Körner Musik

8/10/2019 Krner Musik

1/34

"On the Representation of Character in Music": Christian Gottfried Krner's Aesthetics ofInstrumental MusicAuthor(s): Robert RiggsSource: The Musical Quarterly, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Winter, 1997), pp. 599-631Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/742287.Accessed: 02/08/2011 13:38

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2/34

Primary

Sources

O n t h

epresentation

Character n

M u s i c :

Christian

Gottfried

K o r n e r ' s

esthetics

o

nstrumental u s i c

Robert

Riggs

The formulation

of a

definitive,

historically

based aesthetic

theory

of

Viennese

Classical

instrumentalmusic has

proven

to be an elusive

topic.

Perhaps

he most

obvious

problem

s the

transitionalstate of

aesthetic

attitudesin the

late-eighteenth

century;

ransitional,

hat

is,

between

the more

fully

developed

and established

Baroque

and

Romantic

poles

at

either end. The most

dramatic

aspect

of this transitionwas the

gradual

shift andeventual inversionin the evaluation of instrumentalmusic.

Baroque

aesthetics

denigrated

nstrumental

music,

especially

the new

stylegalant,

because of its obscureand

indeterminate

content;

but

Romantic

aesthetics

(already

n

the

1790s)

glorified

nstrumentalmusic

precisely

because of

its lack of

specificity

or definite

associations.1

In this

article,

I

propose

that Christian

Gottfried Karner

offersa

viable

approach

o

establishing

a

historically

basedaestheticof

Viennese

instrumentalmusic.In his

writings

on

aesthetics,

which have been

noted frequently n Germanscholarshipbut only rarely n Englishstud-

ies,

K6rner

attempted

to

integrate

music into the

broad

philosophical

and

aesthetic issuesraised

by

his

contemporaries,

Kant and

Schiller.2

He

was the firstto

attempt

this,

and

although

only

partially

successful,

his

effort commands

due

respect.

Like

Mozart,

Korner

was

born in

1756,

but he lived

until

1831. He

studied

philosophy

and law

at the

university

n

Leipzig,

his

hometown.

After

receiving

a

doctorate and

making

an extended tour of

Europe,

he

began

a

long

and

successful

egal

careerwith

city

administrations: irst n

Leipzigandthen, from 1785, in Dresden. He remained n Dresdenfor

thirty

years,

until

1815,

when

he was

forced to

move

to

Berlin

because

of

his

position

in favor of

Prussia n

regard

o the

restructuring

f

Germany

after the defeat of

Napoleon.3

Kmrner's

assion,

however,

was

philosophy

and

the

arts-literary,

pictorial,

and

musical-and he

eventually

developed

close

friendships

599


3/34

600 TheMusical

Quarterly

with

many leading figures

n these fields.The most intense of these

rela-

tionshipswas with FriedrichSchiller (1759-1805). Schiller had scored

an

early

success

and

attractedconsiderableattention with several

plays,

most

notably

Die Riuber

(premiere,

1782),

but after several

difficult

years

he foundhimself without a

steady

position

or income. Kornerand

his

fianc6e,

as

admiring

readers,

xchanged

letters

with

Schiller and

tactfully

invited

him

to live

with

them. In

1785,

Schillermoved to Dres-

den and became their

houseguest

or

nearly

two

years,during

which

time he

completed

Don Carlos

and

wrote

"An die Freude."

Although

Schillermoved to Weimar n 1787, fourlargevolumesof correspon-

dence attest

to his continued

intimate

relationship

with Kornerand to

their fertile

exchange

of

ideas.4

Schiller valued

Korneras a

perceptive

critic and

always

submitted

new worksto him before

publication.5

The Kornerhousehold

in

Dresden,

both

during

and

after Schiller's

stay,

became

a

literary

and musicalsalon.

Plays

and

essays

were

read;

Singspiele

nd

chamber

music were

performed;

nd lectureson art were

given.

Guests and

participants

ncluded

Johann

Gottfriedvon

Herder,

Goethe,

Wilhelm von

Humboldt,

the

Schlegel

brothers,

Ludwig

Tieck,

Novalis,

and the musicians

Johann

Naumann,

Johann

Hiller,

KarlZel-

ter,

Mozart,6

nd

Weber.7

While

admittedlyonly

an

amateur,

Korner

sang,

and

played

the

piano

and

lute,

in the best GermanHausmusik ra-

dition.

Perhaps

more

significant

or

my argument

s his demonstrated

knowledge

of

composition.

He

prepared although

never

published)

an

essay

on

music

theory

for his

wife,

and he also

composed

some

thirty

songs

andchoral

works-including,

incidentally,

he first

setting

of "An

die

Freude."These

compositions

exhibit solid

workmanship

and are

styl-

isticallyclose to the Berlinsongtraditionof JohannReichardtand Zel-

ter.8Thus Korner

was

considerably

more

knowledgeable

about music

than

his

literary

riends,

someof whom

also

wrote

about musical aesthet-

ics but

without the

prerequisite

musical

expertise.

This

solid

grounding

in both

philosophy

and music

(rarely

ound in the same

individual n

any

century)

makes Korner

a valuable

and

authoritative

contemporary

witness.

Korner's

major

contribution

is an

essay

entitled

"Ujber

Charakter-

darstellung n der Musik" "Onthe Representationof Character n

Music"),

which was

published

n Schiller's

ournal

Die

Horen

n

1795.9

(My

translation

of Korner's

ssay

is

provided

as an

appendix

to this arti-

cle and should be

read

in

conjunction

with

it. This is the first

publica-

tion of

a

complete

English

version.

Page

references

after

quotations

in

the article refer

to this

translation.)

Unfortunately,

he

logic

of Korner's

argument

s not

always

apparent;

he seems

to assume

that the reader

s


4/34

KIrner's

esthetics

f

Instrumentalusic

601

already

conversant with the central

issuesand

terminology

of his

essay.

Its fundamentalphilosophicalcontext is not difficultto find. In 1790,

ImmanuelKant had

published

the

Critique

f

Judgement,

n

which

ele-

ments from his two

previousCritiques

were

fusedinto a

sophisticated

and

widely

influential

theory

of

aesthetics.10

Korner,

who was

already

amil-

iar

with Kant's

earlier

writings, immediately

read

the newest

Critique

nd

was active in

sparking

Schiller's nterestin

Kant.

Another factorin

Schiller's

orientation toward

Kantwas his

appointment,

in

1790,

as

pro-

fessorof

history

at

Jena,

which

was a

stronghold

of Kantian

thought.

Schiller read the thirdCritiquen 1791, and the followingyearhe began

a

serious

study

of all three

Critiques,

determinedto

master

them,

even,

as

he wrote to

Korner

(1

January

1792),

if it should take

three

years.

Schiller

emphaticallyproclaimed

his enthusiasm

or Kant's

critical

phi-

losophy

(with

its

emphasis

on

self-determinationand

freedom

in

ethics):

"Certainly

no

greater

words

wereever

spoken by

mortal man than

these

of Kantwhich

represent

at

once the essenceof

his entire

philosophy:

'Determine

yourself

romwithin.'

