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GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND DECENT WORK:
ARE NORMS AND VALUES ENOUGH?
By
JULES ARNTZ-GRAY
MAIS 702 Integrated Studies Project
submitted to Dr. Paul Kellogg
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts – Integrated Studies
Athabasca, Alberta
September, 2014
Contents
Abstract...................................................................................................................................... 1 Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... 2 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 3
Thesis Statement ........................................................................................................... 5 Research Question ......................................................................................................... 5 Structure ......................................................................................................................... 5
1. Globalization, work and challenges of global governance: a review of the literature ............... 6 Laying the Groundwork .................................................................................................. 6
Global Labour Markets and Labour Standards as Human Rights ........................ 7 Cooperation ........................................................................................................ 8 Norms 10
Global governance, labour standards and the modern corporation ................................13 Labour Standards and Trade .............................................................................16 Transnational Labour Regulation .......................................................................20 The governance deficit .......................................................................................22
International Labour Organization (ILO) .........................................................................25 ILO, Trade, and Innovative Approaches to Improving Labour Standards ...........26
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) ..........................................................................28 Global Compact .................................................................................................30
2. Data – Labour standards in a globalized world ......................................................................32 Occupational Health and Safety ....................................................................................32 Methodology ..................................................................................................................33 Fatality Rate in Select Countries in the Mining and quarrying, electricity, gas and
water supply sector ............................................................................................35 Injury, Illness and Fatality Trends in Ontario’s Mining Sector .........................................38 ILO Convention and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
Ratification .........................................................................................................49 Global Labour Inspection (in select countries) ...............................................................56
3. Legislative and Regulatory Compliance in the Mining Sector in Ontario, Canada – 2004-2013 .....................................................................................................................59
4. Summary of Results from Sections 2 and 3 ..........................................................................70 Fatality Rate in Select Countries in the Mining and quarrying, electricity, gas and
water supply sector ............................................................................................70 Injury, Illness and Fatality Trends in Ontario’s Mining Sector .........................................70 ILO Convention and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
Ratification .........................................................................................................70 Global Labour Inspection (in select countries) ...............................................................71 Legislative and Regulatory Compliance in the Mining Sector in Ontario, Canada –
2004-2013..........................................................................................................71 5. In a Complex Global Governance World, How can Labour Standards be Improved? ............73
Mining Sector .....................................................................................................76 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................78 References: ..............................................................................................................................79 Appendix A – Mining Fatality Rate in Select Countries in Detail ................................................86 Appendix B – Orders Issued Pursuant to the Ontario OHSA in the Mining Sector 2004-
2013 Categorized by Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S) System Framework ....................................................................................................................98
Global Governance and Decent Work 1
Abstract
We find ourselves living in an increasingly globalized world where capital, information, and
trade are moving around the world at an unprecedented pace. While the nation state still plays an
important role, borders seem to be blurring and losing some of their relevance. Despite this
apparent weakening of the Westphalian model, institutions of global governance have not filled
the gap and instead remain weak and incomplete, unable to fill the role traditionally expected of
the nation state. In such a world public regulators do not always have the capacity to ensure
labour standards are met. One approach to fill this regulatory gap is self-regulation by the private
sector. But self-regulation without external audit with sanction powers is not enough to ensure
societal goals are met. This paper explores the role that global governance, or its lack may play
in the realization of decent working conditions for all workers, by asking: what is the role for
global governance in decent working conditions for all workers? Is a transformation of norms
and values enough or is some form of a global regulator required and who can play this role if
necessary? This paper examines Ontario’s mining sector, composed of many advanced
transnational companies, in order to test the self-regulatory idea. Analysis of regulatory
compliance – in the developed world with sophisticated companies without independent external
audit with ability to lay sanctions – finds the concept of self-regulation lacking, therefore
challenging the utility of using such an approach in the developing world with weaker
governance regimes.
Global Governance and Decent Work 2
Acknowledgements
My exploration of global change and globalization as a student at Athabasca University has been
a rich and rewarding experience. This paper is the culmination of the multi-disciplinary
exploration I have had the privilege of being on for the past few years. I would like to personally
recognize and thank a few key people who have supported and advised me along this path. With
regard to the idea that regulatory compliance could potentially be linked to health and safety
management systems I would like to recognize the work of my former manager at the Ontario
Ministry of Labour, Duncan Martin. It was Duncan who initially opened my mind to the idea that
compliance orders could indicate the state of health and safety in a workplace if properly
analyzed. I would also like to thank Dr. Mike Gismondi for listening to my initial ideas in this
research paper and for guiding me to my research advisor, Dr. Paul Kellogg. Paul has been a
great sounding board; I have really appreciated his support and important advice and
suggestions. Last but definitely not least I want to thank my wife Janna, it has been a long
journey and I couldn’t have done it without her support. Her willingness to discuss an at times
bewilderingly wide range of topics, providing key insights and ideas is much appreciated. In
addition I appreciate Janna’s editorial comments; she is a master at helping make arcane ideas
clearer.
Global Governance and Decent Work 3
Introduction
We find ourselves living in an increasingly globalized world where capital, information, and
trade are moving around the world at an unprecedented pace. It is a world that in many ways
seems to be shrinking. While the nation state still plays an important role, borders seem to be
blurring and losing some of their relevance. Despite this apparent weakening of the Westphalian
model, institutions of global governance have not filled the gap and instead remain weak and
incomplete, unable to fill the role traditionally expected of the nation state. This leaves us having
to deal with global problems that extend beyond the power of any single nation state but without
a global government to tackle these problems.
Increasing globalization has major implications for the working conditions of workers worldwide
– workers who are extracting resources, growing food, and producing goods for a global market.
With business increasingly able to move to jurisdictions providing a ‘favourable’ business
climate, can lower working standards be part of this attraction? If so what factors can control or
mitigate this; what can stop a race to the bottom? Working conditions in the Westphalian model
are the responsibility of the nation state. But what happens when the nation state is unable to
effectively perform this role, either from lack of will or lack of resources and capacity?
Given that institutions of global governance have played central roles in lowering barriers to
trade and capital movement, should there be a role for institutions of global governance in
overseeing and regulating working standards being impacted by this trade and capital
movement? Without a global regulator of labour standards can we create a world with decent
working conditions for all? The International Labour Organization (ILO) is often seen to be
creating norms and values to guide the creation and implementation of decent work, but are
norms and values enough?
In this, my final project as a student pursuing a Master’s degree in interdisciplinary studies at
Athabasca University, I aim to use the interdisciplinary background I have built to flesh out and
explore the role that global governance, or its lack may play in the realization of decent working
conditions for all workers. I intend to explore this question using concepts and theories from
political science, history, anthropology, psychology, sociology, social theory, economics,
evolutionary theory, policy analysis, and complexity science.
It is my belief that the long-term prospects of human civilization will be enhanced by the
evolution of an equitable and sustainable global governance regime and that decent work is a key
component in the creation of such a world. This does not necessarily mean that there needs to be
a global government. But short of the establishment of a functioning global government, does
there need to be a global regulator of labour standards? That topic will be explored in this paper.
This research will be a form of activist scholarship. Realization of a sustainable and equitable
world with decent work for all is not just a research topic but, I argue, a legitimate and important
ethical goal for us all. In this sense it would be most accurate to state that this research project
aims to provide recommendations for improving working conditions through transformative
research.
Global Governance and Decent Work 4
It is my hypothesis that global governance cannot be achieved within the narrow focus of the
current economic model of globalization. Rather what is needed is a transformative approach
with a view to the long-term prospects, opportunities and threats humanity faces. Such
transformative change cannot occur without changing or at least adapting to the weaknesses of
some of our dominant institutions, such as governments tied to four-year voting cycles (as many
are), and corporations tied to quarterly income statements. But more important than making
institutional changes will be the changing of humanity’s viewpoints (norms and values) – these
viewpoints are often moulded by and constrained by racist, sexist, nationalistic, or religiously
hegemonic cultural conditioning, which will all have to be addressed in the pursuit of this goal.
Global problems and global governance issues like decent work for all are embedded in a
complex policy environment, and those who wish to create an equitable, sustainable world need
to have a sophisticated approach to influencing change beyond the traditional tools available to
nation states. Many jurisdictions around the globe are already accepting this, but only for issues
that fall within their borders. Globally, where there is no government, it is even more imperative
we explore such approaches.
Beyond laws and regulations, there exists a range of other tools that can be employed to achieve
the global equity and sustainability policy objectives. Some of these tools are based on the need
to influence change where command and control approaches cannot be implemented. Others are
based on insights flowing from behavioural economics and compliance psychology. What are the
incentives that lie behind the setting of labour standards, and can changes be made to influence
positive change?
Global Governance and Decent Work 5
Thesis Statement
In an increasingly globalized world public regulators do not always have the capacity to ensure
labour standards are met. One approach to fill this regulatory gap is self-regulation by the private
sector, but self-regulation without external audit with sanction powers is not enough to ensure
societal goals are met.
Research Question
What is the role for global governance in decent working conditions for all workers? Is a
transformation of norms and values enough or is some form of a global regulator required and
who can play this role if necessary?
Structure
The project below has five major components.
First, is an essay surveying key concepts in the literature, essential to the exploration of
the research question.
Second is an extensive compilation of data on labour conditions in representative parts of
the world economy.
Third is an empirical examination of legislative and regulatory compliance in one sector
(mining) and one jurisdiction (Ontario, Canada)
Fourth are some reflections on the results we can tease out of the data presented in
sections two and three.
Finally, there is my attempt to use the concepts from the essay and the information from
the data to suggest ways in which the research question might be answered.
Global Governance and Decent Work 6
1. Globalization, work and challenges of global governance:
a review of the literature
Laying the Groundwork
Before digging into the topic of global labour standards it is first necessary to explore this topic
through an interdisciplinary review that begins by digging deeper into the concepts that lie
behind why it is that society has rules and why it is that some follow these rules and some do not.
Labour standards are a small subset of human rights, which themselves are a small subset of the
much larger class of social objects known as norms and values. Norms and values are often used
interchangeably but they do express slightly different concepts. A norm is “a standard or pattern
of social behaviour that is accepted in or expected of a group” (OED, 2014). In contrast values
are “the principles or moral standards held by a person or social group; the generally accepted or
personally held judgement of what is valuable and important in life” (OED, 2014). Therefore we
can see that while norms and values can overlap when one is speaking of the values held by a
social group, values also can be held by individuals. Norms differ with regard to this, as they are
not held by individuals but by their very nature and definition are a part of the fabric of our
social group.
While there are many ways one can approach these issues one good framework approach is that
of social psychology, which is the “branch of psychology that attempts to explain how the actual,
imagined or implied presence of others can influence the thoughts, emotions and behaviours of
an individual (Psychology Centre, 2014). It is through the discipline of social psychology that we
are introduced to the idea of socialization, the concept that explores how individuals learn social
norms, including through observation and imitation of parents, peers and other role models in
society (Psychology Centre. 2014).
Another key concept to be explored is that of compliance, which is “conforming one's outward
behaviour to that of others because of social pressure even though one's private beliefs may not
have changed” (Psychology Centre. 2014). Compliance is achieved through social control which
is the control of individuals or groups in society in order to ensure that social norms are
followed. Various techniques can be used stemming from socialization, which is often invisible
without analysis to the more visible use of laws and enforcement (OED, 2014). Informal social
control occurs when individuals internalise the norms and values of their social group, accepting
them unconsciously, leading to control of behaviour to a far narrower range than available
without such constraints. Formal controls are more visible and are often enforced by
governments and can often be expressed through laws and regulations.
Norms and values that have been internalized are extremely effective methods of control.
Unconscious controls are only with analysis revealed in a manner that would allow questioning
and challenge. Formal controls in contrast are often resisted by the social groups they are applied
to. One feature that may play a key role in any exploration of global labour standards is the idea
that corporations, while “persons” under the law are not themselves swayed by norms and
values, it is only people that are. This leads to the idea that while individuals are not truly the
Global Governance and Decent Work 7
rational economic actors often seen in economic theory we will examine whether it may be true
that corporations can be. While there may be no Homo economicus, there may be a Corporis
economicus, therefore any attempt to apply norms and values may need to consider this.
Global Labour Markets and Labour Standards as Human Rights
While globalization is not a new phenomenon, since the end of the twentieth century we have
seen increased economic globalization principally through the creation of globally extended
capital markets and also through the outsourcing of production in global supply systems across
the globe. Many argue that this recent globalization has been predominantly liberal capitalist and
pro-business and that international social and environmental governance mechanisms have not
kept pace with this rapid growth. “We are, in other words, faced with a highly imbalanced
globalization, where, judging by the standards of advanced democratic industrial economies, the
global space remains politically under-governed – particularly in the environmental and social
fields. Yet while the global markets remain politically under-governed in a political sense,
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and business self-regulation have rapidly expanded”
(Midttun, 2008, pp.406-407). This is an interesting new development that may be an innovative
creation of governance mechanisms where they are lacking, or it may be a smokescreen based on
protecting brand without truly providing governance.
Our commerce has for millennia been embedded in a system of social rules. Even the ancient
Israelites circa 1500 BCE had safety rules for construction projects, "When you build a new
house, be sure to put a railing around the edge of the roof. Then you will not be responsible if
someone falls off and is killed” (GNB, Deuteronomy 22:8, p.195). Markets set up in medieval
European cities were created and sustained by a network of actors, the ‘Great Chain of Being’,
who each had a defined role, from the monarch who provided the charter or franchise, to the
merchants and customers who bought and sold products within a defined set of conventions and
rules. Human have consistently set up systems that have a defined set of “rules of the game”,
some explicit and some implicit, that shape political, social and economic interactions (Mouzas
and Ford, 2009, p.496).
Eleanor Roosevelt discussed the idea of human rights at the individual and local level, “Where,
after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home-so close and so small
that they cannot be seen on any map of the world. Yet they are the world of the individual
person: the neighbourhood he lives in; the school or college he attends; the factory, farm or
office where he works. Such are the places where every man, woman, and child seeks equal
justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without discrimination. Unless these rights have
meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere” (Carozza, 2003, p.38). So while we are
taking a global view, it is at the level of each and every worker that labour standards are truly
realized. Labour standards are a subset of human rights and are based on the concept that “each
human individual is endowed with an inherent and inalienable worth, or dignity, and thus that the
value of the individual human person is ontologically and morally prior to the state or other
social groupings" (Carozza, 2003, pp.42-43).
The intersection between business and human rights has been a topic explored by the United
Nations (UN) for the last several decades, most recently led by John Ruggie establishing the
Global Governance and Decent Work 8
Global Compact in the year 2000 and then from 2005 to 2011 as the United Nations Secretary-
General's Special Representative for Business and Human Rights. In the latter role, Ruggie
asserted that “business is the major source of investment and job creation, and markets can be
highly efficient means for allocating scarce resources” (Ruggie, 2008, p.3). Business is a creation
of our societies, a creation that is capable of generating economic growth and reducing poverty.
Business also can play a role in increasing the demand for the rule of law, which is a key
underpinning of a robust human rights regime. But history has shown us that markets only work
towards the goals of society as a whole when “they are embedded within rules, customs and
institutions. Markets themselves require these to survive and thrive, while society needs them to
manage the adverse effects of market dynamics and produce the public goods that markets
undersupply” (Ruggie, 2008, p.3). In fact, business actually poses the greatest risk to both
society and itself when its scope and power far exceed the governance mechanisms that allow
them to function effectively by providing necessary stability. “This is such a time and escalating
charges of corporate-related human rights abuses are the canary in the coal mine, signalling that
all is not well” (Ruggie, 2008, p.3).
