasusing such sub-sciences

as thermal imagery are oflittle value for humanitar-ian programmes and, inany event, are prohibit-ively expensive.

Mines which can bedisarmed should be dealt

with by trained special-

So ldiers from the UN force in

Somalia, preparing to blow up a

dump of mines and other muni-

tions.



Solutions: local and global • 69

ists with a knowledge of the technique relevant to each

particular device. Not all mines can be safely disarmed.The in-situ destruction of a mine may be achieved byplacing an explosive charge beside the device, andremotely detonating both charge and mine. Mines mayalso be detonated or physically destroyed in-situ usingmechanical methods such as chain flails mounted onarmoured plant or tanks.

However, flails are only suitable for certain ground

situations, do not destroy mines incorporating over-pressure devices, and may throw live mines outside theclearance area. The use of such machinery should notbe undertaken without ensuring adequate funding andsupport for the upkeep and repair of the tractionvehicle. All ground cleared using flails or similarsystems must be manually checked before it is declaredclear of mines.

Other mechanical systems, such as mine ploughs,which are designed to move mines clear of a breachedlane rather than destroying each device, are not relevantor useful for humanitarian eradication operations sincethey merely transfer the problem elsewhere.

Techniques for the collective destruction of minessuch as fuel air explosives and 'explosive sausages' of

the 'Giant Viper' type are not useful for humanitarianprogrammes for three reasons — they are ineffectiveagainst mines fitted with over-pressure devices; they areinexact and must be fully supported by manualclearance; and they are often unacceptable for safetyand ecological reasons.

The global solution

When a victim is torn apart by a fragmentation mine orloses a leg after standing on a blast mine a long andoften cynical chain of action has come to an end. Anti-personnel mines are uncontrol lable and randomweapons which, once laid, remain a threat to life longafter the original military deployment criteria have beenforgotten. Despite this fact, military strategists and arms



70 • Landmines

manufacturers have cont inued to develop the

technology of mines with no regard for the subsistencerural communities who are most affected by theseweapons. A number of governments have either ignoredor colluded with the sale of mines to users who havecarelessly or purposely targeted civilians and, evennow, when a ban on the use, export or even productionof anti-personnel mines has become a real possibility,there are governments who appear willing to place

profits from the arms trade above innocent lives.A number of humanitarian NGOs, based on their

exper ience in mined regions , and human-r ightsorganisations, have become actively involved inadvocacy on the issue of landmines, and are pressingfor revisions to the current international law onlandmines (the 1980 Inhumane Weapons Convention),

as it comes up for review in 1994-5. Their aim is theeffective protection of civilians, and there is a growingbody of opinion which believes that the only way toensure this is to address, through the United Nations,the fundamental question of the legality of themanufacture, transfer and use of anti-personnel mines(see Appendix Three).

Because of the high cost of mine-eradication

programmes there is a need for radical thinking toensure that effective remedial action can continue inmine-affected countries. The request by the UN GeneralAssembly in October 1993 for the Secretary-General toconsider setting up a special United Nations trust fundis laudable but there must be adequate safeguards toensure that the fund is not used to cover UNadministrative costs or to pay governments of memberstates for supplying military instructors at the expenseof actual mine clearance. There is also a strongargument for a UN-enforced charge to be levied onstates which manufacture and export landmines, whichcould fund the costs of mine eradication.

Most of all it is vital that everyone who has seen theimpact of anti-personnel mines on civilian communities

takes every opportunity to make the world aware of the



So lution s: local and global • 7 1

death and suffering inflicted on poor people by these

hidden and persistent weapons. Aid and developmentworkers and organisations should become activelyinvolved in seeking a solution to the problem of mines,and speak out about their experience of the scale ofdamage — to people, to the infrastructure, and to theenvironment — caused by these weapons. It is onlywhen the international community as a whole becomesaware of and takes responsibility for what is a major

human tragedy that effective action to deal with theproblem will become a possibility.



Endnotes

1 Alan Moorehead, biography by Tom Pocock. Bodley

Head, London 1990.

