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The weekly Koha (The T imes) was published in Prisht ina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. E dited by Veton Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the name of Koha Ditorë. With the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were original ly posted on http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org. - 1 - Koha Digest # 87 Date: 17 J anuary 1996 FRONT PAGE: AGANI REPLIES TO BUKOSHI EDITORIAL BERISHA AS A TURK'S HEAD  by VETON SURROI Sali Berisha is in fact guilty. Albania's President sold Kosova with three sentences, in Bonn and Tirana, related to the beginning of the solution of Kosova's question. The easiness these words are expressed with could re flect an increased dose of nervousness among the Kosovan  population, another deflation of previous illusions, but als o an elementary incapability to make political evaluations. Nervousness because, it is evident, we are dealing with a long and exhausting crisis in all aspects. Deflation, because inflated as this public in Kosova was, the impression was created that Albania was becoming a regional power which can impose a solution for Kosova. Lack of evaluation, because in this case too, it is expected that someone outside Kosova, despite the same blood and language, will impose the political solution as it would suit the majority of the citizens of Kosova. In fact, more than anything else, in Sali Berisha's case and the reactions in Kosova, I see a wish to find the one to blame, for the present as well as an eventual failure in the future. In Albania they call it Turk's head, in Biblical civilizations it is a scapegoat, and to us Kosovans, it is a historic blameworthy of this century who doesn't allow us to reach freedom. Some ten years ago, it was Enver Hoxha who sold Kosova. There is no doubt that a dictatorship as Hoxha's sold many things, even the spirit of the people. Kosova tends to forget though, that the main problem was not E. Hoxha, but the conditions that brought the illusion that one E. Hoxha can solve Kosova's problem. And the conditions were palpable: during the four years of WWII, Kosova didn't rise massively against fascism. Any Albanian politician, from Albania or Kosova, with Kosovan soldiers' anti-fascist  brigades, which grew in '43 and '44, behind them, would talk differently about Kosova. In a  present analogy, even though withou t weapons, it is expected that Sali Berisha, who made an extremely productive change in regard to the Albanian question compared to E. Hoxha, will solve the Kosovan issue definitively, while the Kosovans will applaud the act, they will greet it in press conferences and praise him in long songs played on two strings. In fact, Sali Berisha, in good or bad timing, invited the Kosovans to play the game. The bottom line, under which no game is allowed, are t he violently suspended constitutional relations - let the negotiators themselves build the roof.

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The weekly Koha (The T imes) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. E dited by VetonSurroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Y ugoslavia, Koha

soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the

name of Koha Ditorë. With the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on

http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.

- 1 -

Koha Digest # 87

Date: 17 January 1996

FRONT PAGE: AGANI REPLIES TO BUKOSHI

EDITORIAL

BERISHA AS A TURK'S HEAD

 by VETON SURROI

Sali Berisha is in fact guilty. Albania's President sold Kosova with three sentences, in Bonn

and Tirana, related to the beginning of the solution of Kosova's question. The easiness these

words are expressed with could reflect an increased dose of nervousness among the Kosovan

 population, another deflation of previous illusions, but also an elementary incapability tomake political evaluations. Nervousness because, it is evident, we are dealing with a long and

exhausting crisis in all aspects.

Deflation, because inflated as this public in Kosova was, the impression was created that

Albania was becoming a regional power which can impose a solution for Kosova. Lack of 

evaluation, because in this case too, it is expected that someone outside Kosova, despite the

same blood and language, will impose the political solution as it would suit the majority of 

the citizens of Kosova. In fact, more than anything else, in Sali Berisha's case and the

reactions in Kosova, I see a wish to find the one to blame, for the present as well as an

eventual failure in the future. In Albania they call it Turk's head, in Biblical civilizations it isa scapegoat, and to us Kosovans, it is a historic blameworthy of this century who doesn't

allow us to reach freedom. Some ten years ago, it was Enver Hoxha who sold Kosova. There

is no doubt that a dictatorship as Hoxha's sold many things, even the spirit of the people.

Kosova tends to forget though, that the main problem was not E. Hoxha, but the conditions

that brought the illusion that one E. Hoxha can solve Kosova's problem. And the conditions

were palpable: during the four years of WWII, Kosova didn't rise massively against fascism.

Any Albanian politician, from Albania or Kosova, with Kosovan soldiers' anti-fascist

 brigades, which grew in '43 and '44, behind them, would talk differently about Kosova. In a

 present analogy, even though without weapons, it is expected that Sali Berisha, who made an

extremely productive change in regard to the Albanian question compared to E. Hoxha, willsolve the Kosovan issue definitively, while the Kosovans will applaud the act, they will greet

it in press conferences and praise him in long songs played on two strings. In fact, Sali

Berisha, in good or bad timing, invited the Kosovans to play the game. The bottom line,

under which no game is allowed, are the violently suspended constitutional relations - let the

negotiators themselves build the roof.

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INTERVIEW

FEHMI AGANI, Vice-Chairman of the LDK 

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PARLIAMENT WOULD STRENGTHEN OUR  NEGOTIATING POSITION

Interviewed by BATON HAXHIU / Prishtinë

KOHA: In KOHA's last interview, Bukoshi said that

"Kosova's problem is being marginalized. He also stated

that "the optimist promises on Kosova's status have no

grounds". What is the truth here?

