Kant on Responsibility

8/13/2019 Kant on Responsibility

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II. Responsibility as Absolute Spontaneity: Kant and Transcendental Freedom

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Personhood and Responsibility.

Kant situates responsibility within the sphere of rational agency within the hori!on of

sub"ecti#ity of the sub"ectum. A certain conception of freedom $as causa sui self%determination

and autonomy& ma'es possible such responsibility and Kant(s philosophical reflection on

responsibility ta'es place within the hori!on of the freedom of the sub"ect specifying further

what Aristotle had metaphorically designated as the )paternity* of the act. +ere agency the

principle of the act is further determined in terms of freedom and spontaneity freedom being

defined as )absolute spontaneity* that capacity by the sub"ect to begin absolutely a new series of

causes. For it is indeed the sub"ect the sub"ectum the spontaneous I that is the causal foundation

and absolute beginning $transcendental freedom& and which Kant designates in the ,riti-ue of

Pure Reason as the locus and basis of responsibility $as imputatibility Imputabilitt&.

Responsibility is understood in terms of the sub"ectum that lies at the basis of the act.

Kant determines responsibility as imputation based on the freedom of the sub"ect and

claims further that responsibility as self%responsibility defines personhood as such. /ltimately

Kant pri#ileges the notion of personhood within his interpretation of sub"ecti#ity personhood

actually being defined by responsibility and self%responsibility. The Kantian determination of

the essence of sub"ecti#ity is indeed threefold and as it were split into three fundamental senses

corresponding to the three determinations of the I that he retains: the I in the sense of the

determining I $the 0I thin'0 or transcendental apperception&1 the I in the sense of the

determinable I $the empirical I the I as ob"ect&1 and the I in the sense of the I as moral person as

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end in itself. 4n the whole the Kantian determination of sub"ecti#ity can be di#ided into two

fundamental senses: on the one hand that of the broad formal concept of the ego in general in

the sense of self%consciousness whether as transcendental consciousness the I%thin' or as the I%

ob"ect that is personality ta'en in the sense of rationality1 on the other hand the strict and

proper concept of personality that of the moral person defined by responsibility.

5ith respect to the first sense Kant follows the traditional definition of man as rational

animal. +owe#er the union of animality and rationality does not suffice to fully define the

essence of personality or personhood through which man is not only considered as a particular

entity among others but as freedom and self%responsibility. Strictly spea'ing personality applies

to the sub"ect only as it is recogni!ed as capable of responsibility of imputation that is

responsible for itself. The essence of the person is self%responsibility. The practical sub"ect

en"oys a certain preeminence o#er the theoretical sub"ect because unli'e the theoretical

determination of the I deemed 0impossible0 by Kant in the Paralogisms the practical

determination of the sub"ect alone is capable of establishing a positi#e account of personhood as

end in itself and self%responsibility. For instance the person6s being an )end in itself*

$Selbst!wec'haftig'eit& such as it is displayed in the Kantian theory of the moral person could

be posited as one of the most fundamental determination of the human being as Kant situates the

ultimate ends of man in morality. In fact the characteri!ation of the sub"ect as moral with its

distinction between persons and things is determinant for the notion of responsibility more

precisely of imputation: As person the human being is understood as a being capable of

imputation as being responsible for its own self.

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The Foundation of Responsibility in Transcendental Freedom.

Responsibility indeed constitutes for Kant the differentiating feature between persons and

things the defining characteristic of personhood. In contrast with things Kant asserts a person is

a sub"ect that is capable of imputation. In his 9octrine of Right Kant eplains that a person is )a

sub"ect whose actions can be imputed to him* whereas a )thing is that to which nothing can be

imputed.*;This capacity to be a sub"ect as ground of imputation is owed to the faculty of

freedom ta'en as )transcendental freedom* which determines the possibility of responsibility

and moral responsibility: In the ,riti-ue of Practical Reason Kant insists that freedom is the

ground for all subse-uent responsibility writing )the -uestion of freedom< lies at the

foundation of all moral laws and accountability to them* which means that )without

transcendental freedom in its proper meaning which is alone a priori practical no moral law and

no accountability to it are possible.*2Responsibility rests upon the sub"ecti#ity of the free

sub"ect. Kant states that an )action is called a deed insofar as it comes under obligatory laws and

hence insofar as the sub"ect in doing it is considered in terms of the freedom of his choice. =y

such an action the agent is regarded as the author >/rheber? of its effect >5ir'ung? and this

together with the action itself can be imputed to him if one is pre#iously ac-uainted with the

laws by #irtue of which an obligation rests on these.*7As we will see transcendental freedom is

the foundation of responsibility.

4ne finds in Kant a crucial de#elopment on transcendental freedom and on the

imputation of the acting sub"ect in the ,riti-ue of Pure Reason in the third antinomy in the

Transcendental 9ialectic $)Third ,onflict of the Transcendental Ideas*& also 'nown as the

)cosmological* antinomy. The imputability of the sub"ect is indeed both a moral or "uridical

notion and a cosmological or metaphysical one and both in#ol#e a fundamental philosophical

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freedom* $,PR A72=C8 p.72&. )In only two ways* $we recall that for Aristotle things

could happen in three ways: through necessity through fortune or chance and through our

