30 September 1997

Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for

Noncombatant EvacuationOperations

Joint Pub 3-07.5

PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication provides tactics,techniques, and procedures to guidecombatant commanders and their subordinatejoint force and component commanders inpreparing for and conducting noncombatantevacuation operations. Specific informationon how forces might be employed is provided.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine andselected joint tactics, techniques, andprocedures (JTTP) to govern the jointactivities and performance of the ArmedForces of the United States in joint operationsand provides the doctrinal basis for USmilitary involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other joint forcecommanders and prescribes doctrine andselected tactics, techniques, and proceduresfor joint operations and training. It providesmilitary guidance for use by the Armed Forcesin preparing their appropriate plans. It is notthe intent of this publication to restrict theauthority of the joint force commander (JFC)from organizing the force and executing themission in a manner the JFC deems mostappropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques,and procedures and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of these commands. Theseprinciples and guidance also may apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attachedto forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP)will be followed except when, in the judgmentof the commander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

DENNIS C. BLAIRVice Admiral, US NavyDirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER IOVERVIEW

• Introduction .............................................................................................................. I-1• Terminology............................................................................................................. I-2• Special Nature of Evacuation Operations.................................................................. I-2• Operational Environments........................................................................................ I-3• Military Planning and Forces................................................................................... I-4

CHAPTER IIUS ORGANIZATIONS AND FOREIGN AGENCIES: THEIR ROLES,COORDINATION, AND INTERACTION

• Introduction ............................................................................................................. II-1• Role of the Department of State............................................................................... II-1• US Embassy Representatives................................................................................... II-2• Other Agencies........................................................................................................ II-4• US Military Commands........................................................................................... II-6• Private Voluntary Organizations, Nongovernmental Organizations,

and Regional and International Organizations..................................................... II-7

CHAPTER IIICOMMAND AND CONTROL

• Introduction ........................................................................................................... III-1• Command Relationships........................................................................................ III-1• National Command Authorities and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff..... III-3• Joint Task Force Organization............................................................................... III-6

CHAPTER IVCONTINGENCY AND PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

• US Embassy and Consulate Plans.......................................................................... IV-1• Military Planning — Combatant Command Plans................................................ IV-1• National Imagery and Mapping Agency................................................................ IV-1• Defense Intelligence Agency.................................................................................. IV-2• Atlantic Intelligence Command and Joint Intelligence Center Pacific................... IV-2• Notification Procedures.......................................................................................... IV-3• Notification Phases................................................................................................ IV-4• Personnel Assignments and Identification............................................................. IV-5• Coordination With Senior In-Country Military Officials....................................... IV-7

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• Embassy Security and Operations.......................................................................... IV-7

CHAPTER VEMPLOYMENT AND EVACUATION OPERATION PROCEDURES

• Implementation of Evacuation Plan........................................................................ V-1• Advance Party......................................................................................................... V-1• JTF Main Body Organization and Missions............................................................ V-8• General Considerations.......................................................................................... V-12

CHAPTER VIEVACUEE PROCESSING

• Evacuation Control Center.................................................................................... VI-1• Evacuation Control Center Flow Chart.................................................................. VI-1• Evacuee Processing................................................................................................ VI-1• ECC Processing Center......................................................................................... VI-3• Classification, Priorities, and Consideration for Evacuees..................................... VI-7

CHAPTER VIIINTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE AND TEMPORARY SAFE HAVEN OPERATIONS

• Intermediate Staging Base.................................................................................... VII-1• Temporary Safe Haven Site................................................................................... VII-3• Organization and Functions.................................................................................. VII-3

APPENDIX

A Rules of Engagement and the Law of Armed Conflict..................................... A-1B Legal Considerations........................................................................................ B-1C Psychological Operations Considerations......................................................... C-1D NEO Planning Guidance................................................................................. D-1E Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists...................................................... E-1F Sample Forms Notice....................................................................................... F-1G References....................................................................................................... G-1H Administrative Instructions............................................................................. H-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms................................................................. GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions............................................................................ GL-4

FIGURE

I-1 DOS-DOD Policy Objectives Concerning Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens Abroad............................................ I-1

I-2 Operational Environments............................................................................. I-3I-3 Joint Task Force Commander Responsibilities................................................ I-5

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II-1 Members of the Country Team...................................................................... II-5III-1 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)/Repatriation Operations

Organization Chain of Command.......................................................... III-2IV-1 Contents of Emergency Action Plans.......................................................... IV-2IV-2 Notification Phases..................................................................................... IV-4V-1 Forward Command Element Tasks.............................................................. V-7V-2 Joint Task Force Main Body......................................................................... V-9VI-1 Evacuation Control Center Flow Chart........................................................ VI-2VI-2 Classifications of Evacuees......................................................................... VI-8VII-1 Advantages of an Intermediate Staging Base.............................................. VII-1F-1 Sample Stand Fast Notice.............................................................................. F-1F-2 Sample Leave Commercial Notice................................................................. F-2F-3 Sample Evacuation Notice............................................................................. F-3F-4 Sample Embassy/Post Closing Notice........................................................... F-5F-5 Sample Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity.................................................... F-6

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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Noncombatant evacuationoperations (NEOs) havehumanitarian, military,and political implications.

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are conductedto assist the Department of State (DOS) in evacuatingnoncombatants, nonessential military personnel, selectedhost-nation citizens, and third country nationals whose livesare in danger from locations in a host foreign nation to anappropriate safe haven and/or the United States. NEOs usuallyinvolve swift insertions of a force, temporary occupation ofan objective, and a planned withdrawal upon completion ofthe mission. During NEOs, the US Ambassador is the seniorauthority for the evacuation and is ultimately responsible forthe successful completion of the NEO and the safety of theevacuees. The Ambassador speaks with the authority of thePresident and serves as direct representative on site.Evacuation operations are characterized by uncertaintyand may be directed without warning; situational awarenessand correct appraisal of the changing political and militaryenvironment are key factors in noncombatant evacuationplanning. Alternative plans should be developed forpermissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. Thegeographic combatant commanders are responsible for

Discusses Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures forNoncombatant Evacuation Operations

Explains the Roles, Coordination, and Interaction between USOrganizations and Foreign Agencies

Outlines Command, Control, and Communications

Provides Contingency and Predeployment PlanningConsiderations

Covers Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures

Discusses Evacuee Processing

Explains Intermediate Staging Bases and/or Temporary SafeHaven Operations

Overview

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At all levels, Departmentof Defense andDepartment of State(DOS) personnel need tocooperate to execute theNEO successfully.

The DOS, acting on theadvice of the Ambassador,determines whenevacuation of designatedpersonnel will take place.

planning and conducting NEOs to assist the DOS. Oncerequested, approved, and directed, the combatant commanderwill order supporting, assigned, and/or attached forces toconduct evacuation operations. It is imperative that theAmbassador’s evacuation plan and the joint force commander’s(JFC’s) plan for the NEO be supportive, coordinated, and fullyintegrated.

While the protection of US citizens being evacuated remainsparamount, NEOs will probably be conducted in anenvironment where political concerns and constraints are keyconsiderations. The Washington Liaison Group ensures thenational-level coordination of planning and implementationof plans of the DOS and the combatant commanders for theprotection or evacuation of noncombatants abroad. TheRegional Liaison Groups ensure coordination of planningin the field and provide advice and guidance in planning andexecuting NEOs. The Emergency Action Committee is thefocal point for DOS and Department of Defense evacuationsite interface while briefing, coordinating, and planningfor the evacuation. The US Embassy representatives includethe Ambassador, deputy chief of mission, security assistanceofficer, chief of station, Defense Attache Office, administrationofficer, political officer, commercial and/or economic officer,consular officer, regional medical officer, regional securityofficer, public affairs officer, US Marine Corps security guard,Country Team, and other agencies outside the DOS. US militarycommands, private voluntary organizations, nongovernmentalorganizations, and international organizations often require andprovide assistance, and such assistance should be coordinatedduring a NEO crisis.

Normally, an evacuation starts with the Embassyemergency action plan (EAP), using scheduled airlines,chartered flights, or surface transportation. Due to timeconstraints and the unusual command relationship withrespect to NEOs, operational planning and decision makingmust be based on a foundation of common understandingof perspectives concerning the situation, mission, objectives,

Command, Control, and Communications

US Organization and Foreign Agencies:Their Roles, Coordination, and Interaction

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Executive Summary

procedures, and free exchange of information. Consultationsbetween the Ambassador and the JFC as well as clear directionto personnel are required in the planning and execution ofNEOs. Guidance to the geographic combatant commandersby higher authority is provided in the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff Warning Orders, which normally coverareas of key concern to the National Command Authoritiesand provide the theater combatant commander with anoverview of the political context within which the NEO isbeing considered.

Although a single-Service or Service department may be taskedto conduct a NEO, a joint task force (JTF) may also be formedto conduct a NEO. When a JTF is formed, the commander,JTF (CJTF) is responsible for all phases of the militaryoperation including intermediate staging bases (ISBs) andtemporary safe havens. The CJTF has full authority toorganize all elements of assigned and attached forces asnecessary, including composition of the JTF; the organizationof the JTF’s headquarters, staff, location, and facilities; andcommunication considerations and responsibilities. Otherforces may operate in support of or under the tactical controlof the JTF, as directed by the combatant commander.

The Ambassador is responsible for the preparation andmaintenance of EAPs. The combatant commander isresponsible for reviewing and commenting on EAPs whilesupporting the Ambassador’s planning and ensuring that theEAP is accurate and adequate to support military operations.EAPs include the following information: evacuation sites;anticipated number of evacuees; assembly areas and majorsupply routes; command posts; key personnel; description ofthe Embassy communication system, transportation fleet, andwarden system; quantity of Class I supplies on hand at theEmbassy; and standard map products of the local area, withannotations identifying critical landmarks. The emergencyplanning handbook is a consolidated source of guidancefor foreign service posts for planning and dealing with certainemergency situations. In situations where evacuationoperations in a hostile environment are required, the provisionsof Joint Pub 3-18, “Joint Doctrine for Forcible EntryOperations,” will apply.

Once tasked, thecombatant commanderdecides how the commandshould conduct theproposed NEO.

US Embassies andconsulates are required tohave emergency actionplans for the area undertheir cognizance.

Contingency and Predeployment Planning Considerations

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The military is most often viewed as the last resort in aseries of evacuation options, and it is important for the CJTFand JTF staff to understand this role when preparing a plan forthe evacuation. Operations at the evacuation site are clearlydelineated between those performed by DOS personnel andthose performed by the JTF, yet on occasion these functionsmay be interchanged. Once the Secretary of State approvesan evacuation, the chief of mission (COM) has the authority toimplement the plan in a crisis. As early as possible in theplanning, the JFC forms the advance party and requestspermission to send it to the site of the operation. The advanceparty may consist of two elements: the forward commandelement (FCE) and the evacuation site party. The FCEcoordinates with in-country DOS personnel and host countryauthorities and establishes a communication link among theCJTF, geographic combatant commander, and DOS. Theevacuation site party conducts reconnaissance to evaluate,validate, and confirm assembly areas and evacuation sites. TheCJTF, in conjunction with the Ambassador or his designatedrepresentative, determines the size and composition of the FCEand evacuation site party.

As the advance party rejoins the main body, the JTF may consistof a command and control element, marshalling element,security element, logistic element, and special operationsforces. The size of the JTF depends on the number ofevacuees, evacuation sites, assembly areas, and the tacticalsituation. During evacuation operations, it may be difficultor impossible to insert and establish the support functions forthe JTF, but medical, dental, joint rescue, mortuary affairs,public affairs, psychological operations, civil affairs, specialoperations, and information operations must be planned,coordinated, and implemented.

The evacuation control center (ECC) supports the DOS,which conducts processing, screening, and selected logisticfunctions associated with emergency evacuation ofnoncombatants. Size and composition of the ECC will bedetermined by the number of evacuees, evacuationenvironment, and location of the evacuation area. Of

In the total evacuationprocess, the military playsa key supporting role inplanning and conductingthe operation.

After insertion of the jointforce commander’s mainbody, each componentprepares for its part in theoperation.

Evacuee processing maytake place in country at anair terminal, onboardship, or at a temporarysafe haven site.

Evacuee Processing

Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures

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Executive Summary

primary importance is the nature of the emergency causing theevacuation; it may be a natural, political, or military one. TheJTF’s primary duty is to assist the COM in protecting andevacuating the evacuees. This duty may include providingsecurity and other support in caring for the evacuees asrequested. Shelter, safety, interpreters, local immigration,embassy, support liaison, and medical personnel should bepresent during processing. The three guiding principles forany ECC are accuracy (everyone is accounted for), security,and speed (processing is accomplished quickly andefficiently). For organizational purposes all evacuees receivea number priority and classification designator in order toensure the smooth execution of the operation. The JFC staffshould keep abreast of changes in the total number of potentialevacuees by receiving periodic updates from the Embassy staff.

Use of an ISB during deployment provides the JFC manyadvantages over deploying directly from the home station.The ISB may be located in another country close to where theevacuation is taking place or may be any ship under UScontrol. The ISB becomes more important as the distancefrom the home station and the likelihood of hostilities increase.When an ISB is located in a country other than the UnitedStates, the DOS is responsible for coordinating with thegovernment of that country. Since ISBs are typically airfieldsor seaports, the geographic combatant commander needs tobe aware of on-hand information related to facilities and sitesbeing considered as likely ISBs.

A temporary safe haven, designated by the DOS andcontrolled by the CJTF, is a location in an area or country towhich evacuees may be moved quickly and easily; ideally, thesafe haven would be in the United States. On occasion anintermediate safe haven may be needed, such as a US Navyship, yet evacuees should be removed from the ship to land-based safe havens as quickly as possible. Coordination forthe use of facilities, customs requirements, security,transportation, and billeting is required. A limited securityforce can provide necessary internal and perimetersecurity and consist of command groups, reception teams,processing teams, comfort teams, scheduling teams, militarypay and allowance teams, and security teams.

Ideally, the intermediatestaging base will alsofunction as a temporarysafe haven, if one isrequired.

Intermediate Staging Base and/or Temporary Safe Haven Operations

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CONCLUSION

This publication provides tactics, techniques, and proceduresto guide combatant commanders, CJTFs, and their subordinatecomponent commanders in preparing for and conducting aNEO. Specific information on how forces might be employedis provided. This publication is applicable across the range ofmilitary operations and in any operational environment.

CHAPTER IOVERVIEW

1. Introduction

Noncombatant evacuation operations(NEOs) are conducted to assist theDepartment of State (DOS) in evacuatingnoncombatants and nonessential militarypersonnel from locations in a foreign nationto an appropriate safe haven in the UnitedStates or overseas. A NEO is conducted toevacuate US citizens whose lives are in danger.NEOs also may include the evacuation ofselected citizens of the host nation (HN) or thirdcountry nationals (TCNs).

“Man has two supreme loyalties — to country and to family. . . So long astheir families are safe, they will defend their country, believing that by theirsacrifice they are safeguarding their families also. But even the bonds ofpatriotism, discipline, and comradeship are loosened when the family itselfis threatened.”

B.H. Liddell HartSherman, 1927

a. US Policy. Pursuant to Executive Order12656, the DOS is responsible for theprotection or evacuation of US citizens andnationals abroad and for safeguardingtheir overseas property abroad. This orderalso directs the Secretary of Defense to adviseand assist the Secretary of State (SECSTATE)in preparing and implementing plans for theprotection, evacuation, and repatriation of UScitizens. The US policy has resulted in aDOS-DOD policy memorandum ofunderstanding, the objectives of which aresummarized in Figure I-1.

Figure I-1. DOS-DOD Policy Objectives Concerning Protection and Evacuation of USCitizens and Designated Aliens Abroad

DOS-DOD POLICY OBJECTIVES CONCERNINGPROTECTION AND EVACUATION OF US

CITIZENS AND DESIGNATED ALIENS ABROAD

Provide for their protection, evacuation to and welfarein a safe area

Reduce to a minimum the number subject to risk ofdeath and/or seizure as hostages

Reduce to a minimum the number in probable oractual combat areas

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b. Characteristics. N E O s h a v ehumanitarian, military, and politicalimplications. NEOs usually involve swiftinsertion of a force, temporary occupationof an objective, and a planned withdrawalupon completion of the mission.

2. Terminology

For the purpose of simplification, the term“Ambassador” is used throughout thispublication. An Ambassador is a diplomaticagent of the highest rank. Variations of thetitle Ambassador or other titles referring tothe senior DOS diplomatic agent or chief ofmission (COM) (e.g., charge d’affaires, consulgeneral) at a particular diplomatic post couldbe interchanged throughout this publicationand not change its relevancy.

3. Special Nature of EvacuationOperations

The command and control structure andthe political factors involved in timing theexecution of the military support of NEOsmake them different from other militaryoperations. During NEOs the US Ambassador,not the combatant commander orsubordinate joint force commander (JFC), isthe senior United States Government(USG) authority for the evacuation and, assuch, is ultimately responsible for thesuccessful completion of the NEO and thesafety of the evacuees. The decision toevacuate an embassy and the order to executea NEO is political. US foreign policyobjectives are the determining factor in the

timing of an evacuation. The order toevacuate may not be given at the mostopportune time, but rather may be delayeduntil the last possible moment to avoid actionsthat may be viewed as a tacit admission ofpolitical failure.

a. The geographic combatant commandermay decide to create a joint task force(JTF) to conduct NEO. When the commanderof a JTF (CJTF) is designated, the commandershould be prepared to deal with the situation as itexists at the time of evacuation.

b. If a CJTF is already conductingoperations other than a NEO and issubsequently tasked with accomplishing aNEO, the CJTF may task the NEO missionto a component commander.

c. Rules of engagement (ROE) may besuch that the CJTF should be prepared toprotect personnel (military and evacuees) froma wide variety of threats while not having theauthority to preempt hostile actions byproactive military measures. The CJTFinfluences the ROE to provide maximumflexibility to the JTF so as to not undulyrestrain use of force. The CJTF should begiven sufficient ROE to ensure the successfulaccomplishment of the mission. ROE mustensure that the military commander has theauthority to protect civilians whiledemonstrating restraint and, whenappropriate, using force proportional to thethreat. See Appendix A, “Rules ofEngagement and the Law of Armed Conflict,”for additional guidance concerning ROE.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUA TION OPERATIONS

The United States Government is responsible for protecting the lives and safetyof its citizens abroad. Often, that task falls to our Armed Forces. Whenconditions of violence or disorder in foreign countries threaten American lives,United States forces, in support of the Department of State, will use allappropriate means to extract American citizens promptly and safely.

SOURCE: National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995

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• Dissemination and use of clearlydefined ROE are critical. Although theobjectives (political and military) are notto destroy enemy forces, and armedconflict should be avoided wheneverpossible, an appropriate and proportionaluse of force may become necessary. ROEmust be as precise as practical; however,ROE must never deny the use ofappropriate self-defense measures.

• Upon arrival in country, the JFC shall,if practicable, discuss the ROE with theAmbassador. Modifications to the ROEmust be made and approved by theappropriate authorities, via the supportedcombatant commander.

4. Operational Environments

See Figure I-2.

Evacuation operations are characterizedby uncertainty and may be directedwithout warning because of sudden changesin a country’s government, reorientedpolitical or military relationships with theUnited States, or a sudden hostile threat toUS citizens from a force within or externalto a host country. The key factors innoncombatant evacuation planning aresituational awareness, a correct appraisaland understanding of the changing politicaland military environment in which the JTFwill operate, and preparation of the

evacuation force for a situation that mayrapidly move from permissive to uncertainor hostile. Alternative plans should bedeveloped for permissive, uncertain, andhostile environments.

a. Permissive Environment. Under thiscondition, no resistance to evacuationoperations is expected, and thus theoperation would require little or noassembly of combat forces in country.Evacuees may or may not have beenprocessed and assembled at designatedassembly areas, evacuation points, and sites.In such an environment, a JTF can expecthost nation concurrence and possible support.The JTF’s primary concerns may be logisticfunctions involving emergency medicaltreatment, transportation, administrativeprocessing, and coordination with the DOSand other agencies involved in the evacuation.A minimum number of security forces shouldbe used during the NEO. Nonetheless,discreet, prudent preparations should be inplace to enable the force conducting the NEOto respond to threats to the evacuees.

b. Uncertain Environment. Anoperational environment in which hostgovernment forces, whether opposed orreceptive to the NEO, do not have totaleffective control of the territory andpopulation in the intended area or countryof operations. Because of the uncertainty,the CJTF may elect to reinforce the evacuationforce with additional security units or areaction force. The ROE developed aredisseminated early to ensure that the JTF hashad sufficient training and is proficient inapplication of the ROE. Planning for NEOsconducted in an uncertain environment mustalways include anticipating the possibility forescalation to a hostile environment.

c. Hostile Environment. Personnel maybe evacuated under conditions rangingfrom civil disorder or terrorist action tofull-scale combat. Under such conditions,Figure I-2. Operational Environments

OPERATIONALENVIRONMENTS

PERMISSIVE

UNCERTAIN

HOSTILE

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the JTF must be prepared for a wide range ofcontingencies. The CJTF may elect to deploya sizable security element with the evacuationforce or position a large reaction force, eitherwith the evacuation force or at anintermediate staging base (ISB). In additionto normal functions associated with personnelevacuations (embarkation, transportation,medical, and services), the JTF may berequired to conduct a forced entry, establishdefensive perimeters, escort convoys,participate in personnel recovery operations,and perform the screening of evacueesnormally accomplished by DOS officials.

5. Military Planning and Forces

DODD 3025.14, “Protection and Evacuationof US Citizens and Designated Aliens inDanger Areas Abroad,” assigns theresponsibility to plan and conduct NEOsin support of the DOS to the geographiccombatant commanders. Actual evacuationassistance can only be provided upon therequest of the SECSTATE to either theSecretary of Defense or the President. Oncerequested, approved, and directed, thecombatant commander will order assignedand/or attached forces to conductevacuation operations in support of the

DOS and the US Ambassador. TheAmbassador is not in the military chain ofcommand, but as the senior US official onscene is responsible for the NEO andprotection of US citizens, citizens of the HN,or TCNs who have been designated forevacuation. It is imperative that theAmbassador’s evacuation plan and theCJTF’s plan for the NEO be supportive,coordinated, and fully integrated.

a. Military Response. Normally, theCJTF receives authorization from theappropriate combatant commander beforeusing any forces and facilities in a foreigncountry for protection and evacuation.However, if a CJTF receives a request fromthe Ambassador or responsible US diplomaticrepresentative to provide assistance and thedelay in obtaining authorization wouldjeopardize the safety of US citizens, the JFCconcerned should respond to the extentdeemed necessary and militarily feasible.

b. Force Options And ConsiderationsDealing With Multinational For ces. Forceoptions to conduct a NEO may first andforemost depend on the operationalenvironment in which NEOs will beconducted. Many forward presence or

As the operational environment dictates, the joint force commander may tasksecurity forces to assist in the evacuation of noncombatants.

