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8/13/2019 June Shew, et al. v. Dannel P. Malloy, et al. Order Granting Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment
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effective on April 4, 2013. It was thereafter amended by Public
Act 13-220. 4
The present action is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
2201, 2202, 42 U.S.C. 1983 and equitable common law principles
concerning injunctions. The issues presented are whether the
legislation: 1) violates the plaintiffs right under the Second
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to keep and bear arms; 5 2)
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution; 6 and 3) contains portions that are
unconstitutionally vague. 7
At the outset, the court stresses that the federal
judiciary is only vested with the a uthority to interpret the
law . . . [and] possess[es] neither the expertise nor the
prerogative to make policy judgments. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep.
4 The amendment covered, inter alia , large capacity magazines, and becameeffective June 18, 2013.
5 The Second Amendment provides: A well regulated militia, being necessary tothe security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,shall not be infringed. U.S. Const. amend. II.
6 The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part : No State shall make orenforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizensof the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any personwithin its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend.XIV.
7 With respect to this constitutional doctrine, the plaintiffs object to thefollowing specific terms in numerous provisions of the legislation: 1) a gripallowing a non-trigger finger to be below the action when firing, Conn. Gen.Stat. 53- 202a(1)(E)(i)(II), (vi)(II); 2) copies or duplicates with thecapability of other firearms in production by the effective date, Conn. Gen.Stat. 53-202a(1); 3) inaccurately named firearms, Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-202a(1)(A)-(D); and 4) the modification, alteration, or assembly of magazinesand components.
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GRANTED. The plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction is
DENIED as moot. 9
FACTS
An examination of the pleadings, exhibits, memoranda,
affidavits and the attachments thereto, discloses the following
undisputed material facts:
On July 1, 2013, the Connecticut General Assembly passed
Conn. P.A. 13-3, prohibiting, inter alia , the ownership of
numerous semiautomatic firearms.10
The act followed the events
of December 14, 2012, in Newtown, Connecticut, where a lone
gunman entered a grade school and shot and killed 26
individuals, including 20 school children.
Building on previous legislation, 11 the definitional scope
for an assault weapon has been expanded, including additional
semiautomatic firearms. 12 However, the legislation does not
9 Because the court grants the defendants motion for summary judgment, theplaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction is rendered moot .
10 Citing Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-202a(A)-(D), t he defendants state [a] s aresult of the Act, there are now 183 assault weapons that are prohibited bymake and model in Connecticut.
11 In 1993, the Connecticut General Assembly passed Conn. 1993, P.A 93-306,which prohibited possessing, selling, or transporting, what the Act definedas assault weapons, with limited exceptions.
12 Assault weapon is a term of common modern usage, without a universal legaldefinition. It is generally defined as any of various auto matic orsemiautomatic firearms. See assault weapon Merriam-Webster.com , Merriam-Webster 2011. An assault rifle is generally defined as a gun that canshoot many bullets quickly and that is designed for use by the military. Seeassault rifle Merriam-Webster.com , Merriam-Webster 2011.
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parts of an assault weapon that can be rapidly put together as
a whole assault weapon. 18
The legislation further provides that a firearm can qualify
as an assault weapon even if it is not specifically listed in
the statute as long as it meets one of several criteria. This is
sometimes referred to as the one - feature test. 19 Under this
test, an assault weapon is [a] semiautomatic , centerfire rifle
that has an ability to accept a detachable magazine and has
either:
(I) A folding or telescoping stock;(II) Any grip of the weapon, including a pistol
grip, a thumbhole stock, or any other stock,the use of which would allow an individual togrip the weapon, resulting in any finger on thetrigger hand in addition to the trigger fingerbeing directly below any portion of the actionof the weapon when firing;
(III) A forward pistol grip;(IV) A flash suppressor; or(V) A grenade launcher or flare launcher . . . . 20
A semiautomatic pistol with a detachable magazine 21 and a
semiautomatic shotgun 22 that include similar features are also
18 In other words, a person cannot shield an assault weapon from violating theact by simply breaking it down into parts that can be put back togetherrapidly. See Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-202a(a)(1)(ii).
19 See Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-202a(1)(E). The one-feature test is a change fromthe 1993 Act which employed a two-feature test whereby it prohibited firearms
that had at least two listed features.
20 Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-202a(1)(E)(i)(I)-(V).
21 This type of pistol qualifies as an assault weapon if it has any of thefollowing features: (I) an ability to accept a detachable ammunitionmagazine that attaches at some location outside of the pistol grip; (II) Athreaded barrel capable of accepting a flash suppressor, forward pistol grip
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for use in the discharge of their official duties or when off
duty . 28 Finally, the legislation allows exempt personnel who
retire[] or [are] otherwise separated from service an extension
of time to declare lawfully possessed assault weapons and LCMs
used in the discharge of their duties. 29 Any person who is not
exempted and possesses an assault weapon . . . shall be guilty
of a class D felony . . . . 30
On May 22, 2013, in response to the legislation, the
plaintiffs filed the complaint in this action.
STANDARD
A motion for summary judgment may be granted if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after discovery, the
nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an
28 Conn. P.A. 13-220 1(d)(1).
29 See e.g. Conn. P.A. 13-220 2(a)(2) and 7(a)(2).
30 See Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-202c(a). The legislation also provides that[a]ny person who, within [Connecticut], distributes, transports or importsinto the state, keeps for sale, or offers or exposes for sale, or who givesany assault weapon, except as provided by sections 52-202a to 53-202k,inclusive, shall be guilty of a class C felony and shall be sentenced to aterm of imprisonment of which two years may not be suspended or reduced bythe court. Conn. Gen. Stat. 53 -202b(a)(1).
