Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Journal of theAustralian Naval Institute

Summer 2000-2001

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC.

The Australian Naval Ins t i tu te was formed and incorporated in the ACT in 1975. The mainobjectives of the I n s t i t u t e are:

• to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and themari t ime profession; and

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• Regular Members. Regular membership is open to members of the RAN. R A N R , RNZN,RN/ .NVR and persons who, having qual i f ied for regular membership, subsequently leave theservice.

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

ISSN 0312-5807 Volume 26 Number 4 Summer 2000/2001

The Australian Naval Institute -PO Box 29 RED HILL ACT 2603

CONTENTS

From the President ~

Australian Naval Institute Audit Abstract for 2000

The 2000 Peter Mitchell Prize Winning Essay:Meeting the Challenge of Defence 2000 6- Lieutenant Commander Richard Gimblett CF

Ugly Duckling or Swan ? 1 3- Commander Tonv Vine RAN

The Commonwealth Naval Forces: .-,Australia's Navy - 100 Years of Service to the Nation- Dr David Stevens

The Medium Power Navy in the 21 s t Century -, |Captain James Goldrick RAN

Public Consultation and Defence Policy making - An Anzac ContrastR. T. Jackson 28

The Australian Maritime Defence CouncilWarren Bar us ley 33

The USN into the Future: A View from Massachusetts AvenueCommodore Jack MacCafferie AM RAN 35

Book Review: India's Maritime StrategyCaptain James Goldrick RAN 39

Front Cover: HMAS Dechainuex (RAN Official)Back Cover: HMAS Manoora (RAN Official)

The ANI Journal is printed by:National Capital Printing22 Pirie Street, Fyshwick, ACT 2609

Summer 2000-2001


FROM THE PRESIDENT

Members,

At the 2001 Annual General Meeting on the 20lh March I made the following remarks which I wouldl i k e also to share with the ful l membership through our Journal . Firs t the AM Renewal is makingprogress hut this year wi l l be crucial.

Adniinstrat ionIn this crucial area we have reorganized the procedures of the Institute. Ms Jean Davitt is providingprofessional assistance to the Secretary and the Treasurer. This has resulted in:

• Better administration,• A clearer appreciation of the Institute's financial state; and• The freeing up the ANI Council to do the real business of the organi/ation.

MembershipThe Council in conjunction with Ms Davitt has been working hard to ensure all members are financial.This has been a most effective exercise. I thank the many members who have forwarded renewals o \errecent weeks. The aim for 2001 must be to increase our membership numbers and I encourage allmembers to see what can be done in this area.

Friends of the ANII have sent letters to leading defence industry companies requesting their support in the form of a neutiered system. An increased level of support will be crucial to our renewal program. The new tieredFriends program offers greatly flexibility and has the characteristics detailed in the table below.

JournalThe journal must be the focus of our attention. Following on from the good work of Matt Rowe theCouncil is continuing to reinvigorate the Journal. This includes attempting to ensure it has widerappeal and content. Currently the Council is undertaking the Editorship of the Journal. This is only atemporary arrangement and our aim must be to have a professional editor.

FinancesThe f inanc ia l state of the ANI is unsatisfactory. Details of the AM's funds are detailed later in th isedi t ion. In short we are operating from Journal to Journal and this underscores the need to undertakethe renewal program. On a positive note we now understand the dimensions of the problem and havetaken steps to address the situation. The budget tabled at the ANI is ambi t ious but gives the prospectof a viable future for the ANI.

Slimmer 2000-2001


FEATURES

CorporateMembership

JAN!SubscriptionRecognition

on AN!Letterhead

Ad in J A N I

Places atA N I DinnerAppear on

ANIWebsite

COST ( P A )

TIER 1FRIEND

1

2

YES

ColourFull Page

2

YES

$1 (),()()()

TIER 2GOLD

Supporter

1

2

YES

One B+W FullPage

1

YES

$5000

TIER 3SILVER

Supporter

1

1

YES

One B+W HallPage

1

YES

$2,500

TIER 4BRONZESupporter

1

1

One B+WQuarter Page

1

YES

$1,000

T I E R SSHIPMATE

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Logo

$500

ANI ActivitiesFor the ANI to achieve its stated goals it is essential that it to do more than just produce the Journal.We arc therefore keen to expand its activities. One example is the co-sponsorship of the King -Ha l lHistory Conference (26-27 Ju ly) . I am keen also to host visiting speakers on an opportunity basis inCanberra, Sydney and Stirling.

The Council.A key to the renewal plans is to expand the council and assign part icular ly duties to members as waseffectively done in the past. We also need a younger and more diverse Council to more accuratelyreflect the membership. 1 am pleased that this in fact occurred and the new Council is:

President: Rear Admiral Brian Adams Vice President: Captain Peter JonesPublic Officer: Lieutenant David SwansonSecretary: Commander John ShevlinTreasurer: Lieutenant Cameron Moore to be relieved by Lieutenant Commander Drew ForsterCouncillors:

Captain James GoldrickCaptain Karel de Laat RANKC'aptain Paddy Hodgman RANRCommander Rex Edwards RNZN (New Zealand Chapter representative)Commander Craig Pritchard (Australian Defence College rep.)Dr. John Reeves (Osborne Naval History Fellow & ADFA rep.)Commander Mark FitzpatrickCommander Ray Griggs

Due to the demands of my position as DCN it is my intention to hand over the reins of the A N I th i syear. This will only occur once a suitable candidate is forthcoming.

Summary2001 is the make or break year for the A N I . We w i l l either to the 2002 AGM and say the ANI has afirm future or we wil l propose the disbandment of the Ins t i tu te . I am confident however that we w i l lsucceed.

Summer 2000-2001


AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE - ABSTRACT OFAUDIT FOR 2000

This is an abstract of the AN1 Audit for 2000. It was presented at the 2001 Annual GeneralMeeting is detailed below.

PROFIT AND LOSS STATEMENT FOR THE YEAR ENDING 31DECEMBER 2000

INCOMECorporate SponsorsJournal SalesSubscriptionsNZ ChapterSundry IncomeInterest ReceivedTOTAL

2000$5000.00$785.00$4198.00

$420.16

$10,403.16

1999$10,000.00

$769.00$6478.00$2080.00

$76.00$559.00

$19,962.00

EXPENDITUREAdministration CostsBank Charges & FIDChargesEntertainment ExpensesInternet ExpensesJournal PostageJournal PrintingMedallionsUnknown ExpensesTOTAL

2000$2135.26$110.90

$412.00

$1693.18$17.035.00

$3,270.00$24,656.34

2001$52.00$43.00

$781.00$250.00$1507.00

$13,175.00$600.00

$1,676.00$18,084.00

Summer 2000-2001


BALANCE SHEET - DECEMBER 2000

ASSETSCurrent AssetsCommonwealth BankCash at Bank S50Cash at Bank S30Total Current AssetsInvestmentsShares - DFCUTotal Investments

$5851.04$1200.07

$14.16$7056.27

$10.00$10.00

LIABILITIESCurrent LiabilitiesTrade CreditorsTotal Trade CreditorsGST LiabilitiesGST PaidTotal GST Liabilities

Non-Current LiabilitiesPre-paid Subscriptions 2001Pre-paid Subscriptions 2002Pre-paid Subscriptions 2003Total Liabilities

Net Assets

EquityMember's EquityAccumulated SurplusTotal Members EquityCurrent Year Earnings

Total Equity

$716.50$716.50

-$904.56-$904.56

$5363.10$915.00$355.00

$6445.04

$630.23

$7507.41$7507.41-$6877.18

$630.23

Siiinmt'i- 2000-2001


THE 2000 PETER MITCHELL PRIZE WINNINGESSAY

MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF DEFENCE 2000:A Transformational Fleet for

Australia's Future Defence Force

By Lieutenant Commander Richard Gimblett Canadian Forces

The 2000 Peter Mitchell Essay Competition asked entrants to look at theWhite Paper and the possihle shape of the future RAN. The winner gives aCanadian perspective of the RAN's future.

1 he RAN is at a crossroads. New An:acfrigates. Col/in* class submarines and theJervis Bav fast catamaran are joining the fleet,hut a replacement for the guided m i s s i l edestroyers is urgent ly required, the Adelaideclass guided missile frigates are overdue theirm i d - l i f e upgrade, and the b u l k o f therep len i shment and a m p h i b i o u s vessels arcageing. S t i l l , amongst the coun t ry ' s threearmed services, the broad range of capabil i t iesresident in the licet make i t un ique ly wellequipped for operations across the spectrum ofconflict .

The public discussion paper. DefenceReview 2000 - Our l-'unire Defence Forces,ident i f ies key choices w h i c h must be made\ \ i t h respect to Austra l ia ' s defence needs forthe 2 P' century. With the flexibility inherent ina balanced naval force, the RAN standspositioned to lead the ADF in meeting thechallenges of the 2 I s 1 century.

The present structure, however, wasdesigned to meet the challenges of the ColdWar. The simple fact is that the new andi m m i n e n t procurements w i l l complete a fleetof plat forms which , aside from incrementa lsystems upgrades, could be in service for then e x t h a l f c e n t u r y . The t r a n s i t i o n to a newglobal order raises serious questions as to thec o n t i n u i n g relevance of a navy conceived inthe 2() ' h century. Arguably, the fleet has mult i-purpose capabilit ies, but are they the bestba lance to meet the cha l l enues of the 2P 1

century? Does it have the right combination ofresources to meet the objectives of DefenceReview 2000'! Can it r emain r e l evan t to theneeds of the state? How can the nava l serviceadapt to the future?

The paths at the crossroads are these:follow the tried and true rationale of the past 50years; or embark on a new endeavour. Mil i taryins t i tu t ions are essent ia l ly c o n s e r v a t i v e innature , so the t empta t ion is to stick wi th theknown. But i m p l i c i t in Defence Review 2000 isthe sense that, r igh t ly or wrongly, in keepingwi th the sp i r i t of the new m i l l e n n i u m , thegovernment is searching for a new defencestrategy. Accordingly, the premise of this paperis t h a t continuation along the present course w i l llead to d iminish ing relevance to the state and,u l t ima te ly , the wi ther ing of the fleet.

With the f lexib i l i ty inherent ina balanced naval force, theRAN stands positioned to leadthe ADF in meeting thechallenges of the 21 s t century.

As an alternative, the discussion beloww i l l describe a number of factors t h a t arecoalescing to make the Navy the logical focus ofa new defence strategy for A u s t r a l i a . These

Summer 2000-2001


factors stand to have a major impact on thedecisions which arc pending within the comingyears on replacing the area air defencecapability and revi ta l is ing the expeditionaryforces. The present plans to modernise the fleetw i l l demand a s ign i f i can t portion of thedefence budget , p u t t i n g the Navy incompetit ion with the Army and Air Force forscarce funding . This is po ten t ia l ly a self-defeating strategy. As logical as these plans areto any naval professional, they are based uponold t h i n k i n g . They w i l l prove d i f f i c u l t tosustain before politicians seeking a differentso lu t ion . The su rv iva l of a professionalA u s t r a l i a n fleet i s con t ingen t upon the

m i l i t a r y spending on the basis of direct defenceof the homeland. The vast reaches of the Ind i anand Pacific Oceans, not to mention the absenceof any apparent aggressor, reduces the notion toan abstract. Strategic analysts are unanimous inthe assessment that, with no peer competitor tothe US in sight, there is little chance of global oreven major theatre war for several decades.

Evolving security concepts such asasymmetric threats are difficult for polit icianslet alone the general public - to grasp, andespecial ly when presented in n a v a l terms;protection of seabed resources and theenvironment are only s l i gh t ly less so. Theirprofessional experience leads dedicated staff

Photograph: John Mortimer

demonstration of its cont inuing relevance tothe state. I t is critical that t h i n k i n g beginsimmediately to obtaining the right equipment -and in the right mix and numbers - so as toaddress the new strategy. Urgent considerationmust be given to the transformation of theAustralian fleet.

The Changing Foreign Policy DimensionMore so than at any time in the past, it isincreasingly d i f f i cu l t to j u s t i f y Aus t ra l i an

officers to devise counters to these variousthreats, if only because they cannot afford to bewrong. Indeed, history proves tha t , sooner orlater, a capable warfighting fleet again w i l l berequired. At the same time, h is tory alsodemonstrates that the RAN has prospered whenits rationale clearly reflected the state's foreignpolicy (e.g., at the time of its creation in 1909;rearmament in the 1930s; and the balanced fleetof the early 1950s).

Slimmer 2000-2001


Conversely, the fleet has atrophied\ \ l i e n it did not (retrenchment following eachof the World Wars; and rust-out in the 1970s).In the present uncertainty, once again we standat the brink of the abyss.

Wi thout fa i l , in two world wars and inUN operations from Korea to the Arabian( i u l f . Australia has turned in need to a well-ba lanced l icet . I ndeed , in each of theseinstances, it was the Navy that made the initialdep loymen t of forces. The more recentexperience of Fast Timor, however, is perhapsmore i n d i c a t i v e of the future securitychallenges. Tellingly, in this instance the fleetwas not first upon the scene, and when it didarrive its power projection capabilities wereemployed in non-t radi t ional fashions. Thelogic is clear: if the fleet is to survive as aprofessional force for the inevitable calling, itmust remain relevant to the state in the interim,and th is is most ably accomplished by visiblysupporting the government's foreign policy.

While critics might choose to interprett h i s as catering to narrow service interests, itac tua l ly is in the best interests of the state. Inthe absence of major warfare, the futuresecurity e n v i r o n m e n t w i l l be dominated byoperations oilier than war (OOTW), whichone a n a l y s t has labelled "PeacetimeE n g a g e m e n t and Chaos Management".1

Indeed. OOTW is at the core of DefenceReview 2000. Capable defence forces wi l lc o n t i n u e to be relevant, because crisismanagement in peacemaking , peacekeepingand humani t a r i an assistance to failing states(peace support operations) is pre-conditionedupon the professional management of violence.

The single most important factor to beaddressed in fleet planning today, therefore, ist a i l o r i n g the Navy 's basic w a r f i g h t i n gcapabi l i t ies to provide this service.

How has the RAN fared in thischanging environment? Twice in the pastdecade, Austra l ian naval forces participated in1 \ peace support opera t ions . But in n e i t h e rthe Arabian Gul f nor in Hast Timor did thedestroyers and frigates of the RAN come incontact w i t h the predicted enemy. It also iseasy to env is ion scenarios such as a stand-offover the Spratley Islands which wi l l demand a

1 Alberto Coll, "The Role of the Naval Services inOperations Other than War: Peacetime Engagementand Chaos Management." in Richard H. Schu l t / J rand Robert I . . Plait/graft" Jr (eds.). The Role of\tivdl Forces in 2T' Century Operations( W a s h i n g t o n . DC': Brassey's. 2000). pp. 85-91.

role for n a v a l peacekeeping forces, and forwhich the Adelaide and An:ac classes areunique ly qual i f ied. But what if over the nextdecade there comes no such call for the use ofthese traditional forces? Certainly it behoves theRAN to maintain frigates and destroyers to meetsuch eventualit ies, but in the present business-case oriented environment, governments needmore tangible evidence of a return upon the i rinvestment or else they w i l l begin to loseinterest.