#oluntary action& and only through two causalities: mechanistic causality $in Kant(s sense of a

mechanism of nature& and freedom. For Kant there are thus only two ways for things to happen:

either by necessity $they could not ha#e happened any other way& following the uni#ersal laws

of nature by which each thing is at it were )pushed* or determined by a preceding cause1 or else

from freedom a 'ind of spontaneity or free surge that does not follow the uni#ersal laws of

nature $at least as we will see not in causality although it does follow it in time following a

distinction made by Kant to which I will return shortly& and is therefore not )pushed* by some

preceding cause that would determine it. Kant presents it as a sort of originary capacity to begin

absolutely )from itself* i.e. spontaneously. )=y freedom in the cosmological sense on the

contrary >to the causality of nature? I understand the faculty of beginning a state from itself $#on

selbst& the causality of which does not in turn stand under another cause determining it in time in

accordance with the law of nature.* $,PR A 77=C; p.77&. et us clarify from the outset:

both causalities are operati#e in the world in a singular intertwining. Let they are nonetheless

said to be radically distinct as causalities in a classic Kantian dualismE.

4ur focus will bear mostly on so%called causality by or through freedom as it is the one

instrumental in Kant(s definition of responsibility. Kant first and pro#isionally characteri!es

freedom negati#ely as a sort of )lawlessness* $,PR A@@D=@D p.@E& rebel to uni#ersal

determinism leaping out of natural causality. Indeed in one sense $the negati#e sense& freedom

is independence from the laws of nature a )liberation from coercion* or )from the guidance of

all rules.* Freedom in this contet is identified with lawlessness: Kant for instance spea's of the

)lawless faculty of freedom* $,PR A@;=@D3 p.@E3& and he goes so far as to claim that

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freedom is )contrary* to causal law. )Thus transcendental freedom is contrary to the causal law*

$,PR A@@=@D7 p.@E&. Freedom seems as antinomical to rules and laws as nature is

structured according to them to such an etent that Kant adds pleasantly: )if freedom were

determined according to laws it would not be freedom but nothing other than nature*M $,PR

A@@D=@D p.@E&. 5ith transcendental freedom we are as it were leaping out of causality

that is to say of nature3if not out of the world. Such faculty of freedom is indeed literally )out

of this world* because it cannot appear in the field of appearances as a spatio%temporal gi#en

and is for that #ery reason termed )transcendental.* Kant eplains that freedom ta'en in the

cosmological sense that is as the faculty of beginning a state from itself )is a pure

transcendental idea which first contains nothing borrowed from eperience and second the

ob"ect of which cannot be gi#en determinately in any eperience


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beginning pro#ided by a first cause. This is why Kant insists that by following the mere causality

of nature one could ne#er attain a )completeness of the series on the side of the causes

descending one from another* $,PR A@@C=@D@ p.@E@&. This aporia signifies the impossibility

of the antithesis $)There is no freedom but e#erything in the world happens solely in accordance

with laws of nature*& which precisely claimed that there was only one causality the causality of

nature: such causality cannot pro#ide the first beginning that would ensure the completeness of

causes and thus satisfy its own re-uirement. Kant then concludes that )the proposition that all

causality is possible only in accordance with laws of nature >nach Oeset!en der Natur? when

ta'en in its unlimited uni#ersality contradicts itself and therefore this causality cannot be

assumed to be the only one* $,PR A@@C=@D@ p. @E@ emphasis mine&.

As a conse-uence another causality must be admitted one in which )something happens

without its cause being further determined by another pre#ious cause* $,PR A@@C=@D@ p.

@E@&. That implicit reference to the motif of a first cause and thus of the causa sui is presented

by Kant in terms of spontaneity i.e. that which begins from itself an )absolute causal

spontaneity beginning from itself* that Kant also names )transcendental freedom*

transcendental insofar as it transcends the course of nature e#en though it alone pro#ides the

possibility of a completeness of the series of appearances on the side of the causes.;2An

intelligible freedom must be assumed although )no insight into it is achie#ed* $,PR A@8=

@DE p.@EC& since it is not a part of the phenomenal world;7. It can thus only be assumed as an

outside of the world and yet this outside ma'es the world possible by securing the completeness

of causes. The completeness of the world and thus its possibility rests upon this noumenal

outer%worldly freedom. Such is the enigma presented by Kant: the completeness of the world lies

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outside the world and yet this outside constitutes the world1 it is literally the outside of the

world.

Transcendental freedom Kant eplains is the capacity of a cause to produce a state

spontaneously or )from itself* $#on Selbst& $,RP A77=C; p. 77&. A transcendentally free

cause would be a )first cause* that is without a prior cause. The whole determination of

responsibility as imputation will re#ol#e around the possibility of such a causa sui. Kant "ustifies

this claim by appealing to a re-uirement of reason going bac' to the Ancient tradition of the first

mo#er: )The confirmation of the need of reason to appeal to a first beginning from freedom in

the series of natural causes is clearly and #isibly e#ident from the fact that $with the eception of

the picurean school& all the philosophers of Anti-uity saw themsel#es as obliged to assume a

first mo#er for the eplanation of motions in the world i.e. a freely acting cause which began

this series of states first and from itself* $,PR A@8=@DE p. @EE&. The first instance of a free%

acting cause is thus the first mo#er which allows one to concei#e of an origin of the world. The

origin of the world cannot be in the world. Let as we saw the world as a totality is only possible

on such basis. In fact nature and freedom are for Kant thoroughly intertwined: absolute

spontaneity is said to begin )from itself* )a series of appearances that runs according to natural

laws* $,PR A@@C=@D@ p. @E@& this already indicating that free causality although

independent from natural causality is intertwined it: Qust as natural necessity rests on

transcendental freedom freedom in turn produces effects in the world. 5e will return to this

intertwining shortly. At this stage it suffices to posit that natural causality does not gi#e us a first

cause1 the causality of freedom does thus satisfying the principle of sufficient reason.

