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Journal of theAustralian Naval Institute

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Summer 2003

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

The Australian Naval Insti tute was formed and incorporated in the ACT in l l)7x Them a i n object ives of the I n s t i t u t e are:

• to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy andthe m a r i t i m e profession; and

• to p rov ide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navyand the mari t ime profession.

The Insti tute is self-supporting and non-profit-making. Views and opinions expressed inthe ./iiiirini/ of the Australian Naval Institute are those of the authors and not necessarilythose of the I n s t i t u t e or the Ro^al Australian Navy. The aim is to encourage discussion,dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement ofprofessional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

PATRONChief of Navy Vice Admira l Chris Ritchie. AO RAN

COUNCIL MEMBERSPresident Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt . RANVice President Captain Richard Menhinick, CSC RANSecretary Commander Craig Pritchard, RANTreasurer Ms Kym Will iamsJournal Kditor Mr Andrew ForbesCouncillor Commodore James Goldrick, CSC RANCouncillor Captain Ray Griggs. CSC RANCouncillor Dr David StevensCouncillor Commander Kevin C'orles, RNZNCouncil lor Commander Henry Pearce, RAN

Publ ic Officer Lieutenant Patience Neal, RAN

AREA REPRESENTATIVESThe fo l lowing Ins t i tu te members have agreed to act as points of contact on membershipissues and for submitting articles, book reviews and correspondence for the Journal.

AC'SC, Canberra CMDR Craig Pritchard craig.pritchard(« defence.gov.auA I)I''A, Canberra Dr John Reeve [email protected] I M A S Albatross CAPT Steve Pearson [email protected] I M A S Cairns LEUT Darryn M u l l i n s darryn.mullins(« defence.gov.auHMAS Cresvvell CMDR Henry Pearce [email protected]);u \\ in LCDR Jo Bastian [email protected] M A S Penguin CMDR John Shevl in [email protected] M A S St ir l ing CAPT Ray Griggs [email protected]

Journal of the Australian Naval InstituteNumber 107

ISSN 0312-5807The Australian Naval Inst i tutePO Box 29, Red H i l l ACT 2603ABN 45 988 480 239

CONTENTS

AIM Friends and Supporters 2

From the Editorial Board 3

AIM Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defenee 4and Trade Inquiry into a Maritime Strategy

Australia's Oceans Policy 7Lieutenant Commander I'irginia Oborn, RAN

Reforming Naval Planning 1977-78 14Commodore Alan Robertson, RAN (Ret 'd>

Legal Issues in Warship Design .Lieutenant Commander Chris Galloway, RAN and Lieutenant CommanderCameron Moore, RAN

Sail to Steam and its Impact on the Strategy of War at Sea 24Commander Nick Youscman, RAN

The Continued Util i ty of the AIXZUS Treaty 3 1Commander Jonathan Mead, RAN

S H I P H A N D L I N G CORNER: Life in the Northern Arabian Gulf 38Captain Ray Griggs, CSC RAN

BOOK REVIEWS:• Lost Subs: From the Hunley to the Kursk. The Greatest Submarines Ever

Lost - and Found .?

Reviewed b\- Lieutenant Matthew Hoffman, RAN• Don't Tell the Prime Minister

Re\'ie\veil hv Dr Sam Bateman

Front Cover: Maritime Interception Force ships based in Bahrain. ( R A N )Back Cover: A boarding party from HMAS Manoora prepares for action. ( R A N )

The Journal of the Australian Naval Institute is printed by:New Millennium Print 1/38 Kcmbla Street, Fyshwick, ACT 2609

Slimmer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute\uinhcr 10~

ANI FRIENDS AND SUPPORTERSThe companies listed below have demonstrated the i r support for the aims of the Austra l ian\a \a l I n s t i t u t e by becoming Friends or Supporters of the AN1. The Ins t i tu te is grateful forthe i r con t inued assistance.

Raytheon Australia

LOPAC and SAAB Systems Australia

Thales Underwater Systems

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For more detai ls on how to become a friend or supporter of the Austral ian N a v a l I n s t i t u t e ,please contact Commodore James Goldrick, CSC' RAN: james.goldrick(</ defence.gov.au.telephone ( 0 2 ) 62653 153 ( b h )

Summer 2003


FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD

Commodore Warick Gately, AM RAN tendered his resignation from the Navy at the end of2002 and also as President of the Institute, we wish him well in his future endeavours andthank him for his efforts in expanding the membership of the AN I. The Deputy Chief ofNavy, Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt, RAN has agreed to be the Institute's President.

The AN I Library has been repatriated from the Defence Library system and is now housed inthe RAN Sea Power Centre. The Institute wi l l gladly aecept book donations on naval andmari t ime matters (where they wi l l either be added to the library or traded for d i f f i cu l t toobtain books). Could prospective donors please contact Dr David Stevens on (02) 62662423.

The Institute has never had a physical home, but from 2003 it will be housed in the RAN SeaPower Centre. We now seek the assistance of former Council members to locate ANI recordsand property, as well as the Insti tute 's copies of Proceedings, Naval Review, Maritime Studiesand other journals, which w i l l be incorporated into the ANI Library. As ANI material hasbeen found on a number of naval establishments, could all members also check their worklocations for any items belonging to the Institute; please contact Mr Andrew Forbes on (02)62655062 to arrange collection.

The Annual General Meeting is planned for March 2003. where a range of amendments to theConstitution wi l l be proposed to ensure the continued viability of the Institute.

The third King-Hall Navy History Conference on The Navy and the Nation will be held inCanberra on 24-25 July 2003. The annual ANI dinner wi l l be held in conjunct ion wi th theconference on 24 July and Professor Geoffrey Till wi l l deliver the Vernon Parker Oration,discussing the Royal Navy in the Pacific.

Back copies of the Journal (where held) cost $5 for members and $15 for non-members. TheIns t i tu te wi l l take back old copies of the Journal if members no longer wish to hold them.

We hope you enjoy this issue.

EDITORIAL BOARDEditor Mr Andrew Forbes andrew.forbesl /_/ .defence.go\ .anHistory articles Dr David Stevens david.Stevens 1 (a.defence.gov.auNew Zealand articles CMDR Kevin Codes kevin.corlcsfr* nzdf.mil.nzSli iphimdli i i" Corner CAPT Ray Griggs ray.griggs(c/ defence.gov.auBook Reviews Dr John Reeve irccvetoadfa.cdii.au

Summer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval InstituteNumber I07

The Australian Nava l Ins t i tu t ePC) Box 29

RED H I L L ACT 2603

25 October 2002

SecretaryJoint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and TradeParliament HouseCanberra. ACT 2600

I N Q U R Y INTO AUSTRALIA'S M A R I T I M E STRATEGY

Dear Sir,

The Council of the Australian Naval Ins t i tu te ( A N I ) has viewed with interest the Committee'sin tent ion to inqu i re into the role of mari t ime strategy in Aust ra l ia ' s defence policy. Thefollowing general comments and a selection of art icles from the Journal of the Australian\aval Institute are forwarded as this organisation's contribution to the debate.

NVhat is a marit ime strategy?Although not specifically addressed in the Inqui ry ' s terms of reference one of the morefundamenta l issues that might profitably be addressed by the Committee is the meaning andunderstanding of the term 'maritime strategy'. Unfortunately, there is no single acceptedde f in i t i on and. as in many other areas of Austral ian Defence doctrine, terminology remains as t u m b l i n g block to the creation of an effective joint force capabil i ty. As elaborated in a recentarticle: 'Doctrinally, the ADI- has a situation where joint, maritime lain! and aerospaceconcepts are expressed in Jour different languages, which are not necessarily well understoodacross the ADF'.1 This has led to a situation where policy papers, such as Defence 200(1. usethe term ' m a r i t i m e strategy' in a manner which imposes qu i t e severe and unnecessaryconstraints on what , in practice, should be a far more flexible and broadly based aspect ofnational strategy.

According to Professor John Hattendorf of the US Naval War College, a maritime strategyincorporates "the direction of all aspects of national power that relate to a nation's interestsat sea'.' In a s imilar manner, the Royal Australian Navy defines a maritime strategy as 'Thecomprehensive direction oj a/1 aspects oj national [lower to achieve national strategic goa/shy exercising some degree of control at sea\ Clearly, a mar i t ime strategy is closely relatedto national security, however, it should not be seen as a purely naval , nor even militarypreserve. Instead, the concept involves the integration of a far wide r range of national

P.I). Leschen, 'The Integration of Joint and Single-Service Doctrine-Hnsuring Marit ime, Land and AirConcepts are I 'nderstood and Applied' Australian Defence Force Journal. No. 152. .lanuary/February 2002. pp.5-14.

J.B. Hattendort. 'What is a Mar i t ime Strategy?' in I). Stevens (ed.l . //; Seiircli <>/ </ Maritime Strategy: themaritime element in Australian defence planning since IVOI (Canber ra : SDSC, I W 7 ) . p. 13.3 Royal Australian Navy. Australian Maritime Doctrine. RAN Sea Power Centre. 2000. p. I 56.

Summer 2003


insti tutions and interests. In addi t ion to purely military concerns, these interests should at leastinclude the economic, cultural , industrial and environmental dimensions of Aus t r a l i a ' smaritime environment. Hence a true maritime strategy must be a sub-set of national grandstrategy and, from this perspective, Australia's military strategy should devolve from ourmaritime strategy rather than the other way around.

Does Australia have a maritime strategy?Because of its historic failure to harness the wealth of its surrounding oceans Australia has attimes been described as an incomplete marit ime power.4 Most Australians still regard the i rcoastline as l i t t le more than a convenient playground, while the vast expanse of water beyondis of only peripheral importance. As the late Professor Frank Broeze pointed out in his far toorare survey of maritime Australia: 'Image* and perceptions of national ideality have largelyrevolved around inward-looking and often racist concepts of "continental" Australia inwhich the sea was seen as a fence shutting out intrusions from the surrounding region'. Theperception that the sea is a highway, one which makes every other coastal state in the world aneighbour, has achieved far less national prominence. Yet, it is this last point that h igh l igh t sthe security implications of the nation's broader maritime setting. Any possible mi l i t a rymovement of persons and materiel, either by or against Australia, must travel either on, over,or under the sea. Hence, no matter whether the security problem is local, regional or global,and no matter whether viewed from our own perspective or from that of an adversary, thecritical factor underlying success will always be the ability offerees to make use of the sea.

Although portrayed as the product of an unprecedented developmental process Defence 2000follows the pattern of previous White Papers in focusing only on a very limited range ofAustralia's national maritime affairs. There is little discussion of the vital role of maritimeresources and communications, or even the problems of enforcing Australian jurisdiction overone of the largest combined maritime economic zones on the planet. There is certainly noattempt to integrate these aspects into a comprehensive national security strategy.Unsurprisingly, the maritime strategy portrayed in Defence 2000 is one limited to 'control ofthe sea and air approaches1. The prime mission assigned to the ADF's maritime assets centreson the prevention of any incursions in force while supporting the ADF's freedom of operationin our approaches. In effect, Australia has continued to focus on using the sea for the creationof a barrier rather than exploiting it as a highway. Consequently, our endorsed militarystrategy places a premium on the denial capabilities of our naval and air forces. The dangerinherent in this policy is that it too often leaves the initiative with an adversary, while barelyacknowledging that our national interests extend well off our coast and involve far more thanthe defence of territory. More fundamentally, and notwithstanding the underlying importanceof protecting Australian soil from a foreign lodgment, current policy needs to acknowledgethat our sovereignty can never be seriously threatened while we maintain supremacy offshore.

Rather than impose constraints a true maritime strategy should make use of the f lex ib i l i typrovided by maritime forces (including naval, air and land elements) to concentrate onstrategic end states rather than the defence of a particular territory. Australia mustcontinuously seek to impose our choice about where and when to fight and. equa l lyimportantly, our level of involvement. Intell igently directed, the capabilities for mobility,power projection and sustainment inherent in maritime forces allow Australia to fine tune our

4 D..I. Campbell, 'Maritime power and the Australian Defence Force' in D. Stevens (ed.), Maritime Power in tin-Twentieth Century: The Australian Experience (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1998), p. 249.5 F. Broeze, Island Nation: A Histoty of Australians and the Sea (Sydney: Allen & Unwin. 1998). p. 1 .

Summer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute.\umber 10"

defence obligations and sh i f t focus with remarkable rapidity. Furthermore, and of v i t a limportance in an era of instability and uncertainty, a nation's maritime power can act as as ign i f i can t presence anywhere in the world, demonstrating commitment to an a l l i ance orc o a l i t i o n , \ \ h i l e ac t ing to both l i m i t the development of problems and keep threats at adistance.

Notwithstanding the shortcomings of its existing Defence strategy, Australia has alreadybegun attempts to better integrate its national maritime activities. Indeed, at the release ofAustralia's Oceans Policy in 1998 we probably led the world in th is area. The Aus t ra l i anN a \ a l I n s t i t u t e believes that our nation must continue to proceed down this path. By movingcloser to a t r u l y national mari t ime strategy we can expect to make best use of all the attr ibutesoffered by our maritime forces and face the future with far greater confidence.

Relevant ArticlesAttached are a number of articles from recent editions of the Journal oj the Australian \a\\ilInstitute tha t might be of interest to the Committee. They cover some recent RAN operations,force s t ructure issues and mari t ime/naval strategy.

Yours Sincerely,

.•t.K. I-'ORKKS D.M. STE \ E\S, PliDJot/null Editor Councillor

Kclitor's NoteThe articles provided to the Committee were:Commodore Sam Bateman, AM RAN (Ret 'd ) 'Australia 's Oceans Policy and the Mari t imeCommunity' January/March 2000.Commander A l l a n du Toil, RAN 'Breaking the Spears: HMAS Tobruk's involvement inTruce Moni tor ing Operations in Bougainvi l le ' January March 1999.Cap ta in A l l a n du Toil. RAN 'Tactical Warfare Command in the R A N ' Winter 2002.L i e u t e n a n t Colonel Fawcett, 'Sea Control to Power Protection in the Littoral ' Spring 2001.Lieutenant Commander Trevor Gibson. RAN 'The One That Didn't (jet Away' Autumn-Winter 2001.Captain .lames ( ioldr ick, RAN 'The Medium Power Navy in the 2P1 Century' Summer 2000-2001.L i e u t e n a n t Brad Maekay, RAN 'Earthquake Relief in Turkey' Spring 2001.Mr John Mor t imer ' N a v a l Force Structuring' Spring 2002.Lieutenants St John-Brown and Lobley. R A N R 'A New RAN Focus for the Protection ofShipping" Spring 2001.L i e u t e n a n t Commander I) Schopen, RAN 'Has the Royal Austral ian Navy Achieved aBalanced Fleet'.'' Apri l June 1999.S u t e k h ' F u n d i n g the Frigates' Summer 2001-2002.Lieutenant Benjamin White. RAN "Mari t ime Operations in East Timor' Apri l /June 2000.

'' Hnvironmcnt Austra l ia . Austnilki's Oceans Po/icv, Canberra.

Summer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute.Yum her 107

Australia's Oceans Policy

By Lieutenant Commander Virginia Oborn, RAN

' J I V A 'm>i r more about Mars than we do aboutour oceans'

1 his statement from a N a t i o n a l Oceans Officerepresentative encapsulates the l imitedknowledge about oceans and their managementin Aust ra l ia . Around 97% of the volume ofAustral ia ' s trade is moved by sea.2 Australia'scommercial fisheries production is estimated atSI .8 bi l l ion pa.' Offshore petroleum is worthapproximately S8 b i l l ion pa and supplies 85% ofthe na t ion ' s petroleum demands.4 Theseeconomic factors, in addition to ensuring theintegrity of Australia 's ocean ecosystems,protecting marine biological diversity, andsupporting a diverse and ecological sustainablemarine tourism sector, are some of the diversechallenges and responsibilities Australia faces inguaranteeing the long term health of our oceans.The size of our maritime jurisdictions, our scantknowledge about t h e i r resources, and theperceived lack of a mar i t ime cul ture poseenormous problems for management/

Australia's ratification of the 1982United Nations Convention of the Law of theSea (UNCLOS) led to the declaration of an 1 1m i l l i o n square kilometre Exclusive Economic/one (EEZ)." Nat ions who rat i fy UNCLOS notonly gain control over substantial l iv ing andnon-living resources in their EEZ, but also agreeto obligations to protect the marine environmentthus gained. In terms of governmentalresponsibility a massive area previouslyclassified as global commons, is now a nat ionalresponsibility and of enormous potentialeconomic benefit, provided they are managedeffectively.7 The responsibilities that accompanythis /one resulted in the Australian Governmentdel iver ing an 'integrated and comprehensive'Oceans Policy in 1998. l l e r r i m a n argued tosome extent, Austral ia already had a na t iona loceans policy in the form of existing strategies,policies, institutional arrangements, from Stateand federal arrangements, groups and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs).s WhatUNCLOS provided was the impetus to constructa coordinated, integrated and comprehensiveapproach to managing ocean policy and theopportunity to raise the profile for a mar i t ime

culture in Austral ia. Another s t imu lus involvedin raising the profile of maritime affairs aselements of public policy in Austral ia were theachievements of some sectors of Australia'smarine industry, particularly fishing, marinetourism, and offshore oil and gas.'1

This article examines the factorsinvolved in the development of Australia'*Ocean Policy. The factors are representative ofthe mul t ip l e uses of the marine environment andtheir abili ty to influence a policy designed lomanage Australia 's large ocean environment .Managing the policy w i l l be appraised wi thspecific reference to the role of the OffshoreConstitutional Settlement and the RegionalMarine Planning approach. F ina l ly , the issuesfacing the future direction of Australia's OceanPolicy will be examined and the prospects for anAustralian maritime culture.