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Overview

forward-deployed single-Service forcescan normally conduct a NEO in a permissiveenvironment. However, a NEO in anuncertain or hostile environment may requireformation and deployment of a JTF ordeployment of combat, combat support, andcombat service support forces. Inaddition to the operational environment,the HN’s support capabilities may play amajor role in determining courses ofaction for the conduct of NEOs. Thecombatant commander should consider aflexible force option that provides both earlyresponse to a developing situation and acapability to quickly expand should theoperational environment become hostile.To provide the smallest opportunity to apotential adversary, NEO forces enteringforeign territory should be kept to theminimum number required for self-defense and for extraction and protectionof evacuees.

• Command of the Joint Task Force.Military forces employed in a NEO maybe comprised of units from more thanone Military Department. Once orderedto support a NEO and following thecombatant commander’s decision toemploy a JTF, a CJTF will bedesignated to exercise overall control

of operations. The JFC is responsiblefor all activities, to include those shownin Figure I-3. (Joint Pub 5-00.2, “JointTask Force Planning Guidance andProcedures,” provides guidance forforming and employing a JTF.)

• Force Sequencing. Force sequencingis the phased introduction of forces intoand out of the area of responsibility(AOR) or joint operations area (JOA).Force sequencing provides the JFCwith the option to provide a flexibleand rapid response to a NEO throughemployment of forward-deployed forces,which may form the nucleus for a largertailored force to be deployed from anISB. Effective force-sequencing requiresdetailed knowledge of available Service,joint, and multinational militarycapabilities.

• Multinational Forces. In planning fora NEO, the Ambassador, combatantcommander, and CJTF may considerthe possibility of employingmultinational forces. However, theapproval for US participation in amultinational NEO will come from theNational Command Authorities (NCA).Under an emergency situation involving the

Initial planning

Deployment to an intermediate staging base

Conduct of all military aspects of the evacuation

Operations at the safe haven (if this mission isassigned)

JOINT TASK FORCE COMMANDERRESPONSIBILITIES

Figure I-3. Joint Task Force Commander Responsibilities

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safety of human life or the protection ofproperty, offers of voluntary service fromother countries may be accepted prior toNCA approval.

•• Any situation that would cause theUnited States to initiate a NEO wouldlikely cause other countries to reactsimilarly. It may be politically ormilitarily expedient to employmultinational forces in conductingthe operation. These may be either HNforces cooperating in the evacuation orthird nation forces whose citizens arealso threatened.

•• Other nations’ forces should not beintegrated with US forces unless political

considerations recommend such actionor in the event that the other nations’forces have trained and operated withUS forces, thus engendering therequisite confidence.

•• The use of multinational forcesin a potential NEO should be aplanning consideration. The actual useof multinational forces will be a politicaldecision made by the NCA. If seriouslycontemplated, detailed multinationalplanning and rehearsal are importantfactors in ensuring a successful operation.The difficulties of obtaining unity ofeffort within a multinational force maycause serious difficulties in a time-sensitive NEO.

“There are some militarists who say: ‘We are not interested in politics butonly in the profession of arms.’ It is vital that these simple-minded militaristsbe made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and militaryaffairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. Whilemilitary affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolateone from the other.”

Mao Tse-tung, 1937

CHAPTER IIUS ORGANIZATIONS AND FOREIGN AGENCIES: THEIR

ROLES, COORDINATION, AND INTERACTION

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1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the roles andresponsibilities of principal persons andorganizations, whether governmental, civil,international, or military, with whom the CJTFmay interact while planning or executing aNEO. Detailed information on this subjectis found in Joint Pub 3-08, “InteragencyCoordination During Joint Operations.”

2. Role of the Department ofState

At all levels, Department of Defense(DOD) and DOS personnel need tocooperate to successfully execute the NEO.This is most important at the Ambassadorand JFC level and includes their staffs and allother personnel. While the protection ofUS citizens being evacuated remainsparamount, NEOs will probably beconducted in an environment wherepolitical concerns and constraints are keyconsiderations. In most cases, the UnitedStates may not be actively engaged militarilyagainst the forces posing a threat to thenoncombatants. Military action maytherefore be limited by the situation. Politicalconstraints may also be imposed on theintroduction of military personnel into acountry prior to an evacuation operation, thushampering planning and preparation. TheJFC will fully support the Ambassador’splans and cooperate with DOS and

embassy personnel without compromisingmission requirements. The DOS andembassy personnel can keep the JFC fullyapprised of the on-scene conditions and areinfluential for coordinating actions thatgreatly affect the NEO. These actions includepolitical constraints on the JFC’s legal issues,agreements, rights, privileges, andimmunities (if any) within the HN, the ISB,and the safe haven.

a. Washington Liaison Group (WLG).The WLG is an organization chaired by arepresentative of the DOS. Representativesfrom the Department of Defense and otherappropriate departments and agencies of theUSG are members. Its responsibility is toensure the coordination of planning andimplementation of plans of the DOS and thecombatant commanders fo r t hep ro tec t ion o r evacua t ion o fnoncombatants abroad. Representatives onthe WLG are the points of contact for theirdepartments on all matters pertaining toemergency and evacuation planning.Through close coordination between thecombatant commander, Joint Staff, and theDOS, the WLG designates the ISB, temporarysafe haven, and repatriation site.

b. Regional Liaison Groups (RLGs).RLGs are established by the DOS and arechaired by that agency’s political advisers tothe combatant commanders. They meet asnecessary, on the recommendation of the

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WLG, to ensure coordination of planningin the field and provide advice and guidancein planning and executing NEOs. As a generalrule, each RLG covers all Foreign Service postsand embassies within the AOR of the combatantcommander with which it is associated. The RLGwill be kept informed of any crisis situation thatcould lead to an evacuation and will ensurecoordination of NEO planning betweenembassies and combatant commanders.

c. Emergency Action Committee (EAC).The EAC is the focal point for DOS and DODevacuation site interface. Another importantaspect of the EAC mission is to brief, coordinate,and plan for the evacuation or protection of USnoncombatants and certain TCNs or HNnationals in a crisis, whether by regularcommercial, chartered, or US militarytransportation.

3. US Embassy Representatives

Joint forces involved in NEOs shouldfamiliarize themselves with the duties of thefollowing positions normally found at USembassies and/or missions.

a. Ambassador. Appointed by thePresident, the Ambassador is the senior USofficial at the Embassy and reports to thePresident through the SECSTATE. Fullresponsibility for direction, coordination,and supervision of USG activities in thehost country rests with the Ambassador.During emergencies, the Ambassador isexpected to recommend evacuations on atimely basis when circumstances warrantsuch action. The decision to evacuate maybe initiated by either the DOS or theAmbassador. If an evacuation is initiated ata post, it will be based on extremecircumstances deemed as life threatening.However, the Ambassador’s authority doesnot include the direction or commandauthority over US military forces under

the command of a US military commander.The Ambassador may be correctly referredto as the COM.

b. Deputy chief of mission (DCM). TheDCM is the senior diplomatic official in theEmbassy below the rank of Ambassador. TheDCM has the diplomatic title of Minister,Minister-Counselor, or Counselor (dependingupon the size of the mission) and is usually acareer Foreign Service Officer. The DCMusually chairs the EAC meetings andcoordinates embassy staff. The DCM helpsensure that all US in-country activities bestserve US interests.

c. US Defense Representative (USDR).The USDR in foreign countries is anadditional duty title assigned to a militaryofficer serving in a specifically designatedposition. In most cases, this duty title isassigned to either the Defense Attache(DATT) or the security assistance officer(SAO). The USDR acts as the in-countryrepresentative of the Secretary of Defense,the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(CJCS), and the geographic combatantcommander, to provide coordination ofadministrative, security, and logistic mattersto USG officials for all DOD noncombatantcommand elements in the foreign country inwhich the USDR is assigned.

d. Security Assistance Officer. The SAOmaintains liaison with the HN military forcesand is authorized by law to perform certainmilitary functions with the HN military. Theadvance party forward command element(FCE) should coordinate with the SAO.JFCs should be cognizant that not allembassies have an SAO; rather, some mayhave a Defense Attache Office (DAO) or nomilitary personnel at all. In many countries,security assistance functions are performedwithin the DAO, and the DATT may alsoserve as the SAO.

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US Organizations and Foreign Agencies: Their Roles, Coordination, and Interaction

e. Chief of Station (COS). As the seniorintelligence adviser to the Ambassador, theCOS is an excellent source of informationon the country and the current situation.

f. Defense Attache Office. The DAO,which consists of one or more DefenseAttaches and support personnel, has themission of observing and reporting on themilitary and politico-military situation incountry. JFCs may find some of thisinformation particularly valuable duringplanning for the NEO. DAO personnel areactive duty military attached to the Embassyin a diplomatic status representing theDepartment of Defense. They may facilitateaccess to the daily embassy situation report(SITREP) and other written intelligence-related information. All military personnel,even those not assigned to the Embassy orunder direct control of the Ambassador,should normally coordinate their activitiesthrough the DAO. The DAO duties alsoinclude continuing dialogue with HN defenseofficials on military matters related to threatassessments, military intelligence, and in-country military capabilities.

g. Administration Officer. TheAdministration Officer is responsible forvarious activities at the Embassy compound,which may include security at small posts;running the commissary, motor pool, andmaintenance activities; and handlingmonetary aspects of embassy business,including foreign service national payroll,cash collection, and the budget. At a smallpost with no security officer assigned, theAdministration Officer assumes thefunctions of the post security officer andhas operational control of the Marine securityguard (MSG) detachment.

• General Services Officer (GSO). TheGSO works for the AdministrationOfficer and is responsible for buildings,grounds, construction, vehicles, andmaintenance.

• Information Management Officer( I M O ) . F o r m e r l y c a l l e d t h ecommunications project officer, the IMOruns the post communications center,processes and tracks all classified pouchmaterial, and oversees the computersystem at the Embassy. The IMO is thepoint of contact concerning thecommunication capabilities available atthe post.

h. Political Officer. The Political Officerreports on political developments, negotiateswith the host government, and representsviews and policies of the USG. The PoliticalOfficer maintains regular contact with hostgovernment officials, political and laborleaders, and other influential citizens of thehost country, as well as other countries’diplomats. The Political Officer is a majorcontributor to the overall intelligencepicture.

i. Commercial and/or Economic Officer.The Commercial and/or Economic Officeranalyzes, reports on, and advises superiors,DOS, and DOD personnel on economicmatters in the host country. Economicofficers also negotiate with the hostgovernment on trade and financial issues.

j. Consular Officer. The ConsularOfficer’s major role is to screen, process, andgrant US passports and visas. Otherresponsibilities the Consular Officer may beassigned include attending to the welfare ofUS citizens and administrative tasks such asmaintaining a census of US nationals withinthe host country. The Consular Officerprovides the requisite number of personnelneeded to screen documents of all potentialevacuees during a NEO and providesinstructions to any Evacuation Control Center(ECC) personnel needed to staff processingstations.

k. Regional Medical Officer. TheRegional Medical Officer is qualified for

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general practice and is trained to set up triage,trauma, and mass casualty operations. TheRegional Medical Officer may also advise theJFC on indigenous diseases and properprophylactic procedures for forces executingthe NEO.

l. Regional Security Officer (RSO). TheRSO is a DOS security officer responsiblefor the security functions of all USEmbassies and consulates in a givencountry or group of adjacent countries.The RSO provides direction to the MSGdetachment via the detachment commander.The RSO oversees the following personnel:

• Post Security Officer (PSO). Postswith no RSO have a PSO. The PSOhas general security duties at a specificembassy (or consulate) and is usuallythe Administration Officer.

• Mobile Security Division (MSD). TheMSD consists of DOS employees of theDiplomatic Security Service whorespond to crises in foreign countries.The MSD is trained to respond toincreased threats or critical securityneeds at an embassy, provide additionalsecurity, and provide immediateresponse to a security-related incident.

m. Public Affairs Officer (PAO). ThePAO is the Ambassador’s adviser concerningpublic affairs (PA), the director of the UnitedStates Information Service (USIS) in country,and overseer of US Cultural Centeroperations. If the situation permits duringan emergency, the PAO will be responsiblefor all press releases and inquiries forinformation directed to the Embassy. ThePAO usually speaks at press conferences thatthe Ambassador cannot attend. Plannersneed to identify a proposed point in time oractivity when the Department of Defenseassumes media responsibility from the DOS(before or during the evacuation process).

n. United States Marine Corps SecurityGuard Detachment. An MSG detachmentwill have a minimum of six Marines, with themaximum number assigned dictated byneed. The Marine Detachment Commanderis normally a member of the EAC and isresponsible to the RSO or PSO for internalsecurity, protection of classified material, andUS personnel. Administration control ofdetachment Marines is through the RegionalMarine Officer (RMO).

o. Country Team. The interdepartmentalCountry Team consists of key members ofthe US diplomatic mission or Embassy thatwork directly with the HN government. Itspurpose is to unify the coordination andimplementation of US national policy withineach foreign country under direction of theAmbassador. The Country Team meetsregularly to advise the Ambassador onmatters of interest to the United States andreviews current developments in the country.

• The Country Team members usuallyinclude those shown in Figure II-1.

• One aim of the Country Team focus isto direct attention toward identificationof potential sources of conflict andthreats to US interests in a country andto improve problems by introducingprograms designed to assist theeconomy, enhance medical care, andimprove the infrastructure of the country.

4. Other Agencies

During NEOs, the CJTF will probably berequired to coordinate with agenciesoutside the DOS. For greatesteffectiveness, coordination must begin atthe first opportunity and be properlymanaged via the embassy staff. Otheragencies that may have importantresponsibilities during NEOs include thefollowing:

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US Organizations and Foreign Agencies: Their Roles, Coordination, and Interaction

maintains liaison with all charitableorganizations capable of conductinghumanitarian assistance (HA). The agencycan respond to virtually any disaster abroad,with emphasis on humanitarian relief in theform of equipment and funds.

b. US Information Service. USIS helpsto achieve US foreign policy objectives byinfluencing public attitudes overseas. Theagency advises US departments outside thecontinental United States (CONUS) on thepossible impact of policy, programs, andofficial statements on foreign opinion. Itcertifies journalists within the HN and workswith the local, national, and international mediato get media coverage in the United States andelsewhere about the HN government and itsefforts. USIS will be interested in the impact ofthe evacuation on local attitudes and can aidjoint forces by fostering popular support for them.It uses a proactive approach to communicationto encourage constructive public support abroadfor US policy objectives and to unmask andcounter hostile attempts to distort or frustrateUS policies.

c. Department of Health and HumanServices (DHHS). By law (42 USC 1313)and Executive Order 12656, “Assignment ofEmergency Preparedness Responsibilities,” theDHHS is the lead Federal agency for thereception of all evacuees in the UnitedStates. DHHS personnel meet and assistevacuees at the US port of entry. TheEmbassy and DOS will coordinate DHHSassistance rendered to evacuees.

d. The Department of the Army, DeputyChief of Staff for Personnel is responsible forthe reception and repatriation of all DOD familymembers, non-essential employees and DODcontractors in accordance with DODD 3025.14,“Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens andDesignated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad.”

e. Immigration and NaturalizationService (INS). If the United States is

a. US Agency For InternationalDevelopment (USAID). USAID is a quasi-independent agency that f undsdevelopmental projects representing thenationwide efforts of the Country Team.Administratively, it functions within the DOSand operates under an administrator who alsoserves as the Director of the InternationalDevelopment Cooperation Agency. USAIDcarries out economic assistance programsdesigned to help people of developingcountries advance their productivecapacities, improve their quality of life,promote economic and political stability,and assist other missions in providing theHN with supplies and equipment toconstruct needed projects. USAID

Figure II-1. Members of theCountry Team

MEMBERS OF THECOUNTRY TEAM

Ambassador

Deputy Chief of Mission

Chief of Political Section

US Defense Representative

Security Assistance Officer

Defense Attaché Officer

Consular Officer

Administration Officer

Chief of Station

Commercial and/orEconomics Officer

Regional Security Officer

Regional Medical Officer

US Information ServiceRepresentative

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designated as the safe haven, the INS maymeet evacuees at the port of entry. INSrepresentatives in country can assist inidentifying the foreign nationals to beevacuated. Responsibilities of the INSinclude the following:

• Facilitate the entry of legally admissiblepersons as visitors or as immigrants tothe United States.

• Grant benefits under theImmigration and Nationality Act,including those seeking permanentresident status or naturalization.

• Prevent unlawful entry into the UnitedStates.

• Apprehend and remove persons whoseentry is illegal or not in the best interestof the United States.

5. US Military Commands

a. Geographic Combatant Commanders.The geographic combatant commanders havedeveloped general contingency plans for thesupport of the DOS should such assistancebe ordered by the Secretary of Defense. Theseplans include support for the evacuation ofnoncombatants. When a situation developswhere US military assistance might be neededin a NEO, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff will designate the supported andsupporting combatant commanders forplanning purposes. Upon request by theEmbassy, the geographic combatantcommander in whose AOR the Embassyis located, and who is the supportedcombatant commander, will dispatch asmall advance liaison team to maintaincontact with the Embassy and coordinatethe initial military effort. The team willhave the communications equipment neededto maintain effective contact between the

geographic combatant commander,subordinate JFC, and the Embassy.

b. Special Responsibilities of theCommander in Chief, US AtlanticCommand (USCINCACOM) and Commanderi n C h i e f , US P a c i f i c C o m m a n d(USCINCPAC). Under conditions of a non-emergency evacuation, USCINCACOMand USCINCPAC are the safe havencommanders for DOD repatriation in theirrespective areas of responsibility.Additionally, USCINCPAC is responsible forrepatriation operations in Hawaii, Alaska,and US territories in the Pacific.USCINCACOM has delegated thisresponsibility to the Army componentcommander, Commander, US Army ForcesCommand.

c. Commander, US Coast GuardAtlantic Area, and Commander, USCoast Guard Pacific Area. Due to itsreputation as a humanitarian Service,the Coast Guard may be called upon toplay a vital role in certain emergencyevacuation situations. The relativelynonbelligerent nature of Coast Guardcutters and aircraft make them an optionin cases where a DOD presence mayexacerbate a potentially hostile situation.

d. Special Responsibilities of theCommander in Chief, United StatesSpecial Operations Command(USCINCSOC). As a member of the WLG,the special operations forces representativecoordinates with the DOS, the geographiccombatant commanders, and the Services toensure the adequacy and timeliness of specialoperations planning and coordination insupport of NEOs.

e. Regional Marine Officer. The RMO isthe company commander of the MSGs within aspecific geographic region.

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US Organizations and Foreign Agencies: Their Roles, Coordination, and Interaction

6. Private VoluntaryOrganizations,NongovernmentalOrganizations, and Regionaland InternationalOrganizations

Joint Pub 3-08, “Interagency CoordinationDuring Joint Operations,” provides asummary of private voluntary organizations(PVOs), nongovernmental organizations(NGOs), and regional and internationalorganizations (IOs).

a. PVOs and NGOs are organizationsthat may be in a country providing HA orre l ie f when an evacuation takes place.Approximately 350 agencies capable ofconducting some form of humanitarian

relief operation are registered with USAID.USAID publishes a yearly report, titled“Voluntary Foreign A id Programs,”that describes the aims a n d ob jec t iveso f the reg is te red organizations. TheJTF should be cautioned that personnelworking for these organizations cannotbe ordered to leave a country. However,they may be able to provide valuable up-to-date information as to the location of UScitizens. Some of these agencies may notsupport US goals. An early determinationof their position in relation to US policy isrecommended.

b. Regiona l and In ternat iona lOrganizations. IOs may provide assistanceto refugees during a US evacuation from aforeign country.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIICOMMAND AND CONTROL

III-1

1. Introduction

The Ambassador, with the approval ofthe Under Secretary of State forManagement, can order the evacuation ofUSG personnel and dependents other thanuniformed personnel of the US ArmedForces and designated emergency-essentialDOD civilians who are not under theauthority of the US COM. While theAmbassador cannot order the departure ofprivate US citizens and designated aliens, theAmbassador can offer them USG evacuationassistance. Normally an evacuation startswith the Embassy’s emergency action plan(EAP), using scheduled airlines, charteredflights, or surface transportation. Militaryassistance is provided in a variety ofcircumstances, not just when requirementsexceed the capability of the diplomaticmission. When the SECSTATE requestsmilitary assistance from the Department ofDefense, the request is directed by the NCAthrough the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff to the appropriate combatantcommander, who will initiate appropriatemilitary operations. When hostilities ordisturbances occur with complete surprise orappear imminent, the Ambassador mayinvoke such elements of emergencyevacuation plans as the situation warrants,including requesting assistance of theappropriate military commander, whilesimultaneously informing the DOS.

2. Command Relationships

Within the country, the Ambassador hasbeen designated as the responsible

“Your greatness does not depend upon the size of your command, but onthe manner in which you exercise it.”

Marshal Ferdinand Foch

authority for the operation. Subject to theoverall authority of the Ambassador,responsibility for the conduct of militaryoperations in support of an evacuation andsecurity of personnel, equipment, andinstallations within the JOA is vestedwith the JFC. Figure III-1 depicts the chainof command for a NEO.

a. Decisions During Planning. Due totime constraints and the unusual commandrelationship with respect to NEOs,operational planning and decision makingmust be based on a foundation of commonunderstanding of perspectives (politicaland/or military) concerning the situation,mission, objectives, procedures, and freeexchange of information. In those caseswhen significant differences between the JFCand Ambassador become obstacles to thesuccess of the operation, they are referred totheir respective superiors for resolution.

b. Consultation Between theAmbassador and JFC. In the course ofplanning and executing NEOs, theAmbassador obtains and considers theopinions and professional judgment of theJFC. This requirement, however, in no waylimits the Ambassador ’s overallresponsibility.

c. Direction to Personnel. All necessaryorders from either the Ambassador or JFCto corresponding personnel are, insofar aspossible, issued through the appropriatechain of command. In the eventcommunications cannot be established withhigher authority or if the situation

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Figure III-1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)/Repatriation OperationsOrganization Chain of Command

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS(NEO) / REPATRIATION OPERATIONS

ORGANIZATION CHAIN OF COMMAND

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT EXECUTIVEAGENT FOR REPATRIATION PLANS AND

OPERATIONS(DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR

PERSONNEL, ARMY)

SUPPORT MILITARY SERVICE BASES /INSTALLATIONS

CHAIRMAN OF THEJOINT CHIEFS

OF STAFF(NEO SUPPORT)

SUPPORTINGCOMBATANT

COMMANDERS

JOINT TASK FORCE(EXECUTION OF NEO)

FUNCTIONAL- SERVICECOMPONENTS/FORCES CINCPAC

(J - 1)EXECUTIVE

REPATRIATIONOPERATIONS IN

HAWAII, ALASKA,AND US

TERRITORIES INTHE PACIFIC

FORSCOM(G-3)

EXECUTIVEREPATRIATIONOPERATIONS INCONUS AND USTERRITORIES

OTHER THAN IN THEPACIFIC

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES

AMBASSADOR

DEPARTMENT OFSTATE

PRESIDENT

LEGEND

COMMAND

COORDINATION /SUPPORT

WASHINGTONLIAISONGROUP

DEPARTMENT OFDEFENSE

GEOGRAPHICCOMBATANTCOMMANDER

deteriorates to one of combat operationsrather than a NEO (regardless of theenvironment) and US lives are at risk, theJFC takes whatever action is necessary to

protect the lives of US personnel, informsthe Ambassador of actions taken, andrequests guidance through the DOD chainof command.