As with all complex problems, the solution is complex as well. Three pillars of society –
government, business and civil society – need to work together in new, yet to be fully developed
ways (Ruggie, 2008, p.4). Not surprisingly the worst human rights violations by business occur
in locations in the world where the governance systems are the weakest (Ruggie, 2008, p.7). It is
in many of these countries that we have seen rapid market growth, and noticeable governance
gaps with regard to the ability of political actors to manage any potential detrimental effects of
such growth (Ruggie, 2008, p.27).
Ruggie has detailed how some positive progress has been made. Some of these include
innovative “multi-stakeholder initiatives, public-private hybrids combining mandatory with
voluntary measures, and industry and company self-regulation” (Ruggie, 2008, p.27). . Despite
some of these positive developments the key issue remains; there are more harms than methods
to tackle them, and as of yet there is no coordinated approach to dealing with challenges to
labour standards on a global scale so any initiative remains at best a band aid solution (Ruggie,
2008, p.27).
Cooperation
The first issue that needs to be addressed is whether a world where labour standards are
universally respected is even realistic. The good news is that, Thomas Hobbes notwithstanding, it
is increasingly clear from both observation and experiment that humans do seem to have evolved
into a (mostly) cooperative species. This may be explained away as kin selection or reciprocal
altruism, both of which have self-interest at their core. In fact recent experiments have
potentially revealed behaviours that do not seem to be explicable using just kin selection or
reciprocal altruistic theories.
Experiments are beginning to show not only that we have a strong tendency to cooperate but also
that we are willing, even when it hurts us, to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation
(Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and Feyr, 2002, p.153). Researchers have termed this strong reciprocity
Global Governance and Decent Work 9
and the experimental results are showing that this tendency to cooperate and to punish those who
don’t, even when it causes personal harm, occurs even when it is unlikely that any costs will be
repaid (Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and Feyr, 2002, p.154). Fascinatingly, these results show up across
cultures across the world. “The canonical model of self-interested behaviour is not supported in
any society studied…all societies…behaved in a reciprocal manner” (Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and
Feyr, 2002, p.158). These results challenge a major tenet of standard economics – that of the
Homo economicus. Research has found higher rates of cooperation than such an economic model
would ever predict, with even higher cooperation rates when the subjects are given the option of
incurring a cost to punish so called “free riders” in the system (Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and Feyr,
2002, pp.158-159).
While these systems are not restricted to the human species, in humans they reach a level
unobserved elsewhere in nature. “More complex and unique mechanisms to enforce cooperation
have arisen in humans, such as contracts, laws, justice, trade and social norms, leading to
incredible feats such as the extreme division of labour that keeps large cities or nations going”
(West, El Mouden and Gardner, 2011, p.255). Results such as these are starting to appear in
economics and political science research with new theories beginning to explore fairness,
reciprocity, aversion to inequality, a concern for relative payoff and a tendency to punish those
who aren’t cooperative (Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer and Fehr, 2001, p.45). This goes in the
face of received wisdom, at least of the economic variety (Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and Feyr, 2002,
p.163). These results are significant and should be considered in any public policy considerations
with regard to economics and social policy.
Increasingly, the concept of humans as selfish beings, Homo economicus, is being disproven. In
reality, individuals care about fairness and reciprocity and they are willing to reward those who
cooperate while punishing those who do not (Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, and
McElreath, 2001, p.2). While contemporary experiments have recently expanded on these ideas,
they are not new. In fact even Adam Smith, the father of modern self-interested economics
understood this fact. “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it” (Smith,
1759, p.1).
The reality of the importance of cooperation is clear once anyone begins any thought into the
creation of any product we use. The essay, I Pencil articulates the complex cooperative
relationships needed to create even a pencil. “…because I am seemingly so simple. Simple? Yet,
not a single person on the face of this earth knows how to make me” (Read, 2000, paragraph 4-
5).
It appears that at our core, rather than being a selfish species, we are in fact a social one, even an
empathic one. This is not a trivial debate, but rather one of the core debates in the social
sciences. Are we Homo economicus or Homo sociologicus (Elster, 1989, p.99)? As with all truly
complex questions though the answer is likely far from being restricted solely to a binary option.
Actions are likely influenced by both rational thought and by norms with the outcome likely
being some form of a compromise between Homo economicus and sociologicus (Elster, 1989,
p.102).
Global Governance and Decent Work 10
Our evolution appears to show an increasing expansion not only of our increased power over
nature, but also to our growing extension of empathy even beyond our own (Rifkin, 2010, p.2).
These are important findings especially given that in our increasingly complex global world the
nation state is no longer omnipotent and self-sufficient (was it ever?). As Crozier (1987) puts it,
the modern state is a modest state that has been forced to recognize that many social problems
are complex, interdependent and can only be solved by working with all of society.
It is only in such a collaborative society that complex problems will be tackled, and this is a
model that has been missing in all previous models of governance (Mendoza and Vernis, 2008,
p.390). Mendoza and Vernis call this approach the relational state. It is built on the concept of
subsidiarity. No one area of society is given precedence over another, in such a model,
government can work with civil society, business can work with government etc., all approaches
are possible and will likely be needed. Both competition and cooperation, and sometimes the
combination of both, will be needed to create innovative, alternative ways to achieve social
efficiency and effectiveness (Mendoza and Vernis, 2008, p.390). In such a model all sectors
should cooperate and complement each other or even, in some public services, compete with
each other” (Mendoza and Vernis, 2008, pp.393-394).
Norms
While it appears that our very biology and psychology may be positively reinforcing cooperative
approaches, the next question is: what is it that we are cooperating on? This is where we must
now explore norms and values. Norms are rules or patterns of behaviour that maintain order to
guarantee social regulation (Coelho and Costa, 2009, p.440). Norms are often enforced without
the need of any state apparatus, but rather they are enforced through the use of moral
judgements. Such moral judgements mark a behaviour as compliant or not to the set of moral
norms. From moral judgements flow regulative actions, of which there are two kinds, either
punishments or rewards (Coelho and Costa, 2009, pp.440-441). A suite of emotions serve to
reinforce our social norms including shame, guilt, pride, regret, and joy amongst others. Pro-
social emotions provide guides “for action that bypass the explicit cognitive optimizing process
that lies at the core of the standard behavioural model in economics” (Bowles and Gintis, 2002,
abstract).
Some scientists are now starting to claim that little progress has been made in understanding how
norms affect behaviour because too much emphasis has been placed on trying to come up with a
self-interested explanation, neglecting the role of evolutionarily-derived emotions on behaviour
(Bowles and Gintis, 2002, p.1). This points to the underlying psychological importance of
behaviour that may stem from non-conscious and not necessarily rational influences.
Norms that are consciously recognized can be explained as worthy of following either to
maximize rewards or to avoid punishment. Internalized norms though are ones that have been so
fully accepted that rather than being seen as a constraint they are seen as an argument in support
of our objective function. “We strive to conform to internalized norms not because we will be
punished if we do not conform, but because we actively wish to conform…Sociological theory
treats the internalization of norms as a central element [in] the analysis of pro-social behaviour.
Norms are internalized from parents (vertical transmission), influential elders and institutional
Global Governance and Decent Work 11
practices (oblique transmission), and one’s peers (horizontal transmission)” (Bowles and Gintis,
2002, pp.19-20).
These concepts cannot be overstated in their importance to social policy. A standard economic
approach when arguing how to deal with unethical or anti-social behaviour is to raise the cost to
the individual of that behaviour. What is missed in this approach is that in some settings, costs
actually can infer legitimacy, in that the willingness to pay for the harm somehow offsets it.
What is misunderstood in this approach is that laws and regulations have a power of their own, a
power to stigmatize antisocial behaviour, thereby influencing behaviour, at times becoming
internalized (Hirschman, 1985, p.10).
The important thing to understand is that norms are often hard to discern, they often work in
what can be described as an invisible hand manner, but are not unchangeable (Helbing, Yu, Opp,
and Rauhut, 2010, p.1). Helbing et al describe how norms can emerge through deliberate action
such as through the passing of laws, or they can arise on their own forming the customs of the
culture we find ourselves immersed in, such as what is appropriate to wear to work (Helbing, Yu,
Opp, and Rauhut, 2010, p.4).
What makes norms relevant to areas of human rights such as labour standards is that
norms do not need external sanction to be effective. When norms are
internalized, they are followed even when violation would be unobserved and
not exposed to sanctions. Shame or anticipation of it is a sufficient internal
sanction…I don't throw litter in the park, even when there is nobody around to
observe me. If punishment was merely the price tag attached to crime, nobody
would feel shame when caught. People have an internal gyroscope that keeps
them adhering steadily to norms, independently of the current reactions of others
(Elster, 1989, pp.104-105).
Now some, possibly from the economic academy, may claim that what appear to be irrational
norms may on closer inspection be shown to actually be disguised self-interested behaviour. The
research, however, does not bear this out. Some norms actually make everyone worse off, or at
least in no way make the majority better off than if the norm did not exist. In addition, we can all
imagine norms, which, if internalized would actually make everyone actually better off, yet these
norms do not exist (Elster, 1989, p.108). For instance, Elster gives the example that a norm for
using public transportation would lead to less congested roadways and less commuting time for a
majority of people, yet such a norm does not exist (Elster, 1989, p.113). The capacity to
internalize the norms that do exist in our society is widespread among humans, though amongst
‘‘sociopaths’’, this ability to internalize norms is diminished or lacking, a fact which may be
useful when thinking about the legal “people” we call corporations (Gintis, 2003, p.407).
Given that corporate “citizens” are not flesh and blood creatures it can be argued that, for them,
the important social control function played by norms is non-existent. When considering the
social control or risk reduction approach with regard to corporations we often again see a binary
opposition. Either corporate action is based on preserving reputational capital or it is based on
protecting human rights. What will continue to be a theme throughout this paper is that binary
opposition models are too simplistic. The world is not binary, and it is far more gray than black
Global Governance and Decent Work 12
and white. In fact these views are mutually supportive of each other. “Human rights form the
core of global corporate governance; normative exemplars systematize human rights and
incorporate standards of practical reason; proactive compliance with human rights
simultaneously builds reputational capital (intangible assets), while advancing integral human
fulfillment, thus harmonizing moral obligations running to shareholders and stakeholders”
(Jackson, 2008, pp.440-441).
At this stage a concept that needs to be explored with regard to norms and values is that of
institutions, a subject covered brilliantly by Douglass C. North (1993) in his lecture to the
memory of Alfred Nobel. Institutions form the networks of incentive structures that underlie our
political and economic systems and our very society of which norms and values play a part.
These incentive structures are one of the key determinants of economic performance. Time is
also a key factor here; time is the dimension that needs to be considered with regard to the
necessary learning process to occur through which humanity shapes how our institutions evolve.
The beliefs that individuals, groups, and societies hold and determine their choices are a factor of
this learning over time, a time greater than the lifespan of any given individual or even of a
generation. Institutions and their incentive structures are created over spans of time through
lessons passed on inter-generationally by our societal cultures (North, 1993, Part I).
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction.
They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal
constraints (norms of behaviour, conventions, and self-imposed codes of
conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. Together they define the
incentive structure of societies and specifically economies … Institutions are not
necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient, rather, they … are
created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new
rules (North, 1993, Part II).
With institutions creating the rules of the game, organizations, as groups of individuals bound
together by a common purpose, can be seen as the players. Examples of organizations include
political entities, economic entities, social entities and educational entities. What organizations
can come into existence depends on the institutional framework in society. If making a profit is
rewarded by the institutional structure, then profit-making organizations will flourish (North,
1993, Part III). It is institutions that transform our belief structures into societal and economic
structures. All of us create mental models to interpret our environment and institutions are the
mechanisms created to provide structure and order to those mental models (North, 1993, Part
IV).
As already discussed time plays a key element, it is the transmission of our accumulated
knowledge over time that leads to path dependence. Path dependence speaks to the powerful
influence the past can have on the future, in some ways it is analogous to the inertia of a society.
So whatever learning and change we try to make today, such as by incorporating new labour
standards, we have to realize that learning is an incremental process that is always filtered
through a cultural lens that will determine what it perceives as the pay-offs. The issue can be that
there is no reason to think that the cumulative knowledge extending from the past forward into
the future is necessarily the right way to approach and solve new problems.
Global Governance and Decent Work 13
There is a chance that due to societal inertia, institutions built on beliefs can fail to properly
address global problems of increasing complexity (North, 1993, Part V). Therefore, considerable
thought and experiment may need to be put into considering how to alter cost/benefit rations that
favour cooperative approaches that value things like labour standards. This may include more
than just changes to political institutions but also economic institutions. North argues that this is
a key reason for the failure of development policies in the underdeveloped world since the end of
World War II. He argues that neo-classical economics fails to consider the important role of
institutions and the societal incentive structure they enforce (North, 1993, Part VI). By ignoring
or misunderstanding these incentive structures neo-classical economics makes incorrect
assumptions that time and institutions don’t play a key role (North, 1993, Part I). So while
formal rules can be changed at the stroke of a pen, informal norms change only gradually over
time. It is from norms that rules gain their legitimacy, so revolutionary changes to rules will
always have less of a revolutionary impact than expected due to norm inertia. This is especially
true in settings where rules from different societies and cultures are adopted, what is missing
with the new rules is the norms and their attached societal enforcement mechanism that
undergird formal rules (North, 1993, Part VII).
So, we find ourselves with some tools that are inherent to ourselves as a species. We are a
cooperative species which can form norms and be guided by values and create institutions. But if
it was that simple then there would be no need to work towards improved human rights, and yet
that is the world we find ourselves in. While we may be at heart cooperative, we still do also act
with self-interest and what is important to understand is that no matter what rules are in place,
humans have a tendency to try to “game the system”. The challenge for policy makers is to
understand this and to design the rules in such a way that, when organizations or individuals
interact, desirable outcomes are still possible. (Veal and Mouzas, 2011, p.290).
Global governance, labour standards and the modern corporation
It is important at this stage to try to get a sense of what is meant by the concept “global
governance”, a term that is becoming increasingly common. Some may argue that global is a
synonym for other words used in the discussion of the world political system for decades, words
such as international, interstate, intergovernmental, or transnational. Yet if this were so then why
are not those terms used in place of the less clear term global? We must assume there is a
different intent (Finkelstein, 1995, p.367). What seems to be increasingly recognized as different
is that there are an increasing number of actors playing increasingly significant roles. Especially
noticeable is the rise of non-state actors and Transnational Corporations (TNCs) on the global
stage. The interconnectedness of all of these actors in the decision-making processes, in states
and between states, has created a situation that is increasingly tangled and complex (Finkelstein,
1995, p.367).
Lack of clarity is also applicable to the term governance. “
At least it must be clear that it does not mean ‘government’, or we would say
that instead. Since that term would be used”. The use of the term governance is
deliberate. “Since the international system” composed of states, business, and
non-state actors “notoriously lacks hierarchy and government, the fuzzier word
Global Governance and Decent Work 14
governance is used instead…In other words, we say ‘governance’ because we
don't really know what to call what is going on (Finkelstein, 1995, pp.367-368).
Lawrence Finkelstein has captured a very workable definition when he states that global
governance “is any purposeful activity intended to ‘control’ or influence someone else that either
occurs in the arena occupied by nations or, occurring at other levels, projects influence into that
arena” (1995, p.368). Another way to describe global governance is to say that it is doing
globally what governments do within state boundaries (Finkelstein, 1995, p.369).
While it is still argued today by some that problems such as poverty, human rights violations and
environmental issues outside of one’s country are beyond ones control and even moral
responsibility, globalization continues to shrink our world and this position is becoming
increasingly untenable. Our own actions in our country can be connected to issues of concern in
other countries, and global problems can also have local impacts. Due to the increasing
interconnectedness of all societies solely expecting each nation state to solve its own problems,
when part of the causes are beyond their nation’s borders is increasingly indefensible (Rajan,
2006, p.3).
