Landmines andU.S. Leadership:

A View from the Field

by Patricia S. Huntington

A National Committee onAmerican Foreign Policy Reportwith Policy Recommendations

December 2000(reprinted June 2001)

Our Purposes

The National Committee on American Foreign Policy(NCAFP) was founded in 1974 by Professor Hans J.Morgenthau, among others, to serve as a nonprofit,independent foreign policy organization, think tank, andeducational forum. Among our members are experts fromthe worlds of diplomacy and academia and leaders frombusiness and the professions.

The National Committee is concerned with the advancementof American national interests in the intricate political andeconomic spheres of the global arena.

These concerns include

1. preserving and strengthening open-society countries,2. improving U.S. relations with the developing world,3. advancing human rights,4. curbing the proliferation of nuclear and other

nonconventional weapons,5. extending arms control agreements, and6. promoting an open and global world economy.

A major and distinguishing activity of the NCAFP is thepresentation of firm and reasoned positions on specificissues. When, after study and discussion, we reach aconsensus on an aspect of foreign policy that affectsAmerican national interests, the NCAFP makes thatjudgment known to the administration, Congress, the media,and the general public. Our willingness to take a publicstand—independent of partisan, ethnic, and regional specialinterests—makes the National Committee on AmericanForeign Policy different from other nonprofit organizationsin the field of foreign affairs.

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Contents

Foreword ............................................................................1

Introduction .......................................................................2

I. The Humanitarian Problem and Mine Clearance .......3

II. Landmines and National Security.............................11

III. The Use of “Dumb” Mines by Nonstate Actors .......16

IV. Policies Governing the Future of Landmines ..........17

V. The U.S. Search for Alternatives to Landmines .......23

Conclusion........................................................................26

About the Author .............................................................27

Notes.................................................................................28

Policy Recommendations.................................................33

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Foreword

The National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP)is a private, nongovernmental organization dedicated toarticulating American foreign policy from a nonpartisanperspective and within the framework of political realism. TheNCAFP publishes and disseminates its policy reports and policyrecommendations to a continually growing audience of foreignpolicymakers, specialists, and practitioners in the United Statesand abroad.

This report titled “Landmines and U.S. Leadership: A Viewfrom the Field” is, with a few exceptions, basically the same thatappeared in American Foreign Policy Interests in December 2000.The policy recommendations remain unchanged.

The NCAFP expresses its gratitude to the government officials,scholars, policy analysts, and leaders working in the field whohave taken time from their busy schedules to confer with us.

Special thanks goes to Dr. Patricia Skinner Huntington, theNCAFP’s project director on U.S. National Security andLandmines and the author of this report. Without her knowledge,determination, and camaraderie this project would never havedeveloped into the pathbreaking policy study with policyrecommendations that it has become.

I also thank Executive Vice President William M. Rudolf,Senior Vice President Donald S. Rice, Professor Bernard E.Brown, and Ms. Edwina McMahon for their unstinting supportand participation.

The NCAFP is also very grateful to the Rockefeller Foundationand to Mutual of America Life Insurance Company for theirgenerous support.

The views and policy recommendations made in connectionwith this report are those of the NCAFP alone.

George D. Schwab, PresidentNational Committee onAmerican Foreign Policy

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Landmines and U.S. Leadership:A View from the Fieldby Patricia S. Huntington

A once prosperous farmer, whose tea plantation stretches alongthe shores of the Black Sea, explained that during Abkhazia’s warfor independence in 1992, he had used landmines to protect hisfarm from hostile Georgians. “If my neighbors and I had not doneso, we would have lost our homes and our tea harvest,” he said.“Sometimes we put the mines out at night and removed them atdaybreak. They were our guards, and we were grateful for them.”

In the village of Tmar Pouk, a former trading center in thenorth of Cambodia, various warring factions such as theCambodian Army, the Khmer Rouge, Royalists, and numerousinsurgent groups laid mines over a period of twenty-five years.According to the Tmar Pouk village chief, the people of his villagealso laid mines to protect themselves from marauders.“Landmines saved us,” he said. “Without them our wives wouldhave been taken and our children slaughtered. We would not bealive.” He explained his position by stating that “In a wartimesituation if you have the ability to lay 100 mines and protect yourfamily, you will use whatever is available, and it doesn’t matter ifsomeone says you shouldn’t.”

Both men fiercely contended that in their particular cases,mines were essentially defensive: They were deployed to savecivilian lives. The use of landmines illustrated in these twoexamples contrasts with the use to which the vast majority ofmines have been put in the world today, suggesting that the issueof landmines is extremely complex. Mines continue to present aserious threat to the lives and well-being of millions of peoplethroughout the world, causing untold suffering to individuals andtheir families, diverting the energies and resources of war-torncountries, and preventing war-devastated areas from regainingeconomic and political stability. There is an inherent tension inweighing the civilian safety concerns against the tactical benefitsof using landmines. Even though everyone deplores the injuryinflicted on civilians and the damage wrought on communities bymines, they will continue to be used by both conventional militaryforces to protect their troops and by nonstate actors such as

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insurgents and guerrilla forces to retain territory under theircontrol. Farmers and villagers will also use them in times ofthreat.

It is necessary to clarify terms before a substantive discussionof landmine policy can proceed. For example, public opinion hasfocused on anti-personnel landmines as the major source of thehumanitarian problem. The term “anti-personnel landmine” is,however, misleading. First, there is a vast difference between thecommon, long-duration, “dumb” anti-personnel mines that remainactive in the ground for decades and can be set off by civilians andthe short-duration “smart” anti-personnel mines used forimmediate military action. “Smart” mines with built-in computerchips can be set to destroy themselves or deactivate in a matter ofhours or days, thus posing little or no harm to civilians.

Concentrating on anti-personnel mines can be deceptive foranother reason as well: They are not the only source of harminflicted on civilians. Other munitions, including booby traps,antitank mines, and unexploded ordnance (UXO) such as clusterbombs, rockets, mortars, and artillery shells are equallyhazardous.

This report consists of two parts. The first section examines thenature of the humanitarian problem, what is being done in thefield to clear landmines, and why clearance is a major componentof U.S. landmine policy. The second part focuses on the problem ofhow to reduce the indiscriminate deployment of landmines byaddressing such questions as “Is the Mine Ban Treaty likely towork?” and “Is U.S. policy moving in a positive direction?” As thequotes from the Black Sea farmer and the Cambodian village chiefsuggest, the objective of reducing the use of mines is extremelycomplex and needs to be understood both in light of U.S. securityconsiderations and in the context of internal conflicts, includingethnic strife, in many parts of the world.1

I. The Humanitarian Problem and Mine Clearance

A comprehensive discussion of landmine policy depends on aclear understanding of both the humanitarian problem and theprocess of mine clearance from the perspective of people in thefield. Even the shocking images of the victims of anti-personnellandmines, booby traps, and antitank mines fail to convey the fullextent of the harm that these weapons cause to individuals and

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their communities. In addition to suffering pain anddisfigurement, many survivors are unable to resume working,especially if they live in rural areas where medical care,prostheses, and rehabilitation are not available. Their familiesmust care for them, which drains resources from already poorcommunities. At the local and national levels, mines disrupteconomic activity and impede development. The presence of minesin a town or village makes the simplest tasks dangerous. Mines onroads and railways hamper transportation, preventing thedelivery of food and humanitarian assistance and the resettlementof refugees. Mines in fields and waterholes put agricultural landsout of bounds; mines in schools put children’s education on hold.In these and many other ways, mines make it harder for people toresume their normal lives and rebuild their societies in theaftermath of war.

Landmines and UXO affect more than 85 percent of thepopulation of Afghanistan. Like the capital city of Kabul,thousands of rural villages are contaminated with mines.Landmines have had such a damaging effect on the Afghaneconomy that former airline pilots, university professors, andphysicians are working as deminers because it is the onlyemployment available to them.

More than half of Angola was mined during four decades of civilwar. Because of mines and UXO, most of the country’s fertilefarmland lies fallow and the country, formerly the breadbasket ofAfrica, now depends on imported food and internationalassistance. Eighty percent of Angola’s twelve million people aresick and starving because mines along the roads prevent aidworkers from delivering food and medicines to them. Despitenatural resources that include gas, oil, diamonds, and minerals,Angola’s hopes for development are bleak.