AGANI: I wouldn't want to reply to determined persons or 

interviews - when I agreed to this interview I didn't knowI would be facing such a confrontation test in the very first

question, but wishing to discuss about the often expressed

opinions in this magazine about the marginalization of 

Kosova's question and the ungrounded optimism about the

solution of it's problem, I must say that I don't consider 

them as appropriate evaluations. The (non) marginalization

of the questions can be perceived or experienced in

different ways. But, the international interest about Kosova

and the concerns of Serbia about the issue have been

increasing in the past months, and this gives no reasons toconclude that the issue is being marginalized. Neither can

the situation in Kosova be a reason to fear marginalization.

In regard to the optimistic manipulative and groundless

 promises, I believe there are some misunderstandings. But,

 political subjects, parties and leadership have important

mobilizing roles. Mobilizing optimism is an important

component of our resistance and efforts. As long as these

exist, there will be hope that our purposes will come true.

Despite the difficulties and the relative failures, hopes and

optimism are not groundless. Only defeatist realism isgroundless!

KOHA: Kosova's Premier declares also that "there is

realistic threat that with this level of organization not even

the autonomy is in the horizon". Why is there so much

 political dissonance between the statements coming from

the LDK and the government?

AGANI: Our organization and phenomenon is such that

one can never claim that it is sufficient. Certainly there aredeficiencies, and there are not hard to find. But our 

activity and organization should not be disregarded. If we

have managed to evade the threat of war, not as an escape,

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organization that we have and, through these institutions,

we have managed to legitimize the representation of our 

 political interests. I believe that this is very important in

this phase. Just look at the attempts of Serbia to ignore or 

deny this fact. It's often statements that it will not acceptthe conversations with separatists, it's attempts to find

other partners for conversations and to take advantage of 

an eventual split in order to assure it's rule on these

grounds. And, look at the mature and dignifying answer of 

Albanians as individuals or groups; we have a legal and

legitimate representation which is forcing Serbia to accept

the conversations, at least declaratively, with the

separatists. This achievement of ours is perceived quite

seriously by the other states. It is too much to say that the

Government is one of our most important institutions. But,

the stagnation in their development has caused theweakness in their functioning. Nevertheless, a good part of 

the life in Kosova is lead by our independent institutions.

KOHA: You are accused of not showing much interest in

constituting the parliament. Where does the reason for it's

non constitution rely on, and will this reflect on your 

electorate - for you promised it that the institutionalization

of life in Kosova will take place?

AGANI: It is not an accusation. There is no space for anyaccusation. But there are different opinions about the

constitution of the parliament. Serbia, as we know,

although it didn't allow the celebration of the elections in

Kosova, it didn't ban them either, but launched a serious

threat about the constitution of the parliament. There were

opinions that the parliament should be constituted, despite

the threats coming from Serbia. This was the opinion of 

the majority of the elected MPs. According to another 

opinion, there was no need to endanger the lives of the

MPs, knowing that the parliament would have it quite

difficult to convene again. This was the reason why the parliament was never constituted and it is very hard to say

what would have been the best. In regard to the second

 part of your question, when the time of the new elections

comes, the voters will know of the non-constitution of the

 parliament and the reasons for that, and they will vote as

they wish. But, let's leave these new elections aside, they

are not that close. In the phase in which we are now, in

the phase of just conversations on Kosova's status, the

constitution of the parliament would strengthen our 

 position. Even though the fourth anniversary of the '92elections is getting closer, the mandate of the parliament

would be extended, as determined in almost all

constitutions, until the conditions are created for the

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normal functioning of the parliament.

KOHA: Last year it was promised that Kosova's problem

will be in the peaceful processes on the Former 

Yugoslavia. Why was these doses of optimism repeatedthroughout the year when there were no grounds for it?

AGANI: The promises, as you say, that Kosova's problem

will be part of the peaceful processes on the former 

Yugoslavia were not an ungrounded declaration. We were

told this by the official representatives of the states that

determine the current international development, but being

in the peace process doesn't mean being at the top of this

 process. Christopher's statement, in his last meeting with

Dr. Rugova that now, after Dayton, Kosova will be at the

top of the international agenda fully confirms our statements.

KOHA: But their posture about Kosova's status is

important. In this aspect, Rugova's and Berisha's messages

for the New Year were quite different. What is the truth

about Kosova here?

AGANI: I don't see these messages or the postures in

general as confronted or distant. Kosova declared itself in

favor of independence and this is Rugova's and almost allof Kosova's posture. But, there is the opinion that since

the process of independence is a long one, it would be

maybe better to start the conversations starting from the

request to reinstall the autonomy Kosova used to have.

This will be the starting point. The ones who know what

kind of autonomy Kosova had in the former Yugoslavia

and who know of the newly created conditions, have it

clear that despite the good wishes, autonomy is not a

solution - it can be only an imposition, while the old

autonomy can't be reinstalled.

KOHA: Kosova was not present in Dayton, Paris or 

London. How can you justify the policy of your party after 

the promises made that Kosova will be there - and the

 promises remain unfulfilled?

AGANI: According to the information and the explanations

that we received, the American initiative for the solution

of the unsolved problems in the former Yugoslavia aimed

at, in the first phase, the solution of Bosnia's problem and possibly Croatia's too. These two problems were the

reasons for the celebration of Dayton, London, Paris,

Bonn - which were meetings for the concretization of the

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solutions of these problems. Therefore, the pathetic

disappointment about our non-presence in Dayton, London

or Paris, seems absurd to me. We have to be there where

Kosova is discussed. And there is no reason why should

Tudjman, Izetbegovic or even Milosevic discuss aboutKosova. Kosova should be discussed among the interested

 parties having the legitimate representatives of Kosova on

the Albanian side. Therefore, there are no unfulfilled

 promises, but this is our general effort which seems to

enter its final phase.