"11

Schiller

became

preoccupied

with the

incorporation

of

Kantian

views into his own writingson aesthetics,and

during

this

period

he

pro-

duced On

the

Art

ofTragedy

Ober

die

tragische

Kunst],1792;

the Kallias

Letters

Kallias

der

iber

die

Schdnheit],

793;12

On

Graceand

Dignity

[Ober

Anmut

und

Wiirde],

1793;

Of

the

Sublime

Vom

Erhabenen],

793;

On

Tragic

Pity

[UOber

as

Pathetische],

793;

and

the

Letters n the

Aesthetic

Education

f

Man

[UOber

ie

isthetische

rziehung

es

Menschen

n einer

Reihe

von

Briefen],

794.13

K6rner

had served as a

sounding

boardand

critic for

Schiller's

thoughts

during

the

gestation

of

these

works,

and his

own "Onthe Representationof Character n Music" rom1794was

writtenunder

their

immediate

influence. Thus

Kirner's

"dialogue"

with

Schiller,

against

the

background

of

Kant,

forms

the

essential

philosophi-

cal context

for

understanding

his

essay.14

I

propose

that Korner

wrote this

essay

in

orderto

defend

music

against

the

reservations hat

both

Kant and

Schiller held about

its merit

as an art form.

Kant was

concernedwith broad

ssuessuch as

the nature

of

beauty

and

the

sublime,

as

well as the

logical

relationship

andstatus

of

the various

arts. For

reasonsdiscussed

below,Kantassignedmusic(at

least

instrumental

music)

the lowest

position

in

the

hierarchy

of the

arts.

Thus

K6rner's

oal

was to

counter

Kant's

negative

evaluations;

more-

over,

as will be

shown,

he

accomplished

this

by

a

subtle and

logically

valid

application

of Kant's

own

prescription

or

artistic

value.

Although

Schiller did not

accept

all of

Kant's

precepts

(the

universal

supremacy

f

the

moral

law,

for

example),

he too

was

skeptical

about the

value of

music,

because

he

mistrusted

ts sensuous

appeal

and

because,

like

Kant,


5/34

602 The

Musical

Quarterly

he viewed music as

something

that

disappears

n

time,

and

thus,

on

accountof its transitorynature,as aestheticallydefective. It will become

apparent

hat Karner s also

utilizing

and

adaptingkey

aspects

of

Schiller's

philosophy

to secure a more

respectedposition

for

music

within the latter's

aesthetics.

Karner

begins

by

rejecting

musicthat is

merely

"pleasurable,"y

which he

meansmusic that

only

seeks to entertain and

thus is

depen-

dent

on

an audience

and its tastesandfashions.

Rather,

f

the

composer

wants to enter the realm of beauty,he mustcreateautonomousworks

that are

free from

external control.15

To

develop

his

theory

of

beauty,

Korner

dispatches

the

outdated,

but still

frequently

cited,

concept

of art

as

imitation,

either of

nature,

language,

or

affects.16

He

justifies

his

rejection by evoking

the

familiar

eighteenth-century

maxim

concerning

the demand for both

variety

and

unity

in

any

work of

art.

Korner,

how-

ever,

employs

new

analogies

to

express

the function

and

relationship

of

these two

qualities.

For

him,

the

primary equirement

of a work

of

art is

that it

distinguish

tself

as a human

creation,

ratherthan

the

product

of

chance,

through

its

order,

hat

is,

unity. Variety,

while

desirable,

s

only

effective

if

displayed

against

the

background

f an

overridingunity.

Korner

displays

his

modern,

post-Baroque

understanding

f

psychology

by emphasizing

hat

affects

(or

passions)

are

highly

transientconditions.

Thus,

while

music

can

and does stimulate

them,

they

must be

equated

with the element of

variety,

which indeed is a

highly prominent

feature

of the Classical

style.

It

follows, however,

that

if music

only

represents

a

series of

passionate

states,

the

result

will be too much

variety

and even

chaos. In K6rner's aradigm, he essentialunity is suppliedbyexpanding

the

analogy.

If the transient

passions

are

equated

with

variety,

hen

human

character,

which

ideally

is

constant in

spite

of

affective

swings,

must

represent

unity.

The artist's

principal

concern, therefore,

should be

the

representation,

not of

affect,

but

of

character.

Korner's ivision of

art

into two

categories-the pleasurable

and

the beautiful-is

taken

directly

from Kant. Korner

agrees

hat,

in order

to be

beautiful,

art

must

represent

an

object

and not

merely

be

pleasur-

able to the subject. Accordingto Kant,the passions,because of their

subjective

essence,

do

not have an existence

independent

from

a

person

that is

adequate

to an idea.

Hence,

they

cannot serve as

objects

of

repre-

sentation,

nor can

they

be idealized.Kant

clearly recognizes

music's

power

to move

the

emotions,

but he

rejects

this

capacity

as a sourceof

beauty,

because aesthetic art must take its standardsnot

from

the emo-

tions of the

senses,

but fromthe reflective

power

of

judgment.

He states

that music

"speaks

by

meansof mere sensations

without

concepts,

and

so


6/34

Kdrner's

esthetics

f

Instrumentalusic603

does

not,

like

poetry,

eave behind it

any

food for

reflection,

still it

moves the mind morediversely,and, althoughwith transient,still with

intenser

effect. It is

certainly,

however,

more

a

matter of

enjoyment

than

of

culture-the

play

of

thought incidentally

excited

by

it

being merely

the effect of

a

more

or less mechanical association-and it

possesses

ess

worth

in

the

eyes

of reason than

any

other of the fine arts."17

imply

stated,

Kantfindsinstrumentalmusic

pleasurable

and

entertaining,

but

he

is

put

off

by

its indeterminatecontent. It

does not

engender

suffi-

ciently

precise

ideas.18

Komer,aswe have seen, also accordsmusic full affectivepowers,

but unlike

Kant,

he

discovers

a much

broader

parameter

and

purpose

within which

this

affective

varietyoperates.

Nevertheless,

K6rner's

sso-

ciation

of

character

with

musical

unity

was

probablypromptedby

Kant's

insistence

that the ideal of the beautifulcan

only

be

sought

in

the

human

form,

in which case the ideal

consists

in

the

expression

of the

moral ideas that

govern

men

inwardly,

hat

is,

their

character.19 his

concept originated

n

Pythagorean

and Platonic

aesthetics,

in which it

was

argued

hat the beautiful s

a

symbol

of

human

character,

andmore

specifically,

hat music is an embodiment of ethical character.20Korner

thus

capitalizes

on

the central

position

of man

in

this schema. The

asso-

ciation of emotions

(whether

Baroque,

tatic and

specific,

or

Romantic,

fluctuating

and

vague)

with music was never called into

question

in

the

eighteenth

century.Why

not associatehumancharacterwith music as

well? The

concept

of characterwas

perfectly

suited to serve as the

object

of

representation

i.e.,

the aesthetic

idea)

that

Kant

required

but didnot

find in

instrumentalmusic.

While the analogybetween affectandvariety,and between character

and

unity

is

readilyapparent,

other

aspects

of

K6mer's

heses are less

accessible.

For

example,

he asserts

hat

the artist

should

not

copy

the real

world,

but should

"complete

hat which we fail to see in the

reality

of an

individual

phenomenon;

he

should dealize is

material..,.

and

intuitively

represent

he infinite.

.

...

In

human naturethere is

nothing

infinite

except

freedom.