Once prosperous, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been brought almostto a standstill by landmines. More than 18,000 minefields infest300 square kilometers of land. When we visited in 1999, we sawapartment buildings, schools, children’s parks, cemeteries,monasteries, power plants, bridges, and dams that had all beenmined. Mines infected all aspects of daily lives, hamperingreconstruction and causing widespread unemployment and asense of hopelessness.

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Getting the Numbers Right

Because a majority of mines laid during civil wars and otherkinds of internal conflicts were never marked or mapped, earlyestimates of their numbers were exaggerated. In 1997 the UnitedNations estimated that 110 million mines in 68 countries wouldrequire 1,000 years to clear at a cost of thirty billion dollars.Furthermore, it estimated that two million new mines were beinglaid each year and that only 100,000 were being removed. Thosestatistics were misleading for several reasons: They inflated thenumber of mines and casualties, leading many to believe thatremoving mines already in the ground would amount to a losingbattle. In attempting to quantify the landmine problem, theorganization inadvertently drew attention away from a moreimportant statistic—the number of square kilometers cleared—that renders the number of mines irrelevant. The blind use ofsuch numbers caused great difficulties in mine-clearancemanagement and led many in mine-affected countries to believethat their situation was hopeless.

The picture from the field looks more encouraging. Based onthe calculations of teams working throughout the world surveyingand clearing mines, the number of mines in the ground is muchlower than estimated previously. According to 1998 U.S. StateDepartment calculations, there are no more than from sixty toseventy million mines globally. Demining groups think that thereare half that number. In Afghanistan alone the number wasrevised downward from thirty-five million to fewer than tenmillion by the Pro Victimis Foundation in a study published in2000. According to the HALO Trust, a leading deminingorganization, very few mines are being laid compared to thenumber that are being cleared. As a result, by the end of the year2001, the organization predicts, many areas on all continents willbe rid of their mine problems.

Humanitarian Mine Clearance

The term “humanitarian demining” was coined in 1988 inAfghanistan by Colin Mitchell and Guy Willoughby, founders ofthe HALO Trust. Humanitarian demining clearing standards areexceedingly high. In fact, the most effective mine-clearingorganizations exceed the United Nations standard of achieving99.6 percent mine-free land, which was established to protect thelives of civilians who use the “demined” land.

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Humanitarian mine clearance today is quite different frommilitary demining. Military forces in wartime clear landminesonly to facilitate their military operations. They use a variety ofmechanical and explosive methods; the main objective is speed,not total clearance. That kind of rapid clearance took place in1945, after World War II, when there were as many mines inEurope alone as there are in the entire world now. More than 80percent were cleared by the military, in some cases usingprisoners of war, within two years of the end of the war. Becauserapid clearance could not guarantee 100 percent effectiveness,some countries such as Poland continued to suffer manycasualties. After the Gulf War, mechanical mine clearance wasused in Kuwait. Mines were easily identified and removed fromthe sandy terrain, but clearance was not thorough, and Kuwaitilives were lost to mines that had been overlooked.

Effective Demining

Although it seems counterintuitive to many people living inindustrialized societies, the key to reducing the threat of mines ismanual demining. Working alone or in pairs, tens of thousands ofmanual deminers throughout the world clear contaminated landsone square meter at a time to ensure that the land is renderedcompletely safe. Using simple tools, metal detectors, probes,scissors, and trowels, they locate mines, uncover them enough toidentify them, and then call in experienced demolition experts toremove or explode them. It is slow, painstaking, and disciplinedwork; the results produced are more extensive than mechanicaldemining and safer for civilians who subsequently use the land. Itis surprising but true that manual demining when done correctlyis less dangerous than commercial fishing or coal mining.

Given the range of situations in which mines have been found,only humans can guarantee high clearance standards. Forexample, mines have been found at different heights and atdifferent depths. Despite what most people think, all mines arenot small plastic containers buried just beneath the earth. Minescan lie on top of the ground or under its surface; they can bemounted on trees or on fences; they can be planted among therocks of embankments awaiting the ascent of the enemy.Deminers must be alert to the presence of trip wires just off theground or waist high or of mines that may be linked to oneanother or to larger, more dangerous explosives. They must look

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for antitank mines mixed in among anti-personnel mines.Frequently they find unexploded ordnance (UXO), which is asthreatening as landmines. Although UXO has been designed toexplode on impact or before, in actuality anywhere from 5 percentto 30 percent usually do not function properly and thereforebecome a threat to civilians.

Mines also have been unearthed in a wide variety ofenvironments: among rocks, next to schools, around public wells,near power lines, on mountain slopes and ski areas, alongbeaches, in city streets, under houses, inside piles of trash andrubble, around gravestones, and in tropical foliage. We watcheddeminers in Abkhazia dig up Russian-made mines, usually laidfrom 1 to 4 centimeters below the ground, that were buried 50centimeters below ground in an area where a river had overflowedits banks and deposited layers of silt. In Laos near the Plain ofJars, we were startled to come across a hundred live artilleryshells stacked in layers under the playground of a school that hadbeen a former military base. Shortly afterward, the author waseven more startled when she came face to face with a live mortarstuck on a stump and camouflaged by cornstalks in a nearbycornfield. In Nicaragua after the floods of Hurricane Mitch, wewere shown mines that had moved 300 meters downstream fromwhere they had been originally laid and mapped. Deminers toldus that after the spring thaws in Kosovo, they found mines farfrom where they had been laid because the snow had melted anddisplaced them. We talked with Mozambican and Kosovardeminers using mine detection dogs to help locate mines and UXOand ensure the quality of the clearance. They told us thatalthough such dogs can speed up certain aspects of mine clearanceand are especially adept at identifying UXO and trip wires, theycannot take the place of human beings who can solve problems onthe spot.

Technology and Mine Clearance

Although one might think that machines could sweep through aminefield and remove and explode all the mines, technology haslimited potential to facilitate the laborious process of demining.Despite the fact that machines can help, heavy equipment such asarmored vehicles with flails, rollers, plows, or buckets cannotoperate in many kinds of terrain, and it is hard to transport themto remote areas where the roads are bad and bridges too weak to

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support them. In areas where machines can be used, theyfacilitate the work by exploding some mines, locating clusters ofmines, cutting underbrush, and preparing the ground for minedetectors. Machines, however, may miss some mines and cannotguarantee thorough clearance. They must be followed by humanbeings who painstakingly cover every foot of ground in theirsearch for mines. In short, technology can help but will not changethe basic nature of the task in the near future.

Humanitarian Mine Clearance and Development

Humanitarian mine clearance is the first step in thedevelopment of war-torn areas. Until indigenous people andrefugees who want to return feel safe and have access to water,arable land, and a stable infrastructure, other forms ofdevelopment cannot take place. In such situations the largestinternational employer is usually the mine-clearance program.Local citizens, unemployed because of war, are trained byinternational experts in acquiring the technical skills of mineclearing, management, and leadership so that they can get wellpaid jobs in mine-action programs. Farmers, fishermen, coalminers, teachers, medics, bankers, professors, and soldiers engagein training. Some conduct mine-awareness programs for schoolchildren and refugees. Others work in rehabilitation centers formine victims. Still others are engaged in destroying stockpiles ofmines. Most deminers are engaged in the exacting work ofclearing mines. Many local deminers become team leaders orsupervisors, gaining skills that they can apply later to other areasof development such as agriculture, health, and education. Inshort, mine-clearance programs create positive relationships withlocal populations who gain transferable skills and establishimportant bonds of trust with those who have come to theirhomeland to assist them.

U.S. Mine-Clearance Policy

The United States government has made a commitment tohumanitarian mine clearance, convinced that it can be achievedby 2010. As early as 1988 the United States sent a landmine-assessment team to war-torn Afghanistan. That initiative led tomine-clearance programs in Afghanistan and seven othercountries. American involvement grew. By the end of 2001, theUnited States will have provided half a billion dollars for mineaction in thirty-seven countries—the largest commitment of any

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nation.

The target date set by the United States for eliminating thethreat of mines to civilians is 2010. The goals of the program areto reduce the loss of life among innocent people, to createconditions for the safe return of refugees and other internallydisplaced persons, and to promote the economic recovery andpolitical stability of war-torn countries. U.S. support is targeted onfive activities: mine awareness, mine clearance, assistance to localmine action center development, civil-military cooperation, andvictim assistance. Half a dozen government offices, including theDepartment of State, the Department of Defense, and AID, poolresources to support mine clearance. The secretary of state’s Officeof Global Humanitarian Demining complements the work of theother agencies by promoting the 2010 Initiative and fosteringpartnerships between the public and private sectors.