Kant recogni!es that so far he has only established the necessity of a first beginning of a

series of appearances from freedom )only to the etent that this is re-uired to ma'e

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comprehensible an origin of the world* $,PR A@@E=@DC p. @EC& which clearly for Kant does

not apply to us. +owe#er he insists because )the faculty of beginning a series in time entirely

on its own is thereby pro#ed* $while he immediately recogni!es as we alluded to abo#e that this

proof gi#es us no insight into it since such a faculty is transcendental and ne#er to be obser#ed

within a field of appearances& then )we are permitted* he continues )also to allow that in the

course of the world different series may begin on their own< and to ascribe to the substances in

those series the faculty of acting from freedom* $,PR A@8=@DE p.@EC&. Kant thus allows for

an analogy between the transcendent creator of the world and rational agents operating in the

world by #irtue of this capacity to begin absolutely to be a spontaneous free cause cause of

itself causa sui. Through this analogy with the prime mo#er in the contet of a discussion on the

aporia of natural causality Kant pro#es the possibility of freedom which can thus be admitted as

operating in the world. Further Kant warns us not to be )stopped here by a misunderstanding

namely that since a successi#e series in the world can ha#e only a comparati#ely first beginning

because a state of the world must always precede it perhaps no absolutely first beginning of the

series is possible during the course of the world* $,PR A@;=@D3 p.@EE&. This is only a

misunderstanding )for here we are tal'ing of an absolute beginning not as far as time is

concerned but as far as causality is concerned* $,PR A@;=@D3 p.@EE&. There is the origin of

the world and there is also an origin in the world. It will be possible to spea' of an absolute

beginning in the world than's to this distinction introduced by Kant between beginning in time

and beginning in causality.

Indeed Kant posits the freedom of the will in terms of the spontaneity of the act itself

resting on the notion of causa sui. Now this concept traditionally only applies to Ood and Kant

does ma'e eplicit reference to the tradition of the prime mo#er. +owe#er such a first cause

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only pertained to the origin of the world. The issue here is determining how can there be also an

origin in the world and how can one reconcile such a free spontaneity with uni#ersal

determinism or causality of nature +ow does one begin absolutely when e#ery e#ent must

presuppose a prior e#ent that causes it +ow can there be an origin within the causal networ' of

nature Kant himself recogni!ed the difficulty in admitting a free cause that would operate

within the world that is within a chain of causes for all that has been established so far was the

necessity of a first beginning of a series of appearances from freedom as it pertained to the origin

of the world while )one can ta'e all the subse-uent states to be a result of mere natural laws*

$)Remar' on the Third Antinomy* ,PR A@@E=@DC p.@EC&. This is the antinomy of pure

reason this idea of a free cause or unconditioned causality constituting for Kant )the real

stumbling bloc' for philosophy* $,PR A@@E=@DC p. @EC&. Kant attempts to resol#e this

problem by distinguishing a beginning in time from a beginning in causality the latter applying

to free agency operating in the world. As $transcendentally& free agents we can ne#er begin in

time but we can begin in causality hence pro#iding a basis for responsibility. 4nly in the case of

di#ine creation beginning in time and beginning in causality are merged. For our own free

actions the beginning is only in causality $as we are not origins of the world but origins in the

world that is as beginning in causality&. In the causality of freedom in the beginning in

causality no antecedent cause determines my actions which in no way can )be regarded as

simple causal conse-uences of the antecedent state of the agent*. In the midst of the world and

within the world and in the course of time itself certain e#ents somehow happen as absolute

beginnings that is from )a faculty of absolutely beginning a state* $,PR A@@=@D7 p.@E&.

To the potential ob"ection that no absolute beginning can happen in the world Kant replies that

there can be a comparati#ely first beginning that there can be an absolute beginning $in

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causality& occurring in medias res. Kant is eplicit on this point namely that there is an origin of

the world but there are also origins in the world writing that )we are permitted also to allow that

in the course of the world different series may begin on their own as far as their causality is

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series* $,PR A@8=@DE p.@EE&. 5ith respect to free decision and action natural causes

eercise no determining influence whatsoe#er. Free action does indeed )follow upon them* but

)does not follow from* them $die !war auf "ene folgt aber daraus nicht erfolgt&.

Now what is significant in such an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself

)absolute spontaneity of an action* or transcendental freedom %% which lies in the )intention* or

)resolution* $ntschliessung& and the act Kant specifies %% is that it will be determined as ground

for imputability that is for the #ery possibility of responsibility as accountability of the sub"ect.