Frankly, the fleet has to be seen to bedoing something to just i fy its upkeep. In thedecades of peace f o l l o w i n g the NapoleonicWars, the RN rationalised i ts existence bydelivering the mail to the far-flung outposts ofEmpire. In a global si tuation analogous to today,although Britain was the only global power, theworld was far from peaceful. To effectivelyconduct this seemingly trivial task, the RoyalNavy had to m a i n t a i n a var ie ty of corecapabi l i t ies , which came to serve it in goodstead. Peace support has all the makings of beingthe "mail" of the 2P1 century.

Indeed, bas ic w a r f i g h t i n g s k i l l s areanything but mutual ly exclusive with OOTW. Agood case can be made t ha t a de te rminedcommitment to support peace operations \ \ i l lrequire a rigorous application of many of today'score capabilities (see discussion below) acrossthe spectrum of warfare. If there is l i t t l e threat ofgeneral war in the coming decades, thereremains no end of potent ia l ly host i le l i t tora loperat ing envi ronments in Aus t r a l i a ' s ownbackyard, in Southeast Asia and a round theIndian Ocean basin. It is not unrea l i s t i c toproject the development of no shortage of EastTimors, Solomon I s l ands , Cambodias andSomalias -• locat ions of recent ADF peacesupport operations with unfortunate regularityin the coming anarchy." All of these states areislands or have lengthy coastlines. The RANundoubtedly will have a role in any such futureoperations. The question remains what w o u l dbe the most advantageous contribution?

Fina l ly , it is necessary to ground anyevaluation of the changing foreign policy agendaagainst a rea l is t ic assessment of the cur ren tdomestic political situation. Especially importantin this regard is the fiscal climate wi th in whichmi l i t a ry spending can be anticipated. DefenceReview 2000 is b l u n t in its prognosis:"Government w i l l need to balance defencerequirements against other social objectives and

~ Robert D. Kaplan, The Coining Anarchy (NewYork: Random House, 2000).

Summer 2000-2001


priorities" and "Funding decisions, particularlyfor the next few years, w i l l take into accountmeasures to further improve the efficiency ofthe Defence organisation."'

Capabilities Vs PlatformsAn important clue to the direction sought inDefence Review 2000 comes in the statement,that "A policy focusing on contributing toregional securi ty could be a legi t imatealternative to structuring against a direct attackon Australian territory." Since peace supportoperations necessarily w i l l come to be appliedon other states' territory, the underpinning ofAustralian defence policy will continue to bethe land forces. The Navy and the Air Forcemust accept the fact that they wi l l be enablersof the Army. This does not mean that they areirrelevant.

Our major al l ies have accepted thislogic. The United States Navy has producedits Forward... From the Sea. The RoyalNavy's The Fundamentals of British MaritimeDoctrine underscores an expeditionary role. Itonly makes sense that a medium power such asAust ra l ia , w i th an activist in te rna t iona lperspect ive and w i s h i n g to m a i n t a i ninteroperability w i t h i ts major al l ies, shouldadopt a complementary force posture. Indeed,the ADF's own developing j o i n t doctrinespeaks to the logic of enhancing its amphibiousc a p a b i l i t y , for t h i s would focus somerationality to its defence structure. It would notmean that the individual services should haveto abandon the i r basic warfighting skills,which any responsible force must retain forfuture eventualities. It is beyond the scope ofthis paper to assess the required capabilities ofland or air forces in expedit ionary peacesupport operations, but examining those ofnaval forces is instructive. Even assuming apermissive delivery environment (i.e., a non-opposed landing), Austral ian naval forcesoperat ing in the li t toral could expect toparticipate in mid-intensity hostilities and shallrequire (in rough order of priority):

• distant deployability• self-defence• across-the-bcach delivery• C4ISR (command, control and intelligence

support), including:• embarked joint headquarters

• allied interoperability• green water undersea warfare• area air defence (to include providing for

forces ashore)• operational sustainment• naval fires (i.e., precision land at tack)• in-thcatre a i r l i f t ( i .e . , embarked aircraft)

Present reali t ies are that the Anzac frigates,Collins submarines and Hiton minehuntcrs nowentering service w i l l be the platforms stilloperating several decades hence . I ndeed ,al lowing for systems upgrades to meet theevolving threat environment, several of thecapabilities required for the expeditionary peacesupport role can best be met by this mix ofvessels. Wi th in only a few years, however, theRAN will be deficient in the critical areas ofarea air defence, deployability, sustainment andacross-the-beach delivery, whi le it does not atpresent hold a true naval fires capabi l i ty . Morefundamentally, as witnessed in East Timor, theADF does not have a functional joint structure toundertake peace support operations. Addressingthese s ign i f i can t deficiencies i n d i v i d u a l l ythrough a platform-for-platform replacement oracquis i t ion would prove prohibit ive. A cost-effective solution to these problems l ies ina d o p t i n g the idea of capab i l i t y -basedprocurement , and p r o v i d i n g for thesecapabili t ies in a common platform, the M u l t i -Role Combat Vessel (MRCV).

Traditionalists w i l l be quick to dismissthese concepts as l imi t ing the f l ex ib i l i t y inherentin a balanced naval force, while creating a highvalue un i t whose loss would prove crippling.The answer is that none of the core navalcapabilities need be lost (in fact, several of themcould be enhanced), and tha t the key lies inprocuring sufficient numbers of a common h u l l .At the same t ime , the c h a n g i n g secu r i t yenvironment allows for this method of ob ta in ing

3 Defence Review 2000. p. 56.4 Defence Review 2000, p. 61.

" Other analysts argue that the global trend is for"more cheap and nasties" (e.g., the USN'sStreetfighter concept - see VAdm(USN) A.K.Cebrowski and Capt(USN) W.P. Hughes,"Rebalancing the Fleet," USNI Proceedings|November 1999]). Whi le these might be practical fora largo navy, the numbers needed to provide therequired critical mass would put insupportablepressures on a medium-sized navy. Moreover, theyprovide for a narrow offensive combat capability notobviously required in the security environment that isthe basic assumption of this paper (and indeed ofDefence Review 2000). Finally, the experience of theTanker War in the Arabian Gulf is that large shipscan absorb a great deal of combat damage.

Summer 2000-2001


g r e a t e r e f f i c i enc ie s demanded by fiscalnecessity.

It is instructive to examine the case ofanother medium naval power that is grappling\ \ i t h these issues. Canada is a nation w i t hmuch the same experience, values and interestsas Australia, and whose mili tary developmentstend to mirror those of Australia, plus or minusa few years. Whi le not yet perfect, jointnesshas become a fundamental characteristic of theCanadian Forces (CF), its u t i l i ty proven invarious operations over the past decade. Toaddress the competing service demands fornew equipments, the CF are moving toward ap rocu remen t strategy t h a t would see thet r a d i t i o n a l p l a t f o r m - c e n t r i c approach replacedby one based more rat ionally on capabi l i t i es .Encouragingly, depar tmenta l bureaucrats ,pol i t ic ians, and even the three services areintrigued by the logic of the process.7 More tothe poin t for the purposes of th is paper, theCanadian Navy's AOR replacement projecthas g ro \ \n to encompass several othercapab i l i t y deficiencies made apparent in recento p e r a t i o n s , s p e c i f i c a l l y the need fo r m i l i t a r ysea l i f t and an embarked Jo in t headquarters. Itis now being pursued as the Afloat Logisticsand Sealift Capabili ty (ALSC) program.Again, broader appeal for this approach hasbeen demonst ra ted , w i t h recent pressdiscuss ion of the pro jec t already label l ingA L S C ' as "the peacekeeping ship."'' Also, it isnot beyond the realm of possibility that theneed to replace the command and control andarea air defence capabi l i t ies of the Iroquoisclass destroyers could come to be included( t h i s projec t is known as "CADRE", whichterm w i l l be used henceforth in this paper). Ifthere is a flaw in the ALSC/CADRE approach,i t is t h a t al l of the various capabi l i t ies arel ikely to be combined into each of only 3-4vessels. There is a physical l imi t as to what can

6 Government of Canada. Vice Chief of the DefenceStaff, Strategic Capability Planning forthei ciiuulian I'orces. |nd - June 200()|(http://www.veds.dnd.cu/dgsp/dd;i/strut/info_e.asp).7 VAdm(CF) G.L. Garnett, "Shaping the FutureForce: A Heller I 'nders tanding of Defence Policyand Strategy." I'anguard (Issue 4. Fall 2000). pp.15-18." Government of Canada, Chief of the MaritimeStaff, Canadian Afloat Logistics and Sen lit!(\i/>(ihility Ships (ALSC) - Concept of EmploymentGuidance, promulgated 10 January 2000.'' David Pugliese. "Canadian troops trapped inshipping dispute." Ottawa Citizen. 25 Ju ly 2000(www.ottawacitizen.com [00/07/25]).

be accommodated w i t h i n even the p l a n n e d26,000-tonne h u l l . The a t t e m p t to be a l l -inclusive is more l ikely to result in compromisesthat would see none of the needed capabilitiesproperly fu l f i l l ed ; moreover, i t l i t e r a l l y is toomany eggs in too few baskets.

A far more rat ional approach would beto bu i ld small numbers of hu l l s emphasisingeach of one or two of the capabi l i t ies . Modularconstruction, containerised suites, and otheroptions in design f l e x i b i l i t y would al low tasktai loring to the various roles (crews would bedetermined in a complementary fashion). Thesemodern techniques could optimise, for example.2-3 vessels with a combined Joint HQ and sealiftmission fit, recognising that a h u l l of that sizewould retain a residual AOR and even area airdefence capacities. Al ternat ively , a CADRF-specific f i t in 2-3 others would reta in t h ecapacity for limited AOR and sealift, while alsoproviding abundant precision s t r i ke capabi l i ty( e i t h e r v e r t i c a l l a u n c h c r u i s e missiles o rextended range gun muni t ions) , making it a t rulypotent vessel. As well, a two ocean navy such asthe RAN needs to consider the f lexibi l i ty innumbers required to allow for simultaneousemployment on several peace support missionsand the more t rad i t iona l task group operations(let alone maintenance scheduling), whichwould inevitably lead to a c o n f l i c t in mis s ionpriorities.

A Transformational Fleet StructureA shift in emphasis from a Cold War posture toone more responsive to the government's peacesupport agenda demands a re -d i s t r ibu t ion ofvessel types w i t h i n t h e R A N t h e"transformational fleet" of the title of this paper.The moment has arrived where the RAN shouldseize the in i t i a t ive and develop the concept ofthe MRCV as the basis for the fleet indeed ofthe ADF - of the 2P' century. There will alwaysbe a need for frigates and submarines, as thereare traditional tasks that can only be undertakenby those platform types and specific capabi l i t iesthat can only be main ta ined in them. Peacesuppor t operations, however, demand t h ereplacement of a number of other capabilitiesthat cannot al l be met in the present f i sca lenvironment.

I t must be emphasised tha t the proposedstructure is intended to allow the realisation ofgreater e f f i c i enc ie s w i t h i n t h e p re sen testabl ishment of the ADF. Since no increase innaval personnel should be expected, an increasein numbers of one p l a t fo rm mus t mean

in Summer 2000-2001


reductions in others. It can be expected thatdiesel-eleetric propulsion and other efficiencieswil l allow a signif icant drop in the size of anM R C V crew compared to the presentamphibious and support ships and air defencedestroyers and fr igates . Perhaps moreimportant is the fact that replacement of threeor four vessel types wi th one common h u l lwould result in significantly reducedinfrastructure costs.

Time now for the tough question -what about numbers? Operational researchmodelling would be required to confirm thenumbers needed to allow for the various roles,and the poss ib i l i ty that 2-3 peace supportmiss ions may have to be u n d e r t a k e nconcurrently. For the purposes of discussion,however, the Aus t ra l i an fleet of the 2 P'century should be distributed, with appropriatecoastal consideration, as follows:

• 6-8 Multi-Role Combat Vessels• 8 Anzac class multi-purpose frigates• 6 Collins class conventional submarines• 6 Iluon class coastal minchunters

The MRCVs should be commissioned in anorder of priority seeing the first 2 or 3 as abasic jo int (seal if t and force HQ) package.Thence the introduction of the CADREpackage should be timed with the paying-off ofthe Adelaide class into reserve (seeing them tothe end of their useful life w i t h o u t mid-l i feupgrade). Finally would come implementationof the AOR package.

I n s t i t u t i o n a l factors recommend theimplementation of this re-structuring over anextended period. To begin with would be therate of b u i l d i n g of the MRCVs. Thecommissioning of one every two years wouldallow for an orderly t ra in ing program andtransfer of crews from the destroyer-frigatecore to the MRCV, while bringing some long-term stabi l i ty to the Australian sh ipbui ld ingindustry (assuming an indigenous design or atleast l i cence -bu i ld ing would be a pol i t ica lrequirement). Again, it must be emphasisedthat, although the basic hull would be commonto the class, each ship down the slips would beb u i l t to a d i f ferent operational suite. Anextended building period would allow the fleetto keep abreast of the latest technologicaldevelopments, rather than being consigned toblock class obsolescence, as has been the habit.The final but vital consideration is that a 15-20year period also would allow the Army and Air

Force sufficient time to adjust their own forcestructures in line with the new joint posture.

There is no need to proceed at any fasterrate. The proposed re-structuring should not beseen as i n h e r e n t l y radical . The under ly inga s s u m p t i o n i s t h a t t h e r e i s n o t h i n gfundamental ly wrong with the present structureand roles of the ADF. Rather, th i s would allow amore efficient execution of the da facto conceptof operations. The expeditionary role is thelogical "defence" input to the foreign policypeace support agenda.

ConclusionRegional security has been the foundation ofAustralia's foreign policy for many decades. Thepost-Cold War notion of peace support is merelya shif t in emphasis wh ich demands a re-focussing of the country 's sea, land and airforces to a t ru ly jo in t expedi t ionary posture .Many factors recommend such a re-structuring,which can and must be accomplished wi thou tloss of each service 's basic warf ightmgcapabilities. For the Navy, the required shif t inscale of effort can be accomplished with a re-distribution of the numbers of various platformsin the fleet, which allows also for a rationalimplementat ion of other procurements needed toaddress essent ia l c o n t i n u i n g c a p a b i l i t yrequi rements . The transformational fleetdescribed above is not defini t ive, but does offerone solution to the c o n t i n u i n g Aus t r a l i andefence "problem".

About the AuthorLieutenant-Commander Richard Gimblettgraduated from the Roval Military College ofCanada (BA. 1979), Trent University (MA,19H1), and Universite Laval (PhD, 2000). Heserved as Combat Officer ofHMCS Protecteur /'//the Persian Gulf, and subsequently co-authored(with Major Jean Morin) the official history.Operation FRICTION: The Canadian Forces inthe Persian Gulf, 1990-91. He is posted to theDirectorate of Maritime Strategv.

II Summer 2000-2001


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12 Summer 2000-2001


UGLY DUCKLINGor

SWAN

The controversial LPAs are now back at sea. Beyond their changedappearances are some impressive capabilities.

tVLanoora and Kanimhla! Rust buckets what awaste of money, we should get rid of them!!How many times have I heard that over the lasttwo years from ill informed fellow navalofficers and sailors, none of whom have visitedthe ships since Manoora re-entered service inDecember 1999.