The Department of Defense provides humanitarian deminingstart-up costs; the Department of State provides a stream of fundsfor mine action. After country programs establish indigenousdemining capabilities and resources and become self-sustaining,the host country bears more of the responsibilities and the costs.“Train the Trainer” is the core of the Defense Departmentprogram. U.S. Special Forces have trained more than 4,000 localcivilians and military personnel through this program.

The United States has been criticized by the United NationsMine Action Services, among others, for not allowing its militaryto enter minefields or engage in demining activities. Criticsquestion why Americans are allowed only to engage in training.Why, they ask, are Americans not willing to risk their own lives ascitizens of other countries are prepared to do? U.S. militaryleaders respond that they are constrained by Title 10 of the U. S.code that stipulates, “United States Forces shall not engage inphysically detecting, lifting, or destroying landmines, unless [theydo] so for the concurrent purpose of supporting a U.S. militaryoperation or provide such assistance as part of a militaryoperation that does not involve the armed forces.”

Another criticism of the U.S. mine-clearance program relates tothe claim that research and development funds are squandered onwhat may turn out to be an idle search for Star Wars mine-clearance technology. Some assert that although high-techconcepts are appealing in Silicone Valley, they may prove to be

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irrelevant in the real world in which mines have been planted.Many critics maintain that such funds could be put to better use ifthey were allocated to establishing additional demining programs.Still others charge that the use of American comic book andcartoon characters to promote mine awareness in other countriesis culturally inappropriate. Those who have experience in the fieldremind us that children who are most affected by mines live inremote areas where there are few radios and even fewertelevisions sets. Because they are not able to identify icons ofAmerican mass culture, they are not able to relate to the life-saving messages attributed to such creatures as Superman andBugs Bunny. Our field research proved over and over that themost effective mine-awareness programs are those rooted in localcultures and familiar concepts. It was no accident that we sawstacks of American mine awareness comic books filed in the trashin more than one area we visited.

Criticisms notwithstanding, the United States remains theworld leader in providing support for mine clearance. It receivescontinuous requests for funds from nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs) and governments throughout the world.U.S. initiatives undertaken in cooperation with leaders andinstitutions in mine-affected countries, includingnongovernmental organizations that clear mines and the militaryof a host country, have proved to be the most effective. In an effortto reinforce and strengthen its impact on mine clearance, theUnited States collaborates with other countries, including Japan,the United Kingdom, Australia, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden,Switzerland, and Canada, and with international and regionalorganizations such as the United Nations, the European Union,and the Organization of American States.

Examples of Progress

American support for mine clearance has produced somenotable successes. In Namibia, where the United States has beeninvolved since 1994, the landmine casualty rate has been reducedby 90 percent. In 2001, Namibia became the first “mined” countryin Africa to become mine safe, although Angola’s continuing civilwar threatened to spill over its northern border, bringing aboutremining. In Central America, El Salvador has been cleared ofmines, and Honduras and Costa Rica are scheduled to become freeof mines in 2001 or 2002. Guatemala and Nicaragua will be mine

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safe by 2006 and would probably have been cleared sooner had itnot been for the displacement of mines during Hurricane Mitch.Having contributed twelve million dollars to the Organization ofAmerican States and the Inter-American Defense Board forclearance, training, and awareness programs in Central America,the United States has been credited with playing a vital role inthis regional demining program. The U.S.-supported program inNicaragua has yielded an additional benefit: It has reducedtensions and promoted confidence in a future shared bySandinistas and Contras, former enemies who have been workingtogether in harmony clearing mines left over from their conflict.

In Laos by the end of 1999, U.S. Special Forces had trainedmore than 800 local deminers, built a staff of competentinstructors, and turned the program over to local authorities. TheNam Suang UXO Training Center, now administered by Laos,provides courses in community awareness, clearance techniques,medical training, and leadership development. Through train-the-trainer programs like this, the U.S. military has providededucation and skills development to more than 25 percent of theworld’s humanitarian deminers.

U.S.-funded mine-awareness programs held in refugee campsfor Kosovars in Macedonia and Albania have been credited withhelping to reduce accidents among returning refugees to fewerthan ten per year. Emergency demining in Kosovo dramaticallyreduced the threat from mines and UXO within a few months.The United States sent teams of experts, including a U.S.-trainedteam of highly skilled Mozambicans using mine detection dogs, toclear the area rapidly before the winter snows. By the beginningof 2001, this effort was so successful that the threat of mines andUXO in the province was virtually nil.

The United States has succeeded in using its resources toaccomplish the essential tasks that enable a country to recoverfrom conflict and proceed with its economic, social, and politicaldevelopment. The mine-clearing work has created jobs,transferred skills, and given the United States a positive imageoverseas. Such successes underscore the need for continuedfunding of humanitarian mine clearance until all the mines havebeen removed. 2

II. Landmines and National Security

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Many countries consider mines, including anti-personnellandmines, to be a vital and legitimate defensive weapon andmaintain that if carefully regulated and subjected to newtechnologies designed to limit their life spans, they can be used toprotect soldiers and homelands without danger to civilians. Morethan fifty countries, including the major military powers, claimthat mines used responsibly serve national interests andsafeguard citizens. Whereas some countries cite the need formines to protect international borders, others focus on thepracticality of using mines for the defense of vital infrastructure,and still others, including the United States and its allies,maintain that antitank mines are essential defensive weapons formodern military forces engaged in ground warfare.

Mines Used in Border Defense

Finland, Turkey, India, Russia, China, Kuwait, and SouthKorea, among other countries that do not support the Mine BanTreaty, claim that mines, including both “dumb” long-durationanti-personnel mines and “dumb” long-duration antitank mines,are necessary to protect their borders. The military in allcountries believe that mines slow and stall an invading enemyarmy and give a country time to organize a response. When fearsof invasion dissipate, they insist, border mines can be removedeasily, as was the case when the United States removed its minesfrom Guantanamo Bay in Cuba and after the fall of the BerlinWall, when deminers removed the vast carpet of landminesstretching from the North Sea to the Alps in less than a year.

In general, border mines are not deployed indiscriminately.Instead, they are recorded, mapped, marked, and, in many cases,fenced. Signs or patrols or both alert local citizens to the dangersof mines. Border mines are not a primary source of thehumanitarian problem. On the contrary, border or barrier minescan play an important role in protecting and preserving civilianpopulations. Korea is one example.

Border Defense in Korea

For the past fifty years, the United Nations Command and theCombined Forces Commands (the Republic of Korea [ROK] andthe United States) have relied on landmines to maintain thedemilitarized zone (DMZ) between North Korea and South Korea.Their mission is to stop a North Korean advance into the South

and prevent the capture of the capital, Seoul. These jointcommands have a little more than 700,000 active troops: 32,000U.S. and 670,000 South Korean. Substantially outnumbered, theyface the third largest army in the world consisting of one millionsoldiers on active duty backed by a reserve force of more than fivemillion. The North has the capability of attacking the South withoverwhelming numbers of infantry supported by chemicalweapons and unprecedented concentrations of artillery. Despiterecent warming trends between Pyongyang and Seoul, hostilitiescould erupt with little or no warning.

Because of the need to provide for the long-term defense of theDMZ, persistent “dumb” landmines play a crucial role in the JointForces plan to repel an invasion similar to the one that launchedthe Korean War in 1950. Mines are considered essential forslowing down an advance from the North, gaining time forreinforcements to arrive and for the evacuation of the residents ofSeoul, which is only twenty-seven miles south of the DMZ.

Border minefields south of the DMZ are mapped, fenced byhigh metal barriers, marked, and monitored. They pose no harmto innocent civilians. On the contrary, the United States believesthat these minefields support rather than conflict withhumanitarian goals: They protect front-line troops guarding theDMZ and aid in protecting civilians in Seoul. Many believe thatits protected border has helped South Korea become the thirdlargest economy in Asia.

Border and Infrastructure Defense in Nicaragua

In the 1970s the Nicaraguan Army laid mines along thecountry’s borders with Honduras and Costa Rica to preventinsurgents from crossing into its territory. Also, it laid mines toprotect the components of the country’s vital infrastructure suchas power lines, bridges, and roads and strategic sites such ascommunication centers and military storage areas. It wasimportant to safeguard telephone lines from North America toSouth America and keep roads and waterways open for commerce.The army kept precise records and maps. Most minefields weremarked to protect civilians as well as to prevent sabotage. Whenthe civil war ended and the international community respondedwith resources and technology, the army began to use its ownrecords and maps to remove most of the mines that had protectedthe infrastructure. Military leaders estimate that the remaining

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mines, some of which Hurricane Mitch moved downstream, will becleared by 2006. There have been few civilian casualties. Theprincipal effect of the presence of mines was slowing the repair ofroads and bridges and thereby constraining economic growthtemporarily.