This power or performati#ity of transcendental freedom $defined as we recall by Kant as the

power GermHgen of beginning a state spontaneously or from oneself #on Selbst& as decision to

act outside of natural causality pro#ides a ground. In the )Remar' on the Third Antinomy*

Kant clarifies that the originary capacity of initiating a causal series gi#es itself as the )ground*

of what he terms Imputabilitt or imputability. It appears here that responsibility as imputability

rests upon a ground a basis a sub"ectum and in fact re-uires it. Kant(s account of responsibility

i.e. the imputation of the act as articulated in the third antinomy thus relies on an ontology of

the sub"ectum for it is because there is a sub"ectum at the foundation of the act that the latter can

be imputed or ascribed to an agent. A certain conception of the human agency is here proposed

consisting in understanding it as sub"ect and sub"ectum.;The infinite chain of causes stops in a

first cause allowing for the ultimate ground of the act to appear $as the collo-uial epression

says )the buc' stops here*&. The infinite chain of antecedent causes of )reasons* of )whats*

gi#es way to a )who* to an author%sub"ect as first cause of the act as ground of imputation. The

search for reasons can proceed infinitely but the search for the author of the act is finite and

stops when the )who* of the act is identified as ground of the act. Responsibility thus means

here the imputation of a free sub"ect. Kant writes:

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If freedom means acting independently from eternal causes $)heteronomy of efficient

causes*& my actions cannot be said to be regulated by some heteronomical principle. Rather I

act freely when I follow my own principles as freedom is the )faculty of determining oneself

from oneself* $,PR A7@=C2 p.77&. 9espite the common #iew that freedom is not sub"ect

to the law and despite Kant(s own formulations in the third antinomy according to which

freedom seems )contrary to causal law* in fact freedom is the act of gi#ing oneself the law

followed. The will cannot be thought of ecept as some 'ind of causality producing effects.

5hereas e#erything in nature wor's according to laws a rational being has the power to act

according to its conception of the law that is according to principles: )this conception is the

will* $Foundations p.2C7&. Rational agents posit an end more precisely posit themsel#es as an

end and to that etent are called persons. ,onse-uently the agent is free and responsible as an

autonomous being. Kant defines personality as autonomy: It rests upon the freedom of the will as

autonomous and therefore a person is only sub"ect to the laws he posits himself. This determines

the moral person in terms of autonomy autonomy being the cornerstone of such ethics of

freedom. This ethics is re#ealed in the feeling of respect.

Kant writes in Foundations of the Betaphysics of Borals that )The =eings whose

eistence does not depend on our will but on nature if they are not rational beings ha#e only

relati#e worth as means and are therefore called )things*1 rational beings on the other hand are

designated )persons* because their nature indicates that they are ends in themsel#es $i.e. things

which may not be used merely as means&. Such a being is thus an ob"ect of respect


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the law. The lawgi#ing which determines all worth must therefore ha#e a dignity.* That is an

unconditional worth. For such a being )only the word respect( is suitable* $Foundations p.

2DE&. This dignity lies in the fact that man ne#er eists merely as a means but as an end $that is

as an absolute priceless #alue& precisely to the etent that in the feeling of respect he gi#es

himself to himself and belongs to himself as responsibility for himself. The moral person eists

as its own end1 it is itself an end. Respect re#eals that the person eists for the sa'e of itself that

it is an end for itself and that the self eists for the sa'e of itself. ;D5hat is categorically

imperati#e is no longer a di#ine command for that would still be heteronomical1 rather

autonomy is the basis for dignity and respect and moral worth. Self%worth is the fundamental

content of morality. This is why Kant stresses that autonomy is the )basis of the dignity of both

human nature and e#ery rational nature* $Foundations p. 2DE&.

The famous fundamental principle of morality states: 0Act so that you use humanity in

your own person as well as in the person of e#eryone else ne#er merely as a means but always at

the same time as an end.* As a result Kant places the principle of morality in the autonomy of

the sub"ect stressing that in pure morality man is not bound to eternal laws but is sub"ect only

to his own. )The moral principle I will call the principle of autonomy of the will in contrast to all

other principles which I accordingly count under heteronomy* $Foundations p. 2DC&. As he

articulated in the ,riti-ue of Pure Reason the rational being has two points of #iew from which

it can regard itself: first as belonging to the world of sense and thus sub"ect to laws of nature

$heteronomy&1 second as belonging to the intelligible world under laws which are independent

from nature and are based in reason alone. As belonging to the intelligible world man can ne#er

concei#e the causality of his own will ecept as free and as independent from the causes of the

sensible world. Thus the concept of freedom is indistinguishable from that of autonomy.

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A law proceeding from a self%legislating rational will J and not from a heteronomical

principle %% obligates us only through respect. Since it is the rational will that is the author of this

law it is in a deeper sense the rational will that is the ob"ect of respect. Rational nature can be

seen not only to be an end in itself $with fundamental ob"ecti#e worth& but to ha#edignity

$absolute or incomparable worth&. Respect here is respect for the moral law. Kant describes this

law as being first negati#e in its effect for it tears one away from one6s inclinations tendencies

and )sensible feelings.* It )humiliates* our self%conceit )repulses* feelings and thus has a

negati#e effect on them. +owe#er "ust as in Spino!a an emotion can only be o#ercome by

another emotion the repulsed sensible feelings will gi#e way to a positi#e feeling that of

respect. The feeling of respect arising against the bac'ground of the humiliation of the sensible

is therefore not itself sensible1 it is a priori intellectual. Kant writes: )And as stri'ing down i.e.

humiliating self%conceit >the law? is an ob"ect of the greatest respect and thus the ground of a

positi#e feeling which is not of empirical origin.*;E

Respect for the law should also re#eal the self which feels respect for itself in its =eing

and in an essential way. In the feeling of respect the self is immediately re#ealed to itself not in

an empirical mode but in a non%sensible a priori way. Reason freely gi#es itself o#er to the

moral law1 it produces as it were the feeling of respect for the law: respect for the law is the

acti#e ego6s respect for itself as the self which is responsible. To the etent that it is both a priori

and self%produced the feeling of respect is a self%affection and respect as submission before the

law a self%submission. =y submitting to the law I in fact submit to myself and thereby am

re#ealed to myself as freedom self%determination and self%responsibility. In sub"ecting myself to

the law I sub"ect myself to myself as pure reason that is in this sub"ection to myself I raise

myself to myself as a free self%determining being. Respect re#eals the self as responsibility to