Development of Australia's Oceans PolicyUpon launching Australia's Oceans Policy,Senator H i l l stated the release of the policy"positions Australia as a world leader inimplementing integrated oceans planning andmanagement.'1 By observing the efforts ofsome overseas examples this statement may beplaced into context. The United Slates. Canada,Japan. Indonesia, and South Korea have alltackled the issue of developing ocean policy inquite different ways. These varied responses arethe result of different drivers and diversecul tural , poli t ical and i n s t i t u t i o n a l factors." Forexample, Indonesia is progressing with sectoralpolicies while Japan is preoccupied with policyaspects surrounding in terna t ional border issuesand mitigation of po l lu t ion effects. South Korea,meanwhile, has addressed integration by anins t i tu t ional path, establishing the Ministry ofMaritime Affairs and Fisheries to integrate theocean related functions from ten governmentauthorities and departments. The US, wh i l eor iginal ly leading the way in coastal/marinepolicy, is no closer to developing a nationalpolicy. This is based on the reaction to theatti tude of their Congress and the f a i lu re of anon-sectoral based constituency for a un i f i edOceans Policy to emerge to combat sectoralinterests. The Canadian experience seems to

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Journal of the Australian Naval InstituteNumber 10"

h a v e been more successful than the USapproach, u i t l i the creation in 1996 of a two partOceans Act.' :

Austral ia ' s development of oceanmanagement policy had a fragmented and mu l t i -pronged approach. Government interest indeveloping an Australian oceans policycommenced wi th the 1989 McKinnon Report,Oceans o/' ll'etilth.^ This report evaluatedAust ra l ia ' s marine science and technologies andmarine industries and made a strong case for amore coordinated approach to developingAustral ia 's ocean industries. There was also abackground scries of seminars, scoping papers,working groups, conservation plans, marinenetworks and reports.14 In particular, ihc releaseof the major report in 1995, Stale oj .liistralui '.vMarine Environment, (bund 'there \vns a luck ofstrategic, inte^rateil planning in marine aiulcoastal environments.* ~~ Marine agencies, suchas Australian Marine Safety Authority,Australian Marine Sciences Association andAustralian Fisheries Management Authority, hadalso begun to produce a range of draft plans andstrategies. Linkages across these p lans weremade bv their concern w i t h 'aspects of themanagement of h u m a n use of the oceans.'"Running parallel to these plans was the NationalStrategy for Ecologically SustainableD e v e l o p m e n t ( L S I ) ) , whose 1992 reportprovided a conceptual framework for oceanspol icy and was a 'compromise betweenconservation and development.'1

W i t h the I - .S I ) strategy as the policyframework, b ipa r t i s an p o l i t i c a l support and thep l ann ing efforts of the v a r i o u s marine agencies.Aust ra l ia had a strong foundat ion for thecreation of a comprehensive ocean policy. l s

H o w e v e r , there were some impediments to thedevelopment and implementation of an oceanspolicy. This would i n v o l v e the federalgovernment w o r k i n g wi th state and localgove rnmen t s to develop a "comprehensive andintegrated oceans policy' across alljurisdictions.'"

The Oceans Policy had to be a na t iona l ,as d i s t inc t from Commonwealth, policy to meeti t s a ims of being comprehensive and integrated.( ) n e of the l i r s t barriers was the friction betweenthe v a r i o u s l e v e l s of government in Aust ra l iaand the r isk of the policy becoming abureaucratically controlled process based inCanberra. Inter-agency r iva l ry and dominationby one. or a few sectoral groups in thedevelopment of a policy could led to the

exclusion of the user-groups, c ruc ia l issues andthe community. Finally, there was the risk of thefinal policy being a series of plat i tudes wi th nopractical implementation elements included."

The Department of Environment . Sportsand Territories (DEST) was assigned theresponsibility to oversee the development of theOceans Policy. DEST established in te r -departmental committees and a steering group toaid the development of the policy. On 3 March1997. the Prime Min i s t e r of Aus t r a l i a launched a'consultation paper' on Aust ra l ia ' s OceansPolicy."1 Before the final policy was released,significant public comment and consultation wasundertaken and a fur ther two fur ther reportswere produced.

The Ministerial Advisory Group onOcean's Policy (MA( iOP) de l ivered the firstreport in March 1998. MAGOP was composedof people from NGOs, reflecting the d i v e r s i t y ofinterest from groups and sectors involved inOceans Policy. The MAGOP report agreed w i t hthe ESD principles and recommended thepr inc ip le of m u l t i p l e use management. The otherreport was the publ ic serv ice d r i v e n processresulting in the delivery of a 'Australia '\ OceansPolicy - an Issues Paper'.~~ The Issues Paperwas substantial, although it did not include anyrecommended in s t i t u t i ona l arrangements forimplement ing the pol icy. ' The adoption of theESD principles by all stakeholders, and theins t i t u t i ona l arrangements appear to be the twomajor issues that w i l l determine the successfulimplementa t ion of the oceans policy.

Australia's Oceans PolicyAustralia's Oceans Policy was launched inDecember 1998 as a who le of governmenti n i t i a t i v e . The policy was developed underinternational obligations to manage waters underCommonwealth jur isdict ion. Aus t ra l i a ' s oceanenvironments are as rich and as va r i ed as any onearth. They are l inked to three of the world'slargest oceans basins, the Pacific, the I n d i a n andthe Southern Oceans, and encompass all f i v e ofthe major c l ima te /ones, from t ropica l andsubtropical through to southern temperate,subpolar and polar."4 The policy was driven byan understanding that w i t h o u t a dedicatedpolicy, Australia would cont inue to operate on asectoral basis without the capacity to handle t heincreasing pressures on our oceans. Sakell fromthe National Oceans Office proposed the policyas a 'small, vet pro active investment lor thefuture sustainability of our ocean

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

environments.'' Australia 's Oceans Policy is anintegrated, cross-sectoral plan for the sustainabledevelopment and management of nationalmaritime zones and their resources.2'1 The policyprovides a strategic framework for the"planning, management and ecologicallysustainable development of Australia's fisheries,shipping, tourism, petroleum, gas and seabedresources while ensuring the conservation of themarine environment.^1 At the core of the policyis the concept of the Regional Marine Plans( R M P s ) , based on large marine ecosystems andconnecting all Commonwealth agencies.:x

With the release of Australia's OceansPolicy, new ins t i tu t iona l arrangements wereestablished. The new National OceansMinisterial Board drives the implementation ofthe policy. A National Oceans Office wasestablished to undertake a range of functions tosupport policymaking, including thedevelopment of RVlPs and coordination acrossand between government levels. RMPs are onemethod adopted w i t h i n the oceans policy toenable decisions about ocean resourcemanagement be transparent, sustainable andprovide equi table opportunities for theAustralian community now and for fu turegenerations. A Nat iona l Oceans Advisory Groupwas also formed as a key consultativemechanism. Regional Marine Plan SteeringCommittees, comprising key non-governmentstakeholders, w i l l be created for each oceanregion. In addition to these arrangements, one ofthe major intergovernmental frameworks isrepresented by the Offshore ConstitutionalSettlement (OCS). Both the OCS and the RMPmanagement regimes wil l be covered in furtherdetail in this paper.

Managing Australia's Oceans PolicyThe policy is neither solely an environmentprotection policy nor solely an economicdevelopment policy. It is a policy for theecologically sustainable development of ouroceans designed to manage mul t ip le uses."'' Theelements required for effective mult iple usemanagement are: an appropriate legislativeframework; and an appropriate operationalframework.'"

The Commonwealth's existinglegislative framework for the management of themarine environment comprises internationaltreaties and related instruments, AustralianCommonwealth legislation. and inter-governmental agreements between the

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Commonwealth, State and Territories.'1 I heleg is la t ive framework is an involved andmultifaceted system. It is one of the challengesfacing the management of Austra l ia ' s marineenvironment. Austral ia 's Oceans Policy IssuePaper 1 describes the Commonwealth'slegislative framework for regulat ing marinesector activities as 'fragmented and complex'and thus, not adequately addressing mul t ip le usemanagement.12 I t fur ther concluded theframework is overly complex and cumbersomeand generally, non-traditional economicactivities such as tourism and recreationalactivities are not regulated." There is a need todevelop a better management framework. Thiswi l l require a review and rationalisation of allexisting marine sector legislation to iden t i fydisparities and areas of common ground. Thisreview could be incorporated in the iteration orphase of the policy.

An appropriate operational frameworkwould consist of several elements to cost-effectively support achieving the nationalobjectives across a wide range of interest groupsand numerous existing sectoral managementarrangements. This would involve consultativemechanisms, clear management strategies, and aframework to allow evaluation and assessmentof the management plan.

Offshore Constitutional SettlementThe federal nature of Austral ian government andthe interrelationship between t h eCommonwealth, the six states and localgovernments means the management of marineareas in terms of ju r i sd ic t ion is complex.Consistent with the provisions of internationallaw, Australia has declared a range of marit imezones under the Seas and Submerged Lands Act1973. The outer l imi t s of all these zones aremeasured from the terr i tor ia l sea baseline,measured from the low-water l ine along thecoast. The /ones, measured form m a i n l a n dAustralia and islands forming part of Australia,are as follows: the territorial sea. the contiguouszone, the EEZ, and the continental shelf.

Around 97% of Australia's marine areais under Commonwealth governmentjurisdict ion for environmental protect ion andresource management.'4 In 1973 the Stateschallenged the Commonwealth's assertion ofsovereignty under Seas and Submerged LandsAct 1973 over the then three nautical mileterritorial sea. The High Court upheld theCommonwealth assertion of sovereignty and a

Summer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute\iimhci-

scries of arrangements were reached with thestates known as the Offshore ConstitutionalSettlement (OC'S) . The purpose of the DCS wasto g i v e the States greater legal andadministrative role in offshore areas. The OCSis the primary arrangement between theCommonwealth and the States and Territoriesconcerning management of marine resources.The pr inc ip le l eg i s l a t ion implement ing the OC'S((.'oastal Water Suites. Power anil Title Act1 9 X 2 ) entered into force in February 1983.36

W i t h i n the OCS arrangements the Statesand Territories were given title to an area called"coastal wa te rs ' consisting of all waterslandward of the three nautical mile l imit but notincluding in te rna l waters w i t h i n theconstitutional l imits of a State; for example.Sydnev Harbour. The States and Territorieswere also g i \ e n concurrent legislative powerover coastal waters, which translates topossessing the same power to legislate overcoastal waters as they would over the i r landterr i tory . ' l i v e n w h e n the territorial sea wasextended to the 12 n a u t i c a l mi les l i m i t in 1990,the OCS remained at the three naut ical milel i m i t . I he OC'S includes a number of'cooperative arrangements' governing themanagement of specific industry sectors,inc lud ing oil and gas. sea bed minerals, fisheriesand The ( i reat Harrier Reef Marine Park. Thefisheries agreements, for example, assignspecified species or f i sh ing a c t i v i t i e s to apar t icular ( i o \ e m i n e n t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n throughoutthe .Austral ian marine environment. Thearrangements under the b'isheries Management. 1 (7 IWI enables a fishery both wi th in andoutside State coastal waters to be managed byone authority under one law. The OCSjurisdictional system h igh l igh ts the necessity forcooperative governance arrangements. TheCounci l of Aus t r a l i an Governments' remains animportant component of the governancearrangements in r e v i e w i n g roles andresponsibili t ies for the env i ronmen t between theCommonwealth, State and Territories.

Regional Marine PlanningRegiona l M a r i n e P l a n n i n g ( R M P ) is oneapproach a v a i l a b l e to protect and manage theocean e n v i r o n m e n t and resources. It is based onlarge mar ine ecosystems w h i c h ' integratesectoral commercial interests and conservat ionrequirements." Morrison cites 'ocean planningi aid management should a//c/>i/>! to ameliorateconflict of use situations anil provide a directed

balance between aiul among various uses ofocean space\v> One of the m a i n veh ic le s forimplement ing the Oceans Policy is thedevelopment of the RMP concept. I t d i v i d e sAustral ia 's HEZ in to 13 marine planning areas.One of the reasons for this approach to 'manage'the large ecosystem w a s the p o s i t i v e experienceand systems established for the management ofthe Great Barrier Reef.

RMP is ecosystems based andincorporates mul t ip le-use p lann ing as a kevfocus. Sustainable development is also afundamental part of environment and resourcemanagement and enta i ls stakeholderi n v o l v e m e n t . I n general, each R M P w i l lundertake regional resource assessments,consideration of current and possible uses.development of proposals for broad cross-sectoral priorities and resource allocationsamong the sectoral uses.4" Final approval foreach plan rests w i t h the N a t i o n a l OceansMin i s t e r i a l Board. Arising from the RMPprocess, the National Oceans Office aims forregional mar ine p l a n n i n g to integrate currentsectoral management arrangements andstreamline i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements.

The South-east Regional Marine Plan(SERMP) is the first of the regional p lanningareas and the planning process commenced inJune 2000. The region extends from KangarooIsland in South Aus t ra l i a to around Fden inNSW and includes Tasmania and MacquancIsland a to ta l of approximately two m i l l i o nsquare kilometres in area. : I t is probahlv themost complex RMP area, w i t h four stategovernments, numerous local governments, andmore than 50 per cent of the national populationin the adjacent coastal lands.4" Almost two yearshave been spent on the scoping, assessment andconsultation phases of the process incorporatinga range of socio-economic indicators, and thepressures on the uses of the region. ' In March2002 the assessment phase was completedproducing seven reports, br inging together themost comprehensive picture of Aus t ra l ia ' swaters inc lud ing a detailed bioregionalisationstudy. Bioregionalisation is a process ofiden t i fy ing areas (bioregions) based onecological attributes (geology, ocean currents).44

Developing operational boundaries for regional,marine p lanning based on ecosystemcharacteristics w i l l be a s i gn i f i can t step towardsecosystem-based management. The next phaseis developing objectives and managementoptions for the plan, including a performance

10Summer 2003


assessment to monitor the plan's outcomes.KMPs could he considered the keystone

to the successful integration and implementationol" the ocean policy as they integrate manysmaller ju r i sd ic t ions and p lann ing /ones into asingle planning and management regime. Theprocess indicates a significant shift in the currentaspects of the marine p lanning systems. Itprovides a mechanism for addressing tradi t ionalboundary problems, a basis for prioritisingmarine research needs, and identification ofcritical knowledge gaps. If implementedappropriately th i s approach should ensure f u l lpubl ic consul ta t ion and community involvementin decision-making. It represents an 'excitingchallenge for people responsible for protectionand sustainable use of the marine

,45

Future Direction of Australia's OceansPolicyWhat might the regional maritime scene lookl i k e in 2020? Bateman forecasted increasedpressures on resources, particularly energy andfish, greater envi ronmenta l pressures, stricterenvironmental and safety controls on shipping,and an increase in seaborne trade. ' The policyhas a role in balancing national interests andensuring internationally Australia does not losemore than it gains by new measures.

Remaining proactive and progressive isone of the challenges facing Australia's OceansPolicy. From an internal perceptive, successcould be gauged by the achievements of firstRMP. developed in the southeastern region ofAust ra l ia ' s F.HZ. This plan has the ab i l i t y toinfluence, impact, and encourageCommonwealth and State cooperation in themanagement of Australia's marine ecosystems.If successful, plans will be developed for othermarine regions around Australia. Theendorsement of Australia's Oceans Policy byState and Territory Governments as an agreednational approach is another factor that w i l linfluence its future direction. It also plays andimportant part in ensuring its effectiveimplementation.