As so often happens, mud sticks. Thereis s t i l l a perception in the naval community oftwo rusting LSTs sitt ing alongside in Sydneysucking up maintenance dollars. This is farfrom the truth. Both ships are now back inservice, and already Manoora has alreadymade a s ign i f i can t cont r ibu t ion to ADF

operations and Kanimhla is poised ready to dothe same.

BackgroundIn 1994 the RAN took the opportunity topurchase two ex-USN "Newport" class LandingShips Tank. It is not my intention to go into thepolitics behind the decision to purchase theships, or the project creep (and mismanagement)which resul ted in the sh ips be ing inmodernisation for an extended period. I w i l lhowever give a brief overview of the condi t ionof ships when purchased, and the changes madeto the vessels, to allow the reader to gain anapprec ia t ion of the work u n d e r t a k e n by

13 Summer 2000-2001


FORGACs Dockyard, and the respective ship'scompanies in convert ing the vessels in toLanding Platforms Amphibious.

The LSTs were designed and built inthe late 1960s early 1970s, at a time when theUSN World War Two fleets were being de-commissioned, and the USN was faced with anongoing involvement in both the Cold war andV i e t n a m . The ships were b u i l t w i t h aprojected l i f e of 20-25 years and weredesigned to be able to transport equipment andpersonnel long distances, where they would bedischarged to shore over a ramp fitted to thefront of the ship.

The ships are fitted with six ALCOV 1 6 M a i n P r o p u l s i o n Diesel Engines( M P D E s ) . ALCO, short for AmericanLocomotive Company, identifies the heritageof the engines, they are in fact train engines.extremely robust, simple in construction and atthe t i m e the ships were b u i l t , there werethousands of VX, V12 and V16 ALCO enginesin service all around the world. In fact duringthe last six months of Manoora's refit many ofher Marine Technical sailors undertook a oneweek Al.C'O diescl course at the NSW StateRail Training centre in Sydney, as State Rail atthat time st i l l had sixty locomotives in servicepowered by ALCOs.

Both Manooru and Kanimhla werealmost 25 years old when purchased and theyhad all the problems of ships of that age. Theships conta ined s i g n i f i c a n t a m o u n t s ofasbestos, now removed as a resul t of ane x p e n s i v e and wel l -documented exerciseduring the refit. A number of MPDE and ShipsService Diesel Generator (SSDG) engineblocks were found to have significant crackingand were s u b s e q u e n t l y replaced by re-condit ioned blocks dur ing the refit. The shipsh u l l , decks and compartments were found tohave extensive wastage, which resulted in alarge amount of unplanned work in ensuringthat the ships were safe to return to service.

The ConversionIn May 1996 Ma no or a was towed toNewcastle to commence her conversion atFORGACS Dockyard to a Training HelicopterSupport Ship (THSS), later to be changed to aLanding Platform Amphibious or LPA.

Structural changesThe I .PA's new role required significants t ruc tu ra l changes. This included extensive re-c o n s t r u c t i o n of the area forward of the

superstructure which invoked the removal ofthe bow horns, ramp and operating equipment toprovide the forward helicopter landing spot.Modifications aft included the construction ofthe hanger, the Primary Care Reception Facility' (PCRF) , and the extension of the flight deckaft.

O t h e r m o d i f i c a t i o n s were t h econstruction of a Classroom, a B r i e f i n g Roomand a Embarked Force Operations Room on 03Deck. The vessels were also fi t ted w i t h bi lgekeels, w h i c h have s ignif icant ly improved thei rseakeeping characteristics.

A boat deck was constructed port side,fitted with two RHIBs and ship's cranage wasprovided with a 70 tonne crane fitted forward,and a 2.5 tonne crane fitted at the rear of thehanger.

MANOORA CLASS LPAAT A GLANCE

Displacement, tons: 4.975 l ight ; X.450 fuloadDimensions, metres: 168.2 _ 27.2 _ 5.3 (Aft)Main machinery: 6 ALCO 16-251 diesels;16,500 hp (12.3 MW) sustained; 2 shafts; cpprops; bow thrusterSpeed: 20 knotsRange:: 14.000 miles at 15 knotsComplement: 207 including I X ArmyMilitary lift: 450 troops (25 officers); 2 LCM8; 320 tons aviation fuelCiuns: I General Electric/General Dynamics20 mm Vulcan Phalanx Mk 15 fitted for butnot with. 6-12.7 mm MGs.Countermeasures: 2 SRBOC Mk 36 chaffand 1R launchers. (Manoora Only)Radars: Surface search: K e l v i n Hughes 1007;F/G-band.N a v i g a t i o n : K e l v i n Hughes: Type 1007.Helicopters: 4 Army Black Hawks or 3 SeaKinus or 1 Chinook

Habitability UpgradeWhen acquired from the USN the ships reliedheavily on saturated steam for galley services,potable water production, compartment heat ingand for the provision of hot water to bathrooms.The steam was provided by boilers, which werefound to h a v e reached the end of t h e i reconomical l i f e . The boilers were r e m o v e d

' The PCRF is a Level Three Medical facilityconsisting of operating theatre, high and lowdependency units (wards), blood hank, pathology andx-ray facilities.

14 Summer 2'(>()<)-2001


during the refit and replaced with a fourthALCO V8 Ships Service Diesel Generator.

The Galleys were gutted on both shipsand were re-constructed using electricallyheated equipment all protected with the latestfire protection systems. The original steamevaporator plant was replaced with a reverseosmosis plant capable of producing 150 tonneof potable water a day and six large electriccalorifiers were fitted to provide enough hotwater for 650 personnel, the galley, laundryand PCRF. The ship 's laundry was re-constructed and fitted with equipment capableof supporting the entire ships company andembarked force. The laundry is also capable ofmeeting hospital linen requirements in supportof the PCRF.

The original air condi t ioning unitshave been replaced by state of the art highcapacity uni ts , w h i c h can deliver more thanenough chilled water throughout the ship. Theunits have sufficient reserve capacity to allowthe ventilation in the Troops Messes to beimproved at a later availabil i ty.

Environmental UpgradeTo ensure that the ships complied with thelatest In ternat ional Mari t ime Organisations( I M O ) regulat ions on pol lut ion control andw i t h A u s t r a l i a ' s o b l i g a t i o n s under t h eMontreal Protocol significant changes weremade to the ships.

The ex i s t ing CHT system, wasmodified to provide a chlorine injection systemto treat both grey and black water, and a largegrease trap fitted to remove greases and oilsfrom galley and pantry grey water systems. AllOzone depic t ing refr igerant gases werereplaced and an I MO compliant Oily WaterSeparator fitted to treat bilge water prior to itsdischarge overboard. Kanimhla has been fittedwith a solid waste disposal compactor andincinerator faci l i ty , Manoora w i l l be fittedwith a similar facility at a later date.

Electronic UpgradeThe ships when purchased contained a largea m o u n t of (insupportable "orphan"communications and navigation equipment. Inthe course of the conversion the ship was fittedw i t h a K e l v i n H u g h e s 1007 radar, asophisticated array of Flight Deck landing aids,a Mk37 laser gyroscope, and a comprehensivecommunications suite. Manoora is also fittedwith a deployable Jo in t Force Headquarterscapabil i ty under Joint Project 8001.

Propulsion PlantThe LPAs have two s h a f t s f i t t e d wi thcontrollable pitch propellers, each of which canbe driven by up to three MPDEs. The shipshave three Main Engine Rooms each containingtwo MPDFs. The MPDEs connect to the shaftthrough air operated clutches via a s ing lereduction gearbox. This u n i q u e m a c h i n e r ylayout provides immense f l e x i b i l i t y andredundancy, as the number of MPDEs connectedto the shaft train can be matched to the desiredship speed to ensure tha t the engines areoperating at peak efficiency. The ships haveproven to be extremely economical in serviceusing up to 50% less fuel than an FFG at speedsof less than 15 knots.

The Bird Johnson Propuls ion controlSystem fitted during the modernisation allowsthe bridge to control the operation of the MainEngines and shaft, and prevents overloading ofthe MPDEs during rapid changes of shaft speedand pitch. The combinat ion of two shafts.Controllable Pitch Propellers and the Large"tunnel" Bow thruster make the ships extremelymanoeuvrable.

On Kanimhla the original switchboardswere replaced with electronically controlledswitchboards which have significantly improvedboth operator and equ ipmen t safety. I t isenvisaged that Manoora w i l l receive a s imi la rupgrade at a later avai labi l i ty .

The refit also included a number ofmaintenance packages, which i n c l u d e d theupgrading of the MPDEs and SSDGs to thelatest modification state, and the replacement ofthe original engine control system with the BirdJohnson computerised system. The maintenancepackages also included the replacement of theoriginal Air Compressors w i th modern locallysupportable PLC controlled Medium PressureAir Compressors.A l i t t le known fact is that the responsibility for alarge amount of maintenance conducted dur ingthe refit remained w i th the ship. As the crewincreased in size from the 30 strong steamingparty that accompanied the ship to Newcastle toits full complement of 207 so did the workload.For example in twelve month period the threeman ship's lagging team re-lagged over a squarekilometre of ships h u l l , often after hav ing to re-preserve the hull first.

Manning and TrainingThe RAN is operating the LPA w i t h 60 lesscrew than the USN. Despite the modif icat ionsmade to the ships the ships wi l l always be labour

15 Summer 2000-2001


i n t e n s i v e to operate and ma in t a in . TheE n g i n e e r i n g Department of the LPA is 83strong of w h i c h 67 are Mar ine Technica lsailors. A single watch below requires twelvesailors, two of whom require EngineroomWatchkeeping Certificates, with a further threehaving Machinery Watchkeeping Certificates.W i t h personnel absent on course, or doubledup for career progression, th is leves only ahandful of sailors to mainta in what is a verylarge ship.

The LPA is an ideal platform to provide init ialsea t ra ining for j u n i o r sailors and officers of allbranches . I ' n l i k e t h e m i n i m u m manned EE( i .ANZAC and COLLINS classes, the LPAsh a \ e a veritable feast of accommodationavailable for trainees. Since re-entering serviceManoora has conducted a Midsh ipmanTraining Cruise to Di l i , Darwin and Vila,embarked large numbers of Kanimbla's sailorsfor on the job training, and a detachment of 17junior Marine Technical sailors from El MA forcompetency log and operator qua l i f i ca t ionprogression. On each occasion the traineesr e c e i v e d exposure to l i fe at sea ga in inginvaluable life sk i l l s .

I lie First Year.In her first year of operational service in theRAN Manoora spent 240+ days outside ofS y d n e y , p a r t i c i p a t e d i n O p e r a t i o n sPLUMBOB, GOLD and TREK 2 , whilst at thesame time squeezing in Contractors Sea Trials,Work Up, Mariner Skills Evaluation and Firstof C'lass Fl ight Trials. In December 2000 theS h i p was awarded the A u s t r a l i a Cup forMarine Engineering Excellence. Not a badeffort for a ship still labelled a l iabil i ty and a

' Operation PLUMBOB - Evacuation of foreignnationals from Solomon Islands June 2000.Operation ( iOI . I ) Olympic (iamcs SecurityOperation, Aug-Oct 2000.Operation TREK - Solomon Islands PeaceMoni tor ing Mission No\ - I )ee 2000.

"Rust Bucket" in many quarters. At the t i m e ofwriting Manoorn is once again enroute to theSolomon Islands to provide logist ical support tothe International Peace Monitoring Team.

The FutureThe a v a i l a b i l i t y of both LPAs now a l lowsHMAS TOBRUK to undergo a much postponedrefit. The LPAs st i l l require some shortcomingsto be resolved and much of the LPAs capabil i tyis still to be realised. Manoora is expected to beformally accepted into Naval Service ( A I N S )during 2001, operations permitting.

The LPAs, along wi th TOBRUK, arequickly earning a name as "CAN DO" vessels.Their f lexibi l i ty in being able to under take awide range of taskings including, but not limitedt o . A m p h i b i o u s O p e r a t i o n s , Peacekeeping/Peace moni tor ing support , ADETraining, and providing a platform in support ofcivil aid to the community, w i l l ensure that theyare constantly in demand.

Despite t h e i r age. the LPAs, havesignif icant ly increased the ADF's a b i l i t y tooperate offshore and are a true "ForceProjection" asset. As the ADE cont inues toexplore the ship's capabilities a clearer view ofwhat the follow on class of amphib ious ship w i l ldevelop.

Just as the ugly duck l i ng eventual lygrew into a swan the transformation of Manooraand Kanimhlu from LSTs to v e r s a t i l e andcapable LPAs is almost complete.

About the AuthorCommander Tony Vine joined the RAN inJanuary 1971 as a 15 year old Engine RoomArtificer apprentice. He was selected forsubmarine service training in 1977 and was amember of HMAS Otama's commissioning crewin I97H. In 1984-86 he served on the staff ofFlag Officer Submarines at Gosport in theUnited Kingdom. Commissioned in 1988 hecompleted a BE(Muritime) (Hons) at theAustralian Maritime College in 1991. Afterpostings as the Marine Engineering Officer ofHMAS Orion 1993-95, Vine served on exchangewith the Canadian Forces during 1995-97, wasthe SUBSAFE Material Safety Officer 1997-98and the Engineering Officer of HMAS Manoorafrom January 1999 to February 2001. Promotedto Commander in January 2001, he is currentlyposted to DSTO - DTRIALS. Commander \ incresides in Canberra with his wife and two oftheir four children.

\h Summer 2000-2001


The Commonwealth Naval ForcesAustralia's Navy -100 Years of Service to the Nation

By Dr DM Stevens

Amidst the barrage of publicity surrounding the Australian Army's 100"'anniversary, it has been easy for Australians to overlook the fact that theirNavy has attained the same milestone.

Although some might point to 10 J u l y 191 1,and the Sovereign's granting of the title 'RoyalAustral ian Navy' as the birth of Austral ia 'sNavy as a more recognisable landmark, thet r u t h remains that A u s t r a l i a had alreadypossessed a unified naval force for more than adecade.

HMA Ships Y a r r a & Parramatta picturedsoon after their arrival in Australia, andbefore the Union Jack was replaced hy theCommonwealth's own flag. (RAN)

The legal basis for the creation of thefirst two national armed services came fromSection 51 of the Austral ian Const i tut ion,which gave the new Parliament the power tomake laws with respect to the naval andmi l i t a ry defence of the Commonwealth. AtFederation, the Governor-General, the Earl ofHopetoun, became Commander-in-Chief, andon 1 March 1901 the states transferred theirn a v a l and mi l i t a ry forces and everyoneemployed in their connection to the FederalGovernment. However, until Parliament couldcrea te the necessary l eg i s l a t i ve andadmin is t ra t ive machinery, the various forces

continued to be controlled under the exist ingColonial Acts and regulations. The four statesthat had maintained maritime forces through to1901_Queensland, New South Wales. Victoriaand South Australia_each possessed a NavalCommandant who reported i n d i v i d u a l l y to theMinister of Defence. For the first year allmi l i ta ry and naval un i t s retained t h e i r oldcolonial titles, but by May 1902 the Federalbureaucracy had adopted the collective namesCommonwealth Naval Forces ( C N F ) andCommonwealth Military Forces (later AustralianMili tary Forces) to dist inguish the two arms ofAustralian defence.

