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C. No Strike ClausePanay Electric Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 688(95)248 SCRA 668 VITUG; October 4, 1995NATURE Petiton for certiorariFACTS -On 30 October 1990, petitioner PanayElectric Company, Inc., posted a notice announcingthe need for a "Report Clerk" who could assume the

responsibility of gathering accounting and computerdata at its power plant-When nobody applied for the position, theEDP/Personnel Manager recommended EnriqueHuyan who was at the time an AdministrativePersonnel Assistant at the head office. Huyan wasthen also a Vice President of respondent union. Therecommendation was approved by the company'sPresident and General Manager.-Enrique Huyan informed petitioner that he was notinterested in accepting the new position.-The EDP/Personnel Manager required Huyan toexplain within 48 hours why no disciplinary actionshould be taken against him for grossinsubordination and for failure to follow the GeneralManager's approved directive.-Eventually, on 03 December 1990, Huyan was givena "notice of dismissal"-An administrative investigation was conducted;thereafter, Huyan was ordered dismissed effective10 December 1990.-On 22 January 1991, the respondent union went onstrike.-Forthwith, the company filed a petition to declarethe strike illegal as it was a serious breach of the "nostrike, no lock out clause," of the CollectiveBargaining Agreement ("CBA")-The NLRC found the strike conducted by the Unionfrom January 22 to 25, 1991 to be illegal as the samewas staged in violation of the no strike, no lock-outclause in the Collective Bargaining Agreementexisting between the parties and also because thesame disregarded the grievance procedure

ISSUE WON the strike committed by the respondentunion was illegalHELDYes-The State guarantees the right of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,as well as peaceful concerted activities, including theright to strike, in accordance with law.-The right to strike, however, is not absolute. It hasheretofore been held that a "no strike, no lock-out"provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement("CBA") is a valid stipulation although the clause maybe invoked by an employer only when the strike iseconomic in nature or one which is conducted toforce wage or other concessions from the employerthat are not mandated to be granted by the lawitself.

-It would be inapplicable to prevent a strike which isgrounded on unfair labor practice.-In this situation, it is not essential that the unfairlabor practice act has, in fact, been committed; itsuffices that the striking workers are shown to haveacted honestly on an impression that the companyhas committed such unfair labor practice and thesurrounding circumstances could warrant such abelief in good faith.-In the instant case, the NLRC found Enrique Huyanand Prescilla Napiar, the "principal leaders" of thestrike, not to have acted in good faith. The NLRC

said: It is bad enough that the Union struck despitethe prohibition in the CBA. What is worse is that itsprincipal leaders, Napiar and Huyan, cannot honestlyclaim that they were in good faith in their belief thatthe Company was committing unfair labor practice.

The absence of good faith or the honest belief thatthe Company is committing Unfair Labor Practice,therefore, is what inclines us to rule that the strike

conducted by the Union from January 22 to 25, 1991is illegal for being in violation of the "no strike, nolock-out" proviso and the failure to bring the union'sgrievances under the grievance procedure in theCBA. It must be borne in mind that prior to thedismissal of Huyan, there was sufficient time to havethe matter of Huyan's transfer subjected to thegrievance procedure. That the Union considered theprocedure an exercise in futility is not reason enoughto disregard the same given the circumstances inthis case. Whatever wrong the Union felt theCompany committed cannot be remedied by anotherwrong on the part of the Union.

DispositionDecision is affirmed (as regards the illegality of thestirke)

Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa saGreenfield v. Ramos, 326 SCRA 428326 SCRA 248 PURISIMA; February 28, 2000NATURE Petition for Certiorari to annul the NLRCdecisionFACTS - Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawasa M. Greenfield, Inc. (MSMG) (Local Union) is anaffiliate of United Lumber and General Workers of thePhilippines (ULGWP) (Federation).- The CBA between MSMG and M. Greenfield, Inc.states that it is entered into by the corporation andMSMG / ULGWP.- The CBA includes a Union Security Clause requiringall employees who are covered by the CBA andpresently members of the UNION to remain membersof the UNION for the duration of the CBA as a

condition precedent to continued employment.- Local union imposed a P50 fine on non-attendingunion members which became the subject of bitterdisagreement between the Federation and the localunion. MSMG then declared general autonomy fromthe ULGWP. In retaliation, the national federationasked respondent company to stop the remittance ofthe local union's share in the education funds. It alsodisauthorized incumbent union officers fromrepresenting the employees.- Petitioner union officers were expelled by thefederation for allegedly committing acts of disloyaltyand/or inimical to the interest of ULGWP and inviolation of its Constitution and By-laws. Thefederation advised respondent company of theexpulsion of the 30 union officers and demanded

their separation from employment pursuant to theUnion Security Clause in their CBA.- Upon demand of the federation, the companyterminated the petitioners without conducting aseparate and independent investigation. Theexpelled union officers assigned in the first shift werephysically or bodily brought out of the companypremises by the company's security guards. Thoseassigned to the second shift were not allowed toreport for work. This provoked some of the membersof the local union to demonstrate their protest for thedismissal of the said union officers. Some union

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members left their work posts and walked out of thecompany premises.- Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissed union officerswere validly and legally terminated because thedismissal was effected in compliance with the unionsecurity clause of the CBA which is the law betweenthe parties. This was affirmed by the NLRC onappeal.

> On the ISSUE of STRIKE:- Labor Arbiter held that the strike was illegal for thefollowing reasons: (1) it was based on an intra-uniondispute which cannot properly be the subject of astrike, the right to strike being limited to cases ofbargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practice (2) itwas made in violation of the "no strike, no lock-out"clause in the CBA, and (3) it was attended withviolence, force and intimidation upon the persons ofthe company officials, other employees reporting forwork and third persons having legitimate businesswith the company, resulting to serious physicalinjuries to several employees and damage tocompany property.ISSUE/S* WON the union officers were validly terminated1. WON the strike was illegal for being grounded on anon-strikeable issue (intra-union conflict between thefederation and the local union)2. WON the no strike, no lock-out clause in the CBAwas violated3. WON the strike was attended with violence forceand intimidationHELD* NO ReasoningAlthough this Court has ruled thatunion security clauses embodied in the collectivebargaining agreement may be validly enforced andthat dismissals pursuant thereto may likewiseWith regard to the issue of the legality or illegality ofthe strike, the Labor Arbiter held that the strike wasillegal for the following reasons: (1) it was based onan intra-union dispute which cannot properly be thesubject of a strike, the right to strike being limited to

cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair laborpractice (2) it was made in violation of the "no strike,no lock-out" clause in the CBA, and (3) it wasattended with violence, force and intimidation uponthe persons of the company officials, otheremployees reporting for work and third personshaving legitimate business with the company,resulting to serious physical injuries to severalemployees and damage to company property.On the submission that the strike was illegal forbeing grounded on a non-strikeable issue, that is, theintra-union conflict between the federation and thelocal union, it bears reiterating that when respondentcompany dismissed the union officers, the issue wastransformed into a termination dispute and broughtrespondent company into the picture.

Petitioners believed in good faith that in dismissingthem upon request by the federation, respondentcompany was guilty of unfair labor pratice in that itviolated the petitioners right to self-organization.

The strike was staged to protest respondentcompanys act of dismissing the union officers.

Even if the allegations of unfair laborpractice are subsequently found out to beuntrue, the presumption of legality of thestrike prevails.

V. STRIKING LOCKOUT PARTY 263 (b), (c)

ART. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. - xxx(b) Workers shall have the right to engage inconcerted activities for purposes of collectivebargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection.

The right of legitimate labor organizations to strikeand picket and of employers to lockout, consistentwith the national interest, shall continue to berecognized and respected. However, no labor union

may strike and no employer may declare a lockouton grounds involving inter-union and intra-uniondisputes.(c) In case of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certifiedor recognized bargaining agent may file a notice ofstrike or the employer may file a notice of lockoutwith the Ministry at least 30 day before the intendeddate thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, theperiod of notice shall be 15 days and in the absenceof a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent,the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimatelabor organization in behalf of its members.However, in case of dismissal from employment ofunion officers duly elected in accordance with theunion constitution and by-laws, which may constituteunion busting, where the existence of the union isthreatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall notapply and the union may take action immediately.

