Key Elements of the Bundeswehr of the Future

Key Elements of the Bundeswehr of the Future

I. The security environment 7

II. Demands on the Bundeswehr 10

III. Key elements 15

1. Armed forces planning and capabilities 15

2. Further development of the armed forces’ command

and control organisation 19

3. Operational and materiel readiness of the armed forces 27

4. Procurement and in-service support 29

5. Federal defence administration 32

6. Federal Ministry of Defence 35

7. Strategic capacity 37

8. Planning law and funding 39

IV. Next steps 40

Imprint 42

Content

3CONTENT

The government policy statement of 23 July 2019 identified three priorities of work for the Bundeswehr.

First: increase public awareness of the Bundeswehr; second: increase operational and materiel readiness;

third: better combine tasks and responsibilities. Specific measures that have since been taken include: free

rail travel in uniform, public pledge ceremonies, implementation of initial measures by the procurement

organisation working group and the readiness initiative. Our position paper of 9 February 2021 identified

the need for change beyond that – the need for thorough adjustments in the Bundeswehr, the defence

administration and the Federal Ministry of Defence (FMoD).

As a next step, this document details the need for action and presents the proposals we have developed

on this basis. We offer options for the prompt implementation of those proposals and develop prospects

for setting the long-term course in the armed forces, the administration, with regard to procurement

and in-service support, and in the Federal Ministry of Defence. The path we have now embarked on has

been discussed for quite some time. Numerous internal and external analyses have examined the subject

to a sufficient degree. We must now turn those insights into action. These key elements will initiate the

necessary steps and concepts. All measures are supported by the FMoD executive group as well as military

commanders.

The measures we have taken have one common goal: to make the Bundeswehr fit for the future. They

intentionally do not resemble previous large Bundeswehr reforms, however. Such disruptive reorgani-

sations will not be necessary in the next four to five years. In addition, the steps presented here will not

require any additional personnel augmentation. They can all be accomplished within the scope of existing

personnel structures. The two official seats of the Federal Ministry of Defence, in Bonn and in Berlin, have

served us well, especially during the pandemic. Digital technology and flexible working mean that issues

regarding location have become less urgent than they might have been in the past. For this reason, we do

not believe there is any need for change in this regard.

Within the scope of these key elements, we are assuming the executive responsibility assigned to us

and are simultaneously striving to make a contribution to the decisions coming up in the next legisla-

tive period.

54

Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer Federal Minister of Defence

Eberhard Zorn Chief of Defence P

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THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Structural changes in international security

policy are progressing at rapid speeds. The

combination of emerging powers, revolutionary

technologies, revived ideologies, demographics,

pandemics and climate change creates a global

situation that puts German security and defence

policy under considerable pressure to adapt.

Since 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany

has also been making an important military

contribution to ensuring freedom and peace in

Europe. To ensure that this will remain possible

in the future, we must make fundamental deci-

sions today. As a tool of national public services

and one of the federal government’s foreign

policy instruments, the Bundeswehr must not

only have modern equipment and display an

extraordinary degree of operational and mate-

riel readiness. It must also be run efficiently and

dynamically. Funding must be predictable in

the long term and in line with the more intense

threat situation as well as the significantly

increased need for the ability to act indepen-

dently in the field of security policy.

The public, however, has not yet fully grasped

the changes in the security situation and the

related need for new political approaches.

Most people remain unaware of the countless

cyber attacks on servers, networks and control

systems that are directed against Germany, our

institutions, businesses and citizens every day.

Too little is known about the massive Russian

rearmament happening only a few hundred

kilometres from Germany’s borders. The public

massively underestimates the significance of

nuclear deterrence with respect to security in

Europe – and the importance of nuclear sharing

for Germany along with it. There is relatively

little understanding of the rapid development of

weapon technologies that permanently change

conflicts and complicate arms control, for

instance with hypersonic missiles, the militari-

sation of outer space and highly complex drone

operations.

China’s ambitious and increasingly aggressive

power politics, whose objectives include re-

shaping the rules-based order and interna-

tional law, could also become a risk for Ger-

many’s globalised economy and is currently

attracting more attention than it used to. The

resulting security risks for our country, however,

still appear to be too intangible for most.

At the same time, the rules-based multila-

teral order, whose benchmark is respect for

human rights, democracy, and the rule of law,

is increasingly coming under pressure within

the scope of this more intense risk and threat

environment. China, Iran, Russia, and North

Korea are not the only ones openly defining

themselves as a counter-model to a liberal

social order. Other actors are following suit

and feel both emboldened and encouraged.

The increase in non-state actors that violently

pursue their own or other power interests,

overtly or covertly, is consistent with this trend.

These developments and a number of others are

challenging Germany and Europe, not only politi-

cally and economically, but also and especially

with respect to security and defence policy. For

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one thing, the “hard” risks for European secu-

rity have changed and intensified significantly.

For another, Europe’s main ally, the United

States of America, is increasingly pivoting away

from Europe. For this reason, Europeans must

become more ready to defend themselves and

increase their ability to take military action,

both in their own interest and as a partner in

the Atlantic security space.

Based on its geographic location at the heart

of Europe, its economic performance and the

fundamental connection between German and

European security, our country has a particular

obligation. Germany’s diplomatic and mili-

tary capabilities are an essential contribution

to empowering a free, independent and safe

Europe. In detail, this means: Demands on

the Bundeswehr will increase – in the short,

medium and long term. This applies to the

German armed forces’ core mission, protecting

Germany and German citizens as well as Ger-

many’s allies, but also to the equally important

task of making a contribution to international

crisis management.

To make sure that Germany remains a powerful

and competitive player in security policy as well

as a reliable partner and ally, the Bundeswehr

must be even more rigorously geared toward

the changed and concentrated requirements

with respect to capabilities, organisation and

operational and materiel readiness. To this end,

a great deal of research within the FMoD’s area

of responsibility, but also outside of the Bun-

deswehr, has yielded analyses and comprehen-

sive insights.

A number of study results and recommen-

dations for reform were taken into account.