The prc-Federation naval forces wereintended solely for local defence, and wereprohibited from operating outside the three-milel i m i t . But even func t ion ing w i t h i n theseconstraints the colonial governments had soonfound that the responsibility of maintaining,repai r ing and operat ing warsh ips was anexpensive business. In an age of technologicalt rans i t ion few author i t ies could a f f o r d thecommitment of scarce indust r ia l , financial andhuman resources required to keep the i r vesselsin cont inuous and efficient commission. As aresult, the ships inherited by the CNF were tired,old and inadequate even for t r a in ing . Theyincluded the ironclad monitor Cerberus and fourtorpedo boats from Victor ia , the gunboatsGayundah and Pahima and two torpedo boatsfrom Queensland, and the gunboat Protectorfrom South Aus t ra l i a . The oldest vessel,Cerberus, had already seen t h i r t y years ofservice. The youngest, the first-class torpedoboat Countess of Hopetoun, had been completedin 1891. Permanent personnel strength total ledonly 239 officers and men, while another 1659served with the part-time naval brigades. Liketheir ships, many of these men were overage.

17 Summer 2000-2001


and one suspects that security of employmentoften ranked above a real desire to serve.

f h c ear ly federal adminis t ra t ions weretoo busy to be overmuch troubled with navaldefence and, with the ongoing war in SouthAfrica, public attention was concentrated farmore on m i l i t a r y mat te rs . ' The CNF'sbudgetary a l l o c a t i o n i n 1901 02 was ju s t167,000. In contrast , the 16.S74 men belongingto the various mi l i t a ry forces were allocated£63S,()()() . Despite the dispari ty, a dilapidatedCNF was not a major national concern if theRoyal Navy could continue to be relied upon toprovide m a r i t i m e protection. SuccessiveBritish commanders of the Australia Stationp r o v i d e d t h i s reassurance , a n d t h eCommonweal th ' s p a y m e n t of a subsidytowards main ta in ing a Royal Navy Squadronin Aus t ra l i a , reinforced the idea that issues ofn a \ a l policy were best left w i th the Admiral tyin London.

Concerned by the rapid growth ofJapanese and German n a v a l power in thePacif ic , the State naval commandants were lessc o n f i d e n t . Led by the Queenslandcommandant. Captain ( la te r Vice Admiral Sir)W i l l i a m Rooke Creswell , they feared thew i t h d r a w a l o f B r i t i s h forces under theexigencies of war. Australia, they argued, lyingat the extreme end of the world's sea routesand possessing no land frontier was open toattack only by sea. Unprotected, Australianfloating trade would be at the mercy of even asmall enemy force, and soon be either sunk orforced to seek refuge. With communicationscu t . i n d u s t r i a l paralysis and economicdevastation would fo l low.

Creswell consistently objected to thefar higher proportion of Commonwealth fundsexpended on the Australian Army's field force,' that branch of the forces that cannot see. muchless come into contact with, an enemy, u n t i lthe Kmpire is crushed at sea'.2 As he observedsharply in a 1902 parliamentary report: 'Thespectacle of some 5,000.000 Anglo-A u s t r a l i a n s , w i t h a n Army s p l e n d i d l yequipped , unable to prevent the burning of acargo of wool in s igh t of Sydney Heads, is

only the ordinary consequence of a policy ofnaval impotence.'1

1 Notwithstanding the South African War's greaterv i s i b i l i t y , at federation Austral ian naval personnelwere serving in China dur ing the Boxer Rebellion.~ Cited in G.L Maeandie. The Genesis oj the RAN(Sydney: Government Printer, 1949). p. 137.

Captain Creswell observes the C'N'F's 19(15Easter manoeuvres from the torpedo boatHMAS Countess of Hopetoun. ( R A N )

Deep issues of naval defence exercisedonly a handfu l of A u s t r a l i a n minds .Nevertheless, the idea of a more capableAustralian navy, locally manned, and under theCommonwealth's executive direction, graduallygathered support. The process was assisted byfurther progress towards s e t t i n g up themachinery to impose federal control over alldefence matters. The proclamat ion of theCommonwealth Defence Act in 1904 led to thesimultaneous creation of both a Direc tor ofNaval Forces and an Inspector-General of theM i l i t a r y Forces. The constitution of Boards ofAdminis t ra t ion for the two services likewiseoccurred together in January 1905. PrimeM i n i s t e r George R e i d d e l i b e r a t e l y choseA u s t r a l i a ' s best known n a v a l i s t . Capta inCreswell, as the first Director of Naval Forces.'

I S

' Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, 1 February1902. p. 149.

4 Orders for CNF uniforms were first placed in 1404.Of passing interest, CNF officers adopted the same

Summer 2000-2001


Whi le admit t ing that his service was'practically on the verge of collapse", and thatonly two of his lieutenants were fit for activeservice, Creswell embarked on a programdesigned to breathe new life into the CNF'soperations. Despite a restricted budget hemanaged to bring several of the gunboats andtorpedo boats back into commission andrenewed regular t ra ining exercises in PortP h i l l i p to improve combat readiness. Theseexercises soon grew into substantial eventswith the torpedo boats commonly called uponto demonstrate f l o t i l l a tactics against anapproaching 'enemy' cruiser. The part of thelatter was normal ly played by one of theQueensland gunboats. The naval commandantsof Victoria and South Australia alternated incommand afloat. No longer confined to servicein t h e i r own State waters, Creswell alsoordered selected vessels to under take Hagshowing cruises along the southern and easterncoasts and down to Tasmania. Public lectures,illustrated by lantern slides, further helped topush Creswcll's message.

The greater v i s i b i l i t y and renewedact iv i ty of the CNF proved the qua l i ty ofAustralian naval men and managed to excitepublic interest, but the service could not longsurvive without the replacement of its ancientvessels. Fortunately, Creswell found an ally inthe new prime minister, Alfred Deakin, who.l i k e his Naval Director, preferred activecooperation to subsidies. In September 1906,Deakin announced an i n i t i a l three-yearprogram of eight coastal destroyers and fourtorpedo boats, but deferred appropriating fundsun t i l after the general election scheduled forearly the next year.

Subject to pol i t ica l ca l cu la t ion asmuch as strategic perception, Deakin's navalscheme made slow progress. In December1907, following discussions at the ImperialConference in London and Admiralty advice,he announced that the CNF's force structurehad been m o d i f i e d to inc lude n ine smallsubmarines and a f l o t i l l a of six coastaldestroyers. Meanwhile, the Government hadsent two senior CNF officers on a mission tothe United Kingdom where they were directedto obta in p lans , specifications, and costestimates for the construction of variouswarships. On 6 February 1909, Australia's

rank insignia as that previously worn by theQueensland Marine Defence Force. A triangle wasused in place of the more familiar executive curl.Creswell's role in th is decision remains obscure.

naval representative in London requested tendersfor the first three vessels, the River Classtorpedo boat destroyers Parramatta, Yarra, andWarrego. Already in place were measures tobui ld up a local defence industry. The successfulyards were each required to employ at least adozen Australian workmen to help build Yarraand Parramatta. This allowed Warrego to betaken to pieces and shipped to Australia, whereit was re-erected at Cockatoo Island Dockyard.Three subsequent destroyers were bu i l t en t i r e lyin Australia.

Aus t ra l i an au thor i t i e s in t ended (heCNF's destroyer f lo t i l la to take on f u l lresponsibil i ty for coastal defence, leaving theRoyal Navy to deal w i t h more d i s t a n toperations. However, by the time I'urrumiilldand Yarra arrived in local waters in December1910, Australian naval policy had made an evengreater advance. Finding itself hard pressed tomaintain its global naval supremacy the RoyalNavy had already decided to support a moresubstantial Aus t ra l i an c o n t r i b u t i o n towardsdefence in the Pacific.

At the 1909 Imperial Conference theAdmiral ty 's First Sea Lord. Admiral Sir JohnFisher, suggested that the CNF expand from theplanned local defence f lot i l la to include a self-contained ' f leet u n i t ' based a round h i srevolutionary battle cruiser and several l i gh tcruisers. The combined package, argued Fisher,represented an ideal force structure; smallenough to be managed by Australia in times ofpeace but, in war, capable of effective actionwith the Royal Navy. Federal Cabinet gaveprovisional endorsement in September 1909 andorders were placed in the United Kingdom forthe additional ships.

Just as important was the passing of theAustralian Naval Defence Act 1910, wh ichprovided the clear legislative authority for anavy that would no longer be l imi ted toAustral ian terr i torial waters. The differencebetween the naval and mili tary forces of theCommonwealth was now striking. With anArmy compelled by law to serve only on localsoil, Australia had to raise a separate volunteerexpeditionary force to serve overseas in 1914.

Since 1904 CNF warships had beendesignated His Majesty 's Aus t r a l i an Ship(HMAS) , but this had never received the King'ssanction. During their visit to London for thecoronation of King George V, A u s t r a l i a nministers made known their desire to have theprefix 'Royal' attached to the Australian Navy'stitle. On 10 Ju ly 1 9 1 1 King George approved the

19 Smnincr 2000-2001


request 'wi th great satisfaction'. The decisionuas promulgated to the CNF on 5 October.Therea f te r t h e Permanent C N F o f f i c i a l l ybecame the Royal Australian Navy, and theCitizen Naval Forces the Royal AustralianNaval Reserve. At the stern of Australianships, t he W h i t e Ens ign replaced theAus t r a l i an Blue Ensign. The Austra l ianCommonwealth flag took the place of theUnion flag at the bow.

The Royal Austral ian Navy did notjust happen in l l ) l 1. The bestowal of the title'Royal ' reflected the progress made in theprevious ten years in t u r n i n g a mo t l eycollection of obsolescent vessels into a truefight ing service. Perhaps more signif icant inhindsight , however, was that the revitalisationof the C'NF marked Australia's first major steptowards nationhood. Arising from a deeperrecognition that Australia's defence interestscould no longer be consigned to others, thedecision to acquire a sea-going n a v yr e p r e s e n t e d a n a s s u m p t i o n o f n a t i o n a lobligation of momentous proportion.

The foresight of men like Creswell andDeakin was amply rewarded just a few yearsla t e r u h e n in 1914 the German East Asiatic-Squadron was decisively deterred fromcarrying out its plans for cruiser warfare in thePacific. But for the navy, wart ime PrimeMinister W.M. 'Billy' Hughes later declared,'the great cities of Australia would have beenreduced to ruins, coastwise shipping sunk, andcommunications with the outside world cutoff." One would be hard pressed to find amore appropria te sentiment to mark theAustralian Navy's first centenary of service tothe na t ion .

About the AuthorDavid Stevens served for twenty years in theRAN. Since 1994 he has been the Director ofNaval Historical Studies.

CONFERENCEANNOUNCEMENT

2001 King-Hall NavalHistory Conference

The Face of Naval Battle:Past, Present and Future

This event is jointlysponsored by:

University CollegeAustralian Defence Force

Academy

Australian Naval Institute

RAN Seapower Centre

Australian War MemorialCanberra,

26-27 July 2001

For further information contact:

Mr David G r i f f i nNaval History DirectorateCP4-1-002Campbell, ACT 2601Tel: (02)62662654

Hmai l : da\ id.«rilTin(«'cbr.defence.uov.au

5 W. M. Hughes, 'A Policy for the Times', Navy,Army and Air-Force Journal, 1 September 1933, p.

20 Smnmer 2000-2001


I THE MEDIUMPOWER NAVY IN

THE 21stCENTURY

By Captain James Goldrick RAN

This paper was presented by Captain Goldrick to the Royal Thai NavySeminar on the future of medium power Navies in November last year.

1 o attempt a survey of the world and of theAsia-Paeific in particular and to suggest whatthe role of medium power navies will be in thenew century is an ambitious project. Let mebegin with some definitions and assumptions.

First, what is a medium power? RearA d m i r a l Richard H i l l , in his 19X6 bookMaritime Strategy for Medium Powers went tosome trouble to examine this question. Henoted tha t superpowers are un l ike ly to sufferdirect chal lenges to the i r terr i tory, theirp o l i t i c a l independence or t he i r nat ionalwelfare. Small powers, on the other hand, areunable to guard their own interests withoutsome form of external support and guarantee.Medium powers fall between these two groupsand they are most clearly identified not somuch by any inherent characteristics as bytheir primary security objective. Richard Hillsuggested that a medium power seeks to'create and keep under national control enoughmeans of power to initiate and sustain coerciveactions whose outcome will be the preservationof its vi tal interests'.'

It follows from t h i s tha t a m e d i u mpower navy is one that seeks to ma in ta in andemploy sufficient naval capab i l i t i e s that thepreservation of vital national maritime interestscan be achieved. In this context, maritime airforces and amphib ious land forces must beconsidered as integral to any thought aboutmedium power navies. Effective Joint systemsare essential force multipliers for any mediumpower and that they must be Joint withoutduplication.

All these def in i t ions do not suggest thatmedium powers are capable of protecting andadvancing every aspect of their vital interests bythemselves. This is a key issue. As Richard H i l lhas noted. 'Medium powers need to be as braveas lions and as cunning as foxes.'" Each mediumpower needs to achieve a balance betweennational autonomy and co-operation or al l iancewith other nations. Every medium power navyneeds to achieve the same balance between itsinherent capabi l i t ies and the extent to which itwill deliberately interact with other navies as a

1 Richard Hi l l Maritime Strategy for MediumPowers, Croom Helm, New York, 1986. p .2 l . note1. See also: R. Hill Medium Power Strategy

Revisited, RAN Sea Power Centre, Working PaperNo. 3. March 2()0().pp.4-5.: R. Hil l Medium Power Strategy Revisited Op. (.'it.p.7.

21 Summer 2000-2001


mechanism for achieving the protection of itsvital interests.

This is not an easy task. Mediumnavies by their nature face several challengesin terms of structure and organisation. Theyplace heavy demands on the domesticresources of t h e n - n a t i o n s and on the hardcurrency resources of their governments.Navies require subs tan t ia l indus t r i a l andt e c h n o l o g i c a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e to support t h e i ra c t i v i t i e s , infrastructure wh ich , in the case ofsmaller services, may seem disproportionate inrelation to the combat c a p a b i l i t y wh ich i tgenerates. ' M o t h in u n i f o r m and out of i t ,navies need the most highly educated andt e c h n i c a l l y competent people that t h e i rcount r ies have to offer, p a r t i c u l a r l y inengineering and information systems. They aret h u s in direct compet i t ion for the sameresources on w h i c h na t ions are comingincreasingly to depend for economic growth inan era of globalisation. Meing instruments ofgovernment, governed by the regulations andconstraints of government, they are rarely in aposit ion where they can offer directcompetit ion to business for the people that theyneed. All too often, businesses leach fromnavies the people that the la t ter 'caught young'to train and educate. This is a syndrome thatpractically every modern navy has experiencedat some period in the last decade - and whichmany are expe r i enc ing now. Conversely,however, navies suffer in periods of economicrecession because of the inevitable reductionsin national spending which follow - reductionsto w h i c h n a v i e s are part icular ly vulnerable.Medium navies in par t icular are constantlyforced to just i fy their ut i l i ty , both to others andin t h c i i i s c K cs. 1 'c rhaps the greatest c h a l l e n g et h a t they face is thus that of understandingthe i r place in a constantly changing world.4

1 For an assessment of the issues involved inanalysing naval activity see Jon Tetsuro Sumidu &David Rosenberg "Machines. Men. Manufacturing.Management and Money: the Study of Navies asComplex Organisations and the Transformation of2()th Century Naval History" in J.B. Hattendorf(ed) Doing Naval Historv: Essavs TowardsIni/trovenieiit US Naval War College, Newport,Rhode Island, 1995, pp. 25-40.4 For a perspective on the issues of navies indeveloping nations in part icular see the author's NoKu\y .•l/i.vircr.v: The Development of the Navies ofIndia, Pakistan. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 1945-1996, Lancer Press, New Delhi. 1997. Chapter 9

Other Challenges to Medium PowerNaviesWhat other challenges are there for mediumpower navies? The first assumption inunderstanding such challenges is that the nation-state, despite the progress of globalisation, w i l lcont inue to be the p r inc ipa l f a c t o r ininternational relations. Coercion, the use of forceor the threat of the use of force, wi l l remain afeature, however undes i r ab l e , of t h e i rinteraction. This real i ty is one t h a t n a t i o n a larmed services, particularly navies, need to bearfirmly in mind when contemplat ing the fu ture ofarmed conflict.