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in Connecticut itself) and are lawfully purchased by millions of
Americans after passing n ational and state-required background
checks. The plaintiffs argue that the banned firearms and
magazines are in common use by . . . millions of law-abiding
citizens for self-defense, sport, and hun ting. The plaintiffs
state that the new restrictions are not the national norm 31 and
are anything but long - standing.
The defendants respond that the plaintiffs absolutist
interpretation of the Second Amendment conflicts with the
established framework of cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Specifically, the defendants argue that the assault weapons and
magazines at issue in this case are outside this established
framework. 32 T he defendants argue that the Act only marginally
impacts Plaintiffs ability to obtain firearms and mag azines for
lawful home and self defe nse. The defendants argue that
Connecticut s regulatory scheme provides ample avenues through
31 The plaintiffs state that the laws of most states and federal law have norestrictions on magazine capacity or the number of rounds that may be loadedin a magazine, nor do they restrict guns that some choose to call assaultweapons.
32 The defendants state that 1) [t]he Act is a reasonable and logicalextension of a twenty-year old Connecticut statute that mirrors analogouslaws that have existed for decades in other jurisdictions, and thus alongstanding restriction on the possession of certain firearms; 2) the Actdoes not prohibit an entire class of firearms, like all conventional handgunsthat are the quintessential self - defense weapon . . . [n]or does it evenban al l semiautomatic firearms; and 3)the act bans a tiny subset ofunusually dangerous military-style weapons and magazines that are designedto enhance their capacity to shoot multiple human targets very rapidly.
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the provision passes muster under the appropriate level of
constitutional scrutiny ) .
Second Amendment jurisprudence is currently evolving, and
the case law is sparse. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570, 636 (2008)(noting that Heller represents the
[Supreme] Court's first in-depth examination of the Second
Amendment, [and] one should not expect it to clarify the entire
field . . . ). Id. 35 The second circuit thereafter recognized
that Heller raises more questions than it answers. Kachalsky
v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2012). 36
What the Heller court did make clear, however, is that
weapons that are in common use at the time are protected under
the Second Amendment. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. 37 The court
explained that the determination is fairly supported by the
historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous
35 Heller struck down as violative of the Second Amendment, a D.C. statutethat banned hand gun possessi on in one s home, as well as a prohibitionagainst rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the immediatepurpose of self- defense. Id. In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court heldthat the right to keep and bear arms is fully applicable to the Statesthrough the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct.3020, 3026 (2010).
36 Heller declined to announce the precise standard of review applicable tolaws that infringe the Second Amendment right because the laws at issue . . .would be unconstitutional [u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that wehave applied to enumerated constitutional rights. Decastro, 682 F.3d at 165(quoting Heller 554 U.S. at 628-629).
37 The Heller court did not, however, identify what time it meant when itused the phra se in common use at the time. New York State Rifle & PistolAss'n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 2013 WL 6909955 at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2013)(hereinafter NYSRPA).
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and unusual weapons. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (citing U.S. v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). 38 Whether legislation
substantially burdens a Second Amendment right is heavily
dependent on the firearms in question being in common use.
Heller also concluded that regulations rendering firearms
in the home inoperable at all times makes it impossible for
citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of self-defense
and is hence unconstitutional. Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
In Heller II, a case determining the constitutionality of a
District of Columbia amendment promulgated in effort to cure
constitutional deficits that the Supreme Court had identified in
Heller , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit thought it clear enough in the record that semi-
automatic rifles and magazines holding more than ten rounds are
indeed in common use. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261 (D.C.
Cir. 2011). 39 However, the court could not be certain whether
38 Furthermore, the Supreme Court emphasized that nothing in our opinionshould be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possessionof firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carryingof firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, orlaws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626- 27. The Supreme Court also stated that [l]ike mostrights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited. Id. at 570. Thus, theSupreme Court logically concluded that [s]tate and local experimentationwith reasonable firearms regulations will continue under the SecondAmendment. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047; see also Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89(concluding that McDonald reaffirmed Heller's assurances that SecondAmendment rights are far from absolute and that many longstanding handgunregulations are presumptively lawful).
39 Similarly, the NYSRPA court found that the statistics provided by theparties on the popularity and percentage of ownership of assault weaponspaint very different pictures and leave many questions unanswered. NYSRPA
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these weapons are commonly used or are useful specifically for
self-defense or hunting and therefore whether the prohibitions
of certain semi-automatic rifles and magazines holding more than
ten rounds meaningfully affect the right to keep and bear arms.
Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1261.
The Connecticut legislation here bans firearms in common
use. Millions of Americans possess the firearms banned by this
act for hunting and target shooting. See Heller II, 670 F.3d
1244, 1261 40 (finding [a]pproximately 1.6 million AR 15s alone
have been manufactured since 1986, and in 2007 this one popular
model accounted for 5.5 percent of all firearms, and 14.4
percent of all rifles, produced in the U.S. for the domestic
market ). 41
Additionally, millions of Americans commonly possess
firearms that have magazines which hold more than ten
WL 6909955 at *10. Since Heller did not elaborate on what time it meantwhen it held that protected weapons are those that are in common use at thetime , . . . it is anomalous that a weapon could be unprotected under theSecond Amendment one moment, then, subject only to the whims of the public,garner protec tion in the next moment. Id. Even so, a firearm must also bepossessed for lawful purposes, and the NYSRPA court found [o]n this point,too, the parties [were] deeply divided. Id. at 11.