2 A recent study by the US State Department has identifiedsixty-two countries where mine incidents have beenreported, but most authorities, including the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross, consider that about half thatnumber of countries have a mines problem of crisisproportions. Countries most seriously affected by mines

are: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Iraq and Laos. Minesalso represent a major problem in Bosnia, Croatia, Georgia,Mozambique, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Somalia, Sri Lanka,and Sudan. A mines problem of a lesser nature, or as yetunassessed, exists in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Chad,Columbia, Cuba, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Eritrea,Falklands/Malvinas, Guatemala, Honduras, Iran, Kuwait,Libya, Russia, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, andVietnam.

3 Sub-munitions are explosive devices delivered to thetarget area within a carrier projectile. This may be abomb, rocket, or other projectile, which on arrival abovethe target dispenses the sub-munitions over a wide area.Sub-munitions often have the same intrinsic properties asmines. There is an increasing tendency on the part ofmanufacturers and the military to redefine scatterable and

remotely delivered mines as 'sub-munitions'.

4 Report from Dr San Somboun, Mongolian Hospital, XiangKhuoang to Mines Advisory Group field survey team May1993. Only includes admitted patients and those recordedas dead on arrival (43) treated by that facility and theprevious field hospital at the same site. It is estimatedthat this figure represents only 40 to 50 per cent of totalcasualty figures among the provincial community.



Endnotes • 73

5 Blast is the wave of air driven at ballis tic spee d from thesite of an explosion. Damage is caused to human tissue

both by the blast itself and by pieces of the mine andother secondary fragments driven into the victim by theforce of the blast.

6 A senior Russian military enginee r officer recen tly statedthat the PMN is 'no longer manufactured in Russia'. Thisstatement remains to be confirmed. I t should also benoted tha t no informat ion exis ts about the poss ib le

continued manufacture of the PMN in other former Sovietstates. The PMN 2 is believed to remain in production inRussia.

7 Quoted in Landmines: A Deadly Legacy, published byHuman Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights,New York, 1993.

8 Interview by the autho r, UK, February 1993.

9 Landmines in Cambodia: The Coward's War, Asia Watch,New York 1991.

10 The scope of this trainin g is do cu m en ted in the AsiaWatch report Landmines in Cambodia: The Coward'sWar. NCR was essentially a title of convenience given tothe Khmer People's National Liberation Force and the

Royalist ANS wh ich a llowed US funds to be- chan nelledinto the insurgent war against the Phnom Penh regime.Through high level poli t ical agreements between theUnited States and United Kingdom governments the SASbecame an instrument of covert US foreign policy. Thereis, in the author 's opinion, no evidence that the SAStrained the Khmer Rouge directly; however, given theclose field co-operation between the KR, KPNLF and

ANS, the point is purely academic.

11 For some years, Parliament was assured that reports of thetraining were untrue. For example, in October 1990,Margaret Thatcher, then Prime Minister, said: 'There is noBritish Government involvement of any kind in training,equipping, or co-operating with the Khmer Rouge forcesor those allied to them.' It was finally admitted in awritten Parliamentary answer, in June 1991 , by the th en



74 • Landmines

Secretary of State for Defence, Archie Hamilton, that

British forces 'provided training to the armed forces of the

Cambodian non-communist resistance from 1983 to

1989.'

12 Selected and representative quotation from de-mining

specialists involved in humanita rian eradication

operations in several countries.

13 From MAG casualty interviews conducted in Afghanistan

and Pakistan during the period 1988-1991.

14 MAG casualty interview, Paktia Province, Afghanistan

1990.

15 See Mines Survey of Afghanistan, Mines Advisory Group,Peshawar 1990.

16 To disarm a mine is to remove components of, or break,the explosive chain to render a mine safe, or safer, to

handle. A disarmed mine may still contain the explosivecharge.

17 Asia W atch report given verbally to MAG. Phnom PenhFebruary 1993.

18 The Mines Advisory Group will always co-operate in

such pro jec ts and can produce ind igenous languageposters with a min imu m of delay. Contact the ProjectOfficer MAG by fax on INT+44 (0)900 827088.