For armed confl ict is acquiring furtherdimensions, not losing them and th is is anotherassumption we must incorporate w i t h i n ourthinking. To the rivalries of nation states must beadded the activit ies of non-state organisations,such as internat ional cr iminals and insurgentmovements, as well as the consequences ofeconomic, poli t ical and environmental fa i lures .And in the context of Hast Asia, we must bear inmind tha t we exist wi th in a region t h a t isprofoundly maritime in nature, to the extent thatpract ica l ly all the issues and problems listedhave a maritime context. More than 50% of thereported acts of armed robbery at sea take placein East Asia, according to the Kuala LumpurRegional Piracy Centre of the InternationalMarit ime Bureau.6 A signif icant proportion ofthe increasing activity in i l legal immigration byseaborne means either originates in or passesthrough East Asian waters. Drug smuggl ing isanother activity of internat ional organised crimethat has a significant mar i t ime element w i t h i nour region. Envi ronmenta l degradation is a factof l i f e and we face the prospect of increasingcompetition at sea for a greatly depleted andconstantly d i m i n i s h i n g amount of l i v i n g naturalresources.

National armed forces w i l l need to domore, not less to adapt to all these s i tua t ions andall these possible conflicts. They wil l need to domore, not less to meet the spectrum of confl ict .

" See RAN Doctrine 1: Australian MaritimeDoctrine. Canberra, 2000. pp. 21-22." Report of the RFC dated January 2000.7 This is probably the most comprehensive recentassessment of the implications of these developmentsfor maritime forces. Not wholly focused on theAmerican situation - is found in Bruce Stubhs &Scott C. Truver America 's Coast Guard:Safeguarding U.S. Maritime Safety and Security inthe 21s' Century USCG Headquarters. WashingtonDC, 2000, especially Chapter II.

22 Slimmer 2000-2001


Given the inherent constraints on resourceswhich medium powers and thus thei r navalforces face, this may only serve to complicatethe problem even further. To what extent domedium power navies distribute their resourcesbetween high level warfighting capabil i t ies andthose rec]uired for other operations? What willbe the division of labour and thus of resourcesbetween navies and other maritime agencies inmeeting all the threats to good order at sea?These are certainly questions which mediumnavies in par t icu lar face as they enter thetwenty first century. But they are not alone.Many armies arc also facing similar issues.

On the other hand, these developmentsmay not mean as profound a change for themarit ime environment as they do for the land.Naval forces by their nature possess what canonly be described as a historical and cul tura la f f in i ty for operations other than war to a fargreater degree than is inheren t ly t rue forarmies. It was internat ional naval forces in thenineteenth century which played a critical partin the suppression of slave t rading. Nava lforces have been engaged in fishery protectionand other constabulary tasks for hundreds ofyears, w h i l e the creat ion of ad-hocmul t ina t iona l maritime coalitions goes backnearly two centuries8.

This acceptance of roles additional towar f igh t ing has been recognised by manyanalysts and described most effectively by theBritish Professor Ken Booth, who explainedt h a t navies have th ree p r i m a r y roles:warfighting, constabulary and diplomatic. Oneof his most important points was that much ofthe capac i ty w h i c h nav i e s possess toaccomplish the huge variety of diplomatic andconstabulary tasks which they do from day today rests upon the capabilities which they havedeveloped for warfighting.

x Arguably starting with the Anglo-Dutchbombardment of Algiers in 1816 over the slaveryissue. While such activities were often forimperialist purposes (the intervention in China in1900 and the blockade of Venezuela in 1903). therewere also interventions for disaster relief. For achronology of the Royal Navy's activities in thenineteenth and early twentieth century, see TheRoval Navv List or Who 's Who in the Navy London,January l9 l7 .Repub l i shed as The Naval Who'sWho / 9 / 7 J . B . Hayward, Suffolk, 1981. pp. 21 I-217." Ken Booth Navies and Foreign Poliev CroomHelm. London, 1977, p. 16.

The Relationship Between ConflictIntensity and TechnologyAnother important a s sumpt ion is t h a t theintensity of a conflict and the sophistication ofthe technology which w i l l be employed withinthat conflict do not have a direct re la t ionship.Nor is there any certain relat ionship betweenwarning time and the weapons which may beemployed. Missiles can be acquired and otherelements of naval capabi l i ty readily assembledby those who have the funds and the will. Therecent example of the discovery in centralAmerica of the attempt by a drug smuggl ingsyndicate to construct a h i g h l y capable smal lsubmersible is the most striking recent exampleof this reality. This means that medium naviesneed to consider comprehensive force protectionas one of the foundations of their capability foroperations in which any degree of armed conflictis possible.

Strategic DevelopmentsWe also need to be aware of two keydevelopments affecting the shape of modernnaval forces. The first relates to the conclusionof the Cold War. The end of the strategiccompetition between the Western A l l i ance andthe Soviet Union in maritime terms also markedthe end of a century in which the mar i t imecapabi l i t ies of the West had served as acounterweight to the cont inenta l strength of asuccession of ' cen t ra l a l l i a n c e s ' . Thatcounterweight came in the a b i l i t y to supplyreinforcements and resources across the oceansof the world, most notably but not only betweenNorth America and Western Europe. The navalforces of the Western Alliance concentratedsubstantially upon capabil i t ies which wouldprotect seaborne communications and were thusprincipally configured for sea control rather thanpower projection operations."1

Despite the r e d u c t i o n s in defencespending which followed the end of the 'ColdWar', the Western powers and particularly theUnited States, found themselves in possession ofan unprecedented degree of uncommit tedm i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y seabornecapability. This has allowed them to focus on theemployment of that c a p a b i l i t y to meet theemerging problems of an increasingly complex,unstable and multipolar world.

10 See Colin S. Gray Modern Strategy OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 218-219.

23 Simmer 2000-2001


The 'Revolut ion in Military Affairs'This process is being assisted by the seconddevelopment, the p r o f o u n d changes intechnology sometimes described as the'Revolution in Mi l i ta ry Affairs'. Many of theset e c h n i c a l advances are related not only toextended range miss i les and muni t ions , butalso to improvements in the speed with whichamphibious forces can be deployed ashore bymeans of surface effect landing craft and til trotor aircraft . The extraordinary advances inC4I as w e l l as s u r v e i l l a n c e andreconnaissance which may permit marit imeforces to achieve much higher degrees of whatis now termed 'battlespace awareness' alsoplay the i r part."

Operations in the LittoralThe result of all this has been the redirection ofmany navies away from sea control towardsope ra t i ons in t he l i t t o r a l 1 and to employmentin c r i s i s m a n a g e m e n t . The USN hasencapsulated its new doctrine in a successionof documents, beginning with From the Sea inI9921 ' and the same approach has beenadopted by other Western navies, as evidencedi n the RN's capstone doctrine of 1999. BR1806: British Maritime Doctrine1^. It is notablethat this redirection extends to navies muchfurther down the ladder of capabi l i ty , such asthe Netherlands. Recently the RN1N completedone large l and ing ship and is p l a n n i n g foranother. Spain has a similar programme while(iermany is bui ld ing a class of mult ipurposelogis t ics sh ip s for c r i s i s managemen toperations.15

The interest in cr is is managementcapabilit ies has not wholly been confined to

1 ' See Norman Friedman Seapower and SpaceI ' S M I'ress. A n n a p o l i s . Mary land . IWJ.i: The 'littoral' is here defined as: The areas toseaward of the coast which are susceptible toinf luence or support from the land and the areasinland from the coast which are susceptible toinfluence or support from the sea.' AustralianMaritime Doctrine, Op. Cit. p. 154.13 From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service forthe 21"' Century United States Navy, WashingtonDC, 1992.14 The recent development in Bri t i sh th ink ing in thedirection of expeditionary operations is part icularlyevident when the text of the 1999 edition of BritishMaritime Doctrine is compared with the previous(19951 edi t ion of HR lM)(>:The Fundamentals ofBritish Maritime Doctrine.^ Richard Sharpe (ed) Jane's Fighting Ships 2000-2001, Jane's. London, 2000, pp. 471, 639 & 257.

the West. Most notably, the Japanese MaritimeSelf Defence Force has begun a b u i l d i n gprogramme of much more capable multipurposehelicopter carrying landing ships than it has everpossessed before, with the specific intention thatthese be avai lable for disaster relief andassociated tasks. Thailand, of course,commissioned a light carrier for such purposesonly a few years ago.

Nevertheless, issues remain for mediumnavies in general and for those in the Asia-Pacific in particular over the extent to which therequirement for sea control capabilities hasdiminished, liven for the navies of Hurope. theabsence of a challenger at sea is a strategic-reali ty that may not last for ever. The Asia-Pacific includes a large number of nations withsignificant maritime and air capability and itwould be extremely unwise to make theassumption that the preconditions for sea controlwill exist whatever the strategic situation. Ifregional medium navies in tend to developimproved crisis management capabil i t ies theymust therefore do so wi thou t prejudice to theirother roles.

INS ABHAV is designed specifically lorlittoral operations. Photo: John Mortimer

What do Medium Navies Need to Do?Medium navies in the Asia-Pacific thus havemany questions to answer as they enter thetwenty first century. Despite the obvious dangersin being prescriptive for a group of organisationsof such a complex variety as the region'smedium navies, it is possible to ident i fy anumber of key areas in which decisions do needto be made.

The first is the question of autonomy,which itself falls into two parts. The first is theextent to which a medium navy ins is ts onoperational autonomy by comparison wi th the

1 Ibid. pp. 379 & 689.

24 Slimmer 2000-2001


degree to w h i c h i t integrates wi th theoperations of other navies. This will often bethrough the mechanism of formal alliances.But it is important to remember that a degreeof latent integration can be achieved by co-operation outside the framework of alliances.A latency that governments may well find avery va luab le asset in an unexpectedcontingency when the national interest requirespart icipat ion in an ad-hoc coalition. What isclear is that achieving latent integration doeshave a price for a medium navy, not in termsof political commitments, but in the degree towhich resources - i n c l u d i n g steaming andtraining time - will need to be allocated toi n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation rather than specificnational tasking.

On the other hand, it is also true thatco-operation greatly assists in establishing andm a i n t a i n i n g bench marks in terms ofoperational effectiveness and may well assistin achieving the necessary standards. Co-operation in the form of large mult i - la teralexercises, for example, can achieve economiesof scale in the provision of targets andopposition forces which i n d i v i d u a l na t ionalforces cannot manage. The p e r i l s ofconformity and group thinking can be avoidedby exposure to different concepts, novel ideasand unfamiliar equipment. Navies generally donot prosper in isolation; l ike many othercomplex organisations and professions, theyneed windows on the world to keep themselvesup to date and effective.

The second question is the degree ofinfrastructure autonomy that a medium navyshould seek. Only the United States Navy canseriously attempt to be on the cutting edge ofevery aspect of naval development and eventhis organisation has had its failures. Mediumnavies have to make clear choices betweencapab i l i t i e s in which the i r requirements aresuch as to produce un ique systems andplatforms and those which can be derived fromthe efforts of other countries. This is not only aquestion of alliances and interests shared bynation-states permitting the necessary degreeof co-operation; there are also highly complexproblems r e l a t i n g to the involvement ofdomestic industry, technology transfer and, inparticular, reliable and effective through-lifesupport . Nevertheless it is clear tha t nomedium power can afford to sustain all thecosts of being a parent navy in every area ofmari t ime warfare. Nor, if it wishes to spend itsbudget wisely, should it try.

The next major issue is the question ofthe balance to be drawn between high levelcapabi l i t ies and those on the lower level. HereProfessor Booth's concept of the triangle of seausage allows the clarification of thought on thesub jec t . M e d i u m n a v i e s a rc def inedfundamentally by their wartlghting capabil i t iesand the i r primary effort needs to be directedtowards an assessment of what is needed inthese areas, provided that the needs of all threeelements are borne firmly in mind at all times.

The question of meeting the full rangeof national security requirements in areas suchas surveillance and enforcement part icularly inthe constabulary role - and the methods bywhich national needs arc met is a question fornational decision rather than by navies alone.Whatever the approach taken, however, mediumnavies must be closely involved and the solutionadopted must allow a coherent, systematic andcomprehensive national effort. If the solution isto give the navy primacy in or a l ead ingrespons ib i l i ty for c iv i l s u r v e i l l a n c e andenforcement, then the force structure must allowfor these ac t iv i t i e s w i t h o u t de t r imen t towarfighting capabilities.

On the other hand, even if the solutionadopted for the formation of Coast Guards (andeven if wholly independent of naval or mi l i ta rycontrol), medium navies and maritime air forceshave much to cont r ibute . They wouldsupplement the surveillance effort and providing'fall back' capabili t ies in the event of morecomplex operations, particularly those requiringthe deployment of substantial coercive force.

N o ma t t e r what t h e i r i n d i v i d u a lsituation, therefore, medium navies wil l need tosustain a very high degree of awareness of andexpertise in surveillance and enforcement andtake seriously their constabulary role. It followsin force structure terms that credible mari t imesurveillance capabilities are and will be inherentto an effect ive m e d i u m n a v y and t h a tsurveillance operations should be a significantelement of naval effort, whether in 'normal 'conditions or in conflict.

Achieving the Balanced FleetIf there is one s t r ik ing feature of the modernworld, which should be apparent from thearguments advanced in this paper, it is the themeof complication, not only in terms of strategicrequirements but also in the methods andstructures developed to meet national needs. Thekey goal of medium navies has always been toachieve the right balance of capabilities and the

25 Summer 2000-2001


concept of the 'balanced f leet ' must remaincent ra l to most of their thought in this era ofcomplication.

Balance to ReactBalance in this sense has two aspects and botharc important for medium navies. The firs taspect is balance to protect a g a i n s t theunexpected threat. This concept is somethingtha t has a long history for navies, one tha tneeds to be understood in an era when manyobservers are h i g h l i g h t i n g the existence of'asymmetric threats' as if they were somethingnew. They are not, and the very term 'balancedfleet' derives from the response necessary tothe development of the first seagoingasymmetric threats in the modern era, thetorpedo boat and the submarine, just on acentury ago.17 By integrating small craft,scouting vessels and capital ships and, later.aircraft, the maritime powers which sought toretain their ability to control the sea were ableto reduce the th rea t to the extent that theycould achieve their ends.