VI. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTSA. Effort Bargain 264 (a); 250-252ART. 264. Prohibited activities. - (a) No labororganization or employer shall declare a strike orlockout without first having bargained collectively inaccordance with Title VII of this Book or without firsthaving filed the notice required in the precedingArticle or without the necessary strike or lockout votefirst having been obtained and reported to theMinistry.No strike or lockout shall be declared afterassumption of jurisdiction by the President or theMinister or after certification or submission of thedispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or

during the pendency of cases involving the samegrounds for the strike or lockout.Any worker whose employment has been terminatedas a consequence of any unlawful lockout shall beentitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Anyunion officer who knowingly participates in an illegalstrike and any worker or union officer who knowinglyparticipates in the commission of illegal acts during astrike may be declared to have lost his employmentstatus: Provided, That mere participation of a workerin a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient groundfor termination of his employment, even if areplacement had been hired by the employer duringsuch lawful strike.ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. -

The following procedures shall be observed in

collective bargaining:(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement,it shall serve a written notice upon the other partywith a statement of its proposals. The other partyshall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10)calendar days from receipt of such notice;(b) Should differences arise on the basis of suchnotice and reply, either party may request for aconference which shall begin not later than ten (10)calendar days from the date of request.(c) If the dispute is not settled, the Board shallintervene upon request of either or both parties or at

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its own initiative and immediately call the parties toconciliation meetings. The Board shall have thepower to issue subpoenas requiring the attendanceof the parties to such meetings. It shall be the dutyof the parties to participate fully and promptly in theconciliation meetings the Board may call;(d) During the conciliation proceedings in the Board,the parties are prohibited from doing any act which

may disrupt or impede the early settlement of thedisputes; and(e) The Board shall exert all efforts to settle disputesamicably and encourage the parties to submit theircase to a voluntary arbitrator. (As amended bySection 20, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989).ART. 251. Duty to bargain collectively in theabsence of collective bargaining agreements. -In the absence of an agreement or other voluntaryarrangement providing for a more expeditiousmanner of collective bargaining, it shall be the dutyof employer and the representatives of theemployees to bargain collectively in accordance withthe provisions of this Code.ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargaincollectively. - The duty to bargain collectivelymeans the performance of a mutual obligation tomeet and convene promptly and expeditiously ingood faith for the purpose of negotiating anagreement with respect to wages, hours of work andall other terms and conditions of employmentincluding proposals for adjusting any grievances orquestions arising under such agreement andexecuting a contract incorporating such agreementsif requested by either party but such duty does notcompel any party to agree to a proposal or to makeany concession.

B. Filing of Notice of Intention 263 (c); (d);(e); 264 (a)

C. Observance Cooling Off Period 263 (c); (e);250 (c), (d), (e)

ART. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. xxx-(c) In case of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certifiedor recognized bargaining agent may file a notice ofstrike or the employer may file a notice of lockoutwith the Ministry at least 30 day before the intendeddate thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, theperiod of notice shall be 15 days and in the absenceof a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent,the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimatelabor organization in behalf of its members.However, in case of dismissal from employment ofunion officers duly elected in accordance with theunion constitution and by-laws, which may constituteunion busting, where the existence of the union isthreatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall notapply and the union may take action immediately.

(As amended by Executive Order No. 111, December24, 1986).(e) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the dutyof the Ministry to exert all efforts at mediation andconciliation to effect a voluntary settlement. Shouldthe dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of therequisite number of days from the mandatory filingof the notice, the labor union may strike or theemployer may declare a lockout.ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. -

The following procedures shall be observed incollective bargaining:

(c) If the dispute is not settled, the Board shallintervene upon request of either or both parties or atits own initiative and immediately call the parties toconciliation meetings. The Board shall have thepower to issue subpoenas requiring the attendanceof the parties to such meetings. It shall be the dutyof the parties to participate fully and promptly in theconciliation meetings the Board may call;

(d) During the conciliation proceedings in the Board,the parties are prohibited from doing any act whichmay disrupt or impede the early settlement of thedisputes; and(e) The Board shall exert all efforts to settle disputesamicably and encourage the parties to submit theircase to a voluntary arbitrator. (As amended bySection 20, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989).

D. Vote, Conduct of; and Period of Validity 263 (f); 264 (a)ART. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. xxx-(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved bya majority of the total union membership in thebargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballotin meetings or referenda called for that purpose. Adecision to declare a lockout must be approved by amajority of the board of directors of the corporationor association or of the partners in a partnership,obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for thatpurpose. The decision shall be valid for the durationof the dispute based on substantially the samegrounds considered when the strike or lockout votewas taken. The Ministry may, at its own initiative orupon the request of any affected party, supervise theconduct of the secret balloting. In every case, theunion or the employer shall furnish the Ministry theresults of the voting at least seven days before theintended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-offperiod herein provided.ART. 264. Prohibited activities. - (a) No labororganization or employer shall declare a strike orlockout without first having bargained collectively in

accordance with Title VII of this Book or without firsthaving filed the notice required in the precedingArticle or without the necessary strike or lockout votefirst having been obtained and reported to theMinistry.No strike or lockout shall be declared afterassumption of jurisdiction by the President or theMinister or after certification or submission of thedispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration orduring the pendency of cases involving the samegrounds for the strike or lockout.Any worker whose employment has been terminatedas a consequence of any unlawful lockout shall beentitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Anyunion officer who knowingly participates in an illegalstrike and any worker or union officer who knowingly

participates in the commission of illegal acts during astrike may be declared to have lost his employmentstatus: Provided, That mere participation of a workerin a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient groundfor termination of his employment, even if areplacement had been hired by the employer duringsuch lawful strike.

National Union of Workers in Hotels, etc. v. CA,570 SCRA 598 (08)

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Luzon Marine Department Union v. Roldan, 86P 507 (50)86 PHIL 507 OZAETA; MAY 30, 1950NATURE Petition for certiorari to review a resolutionof the Court of Industrial Relations.FACTS - June 17, 1948: Petitioner Luzon MarineUnion (UNION) presented to respondent LuzonStevedoring Co. (LSC) a petition containing demands,

including that it be granted of full recognition withthe right to collective bargaining, closed-shop andcheck-off. The Union initiated the petition in the CIRpraying that LSC be directed to comply immediatelywith the demands.- The Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas(UOEF) a labor organization divided into units ofwhich Universal Marine Union is a part, intervened onbehalf of the Union because it alleged that thedemand of the Union for recognition with the right tocollective bargaining, closed-shop, etc. would violatean agreement entered into between LSC and UOEF,where the company recognized UOEF as the labororganization of the workers rendering services toLSC., with full right of collective bargaining.- UOEF moved for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, onthe ground that the Union did not count with morethan 30 members employed in the LSC. JudgeBautista issued an order denying the motion todismiss. Before the receipt of the order, 65 allegedmembers of the Union initiated a strike withoutnotice (July 19). It was only on July 21 that the LSCreceived the notice of strike.- July 20, 1948: Union filed with CIR a petitionalleging that all its members (more than 300) wenton strike on July 19 due to the refusal of LSC to granttheir demands, and prayed for the issuance of arestraining order to prevent the respondent fromemploying strike breakers.- August 16, 1948: Judge Bautista issued an orderdirecting the strikers to return to work, and the LSCto reinstate them in their previous positions. Actingon a motion for reconsideration, the court set said

order aside on the ground that the strike wasunjustified and illegal.- Judges Roldan and Castillo held that although Sec.19 of Commonwealth Act 103 provides thatpending award or decision by the CIR, theemployee, tenant or laborer shall not strike orwalk out of his employment when so enjoinedby the Court, and although the Court had notenjoined the petitioner NOT TO STRIKE, it doesnot necessarily follow that the strike was legaland justified xxx Although the Act recognizesthe laborers right to strike, it also creates allthe means by which a resort thereto may beavoided, because a strike is a remedyessentially coercive in character and general inits disturbing effects upon the social order and

the public interests.- The CIR found out that the reason the memberswent on strike was because the opposite partyclaims or asserts that they had no members insidethe company, and because they were becomingimpatient. From The court concluded that thepurpose of the strike was to influence the decisionand to compel the Court to decide promptly. Theunion insists that the strike was called for a lawfulpurpose: 1) to show they had more than 30members; 2) to answer the challenge of Alejo

Villanueva that he will dismiss the members from thecompany.ISSUES WON the strike was called for a lawfulpurpose.HELD NORatio In cases not falling within the prohibitionagainst strikes, the legality or illegality of a strikedepends upon the 1) purpose for which it is

maintained, and 2) upon the means employed incarrying it on.- The law does not look with favor upon strikes andlockouts because of their disturbing and perniciouseffects upon the social order and the public interests.Reasoning The reasons presented by the Union donot justify the drastic measure of a strike, whichnecessarily entails pernicious consequences not onlyto the company but also to the laborers themselvesand public.- If the purpose of a strike is trivial, unreasonable orunjust, or if violence was committed, the strike,although not prohibited by injunction, may bedeclared by the court illegal, with adverseconsequences to the strikers.- If the laborers resort to a strike to enforce theirdemands (instead of exhausting legal processes first)they do so at their own risk, and should the court findthe strike was unjustified, the strikers would sufferthe adverse consequences.DISPOSITION The petition appealed from is affirmed

Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Philippine LaborOrganizations, Caltex Chapter, 93 P. 295 (53)

Philippine Marine Officers Guild v. CompaniaMaritima, 22 SCRA 1113 (90)Acts of violence in this jurisdiction, when committedin carrying on a strike are not to be overlooked indetermining its legality or illegality.