Mines Used to Protect Ground Forces

Recent conflicts in Serbia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Republic ofCongo, Kashmir, and East Timor have been wars of low intensity,low technology, and long duration. They have been characterizedby endless skirmishes in small, strategic mountain passes, atrivers and bridges, around power plants, and even in city centerssuch as Sarajevo and Grozny. Citing Vietnam and Laos in the1970s and the recent conflict in Kosovo, U.S. military leadersmaintain that such wars cannot be won by aerial bombs andprecision-guided missiles regardless of their quantity. As long aslow-intensity situations persist, U.S. and other military leaderscontend, landmines will continue to serve as important weaponsin ground warfare.

Mines are force multipliers: They help slow down, channel, ordeter the enemy. Military commanders explain that the need forlandmines increases as the size of postcold-war military forcesdecreases. In Korea the Joint Command estimates that it wouldtake many times the number of troops available, enhanced byfighter aircraft and other backup, to obtain the same militarypreparedness that landmines now provide. Moreover, it is believedthat had NATO ground forces been sent into Kosovo, the alliancewould have had to rely on antitank mines in order to achieve itsobjectives with the fewest possible friendly casualties. In 1990,when U.S. advance forces were confronted with the much largerIraqi Army in Kuwait, their commanders used mines as adeterrent or a defense against an attack until reinforcementscould be positioned. In Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. SeventhCorps used “smart” mines to protect its flank while it made a left-hook attack on the Republican Guards. Once the mines “self-destructed,” American soldiers had the option to march throughthe reopened routes—an alternative that contributed to the defeatof the Iraqi aggressors.

Antitank Mines

In modern warfare the infantry moves in mechanized troop

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carriers accompanied by tanks. Because troops and tanks operatetogether, they require combined protection. The United States andits NATO allies rely on similar strategies that differ only in theiruse of operational technology. In order to protect their groundforces, the NATO allies use antitank mines fitted with anti-handling devices that function like anti-personnel mines, thuskeeping the enemy from dismantling them. Although a smallportion of the U.S. inventory includes nonself-destructing “dumb”antitank mines that can be fitted with antihandling devices, thevast majority of the U.S. inventory is made up of self-destructing,self-deactivating “smart” mines. The United States protects its“smart” antitank mines with an array of “smart” anti-personnelmines that fall around them but are not attached to them.

“Smart” Mines

Major military powers agree that the use of landmines isimportant in modern, high-mobility warfare. In order to eliminatethe threat of mines to civilians, the United States, in the secondhalf of the 1970s after the Vietnam War, developed “smart” minesthat “self-deactivate.” Italy and the Soviet Union and, later,Russia did the same thing with less success. “Smart” mines arebattery-driven, minicomputer-operated mines that “self-destruct”after a predetermined period ranging from four hours to forty-eight hours or in some cases fifteen days. In the unlikely eventthat self-destruction does not occur, they will deactivate whentheir batteries run out within 120 days. “Smart” mines haveimpressive performance rates, a 99.999 percent rate ofeffectiveness in tests. The U.S. inventory of “smart” mines offersthe dual advantage of protecting both military forces and civilians.The United States is engaged in a project designed to make“smart” mines even more reliable and easier to identify when theyare inert. One kind of mine was designed to eject its initiationsystem after a preset period. Not only does that serve toneutralize this “smart” mine, but it also gives a soldier or ademiner a sense of security by providing a visual guarantee thatthe mine cannot be set off by him.

“Smart” mine technology has been applied to both anti-personnel landmines and antitank landmines, ensuring, as theCCW (Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions orRestrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons thatMay Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have

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Indiscriminate Effects) requires, that all remotely delivered anti-personnel and antitank mines used in tactical warfare “self-destruct” or “self-deactivate.” It has long been U.S. policy toemploy “dumb” mines only in marked and monitored minefields,another requirement of the CCW. The high cost of “smart”technology used in “smart” mines practically ensures thatinsurgents or terrorists will not use them when ordinary minesare available.

In summary, the selective use of mines by conventional militaryforces to protect national security interests stands in sharpcontrast to the indiscriminate use of mines by irregular forces incivil conflicts. 3

III. The Use of “Dumb” Mines by Nonstate Actors

Traditional armies are not the primary source of thehumanitarian landmine problem. The vast proportion of civilianaccidents have resulted from mines laid by nonstate actors orunconventional forces in civil wars, ethnic strife, rebellions, orrevolutions during the last ten years.

“Dumb” mines, simple explosive devices that remain active andlethal for years after they have been laid, have been widely usedby unconventional forces. They are inexpensive (less than threedollars to buy) and easy to obtain or make. Anyone can make ahomemade mine out of very basic explosives.

Often referred to as the poor man’s weapons of choice, “dumb”mines are usually used to keep stronger forces from gaining theadvantage and sometimes used to intimidate civilians. Often theyare laid randomly as contingents of foot soldiers move acrossfields, through villages, and along roads, rivers, and mountainpasses. Rebels, terrorists, and freedom fighters seldom keep mapsof where they laid their mines and on the rare occasions whenthey do, their renderings usually prove to be inaccurate. As thewidespread use of mines by all sides in Chechnya and the formerYugoslavia shows, “dumb” landmines remain a tempting option.Few people were surprised to learn that a Serb storage garagestacked from floor to ceiling with “dumb” mines from World War IIwas discovered in 1997.

Attributing blame for laying “dumb” mines is not especiallyfruitful. All sides in a conflict deploy mines. All too frequently

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civilians are targeted as a means of demoralizing the enemy. InKosovo as recently as 1999, mines were laid by the KosovoLiberation Army (KLA), the Serbian paramilitary, and theYugoslav Army. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, “the most mined countryin Europe,” all three groups—Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats—usedmines. In Angola as many as twelve armies laid mines during athirty-eight-year period, leaving half of the country infested withexplosives. In 1992 Georgians, Russians, and Abkhaz deployedlandmines as they fought one another in Abkhazia, formerly theMonte Carlo of the Black Sea. The landmine problem in Hondurasis the result of the spillover effect of conflicts in neighboringcountries in the 1980s. Mines were laid inside its Nicaraguanborder by forces fighting to gain control of Nicaragua. Similarly,mines—mostly the homemade variety—were laid inside its borderwith El Salvador by rebels trying to overthrow the government.

Reducing the use of “dumb” mines in internal conflicts can beapproached from two angles. The first involves limiting theiravailability. Russia and China produce the vast majority of“dumb” landmines used in internal wars: 85 percent of the minesthat have been cleared in the world came from Russia or countriesof the former Soviet bloc; 10 percent from China; 5 percent consistof homemade and Western mines. In order to be effective, anyagreement limiting the production of “dumb” mines will have to besupported by Russia and China.

“Dumb” mines are so easy to make that it is unlikely thattreaties covering their production and sale will end the problem.In response to the outreach efforts undertaken by severalnongovernmental organizations, including the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross, some armed nonstate groups haverefrained from using mines in certain areas. Although effortsdesigned to convince nonstate actors to comply with internationalnorms regarding mine use should be continued, over the long termthe best hope for eliminating the irresponsible use of mines byrebels and insurgents probably lies in fostering democraticinstitutions and improving the economic and social conditions ofthe countries in which they live. 4

IV. Policies Governing the Future Use of Landmines

For twenty years U.S. policymakers and others searched forways to prevent the indiscriminate use of landmines by nonstate

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actors and conventional armies. Concern over the continuedsuffering caused by mines and the impression that the process ofregulating the use of mines was not moving fast enough led tocalls for a fast-track treaty to be negotiated outside the frameworkof the UN. This impetus culminated in one approach to solvingthe mine problem: a total global ban on anti-personnel mines.

The Mine Ban Treaty

In 1992 the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)was formed. Together with small and medium size states, itlaunched a movement for a global and total ban on anti-personnellandmines. In December 1993 the UN General Assembly adopteda resolution calling for a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines, and in 1995 Belgium became the firstcountry to ban the use, production, procurement, sale, andtransfer of such mines. In 1996 the Canadian government hosteda conference of seventy countries and fifty NGOs in Ottawa,calling on the conferees to sign a treaty the following year to bananti-personnel landmines by 2000. The Convention on theProhibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer ofAnti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, commonly calledthe Ottawa Convention or the Mine Ban Treaty, was signed in1997 and entered into force in March 1999. By the end of 1999,135 countries had signed the treaty and 81 had ratified it.

