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Kakaя это дружба/what kind of friendship is this?Russia’s “Crimean Syndrome”

Andrea Chandler

To cite this article: Andrea Chandler (2018): Kakaя это дружба/what kind of friendship is this?Russia’s “Crimean Syndrome”, European Security, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2018.1436049

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2018.1436049

Published online: 05 Feb 2018.

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Kakaя это дружба/what kind of friendship is this? Russia’s“Crimean Syndrome”Andrea Chandler

Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada

ABSTRACTRussia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea without the consent of Ukrainewas a rare case of a state taking territory from a state with whom itpreviously enjoyed friendly relations. The paper seeks to explain thecauses and consequences of this annexation by examining theoriesof democratic peace, constructivism and irredentism. In 1971,political scientist Myron Weiner published an article “TheMacedonian Syndrome” in the journal World Politics (vol. 23, no.4, 665–683). In particular, the paper examines the applicability ofWeiner’s theses to Russia’s 2014 attempt to annex Crimea fromUkraine. While Weiner’s theory helps to explain Russia’s moves, histheory can be updated to consider the consequences of thosemoves. Russia attempted to justify its annexation by transposingthe concept of friendship from Ukraine itself to a piece of itsterritory – Crimea. This transposition rested on a false dichotomybetween Ukraine and Crimea, and Russia’s failure to live up to itsinternational commitments to respect Ukrainian borders broughtswift consequences in the form of Western sanctions.

ARTICLE HISTORYReceived 15 August 2017Accepted 30 January 2018

KEYWORDSRussian foreign policy;Ukraine; ethnicity andnationalism; irredentism;conflict

Introduction

When Russia suddenly annexed Crimea from Ukraine, in the wake of the “Euromaidan”upheaval of 2014, the international community was taken by surprise. The annexationof Crimea defied our understanding of post-Cold War politics, which relied on an under-standing that European states should accept each other’s territorial integrity (Allison2017). With the Crimean annexation, Russia had taken over a piece of territory of a neigh-bouring state, without the larger state’s consent: Ukraine vigorously contested the annexa-tion of a region that it considered part of its sovereign territory. Russia’s actions defiedagreements signed between Russia and Ukraine, after the collapse of the Soviet Union,to respect each other’s territorial boundaries. As Kramer (2014) pointed out, these agree-ments included the document marking the formation of the Commonwealth of Indepen-dent States (CIS), as well as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.

Furthermore, the annexation was a sudden event. There was no dramatic surge inCrimean separatism or Russian irredentism immediately prior to 2014 (Plokhy 2014,pp. 290–293). The annexation of Crimea was a sudden event that caught analysts and

© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

CONTACT Andrea Chandler Andrea_Chandler@carleton.ca Department of Political Science, Carleton University,1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6, Canada

EUROPEAN SECURITY, 2018https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2018.1436049

decisionmakers off-guard (Forsberg and Pursianen 2017). Indeed, as Splidsboel Hansen(2015) argued, separatist movements have arisen in Crimea since Ukrainian independence,and Russian politicians sometimes questioned the legitimacy of Ukrainian sovereigntyover Crimea – but the idea of Crimea joining Russia was not a pressing concern foreither side. Given all these legacies, why would Russia engage in sudden aggressivebehaviour in Ukraine, after twenty-four years of acceptance of Crimea’s position inUkraine, and after two decades in which issues involving Crimea had been effectivelynegotiated?

Much of the discussion of the crisis has explored the context of deteriorating East–Westrelations leading up to the conflict (Charap and Colton 2017), or has analyzed the ration-ality of Putin’s decisions (Treisman 2016). As Kramer (2015) argued, vents leading up to theRussian-Ukrainian conflict escalated rapidly and took unexpected turns, creating anenvironment for hasty decisions (also Splisboel Hansen 2015). Less explored is the factthat the annexation of Ukraine was improbable because Ukraine and Russia were friendlynations. Certainly, the two countries’ leaderships had had ample tensions and disagree-ments since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. But as states, the two were on ami-cable terms: their leaders had supported each other’s bids for independence in the finalyears of the Soviet Union, and the two states had a series of bilateral treaties to reachagreement onmutual concerns. Friendly nations do not normally engage in acts of aggres-sion against each other. It is rare in modern times for such events to happen. Internationalrelations theories tend to see conflict as being the end result, even if a sudden one, of anunfriendly relationship. But in this case, there is a need to understand why a friend wouldunilaterally annex territory from another friend. It seems counterintuitive: such actionscould (and did) destroy the friendship, and provoked hostile reactions from othernations in the process. An examination of this case will enable us to learn about why inva-sions and annexations happen, the circumstances under which friendly inter-staterelations can dissolve suddenly, and therefore offer insights into whether more suchevents will occur in the future.

These questions provide an opportunity for revisiting a classic work of comparativepolitics theory, Weiner’s (1971) essay “The Macedonian Syndrome.”1 Written in order toexplain why border conflicts seemed to be accompanying postcolonial development,Weiner sought to analyze irredentism in the European recent past. Although his goalwas to describe the Cold War world, Weiner’s theses are directly relevant to Russia’s con-temporary claim to Crimea. In particular, Weiner observed that nationalism could inspireleaders to engage in counterproductive actions, such as irredentist annexation of territoryfrom a neighbouring state. Irredentist behaviour may be calculated, but may lead to nega-tive consequences that outweigh the benefits. At the same time, the details of the Crimeacase reveal implications which Weiner did not take into account, as they are associatedwith technologies and practices that expanded only after his original article was publishedin 1971.