At this point I will bring the United Nations (UN) into the discussion of the concept of global
governance. The UN clearly has had some successes with influencing behaviour that occurs at a
global level. This includes the establishment of universal standards and frameworks to support
them such as in the area of human rights. In the past raising any question of human rights
concerns occurring within territorial boundaries of a nation-state was considered off limits but
today it has become increasingly accepted that such critique, and at times even action and
response are the role of bodies like the UN (Boutros-Ghali, 1995, p.3). It is now recognized that
for many issues it is beyond the capacity of any single nation-state to act on its own such as in
efforts to tackle disease, pollution or global climate change (Boutros-Ghali, 1995, p.9).
Labour standards are theoretically one area that is within the scope of control of a nation state.
Many nation states do a relatively effective job at producing and maintaining labour standards.
However, we do not see equal successes in all countries across the globe. This is where
organizations such as the UN and others can play a role. Boutros-Ghali describes how the UN
now has the capacity to discuss, investigate, make recommendations, and even condemn a
member state for violations of human rights (Boutros-Ghali, 1995, p.3). A positive benefit of
increasing globalization is that it has raised both economic and political awareness around the
world. The issue is that “many are aware that they have little or no say in changing the
conditions affecting their lives” (Boutros-Ghali, 1995, p.4).
With the protection of human rights as one of its main purposes the UN is a key player with truly
global reach in realizing a world where human rights are respected. What has limited the role of
the UN in protecting labour rights though is the fact that it is primarily focused on the actions of
governments. When the responsible government is incapable of action, or where key actors that
could actually make a difference are in the private sector the UN’s ability to influence change is
reduced (Frey, 1997, p.155).
Here, the intersection between global governance and corporations becomes important.
Historically, corporations have not been the focus in discussions of responsibility for human
Global Governance and Decent Work 15
rights. This is changing, especially since the 1970’s when calls for transnational codes of conduct
for TNCs began. As corporations find themselves increasingly critiqued, many of them are
creating their own policies regarding human rights in the countries they are active in (Frey, 1997,
p.154, 158). In addition in some instances the activities of corporations in other countries are
regulated by laws in the domestic jurisdiction they are based in. For instance in the United States
corporate investment in countries with serious human rights violations can be banned (Frey,
1997, p.158).
Despite serious attempts to create some kind of legal framework regarding the actions of TNCs
starting in the 1970’s, the climate has changed. It is unlikely that binding global regulations
would be accepted without a struggle. There has been “a retreat from the international control
model that was in vogue in the 1960s and 1970s regarding TNCs. States once critical of TNCs
now find themselves competing for the benefits of foreign direct investment from multinational
companies” (Frey, 1997, pp.159-160). It is for this reason that activists in many cases have
turned their gaze directly on the companies themselves in order to influence change.
While legal scholars agree that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to nation
states it is not as clear as to whether it applies to TNCs. As a treaty it binds the governments that
ratify it but not the entities that fall under that government. However there are duties for TNCs
under the International Bill of Human Rights to respect the rights of others. Articles 29 and 30 of
the Universal Declaration and corresponding articles 5(1) of the Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights Covenant and the Civil and Political Covenant also address both individual and corporate
behaviour with regard to human rights. These agreements state that no person or private entity
may engage in an activity which treads upon any other person's rights and freedoms. While
providing some restrictions these covenants do not require TNCs (or individuals for that matter)
to proactively take steps to ensure human rights are respected such as by preventing others from
violating these rights, regulating these entities is left up to the responsible national government
(Frey, 1997, p.163).
Affirmative responsibility remains in the hands of governments, who themselves have the power
to create legislation regulating the behaviour of the individuals and the private sector. What this
means is that in countries with weak laws with regard to labour rights the only obligation for
TNCs is to comply with the local laws of the jurisdiction they operate in. This speaks only to the
legal duties of a TNC, it can be argued that there still is an ethical and/or moral duty to respect
and support the goals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Frey, 1997, p.163). Frey
argues though that a TNC is unlikely to adopt affirmative actions towards the realization of
human rights without being forced to (Frey, 1997, p.165).
While some may argue that issues such as labour rights are not the concern of global governance
the truth is that without consideration of the fact that not every state has the same capacity or
even inclination to enforce labour rights, such rights will continue to be haphazardly enforced.
Examples abound. Kolben discusses in just one case the fact that factory owners working in
Cambodia have few ties to Cambodia, and their modus operandi is to move regularly, moving
from low-wage countries to even lower wage countries as working conditions improve. It is this
movement from country to country, seeking low wages and weaker regulatory regimes that allow
them to produce at the lowest possible cost, and therefore highest profit (Kolben, 2004, pp.82).
Global Governance and Decent Work 16
The Cambodian example is instructive, as a relatively strong labour code has been in place there
since 1996 without consequent improvements, showing that laws are only one piece of the
puzzle. According to Kolben a strong labour code hasn’t prevented poor working conditions in
Cambodian garment factories (Kolben, 2004, pp.83). Part of the reason for this was that laws
need enforcement in order to achieve their public policy goals. In the case of Cambodia
enforcement was poor partly to the weakness of the labour inspectorate. Not only was there a
lack of necessary technical knowledge, but the inspectors, like civil servants in many developing
countries, are paid low wages. Kolben argues that these low wages lead to increased corruption
in the form of the taking of bribes just to make ends meet. But beyond this issue at the level of
the individual inspector, there were also strong incentives for the state to not desire strong
enforcement of the labour code due to political and financial interests arising from the strong
connection between the political class and the private sector (Kolben, 2004, pp.85). This is not to
say that there weren’t some incentives pushing for labour standards. In 2000 for instance the Free
Trade Union of the Workers of the Kingdom of Cambodia (FTUWKC) led a strike of up to
20,000 garment workers asking for a higher minimum wage with result that the minimum wage
was subsequently raised (Kolben, 2004, pp.87). Yet despite this factory owners continue to know
that paying the appropriate bribes at the appropriate levels can be a cost effective method to
circumvent labour standards.
A key challenge is in front of us as we find ourselves in a transition period in our history. The
challenge is that as the worldwide interdependence of social entities grows, there is a concurrent
erosion of the sovereignty of nation states. Martinelli defines globalization as “a set of related
processes that interconnect individuals, groups, communities, states, markets, corporations and
international and non-governmental organizations in complex webs of social relations; and, more
synthetically, as the growth of networks of worldwide interdependence” (Martinelli, 2003,
p.294). The challenge though is the complexity this engenders. Who is in charge, who is
responsible, how do we ensure labour rights are protected?
Some of the problems growing out of our increasing globalization include trans boundary
problems (e.g. cross-border human trafficking, pollution); common property problems (e.g.
oceans, the atmosphere); and simultaneous problems (i.e. nations experiencing similar problems
in urbanization or downward pressures on labour rights (Tapscott and Gegenhuber, 2013, p.2). In
a more insulated world a single nation state was free to manage its labour rights regime as it saw
fit, now with increased capital mobility, issues of remaining competitive come to the forefront. If
labour rights impact competitiveness, then there may be incentives to weaken labour right
regimes. What this can lead to is simultaneous pressures on all jurisdictions to continually erode
rights in an endless competitive spiral downwards.
In the next few sections we will explore the major mechanisms that are playing a role or could
play a role in improving global labour standards.
Labour Standards and Trade
Our current global trading system was built on three fundamental principles. The three
fundamental principles are:
Global Governance and Decent Work 17
“Non-Discrimination: this principle is in two parts. Members of the system must extend
to all other members the privileges that are extended to any one of them (Most Favored
Nation). Further, they must offer foreign trading partners conditions no less favourable
than those offered to domestic competitors (National Treatment).
Transparency: this principle is not used in the traditional sense, but instead refers to
countries (or trading entities) being fully transparent about the criteria, standards, and
regulations that apply to trade with them.
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: it is often said that trade sanctions represent the one
effective tool available to States to constrain or influence the behavior of other States,
beyond the weak approach available through diplomacy and the other extreme of
warfare” (Halle, 2006, pp.2-3).
While these three trade principles guide global trade, especially through organizations such as
the World Trade Organization (WTO), over a half century of experience has shown that these
principles alone do not guarantee the emergence of an ideal world. A key issue in
conceptualizing labour standards is that the trading principle of non-discrimination has been
argued as a reason not to consider the conditions of production for the products that are traded.
The WTO … has tended to maintain the position that the test of ‘likeness’
should rely on the physical characteristics of the traded goods” and not to the
way a good was produced. Thus “a manufactured good prepared through a
process involving child labour or at the cost of destroying natural resources or
polluting waterways, is to be treated at the border no less favourably than a
good produced using the most environmentally and socially preferable process
(Halle, 2006, p.3).
Despite attempts to disregard how something is made, this approach has not stood the test of
time. While at present the WTO still does not consider labour standards it does consider other
conditions regarding how a good was produced including those produced “identically” and
therefore violating intellectual property rights. In addition the WTOs appellate body “has taken
the position that trade law must not be considered in isolation from other rules governing public
policy” (Halle, 2006, p.3).
The idea of using trade agreements to enhance labour standards is not a new idea; it has been
sought since the early 1800’s as a way to protect workers from economic exploitation
(Trebilcock and Howse, 2004, p.261). International conferences to discuss this very issue were
first held beginning in 1890, these conferences were held as it was felt by participants “that in the
absence of international labour standards, international competition in an environment of
increasingly freer trade would precipitate a race to the bottom” (Trebilcock and Howse, 2004,
p.266). Some characterize allowing countries with lower labour standards equal trading rights is
in fact a form of unfair competition. Countries that do not comply with international labour
standards are accused of engaging in social dumping, by allowing lower standards they are
providing a subsidy which allows the relevant industry to lower prices thereby outcompeting
those with stricter labour regimes (Trebilcock and Howse, 2004, p.266).
Global Governance and Decent Work 18
The counter argument from exporting countries, particularly developing ones is that given that
their main and often only competitive advantage at their disposal in competition with advanced
economies is their access to low cost labour. “To deny them the ability to exploit this advantage
is to consign them forever to low value-added commodity production for developed country
markets (‘hewers of wood and drawers of water’)” (Trebilcock and Howse, 2004, p.267).
Regardless of the arguments for or against trade including labour standards, the fact is that WTO
rules already have and do influence rules outside of the scope of trade law. Domestic laws,
regulations and standards are now regularly scrutinized in light of WTO obligations and where
found in conflict are often modified. This practice favours trade laws over other public policy
goals such as labour and environmental legislation. It seems disingenuous for the WTO to claim
it cannot be impacted by concerns beyond trade when at the same time trade law demands that
all other concerns be subordinated to its principles (Halle, 2006, p.5). In addition, what has been
increasingly recognized as unfair in the very creation of the WTO was that the WTO rules were
presented as an all or nothing option. Membership requires acceptance of all the rules with no
possibility to pick or choose if adoption would seriously impact domestic policy goals. The
implication of this is that the WTO trade rules are given “a power and authority that goes well
beyond the rules governing environment, social justice, or other areas of development concern”
(Halle, 2006, p.6).
The WTO itself admits that the global trade regime is intended to advance other public policy
objectives, not to undermine them. Therefore even if the WTO does not wish to administer
labour standards, it should at the very least create a system where trade rules do not have the
unintended consequence of conflicting with other societal goals (Halle, 2006, pp.8-9). “Trade is
a tool, a means to an end, and not an end in itself…development that pursues economic growth
and efficiency while addressing social equity and inclusion, and the sound management of
natural resources and ecosystems—is the end that trade is designed to serve, and that trade must
serve” (Halle, 2006, p.9).
It is important at this point to explain that the resistance to the inclusion of labour standards into
trade rules is not something that is coming exclusively or even predominantly from developed
countries or TNCs. A large portion of the resistance has come from developing nations for the
reason enumerated above with regard to concerns of any erasure of their often sole competitive
advantage which arises from the ability to provide low cost labour. The tripartite decision
making process at the ILO (representatives of trade unions, employers and governments) has
found itself subject to this disagreement and even global labour union bodies have been unable to
come to consensus on these issues amongst themselves (Wilkinson and Hughes, 2000, p.261).
Interestingly, resistance is not found just among labour and employer groups but also from the
International Labour Organization (ILO). The ILO has exhibited significant resistance to the
inclusion of punitive social clauses, as their organizational approach has always been to pursue
improved labour standards by encouraging best practices and by providing technical assistance.
If even the ILO is resistant to the inclusion of labour standards into WTO agreements, it is hard
to envision how the two organizations could effectively come to a cooperative arrangement
ensuring they are included (Wilkinson and Hughes, 2000, p.265).
Providing further context is other initiatives that are occurring at the global level, most
importantly the launch of the Global Compact at the 1999 World Economic Forum by then UN
Global Governance and Decent Work 19
Secretary General Kofi Annan. Annan rejected linking labour standards and trade rules and
instead proposed a compact calling on business to uphold core worker rights in return for a UN
commitment to work to maintain an environment that favours trade and open markets (Wilkinson
and Hughes, 2000, p.266). Studies from both the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) and the ILO have argued that compliance with core labour standards is
likely to have no negative implications for exporting countries and in some studies substantial
welfare gains will be made (Trebilcock and Howse, 2004, pp.268-269).
As far back as the early 19th
century there has been concern that without global labour standards
the inevitable outcome will be a race to the bottom with regard to standards with no winners in
the end. Such an outcome for many can only be avoided by ensuring that some form of
international agreement on global labour standards and their enforcement is reached (Trebilcock
and Howse, 2004, p.270). Many of the above arguments have remained focused on economic
outcomes, but it is important to remind ourselves that many, with strong moral rationale, argue
that regardless of the supposed economic impact of labour standards what is needed is a human
rights perspective.
A human rights perspective challenges one to think beyond the calculations of economists and
instead to consider whether rights for those in the developed world should just as equally apply
to those in the developing world. Such an approach is sceptical of the argument that developing
countries are resistant to the imposition of stronger labour standards based on the argument that
this is not based on the will of the people but rather reflects the will of governments that are
either unrepresentative, repressive or reflect the interests of those with power and who gain from
weak standards. Even when citizens themselves resist rights that would improve their own labour
conditions, they argue that this is often in countries where the citizenry is uniformed and often
poorly educated (Trebilcock and Howse, 2004, p.272).
An example of how a linkage between labour standards and trade can be made can be seen in
Burma. In 2000 the ILO, based on serious labour and human rights abuses, invoked Article 33 of
its constitution encouraging its members to encourage compliance with labour standards from
Burma enforced by member state actions. In 2003 the US congress did that very thing, enacting
the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act which authorized human rights based trade sanctions
in with Burma (Trebilcock and Howse, 2004, p.282).
No matter whether labour standards and trade rule are linked, labour standards cannot be
exclusively addressed through trade rules. Other important elements include clear reporting and
the provision of technical assistance in order to allow national regulators to effectively address
labour standards issues in their own jurisdiction (Albertson, 2010, p.510). In situations where
trade rules are considered an appropriate mechanism to improve labour standard though Banks
has developed some important necessary core elements:
1. “A mandatory process through which the parties deliberate upon and identify a program
of measures constituting reasonable best efforts to improve core labour standards
compliance over a determinate period of time, and iteratively redefine such best efforts.
2. Economic or other incentives sufficient to offset short run incentives for non-compliance
that in practice remain contingent upon such agreement and upon ongoing best efforts,
Global Governance and Decent Work 20
and will only be removed in the event that best efforts cease. In particular, the withdrawal
of benefits should not follow failure to carry out any particular measure, nor should it
follow a failure to comply with a conception of core labour standards compliance
requiring anything other than the set of measures agreed upon as a program to be
implemented within any given time period.
3. Systematic monitoring by a reliable and neutral third party of whether best efforts are
being carried out, and of whether they are achieving their goals.
4. Transparent reporting of monitoring results in order to ensure state accountability for
those results, and that subsequent negotiations respond to findings with respect to
whether best efforts have achieved core labour standards compliance improvements.