The most important provisions of the treaty stipulate thatstates party to the treaty will (1) never use anti-personnel minesunder any circumstance; (2) never develop, produce, otherwiseacquire, stockpile, retain, or transfer anti-personnel mines; (3)never assist, encourage, or induce anyone to engage in anyactivity prohibited under the convention; (4) clear all mined areasunder their control within ten years; (5) destroy respectivestockpiles of anti-personnel mines within four years; and (6)exchange knowledge, equipment, technology, and assistance.

United States leaders became engaged in the process ofbanning mines despite serious reservations: They were concernedthat the draft treaty was not supported by the main mine-producing nations, and they believed that it was flawed. U.S.policymakers pointed to the fact that the treaty was conceivedoutside of conventional diplomatic channels, unduly influenced byNGOs and the media, and negotiated in haste among like-mindedparties, many of which (the Seychelles, Liechtenstein, Samoa,

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Monaco, Jamaica, Barbados, Fiji, Iceland, St. Kitts and Nevis,Samoa, and the Bahamas, to name a few) had neither militaryforces nor landmines. The United States maintained that a ban onall anti-personnel landmines, regardless of their potential to harmcivilians, vastly oversimplified both the problem and the solution.Policy leaders pointed out that the Mine Ban Treaty did notsecure the signatures of the leaders of China and Russia,producers of 95 percent of the mines. Further, it did not give theU.S. scope to protect its military requirements. They maintainedthat an exception should be made for anti-personnel mines inKorea and requested a period of nine years to find alternatives.They questioned why the “dumb” antihandling devices of othercountries—devices attached to mines that can cause injuries fordecades—are allowed under the treaty, whereas U.S. “smart” anti-personnel mines (serving the same purpose as antihandlingdevices) that “self-destruct” or “self-deactivate” are not allowed(because they are not attached to antitank mines). Finally,American leaders questioned why other countries were allowed toretain their antitank mines and American antitank mines wereeffectively banned. The United States did not sign the Mine BanTreaty although it committed itself to do so by 2006 if a suitablealternative to U.S. military landmine capabilities could be foundby then.

Weaknesses in the Mine Ban Treaty

The Mine Ban Treaty focused unprecedented public attentionon the suffering caused by landmines and accelerated the effortsof governments and NGOs to address the issue. The end resultwas a significant reduction in the stockpiles of many countries.Nevertheless, the fundamental weaknesses of the treaty havebecome apparent. The Mine Ban Treaty works best where it isneeded least. China and Russia, the producers of 95 percent of theanti-personnel mines that have created the global humanitarianproblem, have not signed the treaty. Moreover, the treaty has nomechanism that can compel unconventional forces to comply withits provisions. The treaty excludes important categories ofweapons, including antitank mines, booby traps, and antihandlingdevices that pose a threat to civilians.

In general, many critics maintain that the attempt to ban theuse of mines entirely is misconceived. They doubt that a ban willbe successful without the support of major military powers such

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as the United States, Russia, and China. As noted above, manygovernments consider mines indispensable to their nationaldefense. Indeed the leaders of several countries that havevulnerable borders did not sign the treaty for that reason alone.Critics have pointed out that although Canada and Mexicoadvocate the abolition of a key defensive weapon, it is difficult toimagine a situation in which they would ever need to defend theirborders. Others have stated that a total ban is unnecessarybecause new technologies have greatly reduced the danger tocivilians. Furthermore, citing examples of recent conflicts inEthiopia, Angola, Equador, Peru, Burundi, and Sudan, they pointout that the Mine Ban Treaty proved to be unenforceable: Thosecountries that had signed the treaty used landmines when theirsecurity interests were at stake.

The ban has produced a sharp divide among NGOs concernedwith landmines. Many contend that those who advocate a totaland global ban have so distorted the number of mines in the worldthat they have dissipated necessary support for mine clearance.Deminers in the field maintain that a ban will have little or noeffect on casualty rates for many years. They emphasize thatmines will continue to injure or kill until they are removed. Aprominent deminer Colin King (author of Jane’s Mines and MineClearance) has bemoaned the fact that many advocates attachgreater importance to the progression of the treaty than they do tothe work of returning cleared lands to communities.

Finally, the treaty has raised operational concerns within theWest’s premier military alliance, NATO, because it imposes severeconstraints on the ability of signatories to function cooperatively.Such constraints emanate from the national laws that each statewas obligated to enact when it signed the Mine Ban Treaty: Theenabling national laws prohibit treaty signatories from assistingnonsignatory military forces in operations that involve the use ofanti-personnel landmines. Had a decision been made to use NATOground forces in Kosovo, the interoperability crisis resulting fromthe landmine issue might have severely jeopardized the operation.A more realistic approach would be based on the assumption thatmines will continue to be deployed. It would seek to regulate thatuse while continuing to seek to secure the support of the majormine producers.

The CCW Mines Protocol: Negotiating with Major Military Powers

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In 1980 the United Nations Convention on CertainConventional Weapons (CCW) was formulated to regulate thedeployment of landmines. The United States took the lead indrafting Protocol II, known as the Amended Mines Protocol, todeal specifically with landmines, booby traps, and other delayedaction devices. It accorded priority status to negotiationsconducted by the CCW for several reasons. First, the forumbrings major mine-producing states to the negotiating table.Second, the CCW operates through consensus. Its deliberatedecision-making process results in enforceable agreements. Third,many members of the CCW, including the United States, Russia,China, India, and Pakistan, among others, maintain that a totalban on mines is unverifiable. They assert instead that compliancewith guidelines issued for the military use of mines will protectcivilians. Finally, the CCW covers all kinds of mines, includingbooby traps, not only the anti-personnel landmines that constitutethe main concern of those who advocate a total ban.

The 1980 CCW Landmine Protocol stipulates that (1) land-mines not be used indiscriminately but be directed only at amilitary objective and only when the potential military advantageoutweighs the potential harm to civilians; (2) all feasibleprecautions be taken to protect civilians from landmines andbooby traps; (3) the location of mines and booby traps be recordedand eventually revealed after the cessation of hostilities or when aUN force polices the area; (4) such records be used to assist inmine clearance and to warn civilians about the location ofminefields after the conflict ends.

The protocol was an important first step in the regulation oflandmines, but its implementation revealed several weaknesses:(1) it covers only conflicts between states and not conflicts withinstates; (2) it does not target long-lived “dumb” anti-personnelmines that are the greatest hazards to civilians; (3) the protocoldoes not provide assistance to those who clear mines. In effect, theprotocol, which did not reduce civilian casualties during theconflicts of the 1980s and early 1990s, has had a limited impacton the conduct of mine warfare.

In light of this experience, the parties to the CCW reconvenedand over a period of three years negotiated an improved, amendedmines protocol that has been ratified by more than fifty countries,including the United States, China, India, and Pakistan. (Russia

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is in the process of ratifying the protocol.) The United States setthe agenda in an attempt to convince other countries to adopt thepractices of the American military that were designed to reducecasualties and protect civilians. The main focus of the U.S.agenda for amending the protocol was convincing othersignatories to include internal conflicts.

The Amended Mines Protocol

In May 1996 the CCW Review Conference adopted theAmended Mines Protocol. It distinguishes between short-duration“smart” mines and long-duration “dumb” mines. Unless used in amarked area, monitored to exclude civilians, anti-personnelmines, according to the provisions of the protocol, must be capableof “self-destructing” within thirty days and “deactivating” withinthree months of placement. Parties to the protocol agree not totransfer mines to nonsignatory governments and not to transfernondetectable mines under any circumstances. Most important,the scope of the protocol was extended to internal conflicts. TheCCW amended protocol entered into force in 1998. Since itsratification, the Chinese government and its armed forces havecomplied with all its provisions, and the government hassubmitted implementation reports to the United Nations.

More remains to be done through the CCW. U.S. leaders hopeto secure ratification of the protocol by Israel, South Korea, andTurkey as well as countries in the Southern Hemisphere where somany problems with landmines have occurred. The United Stateshas drawn up an agenda of improvements, including expandingthe regulations to mandate that antitank mines have the capacityto “self-destruct” or “self-deactivate.” Also, the U.S. government isseeking to extend the regulations beyond tank mines to the wholecategory of aerial-delivered submunitions. Moreover, U.S.representatives at CCW conferences have recommended thatspecifications for anti-personnel mines be upgraded to increasethe “self-destruct” requirements from 90 percent to 95 percentand that a procedure be devised under which issues of complianceand on-site inspections can be considered. Such issues will bediscussed at the next session of the CCW in 2001.