This paper hypothesises that an altered understanding of friendship/enmity spurredRussia’s actions towards Ukraine. Instead of examining thoroughly how two friendlynations should resolve their differences, Vladimir Putin’s leadership perceived that friend-ship with Ukraine could be hived off to the territory of Crimea, while the concept of enmitybecame transposed on to the larger state of Ukraine. Nationalist and irredentist cognitiveframes explain how that could happen. However, in the process, Russian decisionmakers

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neglected the state’s formal commitments to friendly relations with Ukraine, in particularthe recognition of Ukraine’s territorial borders. By withholding respect for Ukrainian sover-eignty, Russia created insecurity and mistrust in other states about respect for sovereigntyin general. The aftermath of the events in Crimea confirm that in many ways, processes ofglobalisation serve to intensify the costs of such territorial advances for the aggressor. Inthe twenty-first century, an annexing state risks substantial reputational damage, inter-national ostracism, and new forms of sanctions.

The analysis in this paper will be developed as follows. First, it will discuss theories rel-evant to friendship in international relations, and demonstrate the ways in which theannexation of Crimea challenged the existing conventional wisdom that friends do notinvade their friends. Second, Myron Weiner’s theory of irredentism will be discussed asa possible answer to the Crimean puzzle. Third, the paper will discuss the sequences ofevents and decisions surrounding the annexation in order to reveal that hostile actionsagainst friends have high costs, providing a bridge to integrate and update the twotheories.

Theoretical explanations for annexations and interventions

International relations literature includes many investigations of military interventions, butmost of those cases occur within the context of a war or an attempt to stabilise a conflict.International law has strong proscriptions against a military entering another state, unlessthere is a humanitarian crisis or a decision authorised by the United Nations SecurityCouncil (Lawson 2001, Bottom 2010, Birkett 2013). As Allison (2017) noted, Russia’sannexation of Crimea was a rare event: there are few cases of states invading and annex-ing territories during peacetime in recent decades, with Iraq-Kuwait being a rare example.Little has been written about cases of friends invading friends, largely because it seldomhappens in the modern world. In an article, Green and Bogard (2012) suggested that whilestates tend to have good foreign relations with their friends, the notion of a “friend” or an“enemy” is a plastic, subjective concept that can change (as for example after World War II,when Germany and the Soviet Union reversed roles as enemy/friend of the United States).Leaders play powerful roles in explaining these shifts to the public. The concept of friendlynations is problematic, as it is strictly speaking neither a political science term nor a cat-egory used in international law. State leaders of two nations may regard each other asfriends; however, those affective ties do not necessarily coincide with institutionalisedbilateral cooperation, which can exist between states where this affability is absent(Oelsner 2007, pp. 258–259). Despite the vagaries of the concept of friendship, it is aterm commonly used to describe specific relationships between states, and is oftendescribed by members of those states as grounded in a set of shared values and percep-tions (Smith 2011, pp. 23–24).

This paper considers Russia and Ukraine to be friendly nations because their govern-ments described themselves that way, and pledged their friendship in written documents.Indeed, the theme of friendship (druzhba, the word for friendship in both Russian andUkrainian) has been an important theme in bilateral relations between the two countriessince 1990. Ukraine and Russia signed a treaty while they were still member republics ofthe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereafter Soviet Union), in November 1990. At thattime, even though the Soviet Union still existed, the two sides declared their respect for

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each other’s sovereignty and existing territorial boundaries, and the term druzhba appearsin the Treaty’s Preamble as one of the basic foundations of the two republics’ relations. Thetreaty was negotiated by the two countries’ parliamentary leaders, respectively LeonidKravchuk and Boris Yeltsin. Those two individuals assumed the Presidency of their respect-ive republics in 1991, where each presided over their country’s transition to full sovereignstatehood (Ukraine Verkhovna Rada 1990).

Ukraine was also one of the three original members (along with Russia and Belarus) ofthe CIS, formed in December 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although Ukrainesubsequently kept its distance from the CIS, it nominally continues as of this writing to be amember in that organisation. The founding document of the CIS (Commonwealth of Inde-pendent States 1991) directly stated that member states would approach each other onthe basis of “friendship, good neighbourliness and mutually beneficial cooperation”(druzhba, dobrososedstvo i vzaimovogodnoe sotrudnichestvo). In the Budapest Memoran-dum, signatories Russia, Ukraine, USA and the United Kingdom had specifically committedto recognising Ukrainian statehood within its existing defined borders (Council on ForeignRelations 1994). The two states were also both members of European organisations, suchas the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Council of Europe,that were committed to peaceful resolution of issues.

The 1997 Treaty between Russia and Ukraine was titled Treaty on Friendship,Cooperation and Partnership (Ukraine – Verkhovna Rada 1998). Despite the severe deterio-ration of relations between the two states since 2014, the treaty was never formallyrenounced. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs actually noted the Treaty’s twentieth anni-versary on its Website in May 2017 (Russian Federation – Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del2017). At approximately the same time, the summary document on parliamentary hear-ings held in the Ukrainian Rada in May 2017 included the observation that Russia was vio-lating the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation; but its list of recommendations did notinclude renouncing the Treaty (Ukraine – Verkhovna Rada 2017). Also in 1997, a seriesof agreements on the Black Sea Fleet, based in the Crimean city of Sevastopol, gaveRussia access to its portion of the Fleet. That agreement gave Russia access to Crimeafor transport to and from the fleet, but on the condition that Russia kept its military pres-ence within defined limits and parameters (Russian Federation – Offitsial’nyi Internet-Portal Pravovoi Informatsii 1997). In 2010, Russia and Ukraine had signed the KharkivAccords, which would have renewed the Black Sea Fleet arrangement every five yearsfor twenty-five years (Soglashenie mezhdu Ukrainoi i Rossiiei o prebyvanii Chernomors-kogo Flota v Sevastopole 2010).