They include suggestions from working groups

such as those regarding the project on modern

leadership development and civic education

(“Innere Führung – heute”) and the procure-

ment organisation. They also include numer-

ous ideas on reforming command and control

organisation, for instance from the study phase

of the National General/Admiral Staff Officer

Course at the Bundeswehr Command and Staff

College and from generals and admirals. Sugges-

tions by the chiefs of the services regarding the

adjustment of command and control structures

as well as analyses by the directors of higher

federal authorities and directors-general at the

Federal Ministry of Defence were also evalu-

ated. Lastly, considerations by political repre-

sentatives and the parliament, as well as parties

and parliamentary groups, and insights gained

during discussions with military personnel of

all ranks within the scope of troop visits were

taken into account.

Our own findings are consistent with external

ones: We need stronger strategic management,

more streamlined processes and a focus on the

essential aspects. We must streamline our struc-

tures, remedy top-heaviness and confusion over

responsibilities, and once again create oper-

ationally ready, larger formations. We will only

improve our operational and materiel readiness

if we focus on our core mission and consistently

adapt accordingly.

Lessons learned during the COVID-19 pan-

demic also confirm this. Our military personnel

have displayed great motivation and outstand-

ing accomplishments. At the same time, we

have realised once more that there is room for

improvement with regard to coordination and

command and control.

All in all, this paints a clear picture: There is no

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

1110 DEMANDS ON THE BUNDESWEHR

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need for a fundamental Bundeswehr reform.

The current stationing concept and force

structures put us in a good overall position.

However, the Bundeswehr Concept and the

Bundeswehr Capability Profile (both from 2018)

require provisions and ideas to supplement and

update them. Swift adjustments of armed forces

planning, command and control organisation

and requirements regarding operational and

materiel readiness are necessary.

DEMANDS ON THE BUNDESWEHR

Based on Germany’s roles within the security

environment, there are specific demands on the

Bundeswehr.

National and collective defence and initial-entry

forces

The Bundeswehr must remain able to conduct mili-

tary operations against peer competitors in com-

bined arms operations and, in future, also in multi-

domain operations – across the entire spectrum up

to high-intensity combat. This necessitates military

deterrence capabilities across the entire spectrum,

including nuclear sharing. The same authoritarian

states that use hybrid approaches to flexibly con-

trol conflicts below the threshold of Article 5 of the

North Atlantic Treaty continue to expand on their

conventional warfare capabilities and already have

initial-entry capabilities today.

In light of security policy developments and tech-

nological progress, time and speed are becoming

considerably more important. The Bundeswehr must

be capable of responding to a conflict escalation

without long lead times, i.e. employing initial-entry

forces, especially on the external borders of the

Alliance.

Initial-entry capabilities for responding to an escalat-

ing military crisis require a cold-start capability,

a high degree of responsiveness, and robustness

against existing enemy anti-access/area denial (A2/

AD) architectures. A high level of operational and

materiel readiness even in peacetime is paramount.

This requires integrated systems of combat units

and support forces that are structured, trained and

equipped in a way that allows for rapid deployment.

They must be ready for quick deployment, scalable

to different scenarios and agile, i.e. capable of quickly

establishing a concentration of effort.

In future, conflicts will be led and decided across

all domains – land, air/space, maritime as well as

the cyber and information domain – with quick

changes of focus and often deliberately masked and

obscured by hybrid activities at the intersections of

peace, crisis and war.

Our armed forces must be in a position to provide

our political leadership with flexible military options

as well as forces and capabilities that are able to act

II.

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in all domains as required by the situation. They must

be able to act quickly and seamlessly across domains

and be sustainable across the entire spectrum of

domains simultaneously. In this context, interoper-

ability and coordinated action between domains

down to the lowest tactical level are essential.

To this end, a stronger focus on domain responsibil-

ity as well as coordinated action between domains

is necessary. This applies to command and control

organisation, structure, and planning and conduct

of operations. For this reason, the guiding principle

is: “Organise as you fight”. Seamless command and

control from the strategic and operational levels

down to the lowest tactical level are imperative.

Germany as a central hub, homeland security and

national territorial defence

In peacetime, the Bundeswehr must be able to perform

and coordinate extensive duties within the scope of

administrative assistance. Even during the initial stage

of an emerging crisis, the Bundeswehr must already

be able to contribute to preventive security and, in

the event of national/collective defence, contribute to

homeland and Alliance security.

The task spectrum includes ensuring command and

control as well as support capabilities, including the

protection of defence-critical infrastructure, and

ensuring that the Alliance has operational freedom in

Germany – including adjacent seas, airfields and the

cyberspace. This requires logistic capabilities as well as

secure bases for land, air and naval forces to ensure the

Alliance’s freedom of movement and the ability to take

action in continental Europe.

To cover this wide span of command and control, the

Bundeswehr needs a functional and resilient territorial

command and control organisation.

The national territorial commander must be able to

perform their duties seamlessly across all functions, and

through a command and control organisation in peace-

time, in the event of a disaster or state of domestic

emergency or during a state of tension or defence. This

means that the competences and structures assigned

to the national territorial commander must be consoli-

dated.

Sustainable performance of these tasks is only possible

with strong territorial reserves that are quick to deploy.

This requires a high degree of operational and materiel

readiness, also for the reserves, in terms of structure,

personnel, and materiel as well as with regard to train-

ing status and infrastructure. It must be possible to

augment the reserves quickly and at an early stage. The

decision to establish home defence regiments was our

first step in this process.

In line with a whole-of-government approach, com-

mand and control organisation in homeland security

and national territorial defence must network and

coordinate even more closely with structures pertaining

to civilian preparedness for war in the future.

International crisis management

The Bundeswehr must remain prepared to contribute

force contingents to international crisis management

for extended periods of time. It will have to cont-

ribute to rapid response capabilities in the event of

international crises, especially within the framework

of NATO, the EU and the UN, and earmark rapid

response forces for this purpose. This includes the

capability to command and control units of this kind.

In this context, the Bundeswehr often acts as a

framework partner for smaller nations and assumes

command responsibility for multinational task

forces.