The concept of the balanced fleetremains a central clement of force planning form e d i u m n a v i e s because, wi thout a properbalance and range of capabilities, they andt h e i r nat ions become immedia te ly vulnerableto asymmetr ic th rea t s in the mar i t imeenvironment . This a r t i c l e has alreadymen t ioned the requirement for comprehensiveforce protection in low in tens i ty conflict. Thisprovides a good start to the possibilities whichmedium navies need to encompass. This isbecause force protection opera t ions mirrorthose which can be described more broadly as'mar i t ime protective activit ies ' , such as thedefence o f m e r c h a n t s h i p p i n g and theprotection of harbours, coasts, offshoreins ta l l a t ions and wate rways from mines andfrom other attack from the sea. This creates ano b v i o u s h i e r a r c h y o f requi red a c t i v i t y . Minecountermeasures are essential to all mediumnavies. Maritime surveillance has already beendiscussed, but with these elements must alsocome a proper marit ime command, control andcommunications system.

The r e m a i n d e r of the range ofc a p a b i l i t i e s w i t h i n the order of batt le ofm e d i u m navies mus t depend upon t h e i r

' See in particular Jon Sumidu In Defence of NavalSupremacv: Finance. Technology,' and British NavalPolicy 1889-1914, Unwin Hyman, Boston, 1989and Nicholas A. Lambert Sir John Fisher's NavalRevolution University of South Carolina, 1999.

strategic requirements. If there is a requirementfor the capacity to exercise sea denial, then asubmarine force is l i k e l y to be a leadingelement. The medium sized surface combatantwill also be central to operations to exercise seacontrol and to support the projection of power. Itis worth observing that some elements of theRMA, most notably unmanned aerial veh ic lesand extended range m u n i t i o n s f i red frommedium calibre guns, h a v e the poten t ia l to givemedium power surface combatants a u t i l i t y inpower projection against the land which theyhave never enjoyed before.

Balance to ActAt th i s point it is appropriate to introduce thesecond aspect of balance. This is the balancerequired to be able to do the unexpected, toprovide options for national governments notonly to react, but also to act. Medium naviesmust be about providing the maximum numberof possibilities for their governments. Many ofthe force elements already discussed providethose options. But in medium power terms, andin the context of an uncertain and dangerousworld order, there are clear benef i t s in thepossession of amphibious and logistics uni t sand, just as important, land forces which havethe necessary equipment and expertise to operatein the maritime environment.

It is unlikely that most medium powerswill ever have the resources to conduct suchoperations in higher intensity conflicts unless incoalition. Nevertheless, being able to insertpeople, vehicles and logistic supplies without theneed for developed fac i l i t i e s provides manypossibilities for constructive responses to theunexpected. No nation is immune to naturaldisasters and seaborne means part icularly inthe Asia-Pacific may well be the only way inwhich a substantial relief effort can be mounted.Peace operations, too. in a maritime region, arelikely to require significant marit ime elements.

Joint OperationsThere is another theme inherent in the conceptsof balance, both in terms of threat and of action,for medium navies and that is the increasingrequirement for effective joint operations withother national services. Medium powers cannotafford dupl ica t ion between the i r i nd iv idua lservices and the reality is that credible nationalcapabil i ty wi l l depend increasingly upon theeffective integration of all combat services. Veryfew medium navies can afford to sustain organicair defence and even when they do, t he i r

26 Summer 2000-2001


potential must be greatly increased by properco-ordination of carrier borne a i rcraf t withthose based on l and . No medium navy cansensibly contemplate sea control operationswi thout the involvement of maritime patrolaircraft. Very few medium navies can afford tomaintain their own marine forces. Even if theycan, the reality remains that these marines mustdevelop close working re la t ions w i t h the i rarmies. The list goes on.

Keeping Up with TechnologyFina l ly , and still on the question of balance,medium navies have hard decisions to makeabout the extent to which they attempt to adoptthe latest technology. It is easy to be caught inthe situation of expending excessive funds andhuman resources in attempting to main ta ine lde r ly and obsolescent p la t forms andequipment. On the other hand, there may be noalternative if the capital costs of acquiring newtechnology are such that they cannot beafforded w i t h i n the budget. In the case ofmedium and small navies, it is sometimesbetter to be able to do something badly thannot to be able to do it at all.18 The tests mustalways be: first, does the capability, howeverlimited, present options which may prove vitalto the nat ional interest and which can beprovided in no other way? Second, is thecapability not being maintained at the expenseof other more useful capabilities? It is possibleto fall into the trap of pouring resources intoone element of the fleet when others, equal lyvital to a medium navy, are being neglected. Ifthe capability passes these two tests - keep it.

ConclusionsThis art icle has attempted to o u t l i n e thecontemporary s i tuat ion and the challengesfacing medium navies in the fu ture . I tsprincipal conclusions are that medium naviesneed to do as they have always done. Theyneed to develop and main ta in the greatestpossible range of capab i l i t i e s in order toprovide the ba lance necessary to protectagainst threats in the mar i t ime environmentand to provide their governments with thewidest possible range of options. Mediumnavies need to make hard decisions about theextent to w h i c h they w i l l be autonomous bycomparison with the degree to which they will

1K See this argument developed in the author's NoEasv Answers: The Development oj the Navies ofIiuiia. 1'iikixtan. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 1945-1W2 ()[>. C7 / . , pp . 201-202.

co-operate with other nations and navies inacquiring and maintaining their capabilities.Medium navies need to work closely with theirnational air forces and armies to achieve themost effective results for n a t i o n a l security.Above al l , medium navies need to understandthemselves and their situations - and be muchbetter than many of us have been in the past atexplaining our roles to ourselves and to others.

About the AuthorCaptain Goldrick is the Chief Staff Officer toCN. He gave this paper when Director of theRAN Seapower Centre. Captain Goldrick hascommanded HMA Ships Cessnock and Sydney(twice). He is a prolific writer on naval historyand maritime strategic matters.

FOR THE DIARY

Dr Andrew Gordon, au thor of Rules of thedame: Jutland and British Naval Command,will be coming to Canberra in July 2001 as theRAM's Synnot Lecturer.

He will give at least two public presentationsin Canberra which ANI members are welcometo attend. They are:

High Command: Jellicoe & Beattythe basic RN paradigms.The presentation will be delivered on ISJuly in the R l Theatrette at Russell Offices

Crisis Escalation & CommandDilemmas.This wi l l he presented on 19 J u l y at theAustralian Defence Force Academy.

Rules of the Game: Jutland &British Naval Command.This wi l l be presented on 20 Ju ly at theAustralian Defence Force Academy.

For conf i rmat ion of t imes and f u r t h e rinformation contact Mr David Griffin at theNaval History Directorate, CP4-1-002,Campbell. ACT 2601. Tel: (02) 62662654Email: [email protected]

27 Snmini'r 2000-2001


PUBLIC CONSULTATION AND DEFENCE POLICYMAKING - AN ANZAC CONTRAST

By R T Jackson

The extensive public consultation process that Australia undertook beforeits new Defence White Paper gave some of us in New Zealand a sense ofileja vu. Hack in 1984 a public process for defence policy-making on thisside of the Tasman, became mired in controversy.

U I t i m a t e l y in t ha t K iwi experience, thepoli t icians of the day ignored the results of thepubl ic process and took NZ down the nuclear-free, independent path tha t has affected NZdefence policy-making ever since.

But for the new L a b o u r - A l l i a n c eCoal i t ion Government now in Well ington,defence po l i cy -mak ing last year has been, incomparison w i t h 1984. far more decisive. Notonly was there lit t le public consultation by thenewly elected government , but Defenceofficials have indicated that there was minimalconsultation with the Ministry of Defence .Instead, t he Labour Party based their partypolicy on previous work by a ParliamentarySelect Committee, negotiated their policy witht h e i r par l iamentary partners, and thenpresented it to Defence and the public. Defenceofficials are now expected to, and of coursewi l l , implement this policy.

In an academic sense this is policy-m a k i n g at its purest - the newly-electedgovernment consults its own circle of advisers,policy is shaped to be p a l a t a b l e to t h e i rpar l iamentary all ies, and then the governmentmachinery is expected to i m p l e m e n t thep o l i t i c a l decisions. To some extent th is recentprocess in NZ reflects the strong academicbackgrounds of members in the currentCabinet, who see - especially in the case ofDefence - that government departments exist todeliver results, and should not capture policy-making".

Personal discussions with the author" The issue of policy capture has been at the heartof NZ's state sector reforms since 1986. See

Certainly there are those in P a r l i a m e n t w i thmemories of the 1984-1987 defence debate whoview the Defence organisation as unresponsiveand reluctant to accept external guidance. TheANZUS debate of those years was long andbitter. The break in our a l l i a n c e wi th the USoccurred despite being (albeit narrowly) againstsurveyed public opinion .

So it w i t h a sense of irony t h a t \ \ewatched the extensive process of p u b l i cconsultation conducted in Australia. In this

Government Management Vo\ 1, The Treasury, 1987' See for example, Addenda II and III to Defence anilSecurin: What New '/.ealunders want.

28 Summer 2000-2001


discussion of the New Zealand perspective. Iw i l l explore two aspects:

• First, what is the current NZ policy? and• Secondly, what of our 1984 experience -

does it hold any lessons for Aus t ra l i atoday?

New Zealand's 2000 Defence PolicyDespite widespread apprehension amongdefence commentators, the defence policyannounced in June 2000 did not emasculateNew Zealand's armed forces. Rather, our newDefence Po/icv Framework emphasisespart icular roles for the NZDF, while statingclearly that combat v i ab i l i t y has to be afundamental attribute for NZDF units.

Much of the earlier apprehension wasdue to the impact of a 1999 ParliamentarySelect Committee, which had undertaken awide-ranging review of defence issues. TheSelect Committee review, which took placeover two years , was open to p u b l i cs u b m i s s i o n s but i t was not a p u b l i cconsultative process in the manner of therecent A u s t r a l i a n defence policy review.Chaired by (now former) MP Derek Quigley,the Committee's report, ( t i t l ed Inquiry intoDefence Beyond 2000) cemented the publ icimpression that the Army was under-funded,that the Navy needed no more than two frigatesand t h a t the Air Combat Force (thena n t i c i p a t i n g F - l6s ) should be reviewed. TheCommittee emphasised peacekeeping dutiesover preparations for combat .

During the 1999 election campaign,the Labour Party defence policy stated that theSelect Committee report would be the basis offuture defence policy. So there were somefami l i a r themes in the new Government'sformal statement of defence policy, which wasannounced in mid-June last year. As well ashaving the support of the Alliance Party, thegoverning c o a l i t i o n par tner , two minorparliamentary parties, the NZ Greens and NewZealand First, also stated their support for thenew policy.

Our Defence Policy Framework statesthe following basic guidelines:

• NZ's defence is to be based on NZ's ownassessment of the security environment;

• the primary reasons to maintain a DefenceForce are:

4 Defence Beyond 2000, pp 29-31

• to secure NZ against external threats,• to protect our sovereign interests and,• to meet l ikely contingencies in our area

of interest.• There is a need to work collaboratively with

l ike-minded partners, and no s t ra tegicpartnership for NZ is closer that that withAustralia.

• We have special obligations in the SouthPacific for maintaining peace, preserving theenvironment, promoting good governance,and to achieve economic well being.

• We wan t a secure S o u t h Pac i f i cn e i g h b o u r h o o d , a n d d i p l o m a c y a n dmediation are relevant as well as m i l i t a r yforce.

• New Zealand w i l l contr ibute to UN andother appropriate multi-national peacesupport and humanitar ian operations.

• The Government wil l maintain the integrityof our nuclear-free policy but we w i l l notundertake mil i tary co-operation with nationsthat suppress human rights.

New Zealand's specific defence policyobjectives are:

• to defend NZ's people, land, territorialwaters and EEZ, natural resources, andcritical infrastructure.

• to meet our a l l i a n c e commi tmen t s toAustralia.

• to assist in maintaining security in the SouthPacific.

• to play an appropriate role in Asia Pacificand to meet our obligations under the FPDA.

• to contribute to global security and peacekeeping through par t ic ipat ion in the f u l lrange of UN and m u l t i - l a t e r a l peaceoperations.

The DPF recognises t h a t the NZDF has tocontinue to be modernised and seven principleswill guide this process. They are:

• the NZDF is to be trained and equipped forcombat and peacekeeping.

• the NZDF is to be deployable, w i t h aflexible mix of air and sea lift capabilities.

• the NZDF is to be interoperable, wi thbilateral exercises with Austral ia and m u l t i -lateral exercises under the FPDA.

• the NZDF is to held at appropriate levels ofreadiness.

• NZDF deployments are to be sustainable

29 Summer 2000-2001


• t h e N 7 D F is to keep abreast oftechno log ica l changes, speci f ica l ly theRevolution in Military Affairs.

• the N Z D F rebu i ld ing is to be fiscallysustainable.

T h u s the Government's cap i ta l i nves tmen tprogramme is aimed at creating well-equippedcombat-trained land forces, which are able toact as effective peacekeepers, supported by theNavy and Air Force. There are t h r e ei in mediate priorities:

• to u p g r a d e the A r m y ' s m o b i l i t y ,c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , su rve i l l ance and f i resupport capabil i t ies .

• to provide effect ive air and naval transportcapabilities.

• to maintain effective maritime surveillancecapabil i t ies of the Navy and Air Forcewithin the NZ EEZ and the EEZs ofPacific Island states.

Suppor t ing the DPF. the Government alsoreleased two other official papers: a Ministryof Foreign Affairs and Trade paper titled New/ ( • ( / / ( / / / < / ' s /-'uri'i^ii din/ Sci'i/rilv I'o/irvChallenges; and also, Strategic Assessment21)011. w r i t t e n by the External AssessmentsBureau; the first time EAB has released such areview to the public. Both these papers discussNew Zealand's internat ional envi ronment in ac lear and though t fu l way. Sadly, for thosewanting a better informed public, both thesedocuments were l a r g e l y ignored by them a i n s t r e a m n e w s m e d i a . At the t i m e of i t srelease, one prominent commentator wrote ofthe DPF:

"The Labour Al l i ance coal i t ion 's DefencePolicy Framework confounded those whothought the Clark government would retreatfrom combat v i a b i l i t y i n to peacekeeping.Peace support opera t ions r a n k b e h i n d there la t ionsh ip wi th Aus t ra l ia and our obligationsunder the FPDA," said pol i t i ca l analyst IanTempleton in his weekly newsletter. "Thedimensions of the policy underline how far thet h i n k i n g of PM Helen C ' l a rk and her seniorministers has evolved, since taking office andabsorbing the regional strategic priorities."

One worry was that the role of theK N Z . N and K N Z A F in "suppor t ing the landforces" was not clearly enunciated; some

commentators interpreted t h e i r f u t u r e role astransport only. Even Templeton noted that , asWashington and Canberra signed a defencetechnology t ransfer agreement, and madearrangements to celebrate the 50th anni \e r sa ryof the ANZUS pact, those events underl inedWell ington 's "increasing i s o l a t i o n from themainstream of Western defence."