KOHA: The first thing that is expecting you this year are

the Albanian-Serb negotiations. Several countries volunteer 

for mediators. Do you think that before entering the

negotiations the parliament should be constituted?

AGANI: As I just said, the constitution of the parliament

would strengthen our negotiating position. And, it would

make the legality of our demands clearer and more

convincing.

KOHA: At the end of last year, Dr. Rugova had important

visits to the USA and Germany. What is the message of 

these conversations and are there any chances for the USA

to mediate in the Albanian-Serb negotiations?

AGANI: You are right to qualify these meetings as very

important, and these confirmed the interest of such

important countries and the international community on

Kosova, their determination to get involved in finding a

solution for Kosova and hasten the process. There are

grounds to hope that the USA, in cooperation with the

European countries will accept to mediate, or rather, take

the initiative to find a solution for Kosova.

KOHA: Are there any requests from other states to start

negotiations without any due preparations or prepared platforms?

AGANI: I think this question is not worded well. Many

countries wish, and this is our interest, to start the

conversations as soon as possible. The preparations and the

 platform are supposed to be done. If you ask me whether 

this supposition is correct, in our concrete case, it would

 be very hard for me to answer. Anyhow, our orientation

is clear and so are the arguments to our demands. It would

 be nice if the flow of the negotiating process and all possible problems that would arise could be foreseen.

Many preparations should be made in this direction, but

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one can never say that the preparations are final and

sufficient.

KOHA: Rumors say that there were concrete initiatives for 

conversations. What is Kosova's position in theseconversations having in mind that there are suggestions for 

an autonomy and republic within a new federation?

AGANI: There were a couple of initiatives, but, as it is

known, the request for taking the initiative was sent to the

USA. I believe that so far we have achieved that the

conversations take place with the international mediation

and without any conditions. regardless of what someone

thinks or asks, the starting point and our main request will

 be the independence of Kosova.

KOHA: How do you explain the insisting on solving

Kosova's issue based on the ethnic model, and where is the

difference between this and other places which it is often

compared to, as Tirol, for example?

AGANI: The request for the independence of Kosova is

grounded on the ethnic majority. 90% of Kosova's

 population is Albanian and it is really unnatural to have

Kosova in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Therefore, the ethnic

 principle suits us. Our demand is based on the referendumand other forms of declaration. It is also grounded on the

 political and constitutional position of Kosova in the

former Yugoslavia as a constituent, a criteria which served

as ground for the independence of the former Yugoslav

republics. Our case differs from all others and really there

is no sample which can be applied in this concrete case.

KOHA: Some countries have stated the FRY will be

recognized by midst 1996. Isn't this a short period of time

to negotiate such a delicate problem as Kosova?

AGANI: Yes, There are states which claim that

Yugoslavia can return to the OSCE or some other 

international body at that time. But there are also so many

authoritative statements which claim that Yugoslavia can't

come back to any body without solving Kosova's problem.

And this implies an agreement reached with Albanians or 

without accepting a solution which would be acceptable for 

the international community. Five-six months is just a very

short period for any negotiations, but it will depend a lot

on the intensity of the engagement of the internationalfactors.

KOHA: Almost all states declare that they still have no

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 become the mediator".

Therefore, it seems that there is another instance standing

 behind. The American, which has started pressuring both

sides to start the dialogue. Will the dialogue for thesolution of Kosova's problem start, or will it be only about

some aspects of the problem, as are information, health-

care and education, still remains to be seen. Reliable

 political sources in Prishtina tell us that consultations of 

our representatives about dialogue which is expected the

 begin, have been taking place. Even, still according to

these sources, these preparations have started since the

American initiative. The sources claim that the first signal

for the preparation came in the recent meeting of Dr.

Rugova with the first secretary of the American Embassy,

Elizabeth Bonkowsky. The secretary of the embassy is notan important ring in the chain in the process of the

establishment of the dialogue on Kosova's issue but rather 

can be considered as a transmitter of the signals that come

from the State Department. This speaks of the direct

evolvement of the Americans in the possible conversations

which can be developed about Kosova's question.

In his last press conference, president Rugova said that

"we wish Richard Holbrooke takes over the mediation".

Holbrooke, on the other hand, when referring to the

opening of the USIS office in Prishtina said that "The USdoesn't support the secession and independence of 

Kosova". This more or less gives the complete features of 

the Albanians-Serb dialogue which is expected to begin,

and in which Holbrooke is desired as a mediator. Wishing

for Holbrooke or the American involvement also implies

 playing the game by their rules, and this as stated in

 public, is autonomy. This should not be only a game of 

words. Everything will start to be finished within the

frame of the autonomy, and this is contrary to all of what

is being told to us by the LDK.

But, there is another aspect which should be discussed

regarding dialogue before anything. Who will be involved

in these conversations, who will they talk with, what

Albanian political subject will take the responsibility of 

getting into the conversations? According to what can be

seen and according to other sources, it seems that these

conversations will be conducted by the LDK. Thus, these

conversations will not include a large number of experts on

our political issues, which will weaken their position. At

the LDK, we were told that they will include the parliamentarian groups and commissions in the

conversations about concrete issues as education or health-

care, if these groups or commissions exist.