The

power,

which asserts ts

independence

rom all

influenceof

the exteriorworldand

against

all inner stormsof

passion,

exceeds

every

known dimension.It is this freedom hat is madesensibleto us through

the

representation

f

character"

613-4).

For

Kant,

freedom s

the

ability

to be

governed

by

reason.This

ability

is also

called the

autonomy

of the

will and is contrastedwith the

heteronomy

of the

agent

whose will is

sub-

ject

to externalcausessuch as

desire,emotion,

or

interest.Freedomand

autonomy

arethus

key

concepts

at

the

very

foundation

of Kant'smeta-

physics

and

ethics. The first

ormulationof the

categorical mperative,

or

example,

can

be

restatedas

"the constrainton our

freedom s

that

we

must


7/34

604

TheMusical

Quarterly

respect

he freedomof

all."21

he transfer

f

freedom romethics to

aes-

thetics is explicit in Kant'sprescriptionhat "the fine artsmust be brought

into combinationwith

moral

deas,

which

alone are attendedwith

a

self-

sufficingdelight,"22

nd that

"the

beautiful s

the

symbol

of

the

morally

good."23

or

Kant,

freedom s an essential

aspect

of

man'smoral

ife,

that

is,

of his inner character.

Therefore,

he

representation

f characterand

freedom

are

logically

and

intimately

bound

together.

The

specific

associationof freedomwith

beauty

s the centraltheme

of

Schiller's

KalliasLetters.Unlike

Kant,

who

held that

judgment

of what

is beautiful s ultimately ubjective,Schiller was convinced that there are

objective

laws,

and he

attempted

o

prove

an

a

priori

heory

that "freedom

in

appearance

s

the same

as

beauty."24

e understood

"free"

n

the

Kant-

ian senseof

disinterested,

not influenced

by

external

causes,or,

to use his

term,

"self-determined."e faced

a

major

difficulty,

owever,

n

meeting

Kmrner's

hallenge

to find

an

objectiveproperty

hat could be located and

could ensurethat freedom

n

appearance

wasindeed

present.

In On Grace

and

Dignity

he

proposed

hat "movement"

might

be this

objective

property.25

e

argued

hat movementis an

indispensable roperty

f

free-

dom in

appearance,

ecause t is this

quality

hat

prevents

t from

being

lifelessor machinelike.

Presumably,

chiller

ultimatelydropped

his

approach,

becausemovement

is

actuallybeing

usedas a

metaphor

and

thus cannot be identified

n

such

a

positive

manner.For

example,

one

must

ask:which movements

are

truly

ree and thus result romthe inner

determinationof the

object?

This

question

renews he

search or addi-

tional

criteria,

which means that the thesis

has not

been

proven.

More-

over,

Schiller needed

an a

prioriargument

hatdid not

appeal

o

experi-

ence. The conceptof movementdoes not satisfy hiscondition.It simply

cannot be

proven

fromfirst

principles

hat

beauty

resides n movement.26

Nevertheless,

Kornmer

xploits

the

concept

of movement

in

his

attempt

to demonstrate

hat there is a musical

analogue

to

freedom,

and

thus that character

representation

n

music is

possible.

Korner

explains

that

"through

elf-awareness,

we

distinguish

n ourselvesbetween

depen-

dence

on,

or

independence

rom,

the external

world. What is

independent

within us we call

ability.

This

is

expressedpartially hrough receptivity,

by interpretingwhat is specificin the externalworld,andpartially

through

activity, by determining

the

given

material

n the external

world

according

to one's own will.

Through

this

becoming specific

and

this

determining

we

experience

that

relationship

with the external

world which is called

our condition"

(618).

He then

explains

that life

is

nothing

more

than a seriesof such

conditions,

and that since the extent

and limitations

of ouractive and

passive

interactionsarenot a matter

of


8/34

Karner's

esthetics

f

Instrumentalusic

605

indifference,

their

perception

is

accompaniedby

affective

responses.

In

orderto perceivesuch symptomsof a condition in others we require

outer

signs,

and

we findsuch

outer

signs

in

movement.

Komer

then

devotes

considerableattention to

the role of

move-

ment in the arts.

The

significance

of

movement

in

dance and

theater is

obvious becausethe

nature and

goals

of motion in

the

"body

anguage"

of

these arts is crucial to

our

understanding

nd

interpretation

of them.

He then

suggests

hat in

sculpture

and

painting,

"the

position

of the

movable

body

parts

becomes

indicative of a

condition,

only

if it

reveals

the trace of a

previous

movement"

(619).

And

he

claimsthat

our

speech

contains

movement-melodic

movement that is

determined

by

our own

activity

and

is thus an

expression

of ourfreedom.

This

claim

leads

Kmrner

o the

assertionthat

musical

movement

alsocontains

signs

that

are indicative of

condition.

His

explanation

amounts to a

theory

of iso-

morphic

relationships

between

musical

motion

(rhythmic,

melodic,

and

harmonic)

and

physical

motion.

(He

assumes

hat

physical

motion is a

mirrorof

internal

condition.)

Major

considerations

nclude the

degree

of

activity

and

passivity,

as well as

the tension and

release

inherent in

the

goal orientation of the tonal system.The mimeticaspectsof this

approach

are

clearly

reminiscent of

Baroque

aesthetics.

Karner

counters

the

objection

that these

musical

gestures

cannot

be

interpreted

with

sufficient

precision

by

invoking

the Kantian

doctrine

of

free

play.

According

to

Kant,

the

object

should not be

represented

with too much

detail or

distinctness

because

this

would leave

nothing

for

the

imagination

to

complete.

Moreover,

during

the

aesthetic

experi-

ence,

the

imagination

must

be

active ratherthan

passive,

because it is

this active contemplation(or freeplay) that makes it possibleforart to

bridge

the

gap

between the

faculties of

understanding

and

reason.

Kant

and,

following

him,

Schiller

subscribed o

the

widely

accepted

eighteenth-century

principle

of

dividing

human

cognition

into

the "fac-

ulties"of

understanding

and

reason.

The a

priori

aws of

natureare

sup-

plied by

understanding,

and

they

in

turn make

knowledge

of the

empiri-

cal world

possible.

Reason,

on

the other

hand,

is

concerned

with

desire

and

the freedomof

the

moral

agent.

Kant

argues

hat there is a

"super-

sensible

substrate" ehind

both

realmsand that

this

substrate

can be

uncovered

by

input

from a

third

faculty:

udgment.

Judgment

s

con-

cemrned

ith

the

feeling

of

pleasure

or

displeasure,

andwhen

aesthetic

judgment

is

informed

by

taste it can

mediate

between

understanding

and

reason,

as

well as

provide

insight

into

the realmof

the

supersensible.27

(Figure

1

provides

a

visual

aid to

this

proposedsynthesis.)28

In

orderto

describe

his

view of

basic human

tendencies,

Schiller

coined

three terms

that

roughlycorrespond

o

Kant's hree

faculties:


9/34

606 TheMusical

Quarterly

judgment

Spieltrieb

lebende

Gestalt

understandingeason Stofftrieb Formtrieb Leben Gestalt

understanding reason Stofftrieb Formtrieb Leben

G~estalt

Figure

Stofftrieb,

ormtrieb,

nd

Spieltrieb

see

Fig.