41 The AR-15 type rifle, which is an assault weapon under the legislation, isthe leading type of firearm used in national matches and in other matchessponsored by the congressionally established Civilian Marksmanship Program.Plaintiffs SOF, 123 -124. In 2011, AR-15s accounted for at least 7% ofall firearms and 18% of all rifles made in the U.S. for the domestic marketthat year. See Declaration of Mark Overstreet at 2- 4 (Overstreet Decl.).Additionally, the banned features are commonly found (either individually orin combination) on AR- 15 type modern sporting rifles. See Declaration ofPaul Hiller at 3.
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cartridges. 42 See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1261 (finding that
fully 18 percent of all firearms owned by civilians in 1994
were equipped with magazines holding more than ten rounds, and
approximately 4.7 million more [of] such magazines were imported
into the United States between 1995 and 2000). 43
The court concludes that the firearms and magazines at
issue are in common use within the meaning of Heller and,
presumably, used for lawful purposes. The legislation here bans
the purchase, sale, and possession of assault weapons and LCMs,
subject to certain exceptions, which the court concludes more
than minimally affect the plaintiffs' ability to acquire and use
the firearms, and therefore levies a substantial burden on the
plaintiffs' Second Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court must
proceed to the next step of the analysis and determine which
level of scrutiny applies.
A. Levels of Scrutiny
Cases that involve challenges to the constitutionality of
statutes often discuss what have become known as levels of
42 Numerous rifle designs utilize magazines with a capacity of more than tencartridges including the M1 Carbine, AR-15, and Ruger Mini-14 series, and, inrecent decades, the trend in semiautomatic pistols has been to those designedto hold ten rounds or more. See Mark Overstreet Decl. at 5-6
43 Heller II went on to conclude that [t] here may well be some capacity abovewhich magazines are not in common use but, if so, the record is devoid ofevidence as to what that capacity is; in any event, that capacity surely isnot ten. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1261.
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scrutiny. The traditionally expressed levels are strict
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review. D.C.
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008). Levels of scrutiny have
developed because [c]ons titutional rights are enshrined with
the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted
them and are not subject to the whims of future legislatures or
judges. Id. at 634-35. By applying the proper level of scrutiny
to challenged legislation, courts are more likely to apply a
uniform analysis to their review of such legislation.
[A] government practice or statute which restricts
fundamental rights or which contains suspect classifications
is to be subjected to strict scrutiny and can be justified
only if it furthers a compelling government purpose and, even
then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available.
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357
(1978); see also Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997)
(noting that, under strict scrutiny, the challenged regulation
must be narrowly tailor ed to achieve a compelling government
interest) .
In order to survive intermediate scrutiny, a law must be
substantially related to an important governmental objective.
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1998). Historically,
intermediate scrutiny has been applied to content-neutral
restrictions that place an incidental burden on speech,
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disabilities attendant to illegitimacy, and discrimination on
the basis of sex. U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568. (1996).
Under rational basis review, a statute will be upheld so
long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.
Romer v. Evans , 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); Vacco v. Quill, 521
U.S. 793, 799 (1997). Rational basis is typically applied [i]n
areas of s ocial and economic policy when a statutory
classification neither proceeds along suspect lines nor
infringes fundamental constitutional rights. F.C.C. v. Beach
Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313. (1993).
B. The Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
The plaintiffs argue that the legislation implicates the
possession of firearms inside the home, where [the second
circuit] recognizes that Second Amendment rights are at their
zenith. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that a higher
standard than intermediate scrutiny applies to prohibitions on
possession of firearms and magazines in the home. The
plaintiffs argue that like the handgun ban in Heller , the ban
on common firearms and magazines here is categorically void
under the Second Amendment. Alternatively, and at a minimum,
since the Act prohibits [the] exercise of a fundamental right in
the home, it must be evaluated by the highest levels of
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scrutiny. Regardless, the plaintiffs argue, the legislation
would neither pass intermediate scrutiny nor strict scrutiny.
The defendants respond that [a]lthough the protections of
the Second Amendment may be at their apex in the home, neither
Heller, McDonald, Kachalsky, nor any other case establishes a
brigh t line rule for which Plaintiffs advocate.
The Heller majority suggested that laws implicating the
Second Amendment should be reviewed under one of the two
traditionally expressed levels 44 of heightened scrutiny:
intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny.
Two recent second circuit decisions, Kachalsky v. Cnty. of
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012) and U.S. v. Decastro,
682 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2012), have addressed the issue of
determining the applicable standard to gun restrictions under
the Second Amendment. The second circuit concluded that
[h]eightened scrutiny is triggered only by those restrictions
that operate as a substantial burden on the ability of law-
abiding citizens to possess and use a firearm for self-defense
(or for other lawful purpo ses). Decastro, 682 F.3d at 166; see
also Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93 (finding that with the core
44 If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was arational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separateconstitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27.
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C. Intermediate Scrutiny Applied
The plaintiffs argue that the legislation comes nowhere
near being substantially related to the achievement of an
important governmental objective. Specifically, the plaintiffs
argue that the repetitive use of the word assault weapon
fails to address how banning any defined feature would reduce
crime in any manner. The plaintiffs, c iting United States v.
Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010), argue that [t]he
government must do more than offer plausible reasons why a gun
restriction is substantially related to an important government
goal. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants must also
offer sufficient evidence to establish a substantial
relationship between the restriction and that goal to determine
whether the restriction violated the Second Ame ndment by
application of the intermediate scrutiny test.
The defendants respond that the government has a
compelling interest in protecting public health and safety by
eliminating assault weapons and LCMs from the public sphere.
Specifically, the defe ndants argue that [t]he evidence
the Second Amendment context . . . Second, application of strict scrutinywould appear to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holdings in Heller and McDonald, where th e Court recognized several presumptively lawfulregulatory measures . . . [and third,] First Amendment jurisprudenceprovides a useful guidepost in this arena (because free speech issusceptible to several standards of scrutiny, depending on the type o f lawchallenged and the type of speech at issue). NYSRPA, 2013 WL 6909955 at *12.