A computer image- of a fully fitted out RANAN/AC class frigate. RAN Official

Subsequently, the Government in Wel l ing tonhas made some capi ta l equipment decisions inaccord with its new defence policy. The NZArmy is to get 105 LAV III armoured vehiclesto replace the old Ml 13 APCs, and a new seriesof tactical radios. The future of the air combatforce of the RNZAF remains in doubt , butshould be resolved wi th the nex t round ofdefence decisions due in May 2001. However,indications are that our Orions won' t bescrapped, but nei ther w i l l they get a full militaryupgrade for their maritime surveillance suite.

For the RN/.N. the Prime M i n i s t e r hasgiven public indications that we may evolve as atwo- tiered Navy, w i th , perhaps, some oceanpatrol vessels of about 70 metres length toundertake resource protection and SouthernOcean survei l lance and response tasks. Theformal announcement is expected in May,although if th is is the way ahead, then the RNZNw i l l of course face some years of studies andacquis i t ion processes before the future shipsmaterialise. Meanwhile the fate of the CharlesLJpham remains in doubt, and we hope in Mayalso to learn its future.

Public Input into Defence Policy Making1984-1986Isolation from Western defence, was, it can beargued, the actual goal of New Zealand's 'peace'

'/h//i.v 7'tiMiuin 22 J une 2000

30 Summer 2000-2001


groups in the defence debate of the mid-198()s'\ Publ ic consul ta t ion was attemptedthen, but only after New Zealand's 1984Labour Government adopted a nuclear-freepolicy that put New Zealand's membership ofthe widely supported ANZUS alliance underthreat7.

N Z' s p u b l i c d e f e n c e p o l i c yconsul ta t ion then proved to be divisive,because the government of the day was notreally seeking pub l i c i n p u t . Ra the r , theywanted to educate the public into their view ofdefence, whi le allowing all their ( suppor t ive)pressure groups a chance to feel consulted1".

In contrast to New Zealand, throughthe 1980s the Hawke Labor Government wassubject to para l l e l pressures from 'peace'groups, yet Australia maintained a bi-partisanpolitical consensus towards defence andmembership of ANZUS. Australians do have asense of nat ional vulnerabil i ty, but also the far-Left pressure groups in Aust ra l ia then wererelatively less inf luent ia l on the executive - andtoday those groups arc focussed primarily onenvironmental issues, rather than defence.

The Kiwi public consultation processof the 1980s started with a discussion paper,which when viewed today is clearly limited inits scope. Compared with the recent Australianpublic discussion paper, Wellington's 1985discussion paper conveyed l i t t l e of the rolesand functions of the armed forces, whi le itsfocus was v i s ib ly idealistic - can defence benon-violent, is armed neutrality a viableoption, what fu ture for ANZUS 4 ? Wi thhinds igh t , it can be seen that the p u b l i cconsultation process back then was alreadyweighted against the maintenance of balanced,national armed forces, and against collectivedefence.

A Committee of Enquiry was set up,with Frank Corner, a dist inguished diplomat,as its chairman. Their final report was issued inJuly 1986: 'Defence anil Security: Whal NewZeal cinders Want'. Af te r m a n y p u b l i csubmissions, and pub l ic meetings around thecountry, the Corner committee concluded thatthe majority of New Zcalanders favoured:

'' Sec for example issues of Peace Researcher,Journal of the Anti-Bases Campaign.1 Defence and Security, what New Zealanders want.p74* Jackson, Commander Richard; New Zealand andANZUS; JANIVc,\ 19 No 2 May 1993

The Defence Question, a discussion paper'.Wellington 19S5

• collective defence,• membership of ANZUS and. by a sl im

margin,• were wil l ing to tolerate the presence of

nuclear-armed warships.

The Committee also noted the perceptibly pro-Soviet attitudes of the 'peace' movement10.

Because these conc lus ions werecontrary to the Government's expectations, theReport became controversial , w i t h i t s h i s t o r i c a lcontext being dismissed by the then PrimeMinister as Mr Corner's 'personal memoir' .

But in the author 's assessment, there arcdistinct differences between New Zealand thenand Australia now:

• there was no political consensus in NZ aboutthe role or value of defence;

• there was a determined and newsmedia-savvy 'peace' movement determined to getour defence policy changed;

• there was no sophisticated public defence ofDefence; and

• there was a wide perception that the ColdWar threatened global war on such a scalethat New Zealand could not make adifference anyway.

It is relevant to recall that New Zealand headeddown its independent, nuclear-free path in 1984when the Cold War was at its height. Certainlysome then were determined to paint the threat toNZ as actually coming from the US, while therewas limited public awareness about the t ruenature of Soviet ambit ions1 2 . There was aconviction wi th in Wel l ington, fostered by the'peace' groups, that the world then had neverbeen so close to global war as under PresidentReagan".

Former Secretary of Defence GeraldHensley, writing in The Dominion newspaper,said "Because the defence of Austral ia and New

"' ibid p 72" Defence and Security, what New Zealanders want.Addendum 111, para2: This is reflected in the opinion poll ing carried out

by the 1985 Committee of Enquiry." Personal discussions, Dr Rod Alley, VictoriaUniversity of Wellington 1989. I was serving in anexchange billet in Hawaii, 1982-85 and I wasflabbergasted to return to NZ and discover thisattitude. From the front line of USCINCPAC thePacific balance of power had seemed quite s table.Even shocks such as the Soviet shooting down ofKAL Flight 007 were not perceived us l i k e l y warstarters.

31 Summer 2000-2001


/ .calami canno t ho separated, we havecont inued despite ourselves to be protected byANZUS but w i t h o u t the defence andd i p l o m a t i c advantages of an Americanalliance. We made this curious bargain foremot iona l reasons . . . w i t h o u t much thoughtabout i t s wider consequences. The fact wast h a t , pushed by a well organised peace lobby,we resolutely backed into the future, excited bythe process rather than i ts outcome.

The a t t i tude of New Zealand's 1984Labour Government towards ANZUS and ourtradi t ional defence policies was influenced byperceptions tha t seemed to be Moscow-oriented^. Indeed some of the opponents ofDefence in NZ now, s t i l l haven't lost their ColdWar era. anti-American reflexes. For example.Project Sirius. the now-cancel led proposal tomodernise the sensors and data processingcapability of our P-3K Orions was a target foranti-defence opinion shapers, and politicianslike Keith Locke of the Greens. They ignoredthe extensive mar i t ime area that is NewZealand 's u n i q u e responsibility and portrayedthe Orion upgrade project simply as a schemeto uet closer to the Americans 16

The apparent fear of those on the political far-I . e f t is t h a t the logic of the post-Cold Warwor ld and the growth of UN-mandatedcoalit ion operations mean that New Zealandersmight see some va lue from getting back onside in military terms with the US .

ConclusionTime has nuned on and our region is nowclearly more volatile. The relevance of capableand v e r s a t i l e na t ional armed forces is moreobvious now than 20 years ago. Indeed withthe East Timor commitment there was anoutpouring of pride and support for the NZDFthat was unpara l le led in my experience. Weh a \ e to look back to the Korean War to see asimilar demonstration of public support.

In contrast, public opinion in Australiahas long shown markedly more overt pride and

14 Hensley, Gerald: Charting a strange course. Tin-Dominion. 1 August 200015 Defence and Security: What New ZealandersWant, p721(1 Hager, Nicky; Big savings if defence isrevamped, NZ Herald, 18 July 2000. On 23 August(he Government announced its decision to hal tProject SIKH'S and refer the entire question ofmaritime surveillance to a special committee ofMinisters.17 Peace Researcher, No 14 Dec 1947. p2().

also more direct interest in the ADF than, un t i lEast Timor, New Zealanders did for the NZDF.And t h a t is the key difference in t h edevelopment of defence policies between ourtwo nations. Twenty years ago p u b l i cconsultation became a device for New Zealand'sfar-Left to shape an anti-nuclear posture, whichstill has an impact in Wellington today .

But as noted in the first part of t h i sessay, the current defence policy in Wellingtondoes recognise many of the geographic andinternational realities tha t ac tua l ly shaped thebalanced NZDF of earlier years. The newdefence policy does not at this stage appear to bea marked change of strategic course fromprevious postures'"; rather, the fiscal realities arcbit ing deeper. Money wil l shape the NZDF ofthe immediate future, even though the policymakers do acknowledge the con t inu i ty of NewZealand's strategic setting.

But in Aus t ra l i a . I assess t h a t thedefence consultation process, because it focusedon the roles and capabili t ies of the ADF as wellas the tasks that Australia places on them, hasbuil t a a broadly supportive attitude to the WhitePaper's plans for increased defence spending.

About the AuthorCommander Richard Jackson RNZN (Rtd) had a31-vear naval career, before joining the NZDFas a civilian in the position of Deputy NavalCorporate Relations Manager. As aMidshipman, he gained a BSc at the US NavalAcademy & later in his naval career earned anMPP from Victoria University of Wellington.After graduating from the Joint Services' StaffCollege. Canberra in IWn. his final navalposting was to the Directing Staff of the RANStaff College. Svc/nev. He hecame a founderwriter for the now defunct New Zealand DefenceQuarterly & is now the Editor of the RNZNmagazine Navy Today. He has regularlvcontributed to JANI & other defence journalsand to RAN and NZ military history conferences.

ls Main, Victoria; Clark dons anti-nuclear hat beforegoing defence shopping. The Dominion. 7 August2000}q New Zealand '.v Foreign and Security PolicvChallenges, pp 4-9

Summer 2000-2001


AUSTRALIAN MARITIME DEFENCE COUNCIL

By Warren Barnsley

This article explores how the AMDC is evolving to meet the contemporarysecurity challenges to Australia's maritime trade.

I he AMDC' is a non-statutory body appointedby the Minister for Defence. Its mission is:

"Promoting the partnership between theAustralian Defence Organisation (ADO) andthe Australian Maritime Industry, and tofacilitate the provision of effective advice andsupport to Government on maritime issues inthe interests of national security ".

MembershipThe AMDC Chairman is the Deputy Chief ofNavy (DCN) with membership comprised ofrepresentatives from across the broad spectrumof the m a r i t i m e industry, such as: theAus t ra l i an Shipping Federat ion, TeekayShipping, Howard Smith Towage, AustralianMines and Metals Association (representingthe off-shore i n d u s t r y ) , Association ofAus t ra l i an Ports & Marine Authori t ies ,Minerals Council of Australia, Liner ShippingServices and the Stevedoring Industry.Government is represented by the Departmentof Transport & Reg iona l Development,Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; andDefence.

W h i l e the AMDC has a f ixedrepresentative membership, the Chairman hasau thor i ty to i nv i t e other organisations tomeetings if their attendance and contributionwould be considered to add value to the agendaitem discussions.

Originated in 1982, the purpose of theAMDC' expanded beyond the discussions ofNaval Control and Protection of Shipping(NCAPS) and accordingly its membershipgrew. The Department of Transport joined in19X2, the Department of Trade in 1985 andChairman and the Austral ian NationalMari t ime Association (AMSA) came aboard in1990.

1 1

Revised CharterIn 1994 the then Min i s te r for Defence Hon.Robert Ray approved changes to the ASDC. Therevised aim of the Council was:

"To provide a consultative jorum forGovernment and the Australian MaritimeIndustry to initiate and develop proposals jor theprovision of safetv and protection of merchantshipping and Australia 's maritime trade, and theprovision of merchant shipping support to theAustralian Defence Force, in time of threui.tension. Emergencv and war ".

Since 1994 other issues have come to theforefront. These have inc luded mar i t imeindustry support to Defence in situations short ofa Defence emergency, the decline in Australianshipowners and the increasing relevance ofshipping agencies.

A former Chairman of Counci l , RearAdmiral Chris Oxenbould AO RAN, during hisChairmanship set in train the future direction forthe AMDC by in i t ia t ing a Strategic Plan for

Summer 2000-2001


Counc i l and f i r m l y emphas i s ing t ha t theCouncil was a "partnering" arrangement. It isthe u n a n i m i t y of purpose of the membershiptha t w i l l he the ma jo r driver of the AMDC instriving towards its vision of:

"being recognised us the leading authority inthe provision of advice and support toGovernment, on Australian maritime issues inrelation to the maintenance of nationalsecurity. "

Whi le na t iona l security has pr imacy ofpurpose, the AMDC also facilitates discussionon maritime issues of mutual interest, and cane s t a b l i s h mechan i sms fo r c o o p e r a t i v earrangements. Recent AMDC topics h a v ebeen impl ica t ions of archipelagic sea lanes,oceans management policy, marine pollution,employment of women at sea, law of the sea,piracy. Defence access to and use of merchantshipping. Defence access to ports of strategicimportance, and of course shipping reform andthe effects of w ind ing back cabotage.

The future d i rec t ion of the A M D C 'foresees the involvement of members ofindus t ry in major Defence exercise p lanning,\ shen merchant shipping and port support isrequired, a tes t ing of developing proceduresand mechanisms and a general strengthening ofthe current partnering relat ionships.

ConclusionThe AMDC has evolved both to meet thechanging shape of the wa t e r f ron t and the s h i f t sin Australia's strategic environment. Thefundamental need to have a close workingrelationship between the maritime industry andDefence remains as vital as it did a generationago.

About the AuthorWarren Barnslev commenced a maritime careerin 1054 us a marine apprentice with BMP &served with British India Steam NavigationCompanv and Bank Line. In 1962 he gained aMaster Mariner (Foreign-Going) Certificate ofCompetencv in Southampton In 1965 Warrencommissioned in the Royal Australian Engineers(Transportation) as a Captain. He \\~iisCommanding Officer of AVI356 Clive Steclc. aLanding Ship Medium (LSM) in South I'ietnamin / 968/69. He retired from the Army in 1985.

Warren joined the APS in Directorate ofMovement and Transport - Navv (DMOVT-N) inNavy Office and has served continuously invarious logistic Directorates within NavyOffice/Navy HQ. He is now as serving as StaffOfficer Mobilisation, Navy Capability Branch.In that capacity he is Secretary of the AMDC.

NAVAL OFFICERS CLUB LITERARY PRIZE

The Naval Officers Club is sponsoring a new competition between Members and AssociateMembers of the Naval Officers Club for the best essay about Australian sea power combatreadiness. Hntries. between 1500 and 3000 words with graphics suitable for publ icat ion in theNaval Officers Club Newsletter, must be submitted to the Hon. Secretary, Naval Officers Club.PO Box 207 Rose Bay. NSW 2029. by 1 June 2001.Prizes: The first pri/e w i l l be $500, second prize $300 and third $200. Prize winners will beinvited to attend a pri/e awarding ceremony at a Members Luncheon at the RAC. Sydney, inJu ly 2001.Kligihi l i ty: The competition is open to all Members and Associate Members of the NavalOfficers Club. All active and retired commissioned officers of the RAN and a number of othernavies are e l igible for membership (nominal membership subscription $20 per annum) . For thepurposes of this competition, all Australian officers under training, including RAN Midshipmen.also Army and RAAF ADFA cadets, may be eligible for Associate Membership, for the samesubscription.Content: Subjects include Australian sea power combat readiness in the context of policy.strategy, tactics, operations, doctrine, organisation, force structure, weapons, training, recruitingor history.