In 1994 Senator Schacht arguedAustral ia needed to develop a marit imeculture . Other marit ime commentators haveagreed wi th this sentiment. This article contendsAustralia's Oceans Policy provides Australiawith its first real national coordinated approachto mar i t ime issues. Although examination ofrecent government publ icat ions demonstrate this

Nil 111 her If)7

nat ional approach is rather l i m i t e d anddepartmental policy coordination is in itsinfancy. One of the objectives of the oceanspolicy is to promote pub l ic awareness andunderstanding. After examining Defence 2000:Our /-'inure Defence Force, Defence's currentWhite Paper, there is no acknowledgment of theOceans Policy and the role for Defence. This issurprising noting the mar i t ime e n v i r o n m e n t isone and a half times the size of the cont inentallandmass.

Surveillance and enforcement, as part ofdefence operations, in Australia's region is aparamount importance and is retlected inAustralia's Oceans Policy. Austra l ia is amaritime nat ion in a maritime region, featuringmarit ime boundaries with f i v e nations:Indonesia. Papua New Guinea, the SolomonIslands. Neu Zealand and the French sub-antarctic and tropical territories. x We also haveland boundaries in Antarctica wi th Norway,New Zealand and France. Thus, there is a needfor international cooperation. There is arequirement to be able to operate freely in theseareas, have unconstrained access to accurate andup-to-date information and. assist in sharinginformat ion and extending enforcement andsurveillance cooperation with regional globalagencies. The Royal Australian Navy'sAustralian Maritime Doctrine recognisesAustralia's vast area of strategic interest.Australia is dependent on the sea for transportand also, has a h e a v y reliance on the marineenvironment for l i v i n g and mineral resources.4''However, there is no acknowledgment of thecorresponding Australia's Oceans Policy andrecognition of the whole of nat ion approach tocaring for and protecting our oceans now and forthe future. This is a strategic disconnect betweengovernment agencies and should be addressed infuture iterations of both documents.

//; the National Interest. Australia'sForeign and Trade Policy Whi te Paper publishedin 1997 recognised '/'/; a globalised world, theimportance oj integrating domestic andintei'national policies makes a whole-of-nationapproach essential.^ This docs not mean morebureaucratic coordination and layers of'clearance'. Rather it means. Government w i l lcontinue to bring to the policy-making process aclear understanding of the l inkages acrossportfolios/1 This requires better communicationamong those working on related issues in thevar ious portfolios. Australia's Oceans Policyhas departmental l inkages between Defence,

I ISummer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute\umher HI'

Foreign Affairs and Trade, Fisheries, Transport.Environment, Science and Industry. Developinga \ \ l io le-of-nat ion approach to 'oceanmanagement issues' should reflect the reali tytha t trade. industry. defence. tourism,investment. resources, and science andtechnology arc important elements of Australia'sinternal and external interests. They arc allclosely connected u i t h a focus on advancingA u s t r a l i a ' s m a r i t i m e interests.

ConclusionNat iona l and p o l i t i c a l awareness of theincreased rights and obligat ions under UNCLOSpan ided s t i m u l u s for the development ofAustralia's Oceans Policy. This awareness wasteamed with the success and s igni f icance ofsome sectors of the marine industry(shipbuilding, petroleum, f ishing, marinet o u r i s m ) and a strong interest in the marineenvi ronment and ecosystem management.Australia's ()cean Policv is an integratedmanagement and p l a n n i n g system wi th tieredresponsihil i tv for n a t i o n a l coordination andconsistency of the policy. I t acknowledgesregional diversity and the range of backgroundsand in teres ts i n v o l v e d in the managing ouroceans and maritime interests.

Australia's Oceans Policy created anoperational framework to retain the benefits andefficiencies of sectoral management andassociated expertise. I t w i l l improve integrationand coordination across sectors andj u r i s d i c t i o n a l interests w h i l e concurrentlyengaging government . industry and thecommunity throughout the p lanning process.The policy aims to foster a sense of stewardshipfor our oceans and involvement in ensuring thefuture of our oceans. The test remains inchallenging the current sectoral arrangements,p rov id ing evidence to support the principles ofintegrated management approaches, andi n v e s t i n g t i m e and resources for the f u t u r e ofour oceans.

Australia's Oceans Policv provides acomprehensive and coordinated approach tomari t ime issues. Analysts have commented thepol icy s igni f ies a new era of maritime awarenessfor Australia."" Development of a maritimec u l t u r e requires in ter -disc ipl inary approachesfrom all areas of mar i t ime interests to ensurestrategic policy disconnects be addressed infuture policies. Measuring the successfulimplementa t ion of policy wil l be the adoption ofeconomically sustainable development by all

stakeholders and improved ins t i tu t iona larrangements. This w i l l be portrayed bvAustralia 's ab i l i ty to present i t se l f in to theregion as a maritime nation w i t h a developedmaritime cu l tu re . Australia's Ocean Policv is apos i t ive step toward unders tanding oceanmanagement and in that respect, the benchmarkof Mars is more achievable.

About the AuthorLCDR Ohorn completed a Bachelor of ArtsDegree at the University o/ Queensland beforejoining the RAN in 1989. A dual specialistofficer, she has served in a number ofadministrative and sea postings. Her seaexperience includes postings in HMA ShipsTarakan, Torre/is. Westralia. Adelaide and asthe Executive Officer of Ipswich. She hasenjoyed two staff positions, the first in theDefence Personnel Executive and the second inthe Defence Materiel Organisation. / . ( 'DROhorn graduated from the ACSC in Decent her2002 and is now serving as the corporatecommunications officer for \'avy SystemsCommand.

V Sakell, 'Austral ia 's Oceans Policy', lec ture toNavy Single Service. Aus t r a l i an Command and StaffCourse. 2 September 2002.

Environment Australia, Australia's Ocean Policv.I '/>/ _ - Specific Sectoral Measures. Canberra. 1 99S.'Shipping'' Environment Austral ia. Australia's Ocean Policv.I'ol 2 - Specific Sectoral Measures. Canberra. 1998,'Fisheries'

Environment Austral ia . Australia's Ocean I'olicv.I'ol 2 - Specific Sectoral Measures. Canberra. 1998,'Offshore petroleum and Minerals '" S Bateman. 'Deve lop ing a M a r i t i m e C u l t u r e inAustralia' , Aii.sinarine '">-/ (.'on/erence Papers. 1944.p. 44.6 Ci Westeott. " T h e Development of Australia 'sIntegrated and Comprehensive Oceans Policy'.Preservation and Protection oj the MarineEnvironment. Wollongong Papers on MaritimePolicy, No 10, Centre for Mar i t ime Pol icv .University of Wollongong. Wollonuonu. 2000. p. 23.' ib id .s ibid. p. 24.

Centre for Maritime Policv. 'Topic 5 - Austral ia 'sOceans Policy'. Lectures Notes for Austral ianCommand and Staff Course 2002. p. 3 1 .1(1 Environment Australia, Australia's Oceans Poliev(Voll). Canberra. 1998, p. 3." Westeott, pp. 25-30.12 ibid.

12Summer 2003


A Bergin & M Haward "Austral ia 's New OceanPolicy', The InternationalJournal of Marine unitCoastal Law. Vol. 14, No. 3. 1999, p. 391.14 Conferences: Coast lo Const Conference 1W4. theCentre for Marit ime Policy/RAN seminar of 1994.the Marine Environment Conference 1995. and theBureau of resource Sciences Workshop.Programs: Ocean Rescue 2000 (OR2000) programof the Department of Environment; Sports andTerritories; Nat ional Marine Conservation Plan;.OR2000 established a Marine and CoastalCommunity Network (MC'CN) ; Australian MarineIndustries and Sciences Council released a strategyfor the development of marine industries; April 1997working group responsible to the Minister forScience and technology prepared a 'scoping paper"for an Austral ian Marine Science and TechnologyPlan. Reports: Suite of the Marine EnvironmentReport (SOMER).' • Bergin & Haward. p. 391."' Westcott, p. 33.17 ih id .15 ibid. p. 34.'" ibid. p. 33."" S Batcman, 'Australia's Oceans Policy',Presentation Notes to Australian Command and StaffC'ourse, Topic 5, 2 September 2002. p. 3.:i Westcott, p. 36.:: ibid, p. 43.23 ibid, p. 45." Bergin, & I laward. p. 3S8.

5 Sakell

27Bateman, 'Austral ia 's Oceans Policy" p.Centre for Mari t ime Policy, p. 32.- I - iibid.

"'' Hnvi ronment Austral ia . Australia's Oceans I'olicy( l o / I), p. 3.™ Australia's Oceans Policy: Elements that make upa m u l t i p l e use management framework. Issues Paper1.

ih id .5 1

12 ibid. p. 2." , ! . . - ,ibid.M Bergin & Haward. p. 3HX.

Environment Austral ia . Australia 's Oceans Policy( l o l l ) , p . 41 .3(1 ibid, p. 42.; ,b,d.ls Environment Australia, Australia's Oceans Policy( l o / I ) , p . 1 1 .

RJ Morrison, 'Regional Marine P lanning: somegeneral considerations and Australian experiences',Maritime Studies, No I 10, January/February 2000. p.14.

411 ib id . p. U).41 Sakell.4~ Morrison, p 14.4' Sakell. These uses include: Defence,biotechnology, emerging industries, submarine

cables and other sealloor infrastructure, yacht racing,minerals, aquaculture. tourism, petroleum,conservation, shipping, and fishing. Consultationoccurred with Indigenous Communities in theSERMP and through the community and cu l tu ra lvalues assessment.44 ibid.45 Morrison, p. 17.4h S Bateman, 'Regional Mari t ime Policy andSecurity Issues'. Presentation Notes to Austral ianCommand and Staff C'ourse. Topic 7. 4 September2002, p. 9.47 S Bateman, 'Developing a Mar i t ime C u l t u r e inAustralia', p. 41.4K Royal Australian Navy. Australia's MaritimeDoctrine, RAN Sea Power Centre, Canberra, 2000. p.12.49 ibid. p . 1 1 .Ml Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, / / / theNational Interest - Australia 's l-'orei^n and TradePolicy. Canberra. 1997. p. 73.

?: Centre for Maritime Policy, p. 32.

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13Summer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute\iiinber 10'

Reforming Naval Planning 1977- 78

By Commodore Alan Robertson, RAN (Ret'd)

At the ciul of 1976 I took up my appointmentas Director General Naval Operations and Plans.At the t i m e my predecessor, RADM AndrewRobertson, was very busy getting briefed for hisforthcoming appointment as the Head of JointServices Staff in London, and did not have timeto g i \ e me a tu rnover . So it was that I was leftw i t h , in effect , a b lank sheet of paper on whichto \ \ r i t e my n u n views on how the job should betackled. I did. however, have the benefit of aconversation w i t h C'NS' Secretary. IanCrawford, who had served in Washington, and acopy of W v l i c ' s Military Strategy, which hadbeen l e n t to me by Ian Knox.

As a resu l t of Ian Crawford's remarkson the USN's planning cycle I began to form aview of a s imi lar arrangement for the RAN. Andas a resul t of reading Wylie I came across hiselegant phrase t h a t for officers in the armedforces, the appropriate strategic theory should bethe intellectual aihl conceptual hasis of theirprofession.

.A l t e r a \ \ h i l e I concluded tha t my mostimportant p l a n n i n g task was the production of along-range p lan , looking, say. twenty or twentyfive years ahead. And. having just completed anA u s t r a l i a n Adminis t rat ive Staff College coursewhich included a segment on strategic p lann ing ,it seemed to me t h a t tha t concept provided amodel for dea l ing w i t h the uncertainty w h i c hhad bede \ i l l ed earlier attempts at providing ane f f e c t i v e long-range p lan for the Navy. That, int u r n , p rov ided the start poin t for my efforts;which was, to sec w h a t we already had in placeas a long-range plan. Accordingly, I asked myS t a l l Officer. Glenn Lamperd to look for a copyof the N a v y ' s ex is t ing Long Range Plan.

After several days Glenn came back tome and said that he could not f ind a long rangep l a n , all he could find was a piece of graphpaper w i t h exis t ing Fleet u n i t s l i s ted in a columndown the lef t hand side, and years marked outacross the top. Against each ship was a t h i ckl i n e drawn out to the expected service l ife ofeach ship, and a dotted l ine onwards after tha t ,i nd ica t ing , it seemed, a replacement. Writtenover t h i s was "Ditch" and then Di tch wascrossed out and "Stet" wri t ten in its place.

I was staggered, and remarked is this the

Master Plan on which uv are running miorganisation employing over 17,000 people anilwith an annual hiulgel of about S7f)0ni. a Year'.'But apparently it was. Clearly some urgentaction was needed.

I had already decided on a tour stagep lann ing cycle and that the long range planwould be called Plan Blue, w i t h a shorter rangeplan, say 10 years, w o u l d be Plan Green. Tocope with the current Defence funding cycle t h i swould leave scope for a three year plan to becalled Plan Orange wi th the current year plan tobe called Plan Red.

In view of the absence of a king rangeplan it was important to me to get a ten year planwritten and 1 decided that for reasons ofconsistency we needed to i n c l u d e w h a t wasalready in existence. That was. s ta tements madeby CNS in the Chiefs of Staff Committee andany other high l e v e l committee in w h i c h heindicated what he saw as the way ahead for theNavy, views expressed by DCNS (that wasbefore the establishment of C 'NORP) in theForce Structure Committee, and ex i s t ingapproved Staff Requirements. As such it wouldnot be a plan in the true sense of the word, but itwou ld provide the N a v y w i t h a hymn sheet towhich we could all sing.

C ic t t i ng the plan w r i t t e n was somethingof a problem however , because to say that Planswas understaffed was an understatement. IanRichards, my Captain (P lans ) had been assignedto the Aircraft Carrier Project, w h i c h the C'NS(Tony Synnot) had recently decided to establ ish.His intended Deputy, Commander John foster,was still on his way south from New Guinea, buthad a spell in hospi tal to do. The incomingCaptain (P lans) . M i k e Hudson, was not due inu n t i l mid year ( 1 9 7 7 ) and in any ease was to besent over to Defence for a special Defence ofA u s t r a l i a study when he arrived. So I was lef twith my staff officer, Glenn Lamperd and DCSOwen. DCS was an ASW specialist who hadresigned, but was back in fu l l t ime service in theRANEM. So it fe l l to DCS to do the essentialspadework. It would take time.

In the mean t ime I had spoken to theplanner in Personnel and asked h i m how hedecided on the number he needed to recruitwhen he did not know w h a t operations had

14Summer 2003


planned for the size of the Fleet in say, ten yearstime, l i e replied mysteriously: we have ourmethods. So I found out that the planners in theother Divisions did not speak with my people,and, indeed, did not speak to one another. So Iwent and saw the i r respective Chiefs and gottheir agreement that I could call their planners tomeetings on a fa i r ly regular basis. I got an officeallocated and had it furnished with desks, chairs,telephones, a conference table, and a number ofnotice boards on which we could put upinformation about the current Navy Officeprojects, and information about the budget. Thatclone I called them to a meeting, in what I calledthe Planning Office, and gave them a task.

The task I gave them was to devise apriority list of projects from 1 to about 180. Andmy reason for giving them that task was that asDirector of Communications it had alwaysbothered me that , when the Navy was directedby Defence to save say $6()m from its annualbudget, it was done in a most peculiar way. Itwas done l i k e this; the Assistant SecretaryFinance was provided wi th a couple ofuniformed officers to assist him, and they wentaround Navy Office and spoke to all the variousProject Directors. This took a couple of days. Atthe end of this period they came up wi th a list ofprojects to be cancelled and, sure enough, itsaved the required amount. The reasons forselecting projects for cancellation was nevermade public , nor was the decision open toappeal. So 1 asked the Planning Office toestablish the criteria for awarding priority toprojects, and then to sort the exist ing projectsinto a priority list according to their criteria.

The Planning Office wrestled with thisproblem for, as I remember it, about six to eightweeks, and finally came up with list of projectsgraded into priority order. But. as for the criteriaon which to base decisions to award a priority,they could not. they said, suggest them. So 1 satdown and wrote sixteen pages of theology as towhy we had a Navy and went on to discuss theissues involved in awarding priorities. I thenwent on to der ive some criteria. That done I re-sorted the projects according to my criteria.

Meanwhile DCS had done a good job onthe embryo Plan Green. And I forwarded th i sfirst draft to C'NS who liked it, and he directed itto be fully developed. By now it was now aboutJune and Mike Hudson f ina l l y appeared, l i e ,too. l iked what he saw of Plan (ircen. and madeit his plan. So Plan (ireen was refined andcosted for men and money. And we saw that.

Number 107

given the current funding levels and theapproved manning levels , the Navy was u n l i k e l yto ever get the money or the men to implementPlan Green's modest objectives. In forwardingthe plan to CNS I pointed this out. and got hisreply that it did not concern me, it was his job toget the resources needed. So Plan (ircen went toCNSAC. where Mike Hudson presented i t .