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demonstrates that the Act is substantially related to that goal
because it will: (1) reduce the number of crimes in which these
uniquely dangerous and lethal weapons are used; and (2) thereby
reduce the lethality and injuriousness of gun crime when it does
occur. The defendants argue that the plaintiffs completely
ignore all of the evidence and justifications discussed above,
and again rely almost exclusively on their own self-serving and
unsupported submissions, self-interested policy positions, and
preferred views as to the wisdom of Connecticut s bans and the
utility o f these weapons and magazines.
Under intermediate scru tiny, a regulation that burdens a
plaintiff s Second Amendment rights passes constitutional
muster if it is substantially related to the achievement of an
important governmental interest. Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d
160, 168 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Kachalsky v. Cnty. of
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012)).
As the second circuit has noted, [s]ubstantial deference
to the predictive judgments of [the legislature] is warranted .
. . [and] [t]he Supreme Court has long granted deference to
legislative findings that are beyond the competence of courts.
Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010)). 49
49 The Kachalsky court elaborated and stated that [s]tate regulation underthe Second Amendment has always been more robust than of other enumerated
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Connecticut s General Assembly made its legislative
judgment concerning assault weapon and LCM possession after the
mass-shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School. The decision to
prohibit their possession was premised on the belief that it
would have an appreciable impact on public safety and crime
prevention. 50
The evidence suggests that there is a substantial
governmental interest in restricting both assault weapons and
LCMs. 51 Far from being simply cosmetic, [pistol grips, barrel
shrouds, and LCMs] . . . all contribute to the unique function
of any assault weapon to deliver extraordinary firepower.
Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1264; 52 see also Testimony of Brian J.
Siebel at 2. The assault weapon features increase a firearm s
lethalness and are therefore related to a compelling interest
50 As evidenced in the legislati ve record: At the end of that unimaginableday, we learned that we had lost 20 elementary school children and 6 teachersand administrators. They were killed with a weapon of war, a semi-automaticassault rifle, the platform of which was originally designed for thebattlefield and mass killings. . . . The legislature recognized that accessto guns is a big part of the public health challenges in our country today.See Connecticut Senate Session Transcript for April 3, 2013.
51 Christopher S. Koper, s tates that it is his considered opinion, based on[his] nineteen years as a criminologist studying firearms generally and [his]detailed study of the federal assault weapon ban in particular, thatConnecticut s bans on assault weapons and large -capacity magazines, andparticularly its ban on LCMs, have the potential to prevent and limitshootings in the state over the long- run. Koper Aff. at 17.
52 Finding that [a] lthough semi-automatic firearms, unlike automatic M 16s,fire only one shot with each pull of the trigger, semi-automatics still firealmost as rapidly as automatics. . . . Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1264 (internalquotation marks and citations omitted).
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of crime control and public safety. 53 For example, with respect
to LCMs, the evidence suggests that limiting the number of
rounds in a magazine promotes and is substantially related to
the important governmental interest in crime control and
safety. 54 Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1264 (finding t hat large-
capacity magazines tend to pose a danger to innocent people and
particularly to police officers . . . . ) .
The court concludes that Connecticut has a substantial
governmental interest in public safety and crime prevention. 55
This conclusion is not unique to Connecticut, and courts in
53 New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 2013 WL 6909955 at *15(f inding that, although the merits of the judgment remain to be seen,substantial evidence supports the finding that the banned features areusually dangerous, commonly associated with military combat situations, andare commonly found on weapo ns used in mass shootings and that militaryfeatures of semiautomatic assault weapons are designed to enhance thecapacity to shoot multiple human targets rapidly) .
54 This is because limiting rounds in a magazine means that a shooter has topause periodically to change out his magazine, reducing the amount of roundsfired and limiting the shooters capability of laying suppressing fire thatcan frustrate the efforts of responding law enforcement. See Mello Aff. at18,30; Sweeney Aff. at 15, 20; NYSRPA 2013 WL 6909955 at *17 (finding thelink between the ban on large capacity magazines and the state s interest inpublic safety is strong due to evidence suggesting that banning LCMs willprevent shootings and save lives ) .
55 Other courts have also found that the states have substantial, indeed
compelling, governmental interests in public safety and crime prevention.Schenck v. Pro Choice Network , 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997); Schall v. Martin , 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n , 452 U.S. 264, 300, (1981); Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 168 (2d Cir. 2013); Kwongv. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 877 (4th Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 134S. Ct. 422 (U.S. 2013); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester 701 F.3d at 97 (2dCir. 2012); Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1264; Kuck v. Danaher , 600 F.3d 159, 166(2d Cir.2010); NYSRPA 2013 WL 6909955 at *15.
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The plaintiffs reply th at [w] hile an off-duty exemption
may be warranted for officers who may be compelled to perform
law enforcement functions in various circumstances, Silveira v.
Lockyer , 312 F.3d 1052, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002), that does not
apply to military members and the other exempted persons who
have no such duties.
The provisions at issue in the legislation impose felony
penalties on most citizens for the possession and transfer of
the subject firearms and magazines. However, exempt personnel
may possess assault weapons and LCMs for use in the discharge
of their official duties or when off duty . 59 The legislation
allows exempt personnel who retire[] or [ are] otherwise
separated from service an extension of time to declare lawfully
possessed assault weapons and LCMs used in the discharge of
their duties. 60
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
commands that no s tate shall deny to any per son within its
jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws. Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982). However, as the Supreme Court has
explained, the equal protection clause does not forbid
59 See Conn. P.A. 13-220 1(d)(1); Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-202c(b)(2). Severalprovisions do not read exactly this way, but are nearly the same. Forexample, part of one provision reads: . . . for use by such sworn member,inspector, officer or constable in the discharge of such sworn member's,inspector's, officer's or constable's official duties or when off duty.Conn. P.A. 13-3, 23(d)(2).