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Adem Demaçi's last interview in "Telegraf" and his last

meeting with Rugova enrich the mosaic which has to be

assembled from these circulating rumors. Demaçi promises

his direct involvement in politics and even Rugova's

replacement if necessary. This will make Rugova and theones he chooses enter the dialogue in a slippery field, a

terrain which has other options, a terrain with an

alternative.

But all of these say more than the first sight impression. If 

the preparations for the conversations have started now,

five years after the unanimous call for dialogue, then our 

 politics is full of improvisations. This means that the

experts' teams have not been prepared in the past five

years in which we waited for the dialogue, as if a miracle

were expected. And the other distressing question is: whatif conversations start on grounds of improvisations?

 Now, if they have eventually started, they are not favoring

Albanians, but will end who knows how if our teams

which represent us in the conversations, are being formed

and preparing themselves now. Our representatives would

then enter a dark tunnel whose end can't be seen.

INTERVIEW

BAJRAM KOSUMI, Chairman of the Parliamentarian Party of Kosova

WE MUST MOVE ON

Interviewed by DUKAGJIN GORANI / Prishtina

KOHA: There is no doubt that the Parliamentarian Party

last year...

KOSUMI: I believe that after long consultations and quite

a number of meetings we managed to reach and

agreement. The intention is to realistically analyze the

situation in Kosova on January 15. A special attention will

 be dedicated to the Albanian political subject and its work 

so far. I hope that joint conclusions will come out from

these consultations - a reconfirmation of political and

strategic concepts. Giving it a big attention, we believe

that the main issue to be discussed should be the political

unity in the decisive moments for Kosova's fate.

KOHA: Taking into account the end of war in Bosnia, it is

said that 1996 is decisive for the solution of Kosova's

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 problem. It is expected that conversations should start

soon...

KOSUMI: There were rumors and talks in the couloirs

about these "negotiations" also in 1992. The truth is thatthe signals now are stronger, after the end of the conflict

in Bosnia, the terrain is being prepared for the solution of 

Kosova's problem. So far, the Albanian side has always

showed it's interest to solve the problem by conversations

which would suit both sides. What has recently been

noticed as the interest of Serbia to start conversations

about Kosova, is only unilateral, for Serbia continues

sticking to the prejudgments and conditions before even

starting to talk. Such conversations can't be successful.

There is also a big chance for the so much expected

negotiations to never come.

This is where the issue of the international decision-making

centers comes, of their posture towards Kosova. It is very

important, for their presence in the actual relationship

 between Serbia and Kosova is more than necessary.

KOHA: Based on statements coming from the West,

independence doesn't seem to be on the agenda...

KOSUMI: Four or five years earlier, Kosova had a muchmore favorable position among the international decision-

making centers. I believe that lately the position of 

Albanians has found itself in a crisis and that it is

deteriorating ever more. This was obvious in the case of 

the Albanians in Macedonia, who didn't manage to achieve

their political goals in this phase. In Kosova, in the best of 

the cases, these centers offer solutions which I believe are

offending and unacceptable. Peace in Kosova means peace

in the Balkans. And, because of this, Albanians can't

accept any solution which implies the sovereignty of Serbia

on Kosova. Such a solution would force the parties to startmutual disputes which would easily lead to a war. This is

the main reason why Albanians can't accept a solution

suggested to them by the international decision-making

centers. Albanians have grown up as a people, they have

developed their own identity and can't accept to be under 

the dictate of another state.

KOHA: Is 1996 a year of compromises?

KOSUMI: Yes, but I would approach this issue fromanother direction. During the past five years, the Albanian

 political subject was depending exclusively on the postures

of the above decision-making centers. The whole strategy

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and activity turned into a logic of expectation on "what

will happen..." in the Geneva, London or Paris

conferences. This was one of its biggest weaknesses.

During this time, the whole internal Albanian political

 potential was ignored and marginalized.

KOHA: The political topography changed, but in the past

five years we showed to be faithful to our initial principle

"passive resistance". It seems that this faithfulness is

rather a justification for the "incapability", if the new

situation demands "new approaches"?

KOSUMI: This logic of waiting has converted the

Albanians into subjects that doubt of their force and that

are not capable of creating political realities, but rather 

only objects of bargaining. Albanians tend to believe thatall the rest should think of their fate, but that they

themselves can't do anything to change it, linking it to the

decisions made by the "West" or Belgrade, but not to its

energy or potential. I don't believe that a political concept

can be fixed in politics - without knowing the real force

standing behind. We have, even before, declared that the

national global policy should be created, that we should

identify a force which will be capable of getting engaged

and be articulated right now. Only then could we prejudge

other solutions. The idea about independence didn't appear five years ago, it appeared long time ago.

 Nevertheless, the problem now is the following: no

international center can prejudge this or that solution for 

Kosova, since the Albanian political factor has not

appeared and showed it's real force nor has it shown it's

determination about how far can it go in the realization of 

its freedom. I believe that this is the right moment for it

to discuss the present form of our organization and try to

find new ways to organize our resistance. I believe that

this is the moment in which our movement mustunderstand the need to move on. Whatever was achieved

so far was a result of the internal organization of the

Albanian political subject - and not so much a result of 

external impositions. Nevertheless, I would understand this

as a framework which is slowly closing down, as an

ending chapter. We are facing the moment of the opening

of a new chapter, of finding new ways of organization

which make the internal potential arise and which would

successfully impose the just solution.