1).

The

Stofftrieb

s the

desire

to assimilateand

experience

the world of

senses;

the Formtrieb

s

the

urge

to

mentally

"form"

xperience

and

hence to

subject

the worldto

moral law. The

Spieltrieb,

r

urge

for

free aesthetic

activity,

functions as a

bridge

or mediatorbetween the firsttwo.29 n

explaining

the

objects

of

these

"drives,"

chiller extends the

analogy

to aesthetics.

The

object

of

the

Stofftrieb

s life

(Leben):

"a

concept designating

all material

being

and

all that is

immediatelypresent

to

the

senses";

he

object

of

the Formtrieb

is

form

(Gestalt):

"a

concept

which includes all the formal

qualities

of

things

and all the relationsof these to our

thinking

faculties";

nd the

objectof the Spieltriebs living form(lebendeGestalt):"aconcept serving

to

designate

all the aesthetic

qualities

of

phenomena

and,

in a

word,

what in the widest senseof the term we call

beauty."30

While Kanthad

not

employed

he term

"character,"

t

plays

a

very

prominent

ole

in

Schiller's

mpassioned lea

for the

necessity

of

bridging

the

gap

betweenthe facultiesand Triebe. n

yet

anothervariationon the tri-

partite

divisionof human

nature,

Schiller

postulates

hat thereare two

basic

components:

he

physical

natural)

haracter

nd

the moralcharacter

see

Fig.2). The physical sempirical rsense-oriented,s often selfishand vio-

lent,

and can

be

a

danger

o

society.

The moral srationaland

free,

but at

the sametime

only

latentand

underdeveloped

ecauseof the dominanceof

the

physical.

Schiller's

oal

is

to

promote

he

development

of

a

thirdcharac-

ter:

he

aesthetic.

By serving

asa stimulusor the active free

play

of the

imagination Spieltrieb),

rtcan

promote

he

genesis

and

development

of

aesthetic

character.At the same

time, however,

t

is

artand aestheticchar-

acter hat

both

synthesize

he

physical

and the

moral,

as

well

as

liberate,

ul-

tivate,

and

make

possible

he ultimate

riumph

f the moral.31

herefore,

artistic

activity

(either

active

creationor

passiveenjoyment)

reesusfrom

both the dictatesof natural awsand reason

even

Kant's

ategorical mpera-

tive)

and

allowsus to

become

fully

human.

Art thus

assumes

civilizing

ole

becauseof its

power

o coordinate he faculties.These theoriesaresome-

times referred

o as Schiller's esthetic

utopianism,

ecause

hey

culminate

in

his assertion hat

through

aestheticeducation

we

can

develop

the

powers

of

intellect

and

reason

hat are

prerequisites

or

political

order.32


10/34

Korner's

esthetics

f

Instrumentalusic

607

aesthetic

character

art

(stimulates

Spieltrieb)

physical

character

moral

character

(empirical,

sense

oriented) (rational,free)

Figure

Schiller's use of the

term

"character" must

certainly

have been

another factor

in Kdrner's

postulation

of this

concept

as the

object

of

musical

representation.33

But

which of Schiller's three

characters did

K6rner

intend? Schiller

emphasized

the element of freedom and

thus the

association

with

moral character. It

is

obvious,

however,

that

K6mer,

in

pleading

music's

capability

for

character

representation,

is

also

including

the physical and the aesthetic. For K6rner it is a given that music has a

strong empirical component;

he does not

doubt

that it can

stimulate the

senses.

His

goal

is to

counter

Schiller

by

proving

that the

power

and

value

of

music extends

beyond

the

sensual.

He

attempts

to

demonstrate

that music's

rational

content

is

sufficiently

determinate

to

permit

and

activate

the free

play

of the

subject's

imagination,

which,

in

turn,

leads

to the

development

of

aesthetic

character.

In the fourth letter from On the Aesthetic

Education

of

Man,

Schiller

states:

The manof Culture makes a friendof

Nature,

and

honours her freedom

whilst

curbing

only

her

caprice. Consequently,

whenever

Reason

startsto

introduce the

unity

of moral law into

any

actually existing

society,

she must

bewareof

damaging

he

variety

of Nature. And whenever

Nature

endeav-

ours

to

maintain

her

variety

within the moral framework f

society,

moral

unity

must

not

suffer

any infringement hereby.

Removed alike from unifor-

mity

and from

confusion,

there

abides

the

triumph

of form.

Wholeness of

charactermust thereforebe

present

in

anypeople

capable,

and

worthy,

of

exchanginga State of compulsionfora State of freedom.34

Wholeness of character is

only

possible

if all three

components-moral,

physical,

and aesthetic-are

present.

Karner

implies

that

music embod-

ies,

and can

stimulate

the

development

of,

wholeness of

character.

Moreover,

he believes that it is a

viable artistic medium

(and

symbol)

for

Schiller's

paradigm

of

the individual

psyche

and,

by

extension,

of

human


11/34

608 TheMusical

Quarterly

society.

Music,

therefore,

s

fully

capable

of

contributing

o man'saes-

thetic education. (Figure3 providesa compendiumof the manypairsof

dialectical terms that have been discussedand

illustrates he

mediating

role

of free

play,

or

Spieltrieb.)

The

large

central

portion

of Kdrner's

ssay

(summarized bove)

is

devoted

to

the deductive

proof

that character

representation

n musicis

possible,

because,

via

movement,

music

can

illustrate

a

series of affective

conditions,

which in turn

symbolize

reedom.Kdrner's

ogic

is

problem-

atic,

however:

given

that the

composer

can

only

illustratea successionof

affects,how can the listenerdiscover the commonor constantelement,

the character?35

orner

eems

to realize

that,

in

spite

of

his involved

exegesis,

he has not

sufficientlyproven

his

point,

becausehe admits that

"thatwhich we call character

cannot be

perceiveddirectly

either

in

the

realworld or in

any

work

of

art.

Rather,

we

can

only

deduce

it

from

that

which is contained in the featuresof individualconditions.

It

must be

asked

then,

whether,

in the series of conditions

that

music

represents,

sufficientmaterial

s

present

to form

a

definite

presentation

of a

charac-

ter?"

621).

This launcheshim into the

final

section of the

essay

and

into a renewed

attempt

to substantiatemusic's

capacity

for character

representation.

He

again

takes

up

the

issue

of movement and investi-

gates

whether

definite

goals,

or

types,

of

musical movement

can be

per-

ceived.

He concludes that

only types

of "movement" an be

identified,

and

(with

a

quick

terminologicalsleight

of

hand)

he

declares

that all

"drives" an

be

divided into two classes:active or

passive,

which he fur-

ther

equates

with

masculine

and feminine ideals. "Neither

of these two

opposing

categories

of drives

completely

loses its effectiveness as

long

as

life itselfcontinues,but they restricteach other,and at one momentthe

active

drive

dominates,

while at anotherthe

passive

drive dominates. If

a

specific

and

permanent

relationship

between the

two is

perceived,

then this

pertains

to

the character's

eatures,

and hence to the masculine

and

feminine

deal,

and the

infinite

variety

of

shading

between them"

(622).

There

is,

therefore,

a

break

n

sequence

between the main

body

of

Korner's

rgument

which

is based on

perceiving

signs

of

condition)

and

the

concludingsegment(which

focuses on the masculine-femininedual-

ity).