60 See e.g. Conn. P.A. 13-220 2(a)(2) and 7(a)(2).
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classifications. Nordlinger v. Hahn , 505 U.S. 1, 10, (1992)
(noting that most laws differentiate in some fashion between
classes of persons). It simply keeps governmental
decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all
relevant respects alike . Id.; see also Silveira v. Lockyer, 312
F.3d 1052, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that [f]irst, in order
for a state action to trigger equal protection review at all,
that action must treat similarly situated persons disparately );
City of Cleburne, Tex. V. Cleburne Living Center , 473 U.S. 432,
439 (1985) (emphasis added).
Some courts have concluded that a Second Amendment
analysis, as conducted here in section I, is sufficient to
assess the alleged burdening of Second Amendment rights and have
declined to conduct a separate equal protection analysis. 61 Many
courts subjected the equal protection challenge to rational
basis review. 62 Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir.
2013) (finding a geographic classification was not suspect, the
statute itself did not burden a fundamental right, and the
61 See Wollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 873 n.4 (4th Cir. 2013) (decliningto conduct a separate equal protection analysis for Maryland s good-and-substantial- reason requirement for obtaining a handgun permit, because theequal protection claim was essentially a restatement of [the] SecondAmendme nt claim).
62 In applying constitutional scrutiny to a legislative classification ordistinction, if it neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspectclass, we will uphold [the classification or distinction] so long as it bearsa rational rel ation to some legitimate end. Romer v. Evans , 517 U.S. 620,631 (1996); see also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997).
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legislative classification bore a rational relation to
legitimate interest ). 63 In Silveira v. Lockyer, the court
recognized the similarly situated requirement in an equal
protection cause of action when analyzing a similar off-duty
officer provision, but ostensibly omitted it in its analysis
because the provision was easily resolved under rational bas is
review. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1089 (9th Cir. 2002). 64
Notwithstanding, the plaintiffs have not met the threshold
requirement of demonstrating that they are similarly situated to
the exempted personnel in the legislation.
The court concludes that law enforcement, unlike the
general public, often confront organized groups of criminals
with the most dangerous weaponry. Furthermore, the differences
between the general public and law enforcement are similar to
the differences between the public and members of the military,
if not even more pronounced.
63 See also Coal. of New Jersey Sportsmen, Inc. v. Whitman, 44 F. Supp.2d 666,685 (D.N.J. 1999) aff'd, 263 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying rational basisreview with respect to an equal protection cause of action in a caseconcerning an assault weapons ban); National Rifle Ass n of America, Inc. v.Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 211 12(5th Cir. 2012) (applying rational basis review to a firearm regulationbecause it did not impermissibly interfere with the exe rcise of afundamental right).
64 The Silveria court concluded that [i]t is manifestly rational for at leastmost categories of peace officers to possess and use firearms more potentthan those available to the rest of the populace in order to maintain publicsafety. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1089.
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The charge of protecting the public, and the training that
accompanies that charge, is what differentiates the exempted
personnel from the rest of the population. Hence, the court
agrees with the defendants that law enforcement should not be
expected to apprehend criminals without superior or comparable
firepower, but should only be accorded this advantage when
compelled to perform law enforcement functions . Silveira, 312
F.3d at 1089. Similarly, members of the military and government
agency personnel who use the otherwise banned firearms and
magazines in the course of their employment should also have an
advantage while maintaining public safety even if not
technically on the clock.
While not perfectly crafted, the court concludes that the
challenged provisions only allow for the use of assault weapons
and LCMs for law enforcement or for similar public safety
purposes. The court reads the provisions in question to mean
that exempted personnel may use assault weapons and LCMs for use
in the discharge of their official duties whether on or off
duty. 65 In addition, the extension of time to declare the assault
65 In fact, 6(b)(1) of P.A. 13-3 states that nor shall any provision insections 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, as amended by this act, prohibit thepossession or use of assault weapons by sworn members of these agencies whenon duty and when the possession or use is within the scope of such member'sduties. Conn. P.A. 13-220, 6(b)(1). It would be absurd to require the useof an assault weapon to be within the scope of the member s duties when onduty but allow for recreational use by members of these agencies while offdut y. Likewise, another provision does not require exempt personnel todeclare possession with respect to a large capacity magazine used forofficial duties. P.A. 13 -3 2(a)(2).
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weapons and LCMs is consistent with other provisions that
allowed non-exempt personnel to declare their LCMs and firearms
that were lawfully possessed before the legislation came into
effect. 66
The court concludes that the plaintiffs have failed to
prove the threshold requirement that the statute treats
differently persons who are in all relevant aspects alike. Thus,
these provisions do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
III. Void-for-Vagueness Cause of Action
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that portions of the
legislation are unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, the
plaintiffs argue that the gun and magazine bans here impose
severe criminal penalties but include no scienter elements . The
plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to challenge it both
facially and as applied.
The defendants respond that [a] statute is not
unconstitutionally vague simply because some of its terms
require interpretation, or because it requires citizens to take
steps to ensure their compliance with it. Specifically, the
66 See e.g. Conn. P.A. 13-220 2(a)(2) and 7(a)(2); see also P.A. 13-3 24(a).
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defendants argue that the plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of
showin g the Act has no core at all. The defendants further
argue that the the Act is comprehensible, and clearly covers a
substantial amount of core conduct. The defendants state that
there is a wide array of readily available information that gun
owners can use to determine, factually, whether their weapons
and magazines fall within the Act s proscriptions.