As the above discussion indicates, Russia and Ukraine were friendly nations – but theywere not allies. Ukraine and Russia’s treaties included no commitments to defend eachother in a conflict, nor to help each other in the event of an attack. Ukraine did notsign the CIS Collective Security Pact, and thus had no formal arrangement for securitycooperation or coordination with Russia. This meant that there was no basis for Russiato claim to intervene in Crimea in order to offer assistance. Indeed, the agreements thatRussia had signed with Ukraine explicitly committed Russia to refrain from entering Ukrai-nian soil without permission, and to make no claims to territory that was juridically part ofthe Ukrainian state at the time of independence in 1991. At the same time, Ukraine’s par-liament passed a law in 2010 stating that it would not align with any particular military

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alliance, a policy abandoned only in December 2014 after the annexation of Crimea andthe outbreak of conflict in Eastern Ukraine (BBC News 2014).

The “securitisation” school of international relations has discussed the ways in which“friends” and “enemies” can influence, but also constrain relations between states.These scholars offer some insights into how relations can change. For example, if statesdefine a relationship based on calm continuity, leaders may feel threatened if there is asudden political transformation (such as a regime change) in the partner state (Hansen2012). Friendships that do not allow for adaptability and evolution in the other partnercan disintegrate. However, in general securitisation studies are more interested in howfriendly relations can be created than in how they are eroded – and have little to sayabout rapid, sudden reversals, such as occurred with Russia and Ukraine over Crimea.The question then arises: under what circumstances does such a reversal occur? WhenRussia annexed Crimea, it appropriated territory from Ukraine indefinitely; Crimea joinedthe Russian state, and there was no stated intention that it would eventually be returned.Why absorb territory from a neighbour without warning?

The scholarly literature on ethnicity and nationalism may point towards an explanation.The term irredentism is distinct from simple territorial expansion, insofar as it stakes a claimof shared cultural and historical identity: an irredentist state argues that the inhabitants ofa territory located in another state “belong” to the irredentist state. Russia’s annexation ofCrimea fits this definition, as Putin claimed to be a protector of the territory on the basis ofthe Russian ethnicity of a majority of residents. Political scientists generally consider irre-dentism to be a form of politics that has gone out of fashion. Donald L. Horowitz, forexample, argued that while secession is fairly common, irredentism is not. The simplereason for this, in his view, was that irredentism is too risky – it carries too muchdanger of armed conflict that could destabilise the expansionist state (Horowitz 1985,pp. 274, 282–287). Other scholars concur. Kornprobst (2007, pp. 460, 478) argued thatstates avoid irredentism because it is seen as a unjustifiable form of pursuing one’sgoals. Irredentism has become associated with Nazi Germany and other odious regimes.Nagle (2013, p. 296) argued further that irredentism is now seen not only as ethicallysuspect, but prone to disastrous consequences.

Irredentism, however, often coincides with the separatism of the territory in questionfrom the state to which it currently belongs. In Crimea, the presence of a strong ethnicRussian and Russophone population arose as a contentious issue in postcommunistUkrainian political life. In particular, Ukrainian nationbuilding strategies increased theprominence of the Ukrainian language, which unnerved some of the Russophones ofCrimea and Eastern Ukraine. Nevertheless, the enforcement of pro-Ukrainian languagepolicies was uneven, and the Russian language gained greater status after Viktor Yanu-kovych’s election as president in 2010 (Kulyk 2013, pp. 283–286.) The Crimean popu-lation included, in addition to Russians, Ukrainians, Tatars and other nationalities insubstantial numbers. As King (2010, pp. 103–107) established in his work on “frozen con-flicts” in post-Soviet hinterlands, separatist movements are not necessarily broad-basednational movements and do not necessarily establish either viable claims to statehoodor mergers with existing states. Rather, small self-interested elites can benefit fromseparatist movements that effectively defy their existing state and operate in a limbo.This notion of elite-led separatism is applicable to Crimea: as Kuzio (2012) argued,

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Crimean separatist elites had been largely co-opted by Viktor Yanukovych and his Partyof Regions, from 2005 onwards.

Myron Weiner’s theory of “The Macedonian Syndrome” is useful in explaining Crimea’spuzzles. Like other theorists, Weiner assumed that irredentism is linked to a secessionistmovement in another state. However, he differed from other theorists insofar as he expli-citly identified irredentism as a path away from liberal democracy. In his view, irredentismwas associated with militaristic and authoritarian forms of politics (Weiner 1971). Certainly,in Russia, the annexation of Crimea makes more sense if one sees it as a defence of the pro-Russsian Yanukovych regime, and a repudiation of the post-Maidan Ukraine leaders whoreplaced Yanukovych following his flight from Kyiv. Weiner’s theory suggested that irre-dentism is by definition a reactionary act. Weiner also had insight into the rationality ofirredentism. Leaders who engage in irredentist actions generally believe they are behavingreasonably, that they have something to gain from this course of action. However, forWeiner, irredentism indicated a deficit in a leader’s judgment. They get caught up in a“public discourse” of nationalism, and as a result, they make bad decisions (Weiner1971, p. 677).

Finally, one of Weiner’s most important objectives in writing his article was to call forstudies of political development to pay more attention to the international context. Irre-dentism increased the likelihood of conflict between bordering states, which in turnwould compel leaders to orient their polities towards prioritising defence rather thanencouraging pluralism (Weiner 1971, p. 676). But irredentism is always a response tothe perceived interaction between the region and the state in which it is formallylocated. Therefore, following Weiner’s argument, Russia’s annexation of Crimea was per-ceived as an act of aggression not just because of the use of force, but because Ukrainevigorously contested the annexation. Russia attempted to annex Crimea without Ukraine’sconsent, and Russia became diplomatically isolated as a result.