III-3

Command and Control

3. National CommandAuthorities and theChairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff

Guidance to the geographic combatantcommanders by higher authority isprovided in the CJCS Warning Order. Thisguidance normally covers areas of keyconcern to the NCA and provides thegeographic combatant commander with anoverview of the political context within whichthe NEO is being considered. The scope andobjective of US involvement in a developingsituation requiring a military response is oftenprovided in general terms to allow maximumflexibility in the preparation of appropriatecourses of actions (COAs). The CJCSWarning Order defines commandrelationships, the anticipated mission, and anyplanning constraints. The Warning Order alsoidentifies available forces and strategic mobilityresources and establishes tentative timing forexecution or requests that the geographiccombatant commander develop these factors aspart of COA development.

a. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff isresponsible for the following:

• When authorized by the Secretary ofDefense, coordinate the deploymentand employment of US forces in supportof NEO.

• Appoint the CJCS representative ofthe WLG to coordinate the executionof NEO responsibilities.

• Monitor combatant commanders andthe Military Services participation inthe protection and evacuation ofnoncombatants.

• Recommend to the Secretary of Defensetransportation movement priorities

and the use of the US TransportationCommand (USTRANSCOM) to provide theappropriate transportation resources insupport of DOS requests.

• As a member of the WLG, coordinatewith the DOS, combatant commanders,and the Services in the recommendeddesignation of temporary safe havens.

• When conditions of potential hazardwarrant, recommend to the AssistantS e c r e t a r y o f D e f e n s e ( F o r c eManagement and Personnel) that themovement of noncombatants intoaffected countries be suspended.

• Periodically evaluate overseascommand procedures for NEOs,particularly during scheduled CJCSexercises.

b. Secretary of the Army. Theresponsibilities of the Secretary of the Armyinclude the following:

• Appoint the Army member of the WLG.

• Act as the designated DOD ExecutiveAgent for repatriation planning andoperations, and coordinate within theDepartment of Defense and otherFederal agencies (as well as state andlocal agencies) in planning for thereception and onward movement ofDOD family members, nonessentialDOD civilians, US nationals, anddesignated aliens evacuated during aNEO.

• Establ ish and operate a jointreception coordination center (JRCC).

• As specified in the Joint Plan for DODNoncombatant Repatriation, manage allrequirements identified in support ofDOD noncombatants.

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c. Secretary o f t h e N a v y . T h eresponsibilities of the Secretary of the Navyare as follows:

• Appoint the Navy and Marine Corpsmembers of the WLG.

• Provide for the designation andtraining of port liaison officers.

• When requested, provide augmentationsupport to the JRCC, includingappropriate Marine Corps and (iftransferred to Navy operational control)Coast Guard assets.

• As required, provide support forevacuated Navy, Marine Corps, andCoast Guard noncombatants.

d. Secretary of the Air Force. Theresponsibilities of the Secretary of the AirForce are as follows:

• Appoint the Air Force member of theWLG.

• Provide augmentation support to theJRCC, when requested.

• As required, provide support forevacuated Air Force noncombatants.

“Fighting with a large army under yourcommand is nowise different fromfighting with a small one: it is merely aquestion of instituting signs and signals.”

Sun TzuThe Art of W ar,

c. 500 BC

e. Geographic Combatant Commanders.The responsibilities for the commanders ofgeographic combatant commands are asfollows:

• Prepare and maintain plans for theprotection and evacuation of US

noncombatants for whom the DOS andthe Department of Defense areresponsible in accordance with the DOSand DOD memorandum ofunderstanding.

• Cooperate with the Ambassador andprincipal officers in the preparation ofa consular or the Embassy’s evacuationplan, contained in the EAP.

• Appoint the military members to the RLGs.

• Review all DOS EAPs for countriesand consular districts in their AOR orwhere they might logically participatein NEOs. If during the review of EAPsany of the criteria are not met, correctiveaction should be requested via theappropriate Ambassador. Criteria toevaluate includes the following:

•• Adequate provisions to protect andevacuate noncombatants.

•• Accurate references to the use of USmilitary facilities.

•• Accuracy of specific planningguidance.

•• Distribution lists for subordinate andadjacent military commands and jointforces.

•• Procedures for periodic review.

• Provide guidance to the US DefenseRepresentative of the local EACregarding the inclusion of militarypersonnel in consular and embassy plans.

• Ensure that plans are prepared forevacuation of military personnel notincluded in the Embassy, staff, andemergency essential civilians operatingin support of combat units who will beevacuated after the NEO is executed.

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Command and Control

• When conditions of potential hazardwarrant, recommend to the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff thatmovement of DOD noncombatantsinto countries or areas be suspended.Also, recommend evacuation of DODnoncombatants if conditions warrant.

• I f t i m e p re c l u d e s a d e q u a t ecommunication with the DOS orDepartment of Defense and uponrequest of the Ambassador, provideassistance for the protection andevacuation of noncombatants. If timelycommunication with the Ambassadoror the senior DOS representative is notpossible, take proper actions necessary tosecure the safety of participating personnelas well as other US personnel and foreignnationals who request assistance.

• Upon request, provide updatednoncombatant population statistics forareas in which the Department ofDefense is responsible, through the RLG,to the WLG.

• Upon completion of an evacuationinvolving DOD resources or personnel,

provide the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff with an after-actionreport containing a summary of theactivities and recommendations forimproving future operations. AppendixF, “Sample Forms Notice,” provides anexample of the format to be used.

• Coordinate the request for, and thetasking of, common-user airlift tosupport the NEO. Strategic airlift andaeromedical evacuation (AE) missions arerequested through the Air MobilityCommand (USAF) (AMC) TankerAirlift Control Center. Theater airlift assets(if available to the theater) will be tasked tosupport the NEO upon the authority of thesupported geographic combatantcommander.

• In accordance with the mission andpriorities assigned by the USTRANSCOM,provide military sea transportation forthe evacuation of noncombatants.

• Maintain NEO packages (NEOPACKs)covering those nations or areas forwhich the combatant commanderwould be involved in emergency

The successful, safe, and orderly evacuation of noncombatants largely dependson the geographic combatant command’s ability to coordinate the operation withthe Department of State and supporting commands.

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operations. The National Imagery andMapping Agency provides a l lo r g a n i z a t i o n s w i t h N E Oresponsibilities with map NEOPACKs,which contain specific maps, charts, andother geographic material to supportevacuation planning and operations.

• Request assistance from US SpecialOperations Command when requirementsexceed the capabilities of the theaterpersonnel.

• Designate a JFC, as required.

f. US Special Operations Command.The responsibilities of the USCINCSOC areas follows:

• Prepare and provide special operationsforces in support of NEOs conducted bygeographic combatant commanders.

• Appoint the special operations forcesrepresentative of the WLG.

g. US Transportation Command. Theresponsibilities of the Commander in Chief,United States Transportation Commandinclude providing common-user airlift tomeet requirements as requested by the JFCand validated by the supported geographiccombatant commander.

4. Joint Task Force Organization

Once tasked, the combatant commanderdecides how the command should conductthe proposed NEO. If a JTF is formed toconduct a NEO, it will be established andorganized in accordance with Joint Pub 0-2,“Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),”

and Joint Pub 5-00.2, “Joint Task ForcePlanning Guidance and Procedures.” TheCJTF is responsible for all phases of theoperation to include the ISB andtemporary safe haven (if located outside theUnited States and within the JTF JOA). AnISB or temporary safe haven outside the JTFJOA falls under the responsibility of thesupported combatant commander. The NEOJTF is responsible for support and transportof the evacuees to ISBs and safe havensoutside the JOA. The CJTF has fullauthority to organize all elements ofassigned and attached forces as necessaryto accomplish the missions inherent in theevacuation operation.

a. Composition. The composition of theJTF is delineated in the order establishingthe force. The CJTF exercises operationalcontrol over assigned forces and normallyover attached forces through designatedcomponent commanders. Other forces mayoperate in support of or under tactical controlof the CJTF, as directed by the combatantcommander.

b. Joint Task Force Headquarters (HQ)Organization. The CJTF organizes the JTFstaff. The JTF HQ composition, location,and facilities may have a major influenceon what the CJTF and staff canaccomplish. An afloat JTF HQ may havelimitations that could affect staffing levels andequipment capabilities. A JTF HQ locatedin a neighboring country may not haverestrictions on space or amount of equipment.However, such a JTF HQ may encounterrestrictions resulting from increaseddistances, political sensitivities (of theneighboring country), and other types oflimitations.

CHAPTER IVCONTINGENCY AND PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

IV-1

1. US Embassy and ConsulatePlans

a. Emergency Action Plans. USEmbassies and consulates are required tohave EAPs for the area under their cognizance.The Ambassador is responsible for thepreparation and maintenance of EAPs, onesection of which addresses the militaryevacuation of US citizens and designated foreignnationals. The geographic combatantcommander is responsible for reviewing andcommenting on EAPs. EAPs are not tacticaloperation plans in the sense that military plannersthink of, but they are the reference materials thatsupport the formulation of an operation plan.The combatant commander should ensure thatthe EAP is accurate and adequate to supportmilitary operations. A copy of the EAP shouldbe on file and maintained at the appropriatecombatant commander’s headquarters. EAPsinclude the information shown in Figure IV-1.

b. Emergency Planning Handbook(EPH) 12 FAH-1. The EPH is a consolidatedsource of guidance for foreign service postsfor planning and dealing with certainemergency situations. The EPH serves as theprincipal reference for posts in preparing andrevising the EAP. Every foreign service postis required to have an operative EPH designedto provide procedures to deal with foreseeablecontingencies. This handbook provides adetailed agenda to be addressed by theAmbassador and the emergency team for

“The essential thing is action. Action has three stages: the decision born ofthought, the order or preparation for execution, and the execution itself. Allthree stages are governed by the will. The will is rooted in character, and forthe man of action character is of more critical importance than intellect.Intellect without will is worthless, will without intellect is dangerous.”

Hans von SeektThoughts of a Soldier

planning an evacuation operation. It alsoprovides a two-page “Military ImplementationChecklist” of questions most often asked bymilitary commanders and planners concerningan impending evacuation operation.Appendix E, “Sample Emergency Action PlanChecklists,” provides an example of achecklist for a US military assisted evacuation.

2. Military Planning —Combatant Command Plans

Most military plans emphasize thepredeployment phase of the operation becauseit is a period of intense planning andpreparation. Predeployment planning beginswhen the subordinate JFC receives thewarning order from the combatantcommander and lasts until the evacuationforce deploys to either an ISB or theevacuation site. Prior coordination with thestaffs of the geographic combatantcommander and Embassy can significantlyimprove planning for the JFC. Thecombatant command can provide the JFCwith information to begin planning, suchas the general contingency plans developedby the combatant commanders.

3. National Imagery andMapping Agency

The National Imagery and MappingAgency provides selected US missions withNEOPACKs containing specific maps, charts,

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and other geographic material to supportevacuation planning and operations.NEOPACKs are a vital element with whichall key individuals should be familiar.

4. Defense Intelligence Agency

The Defense Intelligence Agency providesthe DOS, selected embassy DAOs,appropriate military commands, and theServices with Contingency Support Packagesand/or US Diplomatic Facilities Graphics foruse in evacuation planning. Other intelligenceproducts that may be available and applicable

to the NEO include the Gridded ReferenceGraphic and the Contingency Support Study.Additionally, the agency is responsible fornational-level evasion and recoveryintelligence production.

5. Atlantic IntelligenceCommand and JointIntelligence Center Pacific

Both the Atlantic Intelligence Command andJoint Intelligence Center Pacific produce NEOintelligence support handbooks (NISH), whichcover most scenarios and countries in all the

CONTENTS OF EMERGENCY ACTION PLANS

Possible courses of action for different threatenvironments

Location of evacuation sites (landing zones, ports,beaches)

Anticipated number of evacuees (total number by area)categorized by medical status - categories include:

Persons not requiring medical assistancePersons requiring medical assistance prior toevacuation

Persons requiring medical assistance prior toand during evacuation

Persons requiring emergency medicalevacuation

Location of assembly areas and major supply routes

Location of command posts

Key personnel (name, location, and desired means ofcontacting them)

Description of the embassy communication system,transportation fleet, and warden system

Quantity of class I (subsistence) supplies on hand at theembassy

Standard map products of the local area, with annotationsidentifying critical landmarks

Figure IV-1. Contents of Emergency Action Plans

IV-3

Contingency and Predeployment Planning Considerations

theaters. NISH are all-source studies that directlysupport joint operational and tactical planningand are based on the DOS EAPs for embassiesand consulates. They consist of annotated aerialimagery and ground photos of embassy grounds,helicopter landing zones, assembly areas, airfields,and seaports, along with encyclopedic data.Information includes post emergencycommunications listing and country profile.

6. Notification Procedures

To develop a realistic evacuation plan, theJTF staff should know how long it will take toassemble the evacuees once the decision toevacuate has been made. Communication with

potential evacuees may be via a wardensystem, which is a communication planto notify individuals having access top r i va te telephones (wardens) andresiding in areas of concentrated USpopulation. A warden coordinator prepareslists of wardens and other contacts to coverareas of assigned responsibilities. Thewardens prepare, update, and maintain alist of phone numbers and addresses of UScitizens residing in their AOR. During anevacuation each warden receives and

distributes messages, keeping individualsinformed about the evacuation and otherrelevant information.

a. Shortwave Radio and CommercialTelephone. Frequently, US citizens and foreignnationals reside outside the large populationcenters (for example, capitals, large cities, andmilitary bases). Embassy contact with theseindividuals is often restricted to shortwaveradio and commercial telephone systems,which are seldom secure. Shortwave radioand commercial telephone should be used tonotify these individuals only if better meansare not available. However, only the minimumunclassified information necessary should be

transmitted. Significant delays can occur innotifying these citizens that an evacuationhas been ordered. This can result in one groupof evacuees being at the assembly area whileanother has yet to be notified of theevacuation.

b. Recall. In some cases, a recall systemfor embassy or consulate personnel is acitizens band radio system tied to atelephone recall. It is usually fast, reliable,and efficient.

Emergency action plans will vary considerably, depending upon the Embassy’sphysical characteristics, its proximity to populated areas, and its securityconfiguration.

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NOTIFICATION PHASES

DRAWDOWN

Authorized Departure

Ordered Departure

EVACUATION

Stand Fast

Leave Commercial

Evacuation

Embassy or Post Closing

c. Runners. In the event of a severecommunications outage, personnel acting asrunners may be the only way to pass information.

7. Notification Phases

Understanding the phases in whichpotential evacuees are notified is essential indeveloping a sensible evacuation plan. FigureIV-2 provides an overview.

a. Drawdown. The basic options fordrawdown are authorized departure andordered departure. The Embassy, referredto as the post, is required to prepare lists ofpersonnel to remain at the post in anemergency situation. The list of employeesto remain will include those needed to managean eventual evacuation of US citizens.

• Authorized Departure. The Ambassadormust request authorized departure statusfrom the DOS. Employees and familymembers who wish to leave the postmust obtain approval from theAmbassador. When the authorizeddeparture status is terminated, the officialevacuees must return to the post.

• Ordered Departure. The Ambassadormay determine that a situation hasdeteriorated to a point that familymembers and certain employees shouldleave the post for their safety. Ordereddeparture is not optional; familymembers and employees will be issuedorders to leave. When the ordereddeparture status is terminated, officialevacuees must return to the post.

b. Evacuation. The decision to evacuatepersonnel assumes that the decision todraw down, at least in part, has been made.When feasible, notification of potentialevacuees involves communicating via theestablished warden system. As a rule,written messages are more reliable than oralmessages and should be used whenever

possible. There are four notification phasesfor an evacuation.

• Stand Fast. When a country’s politicalor security environment has deterioratedand it is perceived that US citizens arethreatened, but an evacuation is eithernot required or is temporarilyimpossible, all US citizens arerequested to “stand fast” and are givenpreliminary instructions for preparingto evacuate the country. The Embassyidentifies the wardens and activates itsemergency action organization. TheEmbassy’s personnel review theevacuation plans, options, and supportrequirements, and the Ambassador mayconsider requesting military assistance.The combatant commander may directthe deployment of a liaison team, activatecrisis action response teams, and assigna subordinate JFC as appropriate. For asample “stand fast” notice, see AppendixF, “Sample Forms Notice.”

• Leave Commercial. Due to the gravityof the situation, nonessential US citizens

Figure IV-2. Notification Phases

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Contingency and Predeployment Planning Considerations

may be told to leave by commercialtransportation as soon as possible. Itis assumed commercial transport will beavailable and adequate. The followingother actions may take place. TheEmbassy’s internal security force may bereinforced by additional MSGs and/orState Department security personnel, orJTFs may be assembled to assist in theevacuation. The Ambassador mightrequest the deployment of a small JTFliaison team to the Embassy to assist inevacuation planning and in anticipationof the requirement for military assistanceto conduct the evacuation. For a sampleleave commercial notice, see AppendixF, “Sample Forms Notice.”

• Evacuation. The political or securityenvironment is believed to havedeteriorated to the point that the safetyof US citizens is threatened. With DOSapproval, the Ambassador orders thedeparture of the personnel listed belowin subparagraph 8b, keeping only anessential skeletal Country Team. TheEmbassy would assemble, document,and begin assisting in the movement of UScitizens and third and host country nationalsto designated safe haven sites. A mix ofcommercial charter, private, or militarytransport might be necessary, dependingon the availability of scheduled commercialtransportation. At some point in this phase,the Ambassador might request militaryassistance, either because the transportationmeans are inadequate or because of theseverity of the threat to the evacuees. Oncerequested, the combatant commander, upondirection from the Secretary of Defensethrough the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, commences military evacuationoperations. These may range from simpletransportation support to the deploymentof the JTF. A sample evacuation notice isprovided in Appendix F, “Sample FormsNotice.”

• Embassy or Post Closing. The situationhas deteriorated to the point that theEmbassy must close and all remainingUS citizens and embassy employees areevacuated. This does not include privateUS citizens and their dependents whodesire to remain in the country. A list ofpersonnel who cannot be ordered to departa country is provided below insubparagraph 8b. Military assistance mightnot be required until this phase of theevacuation. JTF operations could rangefrom removing the remainder of the CountryTeam to full-scale evacuation operations.A sample embassy or post closing notice isprovided in Appendix F, “Sample FormsNotice.”

8. Personnel Assignments andIdentification

The first question most often asked by bothdiplomatic and military planners is, “Who arethe evacuees, and how many of them will therebe in a crisis?” There are several groups ofevacuees, some of whom the Ambassador maydirect to evacuate and some whom theAmbassador cannot. Understanding howevacuees are organized, notified, and movedto assembly areas helps in determining thenumber of potential evacuees and assemblytime estimates.

a. Report of Potential Evacuees. TheReport of Potential Evacuees, also knownas the “F-77 Report,” identifies thenumbers of potential evacuees at eachembassy. Each embassy or consulate isrequired to submit to the DOS an annualreport, on 15 December, of the estimatednumber of potential evacuees in its area ofresponsibility. A copy of the most recentreport must be filed with the EAP.

• The accuracy of the report depends onthe general level of interest in thepotential for an evacuation. The fear

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that an evacuation may be required isoften the most powerful motivator to getan accurate evacuee estimate.

• These counts, however, are only yearlyestimates. The accuracy of the estimatewill vary with the speed and severityof the crisis. If the whole population ofa country suddenly perceives a deadlythreat, evacuee numbers and panicwill be abnormally high. Evacueeestimates will probably be fairlyaccurate if the period preceding theevacuation has allowed for an orderlyassembly of people who want to get outand the perceived threat at the time ofthe evacuation remains relativelyconstant. Note, too, that the estimate maybe high or low due to seasonally-dependent tourism.

b. Personnel Eligible For EvacuationAssistance

• The following categories of personnelare eligible for evacuation assistanceand can be ordered to depart.

•• US civilian employees of all USGagencies (except DOD employees ofmilitary commands who have beendesignated as “wartime essential”).

•• US military personnel assigned to theEmbassy (e.g., DATT, security assistancepersonnel, MSGs).

•• Peace Corps volunteers.

•• US citizens employed on contract toa USG agency if the contract so provides.

•• Family members of those above.

•• Family members of all other USmilitary personnel (command andnoncommand sponsored).

• The following categories of personnelare entitled to evacuation assistance,but cannot be ordered to depart. Ifthese individuals refuse to evacuate, theJTF marshalling team should obtain theirsignature on the “Waiver of EvacuationOpportunity” (see Figure F-5), whichshould be forwarded to the Embassy. Ifthey depart the country, they may returnat their discretion and at their expense.These personnel are as follows:

•• US citizens employed by non-USGorganizations (e.g., World HealthOrganization).

•• US citizens employed by or assignedto international organizations (e.g., UNDisaster Relief Coordinator, UN HighC o m m i s s i o n e r f o r R e f u g e e s ,International Medical Corps).

•• US citizens employed on contractdirectly by the host government, eventhough the contract may be funded bythe USG.

•• US citizens employed by privateentities, such as relief organizations, eventhough the employer may receive someUSG funding.

•• Fulbright grantees and US citizens incomparable roles.

•• Other private US citizens.

•• Family members of private UScitizens, to include alien spouses,children, and other bona fide residentsof the household.

• The category of non-Americansseeking assistance can be the largestand most difficult to control during afast-moving evacuation in an uncertainor hostile environment. The Ambassador

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should establish the policy identifyingwho will receive evacuation assistance.