To overlook these acts of violence would encourageabuses and terrorism and subvert the purpose of thelaw which provides for arbitration and peaceful

settlement of disputes.If a strike is unjustified as when it is declared fortrivial, unjust or unreasonable purpose, the employermay not be compelled to reinstate the strikers totheir employment. More so, when the strike is carriedon illegally.

Union of Filipro Employees v. NestlePhilippines, Inc., 192 SCRA 396 (90)192 SCRA 396 MEDIALDEA; December 19, 1990NATUREThis petition assails the decision of theNLRC, dated November 2, 1988 on the consolidatedappeals of petitionersFACTS- UFE filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of LaborRelations against Filipro (now Nestle Philippines).

- UFE filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP)against Nestle and its officials for violation of theLabor Code (Art. 94) on Holiday Pay, non-implementation of the CBA provisions (LaborManagement Corporation scheme), FinancialAssistance and other unfair labor practice.- Acting on Nestle's petition seeking assumption of

jurisdiction over the labor dispute or its certificationto the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, then Ministerof Labor and Employment Blas F. Ople assumed

jurisdiction over the dispute and issued the followingorder enjoining any strike, lockout, or any other form

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of concerted action such as slowdowns, sitdowns,noise barrages during office hours, which tend todisrupt company operations.- UFE filed a petition for certiorari with prayer forissuance of temporary restraining order, with thisCourt assailing the assumption of jurisdiction by theMinister. Notwithstanding the automatic injunctionagainst any concerted activity, and an absence of a

restraining order, the union members, at theinstigation of its leaders, and in clear defiance ofMinister Ople's Order of December 11, 1986, stageda strike and continued to man picket lines at theMakati Administrative Office and all of Nestle'sfactories and warehouses at Alabang, Muntinlupa,Cabuyao, Laguna, and Cagayan de Oro City.Likewise, the union officers and members distributedleaflets to employees and passersby advocating aboycott of company products.- Nestle filed a petition to declare the strike illegalpremised on violation of the CBA provisions on "nostrike/no lockout" clause and the grievancemachinery provisions on settlement of disputes.- Despite receipt of the second order dated January30, 1986, and knowledge of a notice caused to bepublished by Nestle in the Bulletin on February 1,1986, advising all workers to report to work not laterthan February 3, 1986, the officers and members ofUFE continued with the strike.- Minister B. Ople denied their motion forreconsideration of the return-to-work order.- UFE defied the Minister and continued with theirstrike. Nestle filed criminal charges against thoseinvolved.ISSUE WON the strike is legal.HELDNO. UFE completely misses the underlying principleembodied in Art. 264(g) on the settlement of labordisputes and this is, that assumption and certificationorders are executory in character and are to bestrictly complied with by the parties even during thependency of any petition questioning their validity.

This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary ofLabor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedysolution to labor disputes, without jeopardizingnational interests.- Regardless therefore of their motives, or thevalidity of their claims, the striking workers mustcease and/or desist from any and all acts that tendto, or undermine this authority of the Secretary ofLabor, once an assumption and/or certification orderis issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices on the partof the company, to justify their actions.- The return to work order does not so much confer aright as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it maybe waived, it must be discharged as a duty evenagainst the worker's will. Returning to work in this

situation is not a matter of option or voluntarinessbut of obligation. The worker must return to his jobtogether with his co-workers so the operations of thecompany can be resumed and it can continue servingthe public and promoting its interest."- An assumption and/or certification order of theSecretary of Labor automatically results in a return-to-work of all striking workers, whether or not acorresponding order has been issued by theSecretary of Labor. Thus, the striking workers erredwhen they continued with their strike alleging

absence of a return-to-work order. Article 264(g) isclear.- Once an assumption/certification order is issued,strikes are enjoined, or if one has already takenplace, all strikers shall immediately return to work.- A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance bythe Secretary of Labor of an assumption orcertification order becomes a prohibited activity and

thus illegal, pursuant to the second paragraph of Art.264 of the Labor Code as amended. The Unionofficers and members, as a result, are deemed tohave lost their employment status for havingknowingly participated in an illegal act.- Thus, the NLRC correctly upheld the il legality of thestrikes and the corresponding dismissal of theindividual complainants because of their "brazendisregard of successive lawful orders of then LaborMinisters Blas F. Ople, Augusto Sanchez and LaborSecretary Franklin Drilon dated December 11, 1985,

January 30, 1986 and February 4, 1986, respectively,and the cavalier treatment of the provisions of theLabor Code and the return-to-work orders of theMinister (now Secretary) of Labor and Employment,or Articles 264 and 265 (now renumbered Arts. 263and 264).- No strike or lockout shall be declared afterassumption of jurisdiction by the President or theMinister or after certification or submission of thedispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration orduring the pendency o f cases involving the samegrounds for the strike or lockout.Disposition ACCORDINGLY, the petition isDISMISSED, and the decision of public respondentNLRC, dated November 2, 1988, and its Resolution,dated March 7, 1989, are both AFFIRMED in theirentirety. No costs.

Reliance Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v.NLRC, 193 SCRA 365 (91)193 SCRA 365 Sarmiento, J; 1991NATURE Petition for Ceriorari to review NLRC

decisionFACTS - It appears that to avoid unnecessary loss ofproductive working time due to personal and non-work-related conversations, personal telephone callsand non-work-connected visits by personnel to otherdepartments, the respondent Reliance SuretyInsurance Co., Inc. (company for short) on 21November 1986, thru the manager (Mr.Celso Eleazar)of its underwriting department, effected a change inthe seating arrangement of its personnel in saiddepartment.- Among those affected were members of the laborunion who claimed that the change was done merelyto harass them. In the ensuing discussions, themanager and the union members apparently hadheated words and the union members hurled

unprintable insults. Some employees refused to stayat their designated places. The company then askedthe recalcitrants to explain within 48 hours why nodisciplinary action should be taken against them.Due to the continuing hostility by the union membersthey were place under preventive suspension andfinally dismissed.- Illegal dismissal complaints were fi led. These wereamended to include a charge of unfair labor practice.

The members alleged that the seating arrangementwas changed to pressure or intimidate labor unionmembers. While the action was pending, the union

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filed a notice of strike. Before a conciliationconference can be held, the union struck andpicketed the company premises thus preventingofficials and other employees from doing their usualduties.- Company filed a petition to declare the strike illegalsince there was no strike vote and the requiredcooling off period was not followed. The Arbiter found

the strike illegal. The finding was modified by theNLRC and ruled that the strike while illegal shouldnot result in the termination of the employeesinvolved since the members truly believed that thecompany was committing unfair labor practice interminating the other employees. It ruled that theemployees be reinstated but without backwages.- Hence this appeal to the SC.ISSUE/S WON strikers who have found to have stagedan illegal strike may be reinstated to workHELDNo. There is no question that the strike itself wasprompted by no actual, existing unfair labor practicecommitted by the petitioner. In effecting a change inthe seating arrangement in the office of theunderwriting department, the petitioner merelyexercised a reasonable prerogative employees couldnot validly question, much less assail as an act ofunfair labor practice. The Court is indeed at a losshow rearranging furniture, as it were, can justify afour-month-long strike. As to the privaterespondent's charges of harassment, theCommission found none, and as a general rule, weare bound by its findings of fact. Amid thisbackground, the Court must grant the petition. Instaging the strike in question, a strike that was illegalin more ways than one, the reinstated union officerswere clearly in bad faith, and to reinstate themwithout, indeed, loss of seniority rights, is to rewardthem for an act public policy does not sanction.- As a general rule, the sympathy of the Court is onthe side of the laboring classes, not only because theConstitution imposes sympathy but because of the

one-sided relation between labor and capital. TheCourt must take care, however, that in the contestbetween labor and capital, the results achieved arefair and in conformity with the rules. We will notaccomplish that objective here by approving the actof the National Labor Relations Commission which wehold to constitute a grave abuse of discretion.Disposition Petition is granted.

Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) v. NLRC,198 SCRA 586 (91)193 SCRA 365 Sarmiento, J; 1991NATURE Petition for Ceriorari to review NLRCdecisionFACTS- It appears that to avoid unnecessary loss of

productive working time due to personal and non-work-related conversations, personal telephone callsand non-work-connected visits by personnel to otherdepartments, the respondent Reliance SuretyInsurance Co., Inc. (company for short) on 21November 1986, thru the manager (Mr.Celso Eleazar)of its underwriting department, effected a change inthe seating arrangement of its personnel in saiddepartment.- Among those affected were members of the laborunion who claimed that the change was done merelyto harass them. In the ensuing discussions, the

manager and the union members apparently hadheated words and the union members hurledunprintable insults. Some employees refused to stayat their designated places. The company then askedthe recalcitrants to explain within 48 hours why nodisciplinary action should be taken against them.Due to the continuing hostility by the union membersthey were place under preventive suspension and

finally dismissed.- Illegal dismissal complaints were fi led. These wereamended to include a charge of unfair labor practice.