Weiner’s argument left some unanswered questions. First of all, his view was that irre-dentism is path-dependent. States embark on an irredentist path step-by-step; as they gofurther down that road, it becomes harder to turn back, and armed conflict becomesincreasingly likely (Weiner 1971, pp. 678, 681). In that sense, actual acts of territorialannexations ought to be fairly predictable, following on months or years of inflamedrhetoric and inter-state tensions. But that was not the case of Crimea, which Russiaannexed very suddenly after a brief period in which relations with Ukraine deteriorated.An additional question: what is it about irredentism that encourages risky, aggressiveactions? Here, Weiner is not exactly alone: other scholars of ethnicity and nationalismhave posited that it has a seductive, emotional quality (Gellner 1983, Anderson 1992).But since annexations are relatively infrequent, and nationalism is relatively prevalent,nationalism alone cannot explain irredentism. Furthermore, while irredentism is risky,that doesn’t necessarily make it irrational: some high-stakes gamblers win. And yet,writing in 1971, Weiner’s work was based on early-mid twentieth century contexts,where the assessment of risks was quite different than it is today. As such, Weiner’s argu-ment doesn’t take into account several of the features associated with globalisation in thetwenty-first century, such as rapid communications and the increasing role of internationalorganisations. It is hypothesised that these processes influenced the cost–benefit analysisemployed by Russian leaders when annexing Crimea.

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The annexation: the path dependency of transforming a friend into an enemy

The principal methodology used in the study was the analysis of relevant documents ofinvolved governments and international organisations, particularly during the crucialperiod of December 2013 to June 2014. These include Ukrainian and Russian decisions,as well as international responses from the United Nations, the Council of Europe, theEuropean Union and the United States. The paper traces the sequence of events inorder to examine the responses and interactions of relevant actors, and this sequencetracing is demonstrated in Timelines 1, 2 and 3. Figures 1–3 provide a timeline to illustratehow events in Crima unfolded, and how the moves of Russia, Ukraine and the internationalcommunity influenced each other.

The timelines are not intended to be an exhaustive account of all events that happened,but rather to illustrate the particular sequence of events and responses of the immediateCrimean crisis of 2014.

Similar to the pattern that Weiner described, Russia used a narrative frame to regardCrimea as its friend and brother in need of rescuing from a domineering Ukraine. Afterthe Euromaidan uprising and the ouster of President Yanukovych, Vladimir Putin arguablyno longer saw Ukraine as a friendly nation, even though the two states continued to havecooperative treaties with each other. Vladimir Putin’s government framed Crimea as a siteof historic struggle between East and West, and depicted the new Ukrainian authorities asperpetrators of a coup: in Putin’s words (Putin 2014), “nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russo-phobes, and anti-Semites.”2 Putin was reported to have told United States PresidentObama on March 2 that Russia sought to defend its own interests and assist Russian-speakers in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea (Sputnik News 2014). On 1 March, the Councilof Russia’s State Duma (lower house of parliament) issued a resolution calling upon thePresident to assist Crimea in maintaining order (Russian Federation Federal AssemblySovet Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniia 2014). Russian Communist Partyleader Gennadii Ziuganov referred to Crimea as a “sacred place” (sviatoe mesto) wherehis father had been wounded in combat (Ziuganov 2014). Another explanation that theRussian side offered for the use of force was that former President Yanukovych had sup-ported Crimea’s appeal for help (Russian Federation Federal Assembly – Sovet FederatsiiFederal’nogo Sobraniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2014b). However, Yanukovych had alreadyleft Ukraine by that point, and in any case would have had no authority to ask forRussian military involvement in Crimea, as Russia and Ukraine did not have a mutualdefence treaty.

Russia’s own institutions employed pseudo-democratic and pseudo-constitutionalmechanisms. On March 1, the upper house of the Russian parliament, the FederationCouncil, authorised Russia to use force to protect the Black Sea Fleet and to protectRussian citizens in Crimea (the Russian constitution requires the Federation Council togive its approval to such uses of force) (Russian Federation Federal Assembly – Sovet Fed-eratsii Federal’nogo Sobraniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2014a). The Duma passed a resolutionthe same day expressing concern about Russian-speakers in Ukraine, depicting the situ-ation in the country as an overthrow of a legitimate order (Russian Federation FederalAssembly – Gosudarstvennaia Duma 2014). The decisions of the Crimean parliament,and the use of a referendum, were important parts of the series of events leading up tothe annexation. On March 6, Crimea’s parliament passed a resolution in favour of

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Figure 1. Timeline 1 of 3.

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Figure 2. Timeline 2 of 3.

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Figure 3. Timeline 3 of 3.

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joining the Russian Federation, to be put to the population in a referendum scheduled totake place on March 16 (Ukraine Constitutional Court 2014b). The Ukrainian ConstitutionalCourt had ruled on 14 March that the Crimean referendum should not be held as it wasunconstitutional, and they called for preparations for the referendum to be put to astop (Ukraine Constitutional Court 2014a). Nonetheless, the referendum having goneforward, Russia and Crimean leaders signed a treaty on incorporating Crimea intoRussia, to take immediate effect, with the treaty also to include Sevastopol (Dogovormezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Respublika Krym 2014). Vladimir Putin issued an appealon March 18 that pointed to Crimea’s referendum results as indicating democratic legiti-macy – but in the same appeal he also referred to Crimea as “Russian land” that was a“symbol of Russian military glory” (Putin 2014).3

In addition to annexing Crimea, Russia also took over many Ukrainian ships (some ofwhich it later returned) from the Ukrainian Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol, compellingUkraine to make Odessa its main naval base (Daly 2014). Russia’s moves in Crimea contra-dicted its international agreements respecting Ukrainian sovereignty. The Black Sea Fleetagreements, in which Russia and Ukraine shared access to Sevastopol and divided theBlack Sea fleet, remained in effect until almost two weeks after Russia had taken overCrimea (Russian Federation Federal’nyi zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii no. 38-FZ 2014). Ineffect, Russia had made a choice to protect the “friendship” of the Crimean governmentat the expense of friendly relations with the Ukrainian state.

