Julie Banner Code 616 Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division System Safety Society WDC Chapter Mtg 16 March 2011

Julie BannerCode 616

Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division

System Safety Society WDC Chapter Mtg

16 March 2011

3/15/11 NSWC Carderock Code 616 2

Information included in this presentation is unclassified

The purpose of this presentation is to provide general information covering

– Basic introduction to lithium battery technology– General hazards associated with lithium batteries– Firefighting methods and lithium batteries– Recent developments in the Navy’s Lithium Battery Safety

Program

Some of the images shown in this presentation are the extreme results of aggressive and deliberate battery abuses


Battery Types– Primary

• Active• Reserve

– Liquid Reserve– Thermal

– Secondary

Cell Designs– Bobbin– Spiral– Bipolar– Coin– Prismatic

Battery Chemistries– Cathode

• Manganese Dioxide

• Carbon Monofluoride

• Thionyl Chloride• Sulfur Dioxide• Sulfuryl Chloride• Vanadium

Pentoxide• Cobalt Oxide

– Anode• Lithium Metal• Lithium Alloy• Lithium Ion

– Electrolyte• Organic Liquid• Polymer/Gel

Cell Sizes– Button Cell

(0.01 Ah)– AA-Size Cell

(2 Ah)– D-Size Cell

(10-20 Ah)– Specialty

Design Cell (2,200 Ah)

– Air Force Design Cell (10,000 Ah)


From Handbook of Batteries, 3rd Edition, by Linden and Reddy


Specific Energy, Wh/kg

Lithium Ion

Zn-air

1375 Wh/kg = TNT



Controlled Release of This Energy Provides Electrical Power in the Form of Current and Voltage

Uncontrolled Release of This Energy can Result in Venting, Fire, Release of Toxic Materials, Shrapnel, High Pressure Events, Deflagration (with or without Report) and Many Combinations Thereof


Venting

Leaking of hazardous materials– Noxious or acidic gases– Strong acids– Flammable gasses and liquids

FireNote: Other types of batteries may also respond to abusive

conditions presenting similar (but not identical) hazards, so many of the handling and safety recommendations that follow can be considered to be appropriate for all battery types


Release of internal pressure from a cell by ejecting some or all of its internal components into the environment

– These components may be flammable and may include noxious gasses

– A venting of a lithium ion battery may release• Flammable organic electrolyte (e.g. PC-EC-DMC)• LiPF6 -- this material is reactive with H20 and forms HF• Carbon either as carbon or water reactive lithiated graphites• LiNiCoO2 or other lithiated oxides and heavy/transition metals• Metal foils and fragments (copper or aluminum)• Methane, hydrogen, carbon monoxide (electrolyte

decomposition products)

Ventings may be accompanied by smoke, sparks and or flames

Ventings may be high pressure events


Release of internal pressure from a cell by ejecting some or all of its internal components into the environment

– A venting of a Li/SOCl2 battery may release• Lithium Metal (Li) - reactive in air & highly reactive in H2O• Thionyl Chloride (SOCl2) - combines immediately with any

moisture to create fumes of HCl and SO2

• Carbon (C)• Aluminum Chloride (AlCl3)• Lithium Chloride (LiCl)• PVC• PTFE (teflon)

Ventings may be accompanied by smoke, sparks and or flames

Ventings may be high pressure events


Physical abuse, such as crushing, puncturing or burning

Overcharging a rechargeable lithium battery (due to electronics failure)

Charging of primary (non-rechargeable) batteries

Exposure of battery to inappropriate environment– High temperature abuse (140°C)– Water immersion of an unprotected or unsealed battery

Short circuit or abnormally high rate discharge of battery

Unanticipated latent manufacturer’s defect failure


Puncturing and crushing result in massive internal short circuits that are not mitigated by external or internal safety devices and frequently result in thermal runaway and violent venting of lithium batteries with incandescent ejecta

Recommendation: Whenever possible, package lithium batteries in protective containers and be aware of potential physical hazards


Lithium ion batteries may be designed to be recharged either inside or outside their system housing

Redundant over-voltage and over-current electronics “should” prevent abuse due to overcharging

In abuse tests of high energy lithium ion cells and similar modules, cells vented with pressure and flame in response to extreme overcharging conditions

Recommendation: Always follow standard operating procedures and manufacturer recommendations for charging the battery


Use of battery in circuit with very low (<50 milliohms or less) resistance

Short circuits can be caused by– Connecting positive and negative terminals of battery (External, i.e.

“crowbar” or loose wires or screwdriver)– Breaching physical integrity of battery (Internal)

Fuses and other over-current electronics “should” prevent abuse due to external short circuits

Some lithium cells include internal safety devices to protect against overcurrent conditions

Precautions include– Do not handle battery modules on metal surfaces– Keep terminals insulated and separated– Never remove or bypass electrical fuses


System-specific guidance included in system emergency documentation

General shipboard guidance given in S9086-S3-STM-010 “Naval Ships’ TM Chapter 555 - Volume 1 Surface Ship Firefighting” Vol 1 Rev 13 of 1 Jan 2010, section 8.14

– Application of a narrow-angle fog of water or AFFF is the preferred method to cool the battery, suppress immediate fire output, and reduce likelihood of propagation to remaining cells

– Maintain an adequate distance for personnel safety from exposure to fireballs and/or projected fragments

– Personnel should wear SCBAs to protect from exposure to hazardous gases (acid gases, oxidizers and other toxic and irritating materials)