The members alleged that the seating arrangementwas changed to pressure or intimidate labor unionmembers. While the action was pending, the unionfiled a notice of strike. Before a conciliationconference can be held, the union struck andpicketed the company premises thus preventingofficials and other employees from doing their usualduties.- Company filed a petition to declare the strike illegalsince there was no strike vote and the requiredcooling off period was not followed. The Arbiter foundthe strike illegal. The finding was modified by theNLRC and ruled that the strike while illegal shouldnot result in the termination of the employeesinvolved since the members truly believed that thecompany was committing unfair labor practice interminating the other employees. It ruled that theemployees be reinstated but without backwages.- Hence this appeal to the SC.ISSUE/S WON strikers who have found to have stagedan illegal strike may be reinstated to workHELDNo. There is no question that the strike itself wasprompted by no actual, existing unfair labor practicecommitted by the petitioner. In effecting a change inthe seating arrangement in the office of theunderwriting department, the petitioner merelyexercised a reasonable prerogative employees couldnot validly question, much less assail as an act ofunfair labor practice. The Court is indeed at a loss

how rearranging furniture, as it were, can justify afour-month-long strike. As to the privaterespondent's charges of harassment, theCommission found none, and as a general rule, weare bound by its findings of fact. Amid thisbackground, the Court must grant the petition. Instaging the strike in question, a strike that was illegalin more ways than one, the reinstated union officerswere clearly in bad faith, and to reinstate themwithout, indeed, loss of seniority rights, is to rewardthem for an act public policy does not sanction.- As a general rule, the sympathy of the Court is onthe side of the laboring classes, not only because theConstitution imposes sympathy but because of theone-sided relation between labor and capital. TheCourt must take care, however, that in the contest

between labor and capital, the results achieved arefair and in conformity with the rules. We will notaccomplish that objective here by approving the actof the National Labor Relations Commission which wehold to constitute a grave abuse of discretion.Disposition Petition is granted.

San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, 403 SCRA 418(03)403 SCRA 418 AZCUNA, June 10, 2003NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition

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FACTS -SMC and Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa(IBM) executed a CBA wherein they agreed to submitall disputes to grievance and arbitration proceedings,aside from no-strike, no-lockout agreement.-IBM, through its VP and subsequently through itspresident (which was opposed by the VP), filed withNCMB a notice of strike against SMC for allegedlycommitting: (1) illegal dismissal of union members,

(2) illegal transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4)contracting out of jobs being performed by unionmembers, (5) labor-only contracting, (6) harassmentof union officers and members, (7) non-recognition ofduly-elected union officers, and (8) other acts ofunfair labor practice. SMC filed a Motion forSeverance of Notices of Strike with Motion to Dismisson the grounds that the notices raised non-strikeableissues and that they affected 4 corporations.-NCMB: issues are non-strikeable, as only SMC wasimpleaded when 4 different companies wereinvolved. Notices of strike converted into preventivemediation.-while separate preventive mediation conferenceswere ongoing, the Union through its VP filed a noticeof holding a strike vote. SMC opposed, invoking PALv. Drilon (no strike could be legally declared duringthe pendency of preventive mediation). NCMBreiterated conversion of notice of strike intopreventive mediation and grounds raised were onlyintra-union conflict nonstrikeable (who between the2 groups shall represent the workers for collectivebargaining purposes, union leadership).-IBM President group filed 2nd notice of strike againstSMC, NCMB found the additional grounds to be mereamplifications of issues alleged in the 1st notice ofstrike. Ordered consolidation of the 2nd notice ofstrike with 1st notice of strike. Group informed SMC ofits plan to hold a strike.-VP group notified the NCMB that their strike votefavored the holding of a strike. NCMB issued a letterreminding the group of the PAL v Drilon. IBM went onstrike. Strike paralyzed the operations of SMC, which

caused millions of loses.-SMC filed with NLRC a Petition for Injunction withPrayer for the Issuance of TRO, Free Ingress andEgress Order and Deputization Order, which wasissued by NLRC, without prejudice to the unionsright to peaceful picketing and continuous hearingson the injunction case. SMC also entered into aMemorandum of Agreement with Union, calling forlifting of picket lines and resumption of work inexchange of good faith talks between themanagement and the labor managementcommittees. The MOA also stated that cases filed inrelation to their dispute will continue and will not beaffected in any manner whatsoever by theagreement. Work was then resumed.-NLRC reconsidered the issuance of TRO, and sought

to dismiss the injunction case. SMC opposed,submitted copies of flyers wherein IBM expressedtheir threat to revive the strike. NLRC issued decisiondenying the petition for injunction for lack of factualbasis, there being no circumstance to constitute anactual or threatened commission of unlawful acts.MFR deniedISSUES WON the strike held by IBM was illegal(therefore, NLRC committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in denying the petition for injunction filedby SMC)

HELD YESa. Procedural aspect of the strike-For a strike to be valid, it must be pursued withinlegal bounds. One of the procedural requisites thatA263 of the LC and its IRR prescribe is the filing of avalid notice of strike with the NCMB. Imposed for thepurpose of encouraging the voluntary settlement ofdisputes, this requirement has been held to be

mandatory, the lack of which shall render a strikeillegal.-In accordance with the Implementing Rules of theLabor Code, the conversion of the notice of strike topreventive mediation has the effect of dismissing thenotices of strike filed by respondent. A case in pointis PAL v. Drilon, where we declared a strike illegal forlack of a valid notice of strike, in view of the NCMBsconversion of the notice therein into a preventivemediation case. During the pendency of preventivemediation proceedings no strike could be legallydeclared.-therefore, since the notice of strike filed by theunion was converted into preventive mediationproceedings, the union had lost the notices of strikerequired under A263. However, the union defiantlyproceeded with the strike while mediation wasongoing. Such disregard of the mediationproceedings was a blatant violation oftheImplementing Rules, which explicitly oblige theparties to bargain collectively in good faith andprohibit them from impeding or disrupting theproceedings.b. on ruling of NLRC that there was lack offactual basis (no circumstance to constitute anactual or threatened commission of unlawfulacts)-at the time the injunction was being sought, thereexisted a threat to revive the unlawful strike asevidenced by the flyers then being circulated by theIBM, which were not denied by the respondent union.Moreover, a declaration of strike without first havingfiled the required notice is a prohibited activity

(A264(a)), which may be prevented through aninjunction in accordance with A254.c. on IBMs failure to observe the CBAprovisions on grievance and arbitration- Strikes held in violation of the terms contained in acollective bargaining agreement are illegal especiallywhen they provide for conclusive arbitration clauses.

These agreements must be strictly adhered to andrespected if their ends have to be achieved.-We cannot sanction the respondent-unions brazendisregard of legal requirements imposed purposely tocarry out the state policy of promoting voluntarymodes of settling disputes. The states commitmentto enforce mutual compliance therewith to fosterindustrial peace is affirmed by no less than ourConstitution. Trade unionism and strikes are

legitimate weapons of labor granted by our statutes.But misuse of these instruments can be the subjectof judicial intervention to forestall grave injury to abusiness enterprise.Disposition. WHEREFORE, the instant petition ishereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution of theNLRC in Injunction Case No. 00468-94 are REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Petitioner and private respondent arehereby directed to submit the issues raised in thedismissed notices of strike to grievance procedureand proceed with arbitration proceedings as

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prescribed in their CBA, if necessary. Nopronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa saGreenfield v. Ramos, 326 SCRA 428 (00)326 SCRA 248 PURISIMA; February 28, 2000NATURE Petition for Certiorari to annul the NLRCdecision

FACTS- Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M.Greenfield, Inc. (MSMG) (Local Union) is an affiliateof United Lumber and General Workers of thePhilippines (ULGWP) (Federation).- The CBA between MSMG and M. Greenfield, Inc.states that it is entered into by the corporation andMSMG / ULGWP.- The CBA includes a Union Security Clause requiringall employees who are covered by the CBA andpresently members of the UNION to remain membersof the UNION for the duration of the CBA as acondition precedent to continued employment.- Local union imposed a P50 fine on non-attendingunion members which became the subject of bitterdisagreement between the Federation and the localunion. MSMG then declared general autonomy fromthe ULGWP. In retaliation, the national federationasked respondent company to stop the remittance ofthe local union's share in the education funds. It alsodisauthorized incumbent union officers fromrepresenting the employees.- Petitioner union officers were expelled by thefederation for allegedly committing acts of disloyaltyand/or inimical to the interest of ULGWP and inviolation of its Constitution and By-laws. Thefederation advised respondent company of theexpulsion of the 30 union officers and demandedtheir separation from employment pursuant to theUnion Security Clause in their CBA.- Upon demand of the federation, the companyterminated the petitioners without conducting aseparate and independent investigation. The

expelled union officers assigned in the first shift werephysically or bodily brought out of the companypremises by the company's security guards. Thoseassigned to the second shift were not allowed toreport for work. This provoked some of the membersof the local union to demonstrate their protest for thedismissal of the said union officers. Some unionmembers left their work posts and walked out of thecompany premises.- Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissed union officerswere validly and legally terminated because thedismissal was effected in compliance with the unionsecurity clause of the CBA which is the law betweenthe parties. This was affirmed by the NLRC onappeal.> On the ISSUE of STRIKE:

- Labor Arbiter held that the strike was illegal for thefollowing reasons: (1) it was based on an intra-uniondispute which cannot properly be the subject of astrike, the right to strike being limited to cases ofbargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practice (2) itwas made in violation of the "no strike, no lock-out"clause in the CBA, and (3) it was attended withviolence, force and intimidation upon the persons ofthe company officials, other employees reporting forwork and third persons having legitimate businesswith the company, resulting to serious physical

injuries to several employees and damage tocompany property.ISSUE/S * WON the union officers were validlyterminated1. WON the strike was illegal for being grounded on anon-strikeable issue (intra-union conflict between thefederation and the local union)2. WON the no strike, no lock-out clause in the CBA

was violated3. WON the strike was attended with violence forceand intimidationHELD * NOReasoningAlthough this Court has ruledthat union security clauses embodied in thecollective bargaining agreement may be validlyenforced and that dismissals pursuant thereto maylikewise be valid, this does not erode thefundamental requirement of due process. The reasonbehind the enforcement of union security clauseswhich is the sanctity and inviolability of contractscannot override one's right to due process.1. NO Reasoning When respondent companydismissed the union officers, the issue wastransformed into a termination dispute and broughtrespondent company into the picture. Petitionersbelieved in good faith that in dismissing them uponrequest by the federation, respondent company wasguilty of unfair labor practice in that it violated thepetitioner's right to self-organization. The strike wasstaged to protest respondent company's act ofdismissing the union officers. Even if the allegationsof unfair labor practice are subsequently found out tobe untrue, the presumption of legality of the strikeprevails.2. NO Reasoning A no strike, no lock out provisioncan only be invoked when the strike is economic innature, i.e. to force wage or other concessions fromthe employer which he is not required by law togrant. Such a provision cannot be used to assail thelegality of a strike which is grounded on unfair laborpractice, as was the honest belief of hereinpetitioners. Again, whether or not there was indeed

unfair labor practice does not affect the strike.3. NO Reasoning The Labor Arbiter and theCommission found that "the parties are agreed thatthere were violent incidents resulting to injuries toboth sides, the union and management." Theevidence on record show that the violence cannot beattributed to the striking employees alone for thecompany itself employed hired men to pacify thestrikers. With violence committed on both sides, themanagement and the employees, such violencecannot be a ground for declaring the strike as illegal.DispositivePetition is GRANTED; the NLRC decisionis REVERSED and SET ASIDE; respondent company isordered to immediately reinstate the petitioners totheir respective positions.

2) Guidelines and Balancing of InterestShell Oil Workers Union v. Shell Co. of thePhilippines, 39 SCRA 276 (1971)00 SCRA 000 FERNANDO; May 31, 1971NATURE Petition for review order of caFACTS - Shell Company decided to dissolve itssecurity guard section from its Pandacan Installation,notwithstanding the tenure of the said section beingembraced in and assured by an existing collectivebargaining contract

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- this resulted in a strike by the union (for unfairlabor practice). During the strike, violent acts werecommitted by some of the members of the union- the CA declared the strike illegal, saying that therewas no unfair labor practice for the dissolution was aa valid exercise of management prerogative andordered the dismissal of the officers who participatedin the strike)

ISSUE WON the strike was illegalHELD NORatio The dissolution of the security guard sectionwas in violation of the CBA, thus amounting to unfairlabor practice. What was stipulated in an existingCBA certainly precluded Shell Company fromcarrying out what otherwise would have been withinprerogative if to do so would be violative thereof.Reasoning there was specific inclusion of thecategory of the security guards in the CBA. Specificmention is made of the CBA covering rank and filepersonnel regularly employed by the Company,including the work area covered by the PandacanInstallation. There was likewise specific reference tosuch positions in the wage schedule as well as in theappendix of regular remuneration, premium pay andnight compensation. Nonetheless, Shell Companywas bent on doing away with the security guardsection, to be replaced by an outside securityagency.- Essentially, the freedom to manage the businessremains with management. It still has plenty ofelbow room for making its wishes prevail. In muchthe same way that labor unions may be expected toresist to the utmost what they consider to be anunwelcome intrusion into their exclusive domain,they cannot justly object to management equallybeing jealous of its prerogatives. Non-complianceWith the CBA constitutes ULP- the ULP strike called by the Union did have theimpress of validity.- the legality of the strike follows as a corollary to thefinding of fact, made in the decision appealed from -

which is supported by substantial evidence to theeffect that the strike had been triggered by theCompany's failure to abide by the terms andconditions of its CBA- The assumption is that labor can be trusted todetermine for itself when the right to strike may beavailed of in order to attain a successful fruition intheir disputes with management. It is true that thereis a requirement in the Act that before theemployees may do so, they must file with theConciliation Service of the Department of Labor anotice of their intention to strike. Such a requisitehowever does not have to be complied with in caseof ULP strike, which certainly is entitled to greater

judicial protection if the Industrial Peace Act is to berendered meaningful.

- Care is to be taken, however, especially where anunfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping itwith illegality just because it is tainted by violentacts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition ofthe right to strike, responsibility in such a caseshould be individual and not collective. A differentconclusion would be called for, of course, if theexistence of force while the strike lasts is pervasiveand widespread, consistently and deliberatelyresorted to as a matter of policy. It could bereasonably concluded then that even if justified as to

ends, it becomes illegal because of the meansemployed.- on balancing of interests: the violent acts made bysome union members does not render the strikeillegal. The right of the management to preventstrike cannot override the right of the workersagainst ULPDisposition Petition is granted. Order is modified

(order against individual members who committedviolent acts affirmed)

Almira v. B.F. Goodrich, Philippines, Inc. 58SCRA 120 (74)58 SCRA 120 FERNANDO; July 25, 1974Facts Due to the refusal of the management toconsider petitioners' union as the exclusivebargaining representative, petitioners staged a strikeand picketed the company's premises. In the courseof the mass picketing, illegal and unlawful acts werecommitted by the petitioners. Respondent CIRdeclared petitioners to have committed an illegalstrike and dismissed the petitioners.Held REASON FOR PENALTY LESS PUNITIVE THANDISMISSAL.-Where a penalty less punitive wouldsuffice, whatever missteps may be committed bylabor ought not to be visited with a consequence sosevere. it is not only because of the law's concern forthe workingman.

There is, in addition, his family to consider,Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrowson those dependent on the wage-earner. The miseryand pain attendant on the loss of jobs then could beavoided if there be acceptance of the view thatunder all the circumstances of this case, petitionersshould not be deprived of their means of livelihood.Nor is this to condone what had been done by them,For all this while, since private respondentconsidered them separated from the service, theyhad not been paid. From the strictly juridicalstandpoint, it cannot be too strongly stressed, tofollow Davis in his masterly work, Discretionary

Justice, that where a decision may be made to restan informed judgment rather than rigid rules, all theequities of the case must be accorded their dueweight. Finally, labor law determinations to quotefrom Bultmann, should be not only secundumrationem but also secundum caritatem.SECURITY OF TENURE FORTIFIES PROTECTION TOLABOR.-The conclusion that the dismissal ofpetitioners in view of their unlawful acts during thestrike is uncalled for is fortified by the stress on thesecurity of tenure that is a notable feature of thepresent Constitution as pointed out in a decisionrendered only last month in Philippine Air Lines, Inc.vs. Philippine Air Lines Employees Association, L-24626, June 28, 1974.ATTENDANT RESPONSIBILITY ON THE WORKING

FORCE AND MANAGEMENT.-The basic doctrineunderlying the provisions of the Constitution sosolicitous of labor as well as the applicable statutorynorms is that both the working force andmanagement are necessary components of theeconomy. The rights of labor have been expanded.Concern is evident for its welfare. The advantagesthus conferred, however, call for attendantresponsibilities. The ways of the law are not to beignored. Those who seek comfort from the shelterthat it affords should be the last to engage inactivities which negates the very concept of a legal

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order as antithetical to force and coercion. What isequally important is that in the steps to be taken byit in the pursuit of what it believes to be its rights,the advice of those conversant with the requirementsof legal norms should be sought and should not beignored. It is even more important that reason andnot violence should be its milieu.