Through skillful, laborious, and extensive negotiations withinthe CCW, the world’s major military powers have accepted aregime consistent with their military requirements andhumanitarian concerns. The CCW’s process of consensual decision

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making has increased the likelihood of compliance over time.Many agree that this significant achievement, primarilyformulated and engineered by the United States, constitutes animportant benchmark in regulating the use of mines. But U.S.policy also reflects research conducted to determine whetheralternatives to landmines could be developed and used toameliorate the humanitarian problem. 5

V. The U.S. Search for Alternatives to Landmines

As discussed in this report, mines have traditionally been useddefensively to protect troops and military and economicinstallations and to provide early warning of an enemy attack andoffensively to shape the battlefield by channeling the movement ofenemy forces and slowing their advance. By serving suchfunctions, mines decrease the number of soldiers that wouldotherwise have to be deployed on the battlefield. Although the useof mines can be avoided by using more troops, the deployment ofarmed forces would entail greater expense and the risk of highercasualties. Because the United States has made a commitment tosign the Mine Ban Treaty by 2006 if it finds a suitable alternativeby then, it has not only taken the lead in developing an effectivereplacement but also has drawn up a budget involving theexpenditure of more than 900 million dollars over five years.

The Man in the Loop

One of the major humanitarian objections to mines stems fromthe fact that they are detonated indiscriminately by targets. “Theman-in-the-loop” system tends to circumvent that problem byusing self-destruct mines that can be activated only by humancommand. When a mine or a trip wire senses pressure, it sends aradio signal to the operator who decides whether to activate themine or group of mines. This system is being developed for Koreaas a substitute for nonself-destructing mines that are victimactivated. In fact, more than half of the U.S. research budget formine alternatives is allocated to developing a system of this kind.But because a large number of troops would be needed to detonateall of the mines that would be deployed south of the DMZ toforestall an invasion from the North, the Combined ForcesCommand in Korea has concluded that it does not have enoughsoldiers to operate “the man in the loop.” Furthermore, thecommand maintains that a massive attack would confound the

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ability of individuals to detonate mines quickly, especially whenthey are under fire.

A further problem concerns the ability of “the man in the loop”to make the right decision. In battlefield conditions it is virtuallyimpossible to distinguish between civilians and the enemy. Smoke,mist, gunfire, glare, dark clouds, downpours, and the use ofchemicals screen out the details needed for soldiers to makeappropriate decisions. In such an event, U.S. forces could bedriven to retreat, leaving civilians to the mercy of the enemy. It isfeared that the use of “the man in the loop” might result in morecivilian casualties than those claimed by traditional mines.

One version of “the man in the loop” that seems to havepotential is Command Activation, a system designed for barrierminefields rather than military maneuvers. Under this scheme, asoldier can activate all the mines with one command if aninvasion seems imminent. Despite all the attention given to “theman-in-the-loop,” these systems remain anti-personnel landminesand would be disallowed by the Mine Ban Treaty.

Remote Area Denial Artillery Munition (RADAM)

Another way to eliminate pure anti-personnel mine systems isby mixing them with antitank mines. Pressure to sign the MineBan Treaty resulted in a proposed mixed munitions system calledRADAM as an alternative to the current system ADAM in whichanti-personnel mines are deployed by themselves. RADAM wouldmix five “smart” anti-personnel landmines with seven “smart”antitank mines, thereby complying with the policy guidelines thatthe U.S. military stop using pure anti-personnel landminesoutside of Korea after 2003. Critics of this plan point out that ifthe production of RADAM proceeds, this system would consume athird of the total budget for alternatives simply to meet a shortterm definitional requirement of the Mine Ban Treaty, namely, toeliminate “pure” anti-personnel mines. They note that RADAMitself is not compliant with the treaty. Some critics maintain thatU.S. mines already incorporate state-of-the-art technology, andthey question why funds should be spent to deal with anonproblem.

The Self-Healing Minefield and Other Ideas

Some alternatives being researched resemble fantasiesfabricated by Disney World rather than weapons developed by the

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Defense Department. If developed, the self-healing minefieldwould be composed of robotic antitank mines that would maintainradio communication with one another. When the enemy entered aminefield intent on clearing a lane, robotic mines would hoparound like frogs, filling in the spaces and preventing forwardmovement. Another system would employ Tags; tiny microchipslike burrs that would stick to enemy soldiers and emit radiosignals causing soldiers or guided munitions to fire at the taggedperson. Unfortunately, Tags would not be able to distinguishbetween the enemy and civilians. The Hunter-killer TaggingSystem, which would combine sensors with lethal weaponsstrategically situated in the battlefield, seems more promisingbut, like the other concepts, has a long way to go before it canbecome a viable military alternative to landmines.

Despite political pressure to do so, finding alternatives to“smart” landmines is a far more complex endeavor than mostpeople realize. U.S. military leaders are reluctant to give up aweapon that slows the enemy, protects tanks, and saves soldiers’lives for the sake of an untested alternative. It may turn out that“smart” mixed munitions themselves will prove to be the answer

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Conclusion

The global humanitarian problem caused by the presence ofindiscriminate “dumb” mines left over from wars is solvablebecause the mines can be cleared. Estimates of the total numberof redundant landmines in war-torn areas today are less than halfof those that were reported to exist several years ago. We nowknow that there were far fewer human casualties than previouslythought. Humanitarian mine clearance is effective; real progressis being made; and far more mines are being cleared than arebeing laid. Assuming that current levels of support are sustainedor increased, global mine clearance could be completed within tento twenty years.

Today’s conventional armies are not the main source of theworld’s humanitarian problems caused by mines. Manyconventional forces use mines as force multipliers to safeguardborders, infrastructure, tanks, and troops. Mines are marked andmapped and removed when conflicts end. It is not likely that theUnited States, its allies, or other countries will relinquish thecapability that mines provide until they possess acceptablealternatives. In the meantime the best strategy for protectingcivilians seems to be working with the CCW in which the UnitedStates has taken the lead by distinguishing between long-duration“dumb” mines and short-duration “smart” mines and regulatingthe use of both. Under the aegis of the CCW, Russia and China,the major mine-producing states, have come to the negotiatingtable. The CCW’s deliberate decision-making process results inenforceable agreements that cover all kinds of mines, includingbooby traps, not only anti-personnel mines that are the sole focusof the Mine Ban Treaty.

Mainly nonstate actors using “dumb” mines indiscriminately ininternal conflicts cause the continuing humanitarian problem thatthe world seeks to address. It is unlikely that rebels, insurgents,and terrorists will end their use of such weapons because of aninternational treaty. “Dumb” mines are their weapons of choicebecause they are affordable and easy to obtain or make. The onlypossible way to eliminate the indiscriminate use of mines may beto reduce the causes of internal conflict and to support China andRussia in their compliance with the CCW, which stops the flow ofmines to nonstate actors and other forces.

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The United States should continue to support humanitarianmine clearance as the most effective strategy for preventingcasualties and promoting stability, development, and democracy inwar-torn areas of the world. It should increase its work with theCCW to regulate the use of mines by conventional forces, promotethe widespread adoption of mines that “self-destruct” and “self-deactivate,” and continue its efforts to find alternatives and tomake munitions safer and more reliable than they are now.

About the Author

Patricia S. Huntington, Ed.D., is a member of the ExecutiveCommittee and a trustee of the National Committee on AmericanForeign Policy. She is the director of two related NCAFP projects:(1) an investigation of how landmines affect U.S. security interests;and (2) the research, development, and production of the firsteducational CD-ROM on Global Humanitarian Mine Clearance.Dr. Huntington began her career conducting research in SouthAfrica for the book Non-white Political Movements in SouthernAfrica. After launching community education projects at the villagelevel in West Africa, she returned to the United States to advisegrant makers on international development programs. Dr.Huntington has traveled in and worked on every continent.

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Notes

1. This paper is the result of an in-depth inquiry into theeffects of landmines on the security interests of the United Statesand hence its foreign policy. The investigation, undertaken withsupport from the Rockefeller Foundation, was conducted throughNational Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP)briefings with close to one hundred civic and military leaders inNorth America and abroad. The author conducted extensivefieldwork in twenty-one minefields in eleven countries in Asia,Europe, and Central America. Frank Huntington served as thevideographer to research and document the field experience,which included interviews with farmers, women, children, victims,deminers, international aid workers, government officials, andvillage chiefs. The author’s experience was enriched and enhancedby living with deminers in an armored compound on the shores ofthe Black Sea and observing them as they cleared mines left fromone of the most bitter battles of the Caucasus.