Russia claimed that the annexation was legal, following Crimea’s declaration of inde-pendence as an act of self determination, and its subsequent “voluntary” request to joinRussia. However, the chain of events showed that Ukraine did not concede its juridicalsovereignty over Crimea. Ukraine used its own legal channels to declare that neitherthe Crimean legal status nor the presence of Russian forces in Crimea had validityunder Ukrainian law. Despite the precarious position of the post-Yanukovych leadershipbetween March and May 2014, Ukrainian officials asserted their legal claims to sovereigntyconsistently and vigorously within international institutions. This use of legal norms andinternational institutions contradicted the Russian discourse which labelled the new Ukrai-nian government as “fascists.”

Furthermore, the chain of events showed that Russian forces were spotted in Crimeaprior to the referendumofMarch 2014,which suggested that the territorywas actually occu-pied before the organisation of a referendum in that territory (Charap and Colton 2017Kindle version, Loc 2668-2778). This undermined the ability of the referendum to beregarded as a voluntary free vote of the people, as well as indicating that Crimea hadbeen de facto the subject of an act of force. The presence of the international media as wit-nesses to the Crimean events, and the speed of communication about the realities on theground, undermined Russia’s claims that the secession/annexation was legitimate, andhelped to precipitate a rapid response. Russia framed its claim to Crimea as a legal andvoluntary decision made on the basis of self-determination. Thus, the Russian governmentused pseudo-democratic narratives in an attempt to justify its behaviour. However, claimsfor Crimean self-determination were used only after President Putin had posited that Russiahad its own self-interestedmotives: as discussed above, Putin told Obama that he had otherreasons. After Crimea declared its intent to join Russia, Russia’s Constitutional Courtweighed in, arguing that it was legal for Russia to annex Crimea and Sevastopol. TheCourt’s ruling occurred on 19 March – unusually quickly. The Court relied on a very

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narrow interpretation of what was constitutional, noting simply that Russian law providedfor the acquisition of new federal subjects, and that the agreement between Russia andCrimea conformed to Russia’s practices for treaty accession and ratification. The Court’s res-olution avoided all mention of Ukraine, and stated outright that its mandate was not toevaluate the treaty’s “political expediency” (politicheskaia tselesoobraznost’) (Russian Fed-eration Constitutional Court 2014). The Court’s decision on Crimea was subsequently sub-jected to a strong critique by a Russian constitutional law professor. Luk’ianova (2015)noted many inconsistencies in the Court’s decision: among them, she criticised the Courtfor invoking the Kosovo precedent, when Russia had never actually recognised the validityof the International Court of Justice’s decision on Kosovo. She also noted that the Court hadfailed to take into account the fact that Sevastopol city was administratively separate fromCrimea (andhadbeenevenprior to the transfer of Crimea from theRussian Soviet FederatedSocialist Republic (RSFSR) to Ukraine in 1954).

In a decree of March 17, Putin declared the recognition of Crimea’s independence onthe basis of its referendum on sovereignty, therefore invoking the idea of democraticself-determination (Russian Federation President – Prezident Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2014).However, on the same day Russia’s Ministry of International Affairs issued an appeal tothe “Contact group” set up by the U.S. and European states on Ukraine, asking thatRussia be included in efforts to resolve the crisis in Ukraine. The appeal included anumber of proposals, among them recognising Crimean sovereignty; but it also calledfor Ukraine proper to enact constitutional change, including establishing federalism inUkraine and securing the status of the Russian language (Russian Federation MinisterstvoInostrannykh Del 2014). It was somewhat inconsistent, therefore, for Russia to be calling forrespect for Crimea’s sovereignty, while pressing for Ukraine to make specific constitutionalreforms. If Russia’s goal was to play a key role in negotiating terms for solving the Ukrainiancrisis, its actions in Crimea had weakened its position considerably.

Russia also attempted to use justifications drawn from international precedents. In theDuma, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov invoked the 2010 decision of the Inter-national Court of Justice on Kosovo as a justification of the idea that unilateral indepen-dence without the consent of the larger state does not necessarily violate internationallaw (Lavrov 2014a). In that sense, Crimea’s annexation could be said to have imitatedaspects of Kosovo’s sequence. However, the International Court of Justice’s decision onKosovo was quite limited. The Court’s position was that simply declaring independencefrom a larger state was not in itself illegal, but it left aside the question of whether sucha declaration actually mandated such independence in practice, let alone whether itwas appropriate for another state to annex a territory that had issued an independencedeclaration (International Court of Justice 2010). On 21 March 2014, Lavrov rejected theuse of the word “annexation” to describe Crimea’s joining of Russia, considering it insultingto Crimeans. Later in the debate, Lavrov answered a question by stating that at present theRussian government had no contact with the Ukrainian government, because “our people”didn’t have anyone in Ukraine that “we” could talk to (Lavrov 2014b). Since a Ukrainiangovernment was continuously in place, it is hard to understand this comment, unlessthe intention was to say that Russian elites didn’t think they had any friends in Kyiv.Several months later, a different, more Realpolitik rationale was voiced: Vladimir Putinwas quoted as saying that Russia could not tolerate a situation in which North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) might have had access to Crimea (ITAR-TASS 2014). These

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events suggest that Russia’s handling of the Crimean crisis was improvised and reactive,drawing on contradictory discourses of greater Russian nationalism and democratic self-determination. This seems to follow Weiner’s pattern of an authoritarian irredentist leader-ship that has acted over-confidently without weighing all the implications of an action.