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itself and for itself. Respect thus manifests an essential characteristic of the person: In

responsibility for itself the person is appropriated to itself in its own proper self: respect engages

the responsibility of a self that in each case I ha#e to be. In respect I raise myself )up* to myself

I )own up* to myself I answer for myself by ta'ing the responsibility myself. This concept of

self%responsibility will become the #ery meaning of enlightenment for Kant as he proclaimed in

the essay )5hat is nlightenment*

The Ideal of Self%Responsibility

4ne 'nows that famous passage from Foundations of the Betaphysics of Borals where

Kant writes: )+ere we see philosophy brought to what it is in fact a precarious position which

should be made fast e#en though it is supported by nothing in either hea#en or earth. +ere

philosophy must show its purity as the absolute sustainer of its laws and not the herald of those

which an implanted sense or who 'nows what tutelary nature whispers to it.* A passage as it

were echoed by Niet!sche who wrote in Twilight of the Idols: )For what is freedom +a#ing the

will to be responsible to oneself.*;3Responsibility becomes identified with an ideal of self%

responsibility as autonomy. For Kant the principle of autonomy re-uires that reason )must

regard itself as the author of its principles independent of alien influences* $Foundations p.

2ED&. Autonomous self%responsibility is thus opposed to heteronomous determinations. To that

etent and in contrast with the )causality of all irrational beings* that are determined by the

influence of foreign causes we are defined in terms of responsibility that is autonomous self%

responsibility. In his ;DE@ essay )5hat is nlightenment*28$the full title reads )=eantwortung

der Frage: 5as ist Auf'lrung& answering the -uestion posed by the Re#erend Qohann

Friedrich Hllner $an official in the Prussian go#ernment& and published in the =erlinische

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Bonatsschrift $=erlin Bonthly& Kant famously defines enlightenment as a way out of

immaturity and dependency %% that is out of a state of irresponsibility %% and as a call to

$self&responsibility. As Bichel Foucault has noted the way Kant poses the -uestion of

Auf'lrung is entirely different from other accounts of a historical era in that it is first

characteri!ed negati#ely: )it is neither a world era to which one belongs nor an e#ent whose

signs are percei#ed nor the dawning of an accomplishment. Kant defines Auf'lrung in an

almost entirely negati#e way as an Ausgang an eit( a way out.(*2;That eit is from

irresponsibility and enlightenment is thus the process that releases us from such irresponsibility.

Indeed in the opening lines Kant declares that )nlightenment is man6s release from his self%

incurred tutelage $/nmndig'eit&* /nmndig'eit designating both immaturity and dependence

and )not being of age.* 5hat tutelage 5hat immaturity 5hat irresponsibility Kant defines it

as )man(s inability to ma'e use of his understanding without direction from another* $5

p.@C2 my emphasis&. Irresponsibility is thus the state of being determined in one(s "udgment by

another that is heteronomy. Significantly Kant claims that this dependence on others this being

ruled by others is self%imposed $as Kant spea's of a )self%incurred* tutelage& as if humans were

ultimately responsible for their own irresponsibility and immaturity22. This indicates that

responsibility represents for Kant the essential nature and #ocation of man and that such a

responsibility will be concei#ed outside and against the inter#ention of the other. There lies the

sub"ecti#ist enclosure of the concept of responsibility and the pri#ileging of self%responsibility

being con-uered against the presence of otherness in selfhood. Responsibility would then be the

autonomous practice of one(s reason without the direction of others that is the #ery o#ercoming

of heteronomy.

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Further Kant stresses that in this situation of irresponsibility the issue is not a lac' of

understanding but of courage namely the courage to use one(s "udgment on one(s own. As

Foucault ma'es clear )nlightenment is defined by a modification of the preeisting relation

lin'ing will authority and the use of reason.*27To that etent responsibility as the autonomous

practice of one(s own reason is not a matter of 'nowledge but of the courage to use it

autonomously. Responsibility as autonomous practice thus pro#es to be a matter of power as

Niet!sche would recogni!e when he wrote that )Independence is for the #ery few1 it is a

pri#ilege of the strong* $=O p. @;&. Responsibility is the power to act autonomously and affirm

one(s independence. )Self%incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lac' of reason but in

lac' of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere AudeM >dare to

'now?. +a#e courage to use your own reasonM(%% that is the motto of enlightenment* $5

p.@C2&. 4ne notes here how responsibility is associated with the thematics of power and self%

legislation and how such power arises out of a rupture with any heteronomical principle that is

a rupture with the reliance on the other. Responsibility represents the position of the power of the

autonomous self the auto%position of a so#ereign sub"ecti#ity. For its part irresponsibility

$immaturity& is thereby defined as a $self%incurred& fleeing in the face of this self%determination.

=y calling human beings bac' to their responsibility i.e. the courage to thin' and act on their

own Kant also articulates a call to autonomy responsibility now being defined strictly as

autonomy. In turn the human being in its proper personality is approached in terms of freedom

and self%responsibility.