5. Regular opportunities for stakeholder consultation and input with respect to the design of
the program in order to ensure that those with an interest in its implementation accept its
broad contours and attempt to hold governments accountable for its implementation”
(Banks, 2011, pp.138-139).
Transnational Labour Regulation
If trade rules do not include labour standards, then consideration must be given to the exploration
of the creation of global, transnational labour legislation. Given concerns that developing nations
may be prevented from pursuing their social development goals if they come in conflict with
short-term economic incentives, one possible strategy would be to create legal incentives as a
counterweight. Economic incentives in the developing, and potentially even developed nations,
may be strong enough to either prevent or erode national labour standards. In this case a
requirement to meet international labour laws could take the political pressure of individual
states, and instead put labour law into the same sphere as the international trade law they are
already trying to comply with (Banks, 2011, p.136).
Kevin Banks argues that global trade is a different game with different incentives. Pressures on
business aren’t the same as in a solely domestic sphere. For instance, states have no control over
whether their competitor states comply with equal labour standards, the concern is that those that
don’t will undercut those that do. A system that could provide such assurances could encourage
their own compliance with labour standards. Some argue that monitoring and transparency can
provide such assurances but a majority of states do not participate in such schemes, including
major players such as China. Even in cases where monitoring and transparency have uncovered
labour standards abuses it has rarely adversely affected the state as a whole (Banks, 2011, p.136).
The application of law to address standards in other countries has in some instances been done
unilaterally by domestic legislatures thereby controlling the actions of business in dealing with
certain countries. The US since 1930 for instance has prohibited the importation of products
made using convict labour (Frey, 1997, p.168). The examples are few and far between though.
While the US and many nations prohibited trade with South Africa due to its apartheid policies,
similar attempts to pass legislation prohibiting the import of products made by child labour have
repeatedly failed to be passed (Frey, 1997, p.169).
Global Governance and Decent Work 21
Reluctance to pass binding international labour standards is not just exhibited by states however.
TNCs have been powerful voices of resistance. Given the strategic economic importance of
TNCs to states in both the developed and developing world, their resistance has been a
significant barrier to improving standards. Instead the TNCs have pushed, often with the support
of governments around the world, for a regime where it is believed that business should be
trusted to regulate itself. Despite this resistance, calls for binding and enforceable rules on global
business, including labour standards are growing (Oshionebo, 2007, pp.3-5).
Oshionebo argues that models exist – for example the ILO has instruments designed to influence
labour practices in TNCs. The Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy, encourages TNCs to promote workplace safety and to minimize
and resolve the adverse effects of their activities on employees. It details best practices
concerning employment and working conditions. The Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work and its successor encourages ILO Member States (including those that have
yet to ratify the relevant ILO Conventions) to respect, promote and realize the ILOs core labour
standards. These core rights include rights to freedom of association and to collective bargaining;
the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child
labour; and the elimination of discrimination in respect to employment and occupation. While
well meaning, such approaches are in the end of limited utility because they are unenforceable
(Oshionebo, 2007, pp.6-7).
Oshionebo shows that it is not only the ILO that has been active on this front, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has also sought to influence the conduct of
TNCs through the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines) which were established
in 1976 and substantially revised in 2000. These guidelines were drafted to apply to business in
nations both in and outside the OECD group of nations. The guidelines encourage business to
respect human rights and to specifically contribute to the effective abolition of child labour, the
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; to respect the right of their employees to
form and participate in trade unions; to refrain from discriminating against employees on
grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction, or social origin; and
to take adequate steps to ensure occupational health and safety in their operations. In addition the
guidelines also call on TNCs to ensure that they work towards protecting the environment. While
well intentioned, they again are weak, voluntary guidelines. As in the case of other tools they
lack the teeth of the financial instruments released by the OECD particularly those on trade and
investment liberalization, which help rather than hinder TNCs (Oshionebo, 2007, pp.8-9).
Given the ineffectiveness of many of the existing instruments aiming at “regulating” the
behaviour of international business there have been renewed calls for stronger mechanisms. In
some cases civil society are creating their own private governance regimes, such as the well-
known Fair Trade movement, a portion of which addresses labour standards. These private
governance regimes aim to influence the private sector through information disclosure and
certification which can affect sales, thereby providing the “teeth” of the approach (Oshionebo,
2007, pp.8-9).
Global Governance and Decent Work 22
The governance deficit
At this point it is important to explore in greater depth this idea of needing rules with teeth. It is
well understood that labour rights are theoretically the jurisdiction and mandate of domestic
governments. Yet the reality is that as developing countries have connected to the global trading
system and TNCs have increasingly employed global supply chains, a gap has arisen between the
ability of the state to regulate. This has been termed the "governance deficit” (Kolben, 2011,
p.405). Kolben explores the components of this governance deficit, the first deficit is that the
home countries of TNCs do not have adequate regulatory tools to control the activities of such
companies outside of their domestic borders. The second deficit is that of international
institutions such as the ILO which have not been given true enforcement powers beyond the
ability to report about the state of labour standards in a given country. The third and the most
important deficit is the limited capacity for domestic governments in the developing world to
effectively regulate (Kolben, 2011, p.406). In addition the countervailing force of the labour
movement has also largely operated and been defined within national borders (Kolben, 2011,
p.407).
While some have argued for the important role of private governance regimes such as Fair Trade,
these can never fully replace regulated labour standards. Private governance regimes, even when
well-meaning suffer from legitimacy and democratic deficits. They are not created by any
specific political polity and are largely unresponsive to democratic levers. In addition they are
accused of being top-down, paternalistic approaches which give little to no voice to the workers
on the ground most affected by poor labour standards. In addition they are usually driven by
consumers and civil society outside of the jurisdiction of the workers themselves. It is only the
attention of the consumers that ensures labour standards are met, leaving the provision of
fundamental rights in the hands of distant consumers and organizations who cannot be called to
task if such rights aren’t provided (Kolben, 2011, pp.408-409). A strong criticism is that we have
seen the rise of private governance mechanisms not precisely because they are filling a
regulatory gap per say, but are in fact strategic responses from governments and the private
sector to avoid any consideration of stronger forms of intergovernmental labour regulation
(Kolben, 2011, pp.409-410).
John Braithwaite argues, however, that the rise of private governance regimes is a positive
development if viewed in what he calls a responsive regulatory world. Braithwaite argues that
we need to re-conceptualize traditional command and control regulatory approaches. In a world
of responsive regulation, policymakers set policy goals, but leave implementation to the
regulated community. Regulators then audit this implementation and respond based on the
degree to which actors effectively regulate themselves. If regulated parties fail to repair and
reform on their own then they are subject to increasing scrutiny and punishment by the regulator.
Again, this theory fails to address issues where the domestic regulator lacks the capacity to do
this (Kolben, 2011, p.417).
Kolben argues that it is key for us to understand that labour ministries in the developed world are
often amongst the most neglected ministries suffering from both resource and staffing challenges
even when the laws are compliant with international standards. Rather than addressing and
remedying these capacity issues the too often taken approach is “to leapfrog dysfunctional states
and move to a post-statist regime of labour regulation that relies on global society to provide the
Global Governance and Decent Work 23
norm-generating and coercive functions” (Kolben, 2011, pp.427-428). Instead of leapfrogging
the state, what is required is an approach to regulation that is sensitive to the limits of private
governance regimes and to the importance of the state in a regulatory field that has important
linkages with public law and institutions (Kolben, 2011, p.428).
Examples where this have been done are when private governance regimes mimic the regulatory
environment they find themselves in, thereby respecting the domestic government institutions.
Where this fails though is that it does not address the issue of weak labour standards and the
pressures to further weaken them that we are attempting to address. Matthew Amengual in a
study of labour regulation in the Dominican Republic found evidence of what he termed
“complementary regulation”. In these cases private labour inspection complemented that done by
the state, improving labour standards on the whole and in some cases it actually resulted in an
increased demand for the regulatory services of the state. In some instances the private and
public inspectors focused on their areas of better expertise and interest, private inspectors on
health and safety, public inspectors on freedom of association issues. In other cases the presence
of private inspectors in some industries freed public inspectors to focus on other neglected
sectors (Amengual, 2010)).
While private labour inspection may have positive benefits; the key concern always comes back
to what is the “stick” for non-compliance? For public regulators it is the sanctioning power of the
state, usually expressed through fines or prison. For private governance regimes the stick is
breach of contract or in other cases naming and shaming which is expected to lead to lost sales.
Yet this is not always the case. Christopherson and Lillie discuss how since the early 1990s for
instance Wal-Mart has been found in violation of core labour standards repeatedly. For example,
between 1999 and 2001 they were discovered sourcing from Chinese sweatshops which were
paying only 8 cents per hour under virtual forced labour conditions and also from source
factories using forced labour in Bangladesh and Myanmar. Other Wal-Mart examples include
contracts with Guatemalan sweatshops where employees were required to be tested for
pregnancy both before and during employment in order be able to fire them, a clear violation of
human rights.. Another NGO, the `Clean Clothes' campaign, has documented over 800 entries in
its database devoted to Wal-Mart labour standards violations (Christopherson and Lillie, 2005,
p.1931). Yet Wal-Mart continues to be one of the most successful TNCs in the world, showing
the weakness of the private regulatory stick in some instances.
These labour standards violations took place amidst a Wal-Mart policy to only work with
factories that are run legally and ethically. During this entire period Wal-Mart had even
contracted for an independent inspection scheme which included more than 200 factory
inspections a week led by a third party firm. By implementing this scheme Wal-Mart was
rewarded by being included in a list of companies to invest in when looking for ethical mutual
funds, a listing since removed due to the large amount of violations noted above (Christopherson
and Lillie, 2005, p.1932). Reviews of their independent monitoring program, which is
administered by PWC, found that auditors failed to note serious labour standards abuses.
Examples included overlooking hazardous chemical use, overtime violations, and health and
safety violations. Partly this stemmed from the fact that local firms were able to successfully
“manage” the audits by ensuring that the auditors only spoke to workers identified by the
managers (Christopherson and Lillie, 2005, p.1932).
Global Governance and Decent Work 24
Despite these serious flaws, Waddell believes that there have been examples of positive impacts
from private governance schemes. A powerful example is the successful reversal of a planned
plant closure in 1999 by Russell based on pressure from the Fair Labor Association (FLA) who
objected to the closing of the plant in Honduras. The FLA suspected the plant was slated for
closure because it was unionized, brining into question Russell’s commitment to freedom of
association. Russell reached an agreement with the FLA, reopening the plant and rehiring all
2000 workers with compensation, and more significantly the ability to unionize would be
extended to all their plants, covering and additional 8000 workers (Waddell, 2011, pp.5-6).
The most recent serious attempt towards transnational labour regulation has been done under the
auspices of the UN’s human rights regimes. In 1997, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights created the Working Group on the Working Methods and
Activities of Transnational Corporations. In 1999, the Working Group decided to draft a code of
conduct for TNCs, the later named “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights" (Mantilla, 2009, pp.285-286).
Mantilla describes that while these norms were not a treaty, upon approval they would have
acquired international legal standing as a form of soft law similar to other UN declarations,
standards etc. Of note, the norms included mechanisms for independent monitoring reporting and
verification, financial redress, and directions that they were to be enforced by national courts
and/or international tribunals. This made them the strongest attempt to date to create global rules
with teeth (Mantilla, 2009, p.286).
The Norms were presented in April 2004 to the UN Commission on Human Rights. The
commission declared that while the responsibilities of business with regard to human rights was
important, the Commission had not requested the Norms and therefore they would not be
considered. This decision came despite the fact that the Working Group was in fact mandated to
do that very thing. “This move by the commission was puzzling to the supporters of the Norms,
within and outside the sub-commission” (Mantilla, 2009, pp.286-287). Mantilla argues that
business actively lobbied against the Norms, and states reacted to this lobbying and chose to
support the interests of business by blocking the Norms (Mantilla, 2009, p.294). The issue has
not died there, beginning in 2005 the UN Commission on Human Rights began exploring this
idea again leading to the release of the document “Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights: Implementing the UN Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework”. This latest attempt
lacks the teeth proposed in the Norms and therefore it falls prey to the same arguments that are
raised with any initiative without a mechanism to employ the stick if necessary (De La Vega,
Mehra, and Wong, 2011, p.9).
“Without mandatory or legal mechanisms in place, a culture of impunity may
prevail among corporations and their approach to human rights violations. The
international community needs to seriously consider the viability of creating
and implementing international legal mechanisms, including accountability and
oversight instruments, and providing effective remedies for victims aggrieved
by business impacts. Internal industry mechanisms are no substitute for
independent judicial mechanisms. The threat of legal recourse need not be
targeted at well-intentioned corporate actors, but rather at the worst offenders:
those engaged in or acting in complicity with human rights violations. Further,
such mechanisms would create a level playing field across culture and context,
Global Governance and Decent Work 25
ensuring that all businesses are held to the same standards in their practices.
Many corporations have raised this particular issue” (De La Vega, Mehra, and
Wong, 2011, p.12).
International Labour Organization (ILO)
In this discussion of global labour standards some more detailed comments about the ILO must
be included. The ILO was created in 1919, as part of the Treaty of Versailles that ended World
War I, which partly explains the hope that such an organization could play a role in ensuring a
universal and lasting peace. Its founding documents argue that peace can only be accomplished if
it is based on social justice. As an organization it actually predates the United Nations, but it is
now recognized as a specialized agency of the United Nations. This recognition of the
importance of social justice in securing peace was overlaid against a background of the real
exploitation of workers in many of the industrializing nations at the time. Amazingly, given it
was almost a century ago, there was also recognition of the increasing interdependence of the
world's economic systems and the need to cooperate in order to obtain similar working
conditions in countries competing for markets. These formative ideas are still being argued for
today, and reflect the main theme of this paper. The Preamble to the original constitution is
relevant today, it states:
1. Whereas universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social
justice;
2. And whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice hardship and privation to
large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the
world are imperilled; and an improvement of those conditions is urgently required;
3. Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an
obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own
countries.
The areas of improvement listed in the Preamble also remain relevant today, for example:
1. Regulation of the hours of work including the establishment of a maximum working day
and week;
2. Regulation of labour supply, prevention of unemployment and provision of an adequate
living wage;
3. Protection of the worker against sickness, disease and injury arising out of his
employment;
4. Protection of children, young persons and women;
5. Provision for old age and injury, protection of the interests of workers when employed in
countries other than their own;
6. Recognition of the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value;
7. Recognition of the principle of freedom of association;
8. Organization of vocational and technical education, and other measures.
Global Governance and Decent Work 26
(ILO, 2014b)
With the rise of the World Trade Organization (WTO) beginning in the 1990s some speculated
that WTO might be a more effective organization to deal with labour standards issues through
attaching requirements to trade agreements, much as was done to the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). But the WTO has consistently rejected the inclusion of labour issues in its
mandate, instead insisting this is the mandate of the ILO, thereby ensuring that the ILO remains
the pre-eminent global organization dedicated to labour standards. To address methods for
achieving global consensus on labour standards the ILO decided to focus on a regime of core
labour standards in order to integrate social policy into a world system increasingly focused on
economic governance (Haworth, Hughes and Wilkinson, 2005, p.1939).
The focus of ILO’s current work in labour rights is focused on what is called the Decent Work
agenda. The stated aim is to promote decent work for all, recognizing the central place work
plays in people’s well-being, including improvements that are economic, social, and personal.
For work to do this though it must be good, safe and fair. Through a series of Decent Work
Country Programs developed in consultation with stakeholders, the ILO works to implement its
four strategic objectives with gender equality being an ever present cross cutting objective. These
four objectives are:
Creating jobs
Guaranteeing rights at work
Extending social protection
Promoting social dialogue (ILO, 2014a)”
So although the ILO began to find its influence waning during the 1980s, it has continued to be
the most relevant voice for labour standards at a global level. Decent Work Country Programs
are running in over 70 countries and they are generally focused on providing funding and/or
technical assistance to national governments or local NGOs.