KOHA: Maybe this peaceful resistance has reached its

expiration date?

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KOSUMI: Because of the weaknesses I mentioned, the

concept of passive resistance is too extensive. The present

resistance meant only the silent denial of the Serb

sovereignty in Kosova. On the other hand, the peaceful

resistance includes a series of different forms of opposition: first of all the vitalization of the institutions in

Kosova- the constitution of the parliament, the return of 

the Government to Kosova, the activation of different

forms of resistance through protests, demonstrations

throughout the whole Albanians space.

KOHA: The belief in the past five years was that the West

and the "internationalization of the truth on Kosova" would

 bring wellbeing...

KOSUMI: We still have the illusions that the issue of Kosova is well-known outside our borders. This is a huge

untruth. I don't doubt that there are external experts that

follow up on the situation in Kosova, however the

diplomacy and the international centers are not well

acquainted with all the problems related to Kosova. We are

still way behind. The Serbian diplomacy managed to fool

the international diplomacy with false data. Albanian

diplomacy and science didn't manage to deny the Serbian

anti-historical posture even with the truth at its disposition.

KOHA: Maybe it is not important what is said, but when

and were is that said? And whom to?

KOSUMI: I agree. The truth is the most important factor,

 but it really depends where, when and to whom do you tell

this truth to...

KOHA: There are indicators that there will be no time for 

any of our political "opulence": rhetoric, lack of 

determination...

KOSUMI: I don't tend to believe that this will be the

decisive year and that our issue will be solved in it... I

 believe that this year will be decisive only for the Albanian

 political subject - its future fate. Albanians in Kosova are

dissatisfied with the political flows and the work achieved.

I don't believe it is disappointed in the political movement

for liberation, but with the methods applied by the political

leadership to achieve this. This feeling of discontent should

not continue. We must move on. If we don't do that now,

then the Albanian political subject will split dangerouslyand this would create even more favorable conditions for 

the Serbian repressive policy.

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KOHA: And the premier of Kosova declares that "...even

the '74 constitution is hard to achieve..."

KOSUMI: I don't believe I am competent to comment

Bukoshi's statement. The truth is that Serbia wants toremove Kosova from the agenda. I am sure of this because

the conflict between Serbia and Kosova reached a very

high level of intolerance where coexistence is very hard to

achieve. Serbia would always try to destroy the autonomy

of Kosova, so often mentioned nowadays.

I believe that the majority of Albanians would go for 

independence and will not give up on it. In this case, the

Albanian political subject should know that the articulation

of the idea does not mean its realization too.

I don't believe that Albanians as a people would accept a

solution other than the one which implies independence.

As a party we will oppose any proposal that is not

independence.

KOHA: Maybe the western centers will not find it difficult

to promote "a group of reasonable Albanian politicians" as

they did six years ago. Taking into account the huge faith

of the people towards the West, something of the kind

could even function...

KOSUMI: "The people are tired", they say. I believe this

is true. But I also believe that this will be the reason that

they will sacrifice themselves for their freedom. Second,

Serbia has always tried to find suitable counterparts, and

I believe it failed. I don't believe that it will achieve this

even with the help of the international community, because

if the Albanian political subject moves on, then the

international factor would give up on trying to find other 

solutions. The ones who have political doubts today, must

know the damage they could cause by playing with quasi- political concepts behind the people's backs.

KOHA: The growing weaknesses threat with failures...

KOSUMI: The weaknesses inside the Albanian political

subject have increased so much that they have caused the

identity crisis of the political movement. Nevertheless, I

don't think that something has failed in the Albanian

 politics. The crisis has been sensed in the past two years,

 but nothing has failed. A political method which producedresults has ended because in new circumstances it can't be

successful. We must give up on the methods and not the

 period, as one can hear from the creators of this policy:

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there you have Mehmet Kraja's book, "The Lost Years"...

I don't think we should give up on these five years, nor 

should we interrupt the continuance as we did in 1990. We

 just must give up on the present political methods and passonto new advanced forms.

It must not be forgotten that this Albanian political subject

has made a serious mistake by extremely making the forms

of people's resistance between 1981 and 1989 passive.

This has been very harmful. Thus, this mistake shouldn't

 be repeated, because in this way we will go back to the

historical zero. If any of the politicians sees no way out,

then there are others that do see it. The main problem still

remains to be the Albanian political subject of Kosova:will it be able to understand the political moment, to give

up on this form of leading the peaceful resistance.

KOHA: In other words, nothing has failed, yet...

KOSUMI: Exactly. This is why we insist so much to move

on. Nothing has failed, but refusing to change the working

method will be our biggest failure! If this is not understood

then our fate will be much more difficult than so far. It is

 better for us to allow these energies to come to the surfacethan allow Serbia and the "international" centers

understand that we can accept a sort of a solution, creating

the Serbian illusion that Kosova can still be kept under 

occupation and the international illusion that a compromise

solution could be achieved. It would be something very

serious for Albanians because it could lead towards war.

Again.

I am deeply convinced that Kosova's fate depends the most

on the internal Albanian factor. The international factor 

tends to find other solutions, but not the just ones.Secondly, it is willing to accept political realities which are

imposed...

KOHA: ...As in the case of Bosnia...

KOSUMI: Yes. This is why the political fate of the

Albanians depends on the Albanians themselves. If the

seriousness of the situation is reflectively understood, then

there is no doubt that the ultimate goal will be

accomplished. If not, then the existing political leadershipshould be marginalized.

KOHA: It is hard to see that these changes would go

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through without internal implosions. These past five years

have created strong bureaucratic mechanisms inside the

 political movement.

KOSUMI: Giving up on the present method is essential.This is the main problem which holds a series of other 

 problems inside the Albanian political subject.

Unfortunately, no democratic relations were created inside

the Albanian political subject. Leaving aside what today

is known as "the political monopoly of the LDK" or the

"lack of coordination of the activities of the political

 parties" - we haven't created the decision-making center.

For the time being, there is no mechanism in Kosova that

would decide about our fate. This situation has allowed the

creation of clans, sects, etc... And wherever there areclans, there are divisions and dispersions. Something of the

kind is present, in the past two years, within the majority

of our subjects.

I don't believe that political pluralism has been understood

correctly in Kosova, as freedom of political expression and

convictions, but it is rather seen as a minor illness, as

 political atavism. Naturally, all of this resulted with the

division and dispersion of the mental potential when 15-16

 political parties were created and when this potential (smallanyway) almost totally dispersed. The majority of the

 parties aim at becoming decision-making centers, but none

of them has the potential to strongly influence the Albanian

movement.

KOHA: Adem Demaçi announced his political engagement

and this was the news...

KOSUMI: Personally I support Demaçi's step and I

 believe that this will be very important for Albanians. I

tend to believe that Demaçi understood that the keymoment for the Albanians - to move on - had come, much

sooner than the political parties.

KOHA: In May expires the mandate of the non-constituted

 parliament. What can you say about the free multi-party

elections and their (non)celebration?

KOSUMI: Finding a solution for the constitution of the

 parliament of Kosova is one of the first things to do. I am

sure that it can be constituted today. If something of thekind doesn't take place, then the MPs who were elected

there are being manipulated with. In regard to the free

elections... I find it hard to express myself. From this

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 position, something of the kind really looks bizarre....

MACEDONIA

HOW TO MAKE SWITZERLAND OUT OF MACEDONIA

 by SELADIN XHEZAIRI / Shkup

The chairman of the Working Group on Ethnic, National

Communities and Minority Issues of the ICFY,

ambassador Gert Arens, again remained in Shkup last

week. Firstly, he had dinner with a delegation of the LDK 

where - as claimed - the conversation was centered on the

reactivation of the Special Group on Kosova within theICFY, although the chances of ICFY's end by the end of 

this month are really big. Later, Arens talked with

Macedonian officials and representatives of Albanian

 political parties.

The meeting ended with a "common language" to continue

the efforts, and was crowned with the inauguration of the

TV studio for minorities/nationalities in the Macedonian

TV. In the solemnity organized on this occasion, Arens

 proved that in his 42 months long wandering on theselands resulted with his learning of Macedonian (besides

Serbo-Croatian): "the expansion of the programs in the

languages of the nationalities is an important contribution

for the peaceful coexistence in Macedonia which is an

example for the less happy states in the region. I am

convinced that the existing problems, outside the media,

will be solved, as so far, in the air of tolerance" - said

Gert Arens in fluent Macedonian.

Another guest spoke of the inter-ethnic relations and their 

importance, the Swiss ambassador in Macedonia, GaudeneRuud, whose government along with the government of 

Denmark financed the realization of this project: "The fact

that Switzerland supported this project shouldn't be a

surprise. As you know, my country is a champion in

minority issues. In this confederation there are 26 cantons

with four languages, and some of the cantons use several

languages. We have three independent TV stations. This is

why Switzerland understands the need of the minorities for 

more programs. We all agree that the structure of the

minority issues here differs from that in Switzerland.

The configuration in Switzerland is not as in your country,

 but there are again, mutual needs: it is an important

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 principle - the fact that if you wish to have a calm

coexistence each one of us should feel as in one's own

home. And to be so, it first implies speaking your own

language. I hope that this studio will help the people to

even more feel at home. There is also another fact: to livein a state doesn't mean that one should continue the old

way. The state is a joint enterprise and, of there are

different groups then they should aim at integration.

Perceived from this angle, I hope that the expansion of the

 programs of the minorities doesn't imply a step towards

separation. Possessing all these programs and different

languages should be understood as a cultural enrichment

for all, and all cultures and languages must be under the

same roof" - concluded his lecture the Swiss diplomat.

On the other hand, MTV's director, Saso Ordanovski,

announced that vacant posts will be advertised for theneeds of the programs of the nationalities (including the

Albanian editorial board), and that as of next week the

 program scheme of the nationalities will expand: the

Albanian program will increase to three hours, the Turkish

to one hour and a half while the programs in the Rhoma,

Vlah and Serbian languages will be broadcasted twice a

week, 30 minutes each.

MACEDONIA

CONFUSION

 by ISO RUSI / Shkup

According to the strange traditions of these lands, the New

Year's was a good opportunity for interviews and

statements of leading politicians. By the end of December,

in a statement published in "Nova Makedonija", President

Gligorov announced his return to office. Thisannouncement was preceded by many encounters with

many personalities which denied the speculations about the

consequences of the attempt. Gligorov's comeback to

 politics should confirm the ascertainment about the normal

functioning of the country during his absence. But, some

details appearing in the interviews, especially that of 

Premier Crvenkovski and Speaker Stojan Andov, speak of 

the further cracks in the League for Macedonia, in an open

conflict between the Social-Democratic League and the

Liberal Party, the strongest members of the rulingcoalition.