The outdated

overtones of

this

approach

need not cause

any

embar-

rassment;

a

strong

belief in distinctions between

masculine

and

feminine

traitswas

fundamental o much

eighteenth-century

hought

and scholar-

ship.36

Nevertheless,

Kdrner's

xplication

of how this

duality

can

aid in

character

representation

s not

convincing.

It

is

clearly

a weak

point

in

the

essay,

because,

even

if he had been ableto demonstrate

he

necessary

connections

(which

he was

not),

the

metaphorical

use

of the terms


12/34

Kbrner's

esthetics

f

Instrumental

usic

609

aestheticworkof art

lebendeGestalt

=

character

epresentation

variety

unity

affect

(artist)

I + (audience) character

pathos

ethos

transient free

play

constant

Stoff

Spieltrieb

Form

Leben

Gestalt

sensual

moral

empirical rational

necessity

freedom

aesthetic haracter

wholenessof character

Figure

.

Compendium

f dialecticalerms

"masculine" nd "feminine" eparates he theoryof characterrepresenta-

tion from its

classical,

humanistic foundation.37

Although

most of

his

essay

is

kept

on an

abstract,

philosophical

plane, Komer

does devote some attention to the

relationship

between

actual musical

techniques

and character

representation.

Unfortunately,

this section also

exhibits several weaknesses: t is too

brief,

there

are

no

concrete

examples,

and certain

terms

(e.g.,

Klang,

Schall,

Harmonie)

are

not

clearly

defined

or

usedwith a

systematic

precision

that

would allow a

positive contextual inferenceof theirmeaning.Nevertheless,Karner

does

provide

some

explanation

of how

timbre,

rhythm

(meter),

melody,

and

harmony

(counterpoint)

contribute

to

the

goal

of

character

repre-

sentation.

In

regard

o

timbre,

K6mer

equates

the differenceon

the contin-

uum

between

"rough

and soft"with the

masculine-feminine

duality

and

thus

links

it to this

aspect

of character.

Rhythm

is

viewed as

the

main

sourceof

unity

(character).

He refers

o

"regularity

n the

change

of

note

values"

but it

is not clear

whether he means

a

dominating

rhythmic

con-

figuration,

or

(as

his

example

of two

strophes

rom

poemsby

Klopstock

would

suggest)

the

recurring

metric

pattern

of

stressedand

unstressed

beats;

perhaps

he

intends both

aspects.38Melody

is

primarily

esponsible

for

variety (pathos),

although

if

it observes

certain

limitationsin its

range

and

regularity

n its

progression,

t

can

also

contributeto the

ethos. Korner inds

that in Harmonie"the

combination

of

simultaneously

sounding

parts

makes t

possible

to

distribute he

melody

and

rhythm


13/34

610 The

Musical

Quarterly

among

these

parts.

Passionand

character,

ach differentiated

by

various

movements,can be illustratedwith more life anddefinition without dis-

turbing

the balancebetween

them,

which is

necessary

orthe most com-

plete

effect of the whole"

(624).

Perhaps

he is

referring

o a

homophonic

texture

in which the

melody

communicates he transientaffect while

simultaneously

he

accompaniment,

with its

regular hythmic

move-

ment,

transmits he constant character.39 ut the final sentence of the

essaysuggests

hat

K6mer's

use of the term Harmonie efers nstead to

true

contrapuntalcomplexity:

"Tothis extent and

degree,

there exists

perhapsno otherrepresentation n music for the sublimen character."

This last-momentmention

of

the sublime

is

his bow

to

the familiar

eigh-

teenth-century

distinction

between the beautifuland the

sublime.

Only

the beautiful

had been under consideration

up

to this

point,

but

K6orner

obviously

wanted,

with this final

salvo,

to

insist on music's

capacity

for

the sublimeas well.40

How does

Korner's

oncept

of characterrelate to the musical

prac-

tice of his

contemporaries?

he

term "character"

lays

a

prominent

role

in discussionsof musical content and

expression

by many

theoristswho

propose

the existence

of basic

verbally

dentifiablecharacters.

They

fre-

quently

reduce the affective

spectrum

o a four-fold

division,

forexam-

ple:

love, sadness,

oy,

and

anger.

Such

systems

of four basic

categories

of

character

are

proposed

by

Caspar

Reutz,

Karl

Junker,

Michel-Paul-Guy

de

Chabanon,

Johann

Hiller,

et

al.41

However,

they

are

using

"charac-

ter" o referto a

grouping

of related

affects,

which,

in

principle,

is

an

awkward

ompromise

between the

specificity

of

Baroque

affect

theory

and the Romantic view that musicalcontent cannot be translated nto

language.

"Character"

s

also

prominent

in the

pedagogical

and

perfor-

mance literature.

Daniel

Tiurk

nd

Carl

Czerny,

or

example, emphasize

the

necessity

of

perceiving

a work's ntended

character,

and then select-

ing

nuances

of

tempo,dynamics,

and

articulation o

heighten

and com-

municate

it.42

But

it

is also clear

that affect

or

expression

s the overrid-

ing

concern in their

understanding

f the term.

Although

the

composers

hemselveswere

generally

reluctantto dis-

cussthe content or meaningof their instrumentalmusic,there are sev-

eral

well-known occasionswhen

they employed

the term"character."

According

to

G.

A.

Griesinger,

Haydn

said "that

he oftentimes

had

por-

trayed

moralcharacters

n his

symphonies."43

nfortunately,Haydn

was

not

willing

to

provide

either

Griesinger

or A. C. Dies with sufficient

details for us

to determinehow he

might

have understood

his

process.

While it is

tempting

to

suggest

that he

might

have used

"character"

n

Korner's

ense,

we must

remember

hat Kantian ideas

enjoyed

a wide-


14/34

Kbrner'sesthetics

f

Instrumentalusic

611

spreadpopularity

n the

1790s.44

Haydnmay

simply

have been

ensuring

the value of his symphonies n the face of Kant'schallenge that worksof

art mustbe

brought

nto

conjunction

with moralideas

if

they

areto be

considered

beautiful.45

Beethoven,

in a letter

of

1817,

announced his intention

to abandon

the traditionalItalian

tempo

indications

because

of their

imprecision

and

to

adopt

Malzel's

metronomenumbers.He

added, however,

that

"the words

describing

he character

Karakter]

f a

composition

are a dif-

ferent matter.We cannot

give

these

up.

Indeed the

tempo

is

more like

the body,but these certainlyreferto the spiritof a composition."46

Beethoven

presumably

ad in mind

expressions

uch as

neue

Kraft

uih-

lend,

mit

innigster

Empfindung,

nd

beklemmt

from

the

String

Quartets

Op.

130 and

Op.

132),

which he

began using

with

greater requency

n

his

late

works.These

highly

evocative and

innovative

expressions

reveal

that

Beethoven's

conception

of characterwas

affect-oriented.In

general,

however,

it

must be remembered hat Beethoven also avoided

discussing

the content

or

meaning

of his instrumentalworks.

Thus,

many

theorists and

performers, erhaps

under the

pedagogi-

cal constraint of

providingpractical

hands-onadvice forstudents,subdi-

vide and translatetheir

concept

of

character nto more or

less

specific

categories

of

affect. The

composers,

on

the other

hand,

were

obviously

reticent about

translating

he content

of

their works.