Subsequently the project priorities paperwas completed and I sent it off to CNSAC aswell. As I saw it, if the l i s t was approved, \ \hcnit came to saving $Xm off the Navy's budget, allthat would be needed would be to go to the l i s tand, working up from the bottom, work out theamount needed not to be spent.

1 was not i nv i t ed to at tend the CNSAC'when it took my paper and had to rely on C'NS'Secretary for a description of what happened.According to him, CNS took my sixteen pagesof theology and said words to the effect of we/Iwe ilon'/ want to discuss this do we? and putthem in the waste paper basket. CNSAC thendiscussed the priority list and rearranged them totheir own satisfaction. It then directed tha t thelist be attached to Plan Green.

So. by the end of 1977 we had a 10-yearplan and a priority l is t of projects. In themeantime I was increasingly concerned aboutthe way the aircraft carrier project was taking abeating in the FSC, and I decided that weneeded a Public Relations p lan to get somesupport from the Australian public . To this end Iwrote a PR plan which 1 called Project Sea Dog(give a dog a bad name). In those days I wasworking to DCNS as no one had as yet beenappointed as CNORP. DCNS was' RADM"Chick" Murray, and he had made it p la in thathe did not l ike me. So I thought i t unwise tosend him the plan as my own work. AccordinglyI got my civi l ian jou rna l i s t \ \ l io was responsiblefor PR to submit the plan to me as his work. Onthis paper I put a minute suggesting that it was asplendid in i t i a t i ve and recommending it be takenup for action.

The trouble was that C 'NS baulked at theestimated $80,000 Sea Dog was l ike ly to cost.Although I noted tha t he had authorised some$7m for the aircraft carrier project. C'NSsuggested that we do Sen Dog on the cheap. Wewould get the Defence psychologist, an Armycivi l ian , to frame the questions to be put to thepublic , and then get the Reserves to ask thequestions. Altogether these s t ipu la t ions put theend to Sea Dog, so the aircraft carrier projectwas left to the attacks of the RAAF. a number of

15Summer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute.\iiinhcr

Defence c i \ i l i ; m s who hud had their prejudicescontinued In the NAP/TAWS Study, and someDefence correspondents in the media.

By January I 9 7 X I wanted to get on u i t ha proper s trategic long-range plan, and. to t h i send, I called in Mike Hudson, briefed him on thena tu re of strategic p lann ing and told him to startd e v e l o p i n g it. Six months later it seemed to methat Mike should ha \ e something to show me soI asked him how it \ \as going. To my dismay hetold me he had not even started it, he had beentoo busy he said dealing wi th tasks given to himby CNS and CNORP. But n e i t h e r CNS norCNORP had (old me that (hey were directlytasking h im: nor for that matter , had Mike seentit to te l l me himself. There was neither the time,nor any profit, in r a k i n g o x e r t h i s matter. In anycase I was seriously considering resigning as Ihad been informed thai my next posting was tobe as NOR WA. a prospect that did not f i l l meu i t h u n a l l o v e d joy So I decided to wr i te PlanBlue myself in my spare time, that is, eveningsand weekends. It took me about eight weeks but,at the end of i t I produced a first draft of PlanBlue. I gave it a covering minute explaining thenature of strategic p l a n n i n g and asked themembers of C 'N 'SAC for their comments anda d v i c e as to w h e t h e r i t was a sui table approachto a long-range plan.

My approach to writing the plan wasbased on a couple of ideas. One was theStanslleld Turner 's proposal for a h i - l o mix for(he I ' S N but whereas the Sea Control Ship andthe I 1 ( 1 \ \ere the km end of the USN mix , theywould be the high end for the RAN. For the lowend RAN escorts, I selected the US Coastguard270 foot cutter . These ships had a crew of 90.cost about $90m a copy in 1978 dollars andshared a lot of common elements with the FFGs,same gun. same Fire Control System, samehelicopter, but one. not two, helos, same HWsuite. L i n k I I etc. It did not have a h u l l mountedsonar but carried a towed array. It was a simpledesign and was suitable for bu i ld ing at anynumber of yards around the country. As such Isau i t as a late 2()"' Century version of the AMS\ \ h i c h had served us so w e l l in W W I I . Theexisting version of the sh ip was l i m i t e d to 19.5knots using diesel engines, bu t , if you wanted itto go faster you could, for more money, put in agas turb ine .

I he other ma in idea behind my draftplan was to use the theory of marit ime strategyto produce three different force structures whilekeeping as much as possible the same force

elements in each. These I called var ious ly BlueWater a sea assertion model, Jeiine ileole awould-be sea assertion model wi thout a i rc ra f tcarriers but with more FFGs, and 1-OrtressAustralia a sea denial force (a sort of glorifiedcoastguard).

The three force structures proposedwere more or less as fo l lows:

Option ABlue Water

3 Sea ControlShips6 FFGs (4already on order)6 Patrol Escorts(270'CG)6 Submarines

Option BJciine i'.cole

4 FFGs

6 Patrol Escorts

12PTFGs

6 Submarines

Option CFortressAustralia

12 FFGs

1 2 Patrol Escorts

12PTFGs

12 Submarines

I had the c iv i l staff cost each option for capitalcosts and manning requirements. And thesurprising thing was how smal l the di f ferencewas between the three of them. Option C wascosted at S3754m and required 3400 people atsea. Option B was costed at 54464m and needed4044 at sea. w h i l e Option A was costed atS4424m and needed 4520 at sea.

The real ly interesting point was t h a tOption A was S40m cheaper than its supposedlycheaper Option B. However Option A's runn ingcosts would have been been higher because ofthe additional personnel it needed at sea. OptionB would have reduced the wages b i l l from theexisting Fleet's costs by SI2.5m annual ly Theother interest ing point was t h a t the differencebetween the extremes of Option A and Option Cwas only S670M spread over t w e n t y years. And.observing that Defence was l iable to requiresome $60,000m o v e r the same period this onlyrepresented a difference of just ove r l " o of thetotal Defence expenditure over the p lanningperiod.

I la id out a proposed bu i ld ing programfor each of the three options, side b\ side, andshowed that, if strategic circumstances changed,or, more l i ke ly , the Government j ibbed atfunding one of the ships types, it was possible toimmediately bring out an a l t e r n a t i v e proposaland so not lose momentum.

So. off went my draft Plan Blue and Iawaited the reaction of the members of CNSAC.One Admiral said he agreed w i t h the approachoutlined. 1 heard that another .Admiral , h a v i n gread the plan, but obviously had not taken in mv

16Summer 2003


covering minute on the nature of strategicplanning , said to his Staff Officer it's notdefinite enough. He, poor chap, was convincedthat we did not need strategic planning, butwanted to return to the old style of Destroyer 09will he launched on I July 1992 type of planningwhich had NEVKR worked in the past.

But I had submitted my resignation andby December 1478 1 had not got the reactions ofall the members of CNSAC. And, to tell you thet r u t h I was losing interest. I was soon to becomea c i v i l i a n again after thi r ty nine years in theregiment.

EpilogueOver the course of the next year I heard that thenew CNS established a working party of three tolook into my proposed plan, and report.Apparently they did. and increased theal ternat ive force structures from three to seven.And when this came before CNSAC, that augustbody decided to select one of the seven, anddi tch the other six. So, that was the end ofstrategic planning. 1 also heard that they did notl ike my coastguard cutter because of its 19.5knots, for the regular Navy in peacetime; notgang ho enough. The AMS could manage about16 knots flat out as I recall.

I do not know how true this latter partis; others may. All I can say is that the existingPlans Blue and Green owe noth ing to me excepttheir titles. And. of course, as we all know, wehave ended up with Option B, which, as you wi l lrecall was to cost $40m more than the seaassertion force structure. It is, in fact, a sort ofulorified Coast Guard.

Number 107

Century was issued in Ju ly 2001 and revised inAugust 2002.

In J u l y 2000. Plan Green was alsoresurrected as an annual plan, i n i t i a l l y w i t h afive-year focus and then 10 years to mirror theDefence Financial Management Plan.

It is assumed that the Navy Plan (whichbecame the Navy Resources Guide in 1996, andwas discontinued in 199X) was based on theproposed Plan Orange.

About the AuthorCommodore Alan Robertson served from 1940to 1979 and saw extensive service in II IIII. Helater served on the staff Of the Commander inChief Far Fast Forces and commanded anumber of ships including HMAS Duchess andI lobar t . A communications specialist, his finalappointment was as Director General NavalPo/icv and Plans. He served as the NationalPresident of the Australia Defence Associationfrom November 1990 to June 2001.

Editor's NoteCommander Sam Bateman, RAN led theworking party that examined the proposed plan.

The last Plan Blue was published in19X9. With the creation of DevelopmentDivision in 1IQADF. and the move of singleService force structure Branches into thatDivision, it was never revised nor published. In2000. the Minis te r for Defence John Mooredirected Navy develop a costed 20 year plan toprove to him that Navy had adequate planningprocesses in place. Chief of Navy VADM DavidShackleton directed this be extended by 10 years(work progressed through Navy 2020 and Navy2030 to become Plan Blue). The classifiedversion was promulgated in December 2002 (tobe updated every three years), while theunclassified version Australia 's \avv tor the 2 T'

17Summer 2003

The right solutionsat the right time

ie Royal Australian Navy

\

Raytheon^^ A O T O A AA U S T R A L I A

www.raytheon.com.au

A D E L A I D E M E L B O U R N E • N O W R A • P E R T H • S Y D N E Y

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute107

Legal Issues in the Design of Future Warships

By Lieutenant Commander Chris Galloway, RAN & LieutenantCommander Cameron Moore RAN

1 he Department of Defence is conducting arange of studies to assist in the development ofthe operational concept and functionalspecification for the proposed Air WarfareDestroyer under Project SEA 4000. One of thestudies recently completed relates to the impactof the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) over thenext 20-30 years on warship design. This articleis an edited version of that study.

IntroductionIn def ining the legal implicat ions for andrestrictions on the use of the weapon systems inquestion under international law, a twofoldapproach has been adopted. Firstly, it is relevantto state the current international law obligationsand attendant limitations as they apply today, asth i s is the law with which putative designs mustaccord. Secondly, in order to flag potentialimpact on future design, a review of thehistorical development in these areas w i l lprovide some pointers to the future direction thatLOAC might take.

It is impossible to discern w i t h anycertainty the future development of the LOAC,except to say that if the last two centuries areany indication, this body of international law hasthe potent ia l to grow exponentially. This hasclear ramifications for future acquisitions, as itis probable that internat ional law wi l lincreasingly restrict options for future weaponsystems.

The discussion of legal requirementswith regard to transporting people must alsobegin with current requirements. Theserequirements are unlikely to change, and indeed,the trend is l ike ly to be in the direction ofgreater regulation with regard to transportingpeople.

International I au GenerallyIt is not proposed to l i s t the sources ofinternational law in detail . In general terms,international law derives its legitimacy from awide range of sources, and can be said to be "thelaw which the wicked do not obey and therighteous do not enforce".' It should also benoted that much of the wri t ten internat ional law

is the product of compromise, is frequentlycouched in vague and uncertain terms, and hasvarying degrees of internat ional support. Theresult is tha t in its application, the law isinvariably arguable to the extent tha t any givenstate may or may not accept it as b ind ing onthem or their activities.

In general terms, the in ternat ionalcommunity has developed a set of workingprinciples which are drawn from the followinggeneral sources:• treaties between nations;• judic ia l decisions; and• custom, as developed between nations over

a prolonged period.LOAC as a discrete classification ofinternational law has had its greatestdevelopment over the last 150 years. TheGeneva Conventions (various) and Addi t iona lProtocols provide the main body of the la\\which governs Aus t ra l i a in preparation for andexecution of any military conflict. The result isthat in any given conflict i nvo lv ing a number ofnations, each may be bound by the Law ofArmed Conflict to varying degrees. This was thecase in Last Timor, where the policy decisionwas taken to follow the spirit of LOAC'. eventhough opposing forces were not signatories tothe Geneva Conventions.

Towards the future, the only workableapproach therefore is to assume that LOAC w i l lapply, and structure new systems and methodsin compliance. Hence, it is the written content,spirit, and underpinning principles to whichAustralia must adhere when scoping the futureof weapons and systems.

Principles Which Apply in 2002Part I I I of the San Rcnio Muium!" summarisesthe law as it stands wi th respect to war at sea.The guiding principles are:1. There is no right to wage unrestricted

warfare;2. There must be a clear dist inct ion between

combatants and non-combatants/civilians;3. Attacks must be l imi ted to mi l i t a ry

objectives;4. I t is forbidden to employ methods of

19Slimmer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute\ 11 in her

warfare which:• Cause superf luous injury or unnecessary

suffering:• Are indiscr iminate , in that :• They are not. or cannot he. directed against

a specific military target; or,• I he i r effects cannot he l imited as required

b\ international law (ie by the principles ofproportionality and mi l i t a ry necessity).

Methods and means of warfare should heemployed w i t h due regard to the na tu ra len\ i ronment : accordingly, damage ordestruction of the natural environment, whichexceed m i l i t a r y necessity or carried outwantonly are prohibited.

WeaponsArticle 36 of the 1977 Geneva Protocol IAdditional lo the (ienevu Conventions <>/ 12August 1949 (Additional Protocol I or AP 1)places an ob l i ga t i on on parties to the protocol todetermine w h e t h e r or not new systems wouldoffend any ru l e of in te rna t iona l l au . For th i sreason Australia is both legally and morallybound to apply the rules as they stand in relationto new acquisit ions.

draduak'd Force and Weapon Mix.The requirements of proport ional i ty andgraduated use of force should dictate the rangeof weapons fitted to a war sh ip . The design ofships w i t h only missiles and no guns supposesthat they \ \ i l l be avai lable only in conditions ofopen \ \ a r fa re on the h igh seas. A gun is essentialfor warning, and then for minimal destruction inlau enforcement; and it must also be ofsufficient range and cal ibre to constitute aneffective use of force to restrain an opponent'sn a \ a l vesse ls or c landes t ine ly armed merchantships in a lou leve l war l ike action. ' ( inns are themost s u i t a b l e weapon for firing warning shots asseen in law enforcement operations such asOperation Slipper ( in tercept ion operations in the( i u l f ) . Operation Relex (an t i - i l l ega l immigrationoperations) and Operation Cranberry (operationsagainst i l l ega l f ishing in northern waters).

Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles. The use ofASCMs is predominantly governed by the Lawof Targeting, w h i c h is guided by the principlesset out above. This has seen the development ofso called smart weapons, which can be used todiscriminate between mili tary and non-militaryobjectives. As current technology stands, thosemaritime missile systems w h i c h rely on highq u a l i t y th i rd party targeting information for t he i raccuracy a u a i n s t m o v i i m targets, and w h i c h are

tire and forget may poten t ia l ly offend LOAC.This is because the target may move, or anothertarget may be inadvertently acquired leading toan indiscriminate effect. As has been postulatedin the request for this advice. ASCMs w i t h arange in excess of lOOOnm w i l l i n v a r i a b l yrequire mid course guidance or update to assuretheir accuracy and to m i n i m i s e collateraldamage. That said, the l.OAC accuracyrequirement and the need to precisely attack anddestroy targets is ent irely consistent wi th themil i tary aim to be achieved by these systems.

Torpedoes. The API A r t i c l e 3drequirement above applies equal ly to torpedoes.In addition Article 1 (3 ) of the 190" I InciteConvention I'll/ forbids the use of torpedoeswhich do not become harmless when thev h a v emissed their mark.

Sea Mines. Sea Mines are governed insome detail by the 190" I Incite Convention I III.The additional regulation arises by v i r t u e of thehistorically indiscriminate use of sea mines inwar. The conven t ion i t s e l f is l imi ted in i tsappl ica t ion, but by custom the approachembodied in it has been expanded to cover theuse of sea mines genera l ly . The major tenet ofthe convent ion is tha t nava l mines should beconstructed so as to become harmless shouldthey break loose from their moorings orotherwise cease to be under the control of thebell igerent tha t laid them. The rules also requirethat shipowners be warned of the mines as soonas m i l i t a r y exigencies permit, or the conf l ic tends. Mines should be employed so as to avoidthe possibi l i ty of damage or injury to neutralthird parties. Belligerents are also obliged toremove or o therwise make safe mines at thecompletion of host i l i t ies . Despite the age of theconvent ion , i t remains the guiding law and hascustomary app l ica t ion to the use of all seamines. Iran and Iraq were widely condemned forreleasing free f loa t ing mines in to the ( i u l fduring the 1980-8X war between the twocountries. In essence, it is the issue ofcontrol labi l i ty under the convention t h a t iscrucial when contemplating new sea mines andt h e i r use.