The role of global communications

The access of the international media to the Crimean events, and the speed of communi-cation about the realities of the ground, served to undermine immediately Russia’s claimsthat the secession/annexation was legitimate and helped to precipitate a rapid response.As seen above, the Russian government reacted very quickly to the events in Ukraine:Crimea was annexed in less than a month from Yanukovych’s ouster. But the narrativethat Crimea was a voluntary and democratic action was contradicted by the internationalmedia on the basis of reporters’ observations. Western media in Simferopol noted onMarch 2 the presence of mysterious armed men who had appeared, known as the“polite people” (Oliphant 2014). Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) News, forexample, had one of its top foreign correspondents, Nahlah Ayed, on the ground inCrimea. She reported on March 8 that OSCE observers had been prevented from doingtheir work in Crimea because shots had been fired, and that that troops acting inCrimea were suspected to be of Russian origin (Ayed 2014a). Attempts by Russian-speak-ing troops to take over Ukrainian military facitilies in Sevastopol were also reported by theinternational media (Ayed 2014b). Eventually, Vladimir Putin admitted that Russian troopshad assisted Crimea’s own self-defence units, and that as early as February 22, Russia hadtaken the decision to restore Crimea (BBC News 2015). Putin conceded that the militarypersonnel who had appeared in Crimea before the annexation were Russian SpecialForces (Rauta 2016, p. 92). One also wonders whether it had occurred to Russia’sleaders that with the Winter Olympics having just concluded in nearby Sochi, Westernmedia might be more likely to arrive in Crimea quickly than they otherwise might. Thenon-governmental organisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) argued that at the time ofthe referendum, Crimea qualified as “occupied territory” according to the 1949 FourthGeneva Convention. HRW’s statement claimed that its field staff had witnessed the pres-ence in Crimea of troops and military vehicles from Russia (Human Rights Watch 2014).

Although Russia had moved swiftly in Crimea, the critiques of Russia’s behaviour fol-lowed just as quickly. Furthermore, it was not only leaders in the West who expressedimmediate concerns; actors within Russia criticised Russian moves in Crimea, and the Inter-net enabled their voices to reach a global audience immediately. A Russian historian,Andrei Zubov, compared Russia’s moves in Crimea to Hitler’s annexations of Austria andthe Sudetenland. Zubov’s op-ed was published in a major Russian newspaper Web sitethe same day that the Federation Council authorised the use of force. Zubov (2014)called the Crimean leadership’s claim to power “a farce.” The next day, nineteenmembers of President Putin’s Human Rights Council signed a position against the useof force by Russia in Crimea, which they said would contravene international law, leadto human rights violations, and aggravate conflict (Russian Federation PresidentialCouncil on Civil Society and Human Rights 2014). Opposition politicians Boris Nemtsovand Mikhail Kasyanov criticised Putin, noting the potential for use of force in Ukraine, astate with which Russia supposedly had friendly relations (Kasyanov and Nemtsov

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2014). Similarly, within Ukraine itself, three former Presidents – Leonid Kravchuk, LeonidKuchma and Viktor Yushchenko –made a statement criticising Russia for putting pressureon Ukraine, and called upon Ukraine to withdraw from the Kharkiv accords (Interfax-Ukraine 2014). Russian opposition parliamentarian Gudkov (2014) argued that Crimea’sreferendum was not “legitimate” (legitimnyi) and that Russia’s legal commitments torespect Ukrainian sovereignty were at risk. (He nonetheless did not vote against annexingCrimea.) These criticisms did not stop Russia from annexing Ukraine, but they did help toundermine the plausibility of Putin’s arguments.

The response of the international community

The timeline shows that the international community reacted promptly and resolutely tothe annexation of Crimea. The international community was shocked by the events inCrimea, partly because of the crudeness of Russia’s annexation – but also arguablybecause Russia had unexpectedly turned on a friend. International institutions enableda rapid response to Russia’s actions in the form of sanctions and reprimands. Althoughthis response did not reverse Russia’s de facto annexation of Crimea, it did ensure thatthe annexation lacked juridical recognition. There were hints that Russian leaders had mis-takenly assumed that the West would not respond to any moves that Russia made inUkraine. On March 1, when Russia’s Federation Council debated authorising PresidentPutin to use force to assist Crimea, one Russian Senator (Panteleev 2014) said that hehad spent 10 years at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), andthat “they will talk and talk and then be done with talking” (“pogoroviat-pogovoriat i per-estanut.”) The assumption was that the West would complain but in the end would donothing, an assumption that suggests a miscalculation on the Russian side.

On the contrary, the West, and European institutions, reacted rapidly to events inUkraine. The day after Russia’s Federation Council authorised the use of force in Crimea,the North Atlantic Council (2014) expressed its “grave concern” about the decision,calling upon Russia to respect the UN Charter and the OSCE process. The Council ofEurope’s institutions also responded quickly. In response to an application from Ukraine,the European Court of Human Rights issued an interim measure calling upon Russiaand Ukraine to avoid any armed acts that could infringe upon citizens’ rights (EuropeanCourt of Human Rights 2014) In early April, a report was delivered to the PACE which rec-ommended suspending Russia’s voting rights in the Council, due to the inconsistency ofthe annexation of Crimea with the Statute of the Council. Among other things, the reportclaimed that Russia had thwarted a negotiated settlement to the Ukrainian crisis, andrefuted Russia’s claims that human rights were at risk because of “fascist” activity inUkraine (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2014a).

