Kristeva Forgiveness

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Forgiveness: An InterviewAuthor(s): Julia Kristeva and Alison RiceSource: PMLA, Vol. 117, No. 2 (Mar., 2002), pp. 278-295Published by: Modern Language AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/823274 .

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PMLA

theories and

methodologies

Forgiveness:AnInterview

Introduction

JULIA KRISTEVA

JULIA RISTEVAs a linguist,psychoana-

lyst, critical heorist, and novelist. She

moved to Paris romher nativeBulgaria

in 1966 and began her prolificcareer

with contributions to literaryreviews,

notablyTelquel,beforethe 1974 publi-

cation of her monumentaldoctoral he-

sis, Larevolutiondu langage poetique

(Revolution n PoeticLanguage).

Kris-

teva teaches at the Universitede Paris

VII,where she directs he doctoralpro-

gram in textual studies and the newly

founded InstitutRolandBarthes.

The Englishversion of the interview s

translatedbyAlisonRice.Her ranscrip-

tion of the originalconversationbegins

on page 288.

278

THIS NTERVIEWITH ULIAKRISTEVA,ONDUCTEDON 25 APRIL

2000, FOCUSESON FORGIVENESS, TOPICTHATIS RECEIVING

considerableattention worldwide.1Numerous nations around the globehaverecentlyextendedapologies to specificgroups of people, includingSouthAfrica,o victimsof apartheid; ritain,o the Maoripeople;Australia,

to stolenaboriginal hildren;he UnitedStates, o NativeAmericans,apa-nese Americans,and AfricanAmericans; nd Germany,o victims of the

Holocaust.This remarkablenternational roliferationf requests orfor-

giveness orwrongdoingand of attemptso makeamends has notescapedthe attention f prominentiteraryritics ndphilosophers.

InFrance,cholarsrecognizehe importance f forgivenessnotjustas

a themein literature ndhistorybut also as a critical rameworkhroughwhichwe can viewthe modernworld.Suchdiverse vents as theadmission

by Francehat t administeredorturenAlgeria nd the UnitedStatespresi-

dentBillClinton'sgrantingof questionablepardonsat the close of his sec-

ond term in office have contributed o an ongoing discussion of what

forgivenessconsists of, who can forgive,and under whatcircumstances

forgiveness an occur.

Kristeva'sommentson forgiveness anthereforebeseen as partof the

currentxploration f thetopicinFrance. aulRicoeurecently ublishedLa

memoire, 'histoire,'oubli "Memory, istory,Forgetting'),n encyclopedicworkon the problematic elationsof history,memory,andjustice.He de-

votes a long epilogueto "pardon ifficile,"he hardshipof reconcilingwith

the past;Ricoeur eeks to distinguishbetweenthe criminal nd the crime,between orgivenessandforgetting. n hisanalysis,we shouldnot forgeta

crimebut shouldforgive he personwho committedt.This s a distinction

thatotherscholarshavecarefullystablished s well, ncludingKristeva.2

Pardon ndrepentancewerethefocusof JacquesDerrida'seminarat

the Ecoledes HautesEtudes n SciencesSociales rom1997to 2000.Derrida

hasformulated definition f forgiveness hattakesintoaccount tspreva-

lence n Christianountriesandhas beenespecially ttentiveo the increas-

? 2002 BY THE MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA



JuliaKristeva 279

ingnumber f public pologies ncountriesforeignto theJudeo-Christianradition. omeof hissignif-icantreflections n thetopicwerepublishednthe

form of an interview, Le iecleet le pardon""The

Century nd Forgiveness"),n 1999.Aresponseto

Derrida ythesociologist EdgarMorinpresentsa

verydifferentthical ndrational ointof view.3

Kristeva raws fromsome of Derrida's ub-lishedstatementsin formingher opinion;in re-

sponse to what she perceives o be his"utopian"

vision, heinsists hatforgivenessmustbe limitedo

theprivatephereof human nteraction. hesocial

arena swhere riminalsmustbetriedandpunishedfor theiractions.WhileKristevaoes notexplicitly

address hewidespread oldingof publicribunalsthatseekto cometo termswith roublesomepasts,sheiscertainlypeakingnthiscontext. hemakes t

clearwithrespectto the Holocaust hat criminals

can beforgiven, utonlyaftertheyhavemaderepa-

rations, xpressedremorse, ndindicated desire

totransformhemselves ndbeginagain.

Forgiveness asplayeda conspicuousrolein

Kristeva'sliteraryriticism,romherstudyof Fyodor

Dostoevsky's ovelsinher bookon melancholyn

Westernculture,Soleil noir:Depression

t melan-

colie Blackun:DepressionndMelancholia),o her

reflection njudgmentand time inher recentvol-

umeHannahArendt.These wosubstantialworks,written vertenyearsapart, pproach orgivenessfromdifferentangles.Kristeva'surrentopinionson

thetopicarethus informedbyherfamiliarity ith

the Christianhemes of Dostoevsky'snovelsand

with heJewish raditioninfluencing rendt'sphilo-

sophical houghtbutattest o Kristeva'sknowledgeof psychoanalysisndsemiologyaswell.

Kristevaikens he psychoanalyticureto theact of forgivenessnherstudyof Arendt'swritings.Inthis firstvolumeof a triptych n "women'sge-nius,"Kristevaarguesthatgivingmeaningbeyondthe nonmeaning f the anguishedpatient'srauma

empowersthe patient o be bornagain, ust as a

forgiven ubject indsnew lifeandstartsoverfol-

lowing a pardon. In Larevolte ntime (Intimate

Revolt), publicationoriginating n herdoctoral

courseattheUniversite e ParisVII,Kristevamain-

tainsthatforgivenesss not a psychoanalyticon-

cept,butshe demonstrateshatthe interpretationinanalysiseffectivelyreatesa situation hat facili-

tates healingandforgiveness.She insists thather

workon melancholy nSoleilnoir helpedherto

see the connection betweenthisJudeo-Christian

notionand itscontinuation n the psychoanalyticcure.4Herelaborations nthe following nterview

clearly how that itwould be difficulto overesti-

matethe importance f psychoanalysisn herun-

derstandingf forgiveness.

Shortlyafter the publicationof Soleil noir,

Kristevagrantedthe philosopherOlivierAbelan

interview n forgiveness "Dostoievski').he nter-

view, nwhichAbelquotesextensivelyromKriste-va'sstudyof forgiveness n Dostoevsky'swritings,was publishedwitharticlesand other interviews

withcriticsikeJeanBaudrillardn a collectionde-

votedto thequestionof forgiveness s a meansof

overcomingdebtand forgetting.Sincethis inter-

viewappeared,n 1991,Kristevaas addressed he

topicindifferentsettingsandfroma variety f an-

gles,but littleof these proceedingshas beenpub-lished. In the following interview,I draw from

commentsKristevamade at two recentcolloqui-ums,whereshe responded o the currentntellec-

tualdebateon forgiveness. also incorporateher

perspective n the matteras she described t ina

personalpiece publishedas a "journal ntry" n

the dailyFrenchnewspaperLiberation;hisreflec-

tivecontributiononcentrates n the rolesof writ-

ingandlanguage n herown questforforgiveness("Monournal").nmyquestions, herefore, refer

to printedand unprinted ources in an effortto

elicitKristeva'suniqueperspective n forgiveness.

She respondsby combiningcomplextheoreticalideas withpersonalanecdotesandexamples.

While heinterviewoes notfocus on particu-larpoliticalituations,with heexception f several

allusionsto the Holocaust,Kristeva'slaboration

of herconceptionof "par-don"onethelesscarries

implicationsor a numberof recentproceedings.Herinsistenceon reservingforgiveness for the

private pheremightappear o contradict fforts

to establishsome sort of collectiveforgiveness.

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280 Forgiveness:An Interview

But it is clear that the aims of South Africa'sTruth

and Reconciliation Commission, for example, are

in tandem with Kristeva'sunderstanding of for-

giveness. The storytelling by victimsand perpetra-

tors that is inherent to efforts at reconciliation,not

only in South Africa but in South American coun-

tries like Chile and Argentina as well, reflects Kris-

teva's assertion that speaking of trauma is crucial

to forgiveness. She strongly supports acknowl-

edging responsibilityand making reparations.She

believes in the creation of a narrative that does

not erase the past but transcends it, allowing the

subject to start anew, which is the ultimategoal of

forgiveness and the evidence of its effectiveness.

Creating a narrative, translating experienceinto words, is an ongoing process. Forgiveness,for

Kristeva,s more than a single occurrence. It s a way

of livingin and perceivingthe world that promotes

constant development and continual renewal. It is

a comprehension of the other that goes beyond

rationalization and univocal logic to interpretthe

reprehensible act in terms that will enable the per-

petratorto behave differently n the future.Forgive-

ness is not limited to relationships with others,

though. Perhaps ts most important orm is forgive-

ness of oneself, which permits personal rebirthand

an optimisticadvancementtoward new horizons.