The Decent Work program has had significant successes but the ILO continues to be unable to
exert significant economic or other leverage in order to bring about compliance with core labour
standards in the majority of cases of deliberate non-compliance, let alone inadvertent non-
compliance. Despite this, the ILO does still maintain several sources of direct and effective
influence. Its main strength is in the creation of global regulatory norms, norms can have more
power than laws, but in addition they often are the starting point for the creation of legal
frameworks around the world. When capacity is the reason for labour standards not being
implemented the ILO also can play a strong role, “by providing legal and policy models and
technical assistance to states at political transition points where governments are actively seeking
models for legal, programmatic, and administrative reform” (Banks, 2011, p.140).
ILO, Trade, and Innovative Approaches to Improving Labour Standards
Given the complexity of global governance questions, and the failure of the status quo to ensure
labour standards are met, novel ideas are needed. The ILO is involved in one program well
Global Governance and Decent Work 27
described by Kolben which takes a different approach and has shown positive results as seen in
the following précis of his study of the Cambodian Decent Work Country Program.
While the issue of linking trade agreements with labour standards (the so-called `social clause')
has been resisted by the WTO despite being raised during its very creation during the Uruguay
round (1986-94) of negotiations, it has not been absent from bilateral and multilateral trade
negotiations such as NAFTA. A great example of a bilateral trade agreement linking trade and
labour standards also links to one of the most successful ILO Decent Work Country Programs. In
1999 the United States and Cambodia signed a bilateral textile trade agreement that included
incentives for the Cambodian garment industry to improve labour standards. What was
especially innovative was that not only was the Cambodian textile industry to comply with
Cambodian law (which should in theory already be happening) but in addition there were
incentives to implement global labour standards. The lead on implementation in the agreement
was not the US or Cambodian governments, but rather the ILO. Another innovation was to not
only provide economic incentives via the trade agreement, but also the implementation of a
factor monitoring program led by the ILO (Kolben, 2004, p.79).
The enforcement of trade agreements and labour standards are usually considered distinct and
unconnected domains. Kolben describes how the ILO's program in Cambodia was novel because
it combined disparate approaches. The first of these approaches was trade incentives to enforce
workers' rights. Academics and advocates have long argued that to achieve labour rights trade
agreements need to include workers' rights as a condition of trading. Such an approach is focused
at the state level as it calls upon the national labour regulator to enact and enforce labour
standards legislation in return for trade (Kolben, 2004, pp.80-81). The second approach is the
inclusion of factory level monitoring into the scheme. Again, what is novel about this approach
is that the ILO is the monitor.
There are many ways to regulate global supply chains and what is often suggested and done in
practice is to have the private sector, usually corporations, implement and monitor their own
codes of conduct. The aim is to improve the respect for labour standards at the level of the
factory floor, but usually also outside of the public regulatory framework. Many, including trade
unions and NGOs, are sceptical of such approaches, suggesting that self-regulated codes of
conduct are at best inadequate and at worst a method of replacing the checks and balances
provided by organized labour and public regulators with voluntary enforcement. That is why the
Cambodian factory-monitoring program is unique as it is not the local public sector, the private
sector, unions or NGOs that are doing the monitoring, but rather the world’s only global labour
organization. Kolben describes the program as “not only as a mechanism to report on labour
conditions in factories, but as a kind of supplement to and temporary replacement for Cambodia's
inadequate national regulatory system, which does not, and perhaps cannot, enforce international
labour standards or its own labour law” (Kolben, 2004, pp.81).
It is interesting to note at this point that there were various pressures on the US government to
include these standards in a bilateral trade agreement; it was not something that arose out of
standard US trade policy. Key stakeholders included American labour unions, particularly the
Union of Needle trades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE), with the support of NGOs
such as the International Labor Rights Fund and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. The
labour standards provision reads:
Global Governance and Decent Work 28
The carrot in these schemes is that if the U.S. determines that the Cambodian garment industry is
in substantial compliance with Cambodian labour law and internationally recognized labour
standards, then they can increase quotas up to fourteen percent per year in addition to a standard
six percent annual increase (Kolben, 2004, pp.90). Upon implementation what is fascinating is
that one of the major sticks ensuring compliance has turned out to not to be the ILO, or the
Cambodian or US governments but rather foreign buyers. Companies such as the Gap have
required all factories they source from to be fully compliant with the ILO monitoring standards
as a condition of contract (Kolben, 2004, pp.105).
The ILO monitoring project in Cambodia is important for the use of novel incentives. Improved
trade quotas are based on the behaviour of the garment sector as a whole, not on the performance
of the government creating a collective incentive to improve labour standards. In addition, in
concert with the collective incentive there is the addition of individual incentive in the form of
factory monitoring; monitoring that can cause the loss of buyer’s contracts if labour conditions
do not meet international standards (Kolben, 2004, pp.106). Despite the relative success of the
Cambodian Decent Work Country Program, the ILO is far from being acceptable or even able to
play the role of global labour regulator, therefore despite considerable successes ranging from
norm creation to actual labour standard monitoring, the majority of nation states are not ready or
willing to accept a global labour police force (Banks, 2011, p.140).
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
Having explored governance by the nation state, intergovernmental organizations and civil
society it is appropriate to examine the corporate contribution to addressing the labour standards
governance deficit in the form of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).–CSR is increasingly
being touted as a change in the way business is done, a change that can address concerns
regarding poor labour standards. CSR addresses more than labour standards; its aim is for
business to contribute to sustainable economic development outcomes, arguing that this is both
good for business and good for development. In many ways there are reasonable arguments for
this approach based on the idea that businesses are after all a part of society, and therefore they
have the potential to make a positive contribution to the goals of society (Ward, 2004, p.3). The
most global approach to CSR can be seen in the efforts led by the UN to launch a Global
Compact; this specific instance of CSR will be addressed in its own section.
CSR has arisen as a response from business to a number of external and internal drivers that
generate a business case for CSR. Such drivers include “new business opportunities through
social and environmental innovation, reputational risk management, campaign pressure from
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or trade unions, media exposure to the practices of
individual companies or sectors, regulation, and litigation” (Ward, 2004, p.3). Ward sees the rise
of CSR as a positive development, but not as a replacement for public regulation. To support the
rise of CSR he advocates for the public sector to do the following:
“Mandate: Laws, regulations, penalties, and associated public sector institutions that
relate to the control of some aspect of business investment or operations.
Facilitate: Setting clear overall policy frameworks and positions to guide business
investment in CSR, development of nonbinding guidance and labels or codes for
Global Governance and Decent Work 29
application in the marketplace, laws and regulations that facilitate and provide incentives
for business investment in CSR by mandating transparency or disclosure on various
issues, tax incentives, investment in awareness raising and research, and facilitating
processes of stakeholder dialogue (though not necessarily in the lead).
Partner: Combining public resources with those of business and other actors to leverage
complementary skills and resources to tackle issues within the CSR agenda, whether as
participants, conveners, or catalysts.
Endorse: Showing public political support for particular kinds of CSR practice in the
marketplace or for individual companies; endorsing specific award schemes or
nongovernmental metrics, indicators, guidelines, and standards; and leading by example,
such as through public procurement practices” (Ward, 2004, p.5).
What is key though is that however beneficial the rise of CSR may be, voluntary initiatives
cannot be an effective substitute for good governance. What business needs is not a repeal of
regulation, but rather clarity in its regulations, the baseline standards it requires of all firms, and
predictability of government intervention (Ward, 2004, p.7).
A major driving force behind the rise of CSR has been due to pressure from civil society, and the
demand for more than traditional economic capital, or even basic compliance with law, but
rather, that to operate business needs social license as well, which can only be provided by the
communities affected by any potential harms created. Within our increasingly media driven
society business reputation is hugely significant. Media ‘‘canonization’’ or conversely
demonization may carry extensive weight in a brand-oriented world where negative media could
inflict serious brand damage. Therefore we are finding ourselves in a new world where
stakeholders with ‘moral rights’ may sometimes negotiate almost on par with shareholders
(Midttun, 2008, p.407).
In a world where CSR is becoming good business practice we see it being implemented in two
separate but complementary ways. One ways is where firms implement CSR as a tool to
differentiate themselves from competitors, a more broad way is where standards across and
industry as a whole are lifted based on CSR. Both approaches led though to business
internalizing new norms of behaviour that can lead to better societal outcomes (Midttun, 2008,
p.408), (Albareda, 2008, p.431).
Blackett argues that while not public governance these initiatives are in fact new and emerging
forms of labour regulation. The rise of CSR speaks in many ways to the limits to public
regulators, and the ability of CSR to adapt to the logic of the new international division of labour
(Blackett, 2001, p.402). The demand for greater corporate social responsibility is not new; it is
just that there are new drivers pushing it. Three previous attempts from international
organizations beginning in the 1970s failed to promote the adoption of greater corporate social
responsibility. These included efforts led by the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations
(UNCTC), the ILO and the OECD (Blackett, 2001, p.408), (Mantilla, 2009, p.282). It reveals
either that these were ideas come before their time, or business only responds to economic
levers.
Global Governance and Decent Work 30
Despite the seemingly positive rise of CSR, in the area of labour rights they often fail to
reference the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, or to specific core
labour standards (Blackett, 2001, p.411). There are attempts to link CSR and ILO labour
standards, through for instance the creation of the Social Accountability International's (SAI)
SA8000 code. The SA8000 relies on the Conventions of the ILO and other key human rights
instruments, including child labour, forced labour, health and safety, compensation, working
hours, discrimination, discipline, freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively. Yet
as with all such CSR schemes, auditing is left to the implementer, with the result being that it is
the companies themselves that are required to prevent anti-union activities in their workplaces,
something that one must imagine goes against other incentives (Blackett, 2001, p.415). Many
social reporting structures exist including the recent Sustainability Reporting Framework
launched by GRI (GRI, 2014).
While CSR may be effective when the brand damage is involved this only covers the small
number or workers employed in sectors with image conscious companies involved. One would
be hard pressed to find a boycott campaign on using nickel from one mining company versus its
competitors; there is no way to tell where the nickel we use comes (Liubicic, 1998, pp.157-158).
These are not insignificant concerns. While there is room to argue about the necessity of a stick
in ensuring better outcomes, if the need for a stick is perceived of as important to key
stakeholders then the lack of them can fatally damage the implementation of any CSR initiative
whether it truly needed the stick or not (Berliner and Prakash, 2012, pp.149-150). For this
reason, program design is as or almost as important as the high level goals of any CSR initiative.
Stronger sticks usually lead to less participation so one must ask whether greater good is reached
through broad membership, but the potential for non-compliance, or small membership with
greater compliance. In all likelihood what is needed is both types of programs, with a clear
understanding of the differences between the two (Berliner and Prakash, 2012, p.150). What is
clear though, is that for CSR to realize its lofty goals, and not just be a marketing tool designed
not to improve social outcomes but rather to solely protect brands governments and
intergovernmental organizations will need to play a role. If the public sector can provide support
to both the private sector and civil society then there is potential for real social and
environmental improvements (Jørgensen, Pruzan-Jørgensen, Jungk, and Cramer, 2003, p.4).
Global Compact
The Global Compact is, in theory, an example of a CSR initiative with all actors at the table:
governments, international organizations, civil society and of course business itself. Launched at
the 1999 World Economic Forum in Davos, by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, it
signified a new chapter in the history of the United Nations. This was the most visible attempt
from the UN to join with business in promoting international development, and is likely
something that could never happened during the cold war when the debate on capitalism still
raged so prominently. The stated objective of the Global Compact is to give global markets a
more human face. Since its launch the Global Compact has become, “thanks to the direct
leadership of the secretary-general, a key instrument in the UN's overall strategy to foster a more
inclusive and sustainable world economy” (Thérien and Pouliot, 2006, p.55). Amongst the
guiding principles are key labour standards including:
Global Governance and Decent Work 31
a position that businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective
recognition of the right to collective bargaining;
the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour;
the effective abolition of child labour; and
the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.
Noticeably absence is mention of health and safety standards.
While it is admirable that the Global Compact has secured the participation of business,
governments and civil society, similar to other approaches, it lacks teeth. As with CSR initiatives
the concern is that without an appropriate stick there will be incentives to join and not implement
true socially responsible actions (Oshionebo, 2007, pp.17-18). Inclusion in the Global Compact
is relatively simple, all that is required is a letter endorsed by a company’s board expressing
support for and commitment to the Compact. The business is then expected to do three things:
set in motion changes to its business operations ensuring Compact principles become part
of its strategy, culture, and day-to-day operations;
publicly advocate the Compact; and
publish an annual report or Communication on Progress indicating ways in which it is
supporting the Compact and its principles.
There is no vetting of applications to examine whether the applicant corporation may be involved
in rights violations even as it is applying to join (Oshionebo, 2007, p.23). Failure to submit a
Communication on Progress for two consecutive years may result in being listed as inactive on
the Compact website. In addition a complaint mechanism has recently been introduced where the
Compact will forward the complaint to the relevant corporation asking them to submit written
comments on the allegations. The biggest stick available is, in cases of egregious violations, the
removal of the offending corporation from the list of participating companies altogether
(Oshionebo, 2007, pp.24-25). Understandably many see these as relatively weak incentives
(Blackett, 2001, p.442), (Arevalo and Fallon, 2008, p.459).
Despite these concerns it is positive to have business at the table discussing issues of social and
environmental concern. In addition the Compact has re-engaged nations in the discussion,
especially nations in the developing world (Blackett, 2001, pp.443-444).
Despite terms in the guidelines that suggest that corporations that are complicit
in human rights abuses will not be eligible for partnership, it is not apparent that
any triage has been undertaken, and the absence of a monitoring mechanism
calls into question how this determination can ultimately be made by the United
Nations (Blackett, 2001, p.445), (Deva, 2006, pp.149-150).
However, any initiative that has succeeded in getting the participation of over 8000 companies
and 4000 civil society organizations in 140 countries deserves some recognition (UNGC, 2013,
p.4).
Global Governance and Decent Work 32
2. Data – Labour standards in a globalized world
Having surveyed and critiqued the relevant literature relevant, the next step is to see what kind of
“quantitative shape” we can give to our topic.
Occupational Health and Safety
Labour standards, while only a subset of human rights, are themselves broad – covering at a high
level three major areas: collective bargaining rights, employment standards (such as minimum
wages) and occupational health and safety standards. While all of these areas would provide a
fruitful exploration, this paper will drill down into occupational health and safety in order to test
its thesis. With a more narrow focus we will be able to test some of the concepts and challenges
arising in the global governance of labour standards. Even more specifically, data to be explored
will focus on the mining sector in a subset of countries that have active mining sectors. The
countries selected include a mixture of developed and developing economies.
Mining lends itself well as a subsector to explore given that developing countries that have not
yet achieved wide scale industrialization find themselves blessed (or cursed) with natural
resources attractive to mining companies. Many researchers have explored this idea of a resource
curse, whether resources, especially non-renewable ones such as minerals do not actually lead to
economic growth but rather stagnation or even economic reversal. What seems to be key is not
just the presence of resources but the institutional context in which they are found. Where
institutions benefit the companies themselves, results are poor, where institutions are friendly to
the workers, positive results are seen (Mehlum, Moene and Torvik. 2006, p.1).
Occupational health and safety is an interesting topic as there is evidence that improved
outcomes are not only a realization of worker rights, but in many cases come with economic
benefits as well. Countries with poor occupational health and safety systems spend a larger
percentage of their GDP on work related injuries and illness, taking away resources and money
that could be used to support more productive activities (OSHA Europa, 2007, p.1). For example
“ILO estimates that work-related illness and accidents cost up to 10 % of GDP in Latin America,
compared with just 2.6 % to 3.8 % in the EU” (OSHA Europa, 2007, p.1). In addition, work-
related fatalities were estimated at over 2 million deaths per year in 2000 (ILO, 2003, p.6).