The whole argument in a sort of self%fulfilling or self%positing circle $recalling the self%

position of power that we noted in Aristotle(s account of responsible decision& de#elops on the

assumption of a primacy of responsibility as self%positing of the self with irresponsibility

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me* $5 @C2&. 4ne can associate this passage with the #ery thrust of Kant critical pro"ect and it

is clear that the pro"ect of a criti-ue of pure reason supposes a sei!ing by reason itself of its own

powers and thus supposes the space of autonomy. These three eamples according to Bichel

Foucault mirror Kant(s three criti-ues: )Kant gi#es three eamples: we are in a state of

immaturity( when a boo' ta'es the place of our understanding when a spiritual director ta'es

the place of our conscience when a doctor decides for us what our diet is to be. $et us note in

passing that the register of these three criti-ues is easy to recogni!e e#en though the tet does

not ma'e it eplicit&*.2The mo#e to self%responsibility is not only difficult it is also inherently

sub#ersi#e to powers: It is not by accident that those rulers who see' power o#er others always

see' before anything else to infantili!e those they rule. )That the step to competence is held to be

#ery dangerous by the far greater portion of humanity< J -uite apart from its being arduous J is

seen to be those guardians who ha#e so 'indly assumed superintendence o#er them* $5 @C2&.

The ruled are made to feel infantile in need of protection in danger. Fear is used in order to

discourage people to become responsible and the guardians )show them the danger which

threatens if they try to go alone* $one can thin' here of how certain political administrations ha#e

used and manipulated public trauma and fear in order to establish control&. People are made to

feel incapable of being on their own. +owe#er as Kant stresses )this danger is not so great for

by falling a few times they would finally learn to wal' alone* $5 @C2&.

4ne(s irresponsibility and immaturity is thus chosen although as Kant notes it then

becomes second nature: )For any single indi#idual man to wor' himself out of the life under

tutelage which has become almost his nature is #ery difficult.* In fact one could say that one

chooses such nature: irresponsibility is the choice through freedom to become nature: this is an

impossible wish but that is the content of irresponsibility for Kant. 4ne wants to stay in this

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immature state as one )has come to be fond of this state* $5 @C2&. It is a matter in resei!ing

one(s responsibility of abandoning the false security of nature of rules and formulas

$)mechanical tools of the rational employment or rather misemployment* to which Kant will

oppose )the dignity of men* who are )now more than machines* 5 @CD& and of reengaging

the ris' of a free eistence. That reappropriating of one(s freedom can ta'e place Kant clarifies

)slowly* as a matter of education and eperience and he warns the reader against a

re#olutionary spirit that would certainly o#erthrow autocratic despotism but could ne#er amount

to )a true reform in ways of thin'ing. Rather new pre"udices will ser#e as old ones to harness the

great unthin'ing mass* $5 @C7&.

The most powerful element the most re#olutionary and emancipatory is in the end

nothing but freedom itself. As Kant states: )For this enlightenment howe#er nothing is re-uired

but freedom* $5 @C7&. 5hat freedom The freedom to use one(s mind and to do so publicly

the freedom )to ma'e public use of one(s reason at e#ery point* $5 @C7&. There are of course

many eamples of restrictions on such freedom and Kant gi#es a list $)=ut I hear on all sides

9o not argueM( The officer says 9o not argue but drillM( The ta%collector: 9o not argue but

payM( The cleric: 09o not argue but belie#eM(*&. A more pernicious way of negating freedom is

to allow for spea'ing one(s mind to allow for so%called )freedom of conscience* as long as it is

not followed by any effect as long as it can be ignored $)Argue as much as you will and about

what you will but obeyM0&. After the e#ents of 3;; whene#er there were epressions of

disagreements with some of the policies of the =ush administration oftentimes one would hear

the president say: )Those people ha#e a right to spea' this is democracy they can say what they

want.* Let in fact what was said was: spea' all you will your opinions will be allowed but

ignored allowed as ignoredM This is why what matters is that this using of one(s reason be truly

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performati#e practical. It must in other words be not only a pri#ate matter but a public

epression in#ol#ing others the whole community.

#erywhere there is restriction on freedom. =ut what sort of restriction is an obstacle to

enlightenment and what sort is not an obstacle but a promoter of it I answer: The public

use of one(s reason must always be free and it alone can bring about enlightenment

among men.

Kant introduces at this "uncture the crucial distinction between the pri#ate and public uses

of reason. )=y the public use of one6s reason I understand the use which a person ma'es of it as a

scholar before the reading public. Pri#ate use I call that which one may ma'e of it in a particular

ci#ic post or office which entrusted to him* $5 @C7&. Reason must be free in its public use $as

a member of the whole community or the society of world%citi!ens& and can tolerate restrictions

in its pri#ate use i.e. within a role in society in a professional setting. Kant pri#ileges the public

use of reason spea'ing out )before the public for "udgment* $5 @C@&: one uses one(s reason

without sub"ecting oneself to any authority. Such is the sense of autonomy. ,learly in some

technical capacities one must not argue but obey. In the pri#ate use of reason one must obey

because one is playing a specific role in society. Let as a member of the reasonable community

as a citi!en as )a scholar* as Kant puts it one can indeed argue. )5hile it would be ruinous for

an officer in ser#ice to -uibble about the suitability of a command gi#en to him by his superior

he must obey1 but the right to ma'e remar's on errors in the military ser#ice and to lay them

before the public for "udgment cannot e-uitably be refused him as a scholar* $5 @C@&. 4ne

must pay hisher taes but as a scholar one can publicly epress one(s doubts on the "ustice of

these taes. A teacher6s use of reason for the sa'e of his congregation )is merely pri#ate* for

Kant $)because this congregation is only a domestic one*&. As a priest one is not free. As a

@


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scholar this cleric )has complete freedom* and )en"oys unlimited freedom to use his own reason

and to spea' in his own person* $5 @C@&.