A supporting partner with shared values

Germany will continue to be one of the nations

that play a key role in NATO and the EU. This

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role is in keeping with Germany’s own aim of

making contributions – in all domains – that are

commensurate with our size and economic power,

which is in line with our partners’ expectations.

Accordingly, the Bundeswehr needs to maintain a

broad military profile from which other nations,

especially smaller ones, can draw support.

As a credible partner with shared values, the

Bundeswehr must also further increase its focus

on the international level in order to take action

together with partners worldwide. To this end,

the Bundeswehr will take measures such as further

expanding and enhancing its cooperation in the

areas of armaments and in-service support, as

well as joint exercises with its partners within the

existing political framework.

KEY ELEMENTS

The following five basic principles will guide the

further development of the Bundeswehr’s com-

mand and control organisation:

• Improved functionality: command and cont-

rol structures and processes must be designed

to ensure that tasks are performed quickly and

smoothly

• Increased effectiveness: interfaces are reduced in

number and clearly defined, responsibilities deter-

mined, and discontinuities do not exist between the

individual levels

• Expanded decentralisation: wherever possible,

required forces and assets will be integrated

into the relevant structures; forces and assets

will only be pooled centrally where absolutely

necessary

• Strengthening the troops: the resources freed up

by changing the command and control structures

and reducing top-heavy organisational structures

will be reinvested at the tactical levels

• Increasing operational and materiel readiness:

all the measures initiated will contribute to

increasing the armed forces’ operational and

materiel readiness.

Domain-specific aspects that have special effects

on mission accomplishment will also be taken into

consideration. At the same time, these principles are

essential criteria for the necessary follow-up analyses.

1. Armed forces planning and capabilities

Principles and objectives

Principles and objectives

The commitments Germany has made in line with

the NATO planning targets are an integral part of its

national level of ambition and reflect the Bundes-

wehr’s long-term aims. The Bundeswehr Capability

Profile implements Germany’s national level of

ambition for armed forces planning, which means

III.

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that it will continue to guide future measures.

However, the changing circumstances mean that

we have to adjust parts of this system of objectives.

To this end, we have to review the qualitative and

quantitative characteristics of the capabilities and, if

necessary, redefine the point in time at which each is

to be achieved.

Our goal is to increase the overall availability of

combat-ready forces. For this purpose, it is not strictly

necessary to establish consistently ideal conditions

for task accomplishment. Instead, it is a matter of

creating sufficiently suitable solutions in reasonable

periods of time and with clearly defined points of

focus.

At the same time, a wide variety of military capabilities

will be developed – at different quantity and quality

levels. In terms of quantity, this spectrum ranges from

fully equipped active duty forces to nonactive assign-

ment to the reserve troops, while the quality ranges

from state-of-the-art advanced technology to the

“robust bulk” of assets.

This approach will be implemented from the top

down. We need to:

• Institute consistent strategic capability controlling,

in close consultation with the personnel respon-

sible for the different domains, for the qualitative

and quantitative characteristics of the capabilities

• Establish the strategic planning board of the FMoD

executive group that regularly defines the relevant

priorities, specifications for levels of excellence and

quantity, and the deadlines for when these levels

need to be achieved in terms of strategic decisions

on future action

• Strengthen the Chief of Defence’s overall plan-

ning responsibility for the overarching concept

for military defence through a more efficient and

centralised planning landscape

• Monitor the planning and procurement process to

reduce costs and complexity and in the interest of

improved management, prioritisation, and accel-

eration of projects with consistent requirements

controlling

• Prioritise commercially available systems and

multinational cooperation whenever possible in

procurement decisions. We should accept develop-

ment solutions in order to secure key technologies

or if there are no suitable commercially available

products.

Priorities

Some capabilities are so important for national and

collective defence or so urgently in need of moderni-

sation that they are already priorities.

We need to establish continuous, effective, inter-

operable command and control capabilities from the

strategic level down to the lowest tactical level. There

is an urgent need for action at the tactical levels. At

these levels, a command and control capability will

soon be established that ensures highly mobile plan-

ning and conduct of operations for the armed forces

across all domains and intensities on a multinational

basis. Technical options must be assessed and tested

in the context of scheduling, personnel and financial

requirements to determine whether they offer actual

benefits.

Developing the capability to achieve rapid projection,

in all domains, of joint force structures capable of

taking action will increase the operational flexibility

of our armed forces. In the land domain, a continuum

of light/airmobile, medium/motorised and heavy/

mechanised forces will be established for this purpose.

We will develop a cross-domain ability to prevail

against an adversary attempting to deny our forces

access to an area of operations within the scope of

anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD). This includes not

only self-protection – e.g. through ground-based air

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defence – but also the necessary offensive capabili-

ties such as standoff weapon systems and unmanned

systems.

The Bundeswehr is facing a twofold challenge: once

again fleshing out and strengthening its existing

capabilities and structures on the one hand, and

keeping up with rapid technological developments

on the other. This forces us to set clear priorities.

For example, we must continually review which

German capabilities are important because they

represent a vital contribution to the capabilities of

NATO and the EU and are essential elements of

current and likely future operations with our part-

ners and allies. We must consistently provide input

regarding our national considerations on these

matters to the relevant NATO and EU processes at

an early stage.

One contribution to national and collective defence

is providing major units that offer our partners points

of connection. In addition, we need to improve our

capability to move these forces, as well as the units

of our North American and European partners, across

Germany as a central hub. Among other things, this

requires logistic capabilities – from railway flatcars

and motorway infrastructure to coordination of troop

movements – without which the Alliance would be

unable to take action.

This also applies to essential enablers of military

operations, e.g. command and control capabilities,

as well as logistic assistance and medical support

for operations. Furthermore, it concerns specialised

high-value capabilities such as reconnaissance, air-

to-air refuelling, and air transport, as well as ope-

rations throughout the electromagnetic spectrum,

including electronic warfare and special operations

forces.