3) Defenses Good Faith ULPInterwood Employees Association v.International Hardwood, 99 P 82 (56)99 P 82 PADILLA; May 18 , 1956FACTS Mr. Enrique Marcelo, president of theInterwood Employees Association, was originallyemployed by the petitioner since July 26, 1949, asshop helper with a daily compensation of P3.Desiring to move to a better position in the company,he tendered a letter of resignation from his currentposition to make himself available for anotherposition. However, he later found out that the newposition was not available. He then tried to go backto his original position but was refused bymanagement on the ground that the old position hadbeen abolished. The union declared a strike on hisbehalf.ISSUE 1. Whether or not Mr. Marcelo was illegallyterminated2. Whether or not the striking union members shouldbe dismissed for fighting for the cause of Mr.Marcelo.HELD NOMr. Marcelo also claims that his letter of resignationwas misinterpreted by the management. From thecontents of Exhibit "A" there could be no othermeaning from the sentence "I am resigning from mypresent post as Supervisor effective March 7, 1953,"except that as used in ordinary parlance, he isquitting or giving up his present position effectiveMarch 7, 1953. The letter of resignation being clearand concise, it should be taken in its face value.Marcelo in his letter of resignation also gave his

reason why he is resigning from his present positionand signified his desire or intention to work in thepowerhouse.Here, Marcelo wanted to assign himself to thepowerhouse. The question of transfer andassignment of employees or laborers from onesection or department to another is purely an act ofthe management which Mr. Marcelo cannot imposeupon the company, otherwise, if he will be allowed todo so, it would undoubtedly encroach upon themanagerial functions of the management.Resignation is not synonymous with separation ordismissal. In his letter of resignation he stated orexpressed the wish to be returned to his formerposition as shift engineer in the powerhouse whichhe, at that time, did not hold, because the job held

by him and the one to which he wanted to betransferred or returned were two different positions.Marcelo's pretension which amounted to animposition upon the respondent cannot and shouldnot be countenanced and sustained. There was novacancy in the powerhouse to which he could betransferred.2. YES.Even granting, just for the sake of argument, thatthere was really a misinterpretation of the letter ofresignation (Exhibit "A"), and because of this, themanagement refused to readmit Mr. Marcelo,

notwithstanding the request made to that effect, isthis a sufficient cause for the members to declare astrike? As lengthily discussed above, Mr. Marcelo wasnot dismissed for union activities. If he wasseparated from the service of the company, it wasbecause of his voluntary resignation which was dulyaccepted by the management. If the managementrefuses to reemploy him, it is merely acting in the

exercise of its prerogative.Mr. Marcelo without resorting to some pacific meansand processes prevailed upon the members of theAssociation to declare a strike simply because hewas harboring the belief that he was illegallydismissed. A strike as a weapon of labor must beused judiciously. It should be used in redress of justand lawful grievances and not to be used whimsicallyor capriciously even by the President of the unionwho caused the strike to be declared in protest of hisfancied notion that he was dismissed by themanagement on account of union activities.If the determination whether a strike is legal or illegalwere to depend upon the reason or motive, nomatter how groundless or false it may be, thestriking members of a labor union had in mind orbelieved in good faith at the time they staged thestrike, there would then be no need for the court topass upon that question, because what the strikershad in mind or believed in good faith at the time theystruck can hardly be refuted, rebutted or disproved.If the Court of Industrial Relations were bound tobelieve and so find what the striking members of alabor union allege or claim to be the reason ormotive for their staging a strike, because as claimedby the petitioner the right of the members of a laborunion to strike for mutual aid or protection, asrecognized in section 3, Republic Act No. 875, is anabsolute right, then there would no longer be anynecessity for holding or conducting a hearing, whereboth parties to the controversy may present theirproofs and upon which the Court is to determinewhich of the claims or contentions is true, correct

and lawful, as disclosed by the evidence before it.Parenthetically, Republic Act No. 875 took effect on17 June 1953. THE STRIKE HELD ILLEGAL WASSTAGED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE PETITIONER ON 9MARCH 1953. THE ACT CANNOT BE INVOKED ANDAPPLIED TO STRIKE STAGED BEFORE THE ACT TOOKEFFECT. 1 NEVERTHELESS, SUCH RIGHT TO STRIKEFOR MUTUAL AID OR PROTECTION IS NOT ABSOLUTE.IT COMES INTO BEING AND IS SAFEGUARDED BY LAWIF AND WHEN THE ACT OR ACTS INTENDED TORENDER MUTUAL AID OR PROTECTION TO AFFILIATESOF A LABOR UNION ARISE FROM A LAWFUL GROUND,REASON OR MOTIVE. IF THE MOTIVE BE LAWFUL, ANYACT THAT WOULD TEND TO GIVE SUCH MUTUAL AIDOR PROTECTION SHOULD AND MUST BE PROTECTEDAND UPHELD. BUT IF THE MOTIVE THAT HAD

IMPELLED, PROMPTED, MOVED OR LED MEMBERS OFA LABOR UNION OR ORGANIZATION TO STAGE ASTRIKE, EVEN IF THEY HAD ACTED IN GOOD FAITH INSTAGING IT, BE UNLAWFUL ILLEGITIMATE, UNJUST,UNREASONABLE OR TRIVIAL, AND THE COURT OFINDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, THE AGENCY ENTRUSTEDBY THE GOVERNMENT TO DETERMINE IT, FINDS ITSO, THEN THE STRIKE MAY BE DECLARED ILLEGAL.REYES, J.B.L., J., with whom PARAS, C.J.,BAUTISTA and CONCEPCION, JJ., concur,concurring and dissenting:

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I fully concur with the majority in its view thatEnrique Marcelo's conduct was unjustifiable andthat he was properly dismissed; but regret notbeing able to assent to the dismissal of the otherstrikers, for this extreme penalty seems to meexcessive under the circumstances of record.Where unemployment is rife, as at present,dismissal may mean risk of starvation for the

laborers and their families. It is practically conceded, and there is no showing

otherwise, that the labor union declared the strikein the honest belief that Marcelo had beendismissed because of union activities, and nounlawful means were employed. Such action cannot be regarded as trivial, illegal or unreasonable:defense of its members goes to the very root of aunion's reason for existence. I concede that thestrike was injudicious and hasty, since no seriousattempt was made to ascertain the side ofmanagement. But it seems to me thatreinstatement without backpay would have been asufficient stern sanction for such inconsiderateaction and a reminder against its repetition in thefuture.

Nor is the guilt of the union in acting without dueinquiry upon the biased report of its president(Marcelo) too serious or unprecedented an offense.Our experience is that precipitate action upon one-sided reports is not confined to labor unions. Thetruth is that if in labor-capital conflicts labor is oftentoo quick to conclude that every move ofmanagement is an attempt to grind it back toslavery, so are capital and management much toopredisposed to view every petition of labor asunjustified demand and harassing insolence. Saverare and honorable exceptions, both sides appearto suffer from emotional infantilism.

In the present case it does not appear thatmanagement endeavored to present the true factsto the union. Had it done so, the strike would haveprobably been averted, for a laborer does not take

lightly to the suspension of the earnings uponwhich he and his family depend for their living.

National Union of Workers Hotels, Restaurantand Allied Industries v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 192(98)

PNOC Dockyard v. NLRC, 291 SCRA 231 (98)PANGANIBAN; June 26, 1998NATURE Petition for review under Rule 65 of theRules of CourtFACTS- private respondent (KMM-PDEC), among unionsnamely: BRUP, PEDEA, PCC-ELU and PSTCEA, filedwith the DOLE a notice of strike against Phil. NationalOil Company (PNOC) and Monico Jacob as

President/Chairman, on the ground of discriminationconstituting ULP. The dispute arose from the grant bypetitioner and PNOC of the amount of P2,500.00increase in monthly salaries to Managerial,Professionals and Technical Employees (MPT) but notto Non-Managerial, Professional and TechnicalEmployees (NMPT).- Acting Secretary Nieves Confesor certified thedispute subject of the notice of strike to the NLRC forcompulsory arbitration.- the day when respondent union was poised tostrike, its officers and members decided to report for

work but petitioner thru its Operations Manager,Nemesio Guillermo, padlocked the gate and refusedentry to the employees. Some officers and membersof respondent union were able to enter the premisesof petitioner and punch-in their timecards; however,they were immediately escorted back outside- Confesor issued a return to work order directing allstriking workers to return to work within 24 hours

form receipt of the Order and for the Company toaccept them under the same terms and conditionsprevailing prior to the work stoppage.- respondent union thru its President, FelimonPaglinawan filed before the NLRC a complaint againstpetitioner for Illegal Lock-out- all members of the private respondent unionreported and were accepted back to work- Subsequently, petitioner filed before the DOLE apetition to declare the strike illegal with a motion tocite the striking workers in contempt for defying theDOLE Orders.- the President, Secretary, Auditor and Treasurer ofthe respondent union, after due notice andinvestigation, were dismissed by petitioner from theiremployment on the ground, among others of theirparticipation in the work stoppage on December 18to 21, 1991- the dismissed union officers filed before the NLRC acomplaint for illegal dismissal. The cases wereconsolidated and in the herein challenged Decision,public respondent ordered the reinstatement of thedismissed officers of private respondent union. Thesame Decision further ruled that, wherereinstatement was no longer feasible "on account ofthe sale of any of respondent companies," separationpay shall be awarded, equivalent to "1 month's payfor every year of service, a fraction of at least 6months considered as 1 whole year, in addition tothe award of backwages."- The parties filed their respective motions forreconsideration. In its December 9, 1994 Decision,the NLRC modified its earlier disposition and ordered