9. Coordination With Senior In-Country Military Officials

The CJTF should establish and maintainclose liaison with the USDR, who is usuallythe DATT or the SAO. The USDR will beable to assist in the coordination of JTFactivities with the Embassy and to assist theCJTF in obtaining the Ambassador ’sevaluation of the situation. Additionally, theUSDR is able to provide information on thegeneral scope of in-country activities for allDOD noncombatant command elements,including missions, locations, organizations,and unique security requirements.

a. As part of the planning process, theCJTF prepares a commander’s estimatecovering the various options deemed feasibleand any pros and cons relating to each,including political constraints. The CJCS orcombatant commander Warning Order willnormally provide the CJTF with a concisestatement of the US national interests at stakein the NEO to include:

• The safety and welfare of US citizens.

• The continued stability of the localgovernment.

• The maintenance of a firm postureagainst terrorism.

• A demonstration of support forinternational commitments.

• The probable environment in which theNEO will be conducted.

b. The Ambassador should summarizethe political objectives and constraintsrelevant to the JTF’s assistance, thenuances involved, and any constraints onthe use of force that might be appropriate.

While these may be obvious to thoseintimately involved with the situation, theCJTF will be better prepared to complyeffectively with a request for help if thereasons have been clearly explained.

10. Embassy Security andOperations

Security outside the Embassy is theresponsibility of the host country, whilesecurity of the Ambassador and embassygrounds is the responsibility of the RSO.In many cases, US Embassies do not havesecurity forces or personnel. If security isprovided, the RSO has DOS securitypersonnel and a small MSG detachment toaccomplish this mission. During theevacuation, the MSG detachment personnelreceive their orders from the RSO, while JTFpersonnel receive their orders from the CJTF.JTF personnel do not receive orders from theRSO. These two chains of command canpotentially cause problems, especially when MSGpersonnel and JTF personnel work togetherduring the evacuation operation. It is vital thatthe JTF staff work out missions and chains ofcommand before the operation. The CJTF mustunderstand the Ambassador’s security plan andintegrate the joint forces as smoothly as possible.

a. The Embassy evacuation plans may notprovide for the embassy site to be a primaryassembly area or evacuation site. However,past experience shows that during times ofcrisis large numbers of US citizens, citizensof the host country, and TCNs will go tothe US Embassy. These people will befrightened and may want to leave the countrybut may not have been included in thenotification plan or could not reach thedesignated assembly area or evacuation site.Separate plans should be developed to dealwith these crowds, both as a threat to theEmbassy and as evacuees.

b. Local citizens wishing to volunteerinformation may arrive at the embassy

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perimeter without prior notice. Theseindividuals are called “walk-ins.” Embassieshave standing operating procedures (SOPs)on the treatment of walk-ins designed toensure quick and secure access to theappropriate embassy officers. JTFs must befamiliar with these SOPs.

c. In some cases local contract guardscontrol the perimeter of each embassy. Thesepersonnel are host country citizens who mayor may not be armed. Quality of the localguard force varies by country. Some localguards are professional and staffed withpersonnel who have proven their loyalty tothe Embassy’s staff. These local guards can

be very useful in assisting US forces assignedto perimeter security duty. Planning mustconsider that some or all local loyal contractguards may desire to be evacuated. Planningfor numbers to be evacuated should includethis additional group. In addition, in the eventthese guards desire to be evacuated at the lastminute, consideration must be made forreplacement security.

d. MSGs control access into criticalfacilities where classified material isprocessed and stored. MSGs have reactionplans to defend these facilities and destroy orevacuate sensitive material or equipment, ifnecessary.

CHAPTER VEMPLOYMENT AND EVACUATION OPERATION

PROCEDURES

V-1

1. Implementation ofEvacuation Plan

In the total evacuation process, themilitary plays a key supporting role inplanning and conducting the operation.Nevertheless, the military is most oftenviewed as the last resort in a series ofevacuation options. It is important for theCJTF and JTF staff to understand this rolewhen preparing a plan for the evacuation.It might be quite natural to assume that theevacuation is a unilateral military operationand prepare the evacuation plan in a vacuum,ignoring the COM’s requirements andperspective for the NEO. This is a potentiallyserious flaw in the coordination between theDOS and the military when preparing andconducting evacuation operations.

a. Evacuation Site Operations. Operationsat the evacuation site are clearly delineatedbetween those performed by DOS personneland those performed by the JTF. However,in cases of emergency the JTF should beprepared to perform functions that arenormally executed by embassy staff. Thisincludes an awareness of movement plansusing commercial and private aircraft, ships,and vehicles and all COAs being consideredby the Ambassador.

b. Authority to Invoke. Once theSECSTATE approves an evacuation, theCOM has the authority to implement theplan in a crisis. The DOS, acting on theadvice of the COM or Principal Officer, willdetermine when US noncombatants and

“A prince or general can best demonstrate his genius by managing [anoperation] exactly to suit his objectives and his resources, doing neither toomuch nor too little.”

Carl von Clausewitz

foreign nationals are to be evacuated. Whenunexpected violence flares up or appearsimminent and communications with the DOSare cut off, the COM or Principal Officer mayinvoke such elements of the plan and initiatesuch actions as the situation warrants.

2. Advance Party

As early as possible in the planning, theCJTF forms the advance party andrequests permission to send it to the site ofthe operation. The advance party mayconsist of two elements: the FCE and theevacuation site party. In a permissive oruncertain environment, the FCE should beinserted before any evacuation site parties.In a hostile environment, the Ambassador’sdecision will probably be to insert the entireNEO force to immediately commence theoperation. The FCE coordinates with in-country DOS personnel and host countryauthorities (when authorized by the DOS)and establishes a communication linkamong the CJTF, geographic combatantcommander, and the DOS. The evacuationsite party conducts reconnaissance todetermine and establish assembly areasand evacuation sites.

a. Preparation and Planning. Deploymentof the advance party depends on the mission,enemy, terrain and weather, troops andsupport available, time available, and politicalconsiderations. The least conspicuousmethod is for the advance party to arrivein the host country in civilian clothes oncivilian aircraft. This is possible only if the

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necessary passport and visa arrangements canbe made and the environment is permissive.An uncertain or hostile environment mayrequire forced entry. Use of military aircraftallows the advance party to carry additionalequipment that may be needed in setting upthe e vacuat ion s i te and establ ishingcommunication and liaison. The followingadvance party tasks should be accomplishedduring this phase:

• Request permission from the USEmbassy for the advance party to enterthe country. The number of FCEmembers allowed and the insertionmethod should be requested. AppendixF, “Sample Forms Notice,” contains asample of a notice that the Embassy canbegin to staff once released by the CJTF.

• Deploy as soon as possible, and inadvance of the main body, to allowmaximum time for coordination and todetermine external supportrequirements.

• Develop and brief a communication planfor the advance party.

• Acquire and review appropriate maps.

• Review the Embassy’s EAP and the EAPchecklists, examples of which areprovided in Appendix E, “SampleEmergency Action Plan Checklists.”

• Assemble and inspect requiredequipment.

• Develop and brief an escape and evasionplan for the advance party.

• Obtain visitor visas for all members ofthe advance party.

• Due to possible sensitivity of the politicalsituation in the host country, determine

whether the advance party should deployin civilian clothes.

• Consider weapon and ammunitionrequirements based on the threatassessment.

• Examine the need for specializedequipment; for example, ordnance toassist DOS officials in destruction ofclassified equipment and documents orsufficient satellite communications(SATCOM) systems to establishcommunications with the JTF orcombatant command headquarters.

• Determine the medical requirements.

• Identify translator and linguisticrequirements.

• Via the Embassy, request overflight andlanding rights for appropriate countries.

• Review all available intelligence on theproposed NEO; obtain assistance to fillgaps created by missing data.

• Assess news media interest in thesituation and activities of the JTF andits involvement in the evacuation.

b. Forward Command Element. TheFCE coordinates with the Ambassador andmembers of the Country Team forinformation and assistance. The FCEnormally submits SITREPs to the CJTF.When the main body enters the country,the FCE rejoins the evacuation force andcontinues operations with the JTF HQ.

c. Forward Command Element Composition.The JFC in conjunction with theAmbassador or his designated representativedetermines the size and composition of theFCE. The FCE may include the followingpersonnel:

V-3

Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures

• Officer In Charge (OIC). Provides directliaison with the senior DOS official at theEmbassy to ensure orders of the CJTF andthe desires of the DOS are accomplished.

• Intelligence Officer

•• Provides a conduit for intelligencedirectly from the Embassy andevacuation sites.

•• Coordinates with the DAO, COS, andRSO to provide the evacuation forceupdated intelligence estimates. The DAOcan facilitate access to the daily embassySITREPs and other intelligence.

•• Obtains information and intelligence,including NEOPACKs, to satisfy JTFintelligence requirements from the CountryTeam and other embassy sources.

•• Provides a signal intelligence functionwith equipment that is interoperable withthe rest of the communications detachment.

•• Considers the following whenevaluating the intelligence picture anddeveloping essential elements ofinformation and other intelligencerequirements: (1) Climatological, tidal,astronomical, and lunar phase data; (2)Intelligence on assets, characteristics,and capabilities of ports, airfields,beaches, helicopter landing zones(HLZs) and drop zones (DZs), and keyfacilities of the HN government forcommunications, utilities, and healthservices; (3) Identification of hostile andpotentially hostile forces, including localgovernment forces, rebel groups, dissidentforces, student groups, and unorganizedmob action, with the focus on location andcapabilities of potential threat forces tobecome organized; (4) Identification of anythird parties (i.e., external countries) thatmay attempt to hinder evacuationoperations; (5) Identification of friendly

third parties that could assist the NEO; (6)Potential for hostile infiltration of evacuees;(7) Satellite imagery of required areas (ifavailable); (8) Liaison with intelligencerepresentatives of other US, third country,and HN agencies as appropriate; and (9)Need for linguists to assist with debriefingsor conduct liaison with foreign nationalsas required.

• Operations Officer

•• Briefs DOS representatives on thecapabilities of the advance party and theJTF.

•• Answers operational questionsconcerning the evacuation plan. Briefsthe OIC concerning any information theEmbassy presents that may affect theevacuation plan.

•• Ensures that support is provided tomanifest noncombatant evacuees.

•• Assesses the requirement fordeployment of combat forces.

• Logistics Officer

•• Coordinates HN transportation assetsneeded by the advance party and JTF.

•• Arranges for supplies the JTF needsbut cannot bring (such as water, medicalsupplies, and rations).

•• Coordinates nonorganic JTF heavyequipment and materials handlingequipment support.

•• Provides on-site logistic assistance tofacilitate the evacuation.

• Communications Detachment

•• Sets up and operates necessarycommunications equipment.

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•• Determines areas of compatibilitybetween military and DOD and/or DOSon-site communications equipment.

•• Resolves any frequency problems thatmay occur.

•• Determines if HN communicationsequipment is similar to, or compatiblewith, US equipment.

•• Ensures that required single-channelcommunications equipment is plannedfor and deployed (high frequency, veryhigh frequency, ultra high frequency,and SATCOM).

•• Develops an understanding of theoperation of the host country’s phonesystem. Existing domestic telephonelines can be used to back up the militarycommunication systems. Althoughtelephone lines are not secure, manualencryption devices may be used to passclassified traffic and should be plannedfor. Telephone lines may be the mostreliable form of communication,especially to remote evacuation sites.Communications personnel shouldverify the serviceability of these lines,record numbers, and ascertain dialingprocedures for possible use duringexecution of the NEO.

•• Establishes positive communicationsbetween the diplomatic mission,geographic combatant commander, andCJTF. Communications must beestablished between the Embassy andCJTF so diplomatic and politicallysensitive situations can be controlled.

• Medical Team

•• Advises the FCE OIC of medicalconsiderations that affect the NEO.

•• Provides immediate medical assistanceas required.

•• Determines characteristics of theevacuation area that are related to the causeand spread of disease, such as terrain, soil,climate, animals, plants, sanitary standardsof the native population, and endemic andepidemic diseases present.

•• Determines the need for specialpreventive medicine units.

• Air Officer

•• Coordinates both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.

•• Determines air traffic controlrequirements.

•• Provides advice concerning thenumber and type of air assets required,the technical aspects of HLZs and DZs(including the type of security required),fixed-wing landing strips, and airevacuation routes.

•• Selects landing zones (LZs).

•• Provides interface for air-to-groundoperations.

•• Surveys air facilities for possible useto support follow-on forces for conductof defensive combat operations.

• Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Officerand/or Fire Support Officer

•• Identifies and confirms prospectivetargets to support the NEO (uncertainand/or hostile environments).

•• Coordinates targets with appropriateembassy personnel.

V-5

Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures

•• Provides initial terminal guidancesupport and supporting arms control asrequired.

• Public Affairs Officer

•• Advises and assists the OIC FCE onmatters concerning the news media.

•• Serves as a liaison between the FCEand embassy staffs for PA.

•• Works with the Embassy to publicizeevacuation efforts in an effort to generateconfidence in and a positive perceptionof the operation. This is alwaysaccomplished in close coordination withthe Embassy’s staff and within theguidelines of approved DOD PA policy.

•• Provides clear, concise, and timelyinformation through the combatantcommand PA staff to senior DOD PAagencies. Provides information to thePAOs at the temporary safe havensconcerning media opportunities prior tothe arrival of evacuees.

•• Provides security review of mediaproducts to ensure that operationalsecurity is not compromised.

•• Establishes an effective commandinformation program.

• Psychological Operations (PSYOP)Officer

•• Advises the FCE OIC on PSYOP-related matters.

•• Serves as liaison between the FCE OICand the supporting PSYOP organization.

•• Coordinates and monitors executionof PSYOP operations to support the NEO.

•• Coordinates with the JTF PAO,embassy PAO, and USIS Director toensure that themes and messages arecongruent.

•• Validates the PSYOP plan.

•• Obtains the Ambassador’s approvalfor PSYOP products and execution of thePSYOP plan.

• Civil Affairs Officer

•• Advises the FCE OIC on how tominimize population interference withevacuation operations.

•• Maintains close liaison with embassyofficials to ensure effective coordinationand delineation of civil affairsresponsibilities and activities.

•• Assists the JTF in accomplishing itsmission by obtaining civil or indigenoussupport for the NEO.

•• Assists embassy personnel inreceiving, screening, and debriefingevacuees.

• Joint Force Legal Adviser

•• Advises the FCE OIC on such legal issuesas may arise on scene in preparation for andduring execution of the NEO.

•• Reviews and assists in preparinginstruction packages on ROE, use offorce, use of riot control agents, applicablestatus-of-forces agreements (SOFAs),HN law enforcement practices, weaponsconfiscation, search and seizures, andcivilian detention.

•• Conducts liaison with embassy andlocal officials as required.

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• Explosive Ordnance DisposalTechnician

•• Advises the FCE OIC and embassystaff on bomb identification measures.

•• Inspects the Embassy and potentialECC sites.

• Unit Ministry Team

•• Advises the FCE OIC on any personalevacuee issues which may impact on theevacuation process.

•• Provides any required pastoral care.

•• Coordinates with other teams such asthe Medical Team.

•• Functions as the FCE OIC’srepresentative to local and evacueereligious officials.

d. Forward Command Element Tasks.Forward command element tasks are shownin Figure V-1.

e. Evacuation Site Party. The evacuationsite party identifies and, where possible,establishes the assembly areas, evacuationsites, and the ECC site. When the evacuationforce enters the country and the evacuationcommences, the evacuation site party becomesthe operations center and/or section of the ECC.Additional information explaining ECCoperations can be found in Chapter VI, “EvacueeProcessing.”

f. Evacuation Site Party Composition.The composition of the evacuation site partyis determined by the CJTF; however, the sizemay be limited by the Ambassador. It mayconsist of the following personnel:

• Headquarters Commandant or OIC.

• Operations Officer.

• Intelligence Officer.

• Communications and/or ElectronicsOfficer.

• Personnel Officer.

• Logistics Officer.

• Security Officer.

• Civil Affairs Officer.

• PSYOP Officer.

• Public Affairs Officer.

• Legal Adviser.

• Air Officer.

g. Evacuation Site Party Tasks

• Plan, organize, and establish the ECCin preparation for the main body.

• Provide direct liaison with the Chiefof the Embassy Consular Office.

• Maintain liaison with civilian or localhost government agencies involved inthe evacuation.

• Conduct ground reconnaissance ofproposed assembly areas, evacuationsites, beaches, HLZs and/or DZs,airports, and ports; obtain photographs,where poss ib le . To ensure thata i rcraf t configurations are taken intoaccount, the air officer will be fully awareof the requirements of potential pickupand delivery sites.

•• Recommend and/or confirm assemblyareas, evacuation sites, and HLZs and/or DZs. If required to move assemblyarea operations, coordinate approval withthe COM.

V-7

Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures

•• Prepare ini t ial evacuation sitedefensive plan and evacuation securityrequirements.

•• Plan and coordinate emergency AEoperations for evacuees with seriousmedical problems.

•• Plan and coordinate operations ofassembly areas and evacuation areaswith DOS representatives.

• Conduct initial preparation ofassembly areas and evacuation sitesto include the following:

Figure V-1. Forward Command Element Tasks

Initiate liaison with the diplomatic mission:Brief Department of State (DOS) representatives onthe capabilities and missions of the advance partyand the joint task force (JTF)

Establish a forward command post that can beexpanded to the JTF headquarters staff

Provide a continuing presence for planning and ensure acomplementary role with DOS personnel

Determine whether the operational environment ispermissive, uncertain, or hostile

Advise the commander, joint task force (CJTF) regardingthe size and composition of forces required. If specifiedin the initiating directive, determine whether the JTF isappropriate for the mission

Advise the CJTF regarding the time, place, and methodfor the arrival of the evacuation force

Determine existing political and sociologicalconsiderations

Determine attitude of the local population

Establish communications between the forwardcommand element and the CJTF:

Make the communication link to CJTF available tothe senior DOS representativeMaintain continuous communication for exchangeof planning data and intelligence

FORWARD COMMAND ELEMENT TASKS

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•• Clear minor obstacles.

•• Plan and layout assembly areas andevacuation sites.

•• Plan and provide for initial terminalguidance at beaches and HLZs and/or DZs.

• Collect essential planning informationthat includes the following:

•• Assessment of hostage threat.

•• Number and categories of evacuees.

•• Medical status of evacuees.

•• Temporary safe havens determined bythe DOS.

•• Political constraints.

•• Number of host country personneland TCNs to be evacuated.

• Assist DOS personnel with news media.

• Establish and maintain communicationswith the FCE and Embassy.

• Coordinate additional securityrequirements the HN police may beable to provide.

• During permissive NEOs, coordinate foroverflight rights. In uncertain or hostileenvironments, consider the need foroperations security and airspacecoordination prior to coordinatingoverflight rights.

• Initiate PSYOP operations.

3. JTF Main Body Organizationand Missions

A JTF “main body” will deploy to effect theon-scene evacuation process. After insertion

of the main body, each component preparesfor its part in the operation. As the advanceparty rejoins the main body, the main bodymay consist of an HQ, marshalling element,security element, logistic element, and specialoperations forces. The size of the main bodydepends on the number of evacuees,evacuation sites, assembly areas, and thetactical situation. Figure V-2 depicts the JTFmain body. Overall JTF organization willcomply with Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified ActionArmed Forces (UNAAF).”

a. JTF HQ. The JTF HQ coordinatesand directs the evacuation.

• Forward Command Element. TheFCE joins the evacuation force andcontinues operations with the JTF HQ.Effective liaison with the Embassy willbe made by the FCE.

• Liaison Team. The liaison activitiescontinue with the Embassy and otheragencies as required.

• Administrative Team. The administrativeteam joins the evacuation site party toform the ECC. The administrative teamis responsible for the smooth operationof the ECC processing center.Processing center operations arediscussed in Chapter VI, “EvacueeProcessing.”

b. Marshalling Element. The marshallinge l e m e n t m o v e s t o a n d s e c u re spredesignated assembly areas, bringsevacuees to the assembly areas, and escortsthem to the ECC. The size of the marshallingforce depends on the number of sites andevacuees.

• Marshalling Team. One marshalling teamcontrols an assembly area and evacuatesthe citizens in that area. The marshallingteam should be large enough to organizeinto two sections that consist of search

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Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures

squads and security squads. Searchsquads may not be needed if theEmbassy’s evacuation plan has beensuccessfully implemented and allevacuees have been notified. If it hasbeen determined that all evacuees havebeen informed, then search squadsshould not leave the assembly areaexcept in emergency cases.

•• The search squads locate evacueesand escort them to the assembly area.Each search squad should have aninterpreter and, if possible, a guide. Alost squad in a potentially hostile

environment can create significantproblems for the evacuation force.Interpreters may be required to assist thesearch squads in moving from theassembly areas and to locate evacueeswho are not at home or whose addressesare incorrect.

•• A security squad provides security tothe team during movement and in theassembly area.

•• Consideration should be given toattachment of one-to-three memberTactical PSYOP Teams, with their

Figure V-2. Joint Task Force Main Body

JOINT TASK FORCE MAIN BODY

ADVANCE PARTY

MAIN BODYJOINT TASK FORCE

HEADQUARTERS

JOINTCOMMUNICATIONSSUPPORT ELEMENT

LOGISTICELEMENT

COMMANDGROUP

LIAISONTEAM

ADMINISTRATIONTEAM AND/OREVACUATION

CONTROL CENTER

PROCESSINGCENTER

FORWARDCOMMANDELEMENT

MARSHALLINGELEMENT

SECURITYELEMENT

EVACUATIONSITE PARTY

LEGEND

COMMAND

COORDINATE

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organic loudspeakers, to the marshallingteams. The organic loudspeakers canfacilitate communication with the localpopulace a n d n o n c o m b a t a n tevacuees. Additionally, dependentupon the country, PSYOP personnel maybe able to provide interpreters.

• Marshalling Force Operations. Themarshalling team locates evacuees andmoves them to assembly areas andeventually to the ECC. The marshallingteam may have several search squads

under the control and direction of theteam’s OIC. The following should beconsidered during marshalling operations:

•• Sufficient transportation for the searchand/or security squads and evacuees. Allevacuees should be prepared to evacuateby helicopter, small boat or craft, and trackedor wheeled vehicles. Other considerationsinclude: (1) the use of local drivers, ifavailable, because of their experience andfamiliarity with the local road network; (2)availability of sufficient mechanics foremergency repairs; and (3) briefing ofmilitary drivers on the HN traffic laws andcustoms.

•• Movement control requires: (1)identifying primary and alternate routesand check points; (2) having local roadmaps available for each driver; (3)planning for convoy control and security;(4) identifying safe houses or areas ifvehicles break down or becomeseparated or lost; and (5) ensuring thatadequate communications equipment isavailable for convoys.

•• Assembly area operations include: (1)establishment of perimeter security, even

in a permissive environment; and (2)sufficient transportation available tomove evacuees to the ECC. Vehiclesbelonging to the evacuees may be usedto transport personnel to the ECC.