I- uture DevelopmentsThe history of LOAC is i n s t r u c t i v e . This bodvof law emerged in the l a t t e r part of the I1) '1 'Century wi th the creation of the Red Cross.largely as the result of the particular horror andhuman suffering which attended war at t h a ttime. This basic need to l i m i t sulVcrhm has

20Summer 2003


developed largely in response to methods andweapons used, usually after specific incidents orcampaigns. The Geneva Conventions andsupporting Addi t ional Protocols attempt todeclare this law to a certain extent , but it is morethe principles which underpin these documentswhich are the pointers to the legal frameworkgoverning future war. Based on the 20'h Centuryexperience, it is not an unreasonable propositionthat the growth of LOAC wil l invariably lead toa continued narrowing of the methods andmeans of waging war.

The development of a technologicallybased approach to war in the late 20 Centuryhas proved the worth of international laws thatregulate these conflicts. While so called smartweapons have had their very public failures wi thlarge numbers of non-combat casualties, th i scollateral damage is much reduced over thecampaigns of WWII and its immediateaftermath. This shift in focus from wholesaleind i sc r imina te bombing of c iv i l i an populationsto legitimate military targets using precisionguided muni t ions , particularly during the 1990-91 ( i u l f War and the 1999 NATO action againstSerbia, is a clear example of the influence of thelaw. This shi f t now places the focus uponintel l igence and accurate information gathering,d i s t i l l a t i o n , dissemination and decision-makingto ensure improved performance of the weaponsthemselves. U l t ima te ly it is the qual i ty of thedecision making process, as much as theweapons themselves that determine anappropriate, legally jus t i f i ab le outcome. Failuresin t h i s area lead to adverse publ ic opinion,meaning that what is legally jus t i f iable may notnecessarily lead to a clearly identifiable ordefensible legal position. The most famousexample of this is the destruction wrought uponIraqi forces fleeing Kuwait City on the road toBasra in 1991. While i n d i v i d u a l actions andthe i r outcome may well fit w i t h i n the LOACprinciples, it may also be that the result of aprolonged campaign or the application of apart icular means of war over t ime may in factlead to a result that does not. The experience ofthe US-led air war in the Balkans campaignexemplifies this view.

In contrast to th is overall orthodoxy, aview espoused by some commentators is thatinternational humanitarian law actual lycontr ibutes by al lowing the mi l i t a ry to do theirjobs, rather than act as an absolute protection fornon-combatants. Furthermore, LOAC is notnecessarily at odds with the mi l i ta ry concept of

Number 107

tight and win . The need to husband resourcesand achieve economy of effort as a m i l i t a r yimperative is arguably consistent wi th the thrustof the law. From a purely theoret icalperspective, ordinance expended on a non-mission target is wasted.

It should be noted that the developmentof technology has also resulted in two classes ofbelligerent: the haves and the have nots. Thehaves are able to wage war with a relatively highlevel of accuracy and precision, by virtue oftheir ab i l i ty to afford smart systems in largenumbers. This is in contrast with the have notswho must resort to inexpensive dumb weaponsto wage war, placing them at a relat ivedisadvantage. The corollary is that because thehaves possess the technology to strikesurgically, the expected norm is tha t they w i l lhave to use it to comply wi th the law.

Weapons SummaryThe following factors are possible formativelegal influences on the use of weapons in futurenaval warfare:• There would be l i t t le or no reading down or

reduction in effect of the current body of theLOAC; on the contrary, it is l i ke ly that thisfield wi l l become more restrictive andcomplex as it develops.

• The principles established under LOAC andout l ined above wil l continue to apply.

• The need for protection of the environmentand minimisation of collateral damage wi l lincrease in prominence.

• As technology evolves, the use of weaponsand systems which cannot be closelycontrolled wi l l wane; conversely theexpectation w i l l be that accuracy to aperhaps i n f i n i t e s i m a l degree w i l l bedemanded and deny the haves the abili ty touse dumb weapons.

• The clear demarcation of ob jec t ives asmil i ta ry or not w i l l be essential, becausetechnology can provide it and publ ic opinionw i l l demand it. pa r t i cu la r ly of the haves.The extent of the disadvantage imposed onthe have nots as a result remains to be seen.

• The need for high level, accurate and q u a l i t yinformation management and decisionmaking wi l l be essential.

Transportation IssuesA number of issues arise wi th regard to thetransportation of persons that should be taken

21Summer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute\iini her 10'

into account in the design of warships. Therequirements v a r v be tween law enforcementoperations, the duty to render assistance andsituations of armed conflict.

Lau KnlorccmeiitThe ( 'rimes Act 1(>14 provides tha t :

23Q Treatment of persons under arrest -A person who is itinler arrest or uprotected sii.sftect must he treated withhumanity and with respect for humandignity. < / / / < / must not he subjected tocruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

This provis ion docs not e x p l i c i t l y incorporateinternat ional h u m a n rights law but it doesrequire a reference to a standard of humanity.human d ign i ty and cruel, i n h u m a n or degradingtreatment. It should he interpreted consistentlyw i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Austral ia is party to theInternational Covenant on Civil ami PoliticalRights ( ICCPR) and it is arguably customaryin terna t iona l l a u . I t s tates tha t "r ights de r ivefrom the inherent dignity of the human person"and is probably the s tar t ing point for legalinterpretation of phrases such as human dignity.Indeed. S.23Q would appear to drau uponArt ic le 7 IC'CPR concerning the right not to bes u b j e c t to cruel , i n h u m a n or degradingpunishment , and Article 10 concerning thedignity of those deprived of their liberty.

Some of the other r igh t s t h a t the I C ' C ' P Rrecognises that may be relevant to marit ime lawenforcement uould include the right not to bediscriminated against/ freedom of religion'1 andthe r i g h t of ch i l d r en to be protected. Freedomfrom discrimination would suggest that officersshould be careful to avoid d iscr iminat ing againstpeople in t h e i r custody on the basis of suchthings as the i r race, colour, sex. language orre l ig ion . Freedom of religion includes the rightto worship or make religious observances.Where possible, officers should grant those int h e i r custody the opportunity to conduct theirr e l i g ious observances. Should officers have achild or chi ldren in custody they should makespecial efforts to ensure that they are protectedfrom any harm, be it mental or physical. TheConvention on the Rights o/ the Child (CROC)elaborates upon this issue. Australia is party to itand it also probably customary in terna t iona l law.It requires t h a t ch i ldren are not to be separatedfrom their parents against their wi l l* and must beprotected from physical or mental violence.

What does t h i s mean for the design ofwarships'.' Recent operations suggest that it is

quite l ikely that a major licet u n i t would berequired to transport ei ther crews of f ishingvessels tha t h a v e been apprehended or thepassengers and crew of vessels seeking to enterAustral ia un l awfu l ly . In the la t te r case, i t isl ikely that the numbers w o u l d he large andinclude a significant proportion of women andchi ldren . It w o u l d seem reasonable to expectthat a w a r s h i p could be cal led upon at shortnotice to transport such people for periods ofdays or weeks, un t i l such t ime as they werelanded or transferred to a more suitable vesse l . I fit is intended to employ major fleet u n i t s in suchroles they should be designed to conform to atleast some degree to the requ i rements ofinternational human rights standards. Thiswould mean that sufficient space be a v a i l a b l e onboard to accommodate a number of people in atleast austere com I oil. how mam w o u l d be amatter for further assessment. There should besuff ic ient space to sleep, eat and worship,moderate privacy for women and children,reasonable access to heads and showers and theupper deck. It would also be important to h a v ethe capacity to separate dangerous or o f f ens ivepersons from others, pa r t i cu la r ly women andchi ldren. Any designs to this effect could alsoserve to accommodate extra crew, troops ortrainees, evacuees or those rescued at sea.

Duty to Render Assistance to those inDistress at Sea. The RAN has frequent ly beenrequired to transport people rescued at sea.Sometimes specific operations have taken placeto rescue people from yachts, as in the SouthernOcean w i t h Isabelle Aut iss ier in 1W5 and TonyHullimorc and Thierry Dubois in 1W7. orduring the 199X Sydney to I lobar t Yach t Race.At other times however . R A N vessels h a v e hadto rescue hundreds of people in distress becausethey happened to have been in p rox imi ty . Thiswas the case in Operation Relex in 2001. e v e nthough the aim of the mission was to deter suchpeople from landing in A u s t r a l i a and not tobring them onboard I I M A Ships. The RAN hasrescued people because it is obliged to do so bvlaw where th i s is the only way to r e l i e v e thedistress being suffered. Ar t i c l e MS of UNCLOScreates an obligation to render assistance tothose in distress at sea. This is reinforced byParagraph 2 . 1 . 1 0 of the InternationalConvention on Maritime Search aiul Rescue. Arange of c r imina l penalties could also apply tomembers of the RAN who fai led in t he i r duty torender assistance to those in distress. Theconsequence of th i s is that RAN ships should be

22S u miner 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute\ nmbcr 107

designed to cope wi th the requirement totransport people rescued at sea, because thelegal obl igat ion to render assistance wil l be onlybe relieved where it causes serious danger tothose rendering assistance.

Armed Conflict. The Laws of ArmedConfl ict impose part icular requirements withregard to the transportation of prisoners of warand certain other categories of persons. There isconsiderable history of warships having totransport prisoners of war, captured either at seaor ashore. Again, any design that takes accountof these issues could serve for otheraccommodation purposes

Prisoners of War. Prisoners of warmust be rapidly evacuated out of combat areas.This must be done humanely and in conditionss imi l a r to those of the detaining forces. Theymust not be exposed unnecessarily to danger,and their safety must be ensured during theevacuation. They must be supplied withsuf f i c i en t food, dr inkable water, necessaryclothing and medical attention. " They must alsobe protected against acts of violence orint imidat ion and publ ic curiosi ty and insults."Essentially, th is would mean that a warshipdesigned to be able to able to carry prisoners ofwar would need to be able to do so below decks,in spaces that would be considered acceptablefor accommodation by members of the ADF.This could be more austere than theaccommodation for the ship's company but noworse than that which would be used fordetachments of own forces embarked for shortperiods.

Wounded, sick, ship \\recked. Similarrules as above apply for prisoners of war that arewounded, sick or shipwrecked. An importantextra requirement to note is that such prisonersshall be afforded the same level of medical careas own forces and in order of medical priority. Awarship may only demand that a hospital ship ormerchant ship hand such personnel over to thewarship if it can provide adequate faci l i t ies andcare.'" The issue for warship design is thatwarships that are capable of transportingprisoners of war must also be capable of caringfor those prisoners of war that arc wounded sickor shipwrecked.

ConclusionThe extant principles of the Law of ArmedConf l i c t w i l l cont inue to define, wi th increasingpart iculari ty, the way wars are fought. I t isaxiomatic that the future can only be predicated

to a l imited extent on the past - however theprinciples of the Law of Armed Confl ict andtheir interpretation w i l l provide the best guide tothe legal requirements of an uncer ta in futuremarit ime warfare environment.

Any requirement to transport persons,whether for law enforcement purposes, after arescue or as prisoners of war. w i l l also requireminimum standards of human d i g n i t y to betaken into account in the design of ships. Thebest way to do so would be to design ships t h a tare big enough to carry extra people in a degreeof austere comfort.

About the AuthorsLCDR Chris Cnillaway joined the \avy in 1982a.s a seaman officer, serving in a variety of seapostings including CnilJ war service in I/MASBrisbane before completing the PrincipalWarfare Officer Course in 1993 as an ASlt' snh-specialist. He subsequently served as a PWO inHMA Ships Canberra and llobart he/oretransferring to the Navv Ready Reserve in 1995.Chris studied law, specialising in maritime andinternational law before returning to the /',\7-' /;;2001 with a dual streaming into the LegalBranch. LCDR Cameron Moore as a Navy legalofficer served in Naval Support Command HQSydney. HMAS Stirling. HMAS Torrens. theDefence Legal Service and recently in NavyHeadquarters. He recently resigned from theNavv to go into private practice.

1 Speech by Abba Hbcn. Isrcali Ambassador to the US, 20September 1957.~ The San Rcmo Manual is a contemporary restatement ofthe international law applicable to armed conflicts at sea. Itis a secondary source of the highest standing, put togetherby a panel of the world's foremost legal and naval expertsbetween 1980-W4.' This paragraph is a paraphrase of I).P. ( I 'C ' on i i eH ' s TheInfluence oj I.un on Sen l'o\vcr. Manchester. 1<)75, pp.183-184.4 A breach of human rights law may not be a DFDAoffence in i tself but it could be evidence of p r e j u d i c i a lbehaviour. This could ground a charge against a memberunder s.60 DFDA for prejudicial b e h a v i o u r .! Art 2." A r t I X .7 Art 24.x Art ')."Art I 1 ) .'" Geneva C o n v e n t i o n I I I Ar ts 14 & 20." G i l l Art 13.12 G II Arts 14.15 &16.

23Summer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute\iiinhcr 10'

Sail to Steam and its Impact on the Strategy of Warat Sea

By Commander Nick Youseman, RAN

A / I Lara's Commissioners /ell it tlicir hoimdenduty to discourage to the utmost of their ahility///c employment of steam vessels, us theyconsidered that the introduction of steam wascalculated to strike ti fatal hlow Lit the NavalSupremacy <>/ the Empire.

Lord Melv i l l eFirst Sea Lord, Royal Navy

1 X 2 X

1 lie h is tory and strategy of mar i t ime powershave been shaped not only by geography andmen but also by n a \ a l technology." Naviesincorporate sophisticated combinations ofmachinery and weaponry, and require manyvcars to e \ o l \ e . Indeed, a na t ion ' s prosperityand technological development is often judgedby the c o m p l e x i t y of i ts n a v y . Throughouthistory, marit ime nations have been obliged tofollow incremental changes in technology tokeep then" n a v i e s v i a b l e in conf l i c t , avoidm i l i t a r y defeat, and min imise the risk ofi n v a s i o n . '

The period 1 X 1 5 to 1X60 saw the end ofthe age of wood and sa i l , and the t r a n s i t i o n toiron and steam. This process was long anddrawn out. al though ult imately all naviesembraced the new technology. ' U n t i l thei n v e n t i o n of the aeroplane in 1903, the warshipwas the most complex piece of machinery in itsday. capable of operating autonomously fordays, weeks or even months.5 The developmentof steam propulsion also coincided w i t h rapidadvances in the field of n a v a l gunnery.Associated changes in hul l design, and the useof iron and steel, transformed the w a r s h i pbevond all recogni t ion. The shi f t from sail tosteam was s igni f icant because it was not onlythe ships but also the way of sai l ing them thatchanged." This combination of effects had aprofound influence on the way maritime warfarewas conducted.

This article w i l l ident i fy the major waysin w h i c h the t r a n s i t i o n from sai l to steamtransformed the strategy of war at sea. It firstp rov ides an h is tor ica l background to shipdeve lopmen t from the Age of Sail to the Age ofSteam, p r o v i d i n g a contextual setting for

subsequent analysis . I t t hen defines strategy as i tapplies to the subject, before discussing theeffects of the shift from sail to steam in l i v emain areas. Final ly , i t draws all elementstogether in a conclusion.

The scope of the ar t ic le extends fromthe wooden galley and ship of the l ine , to theironclad and steel batt leship. The influence ofBr i ta in ' s Royal N a v y is g i v e n prominence, fortwo main reasons. First ly. Br i t a in was thedominant world power between 1 X 1 5 and 1X95.The na t i on ' s leading role d u r i n g the Indus t r i a lR e v o l u t i o n of the late 19" Century also a l l o w e dthe RN to adapt to new ideas more readily.s

Secondly, the q u a l i t y of records describing thehistorical development of the RN make turningpoints in the subject area easier to identify." Toset the scene, it is necessary to consider thehistorical perspective of ship development andwar at sea.

Historical PerspectiveMari t ime power has played a key role in therelat ionships between nations for centuries . '"The sea provides the principal routes forexploration, commerce and warfa re , being t h echeapest and most ef f ic ient method oftransporting large vo lumes of goods over longdistances. Mari t ime power has also been used asa means of prevai l ing in conflict, a l l o w i n g statesto acquire colonies, dominate trade and gainprosperity. Ci t ing the B r i t i s h example.maritime strategist Captain Alfred I Mahanstated in his 1S1)() work /'/k' Injhicncc of SenPower Lpon History 1660-1783:

It ean scarcely he denied that England'suncontrolled dominion of the seas,during almost the whole period...[ 1660-1783 j...was hv lout; odds the chiefamong militarv factors that determinedthe final issue.