We must now aim to quickly increase our

operational and materiel readiness in order to

provide the following for NATO and the EU:

• A fully operational national division in the land

domain

• Command and control, as well as the core of a

multinational air group, in the air domain

• Permanent command and control of or partici-

pation in up to four NATO or allied maritime task

forces, as well as taking on responsibility for the

Baltic Sea area (Baltic Maritime Coordination

Function), in the maritime domain

• A Cyber and Information Domain Task Force

capable of cooperation in the cyber and informa-

tion domain, along with a Combined Joint Opera-

tional Communication Task Force and a Multina-

tional Geo-Meteorological and Oceanographic

Support

• Including the support forces necessary for each of

the above.

2. Further development of the armed forces’

command and control organisation

The armed forces’ command and control organisa-

tion will be adapted to the increased and changed

demands on the Bundeswehr. The focus will be on

consistently orienting the organisation toward the

tasks of operational command and troop-contributor

in the domains. In accordance with this guiding prin-

ciple, the following will be under the administrative

control of the Chief of Defence in future:

• Two operational commands with directive authority

for national command and control of operations

outside of Germany and for performance of the

Bundeswehr’s tasks at home

• Four domain commands that provide operatio-

nally ready forces and component commands for

national and international tasks and

• Joint elements that enhance operational and

materiel readiness throughout the Bundeswehr.


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Restructuring will adhere to the following principles

and common guidelines:

• We will maintain the target of 203,300 military

personnel. This figure also includes military service

volunteers and reservists. The positions needed

for reservists in the future must be analysed with a

view to maintaining an operationally ready reserve

force within this target size.

• Stationing, force structures and unit designations will

generally remain unchanged.

• We plan to design the structure and scope of staff,

agency and specialist positions to allow for an

increase in capacities for force structures.

• In terms of national and collective defence, we

particularly aim to improve the rapid availability

of proven, combat-effective task forces. Specific

aspects of options for improved integration or

more effective cohesion of the logistic, medical and

other cross-cutting support forces in the various

domains – with a special focus on the land domain

– will be assessed under ministerial direction. The

key criteria in this regard are functionality, resource

requirements and attractiveness. Adjustments to

internal structures should be kept to a minimum.

• In accordance with the Chief of Defence’s guide-

lines, increases in efficiency and available resources

will be reinvested to benefit the lower tactical

levels and strengthen urgently needed capabilities

in the support forces.

• In order to sustainably increase the operational

and materiel readiness of weapon systems, all

domains will pool the relevant responsibilities

and competencies, as well as the corresponding

elements for concept, further development and

operational and materiel readiness of the weapon

systems, in “system houses” for the domain-based

coordination of competencies and responsibilities.

Subject to examination results regarding procure-

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ment and in-service support, this includes those

areas of in-service support and operation that

could be assigned to the domains and, additionally,

domain-specific elements. Bundeswehr health care

will be treated in much the same way.

• Subject to examination results regarding procure-

ment and in-service support, this includes those

areas of in-service support and operation that

could be assigned to the domains and, additionally,

domain-specific elements. Bundeswehr health care

will be treated in much the same way.

• For operations across domains, we will establish

a Bundeswehr Joint Doctrine Centre at the Bun-

deswehr Command and Staff College. We are also

examining the possible establishment of a Joint

Operations/Warfare Centre in the future.

Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command

The Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command

remains responsible for the national command and

control of all operations and standby commitments

outside of Germany, for national risk prevention and the

operational command and control of the Bundeswehr

special operations forces.

Bundeswehr Territorial Operations Command

We will establish a Bundeswehr Territorial Operations

Command. In order to increase resilience, it will be

based in Bonn and Berlin. In Bonn, we will also make

our contribution to strengthening cooperation with

relevant bodies and authorities, such as the Federal

Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance.

The national territorial commander/German Joint

Support and Enabling Service Headquarters will

examine the details under ministerial direction.

To increase whole-of-government resilience, we

also plan to strengthen the regional territorial

commands in the 16 federal states.

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The future commander of the Territorial Operations

Command will also be the national territorial com-

mander. The Territorial Operations Command will

perform territorial tasks at home, including assistance

in the wake of natural disasters, national emergency

situations and severe accidents. It will coordinate the

deployment of forces within the scope of NATO and

EU operations and be responsible for homeland secu-

rity and national territorial defence.

Domain commands

Chiefs of service will command the land, air/space,

maritime and cyber and information domains. Their

tasks will include advising the Chief of Defence, pro-

viding combat-ready forces and being able to provide

component commands (highest tactical domain

command).

Establishing domain commands promotes the

necessary development from a contingent-based

way of thinking (modular combination of centralised

structures of purely functional major military organi-

sational elements) to deployable formations that are

as self-sufficient as possible and also provide modules

to form contingents.

Land domain

We will improve the cohesion of land forces by

reducing their current fragmentation across the exist-

ing major organisational elements. To this end, the

Bundeswehr CBRN Defence Command, the Bundes-

wehr Military Police Command and the Multinational

CIMIC Command will be assigned to the land domain

as self-contained capability coordination commands

without implications regarding scope or resources.

The land domain will assume the pilot function for

supporting other domains with these capabilities.

The Army will establish a Land Warfare Centre for the

purpose of pooling responsibilities and competencies

in the areas of concepts and further development as

well as training and exercises and consolidate it with

the aim of combining it with other elements to form

a system for the land domain-based coordination

of competencies and responsibilities. Integration

of the Heeresinstandsetzungslogistik GmbH (LLC

responsible for ensuring the operational and materiel

readiness of major Army weapon systems) remains to

be examined.

Air and space domain

We will strengthen the air and space domain by

establishing the Bundeswehr Space Command under

the responsibility of the Air Force. It will be planned in

detail and run at the Kalkar garrison across domains

and especially in close cooperation with the German

Cyber and Information Domain Service Headquarters.

Multinationalisation of the Command is the goal.