In an effort to understand the rationale behind the military useof mines, visits were made to the DMZ in Korea where theinvestigative team spoke with Korean and American generals. Theauthor and Professor Bernard E. Brown, the NCAFP projectdirector for NATO and Global Security, visited NATOheadquarters in Brussels where they met with NATO and SHAPEsenior officials and participated in briefings given by them.During those briefings, American and allied military leadersexplained in detail the need to use antitank mines to safeguardthe lives of NATO’s ground forces. An NCAFP delegation alsovisited the Picatinny Arsenal in New Jersey where U.S. researchinto short-duration munitions, which become inert after a battleand therefore do not pose a humanitarian problem, and otheralternatives to landmines is conducted.

The National Committee on American Foreign Policy isproducing a comprehensive CD-ROM on Global HumanitarianMine Clearance for dissemination in the United States andoverseas. It will be completed in September 2001.

For accounts of the impact of antitank mines and clusterbombs on the humanitarian problem, see the Introduction toJane’s Mines and Mine Clearance, 1999-2000 (Surrey, England,

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2000); Thomas Kuchenmeister, “Antivehicle Mines with Anti-personnel Effects.” Landmine Monitor Report 2000, Human RightsWatch (Washington, D.C., 2000), 1089-1090; Titus Peachy andVirgil Wiebe, “Cluster Munitions: The Bombs That Keep OnKilling,” Landmine Monitor, 1090-1091; Mennonite CentralCommittee, Clusters of Death: The Mennonite Central CommitteeGlobal Report on Cluster Bomb Production and Use (Akron,Pennsylvania, July 2000); “Waiting to Explode in Laos,” TheEconomist, May 20-26, 2000, 52.

2. This section derives in large part from the author’sobservations and field experience and from unpublished fieldreports from mine-clearance groups. Among the most helpfulreports are “Socio-Economic Land Use Report: Cambodia,”“Demining Survey Report: Abkhazia,” and “Consolidated MinefieldSurvey Results: Kosovo,” The HALO Trust; “Living with UXO,”Handicap International, Vientianne 1997, “Lao UnexplodedOrdnance Report,” Mines Advisory Group, UK 2000; “UXO Lao,”Workplan 1999, UNDP, Vientiane, 1999. For accounts of thehumanitarian impact of mines, see Ken Rutherford,“Humanitarian Consequences of Land Mines,” Update on Law-Related Education, American Bar Association (Washington, D.C.,1997); “Helping Landmine Victims around the World,”LANDMINES: Demining News from the United Nations, vol. 4,September 1996; Primary Care of Landmine Injuries in Africa: ABasic Text for Health Works, International Physicians for thePrevention of Nuclear War (Washington, D.C., 2000); “State LegalResponsibilities Toward Landmine Survivors,” Landmine MonitorReport, (Geneva, 2000). Among the most helpful general sourcesare Ilaria Bottigliero, 120 Million Landmines Deployed Worldwide:Fact or Fiction (Great Britain, 2000); U.S. State Department,Bureau of Political Military Affairs, To Walk the Earth in Safety(Washington, D.C., June 2000); Colin King, Jane’s Mines and MineClearance, 1999-2000; U.S. State Department, Hidden Killers,1998: The Global Landmine Crisis (Washington, D.C., 1998). Foran assessment of the priorities in mine clearance, see Jane’sIntelligence Review Special Report no. 6, “Legislation and theLandmine,” 15 (Surrey, England, 2000); Assistance in MineClearance: Report of the Secretary General, Document A/49/357(United Nations, September 6, 1994). For strategies to protectchildren, see “Anti personnel Landmines: Policies, Strategies andProgrammes” (UNICEF, New York, 2000) For standards on

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clearing mines for civilians, see “International Standards forHumanitarian Mine Clearance Operations” (United Nations, NewYork 2001). Colonel Tom Stott, Deputy Director of HumanitarianAssistance and Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy, U.S. Departmentof Defense, helped the NCAFP research team see the “train-the-trainer program” in action in Laos. A series of briefings with GuyWilloughby, founder, and Paul Heslop, program manager of theHALO Trust from April 2000 to April 2001, provided invaluablefirst-hand information on the best practices to follow for clearanceand on the considerable progress that has been made.

3. This discussion is based in part on high-level briefings givento the NCAFP by the United Nations Command, Republic ofKorea/United States Combined Forces Command, and the U.S.forces Korea and on two days of field observations and interviewsconducted at the DMZ in June 1999. Material was also drawnfrom Colonel Jef Troxell, “Landmines in Korea: The Exception tothe Rule,” Parameters, vol. 30 (spring 2000). An NCAFPRoundtable, “Landmines: Human Rights and National Security,”held in New York City on May 15, 2000, enriched the discussion.Of special importance was the presentation entitled “Landminesand Force Protection in Korea” given by General John H.Tilelli,the commander in chief of the UN Command, ROK/U.S. JointCommand, and U.S. Forces Korea until January 2000.

Information on U.S. “smart” mines was drawn from a series ofDepartment of Defense and Pickatinny Arsenal briefings andbackground papers, from NCAFP field observations conductedduring the spring of 1999, and from interviews in New York Cityin October 2000 with Colonel Jeff McCausland, dean, Army WarCollege, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

Suggested sources include Jarvis D. Lynch, “Landmines, Lies,and Other Phenomena,” Proceedings, May 1998; Bernard E.Trainor, “Landmines Saved My Life,” The New York Times, March28, 1996, 25; “Celestial Navigation: Pentagon’s Extraordinary 64Star Letter Shows Why the U.S. Cannot Agree to Ban AllLandmines,” Center for Security Policy, Decision Brief no. 97-D97,July 14, 1997; Jon Jones, “U.S. Army Operations under theOttawa Convention: Mine Warfare without Anti-PersonnelLandmines,” unpublished paper, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1999;John Hall, “Menacing, Dangerous Place: Scowls Required alongthe DMZ,” Richmond Times Dispatch, May 17, 1999; Andrew C. S.

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Efaw, “The United States Refusal to Ban Landmines: TheIntersection Between Tactics, Strategy, Policy, and InternationalLaw,” Military Law Review, vol. 159 (March 1999).

For a contrary view of regulating landmines for nationalsecurity interests, see Landmine Monitor Report 2000;“Landmines: A Deadly Legacy,” Physicians for Human Rights,Human Rights Watch (Washington, D.C., 1993); Shawn Robertsand Jody Williams, “After the Guns Fall Silent: The EnduringLegacy of Landmines,” Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation(Washington, D.C., 1995).

For a contrary view of the reliability of U.S. “smart” mines, seeColin King, “Legislation and the Landmine,” 15. For commentaryon the reliability of Italian self-neutralizing “smart” mines, see thediscussion of how they can be examined remotely by using a hand-held instrument that determines whether or not they are active.This technology is less relevant to the question of civilian safety,but it makes demining considerably easier. See Jane’s Mines andMine Clearance, 238-239.

4. Concerning the statement that 95 percent of cleared minescome from China and Russia (and the former Soviet bloc), see GuyWilloughby, the HALO Trust interview, July 28, 2000. Thisdiscussion is based largely on field visits and personalobservations in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Central America. Forhumanitarian perspectives, see Kevin Cahill, PreventiveDiplomacy (New York, 1996); “The Ottawa Process: Towards aGlobal Ban on Anti-personnel Mines” (Washington, D.C.: TheEmbassy of Canada, May 1997); Preventing Deadly Conflict,Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (New York,1997), 17.

5. See Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions orRestrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons ThatMay Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious Or to Have HadIndiscriminate Effects (Geneva, 1996); the Convention on theProhibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer ofAnti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa, 1997).The Ottawa Conference was held partly as a response to the factthat a review conference of the 1980 CCW Landmine Protocol,which was held earlier that year, had considered only additionalmeasures to restrict the use of mines and not an outright ban(Jane’s Legislation and the Landmine, Special Report). For a

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historical perspective on landmine policies, see Mike Croll, TheHistory of Landmines (Barnsley, England, 1998). For commentaryon the mine ban, see Conventions: A Model for Future WeaponBan. To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to BanLandmines (Oxford University Press, 1998); Ken Rutherford, “TheMine Ban Treaty and Landmine Victims,” Journal of InternationalLaw and Policy, vol. 6, no. 3 (summer 2001); “The Evolving ArmsControl Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in BanningAnti-Personnel Landmines,” World Politics, vol. 53, no.1 (October2000); Chris Smith, “The Military Utility of Landmines,” Centrefor Defense Studies, University of London, June 1996; JohnSpinelli, “How Does the U.S. Measure Up to the ‘Spirit’ ofOttawa?” DoD unpublished briefing report, January 14, 1999.