Understanding nav ies and m a r i t i m e powerrequires an understanding of the history of thewarship. Before the formation of organisednavies , armed merchantmen were used to protectcommercial shipping against pirates. Nationssubsequently formed navies, bu i ld ing fleets ofspecialised ships for w a r . ' '

24Summer 2(103


The development of ships has generallybeen described according to the means ofpropulsion. Development began with the Age of( ia l leys (2500 BC-1571 AD), passing throughthe Age of Sail ( 1 2 0 0 - 1 X 5 0 ) , and the Age ofSteam ( 1 X 1 5 - 1 9 0 5 ) , to the Modern Age 0906-Present).14 Technological change was oftenrapid but the adoption of new technologies, andtheir influence on the strategy of war at sea,were more gradual. Hence, the developmentalages do not have exact boundaries. The relevantperiods in this ease are the

A»e of Sail and the Age of SteamThe Age of Sail was a 'Golden Age' for theinf luence of sea power, when empires were wonand lost at sea, sometimes in a single batt le.1"The standard fleet formation under sail was inl ine abreast, and battles generally consisted of achase followed by boarding. In a departure fromthis doctrine. Hngland's victory over the SpanishArmada in 158X was at t r ibuted to the smaller,sleeker E n g l i s h gal leons s tanding off us ing thei rguns, rather than closing for boarding action."'Despite the lessons learned from th is battle,navies in the early 17"' Century continued tobuild larger and larger ships, with up to threegun decks and 100 guns. Such majestic vesselswere b u i l t as much for prestige as for theirf ight ing a b i l i t y , but the experimentation indesign led ul t imately to the classic 'ship of thel ine ' . Ad jus tmen t s to fleet tactics inevi tab lyfollowed.

During the first Anglo-Dutch war of1652-54, the 1-nglish changed the i r standardfleet formation to a single l ine ahead.1 In thisarrangement, opposing ships closed beam-to-beam rather than bow-to-bow. The danger ofsmaller ships ending up opposite larger, morepowerful ships led to a gradual increase in thenumber of guns required for a ship to remain inthe l i n e . Ships of the l ine had to be strongenough to withstand enemy fire and make aneffect ive r ep ly . I N However, the tactic of comingtogether in two para l le l l ines produced fewdecisive battles. Within the basic system oftactics dictated by the nature of the technology,there remained considerable scope forv a r i a t i o n .

Alternative manoeuvres k n o w n as'melee' tactics were developed, aimed atachieving positional or numerical advantageover parts of an opposing fleet. One such tacticwas 'crossing the T', whereby a fleet passedthrough the enemy l ine and brought its

!\ii HI her 107

broadside guns against the enemy's l imitedforward guns. Melee tactics proved morediff icul t to control, and the British fleet persistedwith formal linear tactics u n t i l the late I X ' 1 'Century. J l Thereafter, melee tactics were usedby the RN to great effect, exemplified byNelson's victory over the combined French andSpanish fleets at Trafalgar in 1X05. The era ofthe ship of the l ine came to a close at the end ofthe Napoleonic Wars in 1815, with the arrival ofsteam propulsion. A metamorphosis of thewarship followed, during a prolonged period ofrelative peace under the Pax Britannica.21

The Age of Steam saw changes in allaspects of warship design, and can be dividedinto three broad periods. The period 1 X 1 5 to1X60 covered the introduction of the paddle-wheel and the screw propeller. Between 1X60and 1X90. the w a r s h i p was transformed fromwooden sailing ship to steel bat t leship. F ina l ly ,from 1X90 to 1906, came the progressiverefinement of the bat t leship in the pre-dreadnought era.""

The origins of steam propulsion dateback to James Watt 's invention of the steamengine in 1765. Early versions of the steamengine were large and uneconomical in terms offuel consumption, but design improvementseventually allowed the machinery to be fitted toships. The new technology was first used forcommercial fleets and the paddle-wheel \esselwas created." The principle of the screwpropeller was understood but the paddle-wheelwas thought to be more adaptable/4 The firstsuccessful steam warship was the American shipDemotogo.s. completed in 1915 and propelled bya paddle-wheel between catamaran hulls.

France's bu i ld ing of steam drivenpaddle warsh ips led to fears in B r i t a i n that across-Channel invas ion could happen before theRN had time to respond. Paddle-wheel vesselsparticipated in a few wars of the period, butcarried few guns and were not tested in a majorbattle. The main contr ibution of paddle-wheelships was in shore bombardment, blockade, andriver operations."" Otherwise, the paddle-wheelers were mostly relegated to secondaryroles, including towing ships of the l ine , and'packet duty' carrying mai l and messages. Thesituation changed s igni f icant ly in 1X36 whenBritish inventor Francis Pett i t Smith andSwedish-American engineer John Ericssonpatented designs for a screw propeller/1 '

The screw enabled steam and sail to becombined in a single ship.: A disadvantage to

25Summer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Inst i tute\nmhcr

both paddle and screw was the \ • i h r a t i o n of themachinery, which tended to shake wooden shipsapart.:s A turning point came in 1X45, when theBrit ish screw-driven frigate Rentier pu l led thepaddle-driven f r iga te Alccto backwards in acompetition."' Screw ships became dominant by1X50 and the RN's last paddle-wheel warshipwas launched in 1X52.'" Warships emergingover the next ten years were predominantlyconversions; old ships of the l i n e withmachinery retro-fitted. Masts and yards wereretained, being more economical oxer longdistances."

Britain took the lead in conversionsfrom 1X45. al though the French were creditedwith the first large steam battleship. LcNapoleon, launched in 1850.12 Despite this earlyprogress there were problems. Early steamengines were large, and not all hul ls were bigenough to carry the machinery . The engineswere aKn i n e f f i c i e n t , c o n s u m i n g la rge a m o u n t sof coal, and a paddle or screw impaired theship's sai l ing qualities. These drawbacks led toscepticism over the value of steam, confining itsuse for many years to an auxiliary power sourceonly. As each problem arose, however,advances in technology allowed solutions to befound. A subsequent round of development wassparked by the use of iron in sh ipbu i ld ing .

Iron was a comparatively preciousmater ia l u n t i l t he I n d u s t r i a l Revo lu t ion , whenimproved smelt ing methods and machine toolsmade large-scale iron s tructures possible.'4 TheRN had ordered its first iron warship in 1X40.the paddle gunboat I IMS Albert.^ The ironsh ipbu i ld ing industry uas subsequentlysuspended, while trials were conducted on theresistance of iron hul ls to shellfire. susceptibil i tyto bot tom foul ing , and effects on magneticcompasses.'" By the m i d - I X 5 ( ) s . the problems ofthe iron h u l l were largely resolved and ironcladding was used to armour wooden ships,creating the i ronclad. C 'o inc iden ta l ly . theCrimean War of 1X54-56 signalled the demise ofthe wooden warship and an end to the e x c l u s i v euse of sails.17

Although no major sea battles occurred,the C'rimean War i n v o l v e d the first large-scaleuse of shel l -f i r ing guns. C 'annonbal l s had thepower to damage wooden ships but rarely sankt h e m . I he e x p l o d i n g s h e l l , in c o n t r a s t , hail thepower to destroy ships constructed of wood, orrestricted in manoeuvrability by sails.3" In 1858,the French Navy launched the wooden, armourplated and steam-driven warship Ci/oire. The

existing ships of the RN became obsoleteovernight, and rapid action was taken to rectifythe s i tuat ion, .lust two years later, in 1X60.Britain launched the i ron-hulled, steam-propelled w a r s h i p 1 1 MS llt/rrior,technologically the most advanced ship of itsday.'"

The process of change was w e l lestablished and continued to the end of thecentury. Having considered the historicalperspective, the effects of the s h i f t from sa i l tosteam can now be examined.

Kft'ects on Strategy of the War at SeaStrategy of war at sea during the technologicaladvances of the 19th Century centred mainly onthe capabili t ies of the pla t form. F i v e separateareas of platform capabi l i ty and associatedthinking can be ident i f ied, representing themajor ways in which t r a n s i t i o n to steaminfluenced the strategy. These five areas are:speed and manoeuvrability, endurance andrange, strength and armour, destructive powerand weaponry, and t ac t i ca l and analyticalthought.Speed and manoeuvrab i l i t y . Sa i l ing shipsrequired ample sea room to manoeuvre safely.Beating into w i n d strained equipment andpersonnel and was not usual ly attempted overlong periods. Working close inshore put sa i l ingships in danger of shipwreck. This meant battleswere usua l ly fought in open sea, l i m i t i n g thetactical options open to the commander. Warfarein the days of sai l was also r e l a t i v e l y s low. Thewind would be chosen according to theadvantage sought as vessels closed for mutua lbombardment, or raking wi th carronade at shortrange.4" Steam, on the other hand, a l l o w e dwarships to manoeuvre independently of thewind and take the fight to the enemy.41

Steam ships suffered few constraints inmanoeuvring and generally were only limited bywater depth and engine serviceabil i ty. A paddleallowed ships to turn much faster than w i t h ascrew, al though th i s manoeuvrab i l i ty wasconfined to calm conditions. The considerabledrag created by the paddle eventua l ly led todominance of the screw, which could he raisedor lowered as required by the sea-state. Thestrategic importance of anchorages offering safeentry and exit to sailing vessels waned as themanoeuvrability and r e l i ab i l i t y of steam-drivenships increased.42 The ability of steam ships tomanoeuvre in rivers and confined w a t e r senhanced their appl icat ion in amphibious style

26Summer 20(13

Journal of the Australian Naval InstituteAnmbcr 107

warfare from the sea. The advance oftechnology also affected the traditional navalblockade.43

Steam tended to favour the blockade-runner. An evading vessel with steam propulsionwas capable of similar speed to the blockadingships, and was less reliant on tides than a sa i l ingvessel. The Unionist navy of the American CivilWar found it took three times as many steam-and-sail ships to maintain a blockade comparedwith pure sailing ships, owing to the need for theformer to transit to and from refuelling bases.

In the Age of Sail, larger ships usuallyhad a speed and fire-power advantage oversmaller vessels. By the end of the 19th Century,the same machinery capable of propelling largeships at a certain speed was capable of drivingsmaller ships even faster. The use of stand-offweapons such as torpedoes from around 1860made small, fast craft highly effective againstlarger, slower vessels. A new school of thoughtemerged from the Jen tie Ecole in France,suggesting the days of the battleship were over.The expectations of the Jeitne Ecole were notrealised, however, as it was found thatbattleships could adequately defend themselveswith quick-firing, small calibre secondaryarmament.4'1 Overall, the speed andmanoeuvrability produced by steam broughtmajor tactical advantages over sail.Endurance and range. Steam improved themanoeuvring capability of warships but robbedthem of their limitless range capability.4 Thus,the tactical advantages steam were matched by aloss of strategic freedom. Steam-poweredvessels making long journeys needed bases withcoal, spare parts and engineering facilities.Being a first-class naval power increasinglymeant bui ld ing the necessary logisticinfrastructure, and acquiring as many overseasbases as possible.4**

During the t ransi t ion period, Britishwarships were not sent into battle under sail, butsail remained essential for covering the vastdistances involved in policing the Empire.49 Sailwas retained in many ships un t i l 1875. whenCaptain Philip Colomb showed mathematicallythat more coal was burnt transporting masts andspars than was saved by the occasional use ofsail. The development of reliable twin-enginepropulsion f inal ly made sail redundant, the dragof two screws under sail removing too muchspeed to make sail worthwhile.

A signif icant mismatch occurredbetween the endurance and range of ships on the

one hand, and strategic command and control onthe other.51 This situation was eventual lyovercome, through a combination ofincreasingly fuel-efficient engines and improvedaccess to logistic stations through colonialexpansion. Nevertheless, distances to the nearestsources of fuel had to be factored into anyplanning for a war at sea involving steam ships.Strength and armour. Despite the obviousvulnerability of sai l ing masts and spars,detractors of steam viewed engines and paddlesas weaknesses in battle.52 As the use of ironincreased, so did the methods of protectingmachinery and armament. Stabi l i ty became amajor issue and complicated initial attempts atproviding added protection. Steel was strongerand lighter than iron, but for many years was tooexpensive for sh ipbu i ld ing . The period from1860 saw improvements in the design andeffectiveness of armour, followed by increasedproduction of steel to replace iron.53

The American Civil War (1861-65) wasan important testing ground for the ironclads. InMarch 1862, the Confederate ironclad CSSVirginia was attacked by the Unionist ironcladUSS Monitor?4 Virginia had four guns per side,one pivoting gun in the bow, and a gun in thestern able to fire through three ports. Virginiawas also fitted with an iron beak for ramming.Monitor's main armament consisted of twin I I -inch guns in a revolving turret. In an indecisiveengagement, both ships suffered only superficialdamage from a mutual bombardment heavyenough to sink a wooden vessel.56

Virginia's encounter with Monitor wasevidence of the mobili ty and strength providedby a combination of steam propulsion andarmoured hull.57 Armour changed war at seabecause hul l penetration from gunfire was nolonger guaranteed, although the realtransformation occurred as a result of efforts todefeat armour through improved weaponry.Destructive power and weaponry. Thetransition from sail to steam saw acorresponding increase in the destructive powerof the warship. The period of developmentaround the American Civi l War and Britain'slaunching of Warrior was followed by a 30-yearperiod of experimentation in guns andarmament, improvements in the former leadingto a greater requirement for the latter. Shipscarried fewer guns yet achieved greaterfirepower. Longer weapon ranges allowedstand-off engagements and dispensed with theneed for boarding. The American Civil War also

27Summer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Insti tuteNumber lit"

saw the first appearance of torpedo boats andsubmarines, ( i n n turrets were developed,allowing ships to direct fire without turning theship."'"* Naval gunnery changed in a manner notseen since the in t roduc t ion of the cannon fivecenturies earl ier , al though the new technologyhad its complications.

Problems with new weaponry includedexcessive top-weight, and obstructions causedby the masts required for sail."' The R N ' s firstmajor seagoing turret ship, HMS Monarch.carried four 12 - inch guns, plus 7-inch guns foreand aft to overcome the turre t blind-arcs.Concerns o\er s tab i l i ty and the Monarch'srelat ively high 15-foot freeboard resulted in hersister ship, 11MS ( 'aptain. h a \ i n g a freeboard ofo n l v e igh t feet. The Captain capsi/ed in a galein 1S70. drowning 472 sailors. As aconsequence, construction of the turret ship inthe R\ was ha l ted for several years. Othervar i a t ions in armour and battery configurationwere tried to determine the optimumc o m b i n a t i o n of f i r ing arcs, armour and stability.

'Cen t r a l battery' and 'casemate' vesselswere developed, comprising a smaller batteryprotected by a rectangular box in the centre ofthe ship."" 'Breastwork monitors' had a lowfreeboard main deck, but a raised armoured decklor the mounting of armament. In 1873, the RNlaunched the I IMS Devastation, a breastworkmonitor and the first seagoing warship propelledentirely by steam. Devastation e f f ec t ive lybecame the t empla te for subsequentbattleships. ' ' As ship profiles and mainarmament changed, so did the technologyrelat ing to ammuni t ion .

By 1X39. the exploding shell had beenadopted bv many nat ions and smoothbore,mu//le-loading guns were being replaced bybreech-loading weapons.''" Accuracy wasimproved bv the in t roduct ion of the rifledbarrel.6 The French ironclad Gloire was fittedw i t h breech-loading guns. Breech-loading rifledcannon were also fitted in ll'tirrim; but misfiresm I I M S l-'.nryaliis in 1X62 led the RN to rever t tomux/le-loading for the next 20 years. Thissetback did not detract from the overa l l potencyol the new weaponry.

The combination of steam, armour andlong-range guns faci l i tated the capture ofpreviously impregnable forts.64 Hven the use ofthe battering ram enhanced the ironclad'sdestructive power . Ramming had beenimpossible in the Age of Sail, where reliance onthe w i n d and the weakness of h u l l s were

l imi t i ng factors. Ramming was the pr inc ip letactic at the Bat t le of l.issa in 1 S66 be tween theAustrian and Ital ian fleets.10 In 1X67. mar i t imestrategist Sir John Colomb stated the ram was'the ultimate weapon'. Despite the occasionalramming and s ink ing of fr iendly vessels in fleetmanoeuvres, the ram-bow remained a feature ofwarship design u n t i l the a r r i v a l of I IMSDreadnought in 1906.'"' The impact on war atsea was clear; ironclads were devastating againstany th ing pre-dating them.Tactical and ana ly t i ca l though t . Despi te theadvent of steam, naval t h i n k i n g remained tied tothe principles developed in the Age of Sail. In1X59. Captain Alston stated in his introductionto the Royal Navy seamanship manual :

Although itv are living in what may hi'termed the Steam era, and our \avy is asteam \avv, I have in this work whollyexcluded the consideration o/ S/ciimpower, as, owing to the great cost ofcoal, and the impossibility of providingstowage for it c.\ccpl to a limited extent.the application of Steam power forordinary purposes must he strictlyauxiliarv and subordinate, and itsemployment on general service theexception and not the rule.1'

The biggest problem affl ict ing the RN duringthe transition to steam was the lack of anyserious strategic thought amongst the officercorps. The development of n a v a l s t ra tegv waslef t to flag-officers, and l i t t l e analysis exis ted onhow the n a v y might funct ion in t ime of w a r .Steam made manoeuvres to bring ships intob a t t l e more precise, making it easier to a c h i e v es imul t aneous engagements than under sa i l .However, even fundamental questions, such asthe range at w h i c h the enemy should lieengaged, were not addressed.'1" This left B r i t a i npoorly placed to a c h i e v e tact ical and strategicadvantage in w a r .

