~erfud) einiget ~ettad)tungen

ii&et ben

~vtimismus uon

M. IMMANUEL KANT,

tuoburd) er augleicf) feine ~orlefungen auf bas lleUO'rfte~enbe ~alfle Sa~t anfimbigt.

~en 7. Dctobet 1759.

An attempt at some rejleaions on optimism 2:27

by Immanuel Kant

also containing an announcement of his leaures for the coming

semester 7th Oaober 17 59

Now that an appropriate concept of God has been formed, there is per- 2:29 haps nothing more natural than the thought: if God chooses, he chooses only what is best. It was said of Alexander that he thought that he had done nothing as long as there was still something left for him to do. The same thing can be said with infinitely greater propriety• about the most benevolent and most powerful being of all. Leibniz did not think that he was saying anything new when he maintained that this world was the best of all possible worlds, or, which amounts to the same thing, that the totality of all that God has created outside Himselfb was the best which could possibly have been created.' What was new was the employment to which Leibniz put this principle. He employed it, namely, to cut the knot, so difficult to untie, of the difficulties relating to the origin of evil. An idea which is so easy and so natural, and which is eventually repeated so often as to become a common platitudec and a source of disgust to people of more refined taste, cannot continue an object of respect for long. Where is the honour in thinking like the common herd, or in maintaining a proposi-tion which is so easy to prove? Subtle errors are a stimulus to one's self-love,d which takes delight in the sense of its own strength. Obvious truths, on the other hand, are apprehended with such ease and with an under­standing so common that in the end their fate is the fate of those songs which become intolerable as soon as they start to ring out from the mouths of the common masses. To put the matter briefly: it is often the case with some of the things we know that they are highly esteemed, not because they are right, but because they have been gained at a cost. We do not care for truth at bargain price. e In accordance with this sentiment, it was first found extraordinary, then beautiful and finally correct! to assert that it had pleased God to choose this of all possible worlds, not because it 2:30 was better than the other worlds which lay within his power to choose, but quite simply because it so pleased him. 'And why', I ask in all humility, 'did it please Thee, Eternal Being, to prefer the inferior to the superior?' And man places in the mouth of the All-Highest Being the answer: 'It pleased me thus. Let that suffice.'

I shall now, in some haste, outline some remarks which may make it easier for us to form a judgement about the dispute which has arisen in this connection. 2 The members of my audience may, perhaps, find these remarks of use in better understanding and placing in context what I shall have to say on this matter in my lectures. Accordingly, therefore, I begin my argument.

If no world can be thought, beyond which a still better world cannot be imagined, the Supreme Understanding could not possibly have cognition

a Richtigkeit. b der lnbegriff alles desseen, was Gott ausser sich hervor gebracht hat. ' gemein wird. J Eigenliebe. ' die Wahrheit gutes Kaufi. f erstlich ausserordentlich, dann schijn und endlich richtig.

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of all possible worlds. Now, this latter claim is false, so the former claim must be false as well. The correctness of the major premiseK becomes apparent in the following way: if I can assert of any particular idea what­ever, which can be made of a world, that the representation of a still better world is possible, then the same thing can also be said of all the ideas of worlds in the Divine Understanding. Therefore, there are possible worlds which are better than those known by God, and God has not had knowl­edge of all possible worlds. I imagine that the minor premise will be admitted by every orthodox believer.h My conclusion is that it is false to assert that no world can be thought, beyond which a still better world cannot be thought. Or, to express the same idea differently: there is a possible world, beyond which no better world can be thought. Admittedly, it does not, of course, follow from this that one among all the possible worlds must be the most perfect, for if two or more such possible worlds were equal in respect of perfection, then, although no world could be thought which was better than either of the two, neither of them would be the best, for they would both have the same degree of goodness.3

In order to be able to draw this second conclusion, I offer the following reflection, which seems to me to be new. First of all, permit me to equate