PNOC to pay its separated employees severancebenefit equivalent to "two months for every year ofservice" in accordance with the company'sestablished business practice. The separate motionsof PNOC and its subsidiaries were all denied.ISSUES1. WON KMM-PDEC and its officers are guilty of illegalstrike.2. WON the termination of KMM-PDEC union officers,who led the illegal strike, was legal and for justcause.3. WON PNOC is entitled to the award of damages.HELD1. NO.Ratio A strike does not automatically carry thestigma of illegality even if no unfair labor practice

were committed by the employer. It suffices if such abelief in good faith is entertained by labor as theinducing factor for staging a strike. Indeed, thepresumption of legality prevails even if the allegationof unfair labor practice is subsequently found to beuntrue, provided that the union and its membersbelieved in good faith in the truth of such averment.Reasoning In resolving that the strike was legal,the labor tribunal took note of the following facts: (1)the notice of strike was filed only after the unionmembers lost hope for the redress of their grievancearising from their exclusion from the P2,500 salary

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increase; (2) the union members honesty believedthat they were discriminated against, since thecompany practice in the past was to grant salaryincreases to all employees regardless of whetherthey were MPTs or NMPTs; (3) such discriminatorygrant appeared to be an unfair labor practiceintended to discourage union membership, sinceMPTs were non-union members; and (4) the labor

unions complied with the legal requirements beforegoing on strike, such as the members' strike vote bysecret ballot, the submission of the results thereof tothe National Conciliation and Meditation Board, thefiling of a notice to strike and the observance of the15-day cooling-off period. Respondent Commissionopined that the unions had a reason to regard thesalary discrimination, believed to discouragemembership in the labor organization, as an unfairlabor practice.- The NLRC noted further that the strike was peacefuland orderly, unmarred by any form of violence oruntoward incident.2. NO.Ratio Having ruled that the strike staged byrespondent unions was legal, the subsequentdismissals of their officers due to their staging of saidstrike cannot be countenanced.- The NLRC correctly observed that, althoughpetitioner averred that the dismissals of individualrespondent were due to infractions of company rulesand regulations, the alleged infractions actuallyarose from their participation in the strike. This iscrystal clear from the charges leveled against theunion officers, such as "active participation in theillegal work stoppage." "disruption of companyoperations resulting [in] losses." "violation of the 'NOSTRIKE' clause of the existing CBA," among others,cited in their similarly worded notices of investigationthat eventually led to their dismissals.- The issues relating to the strike and lockout werealready submitted before the NLRC through thecorresponding complaints filed by petitioner itself

and private respondents. By filing a formal complaintfor illegal strike, it behooved petitioner to desist fromundertaking its own investigation on the samematter, concluding upon the illegality of the unionactivity and dismissing outright the union officersinvolved.- Moreover, the MOA, other than enjoining thestriking workers to return to work, likewise orderedthe management to accept them under the sameterms and conditions prevailing prior to the workstoppage. In glaring defiance, petitioner arbitrarilyundertook to change the work schedule of someemployee on the very day they resumed work, asidefrom deducting in full the wages and holiday pays ofthe striking employees pertaining to the strikeperiod, even before the LMC could convene.

3. NO. The actual and exemplary damages sought bypetitioner have no basis in law, much less in equityand fair play. From the foregoing discussion, thestrike was staged by respondent unions in the honestbelief that petitioner, among the other PNOCsubsidiaries involved, was guilty of unfair laborpractice due to the discrimination in the grant ofsalary increase believed to discourage unionmembership, and to its refusal to bargain collectivelyon the matter. There was good faith on the part of

the striking unions. Thus, they cannot be penalizedby imposing upon them payment of damages.

VII. TEST OF LEGALITYA. Legal Strikes1) Purpose and Means Test = Art. XIII, Sec. 3,Constitution; Art. 263 (b)

National Union of Workers in Hotels, etc. v. CA,570 SCRA 598 (08)B. Illegal Strikes1. Basis Illegality 263 (b) (c); 264 (a); 265

Sukhothai Cuisine, etc. v. CA, 495 SCRA 336(06)-MARTINEZ; JULY 17, 2006NATURE Appeal by certiorariFACTS- On December 3, 1998, employees of SukhothaiCuisine and Restaurant (duly organized as a union,affiliated with private respondent Philippine LaborAlliance Council [PLAC], and designated as PLAC local460 Sukhothai chapter) filed a Notice of Strike withthe National Conciliation and Mediation Board(NCMB) on the ground of unfair labor practice (ULP)and particularly, acts of harassment, fault-finding,and union busting through coercion and interferencewith union affairs.- In a subsequent conciliation conference,representatives of the petitioner agreed andguaranteed that there will be no termination of theservices of private respondents during the pendencyof the case, with the reservation of the managementprerogative to issue memos to erring employees forthe infraction, or violation of company policies.- In a Submission Agreement, the issue of unfairlabor practice was later submitted for voluntaryarbitration, during the pendency of which, thepetitioner, through its president, Ernesto Garcia,dismissed Eugene Lucente, a union member, due toan alleged petty quarrel with a co-employee. In view

of this termination, private respondent Union filedwith the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal.Another employee, private respondent Jose Lanorias,likewise a union member, was relieved from his postand terminated from employment. Shortly thereafter,respondents staged a wildcat strike which waslater transformed into an actual strike.- On June 29, 1999, the petitioner filed a complaintfor illegal strike with the NLRC against privaterespondents, and for a declaration that respondentswho participated in the commission of illegal actshave lost their employment status. The Labor Arbiterruled in favor of petitioner and held that the Notice ofStrike and the Strike Vote referred to a prior disputesubmitted for voluntary arbitration and cannot applyto the strike staged about six months later; that,

instead of resorting to a strike, private respondentsshould have availed of the proper legal remediessuch as the filing of complaints for illegal suspensionor illegal dismissal with the NLRC; and that even ifprivate respondents complied with all the requisitesof a valid strike, the strike is still illegal due to thecommission of prohibited acts, including theobstruction of free ingress and egress of thepremises, intimidation, and threat inflicted upon non-striking employees.- Private respondents appealed to the NLRC whichdecided in their favor and held that the petitioner is

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guilty of union busting; of violating the SubmissionAgreement that no termination shall be effectedduring the voluntary arbitration proceedings; that theNotice of Strike and Strike Vote are applicable to thestrike of June 24, 25, and 26, 1999 since the sameissues of ULP were involved and that ULPs arecontinuing offenses.- After the NLRC denied the MFR, petitioner appealed

to the CA, which later denied the petition andaffirmed the NLRC hence this case.ISSUES

1. WON the strike was illegal2. WON private respondents are deemed to have losttheir employment status by participating in thecommission of illegal acts during the strike.3. WON the requisites for a valid strike may bedispensed with in case of union-busting.HELD1. YES. The strike was illegal.Ratio Art.264 of the LC provides: No strike orlockout shall be declared after assumption of

jurisdiction by the Pres. or the Secretary or aftercertification or submission of the dispute tocompulsory or voluntary arbitration or during thependency of cases involving the same grounds forthe strike or lockout.- Strikes staged in violation of agreements providingfor arbitration are illegal, since these agreementsmust be strictly adhered to and respected if theirends are to be achieved, for it is among the chiefpolicies of the State to promote and emphasize theprimacy of free collective bargaining andnegotiations, including voluntary arbitration,mediation, and conciliation, as modes of settlinglabor, or industrial disputes.Reasoning Once jurisdiction over the labor disputehas been properly acquired by competent authority,that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by theapplication of the coercive processes of a strike.- The alleged dismissals of Lucente and respondentLanorias, both union members, which allegedly

triggered the wildcat strike, are not sufficientgrounds to justify the radical recourse on the part ofthe private respondents. These matters should havebeen raised and resolved in the voluntary arbitrationproceedings that were commenced precisely toaddress them.- Private respondents should have first availed of theappropriate remedies under the Labor Code, such asthe institution of cases of illegal dismissal or, byagreement of the parties, the submission of thecases to the grievance machinery of the CBA, if oneis available, so that they may be subjected toseparate voluntary arbitration proceedings, or simplyseek to terminate the pending voluntary arbitrationcase and complete the mandatory procedure for alawful strike. Private respondents should have

availed themselves of any of these alternativeremedies instead of resorting to a drastic andunlawful measure, specifically, the holding a wildcatstrike. And because of the fact that the Union wasfully aware that the arbitration proceedings werepending, good faith cannot be invoked as a defense.- Moreover, even if the strike were to be declaredvalid because its objective or purpose is lawful, thestrike may still be declared invalid where the meansemployed are illegal. Among such limits are theprohibited activities under Art. 264(e) of the LC,which states that no person engaged in picketing

shall: a) commit any act of violence, coercion, orintimidation or b) obstruct the free ingress to oregress from the employer's premises for lawfulpurposes, or (c) obstruct public thoroughfares.2. YES. The strike had been attended by thewidespread commission of prohibited acts.Reasoning Under Art.264(a) of the LC: Any unionofficer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike

and any worker or union officer who knowinglyparticipates in the commission of illegal acts during astrike may be declared to have lost his employmentstatus: Provided, that mere participation of a workerin a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient groundfor termination of his employment, even if areplacement had been hired by the employer duringsuch lawful strike.- The evidence in the record clearly and extensivelyshows that the individual respondents engaged inillegal acts during the strike, such as the intimidationand harassment of a considerable number ofcustomers to turn them away and discourage themfrom patronizing the business of the petitioner;waving their arms and shouting at the passersby,Huwag kayong pumasok sa Sukhothai! andNilagyan na namin ng lason ang pagkain dyan! aswell as numerous other statements made to discreditthe reputation of the establishment; preventing theentry of customers; angry and unruly behaviorcalculated to cause commotion which affectedneighboring establishments within the mall; openlycursing and shouting at the president in front ofcustomers and using loud and abusive language,such as Putang ina niyong lahat!, toward the restof the management as well as their co-workers whorefused to go on strike; physically preventing non-strikers from entering the premises, as well asdeliberately blocking their movements inside therestaurant, at times by sharply bumping into them orthrough indecent physical contact; openlythreatening non-strikers with bodily harm, such asPag hindi sila pumayag, upakan mo!; and shouting

at the security guard Granada! which caused panicamong the customers and prompted security toreport a possible death threat to management andthe security agency.3. NO.Reasoning In case of alleged union busting, it isonly the 15-day cooling-off period that may bedispensed with, the three remaining requirements notice, strike vote, and seven-day report period cannot be dispensed with.Disposition Petition GRANTED. Decisions of the CAand the NLRC are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Decision of the LA REINSTATED. The strike heldILLEGAL and Union officers who participated in theillegal strike and in the commission of illegal acts, aswell as the union members who participated in the

commission of illegal acts during the strike, aredeclared to have lost their employment status.

Allied Banking Corporation v. NLRC, 258 SCRA724 (96)258 SCRA 724 HERMOSISIMA; July 12, 1996Facts- The dispute between petitioner and Union startedwhen their CBA which was to expire on June 30, 1984came up for renewal. They failed to reach anamicable settlement particularly on the wage

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increase issue. The Union filed a notice of strike withthe Bureau of Labor Relations.- On Dec 16, 1984, then Minister of Labor andEmployment, Blas Ople assumed jurisdiction over thedispute pursuant to Article 263 (g) LC. The ordersenjoined the Union from declaring a strike and themanagement from effecting a lock out. The ordersnotwithstanding, Union filed on Dec 20, 1984, a

report on the results of the strike vote that it earlierconducted. On Jan 3, 1985, Union staged a strikeupon the Union president's contention that the LaborMinister's assumption order was a mere scrap ofpaper.- On Jan 4, 1985, petitioner filed with MOLE aManifestation and Urgent Motion praying for a return-to-work order. On Jan 6, 1985, Minister Ople grantedthe motion and issued a return-to-work order whichincluded a P1,000.00 grant per employee chargeableto future CBA benefits.- Minister Ople directed the parties to continuenegotiations until Jan 31, 1985; otherwise, if nocompromise agreement is reached, he will personallyresolve the bargaining deadlock.- The parties failed to break the deadlock; MinisterOple directed them to incorporate in their collectiveagreement the awards granted in his order.- On Feb 11, 1985, "certain members of the Unionresumed the strike and, on the following days, actsof violence were committed . . . resulting in the filingof criminal charges against some of the strikers."- Petitioner, through notices published in the Bulletin

Today, the Times Journal, and the Daily Express,directed the striking employees to return to work notlater than 1:00 p.m. of Feb 13, 1985.- respondents failed to report for work on the stateddeadline, and explained that the resumption of theirpicketing activities was brought about by their beliefthat Minister Ople's decision was not based on

justice, equity and reason. Petitioner issued noticesof their termination.- Meeting the Union demands halfway, Minister Ople

issued a Resolution modifying his Jan 31, 1985 Order,and so the union lifted its picket lines and notifiedpetitioner that the striking employees were returningback to work. Petitioner refused to accept them backon the ground that the strikers have already beendismissed for abandonment of work when they failedto obey the assumption order.- In order to quell further dispute, Minister Opleissued an Order which directed the bank to reinstateprovisionally all striking workers except (a) thosewho have already accepted their separation pay; (b)officers of the union; and (c) those with pendingcriminal charges.- Union then filed with SC a petition for certiorari,with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminarymandatory injunction, asking that the Order of

Minister Ople be modified to likewise direct thereinstatement of all union officers, employees withpending criminal cases and employees who havereceived their separation pay with full back wages,emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) andemployee benefits counted from March 8, 1985 untilactually reinstated. SC remanded the petition toMOLE, with the instruction to resolve all pendingfactual and legal issues relative to the petition.- Minister Augusto Sanchez, successor of MinisterOple, modified the last Order of the latter by orderingthe reinstatement of all striking employees, except

those who have already accepted their separationpay. The bank filed a petition with the SC to nullifythe aforesaid Order.- SC issued resolution: 1) granting "a TemporaryRestraining Order" enjoining enforcement of theorder of the Minister of Labor and Employment onlyinsofar as it directs the payment of back wages,allowances, and other benefits due to private

respondents effective March 11, 1985 until theiractual reinstatement; 2) ordering petitioner toadvance the equivalent of two (2) months salary toeach of the private respondents entitled toreinstatement under the MOLE order, said amount tobe repaid to the petitioner or charged toaccumulated back wages depending on the finaloutcome of the case.Issue:WON the striking union members terminated forabandonment of work after failing to obey the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor andEmployment should be reinstated with back wages.Held:NO. The respondents were validly dismissedconsidering their defiance of the return-to-work orderissued by the Secretary of Labor. As a consequenceof such defiance, they are considered severed fromtheir employment. An award of back wages isincompatible with the findings of the NLRC upholdingthe dismissal of respondents.- Mere participation of union members in an illegalstrike should not automatically result in theirtermination from employment. However, a perusal ofthe records shows that respondents were terminatedfrom employment by reason of their defiance to thereturn-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor.- The provisions of law which govern the effects ofdefying a return-to-work order are:1) Article 263 (g) of the Labor Codexxx xxx xxxWhen, in his opinion, there exists a labor disputecausing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an

industry indispensable to the national interest, theSecretary of Labor and Employment may assume

jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certifythe same to the Commission for compulsoryarbitration. Such assumption or certification shallhave the effect of automatically enjoining theintended or impending strike or lockout as specifiedin the assumption or certification order. If one hasalready taken place at the time of assumption orcertification, all striking or locked out employeesshall immediately return to work and the employershall immediately resume operations and readmit allworkers under the same terms and conditionsprevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretaryof Labor and Employment or the Commission mayseek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to

ensure compliance with this provision as well as withsuch orders as he may issue to enforce the same . . .(as amended by Sec. 27, R.A. 6715; emphasissupplied.)2) Article 264 (a)No strike or lockout shall be declared afterassumption of jurisdiction by the President or theMinister or after certification or submission of thedispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration orduring the pendency of cases involving the samegrounds for the strike or lockout.

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Any worker whose employment has been terminatedas a consequent of an unlawful lockout shall beentitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Anyunion officer who knowingly participates in an illegalstrike and any worker or union officer who knowinglyparticipates in the commission of illegal acts during astrike may be declared to have lost his employmentstatus: Provided, That mere participation of a worker

in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient groundfor termination of his employment, even if areplacement had been hired by the employer duringsuch lawful strike.- Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines,Inc.: xxx the underlying principle embodied in Art.263 (g) on the settlement of labor disputes is thatassumption and certification orders are executory incharacterand are to be strictly complied with by theparties even during the pendency of any petitionquestioning their validity. This extraordinaryauthority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed atarriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labordisputes, without jeopardizing national interests.Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validityof their claims, the striking workers must ceaseand/or desist from any and all acts that tend to, orundermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor,once an assumption and/or certification order isissued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices on the partof the company, to justify their actions. . . .xxx xxxxxx- The return-to-work order is issued pending thedetermination of the legality or illegality of the strike.It is not correct to say that it may be enforced only ifthe strike is legal and may be disregarded if thestrike is illegal, for the purpose precisely is tomaintain the status quo while the determination isbeing made. Otherwise, the workers who contendthat their strike is legal can refuse to return to theirwork and cause a standstill on the companyoperations while retaining the positions they refuse

to discharge or allow the management to fill. Worse,they will also claim payment for work not done, onthe ground that they are still legally employedalthough actually engaged in the activities inimical totheir employer's interest.- Sarmiento v. Tuico, and Asian TransmissionCorporation v. National Labor Relations Commission:It is also important to emphasize that the return-to-work order not so much confers a right as it imposesa duty; and while as a right it may be waived, it mustbe discharged as a duty even against t