In addition, the Air Force will establish an Air Warfare

Centre for the purpose of pooling responsibilities and

competencies in the areas of concepts and further

development and will examine possible integration

of the Federal Office of the Bundeswehr for Military

Aviation with other elements in a system for the air

domain-based coordination of competencies and

responsibilities with the aim of sustainably increas-

ing materiel readiness. The option to transform the

Federal Office of the Bundeswehr for Military Aviation

into a civilian higher federal authority for military avia-

tion in Germany must be considered as an alternative.

The Air Force will streamline its command and control

structures, particularly with regard to clearly defining

responsibilities and establishing capability commands

to strengthen the troops.

Maritime domain

We will strengthen the Navy’s command and control

capability by achieving full operational and materiel


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readiness of the German Maritime Forces Staff and by

improving the ability to plan and command national

and multinational maritime exercises and operations.

In addition, the German Navy is preparing to assume

a special responsibility for the Baltic Sea area once it

assumes the Baltic Maritime Coordination Function.

The Navy will establish a Maritime Warfare Centre for

the purpose of pooling responsibilities and compe-

tencies focussing on the areas of concepts and further

development of operational capabilities. Possible

integration of the Naval Arsenal and the Naval Support

Command with other elements in a “system house” for

the maritime domain-based coordination of compe-

tencies and responsibilities with the aim of sustainably

increasing the operational and materiel readiness is

being reviewed.

Cyber and information domain

We will strengthen the capabilities for the plan-

ning and conduct of operations in the cyber and

information domain and take a holistic approach

to the further development of military intelligence.

The cyber and information domain will intensify its

cooperation with the Federal Office for Information

Security and, pursuing an interagency approach, with

the National Cyber Response Centre in keeping with

Germany’s cyber security strategy.

The cyber and information domain will streamline

its structures by reducing them to one decision-

making level and one implementation level and

reinvesting vacant posts to cater to specialist

tasks. Command and decision-making levels will

be pooled in the German Cyber and Information

Domain Service Headquarters. Furthermore, as an

element of military intelligence for the strategic and

operational levels, the Joint Intelligence Centre will

be placed under the administrative control of the

Chief of the Cyber and Information Domain Service.

In addition, the cyber and information domain will

establish a Cyber and Information Domain Warfare

Centre for the purpose of pooling responsibilities

and competencies in the areas of concepts and

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further development. This will be combined with

other elements to form a “system house” for the

cyber and information domain-based coordination of

competencies and responsibilities, i.e. a Bundeswehr

Centre for Digitalisation.

Bundeswehr health care

Health is a key element of operational readiness and

of Bundeswehr personnel welfare. The successful

development of the Bundeswehr Medical Service

must be continued. For this reason, turning the

Surgeon General of the Bundeswehr into a role within

the Federal Ministry of Defence will highlight the

prominent position of Bundeswehr health care. The

Bundeswehr Health Care Headquarters will be newly

established at the next subordinate level. The Surgeon

General of the Bundeswehr will assume technical re-

sponsibility for health care within the area of respon-

sibility of the Federal Ministry of Defence and for the

Bundeswehr Medical Service within the scope of the

special functional area.

The Surgeon General’s responsibilities will include:

• Strategic management of health care and

operational medical support across domain com-

mands and agencies

• Providing direct expert advice to the executive

group and the Commander in Chief of the Armed

Forces

• Representation with regard to health issues in

interagency processes

• Medical management/functional control, for

instance when dealing with health situations (e.g.

pandemics, bioterrorism, etc.) as well as with regard

to security issues related to health (global health)

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27

• Medical Service personnel careers and Medical

Service competence development in the Bundes-

wehr and

• çdical materiel specific to the Medical Service.

Within the scope of examinations regarding

procurement and in-service support, potential

assignment of responsibilities in the context of

procurement of specific medical materiel will also

be considered.

The objectives are to improve the overall provision of

medical services for fully operational forces, raise the

standard of professional excellence and further pursue

the path toward intensive cooperation with the civilian

health care system in order to meet future health care

challenges.

In the medium and long term, we will continue to

enhance the multinational cooperation of medical

specialist services in Europe and NATO that was

initiated with the establishment of the European

Medical Command/Multinational Medical Coordina-

tion Centre.

Joint elements

The joint elements are:

• The Bundeswehr Command and Staff College

• The Leadership Development and Civic Education

Centre and

• The Bundeswehr Office for Defence Planning.

The future position of the Federal Office of the

Bundeswehr for Military Aviation within the

administrative structure will be examined in the

context of detailed planning of the system for the

air domain-based coordination of competencies and

responsibilities (see above).

A ministerial evaluation will focus on future roles and

tasks as well as the position within the administrative

structure of:

• The Bundeswehr Logistics Command

• The Armed Forces Office and

• The Multinational Joint Headquarters Ulm.

The evaluation of the Armed Forces Office will be

carried out taking into account the transfer of tasks

from the Federal Ministry of Defence. It should be

examined whether the Armed Forces Office could

assume additional administrative tasks with regard

to resources, functionality and command and con-

trol span as well as whether the Armed Forces Office

should be transformed into a newly established Bun-

deswehr Office, if necessary.

In light of the range of the aforementioned joint

elements and with regard to their specific tasks and

functions for the armed forces, the different options

for possible command relationships and positions

within the administrative structures will also be

examined. This includes combining them into one

support section or establishing separate central armed

forces agencies. The future assignment of the Ger-

man Military Representative (DEU MILREP) to the

NATO and EU military committees and the position

of the Federal Academy for Security Policy within the

administrative structures will also be examined in this

context.

3. Operational and materiel readiness of the

armed forces

The equal weight given to the tasks of national and

collective defence and the lessons we have learned

from our involvement in NATO readiness forces in

recent years have shown that we can no longer think

of operational and materiel readiness in terms of

contingents alone and we can no longer measure

weapons systems solely in terms of the percentages

of material stockpiles. Both are a biased perspective

and can lead to a misperception of the overall opera-

tional and materiel readiness of the Bundeswehr.


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The yardstick for the operational and materiel readi-

ness of the Bundeswehr is its capability to accomplish

its mission. For this reason, a new reporting system

will be established in order to inform parliament in a

transparent fashion.