2:3 I the absolute perfection* of a thing with its degree of reality, absolute perfection being regarded in and for itself and independently of any intention.k6 In making this assumption, I have the agreement of most philosophers on my side, and I could very easily justifY this concept. I now assert that reality and reality as such can never be distinguished from each other. For if things differ from each other, then they differ in virtue of something which is present in the one thing and not in the other. If, however, one looks at realities as such, then every characteristic mark' which is to be found in them is positive. Now, if these same realities were to differ from each other as realities, then there would have to be some­thing positive in the one which was not in the other. Therefore, something negativ~ would be thought in the one which enabled us to distinguish it from the other. That is to say: the realities are not being compared with each other as realities, though this was what was required. Accordingly,

* Perfection in the relative sense• consists in the harmony of a manifold with a certain rule,J no matter what that rule may be.• In this sense, there are many frauds, many gangs of thieves, which are perfect in their fashion. But in the absolute sense, a thing is only perfect in so far as its manifold contains within itself the ground of a reality. The magnitude of this reality determines the degree of the perfection. And since God is the supreme reality, this concept would agree with the concept, according to which a thing is perfect in so far as it harmonises with the divine properties.s

g die Richtigkeit des Obersatzes. h von jedem Rechtgliiubigen. • Die Vollkommenheit im respeaiven Verstande. J Die Zusammenstimmung des Mannigfoltigen zu einer gewissen Regel. • wenn man sie ohne irgend eine Absicht for sich selbst betrachtet. 1 Merkmal.

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reality and reality differ from each other only in virtue of the negations, the absences and limitsm attaching to one of them. 1 In other words, reality and reality differ from one another, not in respect of their quality (qualitate) but in respect of their magnitude• (gradu).

Accordingly, if things differ from one another, they always do so through the degree of their reality. Different things can never have the same degree of reality. Therefore, two different worlds can never have the same degree of reality either. In other words, it is not possible for there to be two worlds which are equally good and equally perfect. Reinhard says in his prize essay on optimism:8 one world could well have precisely the sum of realities, albeit of a different kind, as the other. If that were right, then there would be different worlds which were nonetheless equally perfect. But he errs in supposing that realities of equal degree can be distin­guished from each other in respect of their quality• (qualitate). For, to repeat what I have said before: suppose it were so, then there would be something in the one world which was not in the other. They would thus differ from each other in virtue of the determinations A and not-A, one of the two determinations always being a genuine negation. The two worlds would, accordingly, differ in virtue of their limits and degree, but not in virtue of their quality,P for negations can never be numbered among the qualitiesq of a reality; negations rather limit that reality and determine its degree. This observation is abstract and may well be in need of further elucidation; but I shall reserve that for another occasion.9

The ground we have now covered enables us thoroughly to understand 2:32 that, of all possible worlds, one is the most perfect, so that it is neither surpassed nor equalled in excellence by any other world. Now, whether this most perfect of all possible worlds is the real world or not we shall consider in a moment. For the present, it is our wish to put what we have established so far under a more powerful light.

There are magnitudes such that a still greater magnitude can always be thought.' The greatest number, the fastest motion, are magnitudes of this type. Not even the Divine Understanding thinks them, for they are, as Leibniz remarks, deceptive concepts (notiones deceptrices): these concepts are such that it seems as if something is being thought by their means, whereas, in fact, they represent nothing at all. Now, the opponents of optimism •o maintain that the concept of the most perfect of all worlds is, like that of the greatest of all numbers, a self-contradictory concept. For, just as to the sum of units in a number further units can be added without ever producing the greatest number, so also to the sum of reality in a world further reality can be added without ever producing the greatest reality. 11

m Negationen, Abwesenheiten, Schranken. • Grosse. ' Beschaffenheit. P Beschaffenheit. • Qualitiiten. ' Es giebt Crossen, von denen sich keine denken liisst, dass mcht eine noch grossere kdnnte gedacht werden.

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Apart from the fact that the degree of reality of a thing compared with a lesser reality cannot properly be construed on the analogy of a number compared with its units, I would merely adduce the following consider­ation in order to show that the above example is not very appropriate. No greatest number is possible at all, but a greatest degree of reality is possi­ble, and it is to be found in God. Let us examine the first reason why, in the argument under consideration, the concept of number is erroneously employed. The concept of a greatest finite number is the abstract concept of multiplicity as such.' Multiplicity is finite, though additions can nonethe­less be made to it in thought without its thereby ceasing to be finite. In this case, therefore, the finitude of the magnitude does not impose any deter­minate limits, but only such as are general. For this reason, the predicate 'greatest' cannot belong to any such finite number, for no matter what determinate plurality1 one thinks, every such finite number can be in­creased by addition without its finitude being thereby diminished. The degree of reality of a world is, on the other hand, something which is completely determinate. The limits which are set upon the greatest possi­ble perfection of a world are not merely general but fixed by a degree which must, of necessity, be lacking to it. Independence, self-sufficiency, presence in all places, the power to create, and so on, are perfections

2:33 which no world can possess. This present case is not like that of mathe­matical infinity, where the finite is connected, in accordance with the law of continuity, with the infinite by means of a constantly continued and ever possible augmentation. In this present case, the disparity• between infinite reality and finite reality is fixed by means of a determinate magnitude, which constitutes their difference. The world, which finds itself at that point on the scale of beings which marks the start of the chasm containing the measureless degrees of perfection which elevate the Eternal Being above every creature - this world, I repeat, is, of all which is finite, the most perfect.

It seems to me that the degree of certainty with which the following truth can be understood is so great that our opponents cannot offer anything by way of objection to it which is, at any rate, more powerful. I refer to the truth that, among all that is finite and possible, one world of the greatest excellence was the highest finite good, alone worthy of choice by the Being who is the supreme among all beings,v if it is to constitute, in combination with the infinite, the greatest possible sum.w

' Begriff der Vielheit schlechthin. 1 Menge I Carabellese (Assunto) (hereafter C): molteplicita I Festugiere (hereafter F): nombre I Ferrari (hereafter Fe): quantite I (alt: amount, quantity, number). " Abstand. v es sei unter altern Endlichen, was moglich war, eine Welt von der grossten Vortreffiichkeit das hochste endliche Gut. w um mit dem Unendlichen zusammengenommen die grosste Summe, die sein kann, auszumachen.

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If what has been proved above is conceded, and if it is agreed that, of all possible worlds, one is necessarily the most perfect, then I do not wish for a further continuation of the dispute. Not every extravagance of opinion deserves the trouble of a careful refutation. If anybody12 were so bold as to assert that the Supreme Wisdom could find the worse better than the best, or that the Supreme Goodness should prefer a lesser good to a greater, which was equally within its power, I should not waste my time in attempting a refutation.•3 Philosophy is put to a poor use if it is employed in overturning the principles of sound reason, and it is little honoured if it is found necessary to mobilise her forces in order to refute such attempts.

There may be someone who finds the detailed examination of all the subtle questions which we have so far raised and answered too elaborate an undertaking. To such a person I would suggest a much easier method of arriving at the same truth. The method is, admittedly, less scholarly in character,x but it is, perhaps, equally valid. The alternative argument runs as follows: a most perfect world is possible because it is real, and it is real because it has been produced by the wisest and most benevolent choice. Either I can form no concept of choice at all, or one chooses according to one's pleasure. However, that which is according to one's pleasure pleases. But to be pleased with, to find good, to be particularly according to one's pleasure, to be especially pleased by, to find particularly good, 2:34 are, in my opinion, expressions which differ only in verbal form/ Since God chose this world and this world alone of all the possible worlds of which He had cognition, He must for that very reason, have regarded it as the best. And since God's judgement never errs, it follows that this world is also in fact the best. Even if it had been possible for the Supreme Being to have been able to choose according to the fictitious notion of freedom which some have put into circulation, and to have preferred the worse to much that was better as a result of I know not what absolute whim,Z He would never have acted in that fashion. One may dream up for oneself something in the nature of a demi-god of fable, but the only handiwork• which is proper to the God of gods is that which is worthy of Him, and that is the handiwork which is the best of all that is possible.l4 The reason, perhaps, for the choiceb which gave existence to this world was not its particular inner superiority but rather its harmonising to a higher degree with the divine properties. Very well! Even then it is still certain that it is more perfect than any other possible world. It is clear from the effect that all other worlds would harmonise to a lesser degree with the properties of the will of God. But in God everything is reality, and nothing harmonises

x mzt etwas wemger Schulgelehrsamkezt Y Entweder zch kann mzr gar kemen Begnff von ezner Wahl machen, oder man wahlt nach Belzeben was aber belzebt, das gefollt, gefollen aber und for gut halten, vorzuglzch belzeben, szch vorzuglzch gefollen lassen und for vorzuglzch gut hal ten, smd mezner Meznung nach nur Unterschzede der Worte z unbedmgtes Belzeben • Werk ' des Rathschlusses