– Continue to cool the battery for several minutes after the last cell event and do not approach until there is evidence that all reactions have stopped

– Initiate active desmoking/ventilation of the area as soon as practicable during the casualty to remove heat, smoke and toxic gases


Instruction -- Defines the Process– NAVSEAINST 9310 Initial Release in 1979– NAVSEAINST 9310.1a of 11 March 1982– NAVSEANOTE 9310 of 11 June 1985– NAVSEAINST 9310.1b of 13 June 1991– NAVSEAINST 9310.1c revision in review at NOSSA &

planned for an FY11 release

Technical Manual -- Guidelines for Design, Review and Procedures for Testing

– Technical Manual for Batteries, Navy Lithium Safety Program and Procedures, Rev 2 S9310-AQ-SAF-010 of 15 July 2010

https://nossa.nmci.navy.mil/nrws2/tabid/232/Default.aspx


Navy Lithium Battery Safety Authorizations are system specific

Authorizations for previously reviewed batteries:– Leverage data from previous programs (testing, analysis,

design) when appropriate– Do not required duplicative testing– Are usually quicker

Contact NOSSA, Carderock or Crane to determine if a battery has previous safety reviews on file


Originally granted to NAVSEA Safety Division (NAVSEA 665), and has followed the Explosive Safety Office through multiple reorganizations

Currently resides with Code N84 of the Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity, under the auspices of the Explosive Safety Office for Navy Systems

Special Authority for specific platform use– NAVSEA Code 05Z34 for Surface Ship & Submarine Carriage– MSCHQ for Military Sealift Command platforms– NAVAIR 4.4.5.2 for Aircraft Carriage

Primary testing and evaluation sites– Carderock Division, NSWC, Code 616– Crane Division, NSWC, Code GXS

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Official documentation (signed) is the NOSSA Interim Letter of 2 April 09

SEA05Z34 proposed process is contained in draft TM “High-Energy Storage System Safety Manual”

– Released 9 Jul 10 for review– Revised version has been in review by SEA05 (Mr. Drakely and

ADM Eccles) for past few months– Under a mandatory 15 day SEA05Z34 official standards review

Staged implementation of SEA05 TM is planned– New manual will be implemented on new system starts as of the

issue date– Approvals currently in process will follow interim guidance except

the MIL-STD 882 assessment will follow new manual guidance– Approval extensions are TBD

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Goal– Characterize the safety hazards and risks associated with

integration and use of lithium batteries aboard Navy platforms– Determine if use of platform features (fire fighting, special

stowage, charging capabilities) mitigates risks associated with batteries and identify unmitigated risks

Scope– “Includes all lithium batteries used, carried, or intended for

use or carrying on Navy platforms, both as standalone batteries and as systems incorporating lithium batteries. Specifically included are manned Deep Submergence Systems (DSS).”

– Scope as written does not have universal acceptance at top levels in NAVSEA

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Initial Data Submission– Top Level Requirements (TLR) List – Operational Requirements Document (ORD)– Preliminary Hazard List (PHL)– Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

Secondary Data Review due prior to PDR– Program Management Plan– Memorandum of Agreement with SEA05, battery tech agent and program

stake-holders– Hazard Log– Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)– Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

Approved Documentation to Proceed to FDR/Fleet Release– Battery Test Plan– Test Report– Safety Hazard Analysis (Final)– Manufacturing Audit Report

Note: For projects that are not formal acquisition projects SEA05 will accept equivalent documents.For instance if there is not a formal TLR list or ORD, alternative formats would be accepted.

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Require extensive customization of testing with in-depth input & direction from SEA-05Z, SEA-05P, and other cognizant platform warrants

NOTE: This is an all inclusive matrix and many test can be combined into one test by proper design

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Contain severe casualty output and limit consequences to personnel & platform

– Target mitigations to Maximum Credible Event (MCE)– Review data from Worst Case Event (WCE) as part of the risk analysis

Proven battery management systems– Demonstrate reliability & redundancy or inherent fault tolerance– In some cases (platform dependent) software validation IAW Fly-by-wire

criteria is mandatory and will be conducted by joint review

Automated and validated warning systems– Industrial standard systems preferred to those with limited access

(proprietary)– Software validation may apply

Fire suppression and ventilation tactics and systems that are compatible with the platform capabilities & personnel

– Focused on MCE level as demonstrated by test or simulation– Based on system and host platform safety precepts for operability


Within the group known as lithium batteries, there are a wide variety of specific performance and safety characteristics

Specific lithium battery hazards depend on both battery and system-related variables

The major classes of hazards associated with most lithium batteries include

– Venting of noxious and/or hazardous gases– Fire– High pressure events

When fighting a lithium battery fire, cooling (water) is key and smothering (heavy gas or chemical blanket) is not generally effective, therefore Navy safety guidance recommends the use of water or AFFF as the extinguishing media for lithium battery fires

The Navy’s Lithium Battery Safety Program strives to minimize risk to personnel and platforms while allowing the use of lithium batteries on our ships, aircraft and submarines to advance our military capabilities through the approval process managed by NOSSA


Who U Gonna Call?– Julie Banner– NSWC Carderock, Code 616– [email protected]– (301) 227-1853 desk/voicemail– (240) 751-7862– (301) 227-5457 fax– (240) 597-1394 alternate fax

Documents

Julie Banner Code 616 Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division System Safety Society WDC Chapter Mtg 16 March 2011