•• Search squad operations include: (1)obtaining a list of potential evacueesfrom the Consular Officer; (2) obtainingcopies of the instructions given to eachpotential evacuee; (3) having copies ofthe “Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity”readily available (see Appendix F,“Sample Forms Notice”) for evacueeswho refuse to leave; (4) briefing eachevacuee on the baggage limitations set

In accordance with mission priorities and available assets, noncombatantevacuation operations may use a number of transportation modes, to includesmall craft sea transportation.

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Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures

by the Embassy, positive identificationrequirements at the ECC, and restricteditems that may not be transported; (5)recording the name, sex, age, potentialmedical problems, and citizenship ofeach evacuee; (6) escorting evacueesfrom the vehicle parking area to the ECC(Evacuees may drive their vehiclesdirectly to the ECC, and searchpersonnel should note the individual’sname and intent); and (7) identifyingevacuees not on the list provided by theEmbassy.

c. Security Element. Security forces areused as necessary at the evacuation sites,ECC perimeter, LZs, aircraft, staging and/or parking areas, and landing sites for navallanding craft. Security forces can alsoprovide a reaction force if a marshalling teamor other unit encounters difficulty orrequires assistance. To determine the sizeof the security force, consider the following:

• Enemy threat to evacuation operations.

• Anticipated response of HN police, militaryforces, and other friendly forces in andaround the evacuation objective area.

• Crowd control requirements at each site.

• Number of evacuees.

• Number of marshalling and searchteams required to search for evacuees.

• Number of evacuation sites.

• Size of the ECC.

• Transportation available to cover theassigned areas.

• Personal security of the Ambassador.

• Type of resources used to evacuatepersonnel.

d. Logistic Element. The logistic supportprovided should be limited to the minimumessential support required for theevacuation. Consideration should be givento the following factors in determiningrequirements for logistic support of the JTF:

• Characteristics of the evacuation area.

•• Resources available: (1) existing andpotential facilities for support to the JTF,such as facilities for the storage anddistribution of supplies, transportationmeans, airfields, fuel points, medical facilities,medical supplies, and other facilities; and(2) food, water, fuel, and consumables.

•• Climate, weather, and terrain.

•• Number of evacuees and their needs.

• Potential threats to the evacuation.

•• Adversary and/or potential adversarystrength and activity.

•• Disposition and location.

• Strength and composition of the JTF.

•• Total troop strength.

•• Composition of the JTF in terms ofground, air, and naval combat forces,combat support, and combat servicesupport units.

•• Logistic support capabilities of eachcomponent and separate unit.

• Time constraints and duration of operation.

• Logistic support required by theEmbassy and evacuees.

• Availability and suitability of host-nationsupport (HNS) as an alternative todeploying US military logistic support.

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• Experience in conducting NEOs.

• Prearranged HNS and/or inter-Servicesupport agreements as appropriate.

• Capabilities and dependability of the HNtransportation system to provide rapidevacuation of combat and noncombatcasualties.

4. General Considerations

a. Medical and Dental. Duringevacuation operations, it may be difficultor impossible to insert and establish themedical support function for the JTFbecause of time and operationalconstraints. Comprehensive and detailedcasualty and medical support planning shouldbe implemented to cover immediate medicaland surgical treatment points. Special unitsorganized for this purpose may save lives andpermit a more expeditious evacuation.Depending on the size and scope of theevacuation operation, there may be thepotential for large numbers of both militaryand civilian casualties.

• The Theater Patient MovementRequirements Center (TPMRC) is a jointagency established to regulate and monitorthe flow of patients to medical treatmentfacilities. The TPMRC matches patients withthe most appropriate medical treatmentfacility based on patient needs and bedavailability in the area of operations.

• Primary casualty receiving and treatmentships (PCRTSs) may provide medicaltreatment resources offshore. The classesof ships with this capability include:

•• General Purpose Amphibious AssaultShip.

•• General Purpose Amphibious AssaultShip (with internal dock).

•• Amphibious Assault Ship.

•• Aircraft Carriers.

• AE is the movement of patients undermedical supervision to and betweenmedical treatment facilities by airtransportation. The Air Force isresponsible for operating a common-user, fixed-wing AE system. HQ AMC isresponsible for serving as the single AEproponent for the Air Force, managing andoperating the intertheater and CONUS AEsystems. Intratheater AE is a responsibilityof the geographic combatant commander.USTRANSCOM will task HQ AMC toprovide AE forces to strategic airfields intheater to evacuate casualties betweentheaters (intratheater) or from a theater ofoperations to CONUS (intertheater)reception airfields. Distribution of patientswithin CONUS from these strategic airfieldsis a HQ AMC responsibility. Intratheatercommon-user AE will be provided using acombination of theater-assigned AE unitsand/or deployment of theater-specific AEelements. Refer to Joint Pub 4-02.2, “JTTPfor Patient Movement in Joint Operations,”for additional information on AE.

• Other considerations for medical staffsplanning NEOs include the following:

•• Experience has shown that the commonmedical complaints of personnel beingevacuated are nausea, dehydration, anddiarrhea. Most frequently, sick evacueeswill be children.

•• Particularly effective medical staffs duringNEOs include general medical officers, familypractitioners, pediatricians, internists, andpsychiatrists and/or psychologists.

•• Well-established liaison with localairport security and ambulance service isessential.

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Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures

•• A separate area close to thedisembarkation point should be designatedto perform medical assessments, dispensemedication, and conduct patient staging.

•• Medical staff should consider wearingdistinctive clothing or markings to aidin identification.

•• Medical staffs may anticipatemedicinal requests that includeantibiotics, diarrhea medicines, painrelievers, silvadene, eye and ear drops,cough and cold formulas, and high bloodpressure medications.

•• When possible, patients should begiven written instructions on how tocontinue care for themselves or forchildren under their supervision.

•• Special plans and attention to thesituation will be required to move andevacuate personnel hospitalized in HNmedical facilities.

•• AE missions may require movement ofurgent or priority patients in aircraft notcompletely filled. Due to patients’ severeconditions, the aircraft will normally notbe delayed for nonmedical evacuees to bemoved to the airfield in order to fill theaircraft to maximum capacity.

b. Combat Search and Rescue. The needfor combat search and rescue (CSAR) in anuncertain or hostile NEO environment isreadily apparent. The CJTF may establisha joint search and rescue center to planand coordinate CSAR and medicalevacuation (MEDEVAC) missions. Joint Pub3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint Combat Searchand Rescue (CSAR),” provides guidance forplanning, coordinating, supporting, andexecuting joint search and rescue missions.

c. Mortuary Affairs. Mortuary affairspersonnel ensure proper and dignified

treatment of human remains. The JTF shouldplan for mortuary affairs for both militarypersonnel and evacuees. Even in a permissiveNEO environment, deaths among elderly,critically ill, or newborn evacuees may beencountered. For doctrinal guidance andinformation pertaining to the search, recovery,evacuation, and identification of the dead ortemporary burial of remains in theaters ofoperations, refer to Joint Pub 4-06, “JTTP forMortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.” Thedecision to transport remains is dependenton but not limited to the specifics of thesituation, to include the tactical environment,weather, and capacity of receiving ships andaircraft. (Note: PCRTSs are outfitted withlimited morgue facilities.) Under nocircumstances should remains betransferred before all evacuees have beensafely transported.

d. Public Affairs . The CJTF will ensureaccurate and timely release of informationabout the operation is made to the mediato the maximum extent possible consistentwith the security of the operation and thesafety of personnel involved. Speed of mediatransmission makes it probable that aworldwide audience will have immediate accessto information about the conduct of the operationand its participants. To ensure that the mediadoes not provide intelligence to persons hostileto the operation, the PAO working with embassypersonnel needs to manage PA through accurateand timely releases concerning the NEO. DuringNEOs, the JTF PAO needs to ensure that all PAannouncements have been approved by theAmbassador or the designated representative.Additional PAO responsibilities include thefollowing:

• Advise the CJTF on all aspects of PA.

• Develop a PA plan that coordinates allpublic and command informationfunctions, including publication of JTFbulletins, newsletters, video tapes, andpress releases.

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• Review materials prior to public release.

• Establish procedures in accordance withguidance promulgated by higherauthority.

• As required, obtain appropriateclearances for press releases.

• Distribute information pertaining to the JTFand its operations in accordance withestablished command security policies.

• Serve as liaison and escort for civilian andmilitary information media representatives.In anticipation of, and prior to operations:

•• Ensure that the information plan isupdated daily.

•• Determine PA personnel andequipment requirements.

•• Obtain a current list of legitimate mediarepresentatives in country to coordinaterelease of information during a crisis.

• Determine and disseminate CJTFguidance on the release of publicinformation.

• Provide civilian and military media officespace, to include press room or newscenter near the proposed command post,emergency operations center, or ECC.

• During operations:

•• Establish a press conference scheduleand conduct press briefings.

•• Provide rapid response to press queries.

•• Disseminate a daily JTF informationnews bulletin.

•• Disseminate news to subordinate unitsas appropriate.

e. Psychological Operations. PSYOP cangreatly facilitate NEOs in uncertain or hostileenvironments. Principally, PSYOP efforts canfacilitate the passage of pertinent informationto noncombatant evacuees, and PSYOP effortsand assets can execute programs and disseminateproducts that induce an attitude and/or behaviorof noninterference toward the NEO among thelocal populace. Prudent employment of PSYOPcan prevent the degeneration of a permissive oruncertain environment into a hostile environment.See Appendix C, “Psychological OperationsConsiderations,” for PSYOP capabilities andplanning considerations.

f. Command and Control Warfare(C2W). C2W is the integrated use of PSYOP,military deception, operations security(OPSEC), electronic warfare, and physicaldestruction. Planners should consider howC2W can support a NEO. For example, denialof critical information about friendlycapabilities and limitations before a NEO isessential in a hostile environment. Plannersshould incorporate security measures intotheir plans and operations. See Joint Pub3-13.1, “Joint Doctrine for Command andControl Warfare (C2W),” for a completediscussion of the planning and employmentof C2W in joint operations.

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EASTERN EXIT

In early January 1991, US military forces executed Operation EASTERN EXIT,a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) of the US Embassy in Mogadishu,Somalia. The primary forces involved in this ten-day operation were US Navyand US Marine Corps forces diverted from Operation DESERT SHIELD.

EASTERN EXIT was conducted on the eve of the war with Iraq, and thusreceived relatively little attention. In other circumstances, such a short-noticeand high-risk operation might have garnered front page headlines around theworld. The NEO evacuated 281 people from over 30 nations, including 12heads of diplomatic missions and 39 Soviet citizens from amidst a bloody civilwar.

The military operation itself might seem more like a Hollywood script thanreality. Little over two days after leaving the North Arabian Sea, USS Trentonlaunched two CH-53Es with a 60-man combined SEAL and Marine evacuationforce. The launch occurred in the middle of the night, over 450 miles fromMogadishu. En route, the two helicopters conducted two nighttime aerialrefuelings. On arrival off the coast, the two CH-53Es descended to 25 feet andsped over the city, landing in the Embassy compound even as looters were atits walls.

The 60-man evacuation force quickly moved into fighting positions to protectthe Embassy and the two CH-53Es soon took off with the first 61 evacuees.Despite intermittent harassing fire, the evacuation force held its fire duringthe 17 hours it spent on the ground. US forces, using night vision devices,conducted the final evacuation in the middle of the night with the support often CH-46s operating from USS Guam.

SOURCE: Siegel, Adam B., EASTERN EXIT: The Noncombatant EvacuationOperation (NEO) From Mogadishu, Somalia, in January 1991,

Center for Naval Analyses, October 1991

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VIEVACUEE PROCESSING

VI-1

1. Evacuation Control Center

The ECC supports the DOS, whichconducts processing, screening, andselected logistic functions associated withemergency evacuation of noncombatants.The JTF should, however, be prepared toperform functions that are DOS responsibilities,if required. Size and composition of the ECCwill be determined by the number of evacuees,evacuation environment, and location of theevacuation area. Of primary importance is thenature of the emergency causing the evacuation;it may be a natural, political, or military one.

2. Evacuation Control CenterFlow Chart

Figure VI-1 contains a recommended ECCflow chart.

3. Evacuee Processing

Evacuee processing may take place incountry at an air terminal, onboard ship,or at a temporary safe haven site.Regardless of location, a comprehensive planfor reception and care of evacuees should beimplemented. The JTF’s primary dutiesinclude maintaining order in theevacuation site and supporting theAmbassador ’s efforts to care fornoncombatant evacuees.

a. Procedures During Processing. At anair terminal, port, or beach, the evacueeprocessing should be located in a building,tent, or other appropriate place to provide

“. . . there must be a clear-cut, long-term relationship established betweenoperational intentions and administrative resources. Successfuladministrative planning is dependent on anticipation of requirements.”

Montgomery of AlameinMemoirs, 1958

shelter and safety to the evacuees. The areashould be staffed with security, interpreters,local immigration, embassy, support liaison,and medical personnel. The followingprocedures should be considered:

• Use military police when available.

• Use easily recognizable markings on USpersonnel, vehicles, and equipment.

• Disarm evacuees prior to evacuationprocessing.

• Establish a policy concerning JTFresponsibility to secure evacueevaluables during processing.

• Provide interpreters for bilingualinformation at control sites.

• Upon initial screen, use tags for visualidentification.

• Establish provisions for searchingwomen, children, and disabled and/orinjured.

• Use DOS personnel of the same sex asevacuees to conduct searches.

• Have medical personnel present.

• Have a chaplain present, if available.

• Establish procedures for very importantpersons (VIPs), government officials,and TCNs.

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• Organize evacuees and ensure thefollowing:

•• Establish a single point of contactbetween evacuee group and the CJTF.

•• Contact civic officials to increasecontrol and response for theevacuation.

• Request additional diplomatic licenseplates for authorized use by JTFpersonnel during the operation.

• Determine the need for explosiveordnance disposal (EOD) personnel(HN or US military).

b. Onboard Ship. Should the environmenton land preclude the use of an in-country

EVACUATION CONTROL CENTER FLOWCHART

ASSEMBLY AREAASSEMBLY AREA

EVACUATION CONTROLCENTER

DISMOUNT POINT

SEARCH AND/ORRECEPTION STATION

REGISTRATION STATION

SCREENING ANDINTERROGATION

STATION

TRANSPORTATIONSTATION

VIP PROCESSINGSTATION

COMFORTSTATION

EMBARKATIONAND/OR

EVACUATION SITE

REPRESENTS VIP PROCESSING(AT THE DIRECTION OF AMBASSADOR AND ON - SCENE

COMMANDER)

DEBRIEFING STATION

BAGGAGECOLLECTION

STATION

DETAINEEAREA

HOLD

MEDICALSTATION

Figure VI-1. Evacuation Control Center Flow Chart

VI-3

Evacuee Processing

ECC, evacuees may be processedonboard a ship. If it is a US Navy ship,responsibility for processing evacuees maythen rest with the ship’s commandingofficer.

c. Minimum Processing Requirements.Minimum processing requirements are usedin those cases when there is a concern forthe protection and safety of evacuees and theJTF. The procedures used will meet thefollowing guidelines:

• Security of JTF personnel and equipmentwill not be compromised to expediteprocessing.

• Processing of persons with lifethreatening medical problems will beexpedited.

• All evacuees will be screened forverification of identity and documentationas well as prioritization. Classification,priorities, and considerations forevacuees are explained in paragraph 5of this chapter.

• Prior to implementation, the Ambassadorand the CJTF will agree on procedures forminimum evacuee processing.

4. ECC Processing Center

The three guiding principles for any ECCare accuracy — everyone who should beaccounted for is accounted for; security —evacuees and the JTF are safeguarded fromall threats; and speed — processing must beaccomplished quickly and efficiently. As themarshalling teams bring the evacuees to theECC, the processing center assumes controlof the evacuees. The purpose is to preparethe evacuees for eventual overseasmovement to a temporary safe haven or theUnited States. All evacuees should bescreened to certify identification and to ensurethat documentation is accurate and all

in f o rma t i on p rov ided i s cu r rent.Representatives from the Embassy’s consularaffairs office should be in the ECC to assistin determining the eligibility of questionableevacuees. If evacuees arrive without escort,processing personnel should verify theiridentity and eligibility for evacuation priorto allowing the evacuees to enter the ECC.The processing center performs thenecessary screening, registration, medical,and transportation functions to ensure anorderly evacuation and consists of thefollowing:

a. Headquarters Section. The HQ sectionis responsible as follows:

• Plans, organizes, and supervises theoperation of the ECC.

• Maintains liaison with localrepresentatives of the DOS and otheragencies involved in the evacuation.

• Advises the CJTF on the progress of theevacuation.

• Maintains communications with allelements of the evacuation force to includeships, control aircraft, remote sites,evacuation vehicles, DOS personnel, HNsecurity forces, and the ECC.

b. Reception and/or Search Station. Thereception station personnel collect allavailable information from the marshallingteams who escort the evacuees. Informationfrom the marshalling team’s log book isvaluable because it may reduce the processingtime. The evacuees should be moved into aholding area where the following shouldbe accomplished:

• Receive, search, segregate, and briefincoming evacuees in conjunction withDOS representatives. The initialbriefing should be given by seniorofficials who provide sufficient

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information to ease fears about theevacuation process. It should includethe following:

•• Summary of the reasons for theevacuation.

•• Stations through which the evacueeswill process.

•• Need for an inspection of personneland baggage.

•• What support to expect at thetemporary safe haven.

•• What to expect upon arrival in theUnited States.

•• What the repatriation center willprovide.

•• Amnesty opportunity for anyrestricted items.

• Organize evacuees into groups(maintain family integrity wherepossible). Maintain a roster of each

evacuee, with nationality, date of birth,evacuation classification, profession,destination, and name, address, and/orphone number of a point of contact(POC) in the United States fornotification.

• Provide an escort for groups of personnelgoing through the processing center.

VIPs and emergency medical casesshould be provided individual guides ifavailable.

• Inspect for restricted items. Eachevacuee and all baggage should beinspected at the conclusion of thebriefing. Areas used for individualinspections should be screened. Hand-held metal detectors can expedite theinspections. All restricted items shouldbe confiscated.

•• Many foreign countries sell drugs overthe counter that US law requires aprescription to obtain. Medical personnelon the inspection team can aid inidentifying these drugs.

Successful evacuee processing begins with the initial briefing from seniorDOS representatives, which provides sufficient information to ease fears aboutthe evacuation process.

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Evacuee Processing

•• All weapons, excluding those of USGpersonnel, will be impounded and receiptsissued to the owners. Embassy orcustoms officials should be consultedabout the disposition of these weapons.Unless the weapons are illegal in theUnited States, they will be returned tothe owners at the repatriation center.

•• The persons, property, papers, andfamilies of foreign ambassadors authorizedto go to the United States are exempt fromsearch under any circumstances withoutspecific direction from the DOS.

•• The persons, property, papers, andfamilies of foreign diplomats (other thanambassadors) authorized passage to theUnited States are exempt from search.However, personal baggage may besearched if there is reasonable cause to

believe that the baggage containsrestricted items. All searches should beconducted in the presence of thediplomats or their authorized agent.

•• Diplomatic pouches will not besearched.

•• Based on reasonable belief, the JFCmay refuse to evacuate any baggagesuspected of containing weapons orexplosives.

• Evacuees suspected of being enemyagents or criminals should be separatedand escorted to the screening andinterrogation station. The screening shouldbe voluntary and considered a prerequisiteto evacuation. At the conclusion of theinterrogation, the evacuees will be allowedto continue the processing, set free, orplaced in a detainee area.

c. Registration Station. Personnel shouldcomplete all administrative paperworkprior to leaving the country. Foreignnationals must either be on the list of potentialevacuees provided by the embassy or post, orsecure approval from the US Embassy before

they can continue processing. The Ambassadoror designated DOS representative will be thefinal authority on acceptability of evacueeidentification. If there are doubts about aperson’s identity, the matter should be turnedover to the DOS and the person should beevacuated. Registration station personnel should

The Evacuation Control Center supports the Department of State in processingevacuees accurately, securely, and in a quick and efficient manner.

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ensure that foreign nationals are supervised untilthey are cleared for evacuation or escortedoutside the ECC. Military police should beavailable to react to any hostile incidents. Eachevacuee should do the following:

• Prove identity by using passports,dependent identification cards, seaman’spapers, or anything that unquestionablyestablishes US citizenship.

• Provide information to the registrationclerks concerning background andpersonal history. The State Department’sEPH provides for a standard one-pageEvacuee Documentation Card (OF-28)that has three carbon copies. All criticalinformation is recorded on the form, toinclude personal data, health andcitizenship status, privacy warning, andpromissory note. The original of the formremains at the ECC while the copies canbe used as boarding passes for evacuationtransportation and for in-processing at thetemporary safe haven.

• Receive a copy of DD Form 2585,“Repatriation Processing Center ProcessingSheet,” which should be completed beforearrival at the repatriation center.

d. Debriefing Station. This station isoptional, depending on the situation and the timeavailable to conduct the evacuation. It shouldbe staffed by counterintelligence personnel.Each evacuee should be debriefed to obtaininformation that may affect the evacuationforce, its mission, the evacuees, or other USGactivities in the country. Areas of interest mightinclude the following:

• Locations of other potential evacuees.

• Changes in the political situation.

• Movements and activities of indigenousgroups, entities, and parties that mightoppose the evacuation.

• The true intent of a threatening thirdparty — consider the following:

•• Capability and likelihood of carryingout a threat.

•• Can the third party be influenced?

•• Can the potential threat be stoppedor countered?

e. Medical Station. The medical stationprovides emergency medical treatment andimmunizations required by the safe havencountry. As required, injured or illevacuees may proceed through the medicalstation for first aid and to identify medicalconditions that may have an effect on theevacuation process. Serious medical casesreceive top priority for evacuation. However,the medical officer ensures that any seriouslyill, injured, or wounded persons completeprocessing. Medical personnel should:

• Screen to determine if an evacueerequires emergency medical treatmentor evacuation.

• Perform emergency treatment asrequired.

• Isolate persons infected with contagiousdiseases.

f. Transportation Station. Transportationpersonnel prepare each group ofevacuees for embarkation aboardaircraft, ships, or surface vehicles. Someconsiderations are as follows:

• Coordinate surface or air transportation toinclude movement of personnel to theevacuation area, transportation of evacueesto designated aircraft and/or landing craft,and internal evacuation site requirements.

• Provide loading control personnel tosupervise loading of personnel

VI-7

Evacuee Processing

aboard vehicles, aircraft, and/orlanding craft.

• Maintain roster of all embarkedpersonnel showing destination andidentifying information.

• Organize evacuees into transportationgroups (“chalks”), issue boarding passesfor aircraft, and verify baggage tags.

• Ensure that information on the passengermanifest agrees with information providedon the evacuee register.