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to a greater degree with that reality than that which itself contains a greater reality. It follows from this that the greatest reality which can belong to a world is to be found in no other world than this present world. Furthermore, not being able to choose other than that which one dis­tinctly and rightly recognises as the best constitutes, perhaps, a constraint which limits the will,' and a necessity which cancels freedom. Certainly, if freedom is the opposite of this, and if there are at this point two divergent paths within a labyrinth of difficulties, and if, at the risk of getting lost, I am obliged to choose one of them, then I do not deliberate for long. d

Thanks for the freedom which banishes into eternal nothingness the best which it was possible to create, merely in order to command evil so that it should be something, in spite of all the pronouncements of wisdom. If I am positively to choose between errors, then I prefer to praise the benevo­lent necessity,< which is so favourable to us, and from which there can arise nothing but the best. I am, accordingly, convinced, and perhaps some of my readers are convinced, too. I am also happy to find myself a citizen of a world which could not possibly have been better than it is. Unworthy in myself but chosen for the sake of the whole by the best of all beings to be a humble member of the most perfect of all possible plans, I

2:35 esteem my own existence the more highly, since I was elected to occupy a position in the best of schemes. To all creatures, who do not make them­selves unworthy of that name/ I cry: 'Happy are we - we exist!' And the Creator is well pleased with us. Measureless spaces and eternities will probably only disclose the wealth of the creation in all its extent to the eye of the Omniscient Being alone. I, however, from my viewpoint and armed with the insight which has been conferred upon my puny understanding, shall gaze around me as far as my eye can reach, ever more learning to understand that the whole is the best, and everything is good for the sake of the whole.

In the coming semester, I shall, as usual, be lecturing on logic using Meier,'s and on metaphysics and ethics, using Baumgarten.'6 In physical geography I shall be lecturing from my own notes. '7 On pure mathematics, which I am starting, I shall lecture at a special hour; but on mechanical sciences I shall lecture at a separate time. Both of these courses will be based on Wolff.' 8 The distribution of the hours will be announced sepa­rately. As is already known, I shall complete each of these courses in one semester. Should this, however, prove insufficient, I shall make up what is outstanding in a few hours at the beginning of the following semester.

' ein Zwang des Willens. d wenn hier zwei Scheidewege in einem Labyrinth von Schwierigkeiten sind, wo ich auf die Gefohr zu iffen mich zu einem entschliessen soli, so besinne ich mich nicht lange. ' giitige Nothwendigkeit. f welches sich nicht selbst unwiirdig macht so zu heissen.

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Appendix: Three manuscript rejleaions on

optimism (Rejleaions 3703-5:

AK IJ."229-J9)

[The composition of these three reflections was doubtless occasioned by the announcement (published in the Hamburger freyen Urtheilen und Nachrichten for 27 July 1753) of the theme proposed by the Prussian Royal Academy of Sciences for its 17 55 prize-essay competition. The theme was to be Pope's optimism as it was expressed in the dictum 'Everything is good.' The competition attracted entries from, among others, Men­delssohn, Lessing, Wieland, and Reinhard, to which last the prize was awarded. Kant may himself have considered competing for the prize, but he did not in the end submit an entry. These three reflections were probably composed in 1753 or 1754. They are of philosophical interest for a number of reasons: They contain an anticipation of Kant's proof of the existence of God from the possibility of things - an argument attrib­uted rather implausibly to Pope himself; they also contain a criticism of an aspect of Leibnizian optimism (the 1759 Optimism itself containing a defence of a different aspect of Leibnizian optimism). Reflection 3703 contains an outline of an argument in Pope's Essay on Man (1733-4), Epistle IV; Reflection 3704 presents a statement of Leibnizian optimism (based on the Theodicee [1714]) and a comparison of the positions of Leibniz and Pope; Reflection 3 705 contains a criticism of the Leibnizian version of optimism. A French translation by Fran<;ois Marty was pub­lished in 1980 under the title Premieres riflexions sur l'optimisme (in Alquie, 1980, vol. I, pp. 25-34). The text of the three manuscript reflections is fragmentary; breaks in the manuscript are indicated by four dots enclosed in square brackets.]

REFLECTION 3703

You ask: who is happier in the world, the virtuous person or the vicious? If the matter is investigated, it will be found that there is always something intermingled with the advantages enjoyed by the wrong-doer which the virtuous person does not desire and on account of which he would not wish to change his state with that of the other. The virtuous person is

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therefore actually more content with himself than is supposed. The evils which affect the virtuous person do not really affect his virtue but are common to everybody. If the universal laws are supposed to be limited in their application to the relation of the pious and the ungodly, then tell me this: Who then are the pious? Will not one person regard this individual as deserving punishment, whereas someone else will regard another person as culpable? And would God's justice then be acknowledged by every­body? Bread is the reward, not of virtue, but of toil. And if, eventually, you furnish man with everything good, then tell me: Will you then be satisfied? Will you not desire more and more? And will God be able, do you suppose, to discover the aim of your wishes? The true reward of virtue is inner peace of soul; other goods destroy that peace or corrupt it. Learn­ing, fame, wealth - none of them contains the true good. Thus, virtue alone constitutes the true good. Virtue finds something to satisfY it both in plenty and in need, in laughter and in tears. Since virtue, therefore, finds no lack, wishing is worthless.

Self-love, when combined with the love of God and the love of one's neighbours, constitutes man's happiness. The greater the love and the further it extends, the greater the happiness. God starts with love of the whole and extends it to the parts, whereas human love starts with itself and gradually extends to the whole. Earth smiles upon such a one from all sides, and the Divinity itself beholds its own image in the soul of such a person.

REFLECTION 3704: OUTLINE OF OPTIMISM

Optimism is the doctrine which justifies the existence of evil in the world by assuming that there is an infinitely perfect, benevolent and omnipotent original Being. This justification is furnished by establishing that, in spite of all the apparent contradictions, that which is chosen by this infinitely perfect Being must nonetheless be the best of all that is possible. The presence of evil is attributed, not to the choice of God's positive approval, but to the inescapable necessity that finite beings will have essential de­fects. These defects have been introduced into the scheme of creation without guilt on God's part by his decision to permit them. God's wisdom and goodness nonetheless turns them to the advantage of the whole, so that the displeasure which they arouse when they are viewed in isolation is completely outweighed in the whole by the compensation which the divine goodness is able to institute. Since, therefore, this world is the best of all the worlds which are possible through the divine power, and since that world which could be better in parts would not, in virtue of[ .... ]

If one carefully examines the outline which Leibniz gives of his princi­ples, it will be found that this summary expresses his view in the most precise manner possible. One may consider the following classification of

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evils: those which are necessary or metaphysical, and those which are contingent, and are either hypothetical and physical or hypothetical and moral. One only needs to consider his distinction of evils from the point of view of the will which precedes and of the will which follows; the former endeavours to exclude all evils, while the latter includes them within its scheme as the inescapable consequences of the eternal nature of things -one only needs to consider this distinction to be persuaded of the truth of our account. Leibniz represents the goodness of God, which extends without limits, as the current of a river which, with even force, sweeps along everything to be found within it, except that the heavy cargo vessels, which have more natural inertia than those vessels of smaller mass, are carried along more slowly than these latter.