Alison Rice

Universityof California,Los Angeles

NOTES

I translate he Frenchpardonas "forgiveness"because

"pardon" n English often suggests an official reprieve,

whereas ts cognatein Frenchhas wider mplications.2 In her study of forgiveness in the work of Hannah

Arendt,Kristevamakessure o emphasize heresultof such a

distinction:"forgivenesss directed oward heperson,not the

act.One cannot orgivemurder rtheft,only themurderer r

the thief. In addressingsomeonerather hansomething,for-

givenessreveals tself as an act of love"("lepardon 'adresse

a la personne,non B 'acte. Onne peut pardonnere meurtre

oule vol, seulement e meurtrier u le voleur.En s'adressant

quelqu'un et non a quelque chose, le pardon se d6voile

commeacte d'amour ...]"; HannahArendt361;my trans.).

3Morincharacterizeshis approach o the issue as "prag-matic" and "political"("pragmatique,voire politique") in

contrast o Derrida'sanalysis,which in Morin's words "iso-

lates the questionof forgivenessfrom its contexts" "isole la

questiondupardonde ses contextes";26, 24; my trans.).For

Morin,forgiveness does nothave to be "unconditional" nd

"pure" o be effective; he maintains thatrepentanceis not

evennecessary orpardon o takeplace,sinceforgivenesscan

often bringabout a subsequentchange of heartandtherebyresult n personal ransformation. hekey differencebetween

the two sides of the debate ies in their definitions.For Der-

rida,only theunforgivable an be forgiven,and no crime s so

great hat t falls outsidethispossibility.ForMorin,there are

cases that render orgiveness impossible. Morin's criticism

that Derrida ails to contextualize his discussion on forgive-

ness seems to me unfounded:Derridadirectlyaddressesand

reflectson actualpolitical situations, herebyprovidingcon-

creteexamplesto supporthis arguments.4See "Lepardonpeut-il guerir?," transcription f Kris-

teva's course lecture of 16 Jan. 1996, in La revolte intime

25-44.

WORKSITED

Derrida, acques."Lesiecle et le pardon."nterviewwith Mi-

chel Wieviorka.Le mondedes debatsDec. 1999: 10-17.

Kristeva,Julia."DostoYevski, ne poetique du pardon." n-terviewwith Olivier Abel. Lepardon: Briser la dette et

l'oubli. Ed. Abel. Paris:Autrement,1991. 83-96.

. Hannah Arendt.Paris:Fayard, 1999. Vol. 1 of Le

genie feminin. Trans. as Hannah Arendt. Trans.Ross

Guberman.New York:ColumbiaUP,2001.

- . "Mon ournalde la semaine:Diversit6dans la tem-

pete."Liberation 1-2 Jan. 2000. 19 Dec. 2001 <http://

www.liberation.com/quotidien/debats/janvier00/20000101a.html>.

. La revolteintime.Paris:Fayard,1997. Trans.as In-

timateRevolt:The Powersand Limitsof Psychoanalysis.

Trans.JeanineHerman.New York:ColumbiaUP,2002.

. Soleil noir: Depression et milancolie. Paris: Galli-

mard,1987.Trans.as BlackSun:Depressionand Melan-

cholia. Trans.Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia

UP, 1989.

Morin, Edgar. "Pardonner,c'est r6sister a la cruaut6 du

monde." Interview with Sophie Gherardiand Michel

Wieviorka.Le mondedes debatsFeb. 2000: 24-26.

Ricoeur,Paul. La memoire,l'histoire, l'oubli. Paris:Seuil,

2000.

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Julia Kristeva 281

Forgiveness:nInterview

Alison Rice: In an article in Liberationdated

1-2 January2000, you gave the ollowing defini-tion offorgiveness: "to give meaning beyond

nonmeaning"("Monjournal"). Does forgive-

nessalwaysconsistofan attribution f meaning?

Are there acts offorgiveness that recognize an

absenceof meaning?What s the roleof compre-

hensionin orgiveness? Canoneforgive without

understanding?

Julia Kristeva: The definition I provided is

uniquelymy own and involves an appropriation

of themeaningof the word"forgiveness"ccord-

ing to my practiceas a psychoanalyst.To come

backto the source,we must rememberhat n re-

ligion-since thetermcomes froma perspective

thatis essentially religious-forgiveness is un-

derstood to be the suspensionof judgment.It is

the act by which one forbidsjudging andstops

time,whichproceedstowardvengeance,and al-

lows the personwho committed thereprehensi-ble act tobegin anew,to takeup another ife and

anotheractivity.This is a relativelyrecentprac-tice, accordingto HannahArendt,who focused

on the topic-in a profoundway-and noticed

thatthispracticewas unknown o the Greeks.1A

certainversioncan be foundamongtheRomans,

who sparedthe lives of hostages, for example,but it is a practicethat took hold in the Western

worldthroughJudaism,where we find the idea

of kippur,andin Christianity.The fundamental

question, n these tworeligions,is that of know-

ing whoforgives.Is Godtheonly one capableof

stoppingtime,of no longerjudging,of allowingsomeone a beginning, or can humanbeings do

this too? HannahArendtseems to accorda greatdeal of importanceto the Christianstandpoint,whichinsists on theresponsibilityof the subject,who mustbeginby forgivingothersorby forgiv-

ing himself orherself beforeGod intervenes.We

could elaborateat length on the religious prac-tice and its extension,but frommy experienceI

wantedto say two things.First,forgivenessas I

see it does not effacethe act or theculpability. ttakesintoaccountandcomprehendsboth the act

in its horrorandthe guilt. But since it does not

constitute an erasure,forgiveness is a question

of hearing herequestof the subjectwho desires

forgivenessand,oncethisrequesthasbeenheard,

of allowingrenewal,rebirth.

How can this rebirth akeplace? In my un-

derstanding,here s onlyonepossibility,and hat

is to give aninterpretationo the act.Is this inter-

pretationof the reprehensible,guilty, horrible,abjectact also anunderstandingof the act?Yes

andno. It is not anunderstandingn the sense of

rationalization. utit does demandapartial, em-

porary dentificationwith the subjectof the act

andwith the act itself. Itimpliesa countertransfer

by theanalyst n order operceivethedeepmoti-

vations,both rationaland rrational, omprehen-

sibleand ncomprehensible, f whichthesubject

of theactis unaware.This affective dentification

matters.Theinterpretationivenis not necessar-

ily a rationalreconstruction f whathappened. t

can simply be ametaphoricdisplacementor an

interjection hatmanifestsanaccompaniment f

the attitudeof the one askingforforgiveness,an

attitude f change.I havealreadygivenexamplesof dream nterpretationsn this sense. One such

interpretationertainso adepressivepatientwho

cannotmanage o speakof thedeepsourceof her

depression: a great aggressiveness toward her

mother.Shetold me aboutatrial,whichhappened

to be that of Klaus Barbie,which she attendedand atwhichI served asjudge. At thesametime,

she said that she was not in the dream,that she

wasn't veryinterested in it. She was elsewhere.

The"elsewhere" hecomes from is Italy,so I tell

her this with respect to the "tortionnaire"tor-

turer]Barbie:"torse-io-naitre/pasaitre" torso-

I-to beborn/not o beborn],"torsionnaitre."2

She received my interpretationas forgive-

ness, as meaning for her suffering. So you see

11 7.2




thatthis interpretations not anunderstandingn

the sense of "rationalizing"her suffering. It is

simply an accompanimentand an indicationof

going beyond. In breakingdown the word"tor-

tionnaire,"I remembereda suffering she had

spoken of, that of having been a small handi-

capped child who couldn't walk and who had

beenplaced n a castfollowinganoperation.Her

torsowas held in an immobilestate that tortured

her, separatingher from her mother'sbody. In

"torse-io-naitre,"he "io"goes back to the pro-

noun "I,"which she is unable to say. This was

anotherform of sufferingsince she was immo-

bilized by this mother who did everything for

her, who dominatedher and, in a certain way,"tortured"erevenif she thoughtshe was doing

good. And the ideaof beingborn("naitre")was,

for her,connectedto hercomplaintof sterility,

of an inabilityto becomepregnant.

So, you see, it is a question of interpreta-

tion, which capturesthe sufferingand opens it

up to somethingelse, to transcending.The word

"understanding"eemsreductivewithrespectto

this type of story, o this narrativehatI propose

in a metaphoricmanner,to this condensed ac-

count containing wordplay but providing one

way of recognizingherpain. I show her in this

way thatI can share t, as I can share thetorture

of which she was the object but that is also a

tortureshe wantedto inflict on hermother.She

was not only passive in the matterbut active,

withoutbeing able to say it. Accompanyingher

in thisaggressiveness,sharing t withher,I open

the way for her to see herpresentdesire,which

was hiddenuntil this moment:herdesireto be-

come a mother.As if by chance, she succeededin becoming pregnantlater. This is why I say

thatinterpretations an experienceof "attribut-

ing meaning," with the understanding that

"meaning"is different from "signification."I

keep the word"signification"or rationalityand

for all that contains univocal meaning, at the

surface of consciousness. And I keep "mean-

ing"for intonations,metaphors,affects, the en-

tire panoplyof the psychic life, with which the

psychoanalystworks butwhich expressesitself

also in works of art; it distinguishes itself by

meaningful"semiotic"signs, and not by a dog-

matic rationalization.