• Ensure sufficient transportation assets totransport evacuees and their baggage tothe point of embarkation.

g. Comfort Station. The comfort stationis a temporary waiting area for evacueesuntil they board evacuation aircraft.Comfort station personnel should make theevacuees’ stay as untroubled as possible andprovide some degree of privacy. Someconsiderations are as follows:

• Sufficient shelter, cots, blankets, food,water, and infant supplies.

• Sufficient sanitation facilities.

• Senior personnel and medical personneland Unit Ministry Teams and assistantsavailable to counsel evacuees, especiallyfamilies with young children.

• Male and female personal items.

5. Classification, Priorities, andConsideration for Evacuees

For organizational purposes all evacueesreceive a number priority and classificationdesignator. These categorizations are criticalto the smooth execution and success of theoperation and are used when identifying,moving, and locating evacuees. The JTF staff

should keep abreast of changes in the totalnumbers of potential evacuees by receivingperiodic updates from the Embassy’s staff. Theseupdates will be provided in the form of a totalnumber for all evacuees and number by category.

a. Classification. The following system,shown in Figure VI-2, governs priorities ofevacuations. A priority designator includes acombination of a Roman numeral and capitalletter indicating major and minor prioritiesassigned to each individual. Aliens for whomthe United States has accepted responsibility areafforded the same major and minor categoryconsideration as US-sponsored evacuees.

b. First Priority. US citizens in thefollowing order:

• Those with current identification suchas passports, birth certificates, DODidentification cards, seaman’s papers,air crew cards, and anyone designatedas first priority by the Ambassador,regardless of national affiliation. TheAmbassador is the final authority.

• Those with expired US passports lessthan 10 years old.

• Those with expired US passports over10 years old.

c. Guidelines. Some guidelines forinteraction with evacuees are as follows:

• Evacuees are not enemy prisoners of war(EPWs).

• The minimum force required should beused.

• Evacuation can be an unsettling experience,especially for children and families whohave become separated. As a rule,presenting a patient, courteous, andprofessional attitude will do much to calmthe situation and all evacuees.

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• Depending on the situation, personalbaggage may be limited.

• People should not be separated from theirbaggage.

• Baggage should be searched forfirearms, explosives, ammunition, oritems declared to be restricted items.Be considerate but firm; the safety ofpersonnel is paramount.

• The CJTF should establish a policyconcerning pets. Whenever possible allowpets to accompany evacuees except insituations where lives will be jeopardizedor security compromised. If pets arrive forevacuation, a pet control facility will needto be established.

• Personnel should not accept gifts, tips,or bribes. All personnel must be awareof this prohibition.

• All questions about an evacuee shouldbe referred to the DOS representative.

• Persons of higher priority may electevacuation in a lower priority to avoidseparating families. If it is necessary toMEDEVAC a member of a family, theentire family will be evacuated medically.

• Well-established liaison with local airportsecurity and ambulance service is essential.

• Medical personnel should considerwearing distinctive clothing or markingsto aid in identification.

Figure VI-2. Classifications of Evacuees

CLASSIFICATIONS OF EVACUEES

Major Categories

I - American citizensII - Alien immediate family members of

American citizensIII - Foreign Service National and Third Country

National employees of the US GovernmentIV - Eligible non-Americans who are seriously ill,

injured, or whose lives are in imminent peril(but who do not qualify for a higher priority)

V - Others eligible (as directed by the Ambassadoror joint force commander)

Minor Categories

A - Pregnant womenB - Unaccompanied children under 18C - Aged and infirmD - Adults with childrenE - Adults 18 or older

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Evacuee Processing

• When possible, patients should be givenwritten instructions for medical care,especially care for children.

d. Request For Asylum or TemporaryRefuge. International law and custom havelong recognized the humanitarian practiceof providing temporary refuge to anyone,regardless of nationality, who may be inimminent physical danger. It is the policyof the United States to grant temporaryrefuge in a foreign country to nationalsof that country or to TCNs solely forhumanitarian reasons when extreme orexceptional circumstances put inimminent danger the life or safety of aperson, such as pursuit by a mob. Theofficer in command of an aircraft, ship,station, or activity decides which measurescan prudently be taken to provide temporaryrefuge. No information shall be released tothe media concerning requests for asylumuntil cleared by the DOS. Any requests by

foreign governments for the return of anindividual must be reported to the DOSrepresentative. Until determination is madeby the DOS, safeguard those who haverequested asylum or temporary refuge. Donot release personnel against their will to athird party force. The safety of JTF personneland security of the unit must be taken intoconsideration along with the following:

• Grant temporary refuge in cases wherethe requesting individual is inimminent danger, irrespective ofwhether asylum or temporary refugeis requested.

• Let DOS representatives handle asylumrequests through the appropriatechannels.

• Establish procedures to notify thecombatant commander of actions takenin cases of requests for asylum.

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CHAPTER VIIINTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE AND TEMPORARY

SAFE HAVEN OPERATIONS

VII-1

1. Intermediate Staging Base

Use of an ISB during deploymentprovides the CJTF many advantages overdeploying directly from the home station.The ISB becomes more important as thedistance from the home station increases andthe likelihood of hostilities increase. The ISBmay be located in another country close towhere the evacuation is taking place or maybe any ship under US control. Ideally, the

“The work of organization is never done, and the structure has to becontinually adapted to new and anticipated conditions.”

Ralph J. Cordiner

ISB will also function as a temporary safehaven, if one is required. The ISB may alsoserve as an airfield for support forces, suchas additional airlift for unforeseen movementrequirements and/or combat forces (such asair units capable of offensive attacks andairborne infantry units) in the event thatforced entry is required.

a. Advantages. Those items shown inFigure VII-1 can be accomplished at the ISB.

Figure VII-1. Advantages of an Intermediate Staging Base

ADVANTAGES OF AN INTERMEDIATESTAGING BASE

The commander, joint task force can finalize evacuationplans

The joint task force (JTF) staff can gather additionalintelligence information

The JTF can conduct rehearsals and briefings

Units have the opportunity to redistribute and finalizeloads

Personnel can recuperate after a long trip from theirdeploying base

A reaction force or additional security personnel canpre-stage for contingency operations

It can function as the temporary safe haven for theoperation

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b. Coordination. When an ISB is locatedin a country other than the United States, theDOS is responsible for coordinating with thegovernment of that country. If the ISB is anestablished US base in a foreign country, usingthe ISB as a staging point for launching forcesinto another country can pose significant politicalproblems. The CJTF should advise the DOS ofthe requirements for the ISB. The ISB shouldmeet the following criteria:

• Be capable of handling the aircraft orships used in the evacuation.

• Possess effective communication withJTF and combatant commandheadquarters, advance party, ECC,temporary safe haven, and the ISBEmbassy.

.• Have adequate facilities for billeting,

messing, and sanitation for theevacuation force and evacuees if used asthe temporary safe haven.

• Possess repair and refuel capability foraircraft.

• Have storage facilities for perishables;petroleum, oils, and lubricants; medicalsupplies; and ammunition.

• Be close to major medical facilities, ifpossible.

• Be located to provide maximum possibleOPSEC.

• Have overflight rights.

• Have PA contingency plan for plannedor “no-notice” media presence.

• Be close enough to the evacuation sitethat aircraft or ships used in theevacuation can transit without refueling.

• Have adequate local and area securityforces to protect US personnel andequipment. This protection could beaccomplished either by the host nationor by security forces from the deployedISB Support Element.

c. Selection Criteria. Selecting an ISBfor the NEO is a time-sensitive issue. SinceISBs are typically airfields or seaports, thegeographic combatant commanderprocedures should include queryingUSTRANSCOM for on-hand informationrelated to facilities and sites being consideredas likely ISBs.

d. Composition. The composition of theISB force depends on what support isrequired and what is already on site at theISB. An ISB at an established, modern facilityrequires substantially less than one at a lesserdeveloped location. Some considerations for theISB force are as follows:

• Maintenance and service requirementsfor aircraft.

• Liaison with the Embassy and civilianagencies (police, military, customs, andothers as required).

• Interpreters.

• Facilities for maintenance, refueling,billeting, messing, and sanitation.

• Contracts for local services and supplies.

• Local security.

• Air traffic control and movementcontrol.

• HN medical infrastructure.

• Overflight rights.

VII-3

Intermediate Staging Base/Temporary Safe Haven Operations

2. Temporary Safe Haven Site

A temporary safe haven, designated bythe DOS, is a location in an area or countryto which evacuees may be moved quicklyand easily. Ideally, the safe haven will be inthe United States; however, circumstancesmay exist that require an intermediate ortemporary safe haven. Adequatetransportation may not be available to moveall evacuees directly from the evacuation sitesto the United States. An intermediate safehaven may be a US Navy ship; however,the evacuees should be removed from theship to land-based safe havens (in theUnited States or a third country) as quicklyas possible. If a temporary safe haven isrequired, the DOS coordinates with thegovernment where it will be located.Coordination for the use of facilities, customsrequirements, security, transportation, andbilleting is required. The following factorsshould be considered when selecting a site:

a. OPSEC before and during theevacuation operation to ensure missionsuccess and prevent undue pressure againstthe temporary safe haven government.

b. Capability to communicate with theECC, JTF HQ, and local embassy.

c. Airfield or port capacity suitable for theaircraft or ships being used, both for theevacuation and later onward movement forthe evacuees. Consideration should be givento the following:

• Twenty-four-hour operations for theairfield and port.

• Availability of HN controllers to controlthe airfield and the requirement for JTFcontrollers.

• Balance of airflow restrictions againstanticipated dates and timing ofanticipated air flow.

• Total numbers and types of aircraftinvolved in the operation.

• Condition of aircraft parking areas.

• Length, width, and condition of runwaysand taxiway.

• Airfield search and rescue, security, firefighting, and logistic support.

• Airfield maintenance support.

• Capabilities of airfield facilities.

• Channel and harbor depth.

• Berthing space, pier information, andlocation of anchorages.

• Types and capabilities of tugs.

• Availability of equipment to load and/or offload ships, if required.

• Climatological, meteorological, andoceanographic considerations.

d. Proximity to major transportation hubs.

e. Adequate billeting, rations, and potablewater for evacuees and the temporary safehaven force.

f. Although the temporary safe havenoperates under the authority of the hostgovernment, it may not have the goodwill ofthe local population. It may be a prime targetfor terrorism and riots. The CJTF should planfor such situations and protect the evacueesand the JTF personnel.

3. Organization and Functions

The temporary safe haven force, organizedsimilarly to the ECC’s processing section,operates under the control of the CJTF. Itshould deploy no later than the evacuation

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force; however, logistic requirements tosupport a large number of evacuees mayrequire that it deploy earlier. A limited securityforce can provide necessary internal andperimeter security. The force may consist ofthe following elements:

a. Command Group. The commandgroup coordinates the overall operation andshould consist of the commander, executiveofficer, staff noncommissioned OIC,communications officer, Family Center staff,chaplain, liaison officers, and interpreters. TheFamily Center staff provides and coordinateshuman and social service support for evacuees.The chaplain ministers to the spiritual needs ofthe safe haven force and evacuees and helps themdeal with the stress and hardship created by theevacuation. The liaison officers and interpretersmaintain contact with the US Embassy and thehost government. The command group isresponsible for the following:

• Plans, organizes, and supervises theoperation of the temporary safe haven.

• Maintains liaison with local representativesof the DOS and other agencies that maybe involved with the operation.

• Advises the CJTF on the progress of thetemporary safe haven operations.

• Establishes procedures for governmentofficials and TCNs if not previouslyestablished by the JTF.

• Establishes provisions for searchingwomen and children as well as disabledand injured persons.

b. Reception Team. This team consistsof a briefing section and a PA section.

• Briefing Section. This section shouldbrief the evacuees on their arrivalconcerning the following:

•• Current political situation in the HN.

•• Description and operation of thetemporary safe haven.

•• Further traveling options andarrangements.

•• Customs requirements in thetemporary safe haven.

•• Projected departure times for flightsto the United States.

• Public Affairs Section. The PAO,working with the HN embassypersonnel, releases accurate and timelyinformation to the media. However,release of information on the NEO ortemporary safe haven operations withineach country is the responsibility of theAmbassador. The temporary safe havenPAO has the same responsibilities as theJTF PAO, which are provided in ChapterV, “Employment and EvacuationOperation Procedures.” Temporary safehaven PAO responsibilities are asfollows:

•• Advise the temporary safe havencommander on all aspects of PA.

•• Coordinate and supervise all PA andcommand information functions, toinclude planning and production ofbulletins, newsletters, and otherinformation media.

•• Keep the JTF PAO advised on allaspects of PA.

•• Distribute information pertaining to thetemporary safe haven and its operations tothe news media per JTF policies.

•• Escort civilian and military newsmedia representatives.

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Intermediate Staging Base/Temporary Safe Haven Operations

•• Ensure that the news media arerestricted from evacuee billeting areas.

•• Ensure that interviews of JTFpersonnel and evacuees are held onlywith the permission of the CJTF and theindividual concerned.

•• Determine and disseminate JTFguidance on the release of informationto the public.

c. Processing Team. This team does notduplicate processing completed at the ECC,but should verify that all information obtainedfrom the evacuees is complete and correct.

• Administrative Section. This sectionregisters and accounts for all evacueesand ensures that all information requiredby the DOS or the JTF has beencollected. The administrative sectionshould have legal personnel adviseevacuees on claims procedures and assistin relations between evacuees, safe havenpersonnel, and host country nationals.The following should be accomplished:

•• Receive and register incomingevacuees in conjunction with DOSrepresentatives.

•• Maintain a roster of each evacuee whopasses through the temporary safe haven.It should list the nationality, date of birth,evacuation classification, profession,destination, and name, address, and/orphone number of a POC in the UnitedStates for notification.

•• Provide escorts for groups ofpersonnel. VIPs and emergency medicalcases should be provided individualguides if available.

•• Provide for safekeeping and securityof valuables while evacuees wait for

onward transportation to the UnitedStates.

•• Provide assistance as needed inlocating separated family members.

• Transportation Section. The transportationsection is responsible to assist in theonward movement of evacuees to theirfinal destination. The USG does notprovide for the movement of personsother than US employees and familymembers (those listed in Chapter IV,“Contingency and Predeployment PlanningConsiderations,” subparagraph 8b).Nongovernment employees evacuated byUS-funded charter, whether commercialor military, are asked to sign promissorynotes to cover the cost of transportation.The following transportation functionsshould be considered to ensure an orderlymovement:

•• Coordinate surface or air transportationfor the movement of evacuees to theUnited States.

•• Coordinate movement flow of evacueeswith the JRCC.

•• Provide loading control personnel tosupervise loading of personnel aboardaircraft, ships, or vehicles.

•• Maintain a roster of all embarkedpersonnel showing destination andidentifying information.

•• Expedite the departure of all evacueeswho are sick, injured, or wounded.

• Intelligence Section. This section mayconduct a debrief of each evacuee if itwas not conducted at the JTF ECC. Ifthe temporary safe haven is also actingas a temporary ISB, intelligencepersonnel should arrange to pass

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information gained from evacuees tothose forces who are returning to a threatarea for follow-on operations. Informationshould also be reported to the jointintelligence center and DefenseIntelligence Agency.

• Medical Section. The medical sectionprovides support to the temporarysafe haven force. Additionally, thissection may need to conduct evacueemedical screening if this was notperformed at the ECC. Medical servicesmay include any or all of the followingfunctions:

•• Determine if an evacuee requiresemergency medical treatment.

•• Perform emergency treatment asrequired or coordinate with a localhospital to perform the treatment.

•• Advise the temporary safe haven OICon hygiene and preventive medicine.

•• Inspect food and water obtained fromlocal sources.

•• Evaluate the general health of theevacuees, particularly in regard topregnancies and the possibility ofcommunicable diseases.

d. Comfort Team. This team provideslogistic support for the operation. It isresponsible for supplies, billeting, sanitationfacilities, food, and local transportation. Acontracting or purchasing officer should beassigned to coordinate services with the HN.Some considerations are as follows:

• Billeting is ideally accomplishedthrough facilities or hotels provided byor contracted from the temporary safehaven country. However, the JTF maybe required to establish a tent city. Inthis event, the temporary safe haven force

arrives early enough to accomplish thisbefore evacuees begin arriving. The CJTFmay consider contracting locally for thelabor and sanitation facilities.

• Because evacuees will normally leave theHN with little or no food supplies of theirown, meals, ready to eat can be used as atemporary solution. However, thetemporary safe haven OIC should beprepared to establish a food service sectionto provide special diets to foreign nationalsor TCNs involved in the evacuation.

• If the climate of the country issubstantially different from the evacuee’sformer residence, the team may need toprovide adequate clothing.

• Due to the situation, evacuees may havenot had the opportunity to pack personal,comfort, or hygiene items prior to arrivingat the evacuation site. The following is apartial list of items the evacuees mayneed:

baby formulatrash bagsbaby food and/or juicediaperstoilet paperfeminine hygiene suppliestoothpaste and/or toothbrushsoapshampoorazorswashing powdersheetstowelsblanketscandywash bucket

e. Schedul ing Team. This teamcoordinates and plans the departure ofevacuees from the temporary safe haven.The scheduling team should do thefollowing:

VII-7

Intermediate Staging Base/Temporary Safe Haven Operations

• Coordinate with the transportation sectionfor arrangements made for leaving thetemporary safe haven.

• Coordinate with the comfort team totransport evacuees to the points ofembarkation.

• Manifest authorized passengers aboardmilitary or commercial charter flights.

f. Security Team. This team provides, orarranges for, adequate security at thetemporary safe haven site.

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APPENDIX ARULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE

LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

A-1

1. NEO-Specific Issues

The rules of engagement for NEOs reflectthe limited military objective to beaccomplished. NEO ROE limit the use offorce to that force which is necessary tosuccessfully complete the mission andprovide for the self-defense of US militarypersonnel and defense of noncombatantevacuees. CJCSI 3121.01, “Standing Rulesof Engagement for US Forces,” is the basicsource for standing ROE, and includes aspecific section addressing NEO.

a. Upon receipt of an initiating directiveor warning order, the CJTF immediatelyreviews the ROE to evaluate their impact onevacuation operations. Potential problemsshould be identified, and requests for deletionor modification of ROE are forwarded via thecombatant commander to the issuingauthority. Choice of a concept of operationsdepends heavily upon the ROE granted forthe NEO.

b. Commanders have an inherentobligation and responsibility to protect theirforces against attack. ROE do not diminishthis obligation and responsibility, but governthe use of force for mission accomplishment.

• Defensive Actions

•• Conducted only as aggressively asnecessary to protect US lives (and those ofTCN evacuees), property, and equipment.Actions should be proportionate to the levelof threat and should halt upon cessation ofthe aggression.

•• May include pursuit only until theattacker is no longer a threat to USpersonnel (and TCN evacuees), property,and equipment.

• Subordinate commanders should ensurethat personnel are thoroughlyindoctrinated in the need for use ofminimum force. All personnel must beinstructed as to the importance of good orderand discipline when conducting NEOs.

• Commanders at all levels should exercisecaution to use only the force necessary.

c. Ideally, ROE should allow for approvalof requests for joint fire support (such as navalsurface fire support and close air support).Authority for employment of riot controlagents is available if approved by thecombatant commander.

d. The use of force is normally a measureof last resort. When time and conditionspermit, the hostile forces should be warnedand given the opportunity to withdraw orcease threatening actions. Employment ofPSYOP assets and capabilities should beconsidered toward this end.

2. Use of Force Generally

Guidance on drafting ROE and on theprinciples of use of force in self-defense andfor mission accomplishment must begin withthe Joint Chiefs of Staff standing rules ofengagement (SROE). The SROE will providethe baseline from which all supplemental ROEare drafted and approved. Additionally, theSROE contain an appendix specific to NEO.

3. Law of Armed ConflictPrinciples

It is DOD policy that Law of Armed Conflictprinciples govern actions to be taken by JTFpersonnel in defense of US personnel,selected host country personnel, and propertyand equipment. Some of the Law of Armed

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Conflict principles to be considered during theplanning process are as follows:

a. No person will kill or wound hostilepersonnel who have laid down their weapons,have no means of defense, or have surrendered.

b. Shooting of small arms, crew-servedweapons, or artillery into populated areas orbuildings which are not defended is prohibitedunless they are being used for hostile militarypurposes.

c. Personnel will not fire on religious, social,civic, or historic monuments or facilities;hospitals; or places where the sick orwounded are collected unless they are beingused at the time for military purposes. In

this instance, “military purpose” is defined interms of threat to the accomplishment of theJTF mission. Attack on any of the above namedfacilities can only be warranted if the place isbeing used to initiate hostile, aggressive acts thatendanger the lives of evacuees or members ofthe JTF or could prevent accomplishment of theJTF mission.

d. Personnel will not destroy or seize anyproperty unless such destruction or seizure isdemanded by necessities of militaryoperations. The phrase “necessities of militaryoperations” assumes the parameters outlinedin subparagraph 1d above.

e. All captured or detained personnel willbe afforded humane treatment.

APPENDIX BLEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

B-1

This appendix provides general informationand guidance for handling legal matters thatmay arise during a NEO. The CJTF andsubordinate commanders of the evacuationand ISB should have a legal adviser attachedto their staffs to advise on military andinternational legal matters.

1. General

The CJTF and subordinate commandersmust ensure that JTF personnel abide by thestandards of international law, as well as theprovisions of the operation’s ROE. The CJTFshould establish procedures and policies forimmediately reporting and investigatingviolations. The CJTF must report allsuspected violations in accordance withapplicable DOD and Service regulations, andshould notify the Embassy of a suspectedviolation within 24 hours of its occurrence.

a. Role of JTF Legal Adviser. The JTFLegal Adviser will provide guidance on legalissues involving NEO, in coordination withhigher headquarters, DOS agencies, NGOs,PVOs, IOs, foreign governments, and the HNgovernment. The key emphasis will be onassisting with interpretation of andcompliance with applicable US laws andregulations; relevant internationalagreements, including any pertinent SOFAs;and multilateral and bilateral transitagreements impacting on NEO.

b. Legal Imperatives. When planningand conducting NEO, commanders must becognizant of legal imperatives derived fromthe US Constitution, domestic law,international agreements, and customaryinternational law. In view of this governingframework of laws and regulations, as wellas the complexity of legal issues relating to

NEO, commanders must obtain legalguidance at all phases of NEO planning andexecution, particularly during the earlyplanning stage.

c. Legal Input for OperationalPlanning. Commanders should ensure thatlegal advisers at all levels are full participantsin all aspects of NEO planning, operationalguidance and decisions, and national policydirectives. Additionally, operation plans(OPLANs), warning orders, Commander’sEstimates, ROE, operation orders(OPORDs), Executive Orders, and otheroperational documents should besystematically reviewed by the JTF LegalAdviser to ensure compliance withinternational and domestic law.