He represents God as He is ready to reveal Himself with all the infinity of all His properties in the works of creation and as feeling a true displea­sure at the evils, the sight of which so much upsets people of good disposition. But, appealing to the goodness, wisdom and power of God, which are sufficiently well-known from other indisputable reasons, he gives such people reason to hope that the defects will be balanced by benefits in the whole; he also gives them reason to believe that, though evils may in the end spoil even the best plan, they could not be eliminated from the totality without producing an even greater irregularity. Needless to say, freely acting beings might have avoided many evil actions, and they would have greatly pleased God had they done so. However, the choice of the lesser of two evils, of which one was the lack of freedom and the other of the morally best, was an unavoidable necessity. And even in the best plan there were other impediments which could have induced God, from fear of even greater irregularities, not to institute certain motive causes, which might have been able to prevent some kinds of evil. In a word: nothing else was possible; evil had to be. Gratitude is due to the Eternal Wisdom for having admitted only the smallest amount of evil, and for having executed everything in the whole to His glory in the most magnifi­cent fashion. It is true, it seems to me, that we do not yet see what the real effect will be of the substitution, which is intended to compensate the whole for its partial defects. But do you not have the assurance that God is as He must be if we are to be able to expect all that is good from Him? And, in that case, you could not expect anything other than an eventual perfect satisfaction, or at least a complete justification of God's justice and goodness.

Comparison of Pope's system with optimism; superiority offormer

Leibniz admitted that the irregularities and imperfections, which upset those who are of good disposition as if they were true imperfections, were indeed true imperfections. But he reserves the right to excuse the Su-

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preme Wisdom, which he acknowledges for other reasons, for the respon­sibility of admitting such imperfections. Thus, the properties of God are placed in safety to the satisfaction of those who have enough understand­ing and sufficient submissiveness to applaud the metaphysical proofs of the Divine Existence. As for the rest of those who are willing to acknowl­edge that contemplating the world reveals traces of God - they remain troubled. Pope chooses a path which, when it comes to rendering the beautiful proof of God's existence accessible to everyone, is the best suited of all possible paths. This path - and it is precisely this which constitutes the perfection of his system- even subjects every possibility to the dominion of an all-sufficient original Being; under this Being things can have no other properties, not even those which are called essentially necessary, apart from those which harmonise together to give complete expression to His perfection. Pope subjects the creation to detailed scru­tiny, particularly where it most seems to lack harmony; and yet he shows that each thing, which we might wish to see removed from the scheme of greatest perfection, is also, when considered in itself, good. He also shows that we should not beforehand entertain an advantageous prejudice in favour of the wisdom of the Organising Being, in order to win applause for Him. The essential and necessary determinations of things, the univer­sallaws which are not placed in relation to each other by any forced union into a harmonious scheme, will adapt themselves as if spontaneously to the attainment of purposes which are perfect. Self-love, which has as its only purpose one's own pleasure, and which seems to be the manifest cause of the moral disorder which we observe, is the origin of that beauti­ful harmony which we admire. Everything which is of use to itself also finds itself constrained to be of use to other things, as well. The universal bond, which links the whole together in a fashion which has not been examined, ensures that individual advantages always relate to the advan­tage of other things, and do so in a perfectly natural sequence. Thus, a universal law of nature firmly establishes the love which maintains the whole, and it does so by means of the motive causes which also naturally produce that evil, the sources of which we would happily see destroyed.

When one sees essential characteristics in such universal harmony, can one very well suppose that what is thus adapted to the excellent whole should also be the cause of such evil [ .... ]

Concerning the universal peifeaion of the constitution of the world, both in the physical and in the moral sense of the term

The chief rule of the perfection of the world is that it be in the highest degree complete, that everything exist which is possible, and that nothing which is at all capable of existence be lacking either in the chain of beings or in the multiplicity of the changes they undergo; for there is nothing at

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all which constitutes a greater defect for the world in general than for there to be a nothingness in some part or other of it. Hence it is that the field of revelation of the Divine Power embraces all species of finite things; it extends with a kind of wealth even to defects, and it only vanishes by a process or diminution through all the stages from the high­est degrees of perfection down to nothingness.

With this established as an assumption, let us listen with contempt to the lamentations of those to whom, so they think, heaven has not granted a satisfactory share of perfections. I wish, says one, that my understanding were less clouded, and that my sensible desires were less violent; if only I had been fortunate enough to have no other inclinations than those to­wards virtue. If most people were to remember that, in wishing for such properties for themselves as presuppose a change in their nature, they are, in effect, wishing that they did not exist at all, and that another being with the required constitution should exist in their place, they would think better of it, for self-love has a horror of annihilation, and prefers to rest satisfied with the state which has been conferred upon it, than [ .... ]

REFLECTION 3 705: DEFECTS OF OPTIMISM

Leibniz was right to call his system a theodicy, or a defence of God's good cause. For, on the assumption that God may perhaps be the author of evil, the assurance that, as far as it is within his power, everything is good, and that at least it is not his fault if not everything turns out as perfectly as it ought, if it is to accord with what honest people would wish - that assur­ance is, indeed, nothing but a justification of God.