The premier, first of all, confirmed the rumors about this

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in a statement delivered by Radio Skopje by saying that the

coalition is open towards all, and that whoever wishes to

leave is welcome to do it, in order to become harsher 

about the Liberals' participation in the government, first in

"Vecer" and later in "Puls". An unsigned article in thesupplement "Liberal" published by "Nova Makedonija"

once a month, confirmed the conflict. Finally, in the last

issue of "Puls", the Minister of Interior Lubomir 

Frckovski published an article explaining why was he

 personally in favor of the Liberals' departure from the

coalition. In all of this, the attempt against Gligorov's life

and its background clearly play an important role, and it

is clear that they are expecting Gligorov to take sides. But,

let's go by order:

According to the premier, the League for Macedonia wonthe elections convincingly, and that it would have won

them anyway, even if some parties wouldn't have given up

on the second round, but, according to him, "this

convincing victory, in the lack of a strong parliamentarian

opposition as if created...a false feeling of security and

comfort which creates the atmosphere of "court games" in

the attempt of gaining some starting positions in some

future elections". Crvenkovski is explicit also in regard to

the roots of the conflict: "The approach the Liberals have

shown immediately after the elections is a precedent in the parliamentarian practice, in other words, it is hard to find

a similar example in which someone wishes to have

influence but at the same time wishes not to have any

responsibility. Four members of the Liberal Party function

in the Government, three of them lead exclusively

important sections, two of them being vice-chairmen of the

 party, but even despite this, the Liberal Party didn't vote

for the government and always repeated that it officially

didn't participate in the Government at the level of parties

 but participates in it at the level of personalities... We

 believe that this is another "children's illness" of theLiberals, but since this has been lasting over a year now,

it is about time for the Liberals to choose whether they

 become a serious member of the coalition and of the

League for Macedonia and respect all the rules coming

from it, or become a parliamentarian opposition".

Crvenkovski considers that the problem of the mutual

relations relies on "whether the Liberal Party will accept

the results of the democratically expressed will of the

citizens in a concrete relation of political forces, the political influence and strength, which can even be

quantified in numbers of MPs. This relation of political

forces, regardless of whether someone likes it or not, can

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simply change in the next elections, and not with any false

combinations or tactic manoeuvres".

The premier involves the attempt against Gligorov in this

conflict: "It was against all basic rules to legalize thecombinations about his possible replacement in new

 presidential elections, of the new political relations and

even the new parliamentarian elections, which would

create a new legislation and executive government. As the

recuperation of the president was becoming evident, thus

the "trumpets for retrieval" started playing. I must say that

it was interesting to follow from the distance the frequent

 presentations in a short period of time".

The Liberal Party's newspaper, "Liberal" published an

unsigned article called "Manipulators and Manipulations"in which it is once again insisted that there is nothing new

in the investigations on the attempt against Gligorov,

confirming that someone is purposely stopping the

investigations. It is known that the opponents of the

Liberals, as well as the Minister of Interior proper, linked

the famous economic-financial group to the companies led

 by directors who are Liberals. The newspaper says:

"Quicker than expected, the truth about the affair called

"Multigrup" will be uncovered. As if it were certain that

this affair will be proven to be an inflated balloon (a trueone this time), as a premeditated scenario to lead towards

the wrong clues. But then the question will arise whether 

the minister who ordered the investigations against

"Multigrup" did it because he had nothing else to offer,

and just because he wanted to save himself? Did he invent

the whole affair?

In an article published in "Puls", minister Frckovski

analyzes the Liberals as "a phenomenon", qualifying them

as a misproduct of Macedonia's transition towards

democracy. "The political scene, in fact, is richer will acharacteristic combination of the lack of political postures,

which are shown as the "position"; the lack of political

identification; active rhetoric which should definitively

cover the gap, the known result of the human material -

adequate to the mentioned "qualities", in one word, a

 phenomenon of the "empty space" in politics, which

 because of the circumstances, becomes part of the political

forces. According to Frckovski, the profile of the Liberals

is true, "really known"; the support of some orientations

of the Macedonian policy, but at the same time the profitable use of its "experts" in the government, and if 

 possible to withdraw, acting as opposition to the existing

government... The optimism of the leaders of the Liberal

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Party hoping that this will be easily swallowed by the

Macedonian electorate is really surprising. On the other 

hand, the hatred and the rude way in which the leaders of 

this party try to theorize about this political farce is really

annoying and offending". Frckovski mentions four reasonsfor this, or as he calls them "contamination points" which

should lead to the "interruption of any infectious

connections in the ruling coalition": the affirmation and the

expansion of the political "moral" which should serve for 

ruling, while the others hold the responsibility for it; this

 practice has infectious influence on the weak layer of the

Social-Democratic League of Macedonia, characteristic and

similar to the Liberals, which the Liberals unsuccessfully

count on; the political position of "the Liberals, in the

inter-ethnic relations, is maybe a reflex of the lack of fame

and playing VMROs' strong position in a situation of lack of consequences in the parliament, and finally, Liberals

don't have a "base"; the Liberals are the transmitters of 

the anonymous impulses of the "base", creating the image

of permanent tremors, the non-existence and the changes

in the lobbying directions. On the other hand, taking into

account the "base" of the Liberal Party, there is a serious

threat to identify a constant of "lobbying" in the direction

of the northern neighbor. This (if successful) would be

achieved with the so called "regionalization" of the

Republic of Macedonia, regardless of the rhetoricEuropeization".