6. Because of Presidential Decision Directive no. 64, whichaccords priority to searching for alternatives to landmines inpreparation for the signing of the Mine Ban Treaty, research wasaccelerated in 1997. Information concerning specific alternativeconcepts now being researched was developed during NCAFP fieldvisits and briefings in the United States and in Seoul, SouthKorea. John Rosamila, Chief Mine Division, Picatinny Arsenal,demonstrated the explosive impact of various mines and gave theNCAFP team a briefing on the progress of U.S. researchon the feasibility of alternative weapons. Information was alsoderived from the author’s interviews with scientists and engineersin the U.S. Department of Defense (January-June 1999). Of primeimportance were a series of briefings and two presentations byColonel Paul D. Hughes, “U.S. Policy: Balancing MilitaryRequirements and Humanitarian Concerns” (with audio/visuals);“Research on Landmine Alternatives,” May 15, 2000, NCAFPRoundtable.

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Policy Recommendations

In the past the United States developed sound policies that notonly led to the alleviation of the humanitarian problem caused bythe indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines but alsofulfilled its security interests. The National Committee onAmerican Foreign Policy is convinced that based on its record, theUnited States will continue to formulate policies that obligate it toremove or to provide help in removing redundant mines from war-torn areas and comply with U.S. defense requirements at thesame time. In the interest of achieving those objectives, theNational Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP)specifically recommends that

(1) the United States continue to make mine clearance its mostimportant policy objective until all anti-personnel mines havebeen cleared. The U.S. mine-clearance program has allowedrefugees to return home and has restored land to productive use.Moreover, it has helped to stabilize former war zones and toenhance regional security around the world. The program has alsoenabled the United States to improve relations with mine-infestedcountries. Based on its experience in the field, the NCAFP isconvinced that the United States should promote global publicawareness of mine clearance as the best strategy for addressingthe humanitarian problem caused by anti-personnel landminesand should call attention to the progress that has been made sofar.

(2) the United States support low-tech approaches to mineclearance rather than divert funds to costly, high-tech schemesthat would not be feasible to implement in the field. It shouldemphasize that the most effective mine-clearance groups aredeeply sensitive to local customs and hence have earned the trustof local leaders. In essence, low-tech programs are cost effectiveand have proved to be highly successful in clearing anti-personnelmines, preventing casualties, and paving the way for furtherdevelopment.

(3) the United States support nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) engaged in demining to revise estimates of the true extentof the landmine problem. It should help such successful NGOspresent their accurate estimates to other NGOs and to the United

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Nations in order to convince them that if current levels of supportare maintained or increased, all anti-personnel mines can becleared by 2010 or shortly thereafter. The United States shoulddiscourage and even refute the use of inflated numbers.

(4) the United States continue to work within the Conventionon Conventional Weapons (CCW) to restrict or regulate the use ofanti-personnel mines in warfare. It should pursue its efforts tolimit antitank mines used in tactical warfare to “smart” mines.Working through the CCW, the United States should strive tofulfill the long-term goal of achieving consensus on making“bombies” and other air-delivered submunitions “smart.”Unexploded ordnance (UXO) can be as dangerous for civilians asanti-personnel landmines and is often found commingled withthem. Accordingly, the United States should spearhead thedevelopment of technology for “smart” bombies and should makethe achievement of that goal a priority for the CCW.

(5) the United States continue its search for suitablealternatives to anti-personnel landmines as part of its long-standing commitment to improving weaponry to safeguard bothsoldiers and civilians. Until viable military alternatives can befound, the United States should consider “smart” mines theanswer to the humanitarian problem caused by anti-personnelmines.

(6) the United States reconsider its policy projection of endingthe use of anti-personnel landmines outside of Korea by 2003 if asuitable substitute has been found by then. The humanitarianlandmine crisis has not resulted from the use of U.S. landmines,which the United States strictly controls. By either extending orscrapping the 2003 deadline for eliminating the use of pure anti-personnel landmines, the United States would no longer beobligated to develop and produce Remote Area Denial ArtilleryMunition (RADAM). Eliminating this research program wouldenable it to cease spending almost one third of its 900-milliondollar budget to develop alternatives in order to meet anartificially imposed deadline that reflects political rather thannational security interests.

(7) the United States withhold support from the Mine BanTreaty until it has been amended substantially. As it stands, thetreaty is limited because it addresses only anti-personnel minesand contains a loophole that permits European countries to keep

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their antitank mines while disallowing those of the United States.It is also unenforceable because it lacks verification andcompliance procedures. Moreover, the Mine Ban Treaty has failedto gain the support of the major producers and users of landmines.Most important, the ban has deflected attention from the mosteffective strategy that has been developed to reduce humanitariansuffering, that of mine clearance.

In sum, it is in the interests of the United States to expand itsleadership in humanitarian mine clearance, to continue to workwith the major military powers to regulate the use of mines andeventually “bombies,” and to search for militarily soundalternatives to anti-personnel landmines in the context of fulfillingnational security needs rather than bowing to short-term politicalpressures. Further, the United States should do everything it canto explain its long-standing landmine policies to other countriesand in that process strive to evoke their respect for itshumanitarian objectives.

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NATIONAL COMMITTEE ONAMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, INC.

FOUNDER – Dr. Hans J. Morgenthau

MORGENTHAU AWARD RECIPIENTS

Honorable Angier Biddle DukeHonorable Sol LinowitzHonorable Henry A. KissingerHonorable Jeane J. KirkpatrickHonorable George P. Shultz

David RockefellerHonorable James A. Baker, IIIRight Honorable Margaret ThatcherHonorable Thomas R. PickeringHis Majesty King Hussein

KENNAN AWARD RECIPIENTS

Honorable George F. KennanHonorable Cyrus R. VanceHonorable Paul A. Volcker

Honorable Richard C. Holbrooke

OFFICERS 2000

Honorable George F. Kennan–Honorary ChairmanWilliam J. Flynn–Chairman

Dr. George D. Schwab–PresidentWilliam M. Rudolf–Executive Vice PresidentDonald S. Rice, Esq.–Senior Vice President

Dr. Eve Epstein–Vice PresidentHonorable Francis L. Kellogg–Treasurer

William Pickens III–Secretary

TRUSTEES

*Professor Howard L. Adelson*Kenneth J. Bialkin, Esq.General Wesley K. Clark, USA (Ret.)John V. Connorton, Jr., Esq.*Professor Michael Curtis*Viola DrathAnthony Drexel Duke

*Sandy FrankDr. Susan A. GitelsonJudith Hernstadt*Honorable Fereydoun Hoveyda*Richard R. Howe, Esq.*Dr. Patricia S. Huntington*Thomas J. Moran

*Joan Peters*Honorable Maxwell RabbMona SchlachterJacob SteinGrace Kennan WarneckeHonorable Leon J. WeilProfessor Donald S. Zagoria

BOARD OF ADVISERS

Dr. Giuseppe AmmendolaProfessor Kenneth J. ArrowSaul BellowProfessor Bernard E. BrownProfessor Ralph BuultjensHonorable Harlan ClevelandHonorable Seymour M. FingerProfessor George E. GruenHonorable Roger HilsmanHonorable Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

Professor F. H. LittellProfessor Richard PipesDr. Carol RittnerProfessor Henry RosovskyProfessor Arthur M. Schlesinger, jr.Dr. Ronald J. SheppardProfessor S. Fred SingerHonorable Nancy SoderbergDr. Arnold SolowayRenate Bohne von Boyens

WILLIAM J. FLYNN INITIATIVE FOR PEACE AWARD RECIPIENTS

William J. FlynnHonorable George J. Mitchell

Right Honorable Dr. Marjorie Mowlam

*Executive Committee

NATIONAL COMMITTEE ONAMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, INC.

320 Park AvenueNew York, N.Y. 10022

Telephone: (212) 224-1120 • Fax: (212) 224-2524E-Mail: ncafp@aol.com • Web site: http://www.ncafp.org