At a conferenceon thesubjectof melancholy, ou

gave a paper in which you said thefollowing:

"Theunforgivableexists in the social arena."I

wonderedwhatyoumeantbythe "unforgivable."

Youalso addressedthe issue at a recentcollo-

quiumat UNESCO,whereyou indicated hatthe

sphereofforgivenessis not the social sphere.3

This is a discussion I carriedout at a distance

andvery succinctly-since I haven'tdeveloped

it as he has-with the workof JacquesDerrida.

Accordingto my understanding,n certainpub-

lished portions of his seminar on forgiveness,

Derridasays that if one engages in this reflec-

tion on forgivenessandits practice,it would be

necessary to forgive the unforgivable; other-

wise, forgiveness has no meaning.4I thinkthat

this radicalposition should be maintained,but

in a sortof enclavein the publicspherethat can

only be the private sphere. This can only be

done in strictprivacy,notably

that of the ana-

lytic cure. One can imagine that the unforgiv-

able can be forgiven in the way I indicated in

my example, not as an erasurebut as a recog-

nitionof the suffering,the crime,andthe possi-

bility of beginning again. This is possible in

psychoanalysis-even in the case of horrible

crimeslike murderandpedophilia-since this is

a placewherepeoplewho havehadsuchexperi-

ences demonstratea possibility for change, al-

beit sometimestemporarilyandfalsely. We can

thereforeaccompanythemin this movementoftransformationndrebirth.

In contrast, thinkthatthe social sphere-I

remainperhaps n this aspectveryArendtian-

is thatof judgment, andI thinkthat a commu-

nity cannotmaintain tself unless it gives itself

laws thatare impossible to transgress;for it is

founded on law and punishment. We can, of

course, varypunishmentsandopen them up to

therapy, accompanying prison sentences with

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Julia Kristeva 283

psychoanalytictherapy.We can thus introduce

the privatesphereI just spoke of, notablypsy-

choanalysis, but the idea that the social spherewould depriveitself of jurisdictionandpunish-

ment from the outset seems to me unbearable,for thatwouldopenthepathto all sortsof racist,

sexist, and various other violations. Derrida's

vision is extremely generous, a little utopian,and it presupposes the existence of extremelyflexible andevolvedindividuals,which is unfor-

tunately not the case. But I think that he also

opens this utopianpossibility thatshouldn'tbe

closed. Canwe pardoncriminals like Barbieor

Pinochetwithout udgmentandpunishment?

According to what I've read and understood,

there is also an optimism.That s to say that or-

giving someone meansseeing what is thereand

placing a bet on the uture,on a renewal.

This is a big problemthat I treatedat the collo-

quium at UNESCO. Someone asked me, "Are

you a pessimistor an optimist?" am not reallya naive optimist. I believe we all know, espe-

cially in psychoanalysisand when you work in

the arts, how much the humanbeing is drivenby destructivenessandviolence. The worst hor-

rors arepossible and are not behind us. But if

one undertakesworkin therapy,one placesa bet

on the forces of good. I amnot at all a believer

or a mystic, not someonewho adheresto a par-ticular value system. I am rather one of those

who possess interrogativeminds. But if I have

to take a side, even if it's only a temporarystance in this interrogation,t would be to wageron good. Let's say that I believe in good and

thatfor me humanity s perfectible.

But isn't it difficult to forgive an act like the

Holocaust or somethingas seriouswithoutpos-

sibly allowing it, in a certain sense, to happen

again? How can one forgive without effacingthegravityof suchan event?

It is not a questionof "forgiving he Holocaust"

in the social sphere.Onceagain,if there s judg-

ment,the criminalmustbe punished.There is a

public discourse, andit must be continuedas a

discourseof condemnation,of settlingaccounts.

We can forgive individually those who ask for

forgiveness. Imaginea personwho enteredtheNazi partyat the age of twenty and who com-

mitted horrible acts in a camp. He turnsforty,

fifty years of age, has traveled a certain path,and asks, conscious of the horrorof his crime,

to speak, to be transformed.I tell him thathis

actswill bejudgedandpunished, hathe will be

askedfor explanations,thathe will be askedto

makereparationsn variousways. ButI also tell

himthathe will be permitted-and this is where

forgiveness will intervene-to transformhim-self, to freehimself fromthis stigma.He will be

allowednot to forgetbutto startover.

And if there is no repentance? If there is no

remorse?

Then there is no forgiveness to offer. Once

again, I may not be Christian enough. Those

who call on an absoluteforgivenesswithoutre-

pentanceare in anoblativite,a generositythat s

fascinatingand very charitable,but they fail totake intoaccount hebond.Oncethere s a bond,thereis a need to safeguarda certainnumberof

prohibitionsand limits, which the act of judg-mentmust reinforce.Again, thejudgmentmust

notbe symmetrical o the crime. I find thatwhat

is still practiced n the United States,wherethe

criminal is punished with means analogous to

the meansof thecrime,is unacceptable.

Which s, in any case, notpossible. Evenif theykill a manwho has murderedwentypeople, it's

neverequivalent.

It's neverequivalent,and it's especially not dis-

suasive,as manyadvocatesof the deathpenaltyclaimit to be. Forthe criminalwho is in sadistic

escalation,the more he is threatenedwith death,the moreexcitedhe is, andthe morehe kills.

Andthat end transformshimintoa hero.

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It transforms iminto a hero and stimulateshim.

I have a questionabout individual orgiveness,

or the act offorgiving oneself. In an interview

published under the title "Dostoevsky,a Poetic

of Pardon,"you affirmed he importance of in-

terpretive listening in psychoanalysis and in

writing: "Thesame interpretive isteningis evi-

dentlyimplicit, imaginary, n the act of writing.

It is assumed by the analyst in thepsychoana-

lytic situation.At any rate, this dynamicsets offthe work of elaboration: drawing my strength

from thisforgiveness (giving meaning beyond

nonmeaning), I reweave thefabric of my own

story,I preparemyeventual rebirth"("Dosto-'evski"87). To orgive oneself is it necessaryto

have thepresence of the listeningothereither in

analysis or in writing?Does somethingas inti-

mate andpersonal as individualorgivenessde-

mandthepresenceof an other?

I wanted o show thatthere s ananalogyas well

as differences.Let's speakfirst of the analogies

betweenanalyticlisteningand the aestheticact.

In the two cases, it is a questionof comingback

to the place of a trauma,somethingthatis non-sensicaland seems inexpressible,andsymboliz-

ing it. This symbolization is different in the

analytic experience and the aesthetic experi-

ence. In the analyticexperience,thereis first of

all the presenceof the other,the analyst;even if

he is considereda nonperson,he representsau-

thority,knowledge,the law, the paternalor ma-

ternal nstancethatmust be workedthrough.In

the aestheticexperience,this alterityis not im-

mediately present. If I write a novel and dedi-

cate it to my parentsorpublic opinion,I am not

alone, but I am not in a listening relationship

like thatof the analyticcure either.In the actof

writing, I am solitary. There is nonetheless a

horizon, somethingin the way of the other,the

big Other,butit doesn'thavethepowerto inter-

vene. In the aestheticact, I am confrontedwith

culturalcodes, so I try to compose like Baude-

laire or against Colette orfor Joyce or in con-

trast to Bataille.There s alwaysan intertext hat

is a type of "competitivity"with tradition,with

the present,which leads me to theproductionof

an object that I throw into communication and

into the market.Since this preoccupation s ab-

sent from the analytic act, something very pri-vateand unaffectedpresents tself there.Beyondthese differences,thereis an individual'sappro-

priationof the inexpressible,andof trauma,and

this appropriation econciles with the impossi-ble and with the splitting within oneself. This

reconciliation,which I call "par-don,"5s never

definitive.If it weredefinitive,that would mean

that the analysis had stopped, that I was not

searching for anything more; unfortunately,there are a number of

peoplewho

stopin this

way. But it is in the continuity, n the perpetua-tion of this never-endingwork of naming and

symbolizing,thatforgivenesstakesplace in the

sense of incompletionandinfinity.

Thenthere is no such thingas forgiveness once

and or all?

No, becauseonce andfor all wouldmeansome-

thing that is in line with erasure, not rebirth,

which is indefinite.My conception of forgive-

ness entailsunderstandinghe humanbeing as a

subjectivity n permanent reation;we arenever

finished.Evenif you obtaina doctorateor win a

NobelPrize,you shouldnotstopthere.Whatever

the positive meaningthathas been given you or

that you have producedfor yourself, it should

notbe definitive,butratheranopening.It should

be a milestone in a continual rebirth.This is a

wish, a goal. Nobody gets there;we can't make

it there.But it's good to havethis as a horizon.

I imaginea victimwhomanagesto expressher-

self who is able to speak of her experiencebut

who doesn't makeprogress, who continues to

speak of the same thing without changing the

subject,withoutmovingon. And this scares me

becauseI knowsome victimswho always speak

of theirexperience.

It is not of this continuity of the traumathat I

wanted o speak,butrather f leavingthesceneof

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Julia Kristeva 285

the crime andcreatingnew connections.Thevic-

timof whomyouspeak s stillin the sametrauma.

Sheturns n circles.