Frckovski considers that the electoral bounds between the

Social-Democrats and the Liberals should be broken, first

of all, because of the basic sincerity of democratic

 procedure: if it is a political posture then we should go

towards a coalition with the PPD and the whole

responsibility should be taken because of this, for this

 posture is in no way similar to the need for a coalition

with the Liberal Party".

After all what has been said, keeping this make-up

coalition becomes unrealistic. The reason, the attempt

against Gligorov and the opposite opinions about the

investigations and the instigator, bring Gligorov before a

very delicate situation. It is clear that his young disciples

decided to sort out differences with the Liberals, at the

same time accusing the Liberals for being behind the plot.

The Liberals, nevertheless, insist on the responsibility of 

the Minister of Interior in the period during and after the

attempt, by increasing the pressure knowing thatFrckovski's eventual departure will weaken the position of 

the premier. It is again expected that the final word will

come from Gligorov, who wishes to preserve the League

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for Macedonia as it is. What is new is the impression that

the premier and his closest ministers are fighting this war 

with the Liberals even without Gligorov's support.

ECONOMY

EVERYTHING IS CORRUPT

 by IBRAHIM REXHEPI / Prishtina

The state, whatever the name of that in this territory called

Kosova, has always had the monopoly on tobacco. It still

keeps this right, with some small changes. The monopoly

is in the hands of the individuals, which are connected tothe statal organs of Serbia and Montenegro and who do the

 job for individual reasons. It is true that cigarettes of the

"extra" category enter Kosova through Peja. The

connection is in Montenegro. In order to do the business,

there are "reliable" people who have divided their territory

of action and who are mainly in engaged in the

governmental organs. The price is ten percent of the value

of the goods. All take their share, and there is enough for 

all, for the profit is huge. Any Albanian attorney to whom

you speak about corruption will mention a series of names,mainly Albanians, who do the job for a high price. This is

not a payment regulated by law, but it is a matter of 

individual agreements or even mediation. If the passport

was confiscated because of an Albanian seal-stamp, then

one should pay 1.000 or even 1.500 DEM, and get the

document back without any problems. The same thing

happens when the weapons are confiscated. The price

depends on the calibre. If the whole thing goes through

 judicial procedure, the money which was not given to the

 police will be given to the judge, who keeps a list of Serb

attorneys who can be engaged as "defending lawyers".

This makes the tariff ten times higher than the regular 

 price-list of the attorneys, and the sentence can be

eventually reduced. Instead of getting six months, one

could get three months, instead of the urgent procedure,

which implies imprisonment, defense in freedom is

allowed...

The corruption in the health-care institutions, i.e. the

occupied clinics of the

Faculty of Medicine in Prishtina has been "legalized". It

is only a matter of conscience how much will a specialist

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charge. This modus operandi is legal, i.e., it is known to

the persecution organs which don't react to it, because

corruption is not a rare phenomenon.

Officially, the public was informed about the corruption inthe state Clinics. This happened some days before New

Year, when Sukrija Hodza got arrested. He was stalling

the operation of a patient, because the latter didn't want to

 pay. After so many days, the patient finally gives up and

decides to pay, but not before he tells the police. The

moment this doctor took the money, appeared the inspector 

who checked the reported serial numbers of the banknotes

with the ones in the doctor's possession. He was arrested,

 but released quite soon.

If it weren't for the corruption, what happened in the Neuropsychiatric Clinic in Prishtina, could be seen as a

dangerous joke. The patient had nothing else to give the

doctor but a hand-grenade. The doctor took it and the

inspectors found him playing with it.

The mentioned cases only illustrate the fact known to

everyone, and no one wishes to testify about, that

corruption has spread all over the organization of the

Serbian state in Kosova. Knowing how all of these take

 place, it could be even said that it has become legal. Thereare differences in the prices and the techniques. For 

example, the courts have their "liaisons". The fact that a

 judge has the calling cards of the Serb attorneys tell you

that he is willing to take money. Some Albanian attorneys

even complain that they have nothing to do, because the

"ones more suitable for such arrangements are being

engaged". The truth is that Albanians are approaching the

Serbian attorneys without hesitation, especially those who

used to hold important posts in the past.

This type of work is also present in private business. Amember of the management of a large private enterprise in

Prishtina says that "our relations with the financial police

are OK. We have a man, he works and we pay him a price

defined previously". This is not new, because these people

have to be everywhere where the goods or the money

circulates, including producers, the road, customs,

inspections and financial police. According to the previous

statements of the Serbian businessmen, "international

observers played the game too", referring to the period of 

the sanctions.

Whose fault is it: of the one who gives the money or a

"token of appreciation", or the one who takes the money

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In the past, when the Albanians were holding power, there

had been corruption too, but in much smaller dimensions,

and all the activity was centered in the individual

enterprise and not the governmental organ.

The prices in private clinics can also be questioned, for it

is not ceratin whether they are realistically determined or 

following the doctor's wish. If it is the second, then this

too is a kind of corruption, for the patient pays as much as

asked. It is understandable why this money doesn't

circulate through the giro accounts, but it is not

understandable to hear the doctors say: "Go to the Serbian

clinics - the charge less".

An anecdote of a Serbian surgeon could serve as a joke:

"We are bigger patriots than the Albanian private doctorsto the Albanians. For a surgical intervention I charge 100

DEM, while the Albanians charge five times more".