Our armed forces as an entirety must be ready for

action; they can, however, be available after diffe-

rent lead times. In this context, the armed forces

must be considered as a whole. To that effect, the

amount of operationally ready and available forces

must be increased. The declared objective is to fully

equip the forces with modern materiel. Until then,

however, our units must be operationally ready with

the equipment at their disposal.

The Chief of Defence will issue an annual strategic

directive looking several years ahead as a guideline for

establishing and maintaining operational and materiel

readiness and for resource prioritisation.

Operational and materiel readiness system

To realise these goals, a new system will be estab-

lished to ensure the improvement of operational and

materiel readiness.

The new operational and materiel readiness system

will synchronise tasks, materiel and personnel as well

as training and exercises. This requires the effective

control of phases of uptime and downtime for person-

nel and materiel in a three-part cycle that consid-

ers the special features and dependencies of each

domain:

• Deployment phase: deployment is possible with a

lead time of 7 to 30 days

• Heightened operational and materiel readiness

phase: lead time of 30 to 90 days

Basic phase: regeneration and limited availability with

a lead time between 90 and 360 days.

4. Procurement and in-service support

An effective and efficient procurement organisation

is vitally important for the materiel readiness of the

Bundeswehr. It fulfils a variety of different tasks –

from developing future technologies and managing

complex armaments projects to fulfilling the daily

requirements of the forces.

Because of this, it has a complex structure in terms of

organisation, subject matter, and processes. For this

reason, the 2018 coalition agreement called for a com-

prehensive review of the procurement organisation. A

working group involving the Bundestag has developed

proposals. In order to implement these proposals, a

working group entitled “Implementation Procurement

Organisation” has been established in the Ministry’s

area of responsibility.

Through the intense and focused work of the mem-

bers of this working group, 58 different measures

have been implemented and noticeable progress has

been made in the optimisation of the procurement

organisation and the Federal Office of Bundeswehr

Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service

Support. We will continue to build on this progress

and remain committed to optimising processes and

structures.

The Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Infor-

mation Technology and In-Service Support with its

agencies is the central management organisation and

knowledge carrier in the Bundeswehr when it comes

to the development and procurement of operationally

viable defence materiel. It was assigned materiel

responsibility for operational viability and the tasks of

in-service support in 2012. It is also responsible for

central tasks that ensure the operational and materiel

readiness of weapon systems and products.

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This increase in responsibilities has led to an imbal-

ance between tasks, personnel resources, and author-

ity which has not been resolved in recent years. As

well, many additional interfaces were created as

in-service support and supply responsibility remained

with the Services.

The Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Infor-

mation Technology and In-Service Support will focus

on its core tasks, i.e. the development, procurement,

and further development of defence materiel for the

Bundeswehr and the management of armaments

projects.

How and when tasks of in-service support and the

resources associated with them can be taken over by

other organisational elements must be determined.

The aim is to pool tasks, personnel, and resources as

well as available expertise. This will strengthen the

responsibility of in-service and supply managers in the

domains. The special nature of each domain will be

considered and new procedures and organisations will

be explored.

The efficiency and effectiveness of the Federal

Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information

Technology and In-Service Support must be

ensured and, in the long term, increased. In order

to enhance the operational and materiel readiness

of the armed forces for scenarios of national and

collective defence, we must improve the balance

between tasks, personnel and assets, including

processes and their interfaces. The Implementation

Procurement Organisation working group has laid

the foundations, and we must now build on these

foundations to achieve our goal.

In addition, the parameter of operational and

materiel readiness, i.e. concrete data on the

material readiness of individual systems, must be

given more consideration when decisions

on armaments projects are made.

Optimisation of the procurement and in-service

support organisation

The key to optimisation is appropriate decision-

making bodies involving all stakeholders (strategic

planning board) that make binding decisions at an

early date in the procurement process on what is

required and how it should be procured. To prepare

these decisions, cooperation between the responsible

directorates in the Ministry, the Bundeswehr Planning

Office, the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment,

Information Technology and In-Service Support, and

the domain commands must be intensified during this

phase.

The relevant aspects (technical, legal, economic, risks,

and market situation) must be considered at this early

stage and with all stakeholders and must be evalu-

ated in the process of selecting a procurement option.

Owing to available financial and personnel resources,

we will make greater use of purchases and complex

services as procurement options in addition to the

current “Customer Product Management” (CPM).

The comprehensive digitalisation of the procurement

and in-service support processes plays a vital role in

this context and therefore has priority. This includes

the harmonisation and automation of processes as

well as continuous data and information management.

This supports a common and comprehensive situation

picture and improves process control through readily

available and qualitatively sound information at all

process stages.

The procurement organisation outside the Federal

Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Tech-

nology and In-Service Support will be strengthened

and equipped with the resources it needs to accom-

plish its tasks effectively and efficiently.

At the same time, we will expand the “Bundeswehr

Purchasing” procurement option as an independent

pillar of Bundeswehr procurement and will make it an

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“in-house” service provider for the Bundeswehr and

the Ministry

In this context, the Bundeswehr Service Centres will

play an important role as competent local service

partners for the forces. We will quickly and consis-

tently use the potential of automation and digitalisa-

tion for projects such as electronic ordering platforms.

The digitalisation of the Bundeswehr – and thus of its

procurement system – has taken an important step

forward with the introduction of cluster logic, i.e. the

definition of conceptually coherent subsets with clear

responsibilities. This enables us to keep pace with

the short innovation cycles of modern information

technology. We must continue on the path of digitali-

sation and the central provision of IT services for the

Bundeswehr and must pool the necessary organisa-

tional elements.

With regard to the complex questions of procure-

ment and in-service support, the Federal Ministry of

Defence will examine other opportunities for optimi-

sation. At the same time, we must explore whether

public procurement law will allow us to realise

complex military procurement projects faster, more

cost-effectively, and in line with the requirements of

the Bundeswehr.

5. Federal defence administration

Defence administration structures must also be effi-

cient, effective, robust, and able to exercise command

and control in critical situations up to and including

national and collective defence. As in the armed

forces, we will take corrective action wherever top-

heavy structures have emerged which have created

unclear responsibilities.

