Wittgenstein on TranslationMartin Kusch

Introduction

In this paper I shall discuss Hans-Johann Glock's recent interpretation of the later Wittgenstein's views on translation (2008). (Glock builds on some earlier work by Peter Hacker (1996).) According to Glock, the later Wittgenstein advocates a form of conceptual relativism very close to the position outlined and rejected in Donald Davidson's famous paper "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" (1974/1984): Wittgenstein is a scheme-content dualist; he holds that there are radically different conceptual schemes; and he maintains that at least some of the languages expressing different conceptual schemes are incommensurable. And yet, Glock does not believe that Wittgenstein's position is threatened by Davidson's attack on conceptual relativism. Indeed, Glock argues that Wittgenstein himself in good part supplies us with the arguments needed for a counterattack on key pillars of Davidson's classic text.

My paper has five parts. I begin with outlining a taxonomy of different forms of commensurability and incommensurability. I then explain Glock's conception of conceptual relativism, his interpretation of Wittgenstein, and his reading and criticism of Davidson. I conclude with critical examinations both of this criticism and Glock's rendering of Wittgenstein. May main thesis is thatdespite all their other undeniable differencesDavidson and Wittgenstein do not have radically different views on translation, conceptual schemes, and conceptual relativism.

Forms of (In-)commensurability

The following distinction between four kinds of commensurability and incommen-surability will be crucial for my overall argument. My taxonomy is close to one proposed by Glock, and I shall relate my categories to his as I go along.

The first form of commensurability is word-for-word. It is the thesis that the words of another language can always be translated into words of our own language. The corresponding form of incommensurability thesis denies that word-for-word translation is always possible. (Glock calls this form of incommensurability anisomorphism. (2008: 32.)) Word-for-word incommensurability is the weakest form of incommensurability, and the related form of commensurability is the strongest form of commensurability.

The second commensurability thesis is word-for-phrase (where the phrase might be as long as a book): the words of another language can always be translated into extended paraphrases of our own language. The corresponding form of incommensurability rules out that word-for-paraphrase translation is always possible. (Glock speaks of untranslatability. (2008: 32.))

The third commensurability thesis says that expressions of a foreign language can always be translated into our language, provided that we modify or expand our language in appropriate ways. The corresponding incommensurability thesis disputes that such modification is always possible, either for contingent reasonsa case that Glock calls inexplicabilityor conceptual reasonsa case that Glock calls ineffability. (2008: 32.) The third form of commensurability, as I understand it, allows that the new segment of our language is taken over from the foreign tongue. In other words, the third kind of commensurability amounts to the claim that we can always simply learn a fragment of a language that we cannot translate into our existing language. The third form of incommensurability rules out this possibility. It thus assumes that there are situations where our existing language blocks the possibility of such learning.

(Note in parentheses that Thomas Kuhn, the author most strongly associated with talk of incommensurability, warns of the possible confusions that might result from thinking of learning a foreign tongue as a special case of translating it. To become bilingual is not to expand one's own language (2000: 61). Kuhn's warning is well taken, but I shall stick to my usage nevertheless: after all, the segment of the other language that we add to our own might be quite small and nothing like a whole new natural language. Moreover the addition of the segment is meant to enable usif not to translate, then at least to interpret and understandnew sentences in the foreign language.)

My fourth type of commensurability and incommensurability does not have a counterpart in Glocks taxonomy. It is the view characterised by Kuhn where he says that "applied to a pair of theories " incommensurability means "that there is no common language" into which both can "be fully translated" (2000: 60). Kuhn insists on incommensurability in this sense only when translation is taken as a "quasi-mechanical activity governed in full by a manual which specifies which string in one language may, salva veritate, be substituted for a given string in the other" (2000: 60). I shall not restrict translation to such "quasi-mechanical activity", but rather widen it to include the very activity that Kuhn contrast with translation as quasi-mechanical activity, that is, interpretation and understanding. Thus incommensurability of type four denies that there is (or might be) a language in which expressions of the foreign language and our language can both be interpreted. Of course, if the fourth form of incommensurability is to be a stronger position than the third form, then it must also rule out that we could learn the foreign tongue. The fourth form of commensurability is the weakest form of commensurability. The corresponding form of incommensurability is the strongest: it amounts to the claim that the foreign language and our own cannot be related in any way.

Glock on Wittgenstein as a Conceptual RelativistI now turn to Glock's views on conceptual relativism in Wittgenstein. For Glock conceptual relativism has four components:

(a) Conceptualism: The concepts we employ ... are not simply dictated to us by reality or experience. Our conceptual net ... determines what kind of fact we can catch ... (b) Conceptual diversity: There is a plurality of different conceptual frameworks ...(c) Epistemic incommensurability: ... We lack a common ground for evaluating different conceptual schemes as more or less rational ...

and

(d) Semantic incommensurability: One cannot translate the terms or statements of one conceptual framework into those of another. (2008: 25-28.) (d) entails (c) but not vice versa; and (d) is optional.

Glock thinks that (a), (b), and (c) can all be found in the later Wittgenstein, and that (d) can at least be found in a qualified form. Evidence for Wittgensteins conceptualism are his claims that grammar is "arbitrary" and "not accountable to any reality" (1974: 184). Moreover, Glock maintains that Wittgensteins concep-tualism is tied to the scheme-content dichotomy: in Wittgenstein this dichotomy is said to surface as the distinction between grammatical and empirical propositions. Wittgenstein advocates conceptual diversity since he allows for alternative ways of counting, calculating and measuring. Glock finds epistemic incommensurability expressed in passages such as "One symbolism is as good as the next ..." (Wittgenstein 2001: 22): "Wittgenstein rejects even the modest suggestion that our form of representation is superior to these alternatives in any way other than a pragmatic one which is relative to certain interests." (Glock 2008: 22.)

Finally, as concerns semantic incommensurability in Wittgenstein, Glock first submits that Wittgenstein must be sympathetic to word-for-word incommensura-bility. Consider Wittgenstein's famous "odd wood-sellers" (1978: I 150-152): a tribe that sells wood by area covered rather than by volume. Glock surmises that, were we to encounter such a culture, we would not be able to translate their language word for word into ours. (Glock 2008: 28.) Moreover, Glock reckons that Wittgenstein must also support the second and third form of incommensurability. This seems to follow from Wittgenstein's emphasis on the role of samples in language learning: the second and third form of incommensurability result when the samples used by a (past) culture have been lost. In such case there will be no possibility of translating the foreign terms word for word, or word for phrase; nor can our language expand in a way that would make the other language translatable. (Glock 2008: 40-41.)Glock against Davidson on Conceptual SchemesDavidson threatens all three key elements of Wittgenstein's conceptual relativism: the scheme-content dualism, radical conceptual diversity and semantic incommen-surability. Recall Davidson's argument in "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" (1974/1984). The target of his criticism is a conceptual relativism based on the idea of radically different conceptual schemes. Davidson suggests capturing the radical difference as an incommensurability claim: two languages express radically dif-ferent conceptual schemes if, and only if, they are not translatable into each other or into a third language. Davidson shows that a conceptual relativism so understood is incoherent: we do not understand what a language is independently of it being translatable. Davidson defends this criterion for being a language by showing that the only two alternatives fail. These alternatives are that a language organizes reality or experience; or that a language fits the totality of evidence.

In order to save Wittgensteins conceptual relativism, Glock first argues in defence of scheme-content dualism. Davidson holds that such dualism is obsolete in light of Quine's assault on the analytic-synthetic and the language-theory divides. Nevertheless, Glock and Hacker (1996) propose that Wittgenstein's distinction between "grammatical" and "empirical propositions" captures the sensible core of the scheme-content dichotomy. Glock agrees with Quine and Davidson that the three distinctions of scheme and content, analytic and synthetic, and theory and language stand or fall together. Glock concentrates his effort on the language-theory divide and offers three considerations to show that "a language like English is not a theory". First, " the identity of a language is determined not by sentences, but by the principles for the formation of meaningful sentences." Second, " unlike a theory, a language does not state or predict anything." And third, a "language must contain both sentences and their negations, which a coherent theory cannot." (2008: 31.)

Having thus convinced himself that Wittgensteins scheme-content dualism is viable, Glock turns to establishing that Davidsons arguments against radical conceptual diversity and translation failure fail as well. To begin with, Glock does not think that Davidson's distinction between ways of identifying a languagetranslatability, organisation of reality or experience, fit with reality or experienceis exhaustive. The overlooked fourth alternative is that something is a language if it plays a coordinating role in the activities of a community. Crucially, Glock believe that we can recognize that a language fulfils this role even when we are unable to translate it:

it would be possible to ascribe a language to a noise-making community simply on the basis of their way of life, especially if they are capable of coordinating their activities e.g. in the production of complex artifacts.

(Glock 2008: 37, cf. Hacker 1996: 291)

Glock is not just content to show that there can be untranslatable languagesand thus, by Davidsons own criteria, different conceptual schemes. He also wants to convince us that it is meaningful to speak of different conceptual schemes even when the languages (expressing these different conceptual schemes) are intertranslatable. Here Wittgensteins odd wood-sellers or elastic rulers become important for a second time:

[Wittgenstein's] examples include selling wood not by weight or volume but by area covered, and measuring with elastic rulers. The second case clearly involves different rules, and yet it is no less intelligible than the medieval practice of measuring by the ell. (Glock 2008: 38.)

The conceptual schemes are different, but translation is possible. Glock here uses the odd wood-sellers and the elastic rulers not save for a specific form of incommen-surability but to argue against the Davidsonian inference from commensurability to sameness of conceptual scheme.

Finally, Glock employs the odd wood-sellers also as part of an attack on David-sons "Principle of Charity" (Glock 2008: 42-44): roughly, if we want to understand others, we must count them right in most matters.

Assume that we have encountered the tribe that distributes wood in the "odd way", that is, by area covered rather than by volume. Assume further that the tribes word for their practice is 'myynti' (I let the tribe speak Finnish). Glock claims that 'myynti' can be translated into an expression in our language, for instance into 'measuring and selling wood'. This in turn he takes to show that difference in conceptual scheme is compatible with translatability.

Glock imagines Davidson replying as follows: 'Measuring and selling wood' cannot be the correct translation of 'myynti'; for if the practice of the tribe is one of measuring and selling wood then they act irrationally in ignoring the height of the piles of wood. It is not rational to sell wood by area covered rather than by volume. And if our translation or interpretation of the tribes words make its members irrational, then our translation or interpretation must be wrong.Presumably then, Davidson would have to insist on a much more convoluted paraphrase for translating 'myynti'.

Glocks response to the response is to simply reject Davidson's view that charity is essential to interpretation. What justifies translating 'myynti' as 'measuring and selling wood' is nothing to do with charity and rationality; it is simply the similarity between the tribes behaviour when it engages in 'myynti' and our behaviour when we measure and sell wood. It follows that nothing stands in the way of our counting the tribe wrong about the correct way of measuring and selling wood. No Principle of Charity can stop us.

Against Glock on Davidson on Conceptual SchemesI now turn from exposition to criticism. I begin with scrutinising Glocks arguments against Davidson. The language-theory distinction is the natural starting point.(a) Language and TheoryGlock's first argument in defence of the language-theory distinction was that the identity of a language is determined not by sentences, but by the principles for the formation of meaningful sentences. This view can be challenged both with respect to theories and with respect to language. Languages first. Remember that Glock wants his arguments against Davidson and Quine to be "Wittgensteinian" in spirit (2008: 21). But it does not strike me as particularly Wittgensteinian to say that the identity of languages is determined by formation rules for meaningful sentences. Why formation rules rather than languages games? And why assume that abstract rules are primary with respect to paradigmatic cases? Or even more principally: can there be formation rules for meaningful sentences at all? Turning from languages to theories, here too Glock's idea is problematic. Why should we say that the identity of theories is determined by sentences rather than, say, rules or models? Are there not plenty of philosophers of science who have argued for the latter possibilities? Glock's position of theories is hardly uncontroversial.

Glocks second point was that unlike a theory, a language does not state or predict anything. One response here might be to deny his claim about theories: theories do not state or predict anything; people state and predict using theories. If this is accepted then the parallel with language is quickly restored: people state and predict things using languages. One might also decrease the distance between language and theory by pointing out that, depending upon which language we employ, different statements and predictions are possible.

Glock's third consideration was that "a language must contain both sentences and their negations which a coherent theory cannot." I have three worries. What does such "containing" amount to? It surely does not make "Wittgensteinian" sense to say that a language contains all the sentences that can be formulated using it! Moreover, even if such "containing" were to make sense, are we going to allow that a language can also contain meaningless sentences? If we deny this possibility then it is no longer open to us to sayas Glock wants tothat a language must contain both sentences and their negations. And finally, while theories might not (normally) contain both sentences and their negations, theories can have incompatible models: gas molecules are modelled as hard billard-balls and as soft, sticky tennis-balls and within one and the same theory.

I conclude that Glock has not presented a good case against the Davidsonian position on the language-theory distinction.

(b) Criteria for Being a LanguageGlock believes to have found a way of identifying languages that does not depend on translation. The new criterion is that a language must play a role in the coordination of the actions of a community. Glock also holds that we can pick out noises as playing this role even when we cannot translate or interpret them.

I beg to differ. Remember that one of the options Davidson considers and rejects is that a language organises experience and reality. His objection is that if a language has this role, then it must be possibleat least in principleto identify how the language does its organising (of familiar objects). But if such identification of ways of organizing is possible, then it is also possible to interpret (i.e. translate) the words involved. If this consideration is correctand Glock never offers an argument against itthen it must also apply to the organising of people and their actions. After all, people and their actions are part of reality, too. Or, put differently, if we think we have sufficient evidence to say that the noises coordinate actions, must we not also have instances where we can tell what kind of action is triggered by what noise? And if so, do we not already interpret and translate?

(c) The Inference from Translatability to Sameness of Conceptual SchemeDoes the example of the odd wood-distributors show, first, that there are conceptual schemes different from ours, and second, that we can translate and interpret across conceptual schemes? Concerning the first point, it seems to me that Glock simply misunderstands the dialectic here. Of course, if we define the term so widely that a few small differences in concepts make for differences in conceptual schemes, then indeed there are many of them. But this is not the issue for Davidson. For Davidson "different conceptual schemes" are "radically different conceptual schemes": schemes that explain both fundamental differences in world-view, and the incommensurability of languages. The point of restricting the concept in Davidson's way is that it is just not obvious that we need a category of conceptual schemes for the smaller, pedestrian conceptual differences that Glock refers to.

(d) Defending The Principle of CharityIs Glock right to say that Davidson would not be entitled to translate 'myynti' (the tribe's word for their practice of distributing wood) as 'selling and measuring wood' on the grounds that it would have the tribesmen come out irrational? No, Glock is not right. Charity does not demand that the natives always come out rational. Charity is forced on us only to get a foothold in the natives belief-system. Without such foothold we could not begin to assign meaning to their noises. But this is not the situation in this context as Wittgenstein describes it. Wittgenstein describes a situation where we are already able to communicate with the natives.

(e) Misunderstanding Davidson on Semantic IncommensurabilityFinally, Glock also misunderstands Davidson's views on semantic incommen-surability: these views do not rule out the very possibility of conceptual diversity.Consider the four forms of incommensurability that I distinguished at the outset. Contrary to what Glock believes, it seems to me a little uncharitable to suggest that Davidson leaves no room for breakdowns of word-for-word trans-latability. To my knowledge Davidson nowhere implies that such translation is, or must be, always possible.

Davidson does not rule out breakdown of word-for-phrase translatability eiher. Although he sometimes says that "translatability into a familiar tongue" is "a criterion of languagehood" (1974/1984: 186), he does not rule out that the "familiar tongue" might have to develop and change in order to interpret the foreign tongue. Note also Davidson's later comment that "... my view does not make the ability to interpret a language depend on being able to translate that language into a familiar tongue." (1976/1984: 175.)

Davidson also recognizes hurdles to the learning of (fragments of) another language. It is hard to see, for instance, why Glock's example of the missing colour samples would not fit with Davidson's theory. I take it this would just be case were we "have good grounds for believing that what we do not grasp we could learn to decipher" (ibid.). We could learn to decipher the colour code if we were able to find remnants of the samples. The contingency that blocks our advance here is perfectly understandable. And it hardly licences claims for a radically different views of the world.

Of course Davidson would have a problem with the view that we could encounter another language (with its conceptual scheme) and not be able to learn it and this for the sole reason of having our language, our conceptual scheme. In other words, Davidson rejects the idea that I might know of a given set of noises (that I can identify and distinguish) that it constitutes a language even though I cannotand cannot by virtue of having my languageinterpret or translate or learn it. In this scenario, and in this scenario only, Davidson opposes the third form of incommensurability. But then again, so does Glock.

Finally, can there be two languages that cannot be translated into (or interpreted in) a (possible) third language? Here Davidson's answer is clearly negative. Languagehood and in-principle translatability go together conceptually.

I conclude that Davidson accepts the first three forms of incommensurability, the very forms that Glock seeks to defendagainst Davidson!

Against Glock on Wittgenstein as a Conceptual RelativistMy final task is to assess Glocks claims about Wittgensteins so-called conceptual relativism. I begin with the scheme-content dichotomy, and Glocks claim that Wittgensteins distinction between grammar and empirical propositions is an instance of this dichotomy.

(a) Grammar is not a SchemeI shall be brief on this topic since I have dealt with it at much greater length else-where (Kusch, forthcoming). To sum up my argument, I take seriously Wittgen-steins parallel between grammar and metrology on the one hand, and empirical propositions and empirical science on the other hand. And I interpret this parallel against the background of what Wittgenstein has to say about metrology and its interdependence with empirical science. Note for instance that Wittgenstein frequently emphasises the interdependence of choice of unit of measurement and empirical measurement results; that he underlines our changing decisions concerning which samples and prototypes we put in, or take out, of the archive; that he frequently treats Einsteins clocks as analogues of grammatical rules, and that Einsteins clocks are themselves subject to physical measurements; or that he explicitly characterises metrology as a form of applied physics. All this suggests to me that the later Wittgenstein regards a rigid scheme-content distinction as every bit as problematic as do Quine and Davidson.

(b) Wittgenstein against IncommensurabilityIt is surprising that Glock never mentions passages in which Wittgenstein seems close to Davidsons views on (in)commensurability:

A language that I do not understand is no language. (2000: 109 196) Whatever the language that I might construct, it has to be translatable into an existing language ... (2000: 110 144)

It is an important fact that we assume it is always possible to teach our language to men who have a different one. (1980: 644)

If we render the first quotation as 'every language that I cannot even in principle interpret / translate / learn is no language' that we have a position that denies at least the third form of incommensurability (the learning of another language is impossible). And this makes Wittgenstein and Davidson bed-fellows.

(c) Wittgenstein, Wood-selling and the Principle of CharityThe odd wood-sellers play a central role in Glocks argument with Davidson, especially in his criticism of the principle of charity. It is therefore of some interest to note how Wittgenstein himself discusses this strange tribe in his lectures on the philosophy of mathematics first in 1937 and then in 1939.

In the 1937 discussion Wittgensteins main point seems to be this (I here reconstruct his position in terms of the translation of 'myynti'): If our translation of 'myynti' as 'trading' or 'measuring' etc. is correct then, to be rational, the tribesmen must be responsive to our criticism of their practice. Wittgenstein writes: "I should, for instance, take a pile which was small by their ideas and, by laying the logs around, change it into a 'big' one." But there is no guarantee that he will convince them: " perhaps they would say: 'Yes, now its a lot of wood and costs more'and that would be the end of the matter." Under these circumstances Wittgenstein would be ready to say they "do not mean the same by 'a lot of wood' and 'a little wood' as we do" (1978: I-150). If the tribesmen go on and deny the difference in meaning then we have little alternative to charging them with the logical "insanity" that Frege refers to in the preface of his Grundgesetze (1978: I-152). And they would then be reminiscent of the tribe in the Brothers Grimms fairy-tale "Kluge Leute" (inaccurately rendered in the English translation as "the Wise Men of Gotham"). The "clever people" in question are cheated out of their possessions by scrupulous tradesmen who exploit their simple-mindedness. For instance, a woman sells three cows to a trader who claims to have forgotten his purse. As an alleged "guarantee" of a later payment he takes away only two of the cows and leaves the third behindnever to return (1978: I-151). Considerations of rationality familiar from Davidson's discussion thus do play a role in picking a translation for 'myynti'.

Turning to the 1939 treatment, here the first step is to suggest a different translation for 'myynti': giving wood away. This alternative is introduced as an attempt to protect the tribesmen from the accusation of logical madness: "We might call this a kind of logical madness. But there is nothing wrong with giving wood away." (1976: 202.) The second step is charitable in a different sense: now the tribesmen get off the hook by being no worse than us: "What the hells the point of doing this? ... It isnt clear in all that we do, what the point is." (1976: 203-4.) And in a third step Wittgenstein proposes a "historical explanation" of the tribe's practice:

(a) These people dont live by selling wood ... (b) A great king long ago told them to reckon the price of wood by measuring just two dimensions, keeping the height the same. (c) They have done so ever since, except that they later came not to worry about the height of the heaps. Then what is wrong? They do this. And they get along all right. What more do you want? (1976: 204)Here charity is a necessary ingredient in the process of developing a workable theory of the tribesmen's behaviour.

This evidence shows that Wittgenstein does invoke charity considerations when interpreting or translating the terms of other cultures. But he is also readyunder certain conditionsto count the members of another culture as irrational. This readiness sits badly both with Glocks insistence that interpretation and translation need not give room to charity, and with his claim that Wittgenstein is committed to epistemic incommensurability. Wittgensteins position is much more nuanced.

(d) Is Wittgenstein a Conceptual Relativist?This is a big topic, and thus I restrict myself to two comments.

It is a little puzzling why Glocks paper never refers to the tribe of Super-Spartans from Zettel (1981), the people who ridicule all expressions of pain and who therefore do not have a use for the idea of pretending to be in pain:

384. "Pretending", these people might say, "what a ridiculous concept!" ...

387. an education quite different from ours might also be the foundation for quite different concepts. 388. For here life would run on differently. this is the only way in which essentially different concepts are imaginable.

390. 'These men would have nothing human about them.' Why?We could not possibly make ourselves understood to them. Not even as we can to a dog. We could not find our feet with them. And yet there surely could be suchincidentally, humanbeings.Is this passage (from the late 1930s or early 1940s) not a clear case of a radically different conceptual scheme and thus an incommensurable language? After all, Wittgenstein says that they have essentially different concepts, and that we could not possibly make ourselves understood to them.

Although this passage is often cited when Wittgenstein's alleged cultural relativism is at issue, Glock is right not to use it as evidence of conceptual relativism. To begin with, note that Wittgenstein speaks of "Begriffe" where the translation has "concepts"; and that "Begriff" is often best rendered as "conception", "idea" or "notion". Moreover, what the Super-Spartans are struggling to understand is not how best to translate our word 'pretence'. What they have difficulties getting is why anyone would believe that it is important to leave room for the public expression of feelings and sensations. Their puzzlement concerns primarily our values and beliefs, not our semantics. And finally, the same point also holds from our perspective. That these men have nothing human about them, that we could not make ourselves understood to them, is not owed to the way their language organises their experience and reality. It is owed to the fact that their relationship to their own bodies and to other people is close to incomprehensible to us. Of course such differences in values and beliefs affect our respective languages. But this is not where Wittgenstein puts the emphasis. He is interested in our difficulties with understanding certain kinds of people, not with understanding certain kinds of words.

This brings me to my second comment on conceptual relativism is this. Glock is right to note that Wittgenstein allows for much conceptual diversity and that there are many relativistic motifs in his reflection. For instance, Wittgenstein allows for fundamental differences in ethical systems (e.g. Kant vs. Nietzsche), tastes (e.g. Middle Ages, us), regimes of measurement (e.g. hard vs. soft rulers), mathematical systems (e.g. 1, 2, 3, 4, many), systems of colour terms (e.g. inversion of primary-secondary colours), folk psychologies (e.g. concepts of pain), religious frameworks (e.g. Catholicism, Buddhism), or systems of common-sense certainties. Assume for a moment that Wittgenstein is some kind of a relativist in all these areas. The question that is of interest here is how conceptual relativism relates to these other forms of relativism (ethical, metrological, religious ...). Is conceptual relativism the genus with respect to them all, or is it a further species?

Glock cannot opt for the genus alternative since he distinguishes sharply between conceptual relativism and "alethic relativism" (about truth) (2008: 22). But truth is a concept, too. And if being a relativised concept is not enough to justify the label 'conceptual relativism' in the case of truth, why should it in the case of number or colour concepts? Unfortunately, the species option is also unattractive. For if we wish to treat conceptual relativism as a distinct species of relativism, then it needs to be defined in terms of specific theses and claims that set it apart from other forms of relativism. Such theses might concern failures of translation, versions of the scheme-content dichotomy, or perhaps Whorfian claims about how concepts determine how we see the world. The problem is that Wittgenstein endorses none of these ideas.

ConclusionGlock's attempt to defend Wittgenstein's conceptual relativism against Davidson fails in several ways. First, his interpretation of Wittgenstein as a conceptual relativist is mistaken: Wittgenstein does not hold versions of scheme-content dualism, or radical incommensurability. Second, Glock's reading of Davidson is uncharitable: Davidson does not attack word-for-word or word-for-phrase forms of incommensurability. Third, Glock's criticism of Davidson's attack on conceptual schemes is unsuccessful. And fourth, Glock overlooks that Wittgenstein is with Davidson on questions of incommensurability and conceptual schemes. Bibliography

Davidson, D. (1974/1984), On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in D. Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, 183-198.

Davidson, D. (1976/1984), "Reply to Foster", in D. Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, 171-179

Glock, H.-J. (2008), "Relativism, Commensurability and Translatability", in J. Preston (ed.), Wittgenstein and Reason, Oxford: Blackwell, 21-46.

Hacker, P. (1996), "On Davidson's Idea of a Conceptual Scheme", Philosophical Quarterly 46: 289-307.

Kuhn, T. (2000), The Road Since Structure, ed. by J. Conant and J. Haugeland, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kusch, M. (forthcoming), "Wittgenstein and Einstein's Clocks".

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