19 Based on the operating principles of the Mines AdvisoryGroup.

20 It is a sad comment that many mine-clearance projects in

Cambodia, including the UN-sponsored CMAC teams,e m p l o y K h m e r d e - m i n e r s who are not i s su e d w i thprotective clothing other than goggles.



APPENDIX 1

Mines: the explosive chain

(Note: What follows is not intended as a scientific or technicaldescription of the explosive chain, but is a simplified account

of the operation of mines for the non-expert.)

PMN mine segmented to show the explosive mechanism.

The sequence of events which follows the activation of a mineby a victim is known as the explosive chain and varies little inprinciple between different types of mine. There are three key

elements in the ch ain:

• the fuse or igniter• the detonato r

• the explosive conten t.

1 The fuse or igniter

This may be an integral part of the mine or an external addi-

tion which must be added to make the device operate. It may



76 • Landmines

operate mechanically, electrically or by a chemical reaction.

There is often a time delay between the deployment of the

mine and the fuse or igniter becoming operational.The fuse or igniter is the first link in the explosive chain.

Normally i t is operated by direct pressure , such as a the

weight of a person standing on the mine, by indirect pressure

or pressure-release through a tripwire or similar method, or by

distortion or accumulative pressure, as in the case of the PFM-

1 Butterfly mine. The fuse or igniter sets off the detonator.

2 The detonatorThe detonator is the second link in the chain and is simply a

low explosive set off by the activation of the fuse or igniter.

The explosion of the detonator in turn causes the explosive

content to explode.

3 The explosive content

This is the final link in the explosive chain. Normally TNT or

similar high explosive, it requires the boost of a low explosiveto cause it to explode. In fragmentation mines the explosive issurrounded by or contains splinters of metal or ball-bearings.



APPENDIX 2

Mine-protection on projectvehicles

Most aid agencies have considered the use of mine-protectionfor their project vehicles in the field, and manufacturers ofsuch equipment of ten ta rge t agencies working in mined

regions as potential customers. It is important that the follow-ing points are considered before a decision is arrived at:

• M ine-protection is expensive . W ill it be fitted to all veh i-cles? Can the agency afford to make the same protectionavailable to local staff as to expatriates?

• The major disadv antages related to the retro-fitting of m ine-protection are:

i Increase in the weight of the vehicle making the veh icle

more vulnerable to pressure mines.

ii Protected vehicles are more likely to get stuck on the pro-tection p lating in boggy c ond itions.

iii Protected vehicles are difficult to service because ofrestricted access to key components, and are prone tooverheating and similar problems.

Self-help modifications such as filling tyres with water toreduce road pressure, sandbagging the inside of cabs, remov-ing engine covers, and similar tactics are of doubtful practical

effect, and have an attendant negative impact on safe drivingand vehicle reliability.

It is worth stressing that the most effective safety measure isavoidance. Staff should question local people, de-mining teams,and other agencies before entering unknown or suspect areas,and avoid travelling in areas of known risk unless there is anover-riding operational justification.



APPENDIX 3

Statements on landmines byhumanitarian organisations

There is growing concern among humanitarian organisationsabout the problem of landmines. These are two examples toillustrate the range of responses. The first statement, signed by

Oxfam, was prepared by a group of development and relieforganisations. The second statement, to which Mines AdvisoryGroup is a signatory, describes the campaign being organised bya group of hum an rights, de-mining and medical organisations.

1 This paper was produced for the Steering Comm ittee forHum anitarian Response, an alliance for voluntary action of:Caritas International, Catholic Relief Services, InternationalFederation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,

International Save the Children Alliance, L utheran WorldFederation, Oxfam, and the World Council of Churches.

Anti-personnel land mines (APMs) are small but le thalweapons o f des t ruc t ion des igned fo r mi l i ta ry purposes .Although used in inter-nation conflicts, APMs are typically theweapon of choice in civil war situations because of their smallsize, low cost, and capacity to indiscriminately maim and ter-rorise civilian as well as military populations.

The most distinguishing feature of APMs is their capacity tomaim and kill arbitrarily long after wars have ended. APMs arethe quiet but deadly legacy of war for present and future genera-tions.