Tasks, powers, and responsibility must be structured

in such a way that they form a clearly defined unit

and allow rapid transitions between peacetime and

crisis operations. To this end, we must respond to the

effects of the organisational and structural adapta-

tions of the armed forces to the regional structures

of the federal defence administration and to optimise

working relationships. We must consider strength-

ening the regional and technical structures of (local)

organisations as key service providers and first points

of contact for the military.

Additionally, we will adapt the internal structures of

the federal defence administration in such a way that

they contribute to robustness and agility in crisis situ-

ations. It is important that we establish robust rela-

tionships with agencies and organisations outside the

Bundeswehr which can support us in such situations

with the necessary services, personnel, and materiel.

To this end, we must amend emergency preparedness

and emergency control legislation accordingly.

Procedures and processes in select areas such as per-

sonnel management as well as morale, welfare, and

support must be further modernised, made more effi-

cient and accelerated in order to ensure better, more

flexible, and situation-appropriate mission accom-

plishment and to strengthen social security.

Infrastructure

The enormous infrastructure requirements of the

Bundeswehr call for a further acceleration of the cum-

bersome process of providing and maintaining infra-

structure. Where acceleration is necessary, we must

concentrate financial and executive responsibilities in

our own area of responsibility, at least for particularly

relevant Bundeswehr building projects, in order to

exert control over infrastructure processes in these

cases. This will help disentangle responsibilities and

will strengthen the Bundeswehr as a result. Interfaces

will be minimised, and the planning and control of

procedures will be better aligned. To this end, studies

must be conducted and legal foundations laid.

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Personnel

The target strength of the Bundeswehr will remain

unchanged. This will confront us with major challen-

ges in the future. Personnel development must be

enhanced and made fit for the future so that we can

recruit new and retain current personnel.

If the Bundeswehr is to remain attractive as an em-

ployer, we must have faster and more agile recruit-

ment procedures and proactive and flexible personnel

management that is geared, as far as possible, towards

the individual interests of personnel.

Education and qualification will play an important

role in the future. The potential in this area must be

utilised more consistently for the Bundeswehr and its

personnel. For this reason, special attention must be

paid to education. A special focus will be placed on the

Bundeswehr schools of general vocational education.

Measures that will make personnel development

fit for the future include: the introduction of a new

military performance evaluation system, the further

development of the procedure to assess officers’

prospects and the career prospect conference system

as a whole, and the continued development of the

personnel development concepts for civil servants and

employees specifically geared toward the needs of

personnel.

In the context of modern, attractive, forward-looking

and agile personnel management, personnel develop-

ment is geared, as far as possible, toward the indi-

vidual interests of personnel. The intention is to set

the course toward successful fulfilment of personnel

requirements by means of proactive and early intro-

duction of personnel considerations into change

processes. This is combined with targeted recruitment

and reliable, modern personnel management. Indi-

vidual life phases are to be taken into consideration

appropriately wherever possible and to an even

greater extent than before to contribute to making

service in the Bundeswehr more attractive.

Sustainability and climate protection

The concept for a sustainability and climate protec-

tion strategy in the FMoD area of responsibility that

is currently being produced is the next important step

toward achieving the federal government’s climate

goals. These goals are enshrined in the current Federal

Climate Change Act, the most important being Ger-

man climate neutrality by 2045 and a climate-neutral

federal administration by 2030.

The planned strategy will identify the specific goals

and necessary measures to implement sustainability

and climate protection in the FMoD area of respon-

sibility while ensuring the operational and materiel

readiness of the armed forces. At the same time, the

initiated measures – some of which have already been

implemented successfully – will be continued and

systematically expanded (examples include the report

of the expert group for mobile energy systems in the

strategic industry dialogue, the pilot projects initiated

in the context of “green barracks” and the ongoing ini-

tiative to expand the charging station infrastructure).

The overarching sustainability goals affect several ele-

ments of the FMoD area of responsibility. The greatest

challenges will arise with regard to infrastructure and

mobility.

Additional measures will be continuously developed

in line with the strategy in order to facilitate the

implementation of the comprehensive transformation

process toward climate-neutral armed forces and a

climate-neutral Bundeswehr.

6. The Federal Ministry of Defence

Structures and processes in the FMoD area of respon-

sibility must be clear and compatible at the national

and international levels. In line with the reduction of

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top-heavy organisational structures in the Bundeswehr

and the decentralisation of the defence administration,

during the next legislative period, the ministry should

also be streamlined and downsized to match its core

tasks.

Personnel made available over the course of this

process will be used to augment subordinate elements.

These changes are geared toward the need for clear

competencies and areas of responsibility.

The FMoD must continue to perform the following

core tasks:

• As the ministry responsible for the Bundeswehr as

a parliamentary army, recognise the special coop-

eration relationship with the Bundestag

• Exercise the necessary functional supervision over

the numerous and diverse activities of subordinate

agencies and, above all

• Allow the Federal Minister of Defence to com-

mand and control the Bundeswehr in the com-

plex crises of our times and on the basis of a

real-time situation picture.

The growing demands on Germany and the Bundes-

wehr based on their roles require a clearer representa-

tion of the strategic leadership level to coordinate and

control the armed forces in the FMoD.

The further development of the ministry during the

upcoming legislative period must take into consid-

eration completed evaluations and finalised decisions

related to the detailed planning of the armed forces

and subordinate structures. In addition to the general

focus on specific ministerial tasks, the focus will be on

improving the strategic command and control capa-

bility to coordinate and control the armed forces in

peacetime and in crises.

As the executive group’s first step toward fostering a

strategic industrial policy, State Secretary Mr Zimmer

last year established the Staff for the Strategic Manage-

ment of Armaments Activities. Given the growing


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importance of national key technologies for security

policy and the strategic orientation of the German

government with regard to enterprises that are relevant

to security, this area of work will become more impor-

tant in the FMoD as well.

The Federal Ministry of Defence is to focus on its

essential ministerial tasks, systematically streamline

the leadership structures of the ministry, reduce

top-heaviness and make distances shorter. In doing

so, high-value resources can be made available for the

troops.