Reducing work related accidents and disease is a huge challenge. Understanding the size of the
problem is even difficult, given that so many fatalities, let alone injuries, aren’t even reported to
anyone with a global view, if anyone at all. What is known is that “the countries with the highest
accident and illness rates are unlikely to be those with the best-developed inspection and
reporting structures” (ILO, 2003, p.2). Reducing fatalities, injuries and illness in the workplace is
often difficult due to a variety of factors as depicted in the figure below.
Global Governance and Decent Work 33
Figure 1 Factors Resisting Reductions of Fatalities, Injuries and Illness
(ILO, 2013, p.5).
In the sections that follow data will be examined in order to inform an exploration of potential
approaches and considerations that can and do play a role in any potential system of global
labour standards harm reduction.
Methodology
As discussed, labour standards are only a subset of the much broader field of human rights. Even
within labour standards there are a multitude of different rights. In exploring whether norms and
values are enough to maintain decent labour standards, I focus on occupational health and safety,
more specifically, fatalities in the global mining sector in fifteen countries. These countries form
a snapshot of countries with active mining sectors, and include underdeveloped, developing and
developed economies. They can also be grouped in various ways: by membership in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), BRICS (Brazil, Russia,
India, China, South Africa), the western hemisphere or by English speaking nations. No matter
how they are grouped, one positive observation is that the fatality rate on average is improving in
the mining sector across the world.
Yet, more work can be done.
OSH
is a low priority
Lack of treatment,
compensation
Under-reporting
No picture
of the real impact
of poor OSH
conditions
Low resources
for
OSH improveme
nt
and collection
of informatio
n
Public ignorance
Global Governance and Decent Work 34
Mining accounts for only about 1 per cent of the global workforce, but it is
responsible for up to 5 per cent of fatal accidents at work (at least 15,000 per year,
or over 40 each day). Despite considerable efforts in many parts of the industry to
improve its safety record, mining remains the most hazardous occupation in most
countries where it exists, when the number of people exposed to risk is taken into
account (ILO, 2003, p.10).
Raw data was from the ILO archives and was reported to them by each individual country. Using
two databases (Employees by sex and economic activity (Thousands), and Cases of fatal
occupational injury by sex and economic activity both for the Mining and quarrying, electricity,
gas and water supply sector) the data was analyzed, combined and is presented in charts format
below. These charts give context to the problem before us, yet one of the initial conclusions that
can be made just by looking at the data is that in many cases there are gaps in the data. If you
can’t measure something, how can you improve it? If national authorities are not watching, who
can work to fill the data gap?
To calculate the fatality frequency rate two sets were combined, employment data aggregated by
sector and reported fatalities. Interestingly the ILO did not have a published data set with
calculated fatality rates, just raw numbers which on their own tell little as the larger the
workforce the larger the expected fatalities.
Then, a more in depth look is given to injury, illness and fatality rates in our focus jurisdiction –
Ontario, Canada. These statistics did not have to be calculated given that Ontario has a relatively
sophisticated health and safety system in place. The data was obtained from Workplace Safety
North, available online. WSN gets these statistics from the Workplace Safety and Insurance
Board (WSIB). Workplace Safety North is a safe workplace association, one of six different
health and safety associations in Ontario that are funded in part from WSIB premiums. These
health and safety associations are arms-length from government and are not directly an agency of
government, but through the transfer of funding they are accountable to government priorities in
a broad sense. Workplace Safety North is the safe workplace association tasked with providing
training and support to the Ontario mining sector, in addition to the, forestry, paper, printing and
converting sectors. They also provide health and safety services to businesses in other sectors
across Northern Ontario. (WSN, 2014a).
The next section of data analysis explores ratification of key ILO conventions related to health
and safety and inspectorate data for select countries. These charts give context on what global
conventions are in place, and a comparison of the inspectorate that are auditing compliance.
Again what is a key finding is that ratification is sporadic at best, and data on inspectorates and
their activities is low to non-existent. With no data, does that mean that no independent audit is
being done or is the data just not being shared? It is impossible to know, but if a national
regulator is unable to accurately report on its activities to the ILO, this raised basic concerns on
its ability to audit health and safety systems in their own jurisdiction.
This collection of data will lay the basis for the Section 3, where we test whether norms and
values are enough, through an analysis of compliance data in the mining sector in Ontario,
Canada.
Fatality Rate in Select Countries in the Mining and quarrying, electricity, gas and water supply sector
Chart 1 Mining Fatality Rate in Select Countries
(ILOStat, 2014a; ILOStat, 2014b).
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Fa
tali
ty F
req
ue
ncy
Ra
te (
pe
r 1
00
FT
E)
Year
Australia
Brazil
Canada
China
France
Germany
India
Peru
Russian Federation
South Africa
Sweden
Turkey
Ukraine
United States
Zimbabwe
Global Governance and Decent Work 36
Chart 2 Mining Fatality Rate in Select Countries (with trendlines)
(ILOStat, 2014a; ILOStat, 2014b).
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
Year
Fa
tali
ty F
req
ue
ncy
Ra
te (
pe
r 1
00
FT
E)
Australia
Brazil
Canada
China
France
Germany
India
Peru
Russian Federation
South Africa
Sweden
Turkey
Ukraine
United States
Zimbabwe
Global Governance and Decent Work 37
Table 1 Trend Line R-Value
Country R-Value
Australia R² = 0.7956
Brazil R² = 1
Canada R² = 0.4265
China R² = 0.1206
France R² = 0.0022
Germany R² = 0.6699
India R² = 0.7414
Peru R² = 0.9527
Russian Federation R² = 0.1867
South Africa R² = 0.0792
Sweden R² = 0.1829
Turkey R² = 0.599
Ukraine R² = 0.604
United States R² = 0.7261
Zimbabwe R² = 1
(ILOStat, 2014a; ILOStat, 2014b).
Global Governance and Decent Work 38
Injury, Illness and Fatality Trends in Ontario’s Mining Sector
Chart 3 Total Injury Rates Ontario Mining Sector 2000-2013
(WSN, 2014b).
9.8 9.4
9
8.5 8.7
8.2
7.5 7.1 7
6
5.4
6.6
5.6
5.1
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
To
tal
Me
dic
al
Inju
rie
s p
er
10
0 F
TE
wo
rke
rs
Global Governance and Decent Work 39
Chart 4 Lost-time Injury Rates Ontario Mining Sector 2000-2013
(WSN, 2014b).
2.4
2.2 2.3
2 1.9
1.6 1.5
1.4 1.3
1 1.1
1.3
0.9 0.8
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Lo
st-t
ime
in
juri
es
pe
r 1
00
FT
E w
ork
ers
Global Governance and Decent Work 40
Chart 5 Allowed Noise Induced Hearing Loss Claims by Registration Year Ontario Mining Sector 2000-2013
(WSN, 2014b).
114
93 96
116 114
105 105 110
101
120
133 129
141
125
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Nu
mb
er
of
All
ow
ed
Cla
ims
Global Governance and Decent Work 41
Chart 6 Lost-time Injury Rate by Ontario Industrial Sector 2013
(WSN, 2014b).
2.2
1.8
1.5
1.5
1.4
1.2
1.1
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.5
0.4
0.4
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Agriculture
Transportation
Forestry
Municipal
Health Care
Construction
Automotive
Aggregates
Food
Services
Mining
Steel
Chemical/Process
Manufacturing
Pulp & Paper
Education
Electrical
Lost-time Injury Rate per 100 FTE Workers
Global Governance and Decent Work 42
Chart 7 Traumatic Fatalities Ontario Mining Sector 2000-2013
(WSN, 2014b).
5
1
4
3 3
1
3
4
2
1
0
6
2 2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Nu
mb
er
of
Cla
ims
Global Governance and Decent Work 43
Chart 8 Allowed Fatal Occupational Disease Claims Ontario Mining Sector 2000-2013
(WSN, 2014b).
18
12
26
23
20
32
16 15
17 18
21
14
8
10
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Nu
mb
er
of
Fa
tals
Global Governance and Decent Work 44
Chart 9 Total Fatalities (Trauma and Disease) Ontario Mining Sector 2000-2013
(WSN, 2014b).
23
13
30
26
20
33
19 19 19 19
21 20
10
12
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Nu
mb
er
of
Cla
ims
Global Governance and Decent Work 45
Chart 10 Traumatic Fatalities Ontario Mining Sector 2004-2014
(WSN, 2014b).
3
1
3
4
2
1
0
6
2 2
6
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Nu
mb
er
of
Cla
ims
Global Governance and Decent Work 46
Chart 11 Fatal Injury Rate Ontario Mining Sector 2000-2013
(WSN, 2014b).
0.0353
0.0069
0.0276
0.0207
0.0188
0.0062
0.0179
0.0205
0.0094
0.0057
0
0.0268
0.0084 0.009
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Fa
tal
Inju
ry R
ate
/ 1
00
Wo
rke
rs
Global Governance and Decent Work 47
Chart 12 Fatal Injury Rate Ontario Mining Sector 2009-2013
(WSN, 2014b).
0.0057
0
0.0268
0.0084 0.009
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Fa
tal
Inju
ry R
ate
/ 1
00
Wo
rke
rs
Global Governance and Decent Work 48
Chart 13 Fatal Traumatic Injury Rate by Ontario Industrial Sector 2009-2013
(WSN, 2014b).
0.0136
0.0125
0.0104
0.0096
0.0068
0.0064
0.0026
0.0018
0.0016
0.0008
0.0007
0.0007
0.0006
0.0006
0.0003
0.0003
0.0001
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01 0.012 0.014 0.016
Forestry
Agriculture
Mining
Aggregates
Transportation
Construction
Pulp & Paper
Electrical
Municipal
Food
Manufacturing
Steel
Chemical/Process
Services
Health Care
Automotive
Education
Fatal Traumatic Injury Rate per 100 FTE Workers
Global Governance and Decent Work 49
ILO Convention and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Ratification
In addition to a review of fatality rates it is interesting to note which of the selected countries have ratified ILO health and safety
conventions relevant to the mining sector.
Convention C45, drafted in 1935 actually forbids women from working underground. Canada repealed it in 1977 but surprisingly
some other developed countries only repealed it in the last decade.
Chart 14 CO45 – Underground Work (Women Convention)
(ILO, 2014c).
Global Governance and Decent Work 50
Chart 15 C081 Labour Inspection Convention
(ILO, 2014c).
Global Governance and Decent Work 51
Chart 16 C123 Minimum Age (Underground Work) Convention
(ILO, 2014c).
Global Governance and Decent Work 52
Chart 17 C124 Medical Examination of Young Persons (Underground Work) Convention
(ILO, 2014c).
Global Governance and Decent Work 53
Chart 18 C155 Occupational Safety and Health Convention
(ILO, 2014c).
Global Governance and Decent Work 54
Chart 19 C176 Safety and Health in Mines Convention
(ILO, 2014c).
Global Governance and Decent Work 55
Chart 20 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Ratification
(EITI, 2014).
Global Governance and Decent Work 56
Global Labour Inspection (in select countries)
Chart 21 Labour Inspection Rate in Select Countries
(ILOStat, 2014c)
2009
2011
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2009
2010
2011
2012
Global Governance and Decent Work 57
Chart 22 Labour Inspection Visits per Inspector (in select countries)
(ILOStat, 2014d).
2009
2011
050
100150200250
2009
2010
2011
2012
Global Governance and Decent Work 58
Chart 23 Number of Labour Inspectors (in select countries)
(ILOStat, 2014e).
200901000200030004000500060007000
2009
2010
3. Legislative and Regulatory Compliance in the Mining
Sector in Ontario, Canada – 2004-2013
This section of data analysis explores regulatory compliance in Ontario, Canada in the mining
sector. The approach used in unique in the literature, combining an analysis of regulatory
compliance laid against a common health and safety standard framework used by companies
across the world. This analysis allows us to both test the hypothesis of whether companies need
to have independent audit, and it also allows for conclusions to be made on where the weak
points in both regulatory compliance and health and safety implementation lie.
Ontario is used as a proxy to explore the concept of whether there norms and values are enough
or whether there is a need for regulator. Canada is one of the richest nations in the world and it
has a highly developed regulatory system. Workplace injuries and fatalities are legally required
to be reported and multiple checks and balances are in place to ensure that they are. Given this
setting Ontario makes a good test of the idea of whether sophisticated, wealthy jurisdictions with
cultural norms (expressed both informally and formally through law) need anyone watching. Do
the workplace parties comply with the norm of health and safety or is there a need for an auditor
with the potential of a stick to realign behaviour compliance?
This data was acquired through a Freedom of Information request to the Ontario Ministry of
Labour. The data request was for all orders in the 10-fiscal year period covering calendar year
(CY) 2004 through to CY2013, written in workplaces under Mining Health and Safety Program
(MHSP) authority. Specifically I requested the numbers of orders on selected Sections,
Subsections, and Clauses for the Ontario Ministry of Labour’s mining program over the last 10
years for the MHSP.
The data contains no identifying information with regard to the identity of the contravener.
Therefore, while it can be analyzed to make conclusions about compliance in the mining sector
on a provincial level, it does not measure compliance at the level of individuals or companies. In
addition, the data only records non-compliance, Ministry of Labour inspectors do not make
records of compliance with health and safety legislation, and therefore it is not possible to make
conclusions about compliance versus non-compliance rates.
While the analysis method used only examines compliance at a provincial level, the tool
developed could be used to analyze compliance on a company by company basis if contraveners
were identified, in a sense allowing for a compliance score to be given. While this was not the
focus of this research paper, such an approach could prove valuable to regulators who wish to
improve targeting of their limited inspectorates or to take proactive and preventative approaches
with regard to identified non-compliance.
In addition it could prove valuable to companies themselves, many of who are familiar with
standards implementation such as International Standards Organization (ISO) 9001: Quality
Management Systems. In Canada the health and safety standard most often used is Canadian
Standards Association (CSA) Z1000 – Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems.
The compliance data provided by the Ministry of Labour is categorized using CSA Z1000,
Global Governance and Decent Work 60
allowing for the audit information collected by the Ministry of Labour to be put into a format
that fits into the health and safety systems used in the workplace. Standards follow the high level
format conceived of as a continuous loop of Plan, Do, Check, and Act. The analysis possible
through this innovative approach would allow companies to “check” which then feeds back into
the loop of Act, Plan and Do.
An order is one of the compliance tools that can be used, at an inspector’s discretion if a
violation of the Ontario Occupational Health and Safety Act, or its regulations is observed. There
are five different types of orders:
Non-Compliance Orders
Forthwith order – efforts to achieve compliance must begin immediately and be
completed before the inspector leaves the workplace;
Time-based order – compliance must be achieved within a time frame determined by the
inspector in consultation with the employer and workers;
Time-unknown order- length of time to achieve compliance cannot be determined by the
inspector in consultation with the employer and workers therefore no compliance date is
given but the contravention is noted (see companion orders)
Companion Orders (Always written in conjunction with a Time-unknown order)
Compliance plan order- length of time to achieve compliance cannot be determined by
the inspector in consultation with the employer and workers; therefore an companion
order to the non-compliance order is issued to the employer requiring the employer to
communicate what they intend to do to achieve compliance and in what timeframe. Must
be approved by the inspector.
Stop work order – used when an inspector finds that the contravention is an immediate
danger or hazard to the health or safety of a worker (e.g. unguarded machinery that is
being used). A stop work order will be withdrawn upon compliance. There is no date of
compliance for stop-work orders; they remain in place until compliance has been
achieved.