Humanitarian NGOs are particularly aware of the impact ofAPMs. In addition to an unacceptable level of needless humansuffering, APMs cause major disruption to relief and post-warhumanitarian work: safe return of refugees and displaced

people, long-term recovery and development.The civilian and post-war destructive capacity of APMs is

ex tens ive ly documented in Cambodia , Angola , Somal ia ,Afghanistan, and Mozambique.

The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR)and the organisations which it represents believe that their



Appendices • 79

work in humanitarian response necessitates their concertedefforts in regard to APMs in the following w ays:

International Law

In 1980 the U ni ted N at io ns ado p te d a C on ven t ion onProhibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain ConventionalWeapons W hich May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious orto Have Indiscr iminate Effects , commonly known as theConvention on Inhumane Weapons, and three Protocols to it.The convention and its protocols provide for the protection of

c iv i l ians f rom at tacks by means of incendiary weapons,landmines and booby-traps , and prohibi t the use of anyweapons the primary effect of which is to injure by fragmentsthat cannot be readily detected in the human body. Thisconvent ion has been ra t i f ied by 36 countr ies . While theconvention and i ts protocols address the use of inhumaneweapons, the protection for civilians is weak and there is nomech an i sm p ro p o sed fo r t h e l imi t a t io n o f weap o n s

manufacture.As of 2 December 1993 the convention will be reviewed.

Also, it is anticipated that other resolutions relative to APMswill come before the UN General Assembly.

The SCHR is prepared to:i work for the further ratification of the conven tion and its

protocols by countries which have not yet done so;ii seek avenu es of intervention to strengthen the conven tion

and i ts pro toco ls to pro vid e effect ive pro tec t io n forcivilians;

i i i promote international discussion and advocacy whichwould lead finally to the abolition of the manufacture and

consequently the use of APMs.

Adequate NGO access to the UN review of theconvention and protocols

The experience of humanitarian NGOs should be an important

aspect of the inter-governmental review process. The SCHR isprepared to address the issue of NGO access with the UNSecretary-General and other appr op r ia te UN agencies asnecessary.

Adequate financial and human resources for demining

The SCHR is prepared to address the inadequacy of current UNdemining programmes, and to seek a significant commitment of



80 • Landmines

resources to UN and other demining programmes.

Care for victimsThe SCHR is prepared to provide care for mines victims in theirhumanitarian work within their existing mandates ofhumanitarian response.

Raising public awareness

The SCHR is prepared to conduct information and awarenessprogrammes within their organisational constituencies which

seek to educate and inform on the above points.

2 The International Landm ines Cam paign was launched in1992 as a direct response to the increasing toll among civilianscaused by landmines. The campaign is now supported activelyby more than 80 organisations worldwide and has been a majorfactor in influencing recent controls on landmine exports andthe continuing international debate surrounding the manufac-ture, trade and impact of landmines.

Han d icap In t e rn a t io n a l , Hu man Rig h t s Wa tch , Med icoInternational, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for HumanRights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation havecome together to issue a joint call to ban anti-personnel land-mines:

Whereas anti-personnel landmines that detonate on contact areindiscriminate weapons that remain hidden and lethal long

after the end ofa

conflict; andwhereas antipersonnel landmines have killed or mutilated tensof thousands of civilians and rendered large tracts of agricul-tural and pastoral land unusable, preventing the subsistenceand economic development of rural populations; and

whereas the 1981 United Nations Protocol on Prohibitions orRestrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and OtherDevices has failed to prevent the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel m ines;

We call for:

An international ban on the use, production, stockpiling, and

sale, transfer or export of anti-personnel mines; andThe establishment of an international fund, adm inistered by the

United Nations, to promote and finance landmine aware-ness, clearance and eradication programmes worldwide; and

Countries responsible for the production and dissemination ofanti-personnel mines to contribute to the international fund.



APPENDIX 4

Mines Advisory Group

The Mines Advisory Group (MAG) is a non-profit, non-govern-mental charitable organisation dedicated to assisting poor com-munities faced w ith m ine-related prob lems. It is the primary role

of the Mines Advisory Group to eradicate the existing problemsof mines to allow subsistence rural communities to live withoutfear of death and maiming by landmines.