2. Specific Guidance andTerminology

a. Foreign Diplomat. A foreign diplomatof an embassy staff authorized to go to theUnited States for evacuation is entitled tospecial treatment in accordance withinternational law. Ideally, the individual aswell as personal effects and papers are not tobe searched, detained, or seized. Familymembers are also entitled to the sameimmunity unless they are citizens of theUnited States. The diplomatic pouch of adiplomatic courier from a state recognizedby the United States shall also be immunefrom any search, inspection, detention, orseizure by US personnel.

b. Political Asylum or TemporaryRefuge. JTF commanders may not grantpolitical asylum to any foreign national. Theymay grant temporary refuge under emergencyconditions when there is imminent dangerto the safety, health, or life of any person.

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All requests for asylum should be referred tothe Embassy or senior DOS representativeavailable.

c. Status-of-Forces Agreement. AnySOFA between the host nation and the UnitedStates should be reviewed to determine howit applies, if at all, to the current situationinvolving the NEO. If time permits, it shouldbe modified as necessary prior to the JTFarrival. If no agreement exists, the Embassymay negotiate a temporary agreement withthe HN, if time permits, covering criminaljurisdiction, procurement, customs, and otherlegal matters. Given the emergency natureof the NEO, however, it is likely that nospecial SOFA provisions will be negotiated.

d. Status of Detainee. The Embassyshould determine the status of a detainee inadvance of the JTF deployment. In theabsence of this determination, it is US policyto treat a hostile detainee humanely and inaccordance with international humanitarianlaw. Anyone actively detained by US forcesin an attempt to deter or in response to hostileaction will be accorded the rights of an EPW,even though they may not be an EPW withinthe context of the Geneva Convention. TheEmbassy, with the HN, will negotiate thedisposition of the detainee.

e. Claims. The JTF Legal Adviser ordesignated claims officer shall develop a planfor the processing and adjudication of claimsagainst the United States. The plan will becoordinated with the appropriate embassystaff member.

f. International Legal Considerations

• Law of Armed Conflict. Traditionallegal issues associated with the Law ofArmed Conflict will not normally arisein the context of NEO, as NEOs typicallyoccur during times of escalatingconfrontation short of armed conflict.

However, the protections affordedcivilians, sick, and wounded under theLaw of Armed Conflict are almostuniversally accepted humanitariannorms respected in many cases despitethe absence of international armedconflict. NEO planning and executionshould adhere as closely as possible tointernational humanitarian lawprinciples as a matter of consistentpractice.

• National Sovereignty. Commandersmust ensure that the NEO does notviolate the sovereignty of foreign nationsother than the host nation. NEOplanners and operators must becognizant of the potential impact ofoperations on relations with othernations and of all relevant internationalagreements, including pertinent SOFAsand multilateral and bilateral transitagreements.

g. Legal Assistance. Implementing plansshould provide for preventive law programsdesigned to avoid sudden and overwhelmingdemands for emergency legal assistance whenevacuation becomes imminent or isimplemented. To the extent practical, legalassistance and advice will be made availableat safe haven points and collection processingpoints, in coordination with the USdiplomatic mission.

h. Military Justice. Military justice willbe administered in accordance with theUniform Code of Military Justice and JointPub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces(UNAAF).”

i. Reporting Violations of the Law ofArmed Conflict. Commanders shall planand provide for reporting, investigating, andinitiating appropriate disciplinary dispositionof allegations of Law of Armed Conflictviolations, as follows:

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Legal Considerations

• With respect to alleged violations of theLaw of Armed Conflict committed by oragainst members of, or personsaccompanying or serving with, theircommands, promptly investigate, collectand evaluate evidence, and report inaccordance with applicable DOD andMilitary Department guidance. Additionally,forward reports immediately throughoperational command channels.

• With respect to alleged violations ofthe Law of Armed Conflict committedby or against allied military or civilianpersonnel, conduct appropriatepreliminary investigation to determineinvolvement of JTF personnel andreport as required through USoperat ional channels. Once adetermination is made that the JTFwas not involved, further USinvestigation will be undertaken only atthe direction of the combatantcommander.

• In all instances of reported Law ofArmed Conflict violations, makeimmediate message notification to theappropriate combatant commander.Service component commanders shouldprovide such notification as soon as thetactical situation permits, rather thanawaiting complete investigation.Additional details may be supplied bysupplemental reports.

j. Host-Nation Support

• Commanders must be aware ofapplicable basing rights and the status of

US forces within the country whenplanning and executing NEO. Particularcare must be paid to ensuring advanceprocurement of necessary landing,embarkation, and transit rights requiredto support a given operation.

• Additionally, the changing political andmilitary situation must be taken intoaccount prior to relying on previouslynegotiated HNS agreements. Liaisonwith DOS officials responsible for theparticular NEO site must beaccomplished in a timely manner.

k. Legal Review of Rules of Engagement.In all cases in which use of force iscontemplated, legal advisers shall beconsulted in the planning or preexecutionphases to determine the legal basis forintervention and use of force, shall reviewproposed ROE, and shall assess the legal risksor potential liabilities entailed underinternational law.

• Applicable Rules of Engagement.Commanders at every level must ensureunderstanding of ROE by all personnel.Requests for supplemental ROE must behandled in accordance with CJCSI3121.01, “Standing Rules ofEngagement for US Forces.”

l. International Agreements andCongressional Enactments. Operationsconducted may require consultation with, orreporting to, Congress consistent with theWar Powers Resolution. War PowersResolution reports will be initiated, asrequired, by the US Department of State.

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APPENDIX CPSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS

C-1

1. Purpose

This appendix provides guidance for theplanning and execution of PSYOP in supportof a NEO.

2. General

PSYOP are defined as planned operationsto convey selected information and indicatorsto foreign audiences to influence theiremotions, motives, objective reasoning, andultimately, the behavior of foreigngovernments, organizations, groups, andindividuals. The purpose of PSYOP is toinduce or reinforce foreign attitudes andbehavior favorable to the originator ’sobjectives. The CJTF should consider theearly planning for and employment of PSYOP.PSYOP resources and capabilities provide thecommander with a means of influencing hostileand potentially hostile personnel (combatant andnoncombatant) through employment ofappropriate media and using the appropriatelanguage(s) and symbols and/or terms ofreference. Judicious use of PSYOP can helppreclude escalation from a permissive or uncertainto a hostile environment.

3. PSYOP Coordination

PSYOP efforts in support of NEO canproduce the following results:

a. Explain the purpose of the US action tocounter disinformation, confusion, andrumor.

b. Assist in establishing control ofnoncombatant evacuees, the neutral localpopulace, and other groups in the JOA tominimize casualties and to preventinterference with friendly military operations.

c. Prevent or deter interference by hostileforces or other nations.

d. Provide continuing analysis of politicaland cultural factors to maximize political andpsychological effects of the operation.

e. Exploit withdrawal of US forces whilecreating positive perceptions of US intent andgoodwill.

4. PSYOP Forces, Capabilities,and Organization

All Active component and Reservecomponent PSYOP units are subordinate toUS Special Operations Command. OtherActive component organizations from theServices have unique capabilities that can beemployed to support PSYOP.

a. Military and civilian personnel includeregional experts and linguists whounderstand the political, cultural, ethnic, andreligious subtleties of the target audience.Also included are functional experts intechnical fields such as broadcast journalism,radio operations, print, illustration,interrogation, layout operations, and long-range tactical communications.

b. Principal capabilities of PSYOP forcesare as follows:

• Analyze potential targeted audiences toidentify critical communicators andmedia, cultural and language nuances,and applicable themes and symbols.

• Based on that analysis, developprograms and products that advocate thesupported combatant commander’smission and objectives.

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• Employ organic and nonorganic assets todevelop, print, and disseminatephotographic, audio, visual, and audio-visual products that support theseprograms.

c. During contingency operations, the seniorPSYOP HQ is normally under the operationalcontrol of the supported combatant commander.

5. Responsibilities

The combatant commander’s PSYOP officer isresponsible for preparing the PSYOP portion ofthe Operations Annex to the combatantcommander’s NEO OPLAN and/or operation planin concept format. Authority for approval ofPSYOP programs and products should bedelegated to the CJTF in the PSYOP Appendix.Additional responsibilities include the following:

a. Advise the commander on PSYOP-relatedmatters.

b. Work under the staff supervision of theOperations Officer.

c. Prepare the PSYOP Annex or Appendixof the OPLAN or OPORD.

d. Provide liaison on PSYOP-relatedmatters, as required by the commander.

e. Coordinate and monitor PSYOP duringthe execution phase of the NEO.

f. Coordinate PSYOP with the staff andEmbassy PAOs.

6. PSYOP

If the JFC desires to employ PSYOP, thatdecision should be coordinated with theAmbassador and appropriate members ofthe embassy staff. DOS personnel shouldbe able to provide JTF PSYOP personnelwith valuable information about the targetaudience and any programs similar toPSYOP they may have been using inpreparation for the NEO or the crisis thatprecipitated the NEO requirement.

APPENDIX DNEO PLANNING GUIDANCE

D-1

This appendix provides questions that may be used to provide a common framework forevacuation planning and operations. These questions may serve as focus for the detailedplanning and operational dialog between diplomats and military forces that must precede anysuccessful evacuation operation.

1. Will this be a permissive, uncertain, or hostile NEO? If the evacuation is permissive,are unarmed hostilities expected? If the evacuation is uncertain or hostile, will pursuit forcesbe necessary? What is the likelihood of terrorist activities?

2. What multinational forces will be operating in the area?

a. Are multinational forces integrated into the JTF plan?

b. How are plans being deconflicted if the evacuations are separate?

3. What is the current situation in the country? In the Embassy? Near the US citizens?

4. Who is the senior US official in charge of the evacuation operation?

5. Who will give the JTF permission to complete the evacuation and to leave the evacuationsite?

6. What is the chain of command for US military forces?

7. What is the relationship between the CJTF and the Ambassador?

8. Will all US mission and/or embassy officials be leaving? If not, who will remain?What action should be taken in the event an embassy official refuses evacuation?

9. Who will screen the evacuees?

a. Are there embassy personnel assigned to screen?

b. Are there any evacuees (e.g., wardens) who will be able to help with processing andscreening?

c. What are the JTF requirements for screening?

10. Who makes the final determination of evacuee accounting prior to final evacuationdeparture?

11. Is the Embassy’s EAP available? Is it up to date?

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Joint Pub 3-07.5

12. Who is the primary point of contact within the Embassy to work with the JTF on detailsof the operation?

13. What steps are being taken by the Embassy to get the evacuees ready for evacuation?

14. Are there any members of the JTF, or anyone reasonably available, who have been inthe host nation recently?

15. Is there any intelligence needed immediately from the evacuees?

16. Have the primary and alternate assembly areas, evacuation sites, and routes been verifiedand surveyed?

17. Have the screening and processing areas been verified?

18. What is the total number of US personnel to be evacuated?

19. What action should be taken concerning individuals not on the list of evacuees (e.g.,TCNs)? What is the total number of TCNs to be evacuated?

a. Number per priority category.

b. Identification.

20. What will be the composition of the evacuees? Will there be a cross section of thoselisted in the EAP?

21. What discipline problems are expected from the evacuees? Who are the potentialtroublemakers?

22. What action should be taken if there is an outbreak of violence among evacuees?

23. What action should be taken if someone asks for political asylum?

24. Will it be necessary to search the baggage and personal property of all evacuees forweapons or explosives?

25. Who will be available to physically search female evacuees?

26. What proof of US citizenship is acceptable?

27. Are there any changes in the standard priorities for evacuation?

28. Will the US Embassy be able to assign evacuation priorities before it schedulesevacuation?

29. What are the arrangements for evacuee housing, security, and transfer? Will protectiveclothing be required? Will food be required?

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NEO Planning Guidance

a. Type.

b. Quantity.

c. Location.

30. Are any animals (pets) prohibited from traveling on the designated transportation?Have restrictions concerning animals been identified at the safe haven location?

31. Will JTF search teams be sent after missing evacuees?

32. Is there any sensitive equipment or material that will need to be evacuated or destroyed?Will personnel with requisite clearances be required to assist in evacuating or destroyingsensitive equipment or material?

33. Are there procedures to handle claims against US civilians?

34. If required, who will provide an emergency resupply of ammunition for the advanceparty?

35. What cultural nuances and customs should be known by the JTF evacuation force toavoid confrontation?

36. Who are the key host country personnel and what are their attitudes toward theevacuation?

37. Will medical support be available from the Embassy or host country? Have MEDEVACprocedures been coordinated with the host country? Where are the host country health services?

a. Location.

b. Availability.

c. Capability.

38. What is the policy concerning seriously wounded evacuees? Should they be givenprecedence over all other evacuees? What is the physical condition of all evacuees? Are AEassets required? If so, is there a need to pre-stage those assets nearby, and what are themedical evacuation procedures?

39. Where are the host country police forces?

a. Location.

b. Availability.

c. Capability.

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Appendix D

Joint Pub 3-07.5

d. Loyalty to the host government.

e. Hostility to the United States.

f. Factional infighting present.

40. Where are the host country fire services?

a. Location.

b. Availability.

c. Capability.

41. Where are the host country military forces?

a. Location.

b. Availability.

c. Capability.

d. Loyalty to the host government.

e. Hostility to the United States.

f. Factional infighting present.

42. Will the host government be providing any security for the assembly areas of evacuationsites?

a. Location.

b. Unit.

c. Size of security force.

43. What is the potential threat?

a. Strength.

b. Composition.

c. Disposition.

d. Probable tactics.

e. Weapons available.

D-5

NEO Planning Guidance

44. Will interpreter support be available from the Embassy or the host country?

45. What communications support will be available from the Embassy and how will thecommunication architecture be set up to support the operations (i.e., networks, frequencies,secure equipment availability, need for relays)?

46. Can portable communications equipment be sent to the Embassy to facilitate improvedand secure communication?

47. Will transportation support be available from the Embassy or the host country?

a. Type.

b. Location.

c. Capacity.

d. Condition.

e. Operators required.

48. Who will prepare the PA plan? How often will it be updated? Who is the lead PAdirector? Will media representatives be evacuated?

49. Are there areas from which the media are restricted access? Is there a media supportplan?

50. What are the ROE for the JTF?

51. What is the guidance on the use of PSYOP?

52. What coordination has been made with the HN media to support the NEO and/or theNEO PSYOP plan?

53. Will the HN media provide support for the NEO and/or the NEO PSYOP plan?

54. What is the role of Civil Affairs in NEO?

55. Does the JTF have permission to drop sensors and insert special operation forces?

56. Who provides country studies for JTF with information such as LZs, concentration ofUS citizens, port facilities, landing beaches? How will this information be transmitted toJTF?

57. Have all requirements for strategic transportation system been directed to theUSTRANSCOM command center and/or crisis action team?

58. What is the best means of transportation to evacuate personnel?

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Joint Pub 3-07.5

a. Can commercial airlift provide more timely evacuation than deploying US militaryassets?

b. Have air requirements for units and equipment been identified in the Joint OperationPlanning Execution System?

c. Are US naval assets readily available to stage off the coast?

59. What are the appropriate command and control arrangements if the NEO is conductedas a combined operation?

60. Who will provide climatological, meteorological, and oceanographic information?

61. What support is available from other US sources?

62. What support is required by other US agencies?

63. What support is available from other participating nations?

64. What support is required by other participating nations?

65. Are trained EOD personnel available through the HN?

66. Are map products of the JOA and the embassy compound available? What are thesources?

67. Who controls and ensures familiarity with NEOPACKs and other geographicinformation?

68. Which evacuees have special medical needs such as pregnancy, infectious disease,exceptional family member, or pediatric health care problems?

69. What are the ROE?

70. Is an ISB available? Where? How extensive are its facilities and support capabilities?

71. Will the Ambassador allow an FCE to deploy?

Possible Dilemmas

Because each NEO is unique, situations may arise that require special considerations. JTFpersonnel should be briefed and prepared to deal with the following:

1. Questions concerning use of deadly force or a given weapon system in a given situation.When is deadly force authorized?

2. Interpretation of the ROE.

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NEO Planning Guidance

3. Hostile detainees who present themselves or are captured by the JTF.

4. Civil disturbance, from passive resistance or civil disobedience to violence.

5. Terrorism.

6. Bomb Threats.

7. Snipers.

8. Nonambulatory evacuees.

9. Language problems.

10. Religious problems.

11. Potential evacuee’s name not on list provided by the Embassy but appearing to be abona fide evacuee.

12. Deaths of evacuees and evacuation of remains.

13. Listed evacuees or unlisted potential evacuees with unknown identifications.

14. Evacuees carrying contraband and disposition of the contraband.

15. Overwhelming numbers of civilians coming to assembly areas or at the evacuation sitesto request evacuation.

16. Listed evacuee refusing evacuation.

17. Evacuee attempting to give bribes to gain favor.

18. Inaccurate evacuation lists.

19. Large numbers of international journalists converging on the area.

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Appendix D

Joint Pub 3-07.5

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX ESAMPLE EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN CHECKLISTS

E-1

This appendix contains sample checklists from the DOS Emergency Planning Handbook, 12FAH-1. Checklists similar to these are normally found in an embassy EAP.

CHECKLIST FOR US MILITARY ASSISTED EVACUATION

1. Name and title of American official in charge of the evacuation:________________________________________________________________________.

2. American officials remaining behind: (Attach list with names, means of contact).

3. Post officials available to assist in the processing and evacuation: (Attach list - see DOSEmergency Planning Handbook Exhibit 120 - update to show name, probable location, andmeans of identification and contact of officer performing each relevant function).

4. Where and at how many stations will the military be conducting screening ofevacuees?___________________. Who will assist the military?____________________.

5. Is the environment permissive, uncertain, or hostile?____________________________.

6. Perimeter security needs:________________________________; assembly areas andembarkation points:_________________________________________________________.

7. What security will host government or controlling authority provide?________________________________________________________________________.

8. Are alternate evacuation, assembly, or reception sites available if required?________________________________________________________________________.

8a. Where are the NEOPACKs located and who has custody of them? ________________.

9. Could unauthorized persons forcibly attempt to join the evacuation? If so, what actiondoes the post recommend? ___________________________________________________.

10. What action does the post propose if someone asks for political asylum?________________________________________________________________________.

11. Will the post’s OIC vouch for the baggage and personal property of all or some evacueesor should a search for weapons and explosives be conducted?_______________________________________________________________________________________.

12. Does the post desire the military to physically search those evacuees that the post cannotvouch for?________________________________________________________________.

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Appendix E

Joint Pub 3-07.5

13. If it becomes necessary to physically search a woman, who can conduct the search?________________________________________________________________________.

14. If the evacuation priority is different than stated in the post plan, give the modifiedpriority: __________________________________________________________________.

15. Will food be required?______________Total Meals:___________________________.

16. Is potable water available?_________Quantity of bottled water required:__________.

17. Does the post anticipate that any Americans will refuse evacuation?______________.

18. What is the policy on evacuees taking pets? If pets are allowed to be transported, haverequirements such as customs and quarantine restrictions been considered to ensure the petswill be allowed into the safe haven? If pets are not allowed to travel, what will happen to thepets evacuees bring with them to the evacuation processing centers?__________________________________________________________________________________________.

19. Does the post anticipate that military personnel will be needed to search for missingevacuees? If so, in which areas are evacuees likely to be located? (Give radio call signfrequencies, if known.) ______________________________________________________.

20. Would a search operation meet armed resistance?_______________________________.

21. Will the post need help to destroy sensitive materials or equipment? _____________.

22. Portable radios available to assist in assembly, movement, and control of evacuees(consider all likely points):

How many sets?_________; Frequencies?________; Additional needs?_______________.

23. Who will prepare manifests of evacuees? Post:______________________________Military:_________________________________________________________________.

24. Other items that may affect NEO are:

a. Travel restrictions, curfew, roadblocks.

b. Local military activities.

c. Political or security factors affecting evacuation.

d. Public affairs considerations.

25. If interpreters are needed, can post provide? ________________________________.

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Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists

26. Provide updated copies of the post’s:

a. EPH Section 1540 and exhibits for same.

b. Communications annex.

c. Logistics annex.

d. Transportation annex.

e. F-77 (Potential Evacuees) Report.

f. NEOPACKs

27. Give number of evacuees who are:

a. Wounded, injured, or ill: litter___________________________________________.

b. Wounded, injured, or ill: ambulatory______________________________________.

c. Pregnant___________________________________________________________.

28. What medical assistance (to include special equipment) will be required?________________________________________________________________________.

29. Breakdown of evacuees by age and sex:

0-7 yrs 8-16 yrs 17-20 yrs 21+ yrsmale ________ ________ ________ ________

female ________ ________ ________ ________

30. Will doctor(s) and nurse(s) be among the evacuees?_____________________________.

31. Will any influential religious or community leaders be among the evacuees?

32. Weight and volume of any sensitive materials or equipment requiring evacuation:______________lbs._________________cu.ft.

33. Attach an intelligence estimate of the local situation and HN military status.

ASSEMBLY AREA

LOCATION:__________________________ DATE: ___________________________

_______________________Assembly Area_____________________Primary

___________________Embarkation Point___________________Alternate

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Appendix E

Joint Pub 3-07.5

1. Location: ____________________________________________________________.

2. Grid coordinates:_______________________________________________________.

3. Reference points:_______________________________________________________.

4. Size:________________________ Estimated capacity:_________________________.

5. Shelter: _____________________________________________________________.

6. Cooking facilities:_______________________ Water:__________________________.

7. Food Stocks: __________________________________________________________.

Estimated person/days on hand: ___________________________________________.

8. Latrine and shower: ____________________________________________________.

9. Security: _____________________________________________________________.

10. Control point:_________________________________________________________.

11. Telephone:_______________________Radio call sign:_________________________.

12. Access, choke points:___________________________________________________.

Alternates: __________________________________________________________.

13. Nearest police station:___________________________________________________.

14. Nearest medical facility:_________________________________________________.

15. Emergency power supply: _______________________________________________.

16. Distances to embarkation points: __________________________________________.

17. If HLZ, identify:_______________________________________________________.

This report prepared by: ____________________________________________________.

____Sketch attached____Video attached____Photo attached

HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE

LOCATION:______________________DATE:____________________________

1. Designator:_____________________________

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Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists

2. Location:_______________________________

3. Grid: __________________________________

4. Reference point(s):________________________________________________________________________.

5. Dimensions:________________________________________________________________________.

6. Surface:________________________________________________________________________.

7. Obstacles:________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________.

8. Recommended air approach(es):________________________________________________________________________.

9. Recommended ground approach(es):________________________________________________________________________.

10. Distance(s) to assembly area(s):________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________.

11. Comments:________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________.

This report prepared by: ______________________________________________________.