The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe issued an opinion on 21 March onwhether the Ukrainian referendum was constitutional. The Commission noted severalsets of concerns: first, that the referendum was not consistent with the Ukrainian consti-tution; second, that the referendum itself was flawed. The referendum question wasambiguous; little time was given for voters to make up their minds; and balanced newscoverage was not ensured. Furthermore, noted the Commission, “the massive public pres-ence of (para) military forces is not conducive to democratic decision making” (Council ofEurope Venice Commission 2014). The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe

14 A. CHANDLER

issued a decision in early April stating that it considered both Crimea’s referendum, andRussia’s annexation of Crimea, to be illegal actions (Council of Europe Committee of Min-isters 2014). PACE passed a resolution subsequently on Ukraine which among other thingsstated it “strongly condemned” Russia’s “military aggression” and the parliament’s author-isation of the use of force in Crimea, and it rejected the annexation of Crimea as beinginconsistent with Russia’s commitments to the OSCE and the Council of Europe (Councilof Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2014b).4

On March 27, the United Nations General Assembly considered a resolution upholdingUkraine’s territorial integrity within its existing boundaries, rejecting any use of force byanother state, and calling for the situation to be managed peacefully. The resolutionalso declared the Crimean referendum to be null and void ((United Nations GeneralAssembly 2014a). The resolution was passed 100–111, with 58 abstentions and with thestrong opposition of Russia. While the resolution did not mention Russia directly, Ukraine’sActing Foreign Minister spoke in the discussion about Russia’s treaty obligations to Ukraine(specifically the Budapest Memorandum) in refraining from use of force. (United NationsGeneral Assembly 2014b). Several days later, Russia passed a law abrogating the BlackSea fleet agreements of 1997 and 2010 between Russia and Ukraine (Russian FederationFederal Assembly – Federal’nyi zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii 38-FZ 2014). Although thisaction rendered moot the claim that Russia was violating its treaties with Ukraine, itwas a counterproductive decision insofar as it hampered Russia’s ability to access the ter-ritory of eastern Ukraine to supply the Fleet. In the UN, the Acting Foreign Minister ofUkraine stated that Russia and Ukraine had treaties, especially the Budapest Memoran-dum, to refrain from using force against each other. The resolution passed 100–111,with 58 abstentions (United Nations General Assembly 2014b). Petro Poroshenko waselected President in May of 2014 in Ukraine, in elections that OSCE observers consideredto have been on the whole competitive and transparent (Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2014). Thiswas an important event, because it weakened Russia’s claim that the Ukrainian leadershipdid not represent the country’s citizens.

In response to the attempted annexation of Crimea, sanctions were quickly imposedupon Russia by Western states. In the United States, President Obama issued severalexecutive orders, on March 3 and 17, which posited a link between inappropriate use offorce in Crimea and the “misappropriation of its assets.” Executive Order 13661 directlystated that Russia’s actions in Ukraine, including in Crimea, would adversely affect democ-racy and peace in Ukraine; executive order 13660 imposed sanctions on “individuals andentities responsible for violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, or forstealing the assets of the Ukrainian people.” These individuals would have their assetsfrozen, they would not be allowed to enter the US, and US businesses would not beable to have business relationships with them (United States – The White House 2014a).Subsequent sanctions named Russia more explicitly, and applied to specific Russiansectors, including financial services, energy and defence, and later on defence relatedindustries (United States – The White House 2014b). In July, further US sanctions wereapplied to specific Russian companies, banks, and individuals (United States Departmentof the Treasury Press Centre 2014). In December 2014, further sanctions specifically barredUS individuals or business from investing or trading with Crimea (United States – TheWhite House 2014c).

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The European Union also announced similar sanctions on 17 March 2014, includingnaming Russian and Ukrainian leaders, business and banks whose assets would befrozen and who could not travel to the EU. The sanctions included a prohibition on invest-ment, loans or trade with Crimea and no technological assistance to Crimea and no invol-vement with deep water oil extraction to Russia. The European Union also cancelled itsplanned summit with Russia and suspended negotiations on an agreement with Russia(European Union 2015). The European Parliament debated a resolution expressing con-cerns about Russia’s seizure of Ukrainian ships, which was obviously increasing the sizeof the Russian Black Sea fleet (European Parliament 2015). The EU imposed additionalsanctions in September and December of 2014, and extended sanctions in effect to Sep-tember 2015 (European Council 2015, European Union 2015). For its part, Russiaresponded with counter-sanctions, especially on food products from the EuropeanUnion (Jones and Whitworth 2014). EU institutions including the European Council, theForeign Affairs Council, and the EU Heads of State or Government each made declarationsthat they did not recognise the result of the Crimea referendum nor Russia’s annexation ofCrimea (European Commission 2014).

Experts debate vigorously whether sanctions are effective. Some argue that sanctionshave little impact on regime behaviour (O’Sullvan 2000, pp. 56–60, Kaempfer and Loewen-berg 2007, pp. 68–72, Oechslin 2014). Others claim that sanctions can work, especiallywhen regime leaderships seek trade and recognition from the international community(Marinov 2005). The most important point here is, as Lance Davis and Stanley Engermanwrote (2003, p. 196): “New technology has made it easier to enforce sanctions by trackingtrade and financial transactions.” The banking system can detect unusual economicbehaviour much more quickly today than previously (Cartwright and Lopez 2002, p. 34).Furthermore, the literature suggests that sanctions are most effective when they areimposed by a broad-based group of states (Rarick and Han 2010, pp. 68–70), and whenthey are directed at specific elites and sectors (Brooks 2002, Biersteker et al. 2005). Thesanctions on Russia apply to both of these categories. At this point, it does not seemthat sanctions caused Russia to retreat from its position on Crimea. However, sanctionsshowed a swift international response, which inspired debate over whether the annexa-tion of Crimea was justified. A recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) Survey claimedthat the sanctions had had a significant impact on Russian growth and investment (Inter-national Monetary Fund 2015).