The errors of this theory are indeed too serious for us to be able to accept it. Leibniz presents the rules, which aim at perfection, as conflict­ing with each other in their application. He regards exceptions as neces­sary defects, and he recognises the action appropriate to the Supreme Wisdom by the fact that it chooses on the side of the best, just as a sailor sacrifices part of his cargo in order to save his ship and the rest of the cargo. It is true, the wisdom and goodness of God triumph here over all objections. But what is one to say of infinity and independence? What is it which causes the essential determinations of things to conflict with each other when they are combined together, so that the perfections, each of which on its own would increase God's pleasure, become incompatible with each other? What is the nature of the unfathomable conflict which exists between the general will of God, which aims only at the good, and the metaphysical necessity which is not willing to adapt itself to that end in a general harmony which knows no exceptions? If evils, by I know not what kind of necessary fatality, constrain God to permit them without having aroused any pleasure within Him, then they cause this Supremely Blessed Being a certain kind of displeasure; that displeasure may, it is

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true, be to a certain extent diminished, though not eliminated, by the defense that God, for his part, is innocent. If everything in the whole was good, or if everything in the parts is still good, then the view on all sides will infallibly be a source of true pleasure. Why is it necessary that every­thing in the parts should be unpleasant so that pleasure in the whole alone should be awakened? If God abhors vices and torments, if God does not desire them but merely permits them: why then was it necessary that they should have to exist, assuming always that they cannot be excluded, with­out their making way for still greater defects. This excuse serves, it is true, to free God of guilt, but it will never serve to banish the serious question why the essential necessity should have something about it which conflicts with the will of God, and constrains Him to admit evils without their having won His approval. The whole mistake consists in the fact that Leibniz identifies the scheme of the best world on the one hand with a kind of independence, and on the other hand with dependence on the will of God. All possibility is spread out before God. God beholds it, considers it, and examines it. He is inclined in one direction by the determinations inhering in the possibilities, in accordance with the criterion of their particular perfections, and he is inclined in the other direction according to the effect produced by their combination. It is this comparison which occasions his decision.

The being of the world is not as it is simply because God wishes to have it so, but because it was not possible in any other way, only[ .... ]

The second chief mistake of optimism consists in the fact that the evils and irregularities which are perceived in the world are only excused on the assumption that God exists; the mistake consists, therefore, in having first to believe that an Infinitely Benevolent and Infinitely Perfect Being exists, before one can be assured that the world, which is taken to be His work, is beautiful and regular, instead of believing that the universal agreement of the arrangements of the world, if they can be acknowledged to exist in and for themselves, itself furnishes the most beautiful proof of the existence of God and of the universal dependency of all things on Him. The most reliable and the easiest proof, therefore, of the reality of an All-Sufficient, Infinitely Benevolent and Infinitely Wise Being, some­thing which is acknowledged as a result of contemplating the excellent arrangements which the world everywhere displays, is undermined by Leibniz's system. It seems to me that an Epicurus would reply to someone building on this proof: If the agreement, which you perceive in the world, seems to you to prove the existence of an organising wisdom as its Cre­ator, then you must admit that most of the world does not depend on that wisdom, for it everywhere contains within it, and that in more than half the cases, absurdities and abhorrent irregularities. I do not accept your subterfuge, according to which it is to be supposed of this wisdom that it has, for example, organised some parts for wise purposes, while using

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OPTIMISM

other parts to conceal the evidences of its supervision. I prefer, therefore, to conclude as follows: if the wise first cause was not able to bring all things into a scheme of harmonious beauty, then it follows that not all things, at least, are subject, in respect of their properties, to the pleasure of that first cause. Eternal fate, which so much limits the power of the potent cause, and which extorts from it the agreement to the existence of crude evils, thereby deprives that power of its all-sufficiency, and makes it subject to the necessity of those very evils.

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