The Ministry of Labour data request returned an Excel spreadsheet with a total of 36865 orders
issued in the mining sector between January 1st, 2004 and December 31
st, 2013. 14,508 of the
orders were issued under the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA), and 22,357 were
issued under various regulations under the OHSA. The OHSA orders and the regulatory orders
were analyzed separately.
Upon analysis, 7162 of the OHSA orders were excluded. 1 was excluded as it was issued under a
repealed Act, 2 were excluded as the relevant section had been repealed. 1277 were excluded as
there was no contravener or contravention identified, the orders had been issued under
administrative sections detailing things such as the powers of inspectors, rather than health and
safety contraventions. Orders issued under these sections were incorrectly applied and without
the text of the order it was not possible to determine what the non-compliance observed was or
Global Governance and Decent Work 61
who the contravener was. 6066 orders were excluded as they were companion orders and if
included would have resulted in double counting contraventions.
A total of 22,357 orders were issued under regulations under the OHSA. These regulations
included the following:
Confined Spaces
Construction Projects
Control of Exposure to Biological or Chemical Agents
Designated Substances
Industrial Establishments
Mines and Mining Plants
Oil and Gas – Offshore
Roll-Over Protective Structures
WHMIS
X-Ray Safety
Regulatory order sections can be issued to whoever is the relevant contravener unlike sections
under the OHSA which include the contravener. Without the text of the order it was not possible
to determine who the contravener was. That said, for most sections the employer or constructor
is most often the contravener given their overarching duty and responsibility for health and
safety in the workplace. For the OHSA orders, 95.06% of them were issued to the
employer/constructor; it is likely that the percentage of regulatory orders issued to the
employer/constructor would be of a similar magnitude. Designated substances (such as Asbestos
and Isocyanates) used to have separate regulations but in the last decade these were consolidated
into two regulations. All designated substance orders were combined for the purpose of analysis
under the category “Designated Substances”.
An analysis tool was developed by the researcher in order to categorized orders issued against
the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) Z1000 Occupational Health and Safety Management
System standard. Orders were categorized by high level elements based on duties as found in
Ontario health and safety legislation, under four categories derived from CSA Z1000:
Commitment, Leadership, and Participation
Planning
Implementation
Evaluation and Corrective Action
Each of the legislated responsibilities can be categorized under one of these four key parts of a
successful health and safety management system (See Appendix B).
Labour rights are well understood in comparison to many developing world jurisdictions due to
the workforce being highly educated, mining being one of the most unionized sectors in the
private sector, and training in rights being required by law as part of the mining Common Core
Global Governance and Decent Work 62
program which all mine workers must take. Given this setting it will be instructive to analyze
compliance with Ontario’s OHSA and its regulations.
The sections of the OHSA and its regulations are regulatory minimums and many best practices
and standards go far beyond them. As minimums, I intend to analyze compliance, as one would
expect that a mining sector pursuing best practices and corporate social responsibility should be
beyond the legal minimums prescribed in law, proving that a regulator does not need to be
playing an audit role. If an order has been issued then non-compliance has been observed.
When considering legal minimums, a statement from my training years ago, first as a worker Co-
Chair for a Joint Health and Safety Committee in the private sector, and later as an inspector for
the Ministry of Labour, that comes to mind is that every section has been written in blood. The
meaning of this is that it has usually only been after tragedy that legal requirements have been
created, making the legal framework reactive rather than proactive. Therefore, observed non-
compliance not only is a failure to observe minimum requirements, but in many cases, a potential
gap that could potentially lead to injury or even death.
Chart 24 Orders Issued Pursuant to the Ontario OHSA in the Mining Sector 2004-2013 Categorized by OH&S System Element
(MOL, 2014a).
132 72
230
5
1609
86
315
904
3420
114 155 5 8
95 6 4
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Ord
ers
Iss
ue
d
OH&S System Elements
Global Governance and Decent Work 64
Chart 25 Orders Issued Pursuant to Ontario OHSA in the Mining Sector 2004-2013 Categorized by OH&S System Framework
(MOL, 2014a).
434
1614
5007
105
Commitment, Leadership and Participation
Planning
Implementation
Evaluation and Corrective Action
Global Governance and Decent Work 65
Chart 26 Orders Issued Pursuant to the Ontario OHSA in the Mining Sector 2004-2013 Categorized by Contravener
(MOL, 2014a).
6806
8 72 114 5 155
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
Employers andConstructors
Engineers Owners, Directors andOfficers
Supervisors Suppliers Workers
Ord
ers
Iss
ue
d
Contravenor
Global Governance and Decent Work 66
Chart 27 Orders Issued Pursuant to the Ontario OHSA in the Mining Sector 2004-2013 by Contravener
(MOL, 2014a).
68
06
8
72
11
4
5
15
5
Employers and Constructors
Engineers
Owners, Directors and Officers
Supervisors
Suppliers
Workers
Global Governance and Decent Work 67
Chart 28 Order % Pursuant to the Ontario OHSA in the Mining Sector 2004-2013 by Contravener
(MOL, 2014a).
95
.06
0.1
1
1.0
1
1.5
9
0.0
7
2.1
6
Employers and Constructors
Engineers
Owners, Directors and Officers
Supervisors
Suppliers
Workers
Global Governance and Decent Work 68
Chart 29 Orders Issued Pursuant to the Ontario OHSA Regulations in the Mining Sector 2004-2013 Column Chart
(MOL, 2014a).
4 65 12 90 705
21173
2 38 260 8 0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
Ontario Regulation under the OHSA
Global Governance and Decent Work 69
Chart 30 Orders Issued Pursuant to the Ontario OHSA Regulations in the Mining Sector 2004-2013 Pie Chart
(MOL, 2014a).
Confined Spaces
Construction Projects
Control of Exposure to Biological or ChemicalAgents
Designated Substances
Industrial Establishments
Mines and Mining Plants
Oil and Gas - Offshore
Roll-Over Protective Structures
WHMIS
X-Ray Safety
4. Summary of Results from Sections 2 and 3
Fatality Rate in Select Countries in the Mining and quarrying, electricity, gas and water supply sector
Fatality rates across the countries surveyed are declining in the Mining and quarrying, electricity,
gas and water supply sectors (also see Appendix A). But despite dramatic declines, they appear
to have plateaued at an admittedly low level with less significant improvement in recent years.
The United States and China alone show an increasing trend in fatality rates but this conclusion
is based on only two data points and therefore is not reliable. Instead, what this points to is a fact
that applies to the entire ILO data set – the issue of poor reporting. While one may argue about
whether or not there should be a global labour regulator, without the ability to measure the
problem it is next to impossible to make informed decisions as to what should be done.
Injury, Illness and Fatality Trends in Ontario’s Mining Sector
Injury, illness and fatality rates are declining in most instances in the Ontario mining sector.
With regard to lost-time injuries (LTIs) mining is below average, but with fatalities it is above
average.
Fatalities are a better indicator than lost time injuries because in some cases LTIs are more
manageable. By introducing return to work programs employers can significantly reduce the LTI
rate, without reducing the actual events that led to the injury. In addition programs that provide
incentives or rewards for low injury rates can encourage non-reporting. Fatalities are a different
matter – hey are far less likely to be underreported and they can’t be managed to a lower number
except solely through reducing the causative factors.
While the long-term trend in fatality reduction is encouraging, on a shorter time frame it is
concerning that when only looking at the last five years what is observed is a growth in fatalities.
While this could be an artefact of smaller data set, it could also be indicative of a weakening of
controls. While not part of the data set, fatalities this year continue this trend, with six fatalities
already by mid-year, a number already equal to the worst year considered in this data set
beginning 14 years ago (MOL, 2014b, p.10). This is potentially disturbing, and the mining sector
in Ontario should consider their hazard controls in light of this.
ILO Convention and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Ratification
The clear conclusion from this data is that ILO convention ratification is extremely spotty. Of
noted absence is Canada – the only country reviewed that has not ratified any of the conventions
relevant to worker health and safety. While this is not as concerning with regard to Convention
45 which forbids women in underground mines, and is therefore sexist, it is concerning that they
have not ratified any of the other conventions.
Global Governance and Decent Work 71
The lack of ratification by every country reviewed apart from Peru with the EITI is also
concerning though recent efforts on this issue show hope that countries will increasingly sign on
to this effort at transparency.
Global Labour Inspection (in select countries)
As discussed with respect to ILO fatality data, the data on inspections and inspectorates is
extremely poor. Without such data it is impossible to make conclusions regarding the
effectiveness of the inspectorates.
Legislative and Regulatory Compliance in the Mining Sector in Ontario, Canada – 2004-2013
Despite Ontario’s mining sector being well developed, sophisticated and highly unionized
operating in a developed jurisdiction with strong legal protections and well-educated citizens,
independent assessment of health and safety compliance by Ministry of Labour inspectors still
found 22,357 instances of non-compliance in a 10 year period. This is an important finding as
legislative and regulatory provisions are legal minimums – the bare minimum that the law
allows – not best practices. If sophisticated companies with well-developed health and safety
management systems in place are found in non-compliance at this level by independent auditors
the obvious conclusion is that there is still a need at this point for such independent audits.
It is a reasonable extrapolation from Ontario’s data that this conclusion would apply to other
jurisdictions, such as those in the developed world. Therefore if the national inspectorates are not
able to fill this role, and human rights such as labour standards truly are a societal value, than
thought needs to be given as to whom can play that audit role.
The analysis was based on the basic concepts that guide most occupational health and safety
(OH&S) management systems. The basic concept behind these standards is the mantra: Plan, Do,
Check, Act. Theoretically a well-run OH&S system would not need independent auditors as is
would self-assess as part of the “check” requirements of such standards. But, as with financial
standards, our society has long understood that there is a role to play for independent assessment
in providing transparency, and another incentive/stick to comply.
Based on standard OH&S standards the bulk of non-compliance orders issued under the OHSA
in the mining sector were in regard to:
Lack of appropriate job hazard control (1609 orders)
Failure of employers to comply with their duties (3420 orders)
Failure to provide necessary training to workers (904 orders) (MOL, 2014).
In addition, of concern was that 4285 stop work orders were issued (MOL, 2014). These are
issued only in the presence of violations that could immediately lead to injury or death. It is these
types of non-compliance that one would especially expect a sophisticated OH&S system to have
caught on its own.
Global Governance and Decent Work 72
The greatest number of orders were issued for failure to properly implement OH&S controls in
the workplace, with the next largest amount issued for failure to properly plan.
The bulk of the orders by far were issued to employers, 6806, or 95%. Employers have the
greatest command and control of the workplace, and it shows that the weakness of the OH&S
systems in the Ontario mining sector are not found at the supervisor or worker level (MOL,
2014).
Global Governance and Decent Work 73
5. In a Complex Global Governance World, How can Labour
Standards be Improved?
Given the conclusion drawn in Section 4 based on the Ontario data – the conclusion that it is
necessary, even in developed economies with sophisticated companies to have an independent
audit function when it comes to Occupational Health and Safety – who is it that should play this
role, especially in nation states that do not have well-functioning regulatory regimes?
Rosenau argues that governments should “not be posited as first among equals,
but simply as significant actors in a world marked by an increasing diffusion of
authority and a corresponding diminution of hierarchy. States retain their
sovereign rights, however the realms within which these rights can be exercised
have diminished as the world becomes even more interdependent and as state
boundaries become ever more porous (Tapscott and Gegenhuber, 2013, p.3).
Rosenau’s argument opens a window on a potential way forward with regard to improving
labour standards. The challenge is in how to ensure that the desired social outcomes arise out of
such a complex system. In such a world authority cannot be expected to only be applied through
explicit means such as laws and enforcement but also through implicit means such as persuasion
and influence (Tapscott and Gegenhuber, 2013, p.4).
Looking at the analysis of the ILO data, the low data reporting by states is significant. With such
low data reporting, and low ratification rates, the conclusion can be drawn that there is low
respect for the mechanisms of the ILO itself. While not reporting fatalities or inspection numbers
does not necessarily mean that there is a problem in the country being reviewed it does make it
impossible to understand the size of the issue from a global perspective and it shows a
concerning lack of respect for attempts by the ILO to scope out these issues. This poses
significant challenges for those who would exclusively call on the ILO to be the global labour
regulator. It is clear that there is a lack of legitimacy ascribed to the ILO’s mandate by at least
some nations, and this would be a stumbling block to the ILO as regulator. This is not to say this
may never change, but for the near future, we cannot expect the ILO alone to play the role of
global labour regulator.
The idea of needing to use a multitude of tools is not new to regulators. In one concise example
in 1994, the Dutch Ministry of Justice decided to monitor the level of compliance with
legislation, rather than just enacting it. Flowing out of this research a new tool was developed
called the ‘Table of Eleven’. The ‘Table of Eleven’ guides regulators, using a model based on
behavioural sciences, to better outcomes by having them think about how and why people
comply and then crafting their responses based on this (LEEC, 2004, p.3). Tools such as these
will help us tackle the complex challenges facing improving global labour standards.
Malcolm Sparrow provides key insight into operationalizing attempts to improve issues of
concern to society. His advice can be summed up by directing public, private or civil society
actors to unravel the knot of the problem before them in order to discover points which are
weaker and open to what he terms sabotage. Such approaches are perfectly adaptable to global
governance situations with a variety of actors at play (Sparrow, 2008). The idea one has to
Global Governance and Decent Work 74
employ as with any craft is using the right tool at the right time. Those who are required to
follow rules fall along a compliance continuum into three basic categories:
Watch Me
Show Me (or Help Me)
Make Me (or Catch Me)
Figure 2 – Compliance Continuum
(ATO, 2007).
One should not use the same approach with everyone along the continuum. The “watch me”
category is for those who are above legal minimums and leaders pushing best practices. They are
the businesses that truly mean to make a difference through CSR for instance. All they need is a
supportive environment in which to pursue their best practices, and reasonable audits on
infrequent basis. The “show me” category either doesn’t know what the norms or rules are, or
doesn’t understand what needs to be done. This category needs compliance assistance, and
regular audits to ensure compliance, more carrot than stick. The last category is the “make me”
group and they know the rules but deliberately choose not to follow them. This group needs
Global Governance and Decent Work 75
more stick than carrot, but a combination may be best. In worst case scenarios such entities may
need to have the full force of the law applied to them (OFB, 2011).
It is true that having someone independently monitor labour standards can cause work and
potentially some costs, in the same way that preparing your financial records for independent
audit does the same. Yet financial auditing is considered a worthy process by most jurisdictions.
The goal though is not to have whoever is auditing get in the way of innovation and profit, but
rather to work towards improvement of social goals in concert with other such goals of business.
Nike, after huge efforts at factory monitoring, learnt that monitoring alone was not enough, but
rather had to be combined with other interventions especially those that tackled the root
problems leading to poor working conditions. One of their most interesting findings was that in
factories where they focused on improving quality and efficiency, labour standards improved on
their own (Locke, Qin, and Brause, 2007, p.3).
One potential additional tool in the toolbox is what has been termed Global Action Networks
which involve a multitude of actors from all sectors of society working together to tackle
complex problems. Examples include the Forest Stewardship Council and the Fair Labour
Association” (Tapscott and Gegenhuber, 2013, p.8). Both of these organizations have been
successful in making change in realms where traditionally only governments held authority.
These watchdog networks can complement traditional regulators and demonstrate how actors
outside government can collaborate to advance powerful new solutions. Watchdog networks can
help by increasing transparency with the” result of having a larger crowd of informed and
empowered individuals helping to protect the public interest” (GSN, 2013, p.12), (Semogas,
2014, p.1).
While outside auditors can play an important role it is important that they themselves have the
capacity, and incentive to be thorough. When PwC auditors were hired to audit Wal-Mart’s
overseas partners many key labour standards contraventions were missed. These errors stemmed
from a poor methodology that primarily focused on gathering information from management –
physical inspections were conducted on a very limited basis (O’Rourke, 2000, p.1).