Any attempt to preclude through submission to religious authority futureenlightenment

of the human race is condemned by Kant as impossible. That would be he adds a )crime

against human nature* as freedom autonomy and thus responsibility are humanity(s essential

#ocation and destiny. +umanity(s #ocation is to be responsible for itself a self%responsibility that

lies in autonomy. This is why Kant adds that the touchstone of e#erything that can be concluded

as a law for a people lies in the -uestion whether the people could ha#e imposed such a law on

itself* $5 @C&. The monarch cannot impose in a despotic way his law on the people for )his

lawgi#ing authority rests on his uniting the general people will in his own*. Such #ocation is in

progress for Kant which eplains why he clarifies that we do not li#e in an enlightened age but

rather in an age of enlightenment. )If we are as'ed 9o we now li#e in an enlightened age( the

answer is No( but we do li#e in an age of enlightenment* $5 @C&. Ban(s self%responsibility

is the tas' and regulati#e idea of our age. )As things now stand much is lac'ing which pre#ents

men from being or easily becoming capable of using their own reason in religious matters

correctly with assurance and free from outside direction* $5 @C%@CC&. Let the way is opened

for men to remo#e the obstacles to enlightenment as )release from self%imposed tutelage.* The

spirit of freedom must epand so that self%responsibility as self%determination and self%

legislation becomes the future of humanity.

The Kantian philosophy of responsibility thus rests on a philosophy of freedom as

transcendental faculty of the sub"ect on the notion of the autonomy of the person and on the

self%responsibility of man. I am responsible for what I ha#e done myself as a rational free agent

and I am responsible as autonomous being. Further the call to responsibility as self%


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responsibility engages the human to ta'e o#er its own destiny it is a self%empowering act. Kant

thus also re#eals the historicity of responsibility by ma'ing of self%responsibility a tas' of

humanity. +owe#er precisely as self%grounding autonomy will pro#e itself ungrounded and the

more it see's to posit itself on its own the deeper the abyss will open beneath it. Autonomy as

self%grounding deconstructs itself and opens onto its own groundlessness. Such groundlessness

will be eposed J indeed eplored %% in Niet!sche(s historical genealogy of accountability with

radical conse-uences for the concept of responsibility.

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;Immanuel Kant. The Betaphysics of Borals $Part ;: The 9octrine of Right& in Practical Philosophy

$NL: ,ambridge /ni#ersity Press ;333& p.7DE.

2Immanuel Kant. The ,riti-ue of Practical Reason 7rdedition trans. ewis 5hite =ec' $NL: The

ibrary of iberal Arts BacBillan ;337& pp.33 ;88 ;8;.7Immanuel Kant. The Betaphysics of Borals p.7DE.

@Immanuel Kant The ,riti-ue of Practical Reason p.7.

+enry Allison. Kant(s Theory of Freedom $,ambridge Ba: ,ambridge /ni#ersity Press ;338& p.;;.

4n a discussion of the third antinomy in terms of a reflection on responsibility one may also consult

Paul Ricoeur e Quste $Paris: ditions sprit ;33& pp. @;%D8 and in particular pp. @D%8.

CImmanuel Kant. The ,riti-ue of Pure Reason trans. Paul Ouyer and Allen 5. 5ood $,ambridge

/K: ,ambridge /ni#ersity Press ;33E& A 77= C; p.77. +ereafter cited as ,PR followed by A

and = edition pages and page number.

D4n the limits of situating the -uestion of freedom in the contet of causality see Qean%uc Nancy The

perience of Freedom $Stanford ,A: Stanford /ni#ersity Press& pp. 2%2C where Nancy comments

upon a passage from +eidegger(s 4n the ssence of +uman Freedom in which +eidegger states that

),ausality in the sense of the traditional comprehension of the being of beings in ordinary as well as

in traditional metaphysics is precisely the fundamental category of being as presence%at%hand* $#olume

7; of +eidegger(s Oesamtausgabe p. 788 cited by Nancy in The perience of Freedom p. 2C& and

that therefore the -uestion of freedom must be approached in a more originary sense than in relation to

causality. I will return to this criti-ue of causality whether in Niet!sche(s genealogy in Sartre(s

radicali!ation of freedom as original freedom or in +eidegger(s criti-ue of causality as improper

access to being.

EFor instance one reads in the first lines of the preface of the Foundations of the Betaphysics of

Borals: )Baterial philosophy howe#er which has to do with definite ob"ects and the laws to which

they are sub"ect is di#ided into two parts. This is because these laws are either laws of nature or laws


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of freedom. The science of the former is physics and that of the latter ethics1 the former is also called

theory of nature and the latter theory of morals.* Immanuel Kant. Foundations of the Betaphysics of

Borals trans. ewis 5hite =ec' in Selections $nglewood ,liffs NQ: Prentice +all ;3EE& p. 2@@.

+ereafter cited as Foundations followed by page number.3Including our own nature as Sartre would recogni!e when he wrote that we do not ha#e a human

nature because we are free.