All MAG programmes are based on technical expertise withan emphasis on safety, and, as the eradication of mines is a long-term task, the establishment of an indigenous capability to dealwith the problem. MAG has a commitment to ensure the maxi-mum possible level of technical training and assistance for local

teams, which is always based on expatriate staff working along-side trainees in live mined environments.

MAG always destroys mines, either in situ, or when this isnot possible for technical or safety reasons, collectively at theend of each day. No serving soldiers are employed by MAG inany of its programmes. MAG will only eradicate mines fromareas where there is a clear humanitarian reason for such action— minefields w hich have a continuing military role or wh ichare laid to protect the integrity of international borders will not

be cleared unless by mutual request of all involved parties forhumanitarian reasons. All MAG projects are supported by par-allel community education initiatives, normally as an integralsector of MAG action.

MAG is active in North Iraq/Kurdistan, Cambodia, Angola,Laos and will soon begin programmes in Mozambique andCentral America. S ituation surveys have also been co nduc ted inAfghanistan and Somalia.

Since anti-personnel mines constitute a major humanitarianemergency in many poor countries, MAG has and w ill con tinueto actively campaign for an international ban on the manufac-ture, sale, use and proliferation of these w eapo ns.

Mines Advisory Group, 54A Main Street, Cockermouth,Cum bria CA13 9LU, UK

Tel: INT + 44 (0) 900 828580 or 828688Fax: INT + 44 (0)900 827088



Index

References in bold type are toillustrations.

72A/72B plastic anti-personnelmines 19, 20

activation mechanisms 8-9Afghanistan 1, 24, 28, 48, 65,

72, 78, 81; M16A1/M16A2mines 16; nomadic groups

37; PFM-1 mines 18; PMNmines 11; refugees 35;Soviet/Afghan war 3, 4, 21,22, 23, 39-40

agricultural land 2, 23, 31-4, 47;mines used as tools, 44

aid workers: attitudes towardsmines ix, 42,43; avoidanceof mines see avoidance; com-

mitments made to communi-ties 64; community educa-tion 59-61; data collection61-2; mine-protection on pro-ject vehicles 77; siting ofrehabilitation projects 49

airstrips 46amputations 27, 28, 29Angola 1, 29, 65, 72, 78, 81;

anti-personnel mines 8;M16A1/M16A2 mines 16;PMN mines 11; refugees 35

animals 33; dogs used for detec-tion 68

anti-morale tactics 23anti-personnel mines 2, 5, 6, 7,

69; statement by humanitari-an organisations 78-80

anti-tank mines 2, 4

anti-vehicle m ines 5armed conflict 20-24Armenia 72arms manufacturers 69-70avoidance see also education;

minefield procedure; basicrules 47-51; mine-awarenesscourses 35-6, 66; risk areas44-7

Azerbaijan 72

B40 'ball m ines' 14battle zones 45-7blast effect 7, 73; injuries

caused 27; M14 mines 16 ,17;PMN mines 11; PMN-2mines 13

blindness 27, 28, 29

BLU 63/BLU 24B mines 6, 25booby-traps 7,45Bosnia 72bounding mines 8,12;

M16A1/M16A2 16; OZMmines 17

box mines 18breaching minefields 65bridges 45-6Britain; training of Kluner fac-

tions 23, 25, , 73-4Buckley, Christopher 1buildings 45Burma (Myanmar) 72burning vegetation 32-3'butterfly' mines 3,18,1 9, 40,

76; dissemination 9

Cambodia x, 1, 3 , 22, 24, 48, 61,



Index • 83

65, 72, 78, 81; 72A/72B plas-tic blast mines 19, 20; mine-

clearance 74; mines used astools 42, 43; PMN mines 11;refugees 35, 36; training ofKhmer factions 23, 25, 73-4

camouflage 38, 44, 50canals 46categories of mines 4-7Chad 72children 26, 27, 34, 35, 39, 60-