This idea of needing someone to watch and regulate applies beyond the world of labour
standards. Before the financial crash in 2008 leaders within the financial system began to realize
some of the risks that led to the crash. Paulson, the head of the Treasury, knew that the financial
institutions would not be able to rein themselves in and prevent a financial catastrophe. In one
remarkable example of cross-sectoral governance thinking, the CEO of Citigroup, one of the
largest banks in the world, admitted this. At a dinner a year before the crisis this CEO asked
Paulson, “Isn’t there something you can do to order us not to take all of these risks?” (Sorkin,
2009, p.81). This is an interesting look into a private sector actor who was trying to think about
what would normally be of concern to the public sector, yet did not act on these concerns
himself.
It is for reasons such as these that there continues to be a role for regulators with legal authority –
either national regulators on their own or in partnership with others. These partners could include
private governance bodies such as NGOs, private sector inspectorates, global solutions networks
or the ILO through the provision of technical and funding assistance (MMSD, 2002, pp.xxii-
xxiii).
Global Governance and Decent Work 76
Trade law as well, even if resisted by bodies such as the WTO, can and will play a role. The
WTO already includes non-trade issues under its purview such as the protection of intellectual
property rights and phyto-sanitary rules for food safety; therefore there is precedent for the
inclusion of societal goals beyond the purely economic. We have discussed successful examples
such as the labour side agreements attached to NAFTA and the novel Cambodia – United States
trade deal which included labour standards monitoring. Such examples show that trade will
likely play a continuing role in improving labour standards in a globalized world.
While there is still much resistance to this, the example of the trade agreement between US and
Cambodia shows that partnered governance is possible. In that example US unions and NGOs
convinced US legislators to ratify a treaty that held a foreign state to international labour
standards that were audited by an international body, the ILO, which led to positive trade
incentives (the carrot) and enforced by TNCs through the cancellation of contracts (the stick).
The only thing missing in the Cambodia example was a truly effective stick beyond that of lost
contracts (Hall, 2010, pp.458-459). Given this example it is conceivable that other nation states
would be willing to partner with outside groups on issues that are legally their own concern.
States in the past have considered this – in the negotiations after World War II that created the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund serious consideration was given to creating a
trade organization with a fair labour standards clause. This proposed clause was even planned to
have a dispute resolution procedure and remedies available to it – such an idea may find that its
time may come eventually (Banks, 2011, p.141).
Partnered governance is not a challenge to authority, but rather a way for governments to extend
their reach in a world where available resources are finite. In addition, by including business
through partnered arrangements such as the Global Compact, what is being done is that those
who are actually morally responsible for labour standards, the employers, are being both held to
account and supported in their implementation (Midttun, 2008, p.416). Partnered governance
does not raise the concerns of a dominating global government, disconnected from the people it
controls. Instead it recognizes the complexity of global society and the diversity of cultural
differences. By bringing all relevant parties to the table partnered governance can get us not only
to mere compliance, but potentially beyond the lowest common denominator (Midttun, 2008,
p.416). Such a world would still allow the freedoms we cherish to exist, while also striving for a
more equitable world (Coase, 1960, p.68-69).
Mining Sector
In the specific case of mining, the industry provides both opportunity and risk. While on the one
hand it provides revenue that can fund development, it also can result in mineral extraction done
in an unsustainable way that does not respect human rights or the environment (Marcano, 2013,
p.6). While the incentives behind participating in CSR are different for different groups they can
result in benefits as different incentives, combined with an audit function with some teeth can
result in positive change (Marcano, 2013, p.17).
One way to eliminate injuries, illness and fatalities in the mining sector would be to prohibit
mining, but this is of course unreasonable. Mineral products are a key resource behind our
contemporary society and many basic needs would be unmet without them. However, the sector
Global Governance and Decent Work 77
must at minimum meet legislated standards, and increasingly it needs to secure so-called social
license in order to operate. If done within such a framework, mining can play an integral and
vital role in society (MMSD, 2002, p.xiv). The challenge before the mining sector, as with all
sectors is how to ensure that we integrate economic activity into a framework of sustainable
development (MMSD, 2002, p.xvi). Unfortunately, to date, this is not occurring. Instead the
extractive industries are failing to meet the full suite of societal demands, and it this is becoming
a business risk as resistance to projects continues to grow (Franks, Davis, Bebbington, Ali,
Kemp, and Scurra, 2014, pp.7576, 7581).
There are some examples of positive approaches appearing in the sector though. The Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which opens up financial transparency with respect to
money paid to national governments and other groups in the country of extraction, is one such
potentially positive initiative in the mining sector. Another is the Kimberly Process, which
attempts to stop the purchase and sale of conflict diamonds (Marcano, 2013, p.22). Yet another
initiative is the Responsible Mineral Development Initiative (RMDI), that seeks to create
guidance on what should be done to address these challenges” (Marcano, 2013, p.23).
Development agencies are beginning to focus on how to create a sustainable mining sector as
well. The former Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has in recent years been a
champion of CSR in the mining sector. Promotion of the mining sector ties into other Canadian
government goals. CIDA has funded partnerships between civil society and mining companies in
order to ensure that sustainable outcomes that respect human rights are a goal, in concert with the
goal of promoting mining and Canadian mining companies (Coumans, 2012, p.8). It is not only
the former CIDA which has focused on mining, however. The World Bank has also recognized
the fact that ensuring sustainable development in this sector is a key goal, one that supports
development while at the same time supporting economic growth (World Bank, 2002, p.2). As
always though, the caution is who is watching these initiatives to ensure that real change is
occurring.
Global Governance and Decent Work 78
Conclusion
At the beginning of this research I asked:
What is the role for global governance in decent working conditions for all workers?, and
Is a transformation of norms and values enough or is some form of a global regulator
required and who can play this role if necessary?
Having reviewed the relevant literature, and analyzed the data it is my conclusion that a
transformation of norms and values is not enough and that some form of a global regulator is
required. Yet from a simple conclusion some complexity arises when one asks who should be
this global regulator. Unfortunately, there is no one approach and it is only through a multiplicity
of actors that labour standards can be improved across the globe. The key to success may be that
it will take actors from all the three sectors of society, private, public and civil and newer entities
that combine a portion of all three in order to make positive change in a complex global world.
Even during the time this paper was being written, there have been some encouraging
developments that indicate that a world of better labour standards is possible. These include the
following:
The announcement that the UN Human Rights Council has passed a resolution on
creating internationally legally binding instruments applicable to TNCs (TWN, 2014);
Barrick Gold creating the first ever co-president responsible for social license (Kosich,
2014);
The Indian government mandating CSR (Afsharipour and Rana, 2014);
The Initiative for Responsible Mining releasing a draft global standard for socially
responsible mining (IRMA, 2014); and
The International Council on Mining and Metals in a surprising act of transparency is
releasing publicly aggregated safety data on fatalities and injuries (ICMM, 2014).
These developments show that multiple actors are working to address issues of labour standards
in the mining sector and other sectors are experiencing similar developments. Especially
interesting is the release of safety data by the ICMM, an action that is legislated in well-
developed regulatory regimes allowing regulators to post such data but the fact that this was
done by the companies themselves is a fascinating development.
In conclusion, cooperation is a basic human attribute – and carrots work better than sticks.
Despite this, an independent audit function with sanction power is required to balance the
tendency for some actors to game the system. Such an audit function should include more than
just legislation since laws without norms are doomed to failure, it is only through the power of
norms that true change can be made, an internalized norm with audits and sanctions is even more
powerful than a law.
Global Governance and Decent Work 79
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Appendix A – Mining Fatality Rate in Select Countries in Detail
Chart 31 Mining Fatality Rate in Select Countries (without Peru)
(ILOStat, 2014a; ILOStat, 2014b).
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Fa
tali
ty F
req
ue
ncy
Ra
te (
pe
r 1
00
FT
E)
Year
Australia
Brazil
Canada
China
France
Germany
India
Russian Federation
South Africa
Sweden
Turkey
Ukraine
United States
Zimbabwe
Global Governance and Decent Work 87
Chart 32 Mining Fatality Rate in Select Countries (without Peru, with trendlines)
(ILOStat, 2014a; ILOStat, 2014b).
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
Year
Fa
tali
ty F
req
ue
ncy
Ra
te (
pe
r 1
00
FT
E)
Australia
Brazil
Canada
China
France
Germany
India
Russian Federation
South Africa
Sweden
Turkey
Ukraine
United States
Zimbabwe
Global Governance and Decent Work 88
Chart 33 Mining Fatality Rate in Select Countries (Western Hemisphere subset)
(ILOStat, 2014a; ILOStat, 2014b).
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Fa
tali
ty F
req
ue
ncy
Ra
te (
pe
r 1
00
FT
E)
Year
Brazil
Canada
Peru
United States
Global Governance and Decent Work 89
Chart 34 Mining Fatality Rate in Select Countries (Western Hemisphere subset with trendlines)
(ILOStat, 2014a; ILOStat, 2014b).
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
Year
Fa
tali
ty F
req
ue
ncy
Ra
te (
pe
r 1
00
FT
E)
Brazil
Canada
Peru
United States
Global Governance and Decent Work 90
Chart 35 Mining Fatality Rate in Select Countries (OECD Subset)
(ILOStat, 2014a; ILOStat, 2014b).
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.04
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Fa
tali
ty F
req
ue
ncy
Ra
te (
pe
r 1
00
FT
E)
Year
Australia
Canada
France
Germany
Sweden
United States
Global Governance and Decent Work 91
Chart 36 Mining Fatality Rate in Select Countries (OECD Subset with trendlines)
(ILOStat, 2014a; ILOStat, 2014b).
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.05
Year
Fa
tali
ty F
req
ue
ncy
Ra
te (
pe
r 1
00
FT
E)
Australia
Canada
France
Germany
Sweden
United States
Global Governance and Decent Work 92
Chart 37 Mining Fatality Rate in Select Countries (Europe Subset)
(ILOStat, 2014a; ILOStat, 2014b).
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Fa
tali
ty F
req
ue
ncy
Ra
te (
pe
r 1
00
FT
E)
Year
France
Germany
Russian Federation
Sweden
Turkey
Ukraine
Global Governance and Decent Work 93
Chart 38 Mining Fatality Rate in Select Countries (Europe subset with trendlines)
(ILOStat, 2014a; ILOStat, 2014b).
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
Year
Fa
tali
ty F
req
ue
ncy
Ra
te (
pe
r 1
00
FT
E)
France
Germany
Russian Federation
Sweden
Turkey
Ukraine
Global Governance and Decent Work 94
Chart 39 Mining Fatality Rate in Select Countries (English speaking subset)
(ILOStat, 2014a; ILOStat, 2014b).
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Fa
tali
ty F
req
ue
ncy
Ra
te (
pe
r 1
00
FT
E)
Year
Australia
Canada
India
South Africa
United States
Zimbabwe
Global Governance and Decent Work 95
Chart 40 Mining Fatality Rate in Select Countries (English speaking subset with trendlines)
(ILOStat, 2014a; ILOStat, 2014b).
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
Year
Fa
tali
ty F
req
ue
ncy
Ra
te (
pe
r 1
00
FT
E)
Australia
Canada
India
South Africa
United States
Zimbabwe
Global Governance and Decent Work 96
Chart 41 Mining Fatality Rate in Select Countries (BRICS subset)
(ILOStat, 2014a; ILOStat, 2014b).
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Fa
tali
ty F
req
ue
ncy
Ra
te (
pe
r 1
00
FT
E)
Year
Brazil
China
India
Russian Federation
South Africa
Global Governance and Decent Work 97
Chart 42 Mining Fatality Rate in Select Countries (BRICS subset with trendlines)
(ILOStat, 2014a; ILOStat, 2014b).
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
Year
Fa
tali
ty F
req
ue
ncy
Ra
te (
pe
r 1
00
FT
E)
Brazil
China
India
Russian Federation
South Africa
Global Governance and Decent Work 98
Appendix B – Orders Issued Pursuant to the Ontario OHSA in the Mining Sector
2004-2013 Categorized by Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S) System
Framework
OH&S System Framework OH&S System Element Relevant Legislation Number of Orders Issued Pursuant to the Act
1 Commitment, Leadership and Participation
Policies have been prepared and are reviewed as required and a program has been developed and maintained to implement the policies
25.(2)(j), 32.0.1 (1), 32.0.2, 32.0.6
132
2 There is evidence if such exist, that the owner or directors and officers of a corporation comply with their duties under the Act
29.(1), (2), (3), 32., Any regulatory contravention where an owner, constructor, licensee, director or officer of a corporation is the contravener.
72
Global Governance and Decent Work 99
3 There is evidence that the H & S Rep / Committee is functioning as required and that workers participate in workplace health and safety issues as required
8.(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (9), (11), (14), (15), (16), 9.(1), (2), (3), (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18)(a), (d), (e), (f), (19), (22), (23), (24), (25), (29), (30), (31), (32), (33), (34), (35), (36), (37), (39), 10.(1), (2), (3), (5), (6),11., 43.(4)
230
4 Planning An assessment program is in place to support the policies
26.(1)(f), (h), (i), 32.0.3 (1), (2), (4), 39.(1), 45.(1), (2), (3), 47.(4), 48.(1)
5
5 A job hazard control program is in place
25.(1), 26.(1)(a), (b), (g), (j) 1609
6 Implementation A system or method is in place for the reporting of hazards and contraventions
43.(6), 51.(1), 52., 53. 86
7 Necessary documents and information are available as required
12.(2), 23.(2), 25.(2)(b), (i), (k), (l), (m), 26.(1)(c), (d), (e), 29.(4), 30., 32.0.1 (2), 32.0.3 (3), (5), 33.(3), 37.(1), (5), 38.(1), (5), (6)(a), (b), 39.(2), 41., 57.(10)(a), 59.(1), (2), (3)
315
Global Governance and Decent Work 100
8 There is evidence that workers have been acquainted with hazards and have received information and instruction in health and safety, that there is a general understanding of what the Internal Responsibility System (IRS) is and how it works, and that workers are aware of their rights
25.(2)(a), (d), 26.(1)(k), (l), 27.(2)(a), (b), 32.0.5 (2), 32.0.7, 37.(3), 38.(6)(c), 42.
904
9 There is evidence that the employer, constructor or licensee complies with their duties under the Act
23.(1), 24., 25.(2)(c),(f), (g), (h), 26.(3), 32.0.4, 32.0.5 (4), 37.(4), 39., 41., 43.(5), (10), (11), (13), 45.(5), 48.(2), 50.(1), 51.(2), 54.(3), (5), 58., 63.(2), Any regulatory contravention where the employer, constructor or licensee is the contravener.
3420
10 There is evidence that supervisors comply with their duties under the Act and ensure workplace standards are followed
27.(1), (2)(c), Any regulatory contravention where the supervisor is the contravener.
114
Global Governance and Decent Work 101
11 There is evidence that workers comply with their duties under the Act and with the workplace standards
28., Any regulatory contravention where the worker is the contravener.
155
12 There is evidence that persons comply with their duties under the Act
37.(2), 62., Any regulatory contravention where a person is the contravener.
5
13 There is evidence that suppliers, architects or engineers comply with their duties under the Act
31., Any regulatory contravention where a supplier, architect or engineer is the contravener
8
14 Evaluation and Corrective Action
The workplace is inspected as required
8.(6), (7), (8), 9.(26), (27), (28)
95
15 The effectiveness of the IRS is monitored
8.(10), 9.(18)(b), (c), 10.(4), 25.(2)(e)
6
16 The employer responds to reports of occupational health and safety issues as required
8.(12), (13), 9.(20), (21) 4
Total Orders Issued 7160
Global Governance and Decent Work 102
While not an element considered as stop work orders are companion orders to contraventions enumerated above they are an indication on their own of the failure of the IRS to identify a serious hazard so they are counted here
57.(6), (8) 4285
(MOL, 2014a).