____Sketch attached____Video attached____Photo attached

AIRFIELD SURVEY

LOCATION:__________________________DATE:______________________________

1. Name of airfield: _______________________________________________________.

2. Location (map coordinates):______________________________________________.

3. Fuel (type and availability): ______________________________________________.

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Appendix E

Joint Pub 3-07.5

4. Materials Handling Equipment ___________________________________________.

5. Elevation: ___________________________________________________________.

6. Runway length:________________________________________________________.

7. Runway width:_________________________________________________________.

8. Surface composition and estimated single wheel loading factor: ________________________________________________________________________________________.

9. Available parking area:__________________________________________________.

10. Largest aircraft accommodated:___________________________________________.

11. Instrument approach facilities; navigation aids:_______________________________.

12. Aircraft obstacles: _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________.

13. Are runways/taxiways lighted?____________________________________________.

14. Communications (frequencies, call signs used):_______________________________________________________________________________________________________.

15. Physical security: ______________________________________________________.

16. Is the airfield under civilian or military control?______________________________________________________________________________________________________.

17. Status of commercial air traffic into and out of the airfield during the period in issue:________________________________________________________________________.

18. Does the airfield meet International Civil Aviation Organization standards for signs,markings, and other applicable requirements? ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________.

19. What is the availability of Federal Aviation Administration certified air trafficcontrollers?_______________________________________________________________.

20. Key contacts: _________________________________________________________.

21. Distance from assembly area to airport:

Primary:____________________________ Secondary: ___________________________.

22. Conditions of roads leading to airport: _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________.

E-7

Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists

23. Conditions and weight limits of bridges leading to airports: ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________.

24. On-site assembly areas and capacity:_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________.

25. Latrine and shower facilities: _____________________________________________.

26. Feeding facilities and capacity:____________________________________________.

27. Text or copy of description in “Airfield and Seaplane Stations of the World”:________________________________________________________________________.

This report prepared by: ____________________________________________________.

____Sketch attached____Video attached____Photo attached

Note: Complete a separate form for each airfield considered feasible for use during anevacuation.

SEAPORT SURVEY

LOCATION:________________________DATE:______________________________

1. Name of seaport:_______________________________________________________.

2. Location (map coordinates):______________________________________________.

3. Entrance restrictions and minimum anchorage:_______________________________.

4. Channel depth, depending on season:______________________________________.

5. Tide, depending on season:______________________________________________.

6. Pilots required or available:______________________________________________.

7. Navigational aids:______________________________________________________.

8. Port or beach obstacles: __________________________________________________.

9. Wharf (description and capabilities): ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________.

10. Materials Handling Equipment:___________________________________________.

11. Fuel (type and availability): ______________________________________________.

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Appendix E

Joint Pub 3-07.5

12. Physical security available and in use: _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________.

13. Distance from post to seaport: ____________________________________________.

14. Conditions of roads leading to the seaport:__________________________________________________________________________________________________________.

15. Condition and weight limit of bridges leading to seaport: ______________________________________________________________________________________________.

16. On-site assembly areas and capacity: ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________.

17. Dining facilities and capacity: ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________.

18. Latrine and shower facilities: _____________________________________________.

19. Location of nearest medical facility:________________________________________.

20. Key contacts, key personnel: ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________.

This report prepared by: ____________________________________________________.

____Sketch attached____Video attached____Photo(s) attached

APPENDIX FSAMPLE FORMS NOTICE

F-1

STAND FAST NOTICE

NAME OF POST:_______________________ DATE:______________

Because of the current local situation, this office recommends that Americans remain in theirhomes. Only the most essential outside activities should be conducted and public areasshould be avoided until the situation improves. Since there is always the possibility thesituation will deteriorate and you will be required to move elsewhere, this office recommendsthat you promptly take the following precautions:

1. Without hoarding, try to keep on hand a reasonable supply (7 to 10 days) of food, water,and fuel. If you have a personal automobile, be sure it is ready for immediate use; fill the gastank and check the oil, water, tires, and battery.

2. If your passport, exit visa, or registration with this office is not current, contact usimmediately at telephone__________________.

3. Collect all important papers and documents, such as passports; birth, marriage, divorce,and naturalization certificates; inoculation cards; insurance policies; bank books; as well asUS and local currency.

4. Make or update a complete inventory of your household effects in duplicate.

5. Prepare for each family member one suitcase (66 pounds or less) to contain, as applicable,warm clothing regardless of season, eyeglasses, babies’ and children’s supplies, and specialmedications.

6. Listen to the local media and Voice of America, US Armed Forces Radio, or the BritishBroadcasting Company closely for announcements from the local government or this office.

Your warden is ___________________, who can be reached at_______________.

We are monitoring the situation and will provide you with further guidance. Please pass thecontents of this notice to other US citizens and keep it handy for reference.

Figure F-1. Sample Stand Fast Notice

F-2

Appendix F

Joint Pub 3-07.5

LEAVE COMMERCIAL NOTICE

NAME OF POST:_______________________ DATE:_______________

1. In view of the gravity of the current local situation, this office recommends that Americanswhose presence in the country is not essential, depart by commercial transportation as soonas possible. If adult US citizens have compelling reasons for remaining in the area, wesuggest that dependents depart with their pets while normal commercial facilities are stillavailable.

2. American citizens with valid passports and foreign dependents with valid passports orvisas should not come to this office for travel arrangements. Rather, they should make theirown arrangements directly with transportation companies or travel agents.

3. Persons departing are requested to inform this office by telephone___________, or mailof their departure plans, providing the following information: name(s), date(s) and place(s)of issuance of passports, probable date(s) and mode(s) of transportation, and names andaddresses of next of kin or other point of contact in the United States or travel agents.

4. This office cannot accept any personal or real property for protection, but will acceptcopies of inventories of property left in the country and attempt to arrange for protection ofsuch property through the local authorities.

5. American citizens without valid passports or who are unable to arrange for their owntravel or that of their dependents because of insufficient funds or other reasons should reportto this office as soon as possible. They should bring with them:

a. American passports or other proof of US citizenship.

b. For non-American spouses, children, and dependents: passports or identification cardsand proof of relationship (birth or marriage certificates).

6. Please pass the contents of this notice to other US citizens and keep it handy for reference.

Figure F-2. Sample Leave Commercial Notice

F-3

Sample Forms Notice

EVACUATION NOTICE

NAME OF POST:_______________________ DATE:_______________

Because of the situation in this country, the Ambassador has determined that the evacuationof all US citizens is advisable. As the operations of this office may be terminated with littleor no advance warning, American citizens wishing US Government assistance should contacttheir wardens or this office immediately (telephone_________). The Embassy/Consulate isarranging chartered transportation to the United States or another safe haven. The issuanceof tickets is not feasible and all persons being evacuated will be asked to sign promissorynotes to cover the cost of their transportation. The Department of State will bill evacueeslater for the costs incurred. (US Government personnel and their dependents travel on officialorders and therefore their respective agencies, will be billed.) To provide proper protectionand to help you leave safely, we ask you to follow these instructions:

1. Your warden is _______________ and may be contacted at_____________.

2. Your assigned assembly area is at___________________________.

______ a. Please be there at _____.

______ b. You will be told later when to report.

______ c. Do not bring your vehicle to the assembly point.

______ d. Bring enough food for each family member to have _____ meals.

______ e. Cooking facilities are not available, so bring ready-to-eat food(canned items, sandwiches, etc.).

______ f. Bring an unbreakable container with _____ quart(s) of water perperson.

______ g. Pets will be transported during this NEO and are allowed at theassembly point.

(Only checked items apply)

3. Prepare to bring with you all important personal papers (passports, inoculation cards,cash, credit cards, and checkbooks) and one suitcase (66 lbs. or less) per person containingclothing suitable for the local climate as well as for a change of climate. Remember eyeglasses,special medicines, and baby/children supplies. Do not bring firearms or liquor. Pets areallowed only if specifically authorized above.

Figure F-3. Sample Evacuation Notice

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Appendix F

Joint Pub 3-07.5

4. Adult family members should consider the possibility of becoming separated temporarily.Problems can be avoided by exchanging data concerning bank accounts, addresses andtelephone numbers of relatives in the United States, and powers of attorney.

Figure F-3. Sample Evacuation Notice (cont’d)

F-5

Sample Forms Notice

EMBASSY/POST CLOSING NOTICE

NAME OF POST:_____________________ DATE:______________

The situation in this country is such that the US Government is closing its offices hereeffective___________________.

The Embassy of___________________located at_________________will protect USinterests until further notice.

We recommend that American citizens leave the country immediately. Until this office ceasesoperations, we will make every effort to assist US citizens still wishing to depart. Those whoplan to remain should provide their names, addresses, and next of kin so this office can passthe information to the Department of State and to the________________________Embassy.

Please pass the contents of this notice to other US citizens and keep it handy for reference.

Figure F-4. Sample Embassy/Post Closing Notice

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Appendix F

Joint Pub 3-07.5

WAIVER OF EVACUATION OPPORTUNITY

1. Agreement made, this________________day of______________, 19__, between

_________________________________________________________________________

______________________and the military forces of the United States.

2. Whereas the military forces of the United States agree to evacuate____________________________________________________________________________________________.

3. Said offer of evacuation is declined by the above named individual(s),with the understanding that the offer will not be repeated.

4. Evacuee Signature_________________________________________________

Evacuee Signature_________________________________________________

Evacuee Signature_________________________________________________

Evacuee Signature_________________________________________________

Figure F-5. Sample Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity

APPENDIX GREFERENCES

G-1

The development of Joint Pub 3-07.5 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Executive Order 12656, “Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities.”(18 Nov 88)

2. Memorandum of Understanding Between Departments of State and Defense on theProtection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens Abroad. (29 Sep 94)

3. DODD 2000.11, “Procedures for Handling Requests for Political Asylum and TemporaryRefuge.” (3 Mar 72)

4. DODD 3025.14, “Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens inDanger Areas Abroad.” (5 Nov 90)

5. Department of State Emergency Planning Handbook, 12 FAH-1.

6. Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

7. Joint Pub 2-0, “Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations.”

8. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

9. Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”

10. Joint Pub 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.”

11. Joint Pub 3-13.1, “Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W).”

12. Joint Pub 3-17, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater AirliftOperations.”

13. Joint Pub 3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).”

14. Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”

15. Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”

16. Joint Pub 4-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support toJoint Operations.”

17. Joint Pub 4-02.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Patient Movement inJoint Operations.”

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Appendix G

Joint Pub 3-07.5

18. Joint Pub 4-06, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in JointOperations.”

19. Joint Pub 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.”

20. Joint Pub 6-0, “Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)Systems Support to Joint Operations.”

21. Joint Plan for Department of Defense Noncombatant Repatriation. Headquarters,Department of the Army (16 April 1992).

22. FM 90-29, “Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).” (Final Draft) (1 Nov 93)

23. Commander, Surface Warfare Development Group Tactical Memorandum XZ0057-1-93/Operational Handbook (OH) 7-36, “Maritime Conduct of Noncombatant EvacuationOperations (NEOs).” (30 May 93)

24. Center For Naval Analysis 37 39-0003, “Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs):An Analyst’s How-To Guide.” (4 Aug 93)

25. CJCS Instruction 3121.01, “Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces.”

26. CJCS Manual 3122.02, “Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment DataDevelopment and Deployment Execution.”

27. CJCS Manual 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol II:(Planning Formats and Guidance).”

28. CJCS Manual 3122.04, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol II:(Supplemental Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance).”

APPENDIX HADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

H-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication tothe Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, FortMonroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness,consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Marine Corps. The Joint Staff doctrinesponsor for this publication is the J-3.

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CG MCCDC QUANTICO VA//DOC//(C42)//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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Appendix H

Joint Pub 3-07.5

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy(Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, DC 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AE aeromedical evacuationAMC Air Mobility CommandAOR area of responsibility

C2W command and control warfareCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCJTF commander, joint task forceCOA course of actionCOM chief of missionCONUS continental United StatesCOS chief of stationCSAR combat search and rescue

DAO Defense Attache OfficeDATT Defense AttacheDCM deputy chief of missionDHHS Department of Health and Human ServicesDOD Department of DefenseDOS Department of StateDZ drop zone

EAC emergency action committeeEAP emergency action planECC evacuation control centerEOD explosive ordnance disposalEPH Emergency Planning HandbookEPW enemy prisoner of war

FCE forward command element

GSO general services officer

HA humanitarian assistanceHLZ helicopter landing zoneHN host nationHNS host-nation supportHQ headquarters

IMO information management officerINS Immigration and Naturalization ServiceIO international organizationsISB intermediate staging base

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Glossary

Joint Pub 3-07.5

JFC joint force commanderJOA joint operations areaJRCC joint reception coordination centerJTF joint task force

LZ landing zone

MEDEVAC medical evacuationMSD Mobile Security DivisionMSG Marine security guard

NCA National Command AuthoritiesNEO noncombatant evacuation operationNEOPACK noncombatant evacuation operation packageNGO nongovernmental organizationNISH noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) intelligence

support handbooks

OIC officer in chargeOPLAN operation planOPORD operation orderOPSEC operations security

PA public affairsPAO public affairs officerPCRTS primary casualty receiving and treatment shipPOC point of contactPSO post security officerPSYOP psychological operationsPVO private voluntary organization

RLG regional liaison groupRMO regional Marine officerROE rules of engagementRSO regional security officer

SAO security assistance officerSATCOM satellite communicationsSECSTATE Secretary of StateSITREP situation reportSOFA status-of-forces agreementSOP standing operating procedureSROE standing rules of engagement

TCN third country nationalTPMRC Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center

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Glossary

USAID United States Agency for International DevelopmentUSCINCACOM Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic CommandUSCINCPAC Commander in Chief, United States Pacific CommandUSCINCSOC Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations

CommandUSDR United States Defense RepresentativeUSG United States GovernmentUSIS United States Information ServiceUSTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

VIP very important person

WLG Washington Liaison Group

aeromedical evacuation. The movement ofpatients under medical supervision to andbetween medical treatment facilities by airtransportation. Also called AE. (Joint Pub1-02)

combat search and rescue. A specific taskperformed by rescue forces to effect therecovery of distressed personnel during waror military operations other than war. Alsocalled CSAR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combined force. A military force composedof elements of two or more allied nations.(Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gatheredand activities conducted to protect againstespionage, other intelligence activities,sabotage, or assassinations conducted by oron behalf of foreign governments orelements thereof, foreign organizations, orforeign persons, or international terroristactivities. Also called CI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Country Team. The senior, in-countryUnited States coordinating and supervisingbody, headed by the Chief of the UnitedStates diplomatic mission, and composedof the senior member of each representedUnited States department or agency, asdesired by the Chief of the US diplomaticmission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

evacuation. 1. The process of moving anyperson who is wounded, injured, or ill toand/or between medical treatment facilities.2. The clearance of personnel, animals, ormateriel from a given locality. 3. Thecontrolled process of collecting, classifying,and shipping unserviceable or abandonedmateriel, US and foreign, to appropriatereclamation, maintenance, technicalintelligence, or disposal facilities. 4. Theordered or authorized departure of

noncombatants from a specific area byDepartment of State, Department ofDefense, or appropriate military commander.This refers to the movement from one areato another in the same or different countries.The evacuation is caused by unusual oremergency circumstances and appliesequally to command or non-commandsponsored family members. (This term andits definition modifies the existing term andits definition and is approved for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

evacuee. A civilian removed from a place ofresidence by military direction for reasonsof personal security or the requirements ofthe military situation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

hostile environment. See operationalenvironment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation. A nation which receives the forcesand/or supplies of allied nations and/orNATO organizations to be located on, tooperate in, or to transit through its territory.Also called HN. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or militaryassistance rendered by a nation to foreignforces within its territory during peacetime,crises or emergencies, or war based onagreements mutually concluded betweennations. Also called HNS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

human resources intelligence. Theintelligence information derived from theintelligence collection discipline that useshuman beings as both sources andcollectors, and where the human being isthe primary collection instrument. Alsocalled HUMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intermediate staging base. A temporarylocation used to stage forces prior toinserting the forces into the host nation.

GL-4 Joint Pub 3-07.5

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Also called ISB. (Approved for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.The actions and methods which implementjoint doctrine and describe how forces willbe employed in joint operations. They willbe promulgated by the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination withthe combatant commands, Services, andJoint Staff. Also called JTTP. (JointPub 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that isconstituted and so designated by theSecretary of Defense, a combatantcommander, a subunified commander, oran existing joint task force commander.Also called JTF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

liaison. That contact or intercommunicationmaintained between elements of militaryforces to ensure mutual understanding andunity of purpose and action. (Joint Pub1-02)

materiel. All items (including ships, tanks,self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., andrelated spares, repair parts, and supportequipment, but excluding real property,installations, and utilities) necessary toequip, operate, maintain, and supportmilitary activities without distinction as toits application for administrative or combatpurposes. (Joint Pub 1-02)

National Command Authorities. ThePresident and the Secretary of Defense ortheir duly deputized alternates orsuccessors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub1-02)

NEOPACK. Preassembled package ofselected maps, charts, and other geographicmaterials of various scales to support theplanning and conduct of noncombatantevacuation operations in selected countries

or areas. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

noncombatant evacuation operations.Operations directed by the Department ofState, the Department of Defense, or otherapp rop r i a te au tho r i t y whe rebynoncombatants are evacuated from foreigncountries when their lives are endangeredby war, civil unrest, or natural disaster tosafe havens or to the United States. Alsocalled NEO. (This term and its definitionmodifies the existing term and its definitionand is approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

noncombatant evacuees. 1. US citizens whomay be ordered to evacuate by competentauthority include: a. Civilian employeesof all agencies of the US government andtheir dependents, except as noted in 2abelow. b. Military personnel of the USArmed Forces specifically designated forevacuation as noncombatants. c.Dependents of members of the US ArmedForces. 2. US (and non-US) citizens whomay be authorized or assisted (but notnecessarily ordered to evacuate) bycompetent authority include: a. Civilianemployees of US Government agencies andtheir dependents, who are residents in thecountry concerned on their own volition,but express the willingness to beevacuated. b. Private US citizens andtheir dependents. c. Military personnel anddependents of members of the US ArmedForces outlined in 1c above, short of anordered evacuation. d. Designated aliens,including dependents of persons listed in1a through 1c above, as prescribed by theDepartment of State. (Approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

operational control. Transferable commandauthority that may be exercised bycommanders at any echelon at or below the

GL-5

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Joint Pub 3-07.5

level of combatant command. Operationalcontrol is inherent in combatant command(command authority). Operational controlmay be delegated and is the authority toperform those functions of command oversubordinate forces involving organizing andemploying commands and forces, assigningtasks, designating objectives, and givingauthoritative direction necessary toaccomplish the mission. Operationalcontrol includes authoritative direction overall aspects of military operations and jointtraining necessary to accomplish missionsassigned to the command. Operationalcontrol should be exercised through thecommanders of subordinate organizations.Normally this authority is exercised throughsubordinate joint force commanders andService and/or functional componentcommanders. Operational control normallyprovides full authority to organizecommands and forces and to employ thoseforces as the commander in operationalcontrol considers necessary to accomplishassigned missions. Operational controldoes not, in and of itself, includeauthoritative direction for logistics ormatters of administration, discipline,internal organization, or unit training. Alsocalled OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational environment. A composite ofthe conditions, circumstances, andinfluences which affect the employment ofmilitary forces and bear on the decisions ofthe unit commander. Some examples are:a. permissive environment — operationalenvironment in which host country militaryand law enforcement agencies have controland the intent and capability to assistoperations that a unit intends to conduct.b. uncertain environment — operationalenvironment in which host governmentforces, whether opposed to or receptive tooperations that a unit intends to conduct,do not have totally effective control of theterritory and population in the intended areaof operations. c. hostile environment —

operational environment in which hostileforces have control and the intent andcapability to effectively oppose or react tothe operations a unit intends to conduct.(Joint Pub 1-02)

permissive environment. See operationalenvironment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

psychological operations. Plannedoperations to convey selected informationand indicators to foreign audiences toinfluence their emotions, motives, objectivereasoning, and ultimately the behavior offoreign governments, organizations,groups, and individuals. The purpose ofpsychological operations is to induce orreinforce foreign attitudes and behaviorfavorable to the originator’s objectives.Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

repatriation. The procedure wherebyAmerican citizens and their families areofficially processed back into the UnitedStates subsequent to an evacuation.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

rules of engagement. Directives issued bycompetent military authority whichdelineate the circumstances and limitationsunder which United States forces willinitiate and/or continue combat engagementwith other forces encountered. Also calledROE. (Joint Pub 1-02)

safe haven. 1. Designated area(s) to whichnoncombatants of the United StatesGovernment’s responsibility, andcommercial vehicles and materiel, may beevacuated during a domestic or other validemergency. (Joint Pub 1-02)

signals intelligence. 1. A category ofintelligence comprising either individuallyor in combination all communicationsintelligence, electronics intelligence, andforeign instrumentation signals intelligence,

GL-7

Glossary

however transmitted. 2. Intelligencederived from communications, electronics,and foreign instrumentation signals. Alsocalled SIGINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority overassigned or attached forces or commands,or military capability or forces madeavailable for tasking, that is limited to thedetailed and, usually, local direction andcontrol of movements or maneuversnecessary to accomplish missions or tasksassigned. Tactical control is inherent inoperational control. Tactical control maybe delegated to, and exercised at any levelat or below the level of combatantcommand. Also called TACON. (Joint Pub1-02)

uncertain environment. See operationalenvironment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

unified command. A command with a broadcontinuing mission under a single commanderand composed of significant assignedcomponents of two or more MilitaryDepartments, and which is established and sodesignated by the President, through theSecretary of Defense with the advice andassistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff. Also called unified combatantcommand. (Joint Pub 1-02)

unit type code. A five-character,alphanumeric code that uniquely identifieseach type unit of the Armed Forces. Alsocalled UTC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

warden system. An informal method ofcommunication used to pass information toUS citizens during emergencies. (Approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

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Joint Pub 3-07.5

Intentionally Blank

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS

Includes scope ofproject, references,milestones, and who willdevelop drafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

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The CINCS receive the puband begin to assess it duringuse

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7,will solicit a written report fromthe combatant commands andServices on the utility andquality of each pub and theneed for any urgent changes orearlier-than-scheduledrevisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub isrevised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy asshown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications. Thediagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 3-07.5 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0 JOINT PUB 2-0 JOINT PUB 3-0

PERSONNEL

JOINT PUB 4-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to JointStaff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4CJCS Approval

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Lead Agent selects Primary ReviewAuthority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS,Services, and Joint Staff

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STEP #3Two Drafts

JOINT PUB 1

JOINTWARFARE

JOINT PUB 0-2

UNAAF