A good deal of strategic thought wascrystallised during the late 19 t h Century in thewritings of Mahan. the Colomb Brothers andothers. Many of the conclusions had theirfoundat ions in the days of s a i l , and thepub l i ca t ions offered few clues as to how a steamnavy should operate. At the Ba t t l e of J u t l a n d in1916. the Grand Fleet of the RN s t i l l cruised inl ine ahead and relied on 'crossing the T' forattack. In the absence of developed tact ical andanalytical thought, the strategy of war at sea wastransformed progressively each t ime a steamnavy went into bat t le .

2SSummer 2003


ConclusionBy the end ol the Napoleonic Wars, sailing shipsand men-ol'-vvar had reached a peak ofperfection. The revolut ion that transformedn a v a l warfare in the 14" Century was essential lythe result of three major developments thatoccurred more or less simultaneously, namelythe invention of the steam engine, theimprovements in weaponry, and the a b i l i t y tobui ld vessels from iron and steel.

The t rans i t ion from sail to steamdominated military th inking for almost a centuryand to ta l ly re-developed the warship as al ighting machine. Steam transformed thestrategic inf luence and tactical mobi l i ty ofmaritime power. At first, t radi t ions started in thedays of sail inhibi ted rather than encouragedmodernisation. The change was u l t ima te lyembraced, resulting in strong competitionbetween the major marit ime powers over severaldecades. The dominant navy of the transitionperiod was the RN, but lesser n a v i e s wereoccasionally first to develop new ideas. Britainwas never far behind because of its industrialstrength, and the RN succeeded in b u i l d i n gsome of the best examples of vessels based onthe emerging technologies.

Few decisive battles were available totest the performance of early steam platforms.Lqual ly , there was barely t ime to t r i a l newconcepts before fresh ideas emerged. Methodsof f ight ing war at sea were, to a certain extent,in a constant state of tlux. Sail ing masts werei n i t i a l l y removed for reasons relating more toarmament than to propulsion. The finaldisappearance of sails was only made possibleby the increasing r e l i a b i l i t y of machinery, andthe a v a i l a b i l i t y of remote logistic stations.Almost every aspect of naval warfare waschanged in the process of this transition.

Ul t imate ly , the shift from sail to steamtransformed the strategy of war at sea in f ivemajor ways, which encompassed the keycapabil i t ies of warships and the tactics of theircommanders in battle. The linkages betweenthese milestones in the marit ime dimension andthe technological changes of the Indus t r ia lRevolution created a fascinating chapter in thehistory of the world's navies.

Commander Mick Youseman joined the RANfrom the R.\ in / y < A V and served as OIC of theTactical Training l-'acnlty (now MaritimeWarfare Training I-'acitlty) HAfAS Watson,before attending the 2002 Australian Command

ami Staff Course. A I'WO (SW) hv suh-specialisation, Nick has a hroatl careerbackground including DD/FF Navigator, MWVCommand, /)/) /•"/•" Exeat tin- Officer, as well asNA TO and UK Defence staff appointments.

John Winton, An Illustrated History a/ the RoyalNavy, Salamander Books, London, 2000, p. 104." Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea: TheHistory and Strategy of Maritime Empires, Wi l l i amMorrow & Company Inc. New York. 1974. p. 9.' ib id .

Win ton . . • / / ; Illustrated History of the Royal \civy. p.104.' James L. George, History of Warships: l-'roniAncient Times to the Twenty-First Century, NavalIns t i t u t e Press. Annapolis, Maryland, 1998, p. 4.' Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: /•'nun2000B.C. to the Present. The Free Press, New York,1989. p. 125.

Richard .1. H i l l and Bryan Ranft . eds.. The ()\fordIllustrated History of the Royal \avv. ( ) x t b r dU n i v e r s i t y Press, Oxford, 1995. p. 1 6 ] .

The Indust r ia l Revolu t ion was a series oftechnological, economic, social and cultural changesin Britain during the late 18 I h and early 19'1 'Centuries, which transformed the nat ion f rom anagrarian to an industrial society.Q

George, History of Warships, p. 3.Maritime power is a nation's capacity to project,

sustain and apply ef fec t ive m i l i t a r y force at or fromthe sea. This capability may also be referred to as seapower.

Geoffrey Ti l l , Maritime Strategy and the NuclearAge (SecondEdition). Macmillan Press. London,1984. pp. 2-3.12 ibid.

George. History of Warships, p. 1 .14 i b id . . p . 274.15 ibid.

ibid., p. 48.Van Creveld, Technology ami War, p. 134.George, History of Warships, p. 50.Van Creveld, Technology and War, p. 134.

"° George, History of Warships, p. 53.! l The Pax Br i tanniea lasted from 1 8 1 5 to theoutbreak of World War I in 1914 During this t ime.Bri t ish warships policed in t e rna t iona l ma r i t ime tradeand acted to suppress slavery. Despite attempts tocontrol international order through diplomacy, theunderlying requirement for armed force helped tomainta in competition between navies.

George, History of Warships, p. 60.The l i nk ing of engine to paddle w h e e l is u s u a l l y

credited to American engineer Robert Fulton.George, History of Warships, p. 6 I .ibid., pp. 62-63.

r

19

23

29Summer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Inst i tute\iunhcr

Winton. .•(/; Illustrated History of the Royal Navy,p. 104.

The first warship propelled by a screw was theUSS Princeton in 1X42. designed by the Swedish-American inventor John Ericsson.

x Andrew Lambert . "The Organi /at ion of Navies".in John Keegan. ed.. War at Sea in the Age of SailIfi.W-lNiO, Casscll. London. 2000. p. 213.

Rattler and Alecto were of ident ica l si/.e.George, History of Warships, p. 64.Winton. An Illustrated History of the Royal \avv.

p. 104." Britain and France went on to deve lop the world's

largest steam battle fleets of the period, al thoughsteam was s t i l l \ icwed as an auxiliary means ofpropulsion and most steam warsh ips carried sail intothe I X X O s .

R. Humble, Before the Dreadnought: the RoyalNavy from Nelson to Fisher. Macdonald & Janes.London, 1976. p. 189.

Van Creveld, Technology and War. p. 200.° Winton. An Illustrated History of the Royal Navy,p. 104.6 Iron proved brittle, especially w h e n cold. The

effect of iron on the magnetic compass resulted iniron ships being confined largely to rivers, lakes andc h a n n e l crossings.

Larry H. Addington, The Pa/ferns of War Since theEighteenth Century (SecondEdition). Ind ianaI ' n i v c r s i t y Press. Bloomington and Indianapolis .19'M. p. 54.

The exploding shell was a French idea, proposedby Major Henri Paixhan in 1819.

Humble. Before the Dreadnought, p. 52.The English were offensively minded and usually

chose to enter battle tak ing the 'weather gauge', withthe wind at their backs. The defensively mindedFrench usual ly took the 'lee gauge' w i t h the w ind intheir faces, p rov id ing the option of escape ifnecessary.

Addington, The Patterns of War Since theEighteenth Century, p. 54." N.A.M. Rodger. "Weather, Geography and Naval

Power in the Age of Sail", The Journal of StrategicStudies. Vol 22. Nos. 23 . June/September 1999. pp.178-179.

N a v a l blockades served to cut off a country'smari t ime commerce.

Addington, The Patterns of War Since theEighteenth Century, p. 54.

Van Creveld, Technology and War, p. 204.Van C'reveld, Technology and War, p. 204.Addington. The Patterns of War Since the

Eighteenth Century, p. 54.

Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game. NavalInstitute Press, Maryland, 1996, p. 166.

Van Creveld. Technology and War. p. 204.52 •" Winton, An Illustrated History of the Royal \avy.p. 104.

Cieorge. History of Warships, p. 74.The Virginia was formerly USS Merrinuick, a

Unionist hybrid steam ship w i t h f u l l s a i l ing rig.Mcrriniack was scuttled in US Navy Yard, Norfolk,to avoid her capture by the Confederates, but theConfederates raised the ship and coin erted her to anironclad.55 Humble, Before the Dreadnought, pp. 109-1 10.

Virginia received 22 hits from Monitor, andMonitor received 20 h i t s from Virginia. I 'irginia alsomade unsuccessful attempts to ram Monitor as theships circled each other for t w o hours.

Despite the inconclus ive result, the Monitor namewas later g iven to a class of war sh ips based on theor ig ina l .^jj

The concept of a gun turret is credited to SwedishAmerican John Ericsson and Royal N a v y Capta inCowper Coles, both of whom suggested the idea inthe Crimean War.

George, History of If 'arships. p. 71.Ml .. . .

ibid.61 •,i b i d .'" The effectiveness o! breech-loading weapons, w i t h

armour-piercing explosive shel ls , w a s laterdemonstrated by the Russians in the del'eal of theTurkish fleet at Sinope, Black Sea, in 1X53." George. History of I I arships. p. 75.

H i l l and Ranf t . The Oxford Illustrated History ojthe Royal Navy. p. 189.

Van Creveld, Technology and War. p. 203.'" Humble. Before the Dreadnought, p. I 12 .'" ibid. , p. 10X.

Richard H i l l . War at Sea in the Ironclad Age.Cassell, London, 2000. pp. 105-107.

i- Van Creveld, Technology and War, p. 133.Humble, Before the Dreadnought, p. 5 1 .

Summer 2003


The Continued Utility of the ANZUS Treaty

By Commander Jonathan Mead, RAN

'Without any inhibition if tiny kind. 1 nnikc itquite clear that Australia looks to America, freeof any pang* as to our trailitional links ofkinship \\'ith the United Kingdom.'Prime Min i s t e r John Curt in , 29 December 1941 '

"The Treaty j ANZUS I remains today thefoundation of a relationship that is one of ourgreat national assets.'Defence 2000 White Paper

F rom Curtin's wartime Labour governmentthrough to Howard's conservative governmentof 2000, both political factions have highl ightedthe importance of the Austral ia-US alliance.Indeed, whi ls t the geo-strategie environment hasundergone cataclysmic changes throughout thepast 50 years the ANZUS alliance has been thebedrock from which Australia could formulateits security polices around.

The aim of this article is to examine theANZUS Treaty and specifically its influence visa vis Aust ra l ia ' s naval interests. This paper w i l lcommence with a brief history of the ANZUSal l iance . This w i l l lead into an examination ofhow the Treaty has inf luenced Australia'sstrategic and naval interests. Final ly , this essayw i l l conclude with an investigation into thefuture of ANZUS.

History of ANZUSM i l i t a r y all iances have been a recurring featureof internat ional relations. ' The defeat of theJapanese in 1945 and the supremacy of UnitedStates mi l i t a ry power irrevocably altered theAsian balance of power. The demise ofEuropean colonial ism wi th in the Asia-Pacificsphere left the Uni ted States as the soledominant power wi th in the region. In 1949, theUnited States along with its European alliesformed the North Atlant ic Treaty Organisation(NATO) in response to a burgeoning Sovietthreat. Wi th in Canberra, key policy makersinc lud ing , the Minister for External Affairs, DrEvatt, advocated for a s imi la r Pacific pact.However, the US Secretary of State, DeanAchcson, articulated the reluctance of the US toenter into such an arrangement. Acheson stated,inter alia, that 'whi le it is true that there are

serious dangers to world peace existing in thesi tuat ion in Asia, it is also true that a Pacificdefence pact could not take shape until presentinternal confl icts in Asia were resolved.4

Notwithstanding US ambivalencetowards Asia-Pacific engagement, the f l u i d i t y ofthe international arena qu ick ly forcedWashington to reappraise its policy. Inparticular. Mao Zedong's victory overNational is t forces in 1949 and the outbreak ofhost i l i t ies in Korea in 1950 galvanisedAmerican sentiment towards 'containing'communism w i t h i n the Asia-Pacific theatre.Washington viewed Japan as the l inchp in in anycontainment strategy. Ironically, Australia'sinterpretation of the regional securityenvironment was i n i m i c a l to Washington 'sinterpretation - in that Menzies and Spenderboth saw a rearmed Japan as a direct threat toAustralia 's interests. Indeed, even Labour'sEvatt expressed concern over Japan'srearmament. In 1950, he stated that:

/ think it is c/ui/c fallacious toconcentrate on Russia as the onlypossible aggressor in the t'aci/ic orSouth East Asia. 1 ilo not believe thatJapan will always he content to remainallied to those nations that were its chiefenemies in WWII:

Consequently, Canberra wanted lo drag Americainto the Asian morass in order to deter Japaneseexpansionism, whi l s t conversely, Washingtonwanted to extend its inf luence into Asia in orderto defend Japan from the Soviet Union.

Thus, Japan was the nucleus ( though forsignificantly differing reasons) for both theUnited States and Australia to entertain a Pacificpact. President Truman declared on 10 January1951 that :

// is the policy of the US Governmentilial the US will commit substantialarmed force to the defense of the islandchain of Japan... and in order toimplement this policy the USGovernment is willing to make a mutualassistance arrangement among thePacific Island nations (Australia andNew Zealand)."

Thus, a convergence of interests and perceptionsbetween Aust ra l ia and the United States acted as

31Summer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute\umher K>~

the eatalyst tor negot ia t ions over a securitytreaty . Subsequently, the negotiating process,which involved a certain degree of quid pro quo,cu lmina ted u i t h the s igning of the ANZUS(Australia. New Zealand and the United States)Treaty in Washington on 12 J u l y 1951 . Theprincipal elements of the Treaty are contained ina r t i c l e s I I . I I I . I V a n d V . A r t i c l e I I ca l l s upon a l lstates to 'main ta in and develop their i nd iv idua land collective capacity to resist armed attack'.s

Importantly, Article I I I detai ls provisions formutua l consul ta t ion in the event that any of theparties 'is threatened in the Pacific'." UnderArt ic le I I I . consul ta t ion includes suchparameters as instability and subversion. F ina l ly ,articles IV and V refer to the geographicall imi ta t ions of the Treaty. The vexing question ofthe l i m i t a t i o n s of the 'Pacific arena' has beenthe subject of much debate and speculation.Indeed, the actual boundaries of where AN/L 'Sappl ies h a \ e ne\er been decisively defined -though t h i s ambigui ty allows both states tointerpret the Trcatv to t h e i r own advantage.

U n t i l 2001. the ANZUS Treaty hadne \e r been act ivated - and i ronical ly it wasAustral ia who ac t iva ted it in defence"1 of theUnited States. However, throughout its historythere has been considerable angst over ANZUSobligat ions. Indonesia's claim over Dutch New( iu inea was to provide the first test of theseANZUS obligations. Men/.ies sought to gain UScommitment towards Austra l ia ' s stance overD u t c h New ( i u i n e a . However, the US wasre luctant to enter i n t o the foray and insteadadopted a neutral perspective. Further, theprecise meaning of ANZUS came under extrascrutiny dur ing Indonesia 's confrontationtoward Malaysia. Canberra sought to obtain acommitment from the US for Austra l ian troopsstationed along the Borneo border. Again the USwas re luctant to narrow the provisions of theANZUS and instead left the vagueness of theTreaty stand.

President Nixon's celebrated GuamDoct r ine 1 1 of 1969 further confused and indeeddisturbed Austral ia . No longer could Australiaaccept the premise tha t the US w o u l d in tervenein a conf l ic t emanating in South Hast Asia -though an attack on Australian soil would stillinvoke the ANZUS Treaty. Thus, America'sa t t i t ude towards its ANZUS obligations hasbeen characterised by ambigui ty , generality andself-serving interests.12 Conversely. Australiahas been quick to support US interests -Austral ia ' s commitment to Vietnam being a ease

in point .Despite the nuances of the Treaty i t s

'value has been less in countering specificthreats than as a hedge against many possiblethreats - put simply the a l l iance has been threatinsensitive.'" As Norman Harper noted, 'to theUnited States the Treaty was designed as part ofa network of alliances to con ta in communism'.