In summary, the annexation of Crimea had high costs for Russia. As Weiner suggested,Russia alienated other states while the conflict in Ukraine escalated in the East, creatinginsecurity on Russia’s borders. But even though Russia gained a piece of valuable territoryin Crimea, the annexation brought further losses to Russia beyond the deterioration offoreign relations. First, Russia’s international reputation was significantly damaged. Notonly was Russia criticised for disregarding the principle of a state’s sovereignty over its ter-ritory, but its President, Putin, also was widely perceived as having disrespected a friendlynation. Under these circumstances, Russia was precluded from being able to broker a dip-lomatic solution to the Ukrainian crisis, at least not without Western states playing a sig-nificant role. Second, the economic sanctions imposed on Russia were significant,immediate, and had lasting consequences. While the sanctions did not reverse theannexation of Crimea, they included tools that were not available during the Cold War.Finally, while the Black Sea fleet was stationed in Crimea, the annexation of Crimea

16 A. CHANDLER

disrupted Russia’s access to the Fleet, as the Black Sea Fleet Treaty with Ukraine had for-merly allowed access to Eastern Ukraine in order to service and staff the fleet. Crimea mayhave been a boon to President Putin, but evidence suggests that the costs were greaterthan expecteed and that Russia did not anticipate them.

Conclusions

The case of Crimea helps to explain why friendly nations turn on their friends. When aregime is shaken by political crisis, and when that crisis is perceived as being dividedupon regional lines, outsiders may perceive leaders to be divided between friends andenemies, and transpose these categories onto pieces of territory. Crimea became thefriend that Russia claimed to protect; while Ukraine was perceived (inaccurately) asbeing lost to enemy control. While it is perhaps understandable that Russian leadersmight have felt uneasy about the sudden events in Ukraine, it was premature to overrideexisting treaties between the two states. Annexing Crimea without Ukraine’s consentdefied Russia’s international commitments and had high costs.

What does the case of Crimea reveal about irredentism? In the first place, as Weiner andothers argued, irredentism doesn’t pay. Irredentist politics are likely to lead to internationalcondemnation, and to invoke undesirable parallels with past dictators. The high costs ofannexation included Western sanctions, the rupture of relations with Ukraine, and theuncertainties of the Black Sea Fleet. It left Vladimir Putin with few friends among worldleaders, especially from the G20 countries. As Weiner predicted, nationalist narrativeswere seductive, causing Russian leaders to underestimate the potential for internationalbacklash, and to overestimate the authority of separatists. If leaders thought that annexingCrimea was some kind of bargaining chip for future leverage in Ukraine, they seem to havebeen mistaken. The West’s rapid response, in the form of sanctions, may actually have“contained” Russia and prevented further destabilisation of Ukraine.

Crimea also helps us to see the limitations of Weiner’s theory when it comes to under-standing irredentist acts in the age of globalisation. Weiner’s theory was drafted to explaina time in which powerful states could enact irredentist claims as faits accomplis. Withoutinstantaneous communication, and with monopolies over information on the ground,states in the past could annex territory and use legitimising devices such as plebiscites,before anyone had a chance to challenge irredentist narratives. In the case of Crimea,Russia was able to proceed with its annexation very quickly – but just as rapidly, observersand media on the ground were able to challenge the view that Crimea had joined Russiathrough democratic means. The West acted quickly in imposing sanctions, drawing onrapid international communications. This may have been a case where the speed of com-munications and the imposition of sanctions outpaced the ability of leaders to makesound decisions; in the age of globalisation, the impulse to act fact may put slow-moving diplomacy at a disadvantage.

It could also be said, though, that sanctions have not restored Crimea to Ukraine. Sanc-tions have not to date been successful in reversing Russia’s annexation; practically speak-ing, that option became foreclosed as soon as Putin declared Crimea to be “Russian land.”Politically speaking, it would be difficult for Putin to acknowledge to his people that“Russian land” belonged to Ukraine. Russia’s membership in the UN Security Council, itsaccess to nuclear weapons, and Ukraine’s lack of protection from a military alliance all

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make it difficult to compel Russia to leave Crimea. The international community’s responsedemonstrated however that Russian aggressive moves would be countered immediately,and perhaps more importantly, Russia lost face in the international environment. Whileglobalisation cannot prevent irredentism, its norms and techniques can certainly help toexpose it.

Notes

1. Weiner 1971.2. The Russian words used were “Glavnymi ispolnitel’iami perevorota stali natsionalisty, neonat-

sisty, rusofoby, i antisemity.” (Putin 2014).3. Putin’s words were “eto simvoly Russkoi voinskoi slavy.” (Putin 2014).4. In fairness, the resolution also expressed concern about some of the moves on the Ukrainian

side, but considered the new Ukrainian government to be legitimate. Council of Europe, Par-liamentary Assembly 2014b.

Acknowledgements

The original version of this paper was presented to the 47th Annual Convention of the Associationfor Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies, Philadelphia, PA, 22 November 2015. I am grateful tothe other panelists for comments. I am also grateful to two anonymous reviews for their suggestions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Andrea Chandler is a Professor in the Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa,Canada.

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