In order to facilitate this streamlining process, to sup-

port the ministry in its work and to assign responsibility

where it belongs, tasks must be transferred to other

elements. In this context we must investigate which

tasks can be performed by existing elements and to

what extent new elements, e.g. a Bundeswehr Office,

may need to be established. This will also happen in

conjunction with the examination of the future role and

responsibilities of the Armed Forces Office.

7. Strategic capacity

Strengthening the FMoD’s analysis capacity

The coalition agreement for the 19th legislative

period provides for a significant improvement of

Germany’s strategic capacity. Security-relevant

trends must be recognised and analysed earlier,

conclusions drawn from this must be put into

a greater context, and our own efforts must be

planned in the longer term. To this end, political

analyses, research findings, situation pictures and

background information from external and internal

sources must be combined to create an integrated

assessment. Recommendations for action on secu-

rity and defence policy matters are to be supplied

to the ministry’s executive group on a more direct

path. The steps that the FMoD has already taken to

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this end (e.g. cooperation with think tanks) are to

be systematically developed further. The aim is to

strengthen and expand the current analysis capacity

of the ministry in view of a rapidly changing security

situation. This will anchor the comprehensive

whole-of-government approach to security more

firmly within the FMoD.

Security week for broad discussion

Security and defence policy is a core area of public

services. In order to handle this area of government

appropriately in its entire thematic, political and

administrative scope, the FMoD should, starting in the

next legislative period, host an annual security week

during which this topic is discussed comprehensively

and publicly in all its urgency and diversity. The aim

is to make the entirety of the security situation of the

nation, including foreign and security and defence

policy, more visible in politics and create public

awareness.

National security council

We will continue to advocate within the government

for the establishment of a national security council to

pool all ministries’ subject matter expertise and reli-

ably coordinate our strategic instruments. The com-

prehensive approach to security cannot be assigned

to one field of policy, area of expertise or to a single

ministry.

A comprehensive situation picture and well-coordi-

nated options for action across all available instru-

ments of government requires the expertise, data,

facts, analyses and assessments of all relevant min-

istries and players. Overall, this national security coun-

cil could effectively utilise the Federal Chancellor’s

authority to issue guidelines in order to improve

strategic coordination, increase the operational com-

mand and control capability and coordinate across

ministries in crisis situations.

8. Planning law and funding

The security of the Federal Republic of Germany is a

whole-of-government task. We therefore support a

Bundeswehr planning law that creates planning secu-

rity and facilitates a long-term, balanced modernisa-

tion of the Bundeswehr while providing the flexibility

required for a large-scale organisation.

A Bundeswehr planning law must help to make

security less dependent on economic fluctuations

and short-term changes of public opinion and ensure

reliable funding over a longer time period for security

as a core task of the state.

A Bundeswehr planning law must provide a reliable

basis for the funding of essential large-scale projects

that will benefit the entire nation, especially when

these projects include an international or multina-

tional component. It must also target the actual

needs of the Bundeswehr, which are most often met

by smaller projects. Providing a power generator for

the command post can be as essential to the modern

armed forces’ operational and materiel readiness as the

timely delivery of new combat vehicles.

For this reason, we support a Bundeswehr planning law

that is adopted by parliament and therefore provides a

more binding long-term planning framework than the

federal government’s current budgets. Considerable

participation of parliament must also be ensured in the

context of such a law. This is in line with the nature of

the Bundeswehr as a parliamentary army. This Bundes-

wehr planning law would establish the framework for

a long-term and guaranteed increase of the defence

budget, provide planning security for the Bundeswehr

and facilitate investment in future technologies.


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NEXT STEPS

We aim to immediately begin with the implementa-

tion of the key elements by realising initial mea-

sures. As a priority, we will

• Establish a Bundeswehr Space Command in Kalkar

under the command of the Air Force in the third

quarter 2021

• Assume the working structure for the new com-

mand and control organisation in the Cyber and

Information Domain Service Headquarters by

1 October 2021 and transfer it into the new com-

mand and control organisation starting on

1 October 2022

• Establish the Strategic Planning Board of the FMoD

Executive Group this year

• Examine ways of strengthening the responsibility

of in-service and supply managers in the domains,

while taking the concept of system houses for the

domain-based coordination of competencies and

responsibilities into consideration

• Review options to further expand the “Bundeswehr

Purchasing” procurement option as an independent

pillar of Bundeswehr procurement

• Establish a joint doctrine centre at the Bundeswehr

Command and Staff College

• Finalise the review of options for increased inte-

gration or more effective cohesion of the logistic,

medical and other cross-cutting support forces in

the various domains

IV.

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• Prepare proposals regarding command relation-

ships and the allocation of the joint elements

• Establish the Surgeon General of the Bundeswehr

in the FMoD by 1 January 2022

• Establish the Bundeswehr Health Care Headquarters

in Koblenz starting on 1 April 2022 and

• Establish the Bundeswehr Territorial Operations Com-

mand in Bonn and Berlin starting on 1 April 2022.

The identified need for examinations and reviews

to facilitate further decisions will be addressed

immediately so the necessary follow-up decisions

can be made at the beginning of the next legislative

period.

The implementation of the measures is to begin as

soon as possible after the corresponding reviews

are concluded and should be completed by 2025.

NEXT STEPS40

42

Publisher

Federal Ministry of Defence

Leitungsstab

Stauffenbergstraße 18

10785 Berlin

Version

Mai 2021

Design

Redaktion der Bundeswehr/Daniela Hebbel

Picture credits

Cover picture: Bundeswehr/Stefan Petresen/Gergs/Marco Dorow/Martina Pump/

Daniela Hebbel (Montage)

Print

Federal Ministry of Defence

Further Information

Online on

www.bmvg.de

www.bundeswehr.de

The brochure is part of the public relations work

of the Federal Ministry of Defence.

It is given free of charge and is not intended to sale.

IMPRINT

Imprint

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Documents

Key Elements of the Bundeswehr of the Future