61; mines as toys 39-42China: mine manufacture 13,18; training of Khmer forces23

CIA (Central IntelligenceAgency) 3

civilians: insurgency andcounter-insurgency cam-paigns 23-4

'Claymore' mines 8clearance of mines 65-9; cost70; mechanised 67-8, 69

Columhia 72communities: impact of mines

see impact areascommunity action: commit-

ments made by aid workers64; community leaders 63-4;data collection 61-2; educa-tion 59-61

concealed minefields 44counter-insurgency campaigns

22-4Croatia 72Cuba 72cultural centres 49Czechoslovakia 13

data collection 61-2dead ground 46deployment of mines 20-24detonators 76development agencies see aid

workers; non-governmentalorganisations

displaced people 37dissemination methods 9

ditches 46dogs 68

donation of funds 67Dragontooth mine 3

education 59-61; eradication ofmines 66; mine-awarenesscourses 35-6, 66; publicawareness 71, 80

Egypt: mine manufacture 13,14El Salvador 72

elderly people 39emergencies 52-3; escape 53-4;movement 54; probing 55-6;rescue attempts 56-8

eradication of mines 65-9; cost70; mechanised 67-8, 69

Eritrea 72escape 53-4Ethiopia 72

explosive chain 75-6explosive mine-clearance 69

Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 21,72

farming see agricultural landfenced minefields 44-5flails 69flooding 34fragmentation 7-8; BLU 63/BLU

24B mines 6; injuries caused27-8; POMZ-type mines 13,14; VS69 mines 12

fuel air explosives 69funding 67fuses 75-6

Georgia 72'Giant Viper' explosives 69

global solution 69-71governments 70Greece: mine manufacture 15,

16Guatemala 72Gulf War 21; anti-personnel

mines 6

hand-emplaced mines 9



84 • Landmines

herders 32-3, 34, 37, 60 see also

shepherds

Honduras 72humanitarian organisations 70

see also aid workers; state-ment on landmines 78-80

igniters 75-6impact areas 30-31; agricultural

communities 2, 23, 31-4, 44,47; internally displaced peo-

ple 37; nomadic groups 37;refugees 34-6

improvised explosive devices(IEDs) 7

India: mine manufacture 16injuries 26-9insurgency campaigns 22-4internally displaced people 37International Committee of the

Red Cross 72International Landmines

Campaign 80international law 70, 79Iran 24, 72: PMN mines 11;

VS69 mines 12Iraq 1,22, 23, 24, 65, 72,81;

agricultural land 32; children41; community education 60;

M16A1/M16A2 mines 16;PMD box mines 18; PMNmines 11; SB-33 mines 15;VS69 mines 12

Israel: mine manufacture 18Italy: mine manufacture 12,14,

15

Khmer factions 23, 25, 73-4

Korea: mine manufacture 13,16,18Korean conflict 3Kurdistan 22, 23, 65, 81; chil-

dren 41; PMN mines 11; SB-33 mines 15

Kuwait 72; VS69 mines 12

landmines: activation mecha-nisms 8-9; avoidance, basic

rules 47-51; mine-awarenesscourses 35-6; risk areas 44-7;

categories 4-7; communityaction see community action;deployment in armed con-flict 20-24; disseminationmethods 9; eradication 65-9;cost 70; mechanised 67-8, 69;explosive chain 75-6; globalsolution 69-71; hindrance todevelopment objectives 2;

history and development 2-4;impact on comm unities seeimpact areas; injuries caused26-9; local solutions 65-9;mine-awareness courses 35-6, 66; mode of operation 7-8;persistence and uncontrolla-bility 1-2, 69-70, 78-80; pro-tected vehicles 78; protection

mechanisms 9-10; soldiers'attitudes 24-5; statement byhumanitarian organisations78-80; victims see victims;vulnerability see vulnerabili-ty

Laos 1, 2, 3, 22, 25, 72, 81; anti-personnel mines 5, 6; mine-clearance training 66

Libya 72light-sensitive activation 10livestock 33local solutions 65-9; see also

community action

M14 blast anti-personnel mines16,17

M16A1/M16A2 bounding anti-personnel mines 16

M18A1 'Claymore' mine 8MAG see Mines Advisory

Groupmagnetically activated detona-

tion 10Malvinas {Falkland Islands) 21,

72manufacturers 69-70mapping procedures 20, 21, 49,



Index • 85

61,62marked minefields 20, 21, 44

mechanically emplaced mines9

mechanised mine-clearance 67-8,69

mental trauma 28-9mentally disadvantaged per-

sons 39military buildings 45, 49, 51mine-awareness courses 35-6,

66mine ploughs 69mine-protection 77minefield procedures 52-3;

escape 53-4; movement 54;probing 55-6; rescue attempts56-8

minefields 44-5mines see landminesMines Advisory Group (MAG)

vii, 1,10, 25; address andinformation 81; Iraq, work in60; mine-clearance training66; warning posters 59, 74

Mozambique 65, 72, 78, 81;PMN mines 11; refugees 35

Mujahadeen 23, 24, 48Myanmar (Burma) 72

Nicaragua 72; M16A1/M16A2mines 16; PMN mines 11

nomadic communities 33, 34,37

non-governmental organisa-tions (NGOs) 67, 70; state-ment on landmines 78-80

old people 39

OZM-series bounding anti-per-sonnel mines

Pakistan: refugees 35PFM-1 scatterable anti-person-

nel mines 3,18,19, 40, 76;dissemination 9

plastic mines 19, 20ploughs 69

PMD box mines 18PMN blast anti-personnel

mines 11, 73, 75PMN-2 anti-personnel blast

mines 13, 73Poland 2POMZ-type fragmentation anti-

personnel mines 13,14;injuries caused 28

Portugal: mine manufacture 15pressure activation 8

pressure-release activation 9pressure-release protectionmechanisms 10

probing 55-6protection mechanisms 9-10psychological trauma 28-9public awareness 71, 80

railways 46rain 34recording procedures 20, 21Red Cross 72refugees 34-6religious centres 49remote deployment 9, 25repatriation 34-6rescue attempts 56-8risk areas 44-7risk assessment 31-2risk categories 34roads 49-50rural areas 30-31 see also agri-

cultural landRussia 1, 2, 72 see also Soviet

Union; mine manufacture 73Rwanda 72

safety see avoidance; minefield

procedureSAS (Special Air Service):

training of Khmer factions25,73

SB-33 scatterable anti-person-nel mines 15

scatterable mines 9; PFM -118,19; SB-33 15; TS-50 14; VS-50 14,15



86 • Landmines

shepherds 27, 33 see also

herders

shock 28Singapore: mine manufacture

14snow 34soldiers: attitude towards mines

24-5Somalia 23, 72, 78, 81; children

in 42; mine clearance 64, 68Somaliland 23

Southern Africa: PMD boxmines 18;

Soviet/Afghan war 21, 23Soviet Union see also Russia:

mine manufacture 11 ,13 ,17 ,18,73

Spain: mine manufacture 15Sri Lanka 72Steering Committee for

Humanitarian Response(SCHR) 78-80strategic use of mines 20-25sub-munitiions 3, 72Sudan 72

terrorism 23tilt-activated detonation 10tools 42-4

tourist attractions 48toys 39-42training see educationtrenches 46tripwires 8-9TS-50 scatterable anti-person-

nel mines 14Tajikistan 72

Uzbekistan 72United Kingdom: training of

khmer factions 23, 25, 73-4UNHCR 36, 37United Nations 4; mine-clear-

ance 67, 70, 79-80United States 2, 3, 22, 25; mine

manufacture 16; training ofKhmer factions 73-4

US State Department 72

Valmara 69 (VS 69) anti-person-nel bounding mine 12, 40;injuries caused 28

vehicle protection 77

victims x, 2, 38-39; care provi-sion 80; injuries 26-9; rescueattempts 56-8; risk categories34

Vietnam 3,14, 21, 72; mine

manufacture 16,18visible minefields 44voltage-sensitive activation 10VP-12/VP-13 mine-firing

devices 5VS-50 scatterable anti-person-

nel mines 14 ,15, 41VS69 see Valmara 69vulnerability 38-9; children see

children; mines used as tools42-4; refugees 34-6; risk cate-gories 34; shepherds 27

warfare 20-24warning posters 59, 74World War 11 ,2World WarH 1,2

Yugoslavia: mine manufacture13



Documents

Landmines: Legacy of conflict - A manual for development workers