This reticence

aligns

them with a crucial

aspect

of Korner's esthetics.

K6mer

never

discusses

different

haractersor

specifies

how the

characterof one work

might

distinguish

t from that of another. His use of the term

remains

abstract,

and indeed

it

must,

because he defines

it

as an

idealizationof

inner humanqualities. Although he does not explicitlystate

it,

Karner

must have been

building

on the

dichotomy

that Kant

establishes

between

phenomena

and

noumena.Phenomena are

real

empirical

objects.

Noumena are

transcendent

objects,

that

is,

they

arenot

perceiv-

able and do not

belong

to the world of

space,

time,

and

causality.

Only

noumena can be idealized.Art

creates a link or

bridge

between the

phe-

nomenal and noumenal

by

meansof "aesthetic

deas,"

which Kant

defines as

"that

representation

of the

imagination

which

induces much

thought,yet

without

the

possibility

of

any

definite

thoughtwhatever,

i.e.,

concept, being adequate

to

it,

and

which

language,

consequently,

can never

get quite

on level terms

with

or

render

completely

intelligi-

ble."47For

Korner,

character

representation

s an

aesthetic idea.

Korner's

chievement

consists in his

application

and subtlemodifi-

cation

of

Kant'sand

Schiller'saesthetics.48 n

doing

so

he defended

instrumentalmusic

against

theirreservations

and

exhibited an

apprecia-

tion of it that

had eluded them. Korner s

one of the

few

writers rom


15/34

612 TheMusical

uarterly

this

period

who

rejects

art as imitation but does not

accept many

tenets

of earlyRomanticism.Perhaps t is in this narrowzone that we can dis-

cover an aesthetic that

lays

valid claim to the

label"Classical."49When

listening

to the

great

worksof this

period,

do we

not sense

movement,

freedom,

iving

form,

and

(perhaps

ubliminally)

human

character,

as

well as

utopianstriving?

Are these

concerns not central to our

experi-

ence of

beauty

and

sublimity?

submitthat

they

are,

and that

Komer's

aesthetics

provides

a

sophisticated ate-eighteenth-centuryvantage

point

that

can

sharpen

and illuminate

our

perceptions.

Appendix:

"On the

Representation

of Character in

Music,"

by

Christian Gottfried

Kmrner

(English

ranslation

y

Robert

Riggs)

As

long

as

the

composer

knows

no

higher goal

than the entertainment

of his audience,then

it

will merelybe the traitsof this audience that will

guide

him in the selection and treatmentof his material.Sometimes

he

will shock with

crashing

noise,

sometimesstimulate more tender nerves

with sentimental

tunes,

andsometimes

occupy

a

listener,

who thinks

more than

feels,

with artificial

uxtapositions

and bold transitions.For

him,

music is

merely

a

pleasurable

rt;

he has no

conception

that it

could

be

something

more.

On

the other

hand,

when

entering

into the realmof

beauty,

he

composersubjectshimself to quitedifferent aws. Freedfrom all external

influence of the

prejudices,

ashions,

and

caprices

of

his

time,

he

becomes all the more strict

with

himself,

and

his

only goal

is

to endow

his works

with an

independent,

self-sufficient

value.

What a

great advantage

t would be

if,

in a

complete theory

of

beauty,

he

could find

specific

instructions

concerning

the

prerequisites

for such an

independent

value,

and then

merely

needed to

apply

them to

the

specifics

of his art.

But we

do

not

yet

have such a

theory,

and there

are some

outstanding

minds who even doubt that one is

possible.

Mean-

while,

before

we

can

demonstrate,

rom

the nature of

beauty,

a satisfac-

tory development

of the

necessary

and

general

laws of

art,

it will be

helpful

to

identify

the individualfeatures

of that

which

(in

and

of

itself)

is

worth

representing

n

every

art,

especially

without

regard

o the

recep-

tivity

of a

specific

audience.

At

the

present

time,

there are still fewer

preliminary

tudiesof this

type

in

music

than in the other

arts,

and

per-

haps

it has been

undervaluedmore

frequently

or that

very

reason.


16/34

KImer's

esthetics

f

Instrumentalusic613

For

a

long period strange

prejudicesprevailedconcerning

what was

worthyof representation n music.In this context the axiom that imita-

tion

of nature is the

purpose

of

art was

misunderstood;

nd

many

consid-

eredthe re-creation

of

everything

audible,

from the

rolling

of

thunder to

the

crowing

of the

cock,

to be the

proper

businessof the

composer.

A

bettertaste is

beginning

to

gain ground.Expression

of human

feeling

is

replacing

soulless noise. But

is

this the

point

where the

composer

should

stop,

or is there a still

higher goal

for him?

In that which we call the

soul,

we

distinguish

between constant and

temporaryactors: he spirit

[Gemith],

characteror Ethos;and the emo-

tions

[Gemiithsbewegungen],

assionate

state or Pathos.Is it

inconsequen-

tial which of these two the musician

attempts

to

represent?

The first

requirement

of an artwork

s

indisputable;

hroughsigns

of

an

ordering

power,

t must

distinguish

tself as a human

product,

n con-

trast

to the outcome of blind

coincidence;

thus the

law of

unity.

The

superiorcomposer

strives to

give

this

quality

to

his

works,

but not

always

with

equal

success.

Poets and

representational

artists,

because of their

medium,

can

never

represent

a condition without a

person.

The

musician,however,

can

easily

develop

the delusion that

it

is

possible

to

illustrate he emo-

tions as

something independent.

If

he is satisfied n

providing

a

chaos of

sounds,

which

expresses

an incoherent mixture of

passions,

then he

indeed has an

easy

time of

it,

but he must not

claim to be an artist.On

the other

hand,

if

he

recognizes

he need for

unity,

then he

will search in

vain for

it in

a series of

passionate

states.

They

are

nothing

more than

variety,

constant

change,

growth,

and decline. Ifhe

wants to maintain

a

single state, then he becomesmonotonous,dull, and tedious.Ifhe wants

to

representchange,

then this

presupposes omething

constant

against

which it

appears;

nd often such a constant arises

ndependently,

with-

out the artist

consciously

making

a choice.

But

just

because he

disregards

this

choice,

he

will,

in most

cases,

sink to the

crudest

evel. He is

deceived

by

the effect of his

misused

alent,

because

it

is

precisely

the

lowest

expression

that is the

most

commonly

understood.He

will often

reap

the loudest

applause

or

committing

the

worst sins

against

art;

and

this

increasingly

alienates

him

from his mission.

He becomes the slave,

rather than the

master,

of his audience.

Moreover,

here is

certainly

no

proofrequired

hat

art

standsat a

very

low level

if

it

is

content to

repeatunchanged

that which

the real

worldoffers.Such

repetition

can have value in

another

respect-as

renewalof a sensual

mpression.

But

if

we

expect

aesthetic

enjoyment,

we

demandmore. The

artistshould

complete

that

which we fail

to see in the

reality

of an

individual

phenomenon;

he

should

dealize

is

material.The


17/34

614

TheMusical

Quarterly

dignity

of human natureshould

appear

n the creationsof his

fantasy.