The notion that a statute is void for vagueness is a
concept derived from the notice requirement of the due process
clause. Cunney v. Bd. of Trustees of Vill. of Grand View, N.Y.,
660 F.3d 612, 620 (2d Cir. 2011) . It is a basic principle of due
process that a statute is unconstitutionally vague if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined. Id.; Arriaga v. Mukasey,
521 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 2008); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
[T] he void - for - vagueness doctrine requires that a penal
statute define the criminal offense (1) with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and (2) in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement. Village of Hoffman Estates v.
The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498
(1982)(quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
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The degree of vagueness tha t the Constitution tolerates -
as well as the relative importance of fair notice and fair
enforcement - depends in part on the nature of the enactment.
Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498. Specifically,
vagueness in statutes with criminal penalties is tolerated less
than vagueness in those with civil penalties because of the
severity of the potential consequences of the imprecision. Id. 67
All statutes, however, need not be crafted with meticulous
specificity, as language is necessarily marked by a degree of
imprecision. Thibodeau v. Portuondo, 486 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir.
2007) (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110).
Here, the issue is whether the following five provisions
survive a facial 68 challenge for vagueness: 1) the pistol grip;
2) copies or duplicates; 3) assault weapons; 4) modification,
alteration, or assembly of magazines and components; and 5)
magazines with the capacity to accept more than ten rounds. With
67 The court recognizes that in City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 119(1999) (Stevens, J.), a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court set forth apermeated with vagueness test for criminal laws with no mens rearequirement. For t hese statutes, when vagueness permeates the text of such alaw, it is subject to facial attack. Morales, 527 U.S. at 119. The secondcircuit has not declared a preference for this so- called permeated withvagueness test or the impermissibly vague in all its applications test
recognized in U.S. v. Rybicki , 354 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2003). The court sconclusions here, however, are the same whether applying the Morales test orthe vague in all applications test.
68 The defendants challenge the provisions discussed below on on their faceand as applied. Challenges mounted pre - enforcement, that is, before theplaintiffs have been charged with a crime under the legislation, are properlylabeled as a facial challenge. Richmond Boro Gun Club, Inc. v. City of NewYork, 97 F.3d 681, 685 (2d Cir. 1996).
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a f acial challenge, the plaintiffs must establish that no set
of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid .
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (emphasis
added); see also Village of Hoffman Estates 455 U.S. at 494-95
(1982); Richmond Boro Gun Club, Inc. v. City of New York, 97
F.3d 681, 684 (2d Cir. 1996).
A. Grip
The plaintiffs argue that every rifle and shotgun meets the
definition of an assault weapon under Conn. Gen. Stat. 53 -
202a(1)(E)(i)(II),(vi)(II). Specifically, the plaintiffs argue
that the provision is vague because it applies or does not
apply to every rifle and shotgun depending on how it is being
held, but fails to give notice of any assumption that it is
being held in a specific manner. 69
The defendants respond that [c]ourts must interpret
statutes both to avoid absurd results and constitutional
infirmity. Specifically, the defendants contend that [t]he
language at issue obviously exists to prohibit any grip that
results in any finger in addition to the trigger finger being
directly below the action of the weapon when it is held in the
69 The plaintiffs argue that [w]aterfowl shotguns are typically firedvertically when ducks are flying over a blind. When pointed upward forfiring, all four fing ers are directly below the action of the shotgun. Theplaintiffs argue, [b]y contrast, a rifle with some types of pistol grips orthumbhole stocks (depending on the configuration), when held at an angledownward to fire at a deer in a valley, may be tilted sufficiently that thenon- trigger fingers are not directly below the action.
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normal firing position, which is horizontal. As such, the
defendants argue that the plaintiffs cannot challenge the law
as facially vague based on their ridiculous scenario.
The relevant provision of the act provides that it is
unlawful to possess a firearm that has: [a] ny grip of the
weapon, including a pistol grip, a thumbhole stock, or any
other stock, the use of which would allow an individual to
grip the weapon, resulting in any finger on the trigger
hand in addition to the trigger finger being directly below
any por tion of the action of the weapon when firing. Conn.
Gen. Stat. 53-202a(1)(E)(II).
A cardinal function in interpreting a statute is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.
Kuhne v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, 579 F.3d 189, 193 (2d Cir.
2009) certified question accepted, 13 N.Y.3d 791 (2009) and
certified question withdrawn, 14 N.Y.3d 786; (quoting Tom Rice
Buick Pontiac v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 551 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir.
2008)). 70 As the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the
statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation
70 However, where a court finds it necessary, general terms should be solimited in their application as not to lead to an absurd consequence. UnitedStates v. Fontaine, 697 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2012) The court shouldpresume that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, whichwould avoid absurd results. Id. (quoting United States v. Kirby , 74 U.S.482, 486 87 (1868))(internal quotation marks omitted).
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must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain
meaning thereof. Slamowitz, LLP, 579 F.3d at 193.
The court interprets the language to prohibit a scenario in
which the weapon is in the normal horizontal firing position.
Therefore, the provision covers some, if not most applications. 71
Hence, the challenge fails because the provision is only
plausibly vague when applied to a specific use of the weapon.
See Richmond Boro Gun Club, Inc. 97 F.3d at 685 (finding
[a] lthough application of this standard might, in some cases,
be ambiguous, it was sufficient to cover [other cases] and,
thus, to preclude a facial vagueness challenge ). The provision
is not impermissibly vague in all its applications and, as such,
it is not unconstitutionally vague.