She turns in circles since nothinghas changed.The ideal would be, afterthis burn,this horror,

when she has forgiven the perpetrator,hatshe

could enter into a relation different from the

traumaticone she wentthrough.Thatwould as-

sumethat she has experiencedher own painand

entered theproblematicof the perpetrator im-

self, of the perpetrator'straumatism,his vio-

lence. She no longer views it as a victim since

she has been able to enter into the dynamic of

the one whose victim she is. Once again, if we

place ourselves in the problematicof the Holo-

caust,this is impossibleon a collective level, in

my understanding.

Youhave made several statementsaboutatem-

porality, a theme that can be found in your

analysis of HannahArendtas well as in Black

Sun. In Black Sun,for example,you affirm hat

"pardonis ahistorical. It breaks the concate-

nation of causes and effects, crimes and pun-ishment, it stays the time of actions" (200). If

forgiveness itself eludes temporality, is there

nonetheless a chronology offorgiveness? Is it

ever too late toforgive? Can oneforgive in ad-

vance? Would"forgiveness n advance" be the

"promise"that one finds in your analysis ofHannahArendt'spoliticalphilosophy?

I insist on this phenomenonof the atemporalityof forgiveness because it helps us understand

why forgivenesscannot nscribeitself in the so-cial arena.The social sphere s the sphereof his-

tory; there is a past, a present, and a future. In

thatfield, forgivenessmustsimplyfollow judg-mentandcondemnation.But it cannotbe disso-

ciated from that time which marks historical

linearity.On the other hand, the time of scan-

sion, this momentoutside time that is forgive-ness, does it have its chronology?The answer s

yes. Let's return o the exampleof the patient.I

am able to follow her in her pain once I have

reacheda point of a certainimpregnationwith

her story;I don't understandherrationally,but

emotionally,andthattakes some time. There is

lineartimejust as thereis fragmented ime, but

linear time plays a role also in following the

subject. She must also go througha period of

time, notably that of daily disputes with her

motherandthe complaintof sterility, n order o

go beyond them; time allows a maturation of

the trauma. t is notpossiblefor this forgivenessto takeplace without a certaintime of sufferingandits eclipse following themomentof impreg-nationwith the traumaandthetime of the other.

Can forgiveness happen in advance? Thetime of the promise s different romthe time of

forgiveness.Canthey be connected?The ques-tiondeservesreflection.It seems thatthetime of

the promise is somethingotherthanthat of the

cutting of anteriorties. For ties arerenewable.

Andthispromisetakesintoaccountthe factthat

I can forgive, but it doesn't put forgiveness al-

ready at the origin, before the beginning of

time.Judeo-Christianityas given us the ideaof

historical time. This timepresupposes

a conti-

nuity, a linearity within which we make cuts:

promiseorforgiveness.In contrast,experienceslike Buddhism,for

example, andcertainforms of Taoism suspend

time, andthen the questionof forgiveness isn't

asked, since there is no judgment. Unless we

consider hat orgiveness s alwaysalready here.

Thisprovidesstatesof communionwith nature,

very intense subjective or collective sensory

experiences. The disadvantage of this is that

historical time is suspended. Or else, when itmanifests itself, it is in the form of great con-

flicts. In Chinese history,for example, thereis

history when there are revolutions and mas-

sacres. Maybe we possess, with the idea of

linear time, which is relieved by promise and

forgiveness, the possibility of maintaininglin-

earity and modifying it with cuts and projec-tions, but maybe not in putting forgiveness

alreadyat the origin, which would be a way of

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effacing chronology.This is a particulardialec-

tic thatplays itself out between linear time on

the one hand and promise and forgiveness on

the other. These last two relieve linearityfrom

its overly obsessive, performative aspect, pro-videdthey are used with moderationand not re-

moved fromchronology.

Todaywe witnessa proliferationof requests or

forgiveness. Everywhere,in the United States

and evenin countrieswherethis Judeo-Christian

tradition is not dominant, we hear the use ofAbrahamic anguagein a quest or pardon.I am

wondering fforgiveness is in dangerof becom-

ing somethingbanal, ordinary,and completelydevoidof meaning.

Thereis an inflation of the word. That is why I

use the example of the psychoanalytic experi-

ence, where you can verify the authenticityof

the request.It is possible thatpeople come for

an analysis and spend all their time avoiding

analysis. In this case, the interpretationsyou

give cannot be received as interpretations hat

will allow renewal.I thereforeplace myself in a

positionwhere therequestfor forgivenesstesti-fies to a differentmotivation,to an individual's

desirefor transformation.

Love is thusvery importantnpsychoanalysis.

Of course. The steps taken by the person who

seekspsychoanalysisdemonstratehat he or she

has come in an act of love. Thus, the transfor-

mation s underway.

And is love necessaryfor forgiveness? Do thetwogo together?

I believe that forgiveness cannot be granted

unless it is in this relationship.Forme to under-

standmy patient,a certainform of love is nec-

essary. This love is not idealization but an

accompanimentof the loved subject in his or

her traumatismsand states of dereliction. But

this is an accompanimentto bring him or her

out of this situation.Ultimately,what seems to

me to be love is thewageron rebirth. tis possi-ble that this person will be born again. Where

does this optimism come from? When I am in

analysis,I see the effort thepatientmakes to es-

tablish a connection with me, to receive my

word, and then to connect with others. Some-

times, however,there is a will to do nothing.In

thiscase, it is better o renounce he effort.

There s afamous passage in VictorHugo's Les

miserables in whichJean Valjean teals and his

host does notcondemnhim. Thisact of grace,of

forgiveness, of clemency, seems to allow Jean

Valjean o change.

Yes.

He becomes mayor of a city and an honorable

figure. Is this an example of this wager on the

possibilityof beginningagain?

It hasbeen said thatpsychoanalysis s a continu-

ation of confession, that t takesupthereligious

act of believing in the individual. Thereareac-

knowledgeable similarities, provided that we

stipulatehatwe arenot contentwitha

gratuitouswager.Thepsychoanalyststrivesto accompany

the subject in the appropriationof the motiva-

tionsthat ed to the crimeor the trauma. ustas it

has beensaid thatphilosophy s a whitetheology

because it keptthe logic butnot God, I say that

psychoanalysis is a colored Judeo-Christianity

because it has addedimpulses anddesires. Al-

lowing JeanValjean o understandwhy he com-

mittedthis act means allowing him to continue

to deal with his impulses andhis passions, but

not by committing crimes. It is a deeper,more

complexaccompanimenthattakesinto account

therichnessof thepsychicapparatus.

Since sometimesforgiveness eludes reason by

takingintoaccountall these impulses,all these

aspects that don't have significance in them-

selves but that possess a "meaning" that is

larger,can it be said that literature s themeans

par excellence of expressingforgiveness? Be-

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Julia Kristeva 287

cause literature uses metaphor,parable, short

anecdotes,evenpoetry,whichmayelude "signi-

fication" inyoursense of theword?

I made a comparisonbetween the analytic andtheaestheticexperience,butI wouldn'tsay liter-

ature s the meansparexcellence becauseoften,

despiteall the richmeans of polyphonicallyren-

deringthe humanexperience,the literaryexpe-riencesinks intocomplacencyor idealization; t

complacently repeats a traumawithout going

beyond it in the slightest. In this case, there is

no possibilityfor forgivenessorrenewal.

Toconclude, I have a question onwriting

and

translation. n thepart of the chapteron Dosto-

evsky n Black Sunsubtitled"Writing:mmoral

Forgiveness,"you underscore the equivalencebetween writing and forgiveness: "Writingcauses the affect to slip into the effect-actus

purus,as Aquinasmightsay. It conveysaffectsand does not repressthem,it suggestsfor them

a sublimatoryoutcome, it transposes them oran other in a threefold, maginary,andsymbolicbond.Because it isforgiveness,writingis trans-

formation,transposition, ranslation" 217).

Even if the writer'sstoryturns n circles,writingis nonethelessa wayof comingout of thetrauma,of forgivingoneself or the otherandtranslatingit for someone else. This constitutes a distanc-

ing fromtheplaceof the crimethroughsharing.

Inyour "Weeklyournal"published nLiberation

at thebeginningof thiscalendaryear,you made

the ollowing statementaboutyourownwriting:

"Writing:hat'showIforgive myselffor havingabandonedthe dark,golden hues of Byzantineicons, the rockyweightsof mynativeSlavic, all

the while trying to translate into Frenchmany

identityconflicts,this 'Balkanizationofpersonsand nationshencefortheverywhere nprogress,andtolaughat itall inFrench"("Monjournal").Inan articlepublished na collectiontitledLove

of the OtherLanguage, you wrotethe ollowing

aboutwriterswhowritein a languagethatis not

"their own": "Objectof lucid love and none-

thelesspassionate, thenewlanguageis apretext

for rebirth:new identity,new hope" ("L'autre

langue"157). French s notyourmother ongue,andyet it is yourlanguage of writing.Would ou

say thatwriting nFrenchrepresentsnsomewaya "doubleorgiveness"for you?

Yes, that is indeedwhat I triedto say in Libera-

tion. It is a mannerof distancing oneself, be-

cause one always wonders why one goes into

exile. Obviously,thereareeconomic, political,and culturalreasons, but I deeply believe that

one does not choose to change languages if

thereis not a desire to distanceoneself from an

ancienttraumatism, ven if it wasn't too brutal.

There is a way of detaching oneself from the

origin that is a form of matricideand that one

avoids in distancing oneself in another lan-

guage. This does not stop one from comingbackto thisplacefroma largerdistance,evenif,becauseof this new distance,you become a for-

eign element with which the conflicts can then

beginagain.Youwill neverbe sureof a place or

of peacefulness. But this disjunction, this lackof comfort, which are the places of suffering,

eventuallybecomelighter.By frequenting, ban-

daging,"andreflectingon themthroughmusic,

affects, sensations,metaphors, tc., you will not

efface these places of suffering but attenuate

them,allowingthema certain uminosity,a cer-

tain laugh.Writing,speaking,another anguageis a relatively new experience; we have onlybeen doing it for severalcenturies. And it is at

once a greatdifficulty, a sort of tragedy,and a

choice, an opportunity.We do not yet know the

possibilities thatthis can open up. In the begin-

ning, the resultis hybridworksthatdon't have

the magnificenceof the greatworksof the pastby Shakespeareor Homer.But they nonetheless

reflect the wanderings of individualities, the

cleavages and the polyphonies of individuals

thatarethe resultsof numerouscrimesand nu-

merous nstancesof forgiveness.

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Alison Rice: Dans un article de Liberationquidate du ler et du 2 janvier 2000, vous avez

donne la definitionsuivantedupardon:donner

du senspar-dela le non-sens (<Monjournal >).

Lepardon consiste-t-il toujoursen une attribu-

tion de sens? Y a-t-il despardons qui reconnais-

sent une absence de sens? Quelest le role de la

comprehensiondans le pardon? Peut-on par-

donnersans comprendre?

JuliaKristeva:Ladefinitionque 'aidonneem'est

tresparticulieret concemeuneappropriationu

sens dumot<<pardon>que 'aifaite apartirde ma

pratiqued'analyste.Pourenrevenira la source, l

fautrappelerque dansla religion - puisquele

terme vient d'un horizon essentiellement reli-

gieux - on entendparpardon a suspensiondu

jugement.L'actepar equelon s'interditdejuger

et on arretee temps, quiest celui delavengeance

pour permettrea celui qui a commis un acte re-

prehensible de reprendreune autre vie et une

autreactivite.C'estunepratique elativement e-

cente,puisqueHannahArendt,quis'est penchee

sur le sujet - de maniere,je crois, assez pro-fonde- a constatequecettepratique st mecon-

nuedesGrecs.1Onen trouveune versionchez les

Romainsquiepargnaient, arexemple,la vie des

otages;mais c'est unepratiquequis'est instituee

dans le mondeoccidentalpar ejudaisme,oiu l y

a l'idee de Kippour,et dansle christianisme.La

questionfondamentale tant,dansces deuxreli-

gions, de savoirqui pardonne.Est-ce Dieu qui

est le seul capabled'arreter e temps,de ne plus

juger, de permettrea quelqu'unle commence-

ment,ou est-ce quece sontles hommes?Hannah

Arendtsembleaccorderbeaucoupd'importance

a la these chretiennedanslaquelleon insiste sur

la responsabilisationdu sujetlui-memequidoit

commencerparpardonner, u parse pardonner,

avanttoute interventionde Dieu. On peutdonc

glosersurla pratique eligieuseet sur sonexten-

sion, maisa partirde monexperience,j'ai voulu

dire deuxchoses. D'abordquele pardon, el que

je l'entends,n'est uneffacementni de l'acteni de

la culpabilite.I1en tientcompte, il entend aussi

bien l'acte dans son horreurque la culpabilite.

Mais, puisqu'il ne s'agit pas d'effacement, il

s'agit d'entendre a demandedu sujet qui s'ex-

prime parla quete du pardonet, une fois cette

demandeentendue,de permettre e renouveau,

la renaissance.

Comment cette renaissancepeut-elle s'ac-

complir?A mon sens, la seule possibiliteest de

donner une interpretationde l'acte. Toute la

question est de savoir si cette interpretationde

1'actereprehensible,coupable,horrible,abject,

etc., sera aussiune comprehension?Oui et non.Elle n'est pas une comprehensionau sens de ra-

tionalisation.Mais elle demandeune identifica-

tionpartielle,provisoireavec le sujetde l'acte et

avec 1'acte lui-meme. Cela implique donc le

contre-transfert,de la part de l'analyste qui

pourra uivre les motivationsde cet actejusqu'a

des profondeursque le sujet lui-meme ignore,

et qui peuvent etre aussi bien des profondeurs

rationnelles qu'irrationnelles,aussi bien com-

prehensibles que non-comprehensibles.Cette

identificationaffective compte.L'interpretation

donnee n'est pas forcementune restitutionra-

tionnellede l'acte. C'est peut-etreun simplede-

placementmetaphorique u une ponctuationqui

manifeste un accompagnementde l'attitudema-

nifestee parcelui qui demandepardon,de son

attentede changement.J'ai deja donne des ex-

emples d'interpretationsde reve en ce sens. A

propos,parexemple, d'une patientedepressive

quin'arrivaitpas a parlerde la sourceprofonde

de sa depressivite,laquelle n'etait autrequ'une

tresgrandeagressivitevis-a-vis de sa mere.Elle

me parlaitd'un proces qui etait celui de Klaus

Barbieet auquelelle assistaitet danslequelj'e-

tais le juge. En meme temps, elle me disait

qu'elle n'etait pas dansce reve, que Cane l'in-

teressait pas beaucoup. Elle etait ailleurs. Or

1'<<illeurs>, dontelle vient,est l'Italie,et je lui

dis, a proposdu mot <<ortionnaire>: <<orse-io-

naitre/pas naitre>>, <orsionnaitre >>.2

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JuliaKristeva 28917.2

Ellearecumon nterpretationommeunpar-

don,c'est-a-direun sensa sa souffrance.Orvous

voyez quecetteinterpretation'estpasunecom-

prehensionau sens derationaliser a souffrance.

C'est simplementun accompagnementet unin-

dice de depassement.Endecomposant e motde

<<ortionnaire ,je mesouvenaisd'unesouffrance

dontelle m'avaitparle celle d'avoireteunepe-

titefillehandicapee,quin'arrivait asa marcher,

etqu'onavaitplatreeala suited'uneoperation.Et

que son torse etait pris dansune immobilite ou

elle etait torturee t separeeducorpsde sa mere.

Dans <<orse-io-naitre>, le <<o >>envoie aupro-

nom <<e qu'elle n'arrivaitpas a dire,qui etait

uneautre ormede souffrance ar elleetait mmo-biliseeparcette merequifaisait outpourelle, qui

la dominait t, d'une certainemaniere,a torturait

meme si elle croyaitbien faire.L'idee de naitre

etait,quantaelle, liee a saplainted'etresterile,de

nepouvoirpasetreenceinte.

Donc, vous voyez, il s'agit d'une interpre-

tationqui saisit la souffrancepourl'ouvrir vers

autrechose, et vers son depassement.Le mot de

<<comprehension >me paraitdonc reducteur is-

a-vis de ce type de mini-recit,de cette narration

queje propose de manieremetaphorique,con-

densee qui passe parle jeu de mot, mais qui est

une maniere de reconnaitresa douleur. Je lui

montre ainsi queje peux la partager,commeje

peux partagerla torturedont elle etait objet,mais qui est aussi une torturequ'elle voulaitin-

fligera sa mere. Elle n'etaitpas seulementpas-

sive dans1'affaire,mais active, sans parvenira

le dire; en l'accompagnantdans cette agressi-

vite, en la partageantavec elle, je lui ouvraisla

voie de ce qui etait pour elle son desir actuel,bloque parson agressivite,son desir de devenir

mere. Commeparhasard,elle a reussia etre en-

ceinte quelque temps apres. C'est pourquoi jedis que l'interpretationest une experience de

<<onationde sens>>n entendant e mot<<ens>>

commeautrechose quela signification.Je gardele mot <<signification>>pour a rationalite t pourtout ce qui est signification univoque, a la sur-

face de la conscience;etje garde e mot <<ens>>

pourles intonations, es metaphores,es affects,

enfin toute cette panoplie de la vie psychique

avec laquellela psychanalyse ravaille,mais qui

s'exprime aussi dans les ceuvresd'art, pardes

marqueset des indices signifiants,semiotiques,

et nonpas parune rationalisation ogmatique.

Dans une journee d'etude sur la melancolie,

vous avez dit la phrase suivante: <<II a de

l'impardonnabledans le champsocial >. Je me

demandais ce que vous entendezpar < mpar-

donnable>. Vousavezparle aussi a I'UNESCO

de la sphere dupardon et vous avez dit que la

spheredupardonn'estpas la spheresociale.3

C'est une discussionquej'entretenaisa distanceet de maniere ressuccincte,parce queje ne l'ai

pas developpeecommeil 1'afait, avec un travail

de JacquesDerrida.D'apresce quej'ai compris,

dans un seminaire sur le pardondont certains

fragmentsont ete publies, Derrida dit en sub-

stanceque, si on s'engagedans une reflexionsur

le pardonet dansune pratiquecorrespondanta

cettereflexion, l faudraitpardonner'impardon-

nable, sansquoi le pardonn'auraitpas de sens.4

Je pense en effet que cette radicalite doit etremaintenue,mais dans un champquiest en quel-

que sorte une enclave dansla sphere publique,

quinepeutetrequela sphereprivee,et nepeutse

fairequedans a stricte ntimite,notamment elle

de la cureanalytique.Onpeuten effet imaginer

que cet impardonnablepeut etre pardonneau

sensquej'ai indiquedansmonexemple,nonpascommeeffacementmaiscomme reconnaissance

de la souffrance,ducrime,et commepossibilitede renaitre. C'est possible en psychanalyse, y

comprisdansle cas de crimeshorribles commel'assassinat ou la pedophilie, car c'est un lieu

ou des personnes qui sont passees parde telles

experiences montrent, meme provisoirement,meme faussement,une possibilite de modifica-

tion.Ellespeuventdonc etreaccompagneesdans

un mouvementde mutation t derenaissance.

Enrevanche, e pense que la spheresociale

-je restepeut-etre n ceci tresarendtienne est

celledujugement, tje pensequ'unecommunaute

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290 Forgiveness:An Interview P L

ne peut se maintenirqu'en se donnantdes lois

qu'il est impossible de transgresser; ar elle est

fonde'e ur a loi et le ch&timent. npeut,biens'ur,

moduleres chatiments t lesrendreperme'ablesa

lathe'rapie,ccompagneraprisonavec desprises

encharge he'rapeutiques.npeutdoncintroduire

cettesph'ere rive6eontjeviensdeparler,notam-

mentla psychanalyse,mais le champsocial qui

se priveraitd'emble6ee lajuridictionet de lapu-

nition me para'itnsoutenableet ouvrela voie 'a

toutes sortesd'effractionsracistes,sexistes, etc.

LavisiondeDerrida st extremement ene'reuse,

un peu utopique, et suppose des individus ex-

tr8mementlexiblesete'volue's,e qui,he'las, 'est

pas le cas. Parailleurs, l ouvrecetteutopiequ'ilne faut surtoutpas fermer.Peut-onpardonner a

des criminels comme Barbieou Pinochet, sans

qu'ily aitunjugementet unepunition?

D 'apre's e quej 'ai lu et entendu, l y a aussi un

optimisme. C'est-ai-direque pardonner quel-

qu un,c 'estvoirce quiest la'etfaire unpari sur

lefuitur,un renouvellement.

C'est un vasteprobl'eme, uej'ai aborde' ussi 'a

l'UNESCO. On m'a demande'?Etes-vouspes-simiste ou optimiste??>e ne suis pas tellement

naifvement ptimiste. Je crois que nous savons

tous, surtouten psychanalyse et quandon tra-

vaille dans le domaine de I'art, combien letre

humain est anime'par la destructivite', a vio-

lence. Les pires horreurssont possibles et ne

sont certespas deffi'erenous. Mais si on fait un

travaild'analyse, on fait un panisur les forces

du bien. Je ne suis pas du tout une mystique

croyantequidonneson aval'aune valeur.Je suis

plut6ot e ceux qui interrogent.Mais si je dois

m9appuyer, ne serait-ceque provisoirement ur

une interrogation,c'est pourmiser sur le bien.

Disons que je crois pluto'tau bien et que pour

moil,l'hommeest perfectible.

Mais n 'est-ilpas difficilede pardonnerun acte

comme la Shoah ou quelque chose de si grave

sans pouvoir permettre,dans un certain sens,

que cela se produise de nouveau? Comment

peut-on pardonneret ne pas effacer la gravite'

d'un tel e'venement?

Il ne s'agit pasde ?<pardonnera Shoahli? ansle

champsocial. Encoreune fois, s'il y a unjuge-ment, le criminel doit 'etre puni. Le discours

publicdoit&tre oursuivicommeun discoursde

condamnation t de demandede comptes.IIme

semblequ'onpeut pardonnerndividuellementt

acelui qui le demande.Imaginezun hommeo

unefemmede vingtans,entr6dansles jeunesses

hitle6riennest qui a commis des horreursdans

un camp.IL rrive aquarante u cinquanteans;il

a faitun cheminet, ayantprisconsciencede son

crime,demande aparler, a e transformer.e lui

dis que ses actes seront uge's,punis, qu'on lui

demanderades comptes, qu'on lui demandera

reparationde ses crimes, sous diversesformes,

mais qu'on'luipermettra ussi, et c'est kIau'in-

tervient e pardon,de se transformer, e se fibe&

rerde ces stigmates. On lui permettranon pas

d'oubliermaisde rede6marrer.

Et s'il n'y a pas ce repentir,s'il n'y a aucun

remords?

Alors il n'y a pas de pardon'adonner.Encoreune fois, je ne suis peut-e&re as assez chre6-

tienne. Ceux qui invoquent un pardonabsolu,

sansrepentir, ont dansune oblativit6,unegen'

rosite'fascinante et tr'escharitable,mais ils ne

tiennentpas compte du lien. D'es ors qu'il y a

lien, il y a lane6cessite'e sauvegarder n certain

nombre d'interdits et de limites que I'acte de

jugement doit consolider. Encore une fois, ce

jugementne doitpase&ree syme'triqueu crime

commis. Cequi

sepratique

encore aux Etats-

Unis, oii le criminel est puni avec les moyens

analoguesauxmoyensde son crime,est quelque

chose d' nacceptable.

Ce qui n 'est en tout cas, pas possible. Mime si

on tue un hommequi a tue6 ingt personnes, ce

n'estjamais e6quivalent.

Ce n'estjamaise'quivalentt ce n'est surtoutpas

dissuasif, comme le pre'tendentes partisansde

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la peine de mort.Pour celui qui est dansl'esca-

lade sadique,pluson le punitde mort,plus il est

excite',plus il tue.

Ft Ca e changeen he'ros nfait.

C,a e changeen he'ros t qale stimuleen effet.

J'avais une questiona'proposdupardonindivi-

duel, c 'est4ai-dire1I'actede pardonner a' soi-

meme. Dans un entretienpublie'sous le titre

<<Dostorevski,unepoe'tique dupardon>>,vous

avez affirme''importancede 1'e'coutenterpre'-

tativeet dans lapsychanalyseet dans 1 ecriture:

((Pareille e&outenterpre'tativest e'videmment

implicite, imaginaire,dans 1 acte de 1 ecriture.

File est assume'e ar 1 analystedans la situation

psychanalytique.Dans tous les cas, cettedyna-

miqueamorcele travaild'daboration:en m'ap-

puyant sur ce pardon (don de sens par-dela'de

V'insense'),e refais le tissu de mon histoire,je

prepare eventuellementma renaissance>>87).

Pourse pardonner, ourpardonnera'soi-me'me,

faut-il 1 ecoute de 1I'autre'travers1 analyseou

1 ecriture Quelquechose d'aussi intimeetper-

sonnel qu'un pardon individuel exige-t-il lapresenced'un autre?

J'ai voulu montrerqu'il y avait une analogie

en meme temps que des diff6rences. Parlons

d'aborddes analogies entrel'edcoute nalytiqueet l'acte esthe'tique:dans les deux cas, il s'agitde revenirsur le lieu d'un trauma,de quelque

chose d'insense', d'indicible, d'impossible 'a

symboliser. Cette symbolisation est diff6rente

dans 1 expe'rienceanalytique et dans 1 expe-

rience esthe'tique.Dans 1'experienceanalytiquela pre'sencede I'autre, de I'analyste est pre-

mi'ere;me^me 'il est conside'recomme non-

personne, il repre'sente 'autorite',e savoir, la

loi, l'instance paternelle ou maternelle qu'il

s'agit dans tous les cas de traverser.Dans 1'es-

the'tique, ette alte'rite''est pas imme'diatement

presente.Si j'edcris n romanet que je le de'die

a mes parents ou 'al'opinion publique, je ne

suis pas seule mais je ne suis pas dans un rap-

port d'e'coutecomme dans la cure. Dans l'acte

de 1'e'criture,e suis solitaire, et cependantil ya un horizon, quelquechose de l'ordrede I'au-

tre, d'un grandAutre,mais qui n'a pas de pou-

voir d'intervention. Dans I'acte esthe'tique, eme confronteaux codes culturels,doncj'essaie

de faire comme Baudelaire,ou contre Colette,

ou pour Joyce, ou contre Bataille: il y a tou-

jours un intertextequi joue comme compe'titi-vite'avec la tradition, avec I'actualite',qui me

conduit'a a productiond'un objetlance'dansla

communication,voire surle marche'.Alors quedans I'acte analytique,cette preoccupationest

absenteet c'est quelquechose de tr'esntime et

non appre' qui se pre'sente.Par-del'a es diff&rences, il y a I'appropriationarun individuou

un sujet de l'indicible et du trauma, et c'est

cette appropriationqui est une redconciliation

avec l'impossibleet avecle clivage en soi. Cette

reconciliation, celle que j'appelle un par-don,5

n est jamais de6finitive.Si elle e'taitdefinitive,

cela voudraitdireque I'analyse s9arre&e,uejene chercheplus rien, et il y a malheureusement

beaucoup de personnes qui s'arre'tentainsi.

Alors que c'est dans la continuite',dans la per-

pe'tuationde ce travail nfini de nomination,de

symbolisation, que s'accomplit le pardon, au

sens d'incomple'tudet d'infini.

(an existepas alors, unpardon unefois pourtoutes?

Non.,parcequ'unefois pourtoutes,cela voudrait

dire un effacement et non pas une renaissance,

laquelle est inde'finie.Dans ma conception du

pardon, il s'agit de comprendre1'e'trehumain

comme une subjectivite'n cre'ation ermanenteet jamais termine's.Me^mei vous obtenez un

doctoratou le PrixNobel, il ne fautpass9arre-er.

Quelquesoit le senspositifquivousa e'tedonne'

ou que vous vous etes donne',l ne fautpasqu'ilsoit dedfinitif., ais qu'il y ait ouverture,que ce

sens positif soit un jalon dans la renaissance

continuelle.C 'est un vceu.,un objectif.Personne

n'y arrive,nousn'y arrivonspas. Maisc'est bon

de I'avoircommehorizon.

0It

I 1 7 .2




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J'imagine une victimequelconque qui arrive a

s'exprimer, qui arrive a parler son experience

mais qui n'avance pas, qui reste a parler de la

meme chose sans changer de theme. Et Came

fait peur,quandmeme,parce queje connais des

victimesquiparlenttoujoursde leurexperience.

Ce n'est pasde cettecontinuitedu traumaqueje

voulaisparler,mais, ustement,dequittera scene

ducrime,de creerd'autres iens. La victimedont

vousparlezest, elle, toujoursdans e trauma.

Elle toure en rond.

Elle toure enrondcarrien ne se deplace.L'ideal

seraitqu'a partirde cette briulure, e cette hor-reur,et quandelle auraitpardonneaubourreau,

elle puisse entrerdans une autrerelation que

celle, traumatique,qu'elle a vecue. Cela sup-

poseraitaussi qu'elle vive sa propredouleuret

qu'elle entredans la problematiquedubourreau

lui-meme,dans e traumatisme ubourreau, ans

sa violence a lui. Cela supposeraitqu'elle ne se

vive pas uniquementcomme une victime mais

qu'ellepuisse entrerdans la dynamiquede celui

dontelle a ete la victime.Encoreunefois, si l'on

se situedansla problematique e la Shoah,c'est

impossiblesur e plancollectif,a mon sens.

Vousavez ditplusieurschoses a propos de l'in-

temporalite, theme qu'on trouve dans votre

analyse de HannahArendtet aussi dans Soleil

noir. Dans Soleil noir, par exemple, vous af-

firmezque <le pardonest anhistorique.IIbrise

'enchainement es effetset des causes,des cha-

timents et des crimes, il suspend le temps des

actes > (210). Si le pardon lui-memeechappeala temporalite,y a-t-il neanmoinsunechronolo-

gie dupardon?Est-iljamais troptardpourpar-

donner? Peut-onpardonner d'avance? Un tel

pardon d'avance>>serait-il la <<promesse

qu'on trouvedans votreanalyse de la philoso-

phiepolitiquechezHannahArendt?

J'insiste surce phenomened'intemporalitedu

pardoncaril nous fait mieuxcomprendrepour-

quoi le pardonne peut s'inscriredans le champ

[PMLA

social. Le champde la societe est le champde

l'histoire, l y a unpasse,unpresentet un avenir.

La, le pardondoit simplement suivre le juge-

ment et la condamnation.Maisil ne peut pasetre

dissocie de ce temps-la,qui marque a linearite

historique.Parcontre, e tempsde la scansiondu

hors-temps qui est celui du pardon, a-t-il sa

chronologie? La reponse est oui. Revenons a

l'exemplede cettepatiente: e suis capablede la

suivredans sa douleura partird'unecertaine m-

pregnationparsonhistoire, e la comprends ans

rationalitemais avec des affects, et qaprenddu

temps. I1y a un temps lineairecomme il y a un

temps eclate, mais le premierjoue egalement

dansle suivi du sujet.Lapatienteaussi doit tra-verser e temps,notamment,des disputes quoti-

diennesavec samere,de saplainteconcernant a

sterilite, pourles depasser,et pour que se pro-

duise unematuration u trauma. 1n'estpaspos-

sible de donnerce pardonsansun certain emps

de la souffranceet de son eclipse, a partird'une

impregnation ar e trauma t le tempsde l'autre.

Peut-onpardonner l'avance?Le tempsde

la promesse est autreque le temps du pardon.

Peut-onles relier?La questionmerited'etre

po-see. I1me semble que le temps de la promesse

est autreque celui de la coupureavec les liens

anterieurs.Car les liens sont renouvelables.Et

cette promessetientcompte du fait que je peux

pardonner,mais elle ne place pas le pardona

l'origine, c'est-a-dire avantque le temps n'ait

commence. C'est le judeo-christianisme qui a

apport6e tempshistoriquea l'esprithumain.Ce

temps suppose une continuite, une lin6arite a

l'interieurde laquelle nous faisons des coupes,

qui sontla promesseou le pardon.

En revanche, les experiences comme le

bouddhisme,parexemple, et certaines formes

de taoisme, suspendent le temps, et donc la

questiondupardonne se pose pas, puisqu'iln'y

a pas dejugement.A moins qu'onne considere

que le pardonest toujoursdejala. Ce qui donne

des etats de communionavec la nature,de sen-

sorialite subjective ou collective tres intense.

L'inconvenientde tout cela, c'est que le temps



117.2~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Juliaristeva 293

historiqueest suspendu.Ou, quandil se mani-

feste, c'est sous la forme des grandsconflits.

Ainsi dans L'histoirehinoise, il y a de l'histoire

quandil y a des re'volutions,des massacres.Et

peut-etreavons-nous,avec l'ide'ed'un tempsli-

neairesoulage'eparla promesseet le pardon, a

possibiLit6 e maintenir a line'arite't de la mo-

difier, de la moduler avec des coupureset des

avancees,maisnon pasen mettant a 'originele

pardon de'j"a,e qui serait au contraireune ma-

ni'ered'effacer la chronologie.C'est une dialec-

tique particuli'erequi se joue entre le temps

line'aired'une partet la promesse et le pardon

d'autrepart.Ceux-ci soulagent 'aspect tropob-

sessionnel,trop performant,de la line'arite', aisaicondition de les utiliser avecmode'ration,ans

les extrairede la chronologie.

Nous assistons aujourd'huia'uneproliferation

de demandesdepardon.Partout,. n trouveaux

Etats-Unis, ou memedans les pays oii il n'y a

pas cette tradition udJo-chre'tienne,un emploi

du langage abrahamiquepour demanderpar-

don. Etje me demande si le pardon risque de

devenir quelque chose de banal, ordinaire et

comple'tementide de sens.

ILy a en effet une inflation du mot. C'est pour

cette raisonque je prends1'exemplede l1expe'ri-

ence analytique,oiu 'on peut ve'rifier 'authen-

ticite'de la demande.ILarrivequ'une personne

vienne en analyse et emploie tout son temps a

eviterI'analyse.Dans ce cas, les interpre'tations

que vous lui donnezne peuvent pas "etreequescomme des interpre'tationsui lui permettentde

se renouveler. Je ne me situe donc pas dans

l'optique commune du pardon,mais dans uneoptique oii la demande de pardon te'moigned'une autremotivation, et d'un de'sirde trans-

formationde la personne.

L'amour era t-il doncimportant ans1analyse?

Bien sflr,et la dedmarchee celui ou celle quivient 'aI'analyse et qui demandeest venu dans

acte d'amourde6j"aour son analyse, comportecette dimension puisqu'elle s'inscrit dans un

projet ou vise le rapport aune autrepersonne.

La transformation st donc en cours.

Et est-ce qu 'ilfaut de 1 amourpour le pardon?

Les deux vont-ils ensemble?

Je crois que le pardonne peut 'etredonne'que

dans cette relationque je de6cris. ourcompren-

dre ma patiente,ou mon patient,il faut en effet

une certaine forme d'amour, qui n'est pas de

l'ide6alisation,mais un accompagnementde ce

sujet, aime'jusqu'adans ses traumatismes t ses

etatsde de'reliction.Mais c'est un accompagne-

mentpourle ou la sortirde hIa. e qui m'appa-

raiten somme commeamour,c'est le parisurla

renaissance. L st possible quetelle ou telle per-

sonne renaisse. D'oii me vient cet optimisme?

De ce que j'entends en analyse, de 1'effortfait,

par le patient pour e'tablirun lien, avec moi,

d'abord, pour recevoir ma parole, et avec

d'autres.ILarrivem'emequ'il y ait un lien pour

ne rienfaire,et dans ce cas, mieuxvautrenoncer.

IIy a ce passage par exempledans Les mise'ra-

bles de VictorHugo oii Jean Valjeanvole et le

prtrene le condamnepas. Cet acte degrCede pardon, de clemence, semble permettre a'

Jean Valjeande changer.

Oui.

Ii devientmaired'une ville et un'eigure hono-

rable. Est-cequec 'estVa,unexemplede cepani

sur la possibilit,6de recommencer?

On apudirequelapsychanalyseest une sortede

continuationde la confession, qu'elle reprend

I'actereligieux de croyanceen l'individu. ILy a

peut-e&ren effet des similitudes,'a onditionde

preciserqu'il ne s'agitpasde se contenterd'une

mise gratuite,que le psychanalysteessaie d'ac-

compagnere sujetdansI'appropriationesmoti-

vations qui l'ont conduit 'ason crime ou 'ason

trauma. De m'emequ'on a pu dire aussi que la

philosophie est une the'ologie blanche, parce

qu'on a garde'a logique, mais pas Dieu, je dis

que la psychanalyseest unjudedo-christianisme

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294 Forgiveness:An Interview[ML

colore'parcequ'9on y a ajoute6es pulsions et les

de'sirs.Permettre aJeanValjeande comprendre

pourquoi l a commis cet acte c'est luipermettre

aussi de continuera aireavec ses pulsionset ses

passions,mais autrechose quedes crimes. C est

un accompagnementplus profond, plus com-

plexe, tenantcomptede la richesse deI'appareil

psychique.

Est-ce qu'onpeut dire,par exemple,parce que

parfois le pardon&happea' a raison,en tenant

compte de toutes ces pulsions, de toutes ces

choses quin'ontpas de significationen tantque

telle maisqui ont un sens qui estplus large,est-

ce qu'on peut dire quela

litte6raturest le

moyen par excellence pour exprimer cela?

Parce que la litte'rature tilise la me'taphore,a

parabole, les petites anecdotes,la poe'siememe,

qui e&happenteute'tre 'unesignification?

C'est pourquoie faisaistout'al'heureunecom-

paraison entre les deux expe'riences,mais ce

n'est pas, comme vous dites, le moyen parex-

cellence.,caril arrivetr'es ouvent, malgre'ous

les moyens de saisie polyphoniquede 1'expe'ri-

ence humaine,que 1'expe'rienceitte'raire 9en-

lise dansla complaisanceou dansl'ide'alisation,

et re6peteomplaisamment n trauma ans le de'-

placerle momns u monde.Dans ce cas, il n'y a

ni possibilit6du pardon,ni de renouvellement.

Pour conclure, j'ai une question qui porte sur

1 ecriture et la traduction. Dans la partie du

chapitre sur Dostorevski dans Soleil noir qui

porte le sous-titre <<L'e&riture: ardon immo-

ral >>,vous soulignez 1 equivalence entre e&ri-

tureet pardon: (<<Lcriture ait passer 1' ffectdans 1'effet: <'<-actusurus >>,dirait saint Tho-

mas. Elle veThiculees affects et ne les refoule

pas, elle enproposeune issue sublimatoire,elle

les transpose pour un autre en un lien tiers,

imaginaireet symbolique.Parce qu'elle est un

pardon,1 ecritureest transformation,ransposi-

tion, traduction >226).

C 'est-it-dire ueme&mei l'histoireque1'edcrivain

racontetourneen rond,c'est tout de me^mene

manierede sortirdutrauma,de pardonnera oi-

meme oua i'autre, de traduireelapourquelqu'un

d'autre; t cela constituede6jane'loignement u

lieu de toutcrime,enamorqantnpartage.

Dans votre<<ournalde la semaine>>ublie'dans

Libe'rationu dckbute cetteanne'e, ousavezfait

le commentaireuivanta'proposde votrepropre

ecriture:<< crire:c'est ainsique e mepardonne

d'avoir abandonne'les sombres dorures des

icoanes yzantines, es lourdeursrocailleusesde

mon slavonnatal,touten essayantde traduire n

franCaismaintsconfilits,orce6mentdentitaires,

cette << alkanisation>> espersonnes et des na-

tionsdi6sormais artouten cours,et d'en rireenfranCais>><<Mon oumnal >).Dans unarticlepu-

blie'dans un recueil intitule6L'amourde I'autre

langue,vouse6crivezaphrase suivantea'propos

de 1 ecrivainquiecrit dans une languequi n'est

pas <la sienne >>:<<Objetd'amour lucide et

neanmoinspassionnel, la nouvellelangueluiest

prtexte i renaissance:nouvelleidentitg,nouvel

espoir >>(<<L'autre langue >>157). La langue

franVaisen 'estpas votre langue maternelle, et

pourtant,c'est votre angued'e&riture.'e&riture

enfranCais erait-elleen quelquesorteun<<'dou-blepardon>>?

Oui,c'est ce que j'essaiede dire eneffet dansLi-

be'ration.C'estune mani&eee s'e'loigner,parce

qu'on se demandetoujourspourquoion s'exile.

Evidemment,on peutrecenserdes raisonse6co-

nomiques,politiques,culturellesmais,profonde&

ment, je pense qu'on ne choisit pas de changer

de langue s'il n'y a pas un de'sirde s'e'loigner

d'un traumatismeancien, me^me'il n'est pas

tropbrutal. ly a unemani"eree se de'prendreel'origine qui relkvedu matricideet qu'on e'vite

en s'e'loignantdans une autre langue. Ce qui

n'empe'chepas de revenir sur ce lieu aipartir

d'une distance plus grande, m'emesi, du fait

meme de cette distance, vous devenez un e'le&

ment allog"ene, vec lequel les conflits peuvent

donc recommencer. Vous ne pourrez jamais

e^treiir d'un lieu, d'une tranquillite'.Mais ce

dedcalage, et inconfort, qui sont des lieux de

0

PMLA



117.2~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Juliaristeva 295

souffrance, inissentpars'alle'ger.A force de les

fre'quenter,e les redfledchir,e les panser avecun

?<a?>),a raversdes musiques, des affects, des

sensations,des metaphores,etc., vous parvenez

nos' les effacer,mais'a es soulever, t les al-

le'ger.Vous leurpermettezune certaine umino-

site',un certain rire. Ecrire etparlerdans une

autre langue est une experience relativement

neuve, nous ne le faisons que depuis quelques

si'ecles.Et c'est 'a a fois une grandedifficulte',

une sortede trage'die,t unee'lection, nechance.

On ne mesurepasencore espossibilite's uecela

peut ouvrir.Dans unpremiertemps, le re'sultat,

ce sont des ceuvreshybrides qui n'ont pas la

magnificencedes

grandesceuvres du

passe',comme celles d'un Shakespeareou d'un Ho-

mere,maiselles refl'etent e'anmoinses errances

des individualite's, t les clivages, les polypho-

nies des individusqui sont les re'sultatsde plu-

sieurscrimeset deplusieurspardons.

NOTES

Kristevadedicated a recent book to Arendt (HannahArendt).Arendt'swritingon this mattercanbe found in The

HumanCondition236-43.

2 See Kristeva, Soleil noir 67-69, trans. in Black Sun

53-58.

3The conference on "la m6lancholie"was held at Uni-

versit6de Paris VII on 25 Feb. 2000 andthe UNESCOcol-

loquiumon 18 Apr.2000.

IIn an interview Derrida maintains that "forgiveness

forgives only the unforgivable. ... I f there is any forgive-

ness, it is only where there is the unforgivable" "le pardon

pardonne eulementl'impardonnable.On ne peut ou ne de-

vraitpardonner,l n'y a depardon,s'il y en a, que IAoii il y

a de l'impardonnable";1;my trans.).

5Separated by a hyphen,the two halvesof pardonrecall

Kristeva'sdefinitionof forgiveness:"togive meaningbeyond

nonmeaning" "donnerdu sens par-delAe non-sens" [par-

delti means "beyond"and don "gift"]).Kristeva hus draws

heruniqueunderstanding f pardonfrom the word tself.

WORKSITED

Arendt,Hannah.TheHumanCondition.Chicago:U of Chi-

cago P, 1958.

Derrida,Jacques. "Le si6cle et le pardon."Interview withMichel Wieviorka. Le monde des d,6bats Dec. 1999:

10-17.

Kristeva, Julia. "L'autre langue, ou traduire e sensible."

L'amourde 1autre angue.Ed. ElianeFonmentelli.Spec.

issue of Textuel32 (1997): 157-70.

Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia. Trans.

Leon S. Roudiez.New York:ColumbiaUP, 1989.

'Dostoievski, une po6tiquedu pardon."Interview

with OlivierAbel. Lepardon: Briser la dette et l'oubli.

Ed. Abel. Paris:Autrement,1991. 83-96.

.Hannah Arendt.Paris:Fayard, 1999. Vol. 1 of Le

g,6nie i6minin.Trans. as Hannah Arendt. Trans. RossGuberman.New York:ColumbiaUP,2001.

. Monjournalde la semaine:Diversit6dans la tem-

p8te."Lib,6ration1-2 Jan. 2000. 19 Dec. 2001 <http://

www.Iiberation.com/quotid en/debats/janvierOO/20000101.htmf>.

.Soleil noir:D,6pression t m6lancolie.Paris:Galli-

mard,1987.

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Kristeva Forgiveness