He

should raise us from our low sphereof dependenceand limitation to his

level,

and

intuitively represent

he

infinite,

which outside of art

can

only

be

imagined.

But the

passionate

state is limited

by

its own nature.

In

order

to

aspire

to

a definite

goal,

all

power

is

concentrated,

so to

speak,

on

a sin-

gle point.

Here,

fantasy

cannot enrich the

subject

matterwith new ele-

ments,

but rathercan

only intensify

the

degree

of

striving.

Attempts

have often been madeto idealize

sorrow,

oy,

desire,

and

horror.But what wasgenuinelyideal in that case?Wasit the emotion

itself as an

independentlyexisting

object,

or was

it

the

person

in whom

we observedthe emotion? If

we

imagine

this

person

without

anything

that

represents

masculine

power

or

gracious

emininity,

how much

remains

of the ideal?

In

human nature there is

nothing

infinite

except

freedom.

The

power,

which asserts

ts

independence

from all influencesof the external

worldand from all inner

stormsof

passion,

exceeds

every

known

dimen-

sion.

It is this freedomthat is made sensible

to us

through

the

represen-

tation of character.

If music

is

to

renounce

everything

that other arts

gain throughrep-

resentationof

character,

hen a reason forthis must be found in the

peculiarities

of this

art.

This calls for a

specialinvestigation.

Music

would not be able to

represent

he ideal of

character,

or

any

other

object,

if

there was a basis

for the

objection

that,

by

itself,

it

does

not

give

us

something

definite to

think about. This

is

still a

prevailing

opinion

with a

large

part

of the

public.

Poetry,

heater,

or dance are con-

siderednecessary n orderto supplementthis lack of definiteness,and

where music

is

presented

as an

independent

art,

it is misunderstood

because

its

meaning

cannot be translated

nto wordsand

shapes.

Given

the

poverty

of the aesthetic

enjoyment

allotted to us in the

present

age,

it

is fruitful

o

investigate

what each

specific

art can

repre-

sent

by

itself. We

no

longer

have festivalswhere human nature

appeared

in full

display

and

opened

its treasures

imultaneously

or the

eye,

ear,

and

fantasy.

Out of

necessity

we

have learned

to celebratewith modera-

tion the little

that still remainsof these festivals.

If,

in our

age,

a rare

coincidence

of

conditions is

necessary

n order

or

outstanding

artistic

talents from

various

genres

to unite for

a

common

purpose,

hen there is

no choice other

than to

expand

the

range

of each art as much as

possi-

ble,

so that

its works

(even

without the admixture

of

heterogeneous

ele-

ments)

do not lack

in inner richness.

There was

a time

when,

in

dance,

music,

and

poetry,

he

represen-

tation

of a

specific

object

was

not at all intended.

Doubtless,

it was the


18/34

Korner's

esthetics

f

Instrumentalusic615

driveto announce his existence that first

prompted

man to

develop

these artistic abilities. This drive,which indeed is alwayspresentin

healthy

conditions,

expresses

tself

only

in those

moments when it is not

inhibited

by pressure

rom

external

relationships.

Hence the

striving

to

make

these extant

powers

sensible in

any

convenient

object,

and

the

independent

enjoyment

of the

activity

itself,

regardless

f its

effect. The

closest

things

to man

are his

body

and the air that he

breathes n

and

out.

The drive for

independentactivity

found its firstvehicle in

both

of

these. In the free movement of the

body,

without

being

restricted

by

gravity, he mind alsofeels as thoughrelieved of its bonds. The earthly

sphere,

which is its

constant reminder

of

dependence

on

the

external

world,

seems to become

ennobled,

and

the limits of its

existence are

expanded.

Thus man

also

perceives,

in

the sound of his

voice,

a

sensual

effect of his

activity,

without visible

limits;

the free

play

of his

fantasy

opens

a realm of

immeasurable

imensions,

and his

song

communicates

with

all of nature.

Song requires

words,

but

only

those

that are

worthy

of

being sung.

The

mind and the ear both

expect enjoyment

from

language

if

it is to

serve,

not as a

useful means of

satisfying

he

daily

needs

of

soci-

ety,

but

rather

as an

instrument or

expressing

a

particular

tate of

inspi-

ration.

The

imagination

feels freed from the

limitations of

time

and

place.

It revels in

images

of what is

absent,

past,

and future.

But it

does

not

want

to revel

alone. Its fictions should also

appear

n a

refined

way

for

others,

and this is

achieved

by

the selection and

position

of

words.

Dance, music,

and

poetry

(in

this

period

in

the

history

of

art)

are

not means

to

an

end,

but ratherare ends in

themselves.

They

are free

products

of human

nature

in

moments of

a

higher

life. What

appears

n

them is solelywhat is personalabout the artist.One stepfurtherand he

also feels called

upon

to

go

beyond

his own

person

and

to

createa work

existing

in itself.

Inspiration

gave

birth to an

idea that

he wishes to

real-

izeoutside of his own

fantasy.

He is not satisfied

ust

to

disseminatethe

festive mood that he

perceives

in

himself,

but

wishes that his

creations

should

also

enrich the

conceptual

world of his

public.

This

is

the

period

of

representation.

But

dance, music,

and

poetry

(even

as

representational

arts)

do not

completely change theiroriginalnature.The physicalformin which the

artist's

hought

appears

s not

dead but animated.The

elements of free

life often resist the

force

of this

thought.

Therefore,

n

a series of

motions,

tones,

and

words,

there

is much

that does not

represent

a

spe-

cific

object,

but rather

merely

illustrates he

personal

mood of

the

artist.

If the drive to

represent

s

unbounded,

the material

would

eventually

even

destroy

the form.

The

greatest

passion

is

motionlessand

speechless.


19/34

616 The

Musical

Quarterly

If

dance,

song,

and

poetry

are still

to

endure,

then

something

of

reality

mustbe sacrificed,and the artist's ndividualitymustcounterbalance he

rule of

the

object.

Therefore,

n

music,

just

as

in dance and

literature,

definiteness

must

not be demanded rom

any aspect

that does not

belong

to

represen-

tation. The

feeling

of

enthusiasm,

which the artistarouses

by

spreading

his mood

throughout

his

domain,

is darkand indefinite

by

nature.And

the

imagination

welcomes even this

indefiniteness,

becauseit is

less

restrictive

o its free

play.

It is

only

when

music

intends to

represent

hat

its signsmust have a specificmeaning,and, in orderto determine

whether

signs

of this

nature

exist,

we want to

attempt

an

application

to

music

of that which the

general

lawsof

representation

demand in

regard

to definiteness.

A

represented

object

can

appear

o the

fantasy

as a

phenomenon,

only

when

if

it is

given

definite limitations.

he

infinite,

in its

purity,

cannot

appear.

When the intellect

attempts

to think of

it,

and

removes

everything

limited from its

conception,

it also eliminatesall nourish-

ment from

the

imagination.

Therefore,

before it can be

represented,

he

artist's dea mustalreadybe conceived as

it

were in a physicalcloak. The

most

perfect representation

an achieve no more than the

complete

communication

of the

artist's dea

to

our

fantasy.

But if there is

nothing

concrete

in this

idea,

even for the

fantasy,

hen we miss the

genuine

aes-

thetic

enjoyment,

and the

most

luxuriouscostume

cannot

compensate

us

for its loss.