B. Copies or Duplicates
The plaintiffs next argue that an ordinary person is
expected to know the features of 183 named models in order to
know whether a specific firearm is lawful, as well as be
expected to 1) be intimately familiar with each of the listed
models of rifles, pistols, and 1 model of shotgun, 2) know
which versions of the listed models were in production prior to
71 While the vertical firing position may be normal for certain activities,such as duck hunting, it is not the overall normal firing position. Ideally,the legislation would have included a more descriptive statement than whenfiring. The California penal code includes such a statement when it providesthe phrase [n]ormal firing position with barrel horizontal in its chapteron Unsafe Handguns and related definitions. See Cal. Penal Code 31900-31910.
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the effective date of April 4, 2013, 3) know whether a gun is
a copy or dupl icate of any one of these named models and 4)
know whether a gun has the capability of any such listed
firearm. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that [o]rdinary
people and police officers have no such knowledge of the design
history of these scores of firearms.
The defendants respond that when properly considered in
the broader context of the statute as a whole, it is unlikely
that any individual will ever need to know whether a firearm is
a copy or duplicate because all but one of the specifically
enumerated weapons has the requisite military features to
qualify as an assault weapon under the applicable features
test. Specifically, the defendants argue that [i]n the vast
majority of circumstances, an individual need only physically
examine his or her weapon and then read the statute to determine
whether it is prohibited. The defendants also state that the
terms copy and duplicate are not vague on their face because
they are readily understandable based on their commonly
understood meanings. The defendants argue that the
[p]laintiffs claim that ordinary individuals have no way of
knowing the production date of their firearm is simply wrong,
because if the firearm does not have a serial number it was
either produced before 1968 or it is unlawful to possess under
federal law.
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The relevant provisions of the legislation provide that a
weapon is an assault weapon if it is [a]ny of the following
specified [semiautomatic firearms], or copies or duplicates
thereof with the capability of any such [semiautomatic
firearms], that were in production prior to or on April 4,
2013. 72 The statute goes on to list numerous firearm models.
In analyzing statutory text, the court presume[s] that it
speaks consistently with the commonly understood meaning of
[its] term[s]. Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 311 (2d Cir.
2001) (citing Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enters., Inc., 519
U.S. 202, 207 (1997) ). A copy is defined as an imi tation, or
re production of an original work. A duplicate is defined to
include either of two things that exactly resemble or
correspond to each other. Id. (internal citations omitted). 73
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Wilson v. Cnty. of Cook,
concluded that [a] person of ordinary intelligence would
understand that [ the section with the copies or duplicates
language] includes the specific weapons listed and any
imitations or reproductions of those weapons made by that
manufacturer or another. When read together with the listed
72 Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-202a(1)(B),(C) and (D).
73 The Kuhlman court found that the copies or duplicates language was addedto the Ordinance in order to prevent manufacturers from simply changing thename of the specified weapons to avoid criminal liability. Kuhlman, 261 F.3dat 311.
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weapons, the provision is not vague. Wilson v. Cnty. of Cook,
968 N.E.2d 641, 652-53 (Ill. 2012).
In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 2013
WL 6909955 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2013), however, the court found
that a provision 74 of the New York Penal Law regulating
semiautomatic version[s] of an automatic rifle, shotgun or
firearm was excessively vague, as an ordinary person cannot
know whether any single semiautomatic pistol is a version of
an automatic one. Id. at *24 (emphasis added).
Here, the copies or duplicates language is not vague, and
is more clear than the version language that was the subject
of the NYSPRA case. Not only must a firearm be exactly the same
or an imitation of a listed firearm under the current
legislation, it must be the functional equivalent. As such, the
provision does not leave a person without knowledge of what is
prohibited and the language at issue is not unconstitutionally
vague.
C. Assault Weapons
The plaintiffs next argue that the legislation lists
assault weapons by reference to 183 diferent names, but in
many cases the listed names do not correspond to the names that
are actually engraved on the specific firearms, which leaves a
74 New York Penal Law 265.00(22)(c)(viii).
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person without knowledge of what is prohibited. Specifically,
t he plaintiffs argue that [w]hile the validity of all the
listed names cannot be litigated in this case, the court should
declare that, consistent with due process, the Act s
prohibitions may not be applied to firearms that are not
engraved with pr ecise names listed in the Act.
The defendants respond that an individual does not need to
know whether a firearm is included by name in the enumerated
firearms provisions to determine whether it is banned. With the
exception of the Remington 7615, all of the specifically
enumerated weapons have the requisite action-type and military
features that qualify them as an assault weapon under the
applicable features test. The defendants also respond that
even if the existence of the generic features test were not
dispositive which it is Plaintiffs claim lacks merit
because most guns have identifying information engraved directly
on the gun. 75
The legislation defines an assault weapon as any of the
following specified semiautomatic firearms: Algimec Agmi;
Armalite AR-180;. . . the following specified semiautomatic
75 Specifically, the defendants argue that most individuals will be able todetermine whether their firearm is prohibited simply by locating the make andmodel engravings that most firearms have; and if no such engravings exist,by the firearms serial number, calling the manufacturer, calling a federallylicensed firearms dealer, or calling the Special Licensing and Firearms Unitat the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection.
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centerfire rifles . . .: (i) AK-47; (ii) AK-74;. . . the
following specified semiautomatic pistols . . .:(i) Centurion 39
AK; (ii) Draco AK-47; . . . the following semiautomatic shotguns
. . .: All IZHMASH Saiga 12 Shotguns . . . . 76
The legislation s generic features test 77 provides notice
as to what weapons qualify as an assault weapon, with the
exception of the Remington 7615. The specific list of firearms,
which includes the Remington 7615, essentially provides further
clarification to owners of such weapons, if there were any doubt
as to whether their weapon passed the generic features test.