For more details visit: www.navalofficer.com.au

Slimmer 2000-2001


THE USN INTO THE FUTURE:A VIEW FROM MASSACHUSETTS

AVENUE

By Commodore Jack MacCafferieAustralian Naval Attache Washington

In the first of a series RAN Attaches, Advisors and Exchange Officers givea personal perspective about naval matters in their host nations.

1 he USN enters the 21s' Century pre-eminentamong the world's navies and does not appearto have a challenger for its position on thehorizon. But. even though there may be nonaval threats to its ru le over the world 'soceans, there is a new threat regime whichdemands close attention. The recent attack onthe USS COLE wi l l cause the USN and othernavies, to review security of port infrastructureand ships alongside, throughout the world. Itmay be, for some t ime at least, that the USNwill be more threatened when alongside, thanwhen at sea.

There are also some domestic issues,which could cause fundamental t h i n k i n g aboutthe roles and shape of the USN. Essentially,the kind of th inking now being demanded, isthat which was probably required immediatelyafter the end of C'old War, but which only nowcan be done wi th suff icient objectivity andclarity.

As the Clinton era came to an end andthe Bush Administration prepared to govern,the USN a long wi th the other Services,considered that it was stretched, almost to thel i m i t . It was deployed throughout the world'soceans, engaged in operations in well-knowntrouble spots, and having real diff icult ies inkeeping operat ional un i t s and the i r crewstrained and supported. It was looking forwardto the prospect of a Bush Administration,c o m m i t t e d to end ing the rundown incapabi l i ty , which accompanied the end of theC'old War.

In something of a surprise for theUSN, and the other Services, the BushAdministration has arrived with a commitmentto a stroim nat ional defence, but one that looks

very much to the future. It could well demand asignificant change in the way in wh ich naval(and other) capability is generated. The newAdministrat ion is demanding a transformationof the m i l i t a r y and is seeking to leap ageneration of technology. The USN, no less thanany of the other Services, may well have to takea deep breath and be prepared to face the futurewith a degree of boldness not seen for manydecades.

The ChallengesOf the many challenges facing the Navy now,undoubtedly the most significant is that posed bythe review of strategy being conducted forSecretary of Defense Rumsfeld. A team, led byMr Andy Marshall, who is characterized as "anunconventional thinker", is conduc t ing thereview. The significance of this review istwofold. Firstly, it is meant to underpin thedesire of the new Adminis t ra t ion to "transform"the US military, from what is alleged to be still aCold War mindset, to one capable of fightingand winning the wars of the 21 s 1 Century.Secondly, the review is being conducted in greatsecrecy and thus wi thout the a b i l i t y of theServices and other interested parties to influencethe outcomes.

W h i l e i t i s d i f f i c u l t to determineprecisely what "transformation" w i l l mean forthe USN, there are several signs. For example, ata conference in early February. Mr Marshal lnoted that he wanted forces capable of long-range power projection. This could see lessemphasis in the future on aircraft carriers withrelatively short-ranged s t r ike a i rcraf t . But . i tcould also result in greater emphasis on arsenalship concepts - surface ships or submarines. Onanother front , the r e c e n t l v s ta ted USN

35 Summer 2000-2001


development priori t ies; networks, sensors,weapons and platforms do represent a new wayof approaching marit ime conflict , which couldf a c i l i t a t e the desired changes.

Transformation could also see realinterest in leaping a generation of technology,even though many people st i l l have d i f f i cu l tyin def ining exactly wha t is meant by it. TheUSN could argue that DD 21 represents such aleap; w h i l e the USMC could argue tha t byforegoing the F-18 E/F in favour of the JSF, it

confronted by a major challenge wi th currentoperations. Operational tempo is running at avery h igh leve l , w i t h u n i t s and t h e i r c r eusdispersed all over the world. In the last decade,the USN has responded to crises of various sortsat a rate unheard of during the C'old War.

On the equ ipmen t side, the p ic tu reappears to be quite serious. Many air squadronsare finding it increasingly diff icult to mainta inaged aircraft at operational readiness standards.Addi t ional ly , there is a strong sense that not

L'SS Kitty Hawk (C\ 63) makes her way towards Changi Pier in Singapore on 22March 2001. Kitty Hawk is the first U.S. aircraft carrier to moor at Singapore's newdeep-draft vessel wharf at Changi Naval Base. This new facility is one of the few piersin the Pacific that is large enough to berth a carrier and only one of two located inSoutheast Asia. (U.S. Navy photo)

too is leaping a generation of technology. Whatthe USN may need to cons ide r in i t sassessment of leaping ahead, is whether itsleaps are to technologies that reflect the newways of f i g h t i n g and w i n n i n g now beingdemanded by the Bush Administration.

Kven as it tries to grapple with a futurethat could be vastly different from previouslyreasonable expecta t ions , the USN is also

enough money is available for t ra ining purposes.A similar picture is presented in both the surfacefleet and the submarine force. In the surfacefleet , c u r r e n t b u i l d i n g ra tes a r e s i m p l yinsuff ic ient to m a i n t a i n the Fleet at even thepresent barely satisfactory size. Similarly, recentstudies have demonstrated a need for moreSSNs, but there are doubts that the requiredfundinu wil l be made available.

36 Summer 2000-2001


But On The Other Hand...It is, however, too easy to be gloomy about theprospects for the USN. There is mueh in thefuture tha t is exciting and in some casesgenuinely revolutionary. There are new classesof ships and aircraft corning on l ine and newconcepts which could impact significantly onthe conduct of mari t ime operations andconflict.

Undoubtedly, the most radical conceptis that of network centric warfare. In its matureform this concept w i l l allow the USN andUSMC to l ink together a range of combat unitsand formations, provide them with a common,aggregated and highly accurate picture of therelevant battle space. Part of this concept, theCooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) isin the final stages of operational evaluation,with the USN very confident of success. TheRAN and RAAF have a significant interest inCEC and are hopeful of gaining access to theprogram, somet ime af ter opera t iona levaluation has been completed.

We can also expect to see a far greaterUSN emphasis on the use of unmannedvehic les and remotely operated sensors.Unmanned vehicles in naval use w i l l comprisea variety of airborne, subsurface and probablysurface types. They wi l l be used in many roles,i n c l u d i n g reconnaissance, strike and minewarfare. In many cases, they will be supported,as will more conventional forces, by networksor grids of seabed sensors. Sometimes thesesensor grids will themselves be put in place byunmanned vehicles.

On the weapons front, there wi l lundoubtedly be major advances, especially inprecision and range. Although the program hasnot been trouble-free, ERGM looks set tom a t u r e i n t o a g e n u i n e long-range andextremely accurate land attack weapon. Notleast of the concerns in its development, is theprojected cost of rounds. With the comingemphasis on land-attack, we can expect to seeother even longer ranging precision weaponsappearing. Tactical Tomahawk is but oneexample. We can also expect to sec weaponsdeveloped specif ical ly for unmanned aerialcombat vehicles.

[{special ly i f the M a r s h a l l Review-heads in directions expected by many mediacommentators, the most visible changes in thefuture USN will be in platforms. There is somedebate as to the future of the large deck carrier,ostensibly on the grounds of vu lnerab i l i ty tomissile attack. It is d i f f icul t to see how smaller

ones could be any less vulnerable. What maywell determine the u l t i m a t e fate of the largedeck carriers, however, is the extent to whichtheir strike packages could be replaced by othersystems. There is no doubt ing the "presence"value of a CVN, but could an SSBN convertedto carry cruise missi les , pack an equ iva len tpunch, without the need for the array ofdefensive systems?

The Z U M W A L T Class destroyers( D D 2 1 ) wi l l also mark a revolut ion w i t h i n theUSN. They will be not just "electric drive" butal l -e lectr ic ships. That is, through the i rIntegrated Power Systems ( I P S ) the primemovers will generate electricity which w i l lpower propulsion systems, ships' services andweapons systems. Equally revolutionary w i l l bethe crew structure, which w i l l take m i n i m u mmanning to a new low level. Even i l theprojected number of 95 is not reached, this verylarge ship will have few enough people in it torequire major changes in ship managementconcepts.

There is also widespread interest in theStreetfighter concep t for s m a l l sur facecombatants optimized for l i t t o r a l mar i t imewarfare. That interest has also encompassed thefast ca tamaran technology, w h i c h is bestexemplified by the products of the Aus t ra l ianfirms, INCAT and AUSTAL, both of which nowhave joint venture partners in the USA. There isno agreement yet wi thin the USN as to how thistechnology can best be used, nor on the roles forStreetfighter. Nevertheless, despite the fundingdifficulties within the DoD, there is a goodchance that either an AUSTAL or INCATproduct will be leased for a trial period in thenear future. Such a trial would play well with MrMarshall's recent cry for more experimentation.

And the People?Like many navies around the world , the USNhas significant challenges in a t t rac t ing andretaining the right number of the right kinds ofpeople. Nevertheless, it has consistently met itsrecruiting targets in recent times, not leastbecause of an aggressive and very wellresourced recruiting campaign. The USN hasalso been promoting jo in ing and signing-onbonuses to good effect. Recent pay rises and thepromise of more in the near future, must also behaving an effect.

But, the USN is also working hard toboost retention; not an easy task at a time whenoperating tempo is very high and maintenancefund ing is constrained. This is being done

Summer 2000-2001


t h rough a range of programs, which includeattempts to reduce the time which sailors spendon men ia l tasks. There are also l imi ts beingplaced on the t ime which sailors can hedeployed from their home ports and financialcompensat ion if those l im i t s are breached.Al though it may be too early to claim victory,t h i s combination of measures does seem to behaving the desired effect; with recent reports of

improving trends in retention.Beyond tha t , the USN is examining

new approaches to t raining, to accord with thenew crewing philosophies, associated in thefirst place with DD 21. The new approaches\ \ i l l a l so be based s igni f icant ly on thewidespread availability of internet facilities atsea and ashore.

So, What of the Future?This ar t ic le is l i t t l e more than a brief andselective look at the most powerful navy in theworld. Consequently, any conclusions drawnf r o m i t need to be h e a v i l y q u a l i f i e d . Nointerested observer of the USN has difficulty ini d e n t i f y i n g present problems o r f u t u r echallenges, but it is far too easy to makejudgments on that basis alone.

What has particularly impressed t h i sobserver, over the last year or so, is the strengthof the inst i tut ion that is the USN. Despite therecent reductions, the supporting infrastructure,human and physical, remains huge and capable,by any standard. Furthermore, despite somecriticism to the contrary, the USN is capable ofbold and significant change. DD21 and the focuson network centric warfare are evidence of this.W h i l e t h i s inherent strength wi l l certainly betested in the future, the USN seems set to remainthe world's preeminent navy for some t ime tocome.

About the AuthorCommodore Jack McCajfrie is the AustralianNaval Attache in Washington: having agreed toleave the country a\ a condition of his recentparole from Navv Headquarters. In a former lifehe was an aviator, while more recently, he hasbeen Head of what is now the Seapower Centreand a Branch Head in Navv Headquarters

38 Summer 2000-2001


BOOK REVIEWS

India's Maritime SecurityRahul Roy-ChaudhuryKnowledge World in association with the Institute for Defence Studies and AnalysesNew Delhi, 2000

ISBN 81-X6019-29-4201 pp, maps, tables and index.

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury is an Indian academic and defence analyst who has specialised in SouthAsian naval and mari t ime affairs. His first book. Sea Power and Indian Security, published byBrasseys in 1995, was a judicious and comprehensive assessment of the Indian Navy and thechallenges which it faced. Although Roy-Chaudhury wrote from an Indian perspective and withIndia 's national interests at heart, he did so without lapsing into the rhetoric which has markedmuch of what has passed for debate in Indian defence circles.

India's Maritime Security is marked by the same balance and good sense in the author'sefforts to assess the maritime interests of India and the possibilities for improvement in thecurrent condit ion of things. Roy-Chaudhury sets out to analyse the economic, polit ical andmilitary dimensions of India's maritime activities, focusing particularly on the future of India'snaval capabilities and the potential for further international maritime and naval cooperation, Heconcludes with an argument for a comprehensive marit ime security policy for Ind ia in termswhich w i l l be very famil iar to those involved with the development of Australia 's Oceans Policyin recent years.

Roy-Chaudhury's thesis is solidly wri t ten and based on a wealth of statistics. He isgenerally cautious in his crit icism and careful to let the facts speak for themselves. Nevertheless,the difficulties which India faces in adjusting effectively to the modern world are manifest atmany points. Not the least of these difficulties appears to be a h ighly complex bureaucracy illadapted to face the challenges of globalisation and technological change.

In more directly mil i tary terms, the issue of Pakistan does appear to be one of theprincipal factors restraining India from embarking upon a wholly effective maritime securitypolicy. Many issues that appear at first to be concerned solely with economic benefit ,technological development or environmental protection rapidly assume a mil i tary dimensionw i t h i n the Indo-Pakistan rivalry.

Roy-Chaudhury's analysis of the problems facing the Indian Navy is both comprehensiveand thoughtful . Again, many of the judgements within his text are implici t for the cri t ical reader.He goes in to great detai l to display the f i n a n c i n g of I n d i a n defence effort , the r e s t r i c t i o n s placedupon the Navy and - by association - the byzant ine administrat ion of Ind ian defence. Heh i g h l i g h t s the fact tha t I n d i a n naval finances have not been sufficient to support the forcestructure which India has long sought. Nor, quite probably, have they been enough to allowmaintenance, t ra ining or operations at the levels required for a ful ly efficient fleet. India'seconomic difficulties in the early 1990s, the Navy's partial dependence upon the former SovietUnion for much of its technology and the relatively poor performance of the Ind ian s h i p b u i l d i n gindustry have combined to create a decade long gap in new construction that will be practicallyimpossible to remedy, even in the long term. Although Roy-Chaudhury makes clear the extent towhich Indian naval development has revived, his financial analysis suggests that the IN will havesubstantial difficulties in f ind ing the funds sufficient to exploit the latest naval technologieswhich its ships require to satisfy the IN's strategic and operational ambitions. The ways in whichthe IN seeks to work through this conundrum w i l l be of particular interest to many other mediumna\ ies.

39 Summer 2000-2001

.Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

A symbol of India's contemporary naval sophistication. The new Indian destroyerINS Delili at the 2001 Indian International Fleet Review in IVlumbai.riidhiui :ipli: John Mortimer.

All in a l l . t h i s is a good book and wel l worth reading by any student of Aust ra l ianm a r i t i m e affairs. India is a country to which we need to pay more attention than we have in thepast and India '.v Maritime Security makes an excellent start for anyone seeking to understand themaritime dimension of South Asian affairs.

Should any would-be readers have difficulty obtaining the book through Aus t ra l i an retailoutlets, their best approach would be to contact the publisher directly. The details are:Knowledge World, 5A/I2. First Floor, Ansari Road. Daryaganj. New Delhi- 1 10002. INDIA( I c l No. M l - 1 1-326349S).

(.iuldi'ick

40 Summer 2000-2001

IMAGES OF THE INDIAN INTERNATIONALFLEET REVIEW

Photographs:Top: The Russian Udaloy Class Destroyer Admiral PanteleyevBottom: The Indian frigate INS BramaputraPhotographs: John Mortimer

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Documents

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute