Kripke. Witt Gen Stein on Rules and Private Language

8/2/2019 Kripke. Witt Gen Stein on Rules and Private Language

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To my parents

Preface

The main part ofthis work has been delivered at various placesas lectures, series of lectures, or seminars. It constitutes, as Isay, 'an elementary exposition' of what I take to be the centralthread of Wittgenstein's later work on the philosophy oflanguage and the philosophy of mathematics, including myinterpretation of the 'private language argument', which onmy view is principally to be explicated in terms ofthe problemof 'following a rule'. A postscript presents another problemWittgenstein saw in the conception of private language, whichleads to a discussion of some aspects of his views on theproblem of other minds. SinceI stress the strong connection inWittgenstein's later philosophy between the philosophy ofpsychology and the philosophy of mathematics, I had hopedto add a second postscript on the philosophy of mathematics.Time has not permitted this, so for the moment the basicremarks on philosophy of mathematics in the main text mustsuffice.

The present work is hardly a commentary on Wittgenstein'slater philosophy, nor even on Philosophical Investigations.Many well known and significant topics - for example, theidea of 'family resemblances', the concept of 'certainty' - arehardly mentioned. More important, in the philosophy ofmind itself, a wealth of material, such as Wittgenstein's viewson intention, memory, dreaming, and the like, are barely


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viii Prefaceglanced at. It is my hope that much of this material becomesfairly clear from an understanding of Wittgenstein's view ofthe central topic.

Many of Wittgenstein's views on the nature of sensationsand sensation language are either only glanced at or areomitted altogether; and, as is stressed in the text, I adopted thedeliberate policy of avoiding discussion of those sectionsfollowing 9243 of the Investigatior~shat are ordinarily calledthe 'private language argument'. I think that many of thesesections- or example, s sz ~8f f . become much clearer whenthey are read in the light of the main argument of the presentwork; but probably some of the exegetical puzzles in some ofthese sections (e.g. s265) are not devoid of residue. Theinterest of these sections is real, but in my view theirimportance should not be overstressed, since they representspecial cases of a more general argument. Usually I presentedthis work to sophisticated philosophers, but it is my hope thatintroductory classes in Wittgenstein could use it in conjunc-tion with other material. In classes it would be helpfulespecially for the instructor to try out the Wittgensteinianparadox on the group, and to see what solutions are proposed.Here primarily I mean responses to the paradox that we followthe rule as we do without reason or justification, rather thanthe philosophical theories (dispositions, qualitative states,etc.), discussed later in the same chapter. It is important for thestudent to feel the problem intuitively. I recommend the sameinitial emphasis to readers who propose to study the presentwork on their own. I also recommend that the student (re)readthe Investigations in the light of the structuring of the argumentproposed in this work. Such a procedure is of specialimportance here, since largely my method is to present theargument as it struck me, as it presented a problem for me,rather than t o concentrate on the exegesis of specific passages.

Since I first encountered the 'private language argument'and the later Wittgenstein generally, and since I came to thinkabout it in the way expounded here (1962-3), his work on

Wittgenstein's later work. (It had been discussed to someextent a11 along.) Some of this discussion, especially thatappearing after I gave my London, Ontario lecture, can bepresumed to have been influenced by the present exposition,but some of it, in and out of print, can be presumed to beindependent. I have not tried to cite similar material in theliterature, partly because if I made the attempt, I would becertain to slight some published work and even more, someunpublished work. I have become satisfied, for reasonsmentioned below in the text and footnotes, that publicationstill is not superfluous.

It deserves emphasis that I do not in this piece of writingattempt to speak for myself, or, except in occasional andminor asides, to say anything about my own views on thesubstantive issues. The primary purpose o f this work is thepresentation of a problem and an argument, not its critica1evaluation. Primarily I can be read, except in a few obviousasides, as almost like an attorney presenting a major philc-sophical argument as it struck me. I fthe work has a main thesisof its own , it is that Wittgenstein's sceptical problem andargument are important, deserving of serious consideration.

Various people, including at least Rogers Albritton,G. E. M. Anscombe, Irving Block, Michael Dummett,Margaret Gilbert, BarbaraHumphries, Thomas Nagel, RobertNozick, Michael Slote, and Barry Stroud, influenced thisessay. In addition to the Wittgenstein Conference in London,Ontario, 1976, I gave various versions of this material asHowison Lectures. the University of California, Berkeley,1977; as a series of lectures in a special colloquium held inBanff, Alberta, 1977; and at a Wittgenstein Conference held atTrinity College, Cambridge, England, 1978. Versions werealso given in seminars at Princeton University, the first beingin the Spring Term of 1964-5. Only in these Princetonseminars did I have time to include the material in thepostscript, so that it has had less benefit of discussion andreaction from others than the rest. N o dou bt I was influencedby the discussion of my argument at these conferences and


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seminars. I should especially like to thank Steven Patten andRon Yoshida for their beautifully prepared transcripts of theBanff version, and Irving Block both for his help as editor ofthe volume in which an earlier version of this work appeared,and for inviting me to make this exposition more public at theLondon Conference. Samizdat transcripts of the versiongiven at the London Conference have been circulated widelyin Oxfo rd and elsewhere.

An earlier version of the work appeared in I. Block (ed.),Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein (Basil Blackwell,Oxford, 1981, xii+322 pp.). Work on that version waspartially supported by a Guggenheim Fellowship, by aVisiting Fellowship at A11 Souls College, Oxford, by asabbatical from Princeton University, and by the NationalScience Foundation (USA). Work on the present expandedversion was partially supported by a grant from the AmericanCouncil of Learned Societies, by a sabbatical from PrincetonUniversity, and by an Oscar Ewing Research Grant at IndianaUniversity.

Introductory

Wittgenstein's celebrated argument against 'private language'has been discussed so often that the utility of yet anotherexposition is certainly open to question. Most of the exposi-tion which follows occurred to the present writer some timeago, in the academic year 1962-3. At that time this approach toWittgenstein's views struck the present writer with the forceof a revelation: what had previously seemed to me to be asomewhat loose argument for a fundamentally implausibleconclusion based on dubious and controversial premises no wappeared to me to be a powerful argument, even if theconclusions seemed even more radical and, in a sense, moreimplausible, than before. I thought at that time that I had seenWittgenstein's argument from an angle and emphasis verydifferent from the approach which dominated standardexpositions. Ov er the years I came to have doubts. First of all,at times I became unsure that I could formulate Wittgenstein'selusive position as a clear argument . Second, the elusive natureof the subject made it porsible to interpret some of thestandard l iterature as perhaps seeing the argument in the sameway after all. More important, conversations over the yearsshowed that, increasingly, others were seeing the argumentwith the emphases I preferred. Nevertheless, recent exposi-tions by very able interpreters differ enough from the


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2 Introductoryfollowing to make me think that a new exposition may still beof use. 'A common view of the 'private language argument' in

Philosophical Investigations assumes that it begins with section243, and that it continues in the sections immediatelyf ~ l l o w i n g . ~his view takes the argument to deal primarilywith a problem about 'sensation language'. Further discussionof the argument in this tradition, both in support and incriticism, emphasizes such questions as whether the argumentinvokes a form of the verification principle, whether the formin question is justified, whether it is applied correctly tosensation language, whether the argument rests on anexaggerated scepticism about memory, and so on. SomeLooking through some of the most distinguished commentaries onWittgenstein o f the last ten or fifteen years, I find some that still treat thediscussion of rules cursorily, virtually not at all, as if it were a minortopic. Oth ers, w ho discuss both Wittgenstein's views on the philosophyof mathem atics and his views on sensations in detail, treat the discussionof rules as if it were im portan t for Wittgenstein's views on mathematicsand logical necessity but separate it from 'the private language argu men t'.Since Wittgenstein has more than one way of arguing for a givenconclusion, and even of presenting a single argument, to defend thepresent exegesis I need not necessarily argue that these other commentar-ies are in error. Indeed, they may give important and illuminatingexpositions o f facets of the Investigations and its argument deemphasizedor omitted in this essay. Nevertheless, in emphasis they certainly differconsiderably fro m the present exposition.' Unless otherwise specified (explicitly or contextually), references are toPhilosophical Investigations. Th e small numbered units of the Investigationsare termed 'sections' (or 'paragraphs'). Page references are used only if asection reference is not possible, as in the second part ofth e Investigations.Throughout I quote the stand ard printed English translation (by G. E . M .Anscombe) and make no attempt to question it except in a very fewinstances. Philosophical Investigations (x+232 pp., parallel German andEnglish text) has undergone severa1 editions since its first publication in1953 but the paragraphing and pagination remain the same. Thepublishers are Basil Blackwell, Ox ford and Macmillan, Ne w Y ork.This essay does not proceed by giving detailed exegesis of Wittgen-stein's text but rather develops the arguments in its own way. Irecommend that the reader reread the Investigations in the light of thepresent exegesis and see whe ther it illuminates the text.

Introductory 3crucial passages in the discussion following $243 - forexample, such celebrated sections as 258 and 265 -have beennotoriously obscure to commentators, and it has been thoughtthat their proper interpretation would provide the key to the'private language argument'.

In my view, the real 'private language argument' is to befound in the sections preceding $243. Indeed, in 202 theconclusion is already stated ex plici tly: "Hence it is not possible toobey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying arule would be the same thing as obeying it." I do not think thatWittgenstein here thought of himself as anticipating an argu-ment he was to give in greater detail later. On the contrary, thecrucial considerations are a11 contained in the discussionleading up to the conclusion stated in $202. The sectionsfollowing $243 are meant to be read in the light of thepreceding discussion; difficult as they are in any case, they aremuch less likely to be understood i f they are read in isolation.The private language argument' as applied to sensations is onlya special case of much more general considerations aboutlanguage previously argued; sensations have a crucial role asan (apparently) convincing counterexample to the generalconsiderations previously stated. Wittgenstein therefore goesover the ground again in this special case, marshalling newspecific considerations appropriate to it. It should be borne inmind that Philosophical Investigations is not a systematicphilosophical work where conclusions, once definitely estab-lished, need not be reargued. Rather the Investigations iswritten as a perpetua1 dialectic, where persisting worries,expressed by the voice ofthe imaginary inter locutor, are neverdefinitively silenced. Since the work is not presented in theform of a deductive argument with definitive theses asconclusions, the same ground is covered repeatedly, from thepoint of view of various special cases and from differentangles, with the hope that the entire process will help thereader see the problems rightly.

The basic structure of Wittgenstein's approach can bepresented briefly as follows: A certain problem, or in Humean


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4 Introductoryterminology, a 'sceptical paradox', is presented concerningthe notion of a rule. Following this, what Hume would havecalled a 'sceptical solution' to the problem is presented. Thereare two areas in which the force, both of the paradox and of itssolution, are most likely to be ignored, and with respect towhich Wittgenstein's basic approach is most likely to seemincredible. One such area is the notion of a mathematical rule,such as the rule for addition. The other is our talk of our ow ninner experience, of sensations and other inner states. Intreating both these cases, we should bear in mind the basicconsiderations about rules and language. Although Wittgen-stein has already discussed these basic considerations inconsiderable generality, the structure of Wittgenstein's workis such that the special cases of mathematics and psychologyare not simply discussed by citing a general 'result' alreadyestablished, but by going over these special cases in detail, inthe light of the previous treatment of the general case. By sucha discussion, it is hoped that both mathematics and the mindcan be seen rightly: since the temptations to see them wronglyarise from the neglect of the same basic considerations aboutrules and language, the problems which arise can be expectedto be analogous in the tw o cases. In my opinion, Wittgensteindid not view his dual interests in the philosophy of mind andthe philosophy of mathematics as interests in two separate, atbest loosely related, subjects, as someone might be interestedboth in music and in economics. Wittgenstein thinks of thetwo subjects as involving the same basic considerations. Forthis reason, he calls his investigation of the foundations ofmathematics "analogous to our investigation of psychology"(p. 232). It is no accident that essentially the same basicmaterial on rules is included in both Philosophical Investigationsand in Remarks on the Foundations of Ma th em at i~ s, ~oth times as

Basil Blackwell , Oxford, 1956, xix+zoq pp. In the f irs t edit ion ofRemarks on the Foundations of Mathematics the editors assert (p. vi) thatWittgenstein appears or iginally to ha ve intended to include some of th emater ial on m athematics in Philosophical Investigations.T he third ed ition (1978) includes more material than earlier edition s

Introductory 5the basis of the discussions of the philosophies of mind and ofmathematics, respectively, which follow.

In the following, I am largely trying to present Wittgen-stein's argument, or, more accurately, that set of problemsand arguments which I personally have gotten out of readingWittgenstein. With few exceptions, I am not trying to presentviews of my own ; neither am I trying t o endorse or to criticizeWittgenstein's approach. In some cases, I have found a precisestatement of the problems and conclusions to be elusive.Altliough one has a strong sense that there is a problem, arigorous sta tement of it is difficult. I am inclined to think thatWittgenstein's later philosophical style, and the difficulty hefound (see his Preface) in welding his thought into a conven-tional work presented with organized arguments and conclu-sions, is not simply a stylistic and literary preference, coupledwith a penchant for a certain degree of ob ~c u ri t y, ~ut stems inpart from the nature of his subject.$

I suspect- or reasons that will become clearer later- hat toattempt to present Wittgenstein's argument precisely is tosome extent to falsify it. Probably many of my formulationsand recastings of the argument are done in a way Wittgensteinwould not himself a p p r ~ v e . ~o the present paper should bethought of as expounding neither 'Wittgenstein's' argumentnor 'Kripke's': rather Wittgenstein's argument as it struckKripke, as it presented a problem for him.

As I have said, I think the basic 'private language argument'precedes section 243, though the sections following 243 are no

and rearranges some of the sections and divisions of earlier editions.When I wrote the present work, I used the f irs t edit ion. Where thereferences differ, the equivalent th ird editio n reference is given in squarebrackets.Personally I feel, however, that the role of stylistic considerations herecann ot be denied. It is clear that purely stylistic and literary considerationsmean t a great deal to Wittgenstein . His o w n s tyl is t ic preferenceobvious ly contr ibutes to the dif f iculty ofh is wo rk as well as to i ts beauty.See the discussion of this poin t in pages 69-70 below.See again the same discussion in pages 69-70.


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6 Introductorydoubt of fundamental importance as well. I propose to discussthe problem of private language' initially without mentioningthese latter sections at all. Since these sections are oftenthought to be the 'private language argument', to some such aprocedure may seem to be a presentation of Hamlet withoutthe prince. Even if this is so, there are many other interestingcharacters in the ~ l a y . ~7 Looking over what I have written below, I find myself worried that the

reader may lose the main thread of Wittgenstein's argument in theextensive treatment of finer points. In particular, the treatment of thedispositional theory below became so extensive because I heard it urgedmo re than once as an answer to the sceptical paradox. That discussionmay contain somew hat more of Kripke's argum entation in suppor t ofWittgenstein rather than exposition of Wittgenstein's own argumentthan does most of the rest o f this essay. (See notes 19 nd 24 fo r some o f t h econnections. T he arg umen t is, however, inspired by Wittgenstein'soriginal text. Probably the part with the least direct inspiration fromWittgenstein's text is the argum ent that o ur dispositions, l ike our actualperformance, a ren ot potentially infinite. Even this, however, obviouslyhas its origin in Wittgenstein's parallel emphasis on th e fact that w eexplicitly think of only finitely many cases of any rule.) Th e treatmentbelow (pp. 38-39) of simplicity is an examp le of an objection that, as faras I kno w, Wittgenstein never considers himself. I think that m y reply isclearly appropriate, assuming that I have understood the rest ofWittgenstein's position appropriately. I urge the reader to concentrate,on a first reading, on u nderstanding the intuitive force of Wittgenstein'ssceptical problem and to regard byways such as these as secondary.

The WittgensteinianParadox

In s201 Wittgenstein says, "this was our paradox: no courseof action could be determined by a rule, because every courseof action can be made out to accord with the rule." In thissection of the present essay, in my own way I will attemptto develop the 'paradox' in question. T he 'paradox' is perhapsthe central problem of Philosophical Investigations. Even some-one who disputes the conclusions regarding 'private lan-guage', and the philosophies of mind, mathematics, and logic,that Wittgenstein draws from his problem, might well regardthe problem itself as an important contribution to philosophy.It may be regarded as a new form of philosophical scepticism.

Following Wittgenstein, I will develop the problem initiallywith respect to a mathematical example, though the relevantsceptical problem applies to a11meaningful uses oflanguage. I ,like almost a11 English speakers, use the word 'plus' and thesymbol '+' to denote a well-known mathematical function,addition. The function is defined for a11 pairs of positiveintegers. By means of my externa1 symbolic representationand my interna1 mental representation, I 'grasp' the rule foraddition. One point is crucial to my 'grasp' of this rule.Although I myselfhave computed only finitely many sums inthe past, the rule determines my answer for indefinitely manynew sums that I have never previously considered. Th is is the


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8 Th e Wittgensteinian Paradoxwhole point of the notion that in learning to add I grasp a rule:my past intentions regarding addition determine a uniqueanswer for indefinitely many new cases in the future.

Let me suppose, for example, that '68+ 57' is a computat ionthat I have never performed before. Since I have performed -even silently to myself, let alone in my publicly observablebehavior - only finitely many computations in the past, suchan example surely exists. In fact, the same finitude guaranteesthat there is an example exceeding, in both its arguments, a11previous computations. I shall assume in what follows that'68+ 57' serves for this purpose as well.

I perform the computation, obtaining, of course, theanswer '125'. I am confident, perhaps after checking mywork, that '125' is the correct answer. It is correct both in thearithmetical sense that 12 5 is the sum of 68 and 57, and in themetalinguistic sense that 'plus', as I intended to use that wordin the past, denoted a function which, when applied to thenumbers I called '68' and '57', yields the value 125.

Now suppose I encounter a bizarre sceptic. This scepticquestions my certainty about my answer, in what I ust calledthe 'metalinguistic' sense. Perhaps, he suggests, as I used theterm 'plus' in the past, the answer I intended for '68+57'should have been 's'! Of course the sceptic's suggestion isobviously insane. My initial response to such a suggestionmight be that the challenger should go back to school and learnto add. Let the challenger, however, continue. After all, hesays, if I am now so confident that, as I used the symbol '+',my intention was that '68+57' should turn out to denote 125,this cannot be because I explicitly gave myselfinstructions that125 is the result of performing the addition in this particularinstance. By hypothesis, I did no such thing. But of course theidea is that, in this new instance, I should apply the very samefunction or rule that I applied so many times in the past. Butwho is to say what function this was? In the past I gave myselfonly a finite number of examples instantiating this function.All, we have supposed, involved numbers smaller than 57. Soperhaps in the past I used 'plus' and '+ ' to denote a function

T h e Wittgensteiriian Paradox 9which I will cal1 'quus' and symbolize by ' e ' . It is defined by:

~ @ y = x + ~ ,fx, y < 57= 5 otherwise.

Who is to say that this is not the function I previously meant byI '+'?The sceptic claims (or feigns to claim) that I am now

misinterpreting m y own previous usage. By 'plus', he says, Ialways meant quus;' now, under the influence of some insanefrenzy, or a bout of LSD, I have come to misinterpret my ownprevious usage.

Ridiculous and fantastic though it is, the sceptic's hypo-t thesis is not logically impossible. To see this, assume the

common sense hypothesis that by '+' I did mean addition.Then it would be possible, though surprising, that under theinfluence of a momentary 'high', I should misinterpret a11 mypast uses oft he plus sign as symbolizing the quus function, andproceed, in conflict with my previous linguistic intentions, to

1 comput e 68 plus 57 as 5. (I would have made a mistake, not inmathematics, but in the supposition that I had accorded with

II my previous linguistic intentions.) The sceptic is proposingi that I have made a mistake precisely of this kind, but with a

plus and quus reversed.Now if the sceptic proposes his hypothesis sincerely, he is

, crazy; such a bizarre hypothesis as the proposal that I alwaysmeant quus is absolutely wild. Wild it indubitably is, no doubtit is false; but if it is false, there must be some fact about my

I past usage that can be cited to refute it. For although thehypothesis is wild, it does not seem to be a priori impossible.

Perhaps I should make a remark about such expressions as "By 'plus' Imeant quus ( or plus)," "By 'green' I meant green," etc. I am not familiarwith an accepted felicitous convention to indicate the object ofthe verb 'tomean'. There are two problems. First, if one says, "By 'the woman wh odiscovered radium' I meant the woman who discovered radium," theobject can be interpreted in two ways. It may stand for a woman (MarieCurie), in which case the assertion is true only if 'meant' is used to meanreferred to (as it can be used); or it may be used to denote the meaning of

a the quoted expression, not a woman, in which case the assertion is truef


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10 Th e W ittgensteinian ParadoxOf course this bizarre hypothesis, and the references to

LSD, or to an insane frenzy, are in a sense merely a dramaticdevice. The basic point is this. Ordinarily, I suppose that, incomputing '68+57' as I do, I do not simply make anunjustified leap in the dark. I follow directions I previouslygave myself that uniquely determine that in this new instance Ishould say '125'. What are these directions? By hypothesis, Inever explicitly told myself that I should say '125' in this veryinstance. Nor can I say that I should simply 'do the same thing

with 'meant' used in the ordinary sense. Second, as is illustrated by'referred to', 'green', 'quus', etc. above, as objects of 'meant', one mustuse various expressions as objects in an awkward manner contrary tonormal grammar. (Frege's difficulties concerning unsaturatedness arerelated.) Both problems tempt one to put the object in quotation marks,like the subject; but such a usage conflicts with the convention ofphilosophical logic that a quotation denotes the expression quoted. Somespecial 'meaning marks', as proposed for example by David Kaplan,could be useful here. If one is content to ignore the first difficulty andalways use 'mean' to mean denote (for most purposes of the presentpaper, such a reading would suit at least as well as an intensional one;often I speak as if it is a numerical unction that is meant by plus), the secondproblem might lead one t o nominalize the objects- plus' denotes the plusfunction, 'green' denotes greenness, etc. I contemplated using italics("'plus' means plus"; "'mean' may mean denote"), but I decided thatnormally (except when italics are otherwise appropriate, especially whena neologism like 'quus' is introduced for the first time), I will write theobject of 'to mean' as an ordinary roman object. The convention I haveadopted reads awkwardly in the written language but sounds ratherreasonable in the spoken language.

Since use-mention distinctions are significant for the argument as Igive it, I try to remember to use quotation marks when an expression ismentioned. However, quotation marks are also used for other purposeswhere they migh t be invoked in normal non-philosophical Englishwriting (for example, in the case of "'meaning marks'" in the previousparagraph, or " quasi-quotation' " n the next sentence). Readers familiarwith Quine 's 'quasi-quotation' will be aware that in some cases I useordinary quotation where logical purity would require that I usequasi-quotation o r some similar device. I have not tried to be carefulabout this matte r, since I am confident that in practice readers will not beconfused.

Th e Wittgensteinian Paradox I II always did,' if this means 'compute according to the ruleexhibited by my previous examples.' That rule could just aswell have been the rule for quaddition (the quus function) asfor addition. The idea that in fact quaddition is what I meant,that in a sudden frenzy I have changed my previous usage,dramatizes the problem.

In the discussion below the challenge posed by the sceptictakes two forms. First, he questions whether there is any actthat I meant plus, not quus, that will answer his scepticalchallenge. Second, he questions whether I have any reason tobe so confident that now I should answer '125' rather than '5'.The two forms of the challenge are related. I am confident thatI should answer '125' because I am confident that this answeralso accords with what I meant. Neither the accuracy of mycomputation nor of my memory is under dispute. So it oughtto be agreed that $1 meant plus, then unless I wish to changemy usage, I am justified in answering (indeed compelled toanswer) '125', not '5'. An answer to the sceptic must satisfytwo conditions. First, it must give an account of what fact it is(about my mental state) that constitutes my meaning plus, notquus. But further, there is a condition that any putativecandidate for such a fact must satisfy. It must, in some sense,show how I amjustified in giving the answer '125' to '68+57'.The 'directions' mentioned in the previous paragraph, thatdetermine what I should do in each instance, must somehowbe 'contained' in any candidate for the fact as to what I meant.Otherwise, the sceptic has not been answered when he holdsthat my present response is arbitrary. Exactly how thiscondition operates will become much clearer below, after wediscuss Wittgenstein's paradox on an intuitive level, when weconsider various philosophical theories as to what the fact thatI meant plus might consist in. There will be many specificobjections to these theories. But a11fail to give a candidate for afact as to what I meant that would show that only ' 1 25 ' ~not'5', is the answer I 'ought' to give.

The ground rules of our formulation of the problem shouldbe made clear. For the sceptic to converse with me at all, we


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Documents

Kripke. Witt Gen Stein on Rules and Private Language