Thus, the court concludes that, when read together with the
listed banned features of Conn. Gen. Stat. 202a(1)(E)(i)(I)-
(V),(iv)(I)-(IV) and (vi)(I)-(II), the provision does not leave
a person without knowledge of what is prohibited and the
provision is not unconstitutionally vague.
D. Modification, Alteration, or Assembly
The plaintiffs argue [t]he Act s definition of an assault
weapon as a collection of unassembled parts involves components
that an ordinary person may not even recognize as firearm-
related. 78 Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that [o]ne must
76 See Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-202a(1)(A)-(D).
77 For example, these provisions provide that a semiautomatic centerfire riflewith a thumbhole stock (the generic feature) qualifies as an assault weapon.See Conn. Gen. Stat. 202a(1)(E)(i)(I)-(V),(iv)(I)-(IV),(vi)(I)-(II).
78 The plaintiffs state that several provisions in the act refer to thepotential to restore, convert, assemble or alter magazines or parts
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be intimately familiar with 183 listed firearms, must be able to
identify all of the parts thereof, and must know that
combi nations of some parts may be rapidly assembled into 67
firearms under three other categories.
The defendants respond that these claims lack merit because
the Second Circuit and numerous district courts have made clear
that the applicable standard for assessing facial vagueness is
actually the reverse of what Plaintiffs propose; a law survives
a facial vagueness challenge if there are any conceivable
applications of it. Specifically , the defendants argue that
[t]he term rapidly is commonly understood to mean happening
in a short amount of time or happening quickly. The
defendants state that [t]he challenged language exists to
prevent an individual from circumventing the ban by
disassembling their weapon, only to rapidly reassemble it back
into an assault weapon when they wish to use it.
Relevant provisions of the legislation provide that an
[a]ssault weapon means: . . . A part or combination of parts
designed or intended to convert a firearm into an assault
weapon, as defined in subparagraph (A)(i) of this subdivision,
or any combination of parts from which an assault weapon, as
defined in subparagraph (A)(i) of this subdivision, may be
rapidly assembled if those parts are in the possession or under
in any given way. The plaintiffs also state other provisions place theadverbs readily and rapidly to modify these verbs.
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the control of the same person;. . . "Large capacity magazine"
means any firearm magazine, belt, drum, feed strip or similar
device that has the capacity of, or can be readily restored or
converted to accept, more than ten rounds of ammunition, but
does not include (A) A feeding device that has been permanently
altered so that it cannot accommodate more than ten rounds of
ammunition . . . . 79
The Connecticut legislature did not have to specify the
exact amount of time in which a weapon could be rapidly
assembled. 80 Such precision is not always possible due to the
confines of the English language. The Constitution does not
require impossible standards. United States v. Petrillo , 332
U.S. 1, 7 (1947). 81
Assault weapons and LCMs, broken into parts, which can be
restored to their entirety without much effort, are clear[ly]
what the ordinance as a whole prohibits . Grayned v. City of
79 See Conn. Gen. Stat. 202a(1)(A)(ii); Conn. P.A. No. 13-220(a)(1).
80 See e.g., Coal. of New Jersey Sportsmen, Inc. v. Whitman, 44 F. Supp.2d666, 681 (D.N.J. 1999) aff'd, 263 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding that[s] urely the Legislature, intent on reaching assault weapons which could bealtered in minor ways or disassembled to avoid the purview of the otherassault weapon definitions, did not have to specify in hours and minutes andwith reference to specific tools and degrees of knowledge the parameters ofwhat readily assembled means).
81 See also U.S. v. Catanzaro, 368 F. Supp. 450, 454 (D. Conn. 1973) (findingthat the phrase which may be readily restored to fire wa s notunconstitutionally vague in se and that it did not fail to provide fairwarning to a person of ordinary intelligence that the item which is thesubject matter of this indictment was a firearm within the terms of theNational Firearms Act).
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tubular magazines would be impacted by the ambiguity that
Plaintiffs posit, and [b]ecause the ten round limit will be
clear and unambiguous in virtually all of its applications,
therefore, it is not facially vague.
The legislation explicitly states that "[l]arge capacity
magazine means any firearm magazine, belt, drum, feed strip or
similar device that has the capacity of, or can be readily
restored or converted to accept, more than ten rounds of
ammunition, but does not include: (A) A feeding device that has
been permanently altered so that it cannot accommodate more than
ten rounds of ammunition, (B) a .22 caliber tube ammunition
feeding device, (C) a tubular magazine that is contained in a
lever-action firearm, or (D) a magazine that is permanently
inoperable . . . . 83 The legislation s tates that an [a]ssault
weapon means: . . . (E) Any semiautomatic firearm regardless of
whether such firearm is listed in subparagraphs (A) to (D),
inclusive, of this subdivision, and regardless of the date such
firearm was produced, that meets the following criteria: . . .
(ii) A semiautomatic, centerfire rifle that has a fixed magazine
with the ability to accept more than ten rounds . . . . 84
83 Conn. P.A. 13-220, 1(a)(1).
84 See Conn. Gen. Stat. 202a(1)(A)(ii).
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Here, the court concludes that this provision of the
legislation, if applied to standard cartridges, is not
impermissibly vague in all its applications and, as such, it is
not unconstitutionally vague. 85
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment (document no. 60) is DENIED; the defendants
cross motion for summary judgment (document no. 78) is GRANTED;
and the plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction (document
no. 14) is DENIED as moot.
It is so ordered this 30th day of January, 2014, at
Hartford, Connecticut.
_________/s/________________Alfred V. Covello,United States District Judge
85 See e.g., Coal. of New Jersey Sportsmen, Inc. v. Whitman, 44 F. Supp.2d666 680 (D N J 1999) ff'd 263 F 3d 157 (3d Ci 2001) (fi di h
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