Assuming

that

the

artistic ideal has

been conceived

in

a definite

way,

it can

only

be made sensible

if we

perceive

these determinations n

particular elationships.Similarly, he natureof a realobjectcan never

be

recognized

directly throughexperience,

but

only by

meansof

its rela-

tionships,

just

as

we

deduce causes

from effects.The more

comprehen-

sively

the

relationships

of the ideal are

given

in the

representation,

he

more

definite

its

appearance

will

be.

Butthis

completeness

is

dangerous

or the artist.If the

representa-

tion of

the ideal

extends

to all

adjacent

aspects

that are relevant because

of

time,

place,

and the context

of causes and

effects,

then

the

appear-

ance

approaches eality,

and

nothing

remains or the viewer's

antasy

to

complete.

Fantasy,

however,

doesnot wish to be

idly receptive during

the aesthetic

enjoyment;

rather,

t wishesto be summoned

o

its own

activity.

Therefore,

there areartists

who

intentionally

refrain rom

such

completeness

and who leave

unrepresented

he context

n which their

ideal

appears.

There are several

examples

of this

type

among

the works

of the Greek

sculptors.

An

archaeologist

ailsto see the so-calledattrib-


20/34

Korner's

esthetics

f

Instrumental

usic

617

utes in

these

works,

but for

one

who loves art for its own

sake,

this

makes them all the morevaluable,becausethey place fewerrestrictions

on the

free

play

of the

fantasy.

He

imagines

that the

celestial

beings

cre-

ated for

him

by

the

sculptor

belong

to a

higher

sphere

beyond

the

boundariesof

reality.

He

organizes

hem

into

essential

categories

that are

founded

in

nature,

and that are not

dependent

on the coincidences of

mythology

or the customs of a

specificpeople.

But

only

in

orderto

per-

ceive the

distinguishing

marksof these

categories,

does he demand defi-

niteness;

otherwise he can

dispense

with it.

The

physicality

of the ideal consists

in

a

singlerelationship,

not to a

specific

ndividual

object,

but

to the overall

representation

f

space

in

gen-

eral. A

particular

art

of this

space appears

illedhere.

While there is

only

a

vague

conception concerning

that which fills the

space,

its borders re

all

the

more

distinct,

complete,

and

definite.

And

merelyby

representing

these

borders,

he artistsucceeded

n

enrapturing

s for the

creationof his

fantasy.

The

shape

that

appeared

o us was

meaningful

down

to the small-

est

details

of its

surface.

The

only

feature

of the

physical

material hat we

could

contemplate

was its

extension;

ut

never

had an

appearance

n the

real worldsuppliedus, in a singlefeature,with so much.

In this case we can understandhow the

greatest

riches

can

coexist

with

apparentpoverty,

f we remember he

conditions

on which

the con-

tent

of

an

ideal

depend.

We value

the

phenomenon

according

o that

which does

not

appear

n

it,

but ratherhas to be

thought ccording

o the

sum

of

reality

that it

presupposes,

nd

according

to

the content of

our

concept

of that

which

underliesour

representation

of the

phenomenon.

That which we

directly

observed n the individual

phenomenon

never

gives us a complete representationof an object;holes remainthat must

be

filled

in

by

inferencesand

premonitions.

The

imagination

takesthe

material or

these

completions

from its

own

treasures,

but

in

the selection

of

this material

t

is

dependent

on

that which

was

directlyperceivable.

And

the

greater

his

dependence

is when

viewing

a workof

art,

and

the

more

unrestricted he artist is in

commanding

he connoisseur's

antasy,

the richer the

ideal will

be that is made sensible in

his

representation.

The

viewer's

magination

s

guided by

the

sensible

aspect

of the

phenomenon,

but

only

to the

extent that

it

is

definite

atherthan mani-

fold.

The mereoutline of a

figure,

masterfully

ketched on

paper,

s suffi-

cient

to

provide

laws for our

fantasy.Every

point

of the delicate line

is,

so to

speak,

animated;

each one utters an

unmistakable

expression

of

power

or

grace.

We feel

an irresistible nner drive to

complete

the

pic-

ture that has been

only

suggested;

but we

also

feel

the

impossibility

of

including anything

in

our idea that would be

incompatible

with

what is

specific

to such a

phenomenon.


21/34

618 TheMusical

uarterly

The formal

contours in a

sculptor's

work are

simultaneously

defined

in all possibledirections.Thus the fantasywould be warnedeven more

often if it wanted to

attempt

an

inappropriate

iction;

but

it

also

receives

even more

challenge

to

engage

in its own

activity.

And an

immeasurable

field is

opened

for

this

activity

with

respect

to all the

features hat were

not

specifiedby

the

artist.

Everything

hat the

object

can

gain

through

color, movement,

and

external

relationships

s

in

its

power.

It

is also not

restricted

n

time. That which

the artist

presents

or

viewing

can be con-

templated

for

eternity.

Here a singlesensiblefeaturegivesdefinitenessand richnessto the

ideal. But is this

valid

only

for the

contours

of

the form?

Or is there

another

equally meaningful

eature or other arts?

One of the

relationships

hat

gives

definiteness o the

presentation

of an

object

is its

speciallyassignedplace

in a series

of

causes

and

effects.

It

is

primarily

his

relationship

hat

occupies

the

poet,

and

it

is here that

he demonstrateshis

power

of

representation

o the broadest

extent. He

goes

back

to the most

remotecausesof

events,

and follows their

progress

through

the

smallest advancesto the final denouement.

If the

poet

is satisfied n

representing

a series of

phenomena

that are

joined by

general

laws of

nature,

he

can

thus

provide

us with a

very

instructive

work,

but

certainly

not an

inspiring

one. In orderto

leave the

realm

of limited

reality

and cross over into

the

realm

of

the

ideal,

he

requires

reedom.

This

is

the

soul

of his

poetry.By presupposing

elief in

freedom,

an

independent vitality

spreads

over the

elements

of

his

work,

and in

place

of

a

puppet

show,

which is moved with invisible

stringsby

an unknown

power,persons

n action

appear.

Each of these

protagonists

is at the center of a specialsphereof action, and in this spherethere is a

series

of conditions

[Zustianden]

hat is called

life. Every

condition is based

on a

specific relationship

between the free

independentbeing

andthe

world that surroundst. Both areconceived in a context in

which

the

activity

of the

former nvades

the

receptivity

of the

latter.

Freedom,

personality,

ondition,

and life

(when

examinedas

topics

of

art)

are

not

metaphysicalconcepts,

but

rather,

eatures hat are

per-

ceived in ourselves

by

means

of inner

sense,

and which are

transferred

o

other beings.Throughself-awareness,we distinguish n ourselves

between

dependence

n,

or

independence

rom,

the externalworld.What

is

independent

within us we call

ability.

This is

expressedpartially

through

receptivity,by interpreting

what is

specific

in the external

world,

and

partially hrough

activity, by determining

he

given

material

in the

external world

according

o one's own will.

Through

this becom-

ing

specific

and

this

determining

we

experience

that

relationship

with

the external world which is called our condition. n such a condition we


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Korner's

esthetics

f

Instrumentalusic619

can

perceivespecific

eatureswithout

having

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