;8Also in the ),larification of the cosmological idea of a freedom in combination with the uni#ersal

natural necessity* one reads: )The law of nature that e#erything that happens has a cause that since

the causality of this cause i.e. the action precedes in time and in respect of an effect that has arisen

cannot ha#e been always but must ha#e happened and so must also ha#e had its cause among

appearances through which it is determined and conse-uently that all occurrences are empirically

determined in a natural order %% this law through which alone appearances can first constitute one

nature and furnish ob"ects of one eperience is a law of the understanding from which under no

pretet can any departure be allowed or any appearance be eempted1 because otherwise one would put

this appearance outside of all possible eperience thereby distinguishing it from ob"ects of possible

eperience and ma'ing it into a mere thought%entity and a figment of the brain.* ,PR A @2= D8 p.

7E.

;;Further Kant writes that )among the causes in appearance there can surely be nothing that could

begin a series absolutely and from itself. #ery action as appearance insofar as it produces an

occurrence is itself an occurrence or e#ent which presupposes another state in which its cause is

found1 and thus e#erything that happens is only a continuation of the series and no beginning that

would ta'e place from itself is possible in it. Thus in the temporal succession all actions of natural

causes are themsel#es in turn effects which li'ewise presuppose their causes in the time%series. An

original action through which something happens that pre#iously was not is not to be epected from

the causal connection of appearances.* ,PR A @7= D; p. 7E.


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;2Still in the ),larification of the cosmological idea of a freedom in combination with the uni#ersal

natural necessity* Kant eplains that such a free causality would be considered as )an original action

of a cause in regard to appearances which to that etent is not appearance but in accordance with this

faculty intelligible* although it must at the same time as a lin' in the chain of nature be regarded as

)belonging to the world of senses.* ,PR A @@= D2 p.73.

;7Indeed it cannot be part of the phenomenal world as it contradicts the fundamental law of causality

structuring the unity of the world as nature. In fact such freedom is )contrary to the laws of nature*

)to all possible eperience* $,PR AE87=E7;&. +enry Allison clarifies that )transcendental freedom

is opposed to the conditions of the unity of eperience $as specified in the law of causality(& and

therefore can ne#er be met within any possible eperience*. Kant(s Theory of Freedom op.cit. p. 28.

;@As Qean%uc Nancy comments in his own thin'ing of free decision it is a -uestion of a decision for

)what is in no way gi#en in ad#ance but which constitutes the irruption of the new unpredictable

because without face and thus the beginning of a series of phenomena( by which the Kantian freedom

is defined in its relation to the world.* The ,reation of The 5orld or Olobali!ation translation

FranUois Raffoul and 9a#id Pettigrew $Albany NL: S/NL Press 288D& p. 3.

;+eidegger would stress Kant(s debt toward this ontology of the Sub"ectum an indebtedness that

constitutes for +eidegger the insufficiency of Kant6s determination of sub"ecti#ity the fact that it turns

out to be incapable of de#eloping an authentic ontology of 9asein. +eidegger6s reproach can be

summari!ed as follows: by characteri!ing the ego as a sub"ect that is as the ultimate sub"ectum of its

predicates $and of its actions in the practical sense& Kant maintains the traditional ontology of the

substantial and thereby continues to concei#e of the I inade-uately as the )supporting ground $as

substance or sub"ect&.* S p. 7;D. As +eidegger eplains to define the ego as a sub"ect is to approach

it in a mode that is not appropriate to the being that we are.

;C+enry Allison clarifies the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy in these terms: )either the

will gi#es the law to itself in which case we ha#e autonomy or the law is somehow gi#en to the will


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from without in which case we ha#e heteronomy.* Kant(s Theory of Freedom op.cit. p.33.

;D5ith respect to the Kantian determination of the moral person as end%in itself +eidegger argues that

it is not sufficient to merely add finality as a predicate to a being whose mode of being is still grasped

in the sense of presence%at%hand and the tas' is to concei#e of it ontologically as a way to be. At the

same time one could state that +eidegger(s analysis is also indebted to Kant(s theory of the moral

person for instance when +eidegger writes $no longer distinguishing between person and 9asein&:

)The person is a thing res something that eists as its own end. To this being belongs purposi#eness.

Its way of being is to be the end or purpose of its own self. This determination to be the end of its own

self belongs indisputably to the ontological constitution of the human 9asein* 9ie Orundprobleme der

Phnomenologie #olume 2@ of the Oesamtausgabe $Fran'furt am main: Klostermann ;3D& p. ;33

my emphasis. nglish translation by Albert +ofstadter The =asic Problems of Phenomenology

$=loomington In: Indiana /ni#ersity Press ;3E2&. +ereafter cited as OA 2@ followed by page

number.

;E,riti-ue of Practical Reason First Part First =oo' chapter. 7 p. DC.

;3Friedrich Niet!sche. The Twilight of the Idols. Trans. Richard Polt $Indianapolis,ambridge:

+ac'ett ;33D& p.D@ tr. slightly modified. +ereafter cited as TI followed by page number.

285hat is nlightenment in Selections,op. cit. +ereafter cited as 5 followed by page number.

2;Bichel Foucault. )5hat is nlightenment * inRabinow $P.& ed. The Foucault Reader,New Lor'

Pantheon =oo's ;3E@ pp. 72%8.

224ne thin's here of a =oetie(s The Politics of 4bedience: The 9iscourse of Goluntary Ser#itude

$New Lor': Free ife ditions ;3D& the relin-uishing of one(s freedom and responsibility for the

sa'e of a ruler such that it is the one oppressed under the ruler that gi#es that ruler the power. The

rele#ance here is that in gi#ing the power to another one is attempting to relin-uish one(s

responsibility something that will pro#e ultimately impossible.

27Bichel Foucault. 05hat is nlightenment 0 art.cit.


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Documents

Kant on Responsibility