Notwithstanding. the dispari ty ininterpreting ANZUS, the Treaty has spawned amosaic of political and secur i ty fora. Indeed.Australia 's mi l i tary a l l iance w i t h the US hasbeen branded by a ' rapidly expanding programof strategic cooperation, exchange training, j o in tmi l i t a ry exercises, arms procurement andintelligence sharing'.15 At the forefront of th i smi l i t a ry al l iance has been collaboration in thearena of n a v a l interests .

ANZUS and Australia's Naval Interests -Positive ImpactSpawning from the ANZUS Treaty has been ahost of security consultative fora. Defenceprograms. Defence arrangements and m u l t i -lateral 'bilateral treaties. One of the moresignificant of these treaties was the Radford-Collins N a v a l Control of Shipping Agreement.From February 26-March 2 1951. the A u s t r a l i a nChief of Naval Staff. Vice Admi ra l Col l ins , andthe US Commander in Chief Pacific(CINCPAC), Admiral Ar thur Radford. attendeda conference at Pearl Harbour aimed ates tab l i sh ing a service level arrangement betweenthe two commands in the sphere of m a r i t i m esecurity."' The conference concluded w i t h thefollowing recommendations:• A boundary l ine was formed in the Pacific

for allocation of du t i es between the US.Australian and New Zealand wi th respect tonaval escort, convoy routing, d ive r s ion oftraffic, reconnaissance, local defense. ASWand search and rescue.

• Liaison and coordination be tweenCINCPAC and Aust ra l ia and New Zealandwas to be developed t h i s includedexchange of officers.

• Coordination and in fo rma t ion exchangebetween CINCPAC and ANZAM(Australia-New Zealand-Malaya) over navalcontrol of shipping was to be established.

• Reconnaissance, in par t icular ASW was tobe a key objective of the parties.

• Search and Rescue responsibili t ies w i t h i nthe confines of the del ineated area were

Summer 2003


defined.• Synergy of communications was to be

developed. 17

Important ly , the agreement allowed for directbilateral Naval p lanning under the ANZLJSTreaty's. Whilst ANZLJS was unique in that itestablished a mi l i t a ry al l iance between threestates without a common security threat,Radford-Collins was framed to delineatespecific 'areas of maritime responsibility' .1 4 TheANZLJS navies were directed to providereconnaissance and surveil lance of theirrespective areas. Under Admiral GorshkovV"reinvigoration of the Soviet Navy and inpar t icular w i t h the burgeoning rise of itssubmarine arm, Australia and the United Statesfocused their resources on Ant i SubmarineWarfare (ASW). To support Austral ia 's ASWefforts the United States assisted the RAN'sdevelopment of the Ikara ASW weapons system.Mul loka sonar, and Barra sonobuoy." Further,both navies established an environmental datacenter in Guam."

As an a d j u n c t to Radford Col l ins , theRAN formulated contingency plans for theprotection of Al l ied naval sh ipping in the Pacific- p r imar i ly in response to the Soviet Union ' ssubmarine threat.

Cascading from Radford-Collins wasthe development of a series of mari t imeexercises aimed to increase navalinteroperabi l i ty . In the 1970s, a series of NavalControl of Shipping (NC'S) exercises code-named Ripcord"' and Roller Coaster4 wereestablished. These exercises subsequently leadto the development of the Bell Buoy exerciseseries."^ The jewel of naval cooperation is theRIMPAC exercise which is held biennially offHawaii."'1

In 1%6, Aust ra l ia joined the AUS-CAN-UK.-US Naval communicat ionorganisation. Further , the j o i n t R A N - l ' S NHarold H Holt naval communication base atNorth West Cape is another manifestat ion ofRadford Collins arrangements. Naval materialstandardisation through the Australia. Br i ta in .Canada, and United States (ABCA)Quadriparti te program has seen cooperativenaval logistic programs aimed to support boththe RAN and the USN. In 1977, RAN officerswere appointed to the USN Pacific Intell igenceCenter in Hawaii as a forerunner for in te l l igencesharing arrangements."

However, despite the mu l t i t ude of

benefits that flowed out of Radford-Collins, theagreement i tse l f is part icularly vague.Specifically, no naval missions per se, wereassigned to Australia.2* This accorded w i t h thef l u i d nature of ANZUS and allowed each Navythe a b i l i t y to respond to a d ive r se array ofcontingencies.

In summary the positive aspects of bothANZUS and the Radford-Collins arrangementare:• Australia's sense of security w i t h i n the

region has been enhanced.• ANZUS acts as a deterrent to possible

aggressors.• The RAN has received preferent ia l access to

naval intelligence.• Interoperabi l i ty between the two n a v i e s has

been enhanced.• Opportunit ies to t ra in and exercise w i t h the

USN has been increased.• The RAN has received access to USN

equipment and technology.• The R A N ' s s tanding w i t h i n the region has

been improved.• The Treaty has contributed to the s t a b i l i t y of

the region.• ANZUS and Radford C o l l i n s h a v e kept a

permanent USN presence w theregion.

ANZUS and Australia's Naval Interests -Negative ImpactNotwithstanding the l i t any of positives arisingout of ANZUS and Radford Collins there remainsome negatives. Fundamenta l ly , c r i t i cs ofANZUS c la im that Austra l ia may becomeembroiled in a conf l ic t not of its choosing.However, this argument is po l i t i c a l in na tu re andhas l i t t l e relevance to the RAN per se. Moresubt ly , there are some negative aspects t h a t doaffect the R A N . The RAN's dependence on USsourced material makes it a 'hostage of USNlogistics'. Resupply of vital naval equipment isre l i an t on American supply l ines. Thus, theRAN cannot support but any of the most minorof operations w i t h o u t US assistance. Thisdilemma is contradictory to the ADF's Policy of'se l f - re l iance ' 1 ' .

Another cr i t ic ism leveled at Radford-Collins was Australia's disproportionateDefence funding on ASW. to the detriment ofother force development areas. This funding hadits genesis through a fear that Soviet submarineswould interdict Al l i ed sh ipping in the South

Summer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Inst i tute\ 11 in her 10'

Pacific. However, as Professor Ball noted in19X2, the validity of this threat was dubious andproblematic.0 During the 1970s the Whit lamgovernment sought to reuddress this deficiencyby 'developing a well balanced licet which hadcapabi l i t ies in all facets of naval operations'."

Fina l ly , the ever-increasing costs ofm a i n t a i n i n g par i ty wi th the USN in order toach ieve interoperabili ty has had a detrimentalimpact toward RAN long term force structure.

In summary, the negative aspects ofboth ANZUS and the Rndford-Collmsarrangement are:• The R A N is dependent on US sourced

material.• Australia 's policy of sel l reliance is

problemat ic .• RAN force structure can become 'warped'.• C'ost distortions arising out a desire to

source USN technology effectively squeezesthe R A N ' s budget/4 ^

AN/I S and Austral ia 's Naval InterestsRegardless of the v i r t u e s of the ANZUS Treatytwo significant issues emerge. Firstly, thea l l i ance is threat i n sens i t i ve and secondly thea l l iance has typical ly meant more for Canberrathan it has for Washington, Appraisingw h e t h e r the Treaty has been a usefularrangement for Austral ia 's N a v a l interests overthe last 50 years is subjective. Undoubtedly, theRAN has benefited from the host of spin offsthat the a l l i a n c e has produced. Opponentssuggest tha t it has made the RAN less selfre l ian t and c r i t i c a l l y dependent on US supplyarrangements. However , a more objectivemethod of assessing the v a l u e of ANZUS to theRAN can he made by examin ing theramif ica t ions to the Royal New Zealand Navy(RNZN) since its de jure termination of theagreement in August 19X6.

Af te r 19S6. the RNZN was effectively'fro/en" out of l ; S N informat ion sharing,intel l igence exchange, weapon sales,c o m m u n i c a t i o n s access and part icipation inexerc ises . I he nel r e s u l t to the RN/.N has been al i n e a r decl ine in i ts interoperabi l i ty not onlywith the USN but also with other a l l ied naviesinc lud ing the Royal N a v y , the Canadian Navyand the RAN. Further. the RNZN'stechnological parity with other regional navies,i t s proficiency in general marit ime operationsand its 'awareness' of regional activities have allbeen significantly affected.

Thus, the RNZN experience is

testimony to the impact that ANZUS has madeto both the Australia and New Zealand Navies.

The l -u tu reo f ANZUSThis ar t ic le has already concluded that ANZUShas served Australia 's nava l interests well overthe past 50 years. However , the ques t ionremains - will it continue to do?

Strategic interestsDuring the early 1990s the decline of ideologicalbipolarity coupled w i t h a more stable balance ofpower and an improvement in Australia'sstrategic envi ronment led commentators toreappraise the value of ANZUS."' H o w e v e r , asthe even t s of Fast Timor in 1999 and 1 1September 2001 graphically h igh l igh ted , theAsia Pacific region is characterised by v o l a t i l i t y ,unpredictabil i ty and i n s t a b i l i t y .

Adding to the morass of regionalinstabi l i ty is Chinese ambigui ty . Robyn Urn. ofthe Hiroshima Shudo Un ive r s i t y , commentedthat 'China is the great beneficiary of the w a vthe C'old War ended, it is po in t ing east and southstrategically.'

ANZUS offers Australia the sameinsurance policy as it did during the 20lh century- protection against invasion by a belligerentpower. Further, as the USA's new strategicdoctrine of pre-emptive attack"" illustrates,Australia can ill-afford to be complacent w i t hrespect to rogue states. The pro l i fe ra t ion ofWeapons of Mass Destruction within the regionposes considerable strategic risk to Austra l ia .

Admiral Chris Barrie. the Chief of theAus t ra l i a Defence Force, commented in June2001. that ' the horizontal proliferation ofmissiles is a dangerous development, which is inno country's interest and w h i c h needs to bediscouraged as much as possible'. ' ' 'Consequently, ANZUS provides Australia witha formidable ally to deter and if need be combata bellicose state or organisation through the 2P'Century. Whilst no security agreement canprovide absolute protection against al leventual i t ies , ANZUS nevertheless, endowsAustralia with an instrument to respond to crisiss i tuat ions and indeed its mere existence maystymie some adverse circumstances fromdeveloping.

As the Joint Committee on ForeignAffairs and Trade concluded in 1982, breakingup A N / U S would 'be counter produc t ive notonly to Australia 's long term security but thes t a b i l i t y of the reuion as a whole'.411 Further.

34Summer 2003


Admira l Barrio noted in 2001 that ' the Uni t edStates must remain fu l ly engaged in the region,it is a s tabi l i s ing and reassuring presence at at ime of complexity and unpredicabil i ty ' .4 1 In2001, the Australian Minister for Defence, PeterRoith stated t h a t ' I would argue that ANZUS hasalways been more about the security of theregion than about the direct defence ofAustralia'.42

I n f i d e l s of ANZUS often cite that theTreaty no longer reflects Australia 's nationalinterests, nor, that it is relevant in the prevailinggeo-strategie environment. Indeed, in 1980,Professor Joseph Camilleri stated that:

.1 policy of the status quo [ANZUS]appears doomed to failure. There iscertainly no prospect that in the yearsahead relations with the United Satesir/// continue to o/)crnle in the samefashion as in the period of undisputedAmerican dominance.^

However, ANZUS is focused on shared interestsand not threats per so. in addit ion, as the eventspost I I September 2001 i l lus t ra ted, ANZUSprovides Australia and the region with astrategic insurance policy. Gary Brownsummarised this salient aspect when heconcluded that 'a break up of the all iance wouldremove a v i t a l piece of the regional securityframework'.

It is important to h igh l igh t tha t theva l id i ty of ANZUS does not need to atrophy inthe absence of a clearly defined threat. Rather, itis the congruency of strategic interests betweenAustra l ia and the United States, which validatesANZUS.4" As L i n i noted 'cross bracing the USal l iance system based on the maritime societyneeds of all parties is the best way to encouragethe evolution of a peaceful and prosperous EastAsia'.4"

Naval interestsANZUS affords the RAN access to technology,which is cr i t ical lor its future commitments.Peter Reith underscored th i s sentiment in 2001by stating that the RAN was 'dependant on thetechnology access and scientific cooperationprovided by the US alliance.'47 Reith furtherconcluded that alliance arrangements give'Australia even better access to US militarytechnology which gives us a vital edge incapabi l i ty and operations.'4 '

For the foreseeable future ANZUS wil lprovide the RAN the a b i l i t y to conduct bilateralexercise and t ra in ing programs in order to

Number 107

'maintain the i r capabilities'.4 '1 The TandemThrust series of exercise between the RAN andUSN held bi annual ly in the Shoalwater Baytraining area are the largest combined and jointexercises held in Aus t ra l ia . These exercisesafford the RAN the opportunity to beinteroperable wi th the USN. Thisinteroperability has best been achieved through'commonality of equipment' ."" In addi t ion tothese t ra in ing programs is the burden sharing ofinte l l igence which provides the RAN withregional strategic awareness.

If Australia were to cede from thealliance, its regional technical edge would bequickly lost.51 Coral Bell noted that without theUS alliance Australia would have to quadrupleits defense spending in order to " m a i n t a i n i t sstrategic environment.0

Notwithstanding the diverse benefitsthat ANZUS offers for Aust ra l ia ' s fu tu remarit ime interests, there are some drawbacks inrigidly adhering to the alliance. Firstly, ANZUSrisks alienating regional states that have inimicalpolitical, cultural , economic or security intereststo that of the United States. For example, therecent US hard-line stance against Is lamic Iraqthreatens to undermine Australia's favourablestance with its regional neighbours. As the JointStanding Committee on Foreign Affairs ,Defence and Trade concluded in 1997. 'balanceand sensitivity are especially necessary withrespect to Australia 's efforts to commit the USto the region.'"

Secondly, adherence to the alliance canbe cost prohibitive. The 2 I s 1 Century w i l l see theRevolution in Mi l i t a ry Affairs ( R M A ) combinenew applications of technologies, newoperational concepts and mi l i t a ry doctrines in away that will require subs tant ia l funding" . Thus,a l igning wi th the USN and attempting tomaintain interoperability wi l l be a costlyprocess.

F ina l l y , the rationale and legitimacy ofthe Radford Collins agreement is nowquestionable. Indeed, tenets inc luding ASWand reconnaissance56 focused toward the 'Sovietthreat ' are now indisputably obsolete. Hence,from a maritime perspect ive persisting withANZUS and Radford Collins could be viewed asinimical to the prevailing strategic environment.However, Radford Collins represents far morethan the general edict of the agreement. Inparticular, it represents a commitment forengagement by both navies. Consequent ly ,assert iim that Radford Coll ins is archaic, is an

SHminer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval InstituteNumber I0~

i n su f f i c i en t reason to dismiss the agreement.In summary, the future of ANZUS is an

amalgam of strategic, economic, operational,technological and security issues. These issuesarc:• I t offers Austra l ia an insurance policy

against a r is ing China and a proliferation ofthreats from rogue states and organisations.

• It ensures that the US remains committed tothe region t h u s main ta in ing regionalstability.

• It \ \ i l l continue to allow the RAN access toprivileged technological information andintel l igence.

• It allows the RAN to be interoperable wi ththe USN.

• ANZUS wil l provide the RAN a forum fromu h i c h i t can conduct bilateral exercises.

• Ceding from ANZUS could result in theAustralian government having to commitsubstantial more funds for regional stability.

• ANZUS has the potent ia l of a l i ena t ingregional states, pr imar i ly resulting from asuspicion of US foreign policy.

• The RMA has the potential of 'blou ing ou t "the R A N ' s budget.

ConclusionThe longev i ty of ANZUS is indicative of theimportance that both Australia and the US haveplaced on the i r b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i onsh ip . Thedynamics of the r e l a t i onsh ip h a v e been d iverseand complex. Yet. the securi ty treaty per se hasalmost been overtaken by a host of othereconomic, p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y and d ip lomat icaccords.

AN/ I S has been a defining instrumentfor Australia's naval interests. Notwithstandingthe arguments cited against the val idi ty ofANZUS there is no disput ing the impact it hashad on the development and proficiency ofAustralia's Navy. In particular, the al l iance hasf a c i l i t a t e d the exchange of n a v a l personnel,in te l l igence sharing, technologicaladvancements, mari t ime t ra in ing and overal lmi l i t a ry proficiency.

The fu ture of ANZUS is oftenquestioned. Critics of the al l iance contend that itis no longer r e l e v a n t in the prevai l ing geostrategic environment . Yet. it is the very f lu id i tyand dynamism of the strategic environment thatentrenches its future. From a strategicperspective it offers Australia security andregional stabili ty. From a n a v a l perspective the

Treaty wi l l continue to offer technological,economic, and operational remuneration.

About the' AuthorCommander Jonathan Mead joined the RANC in1984 as a Seaman Officer. After graduating in19X6 lie completed a number of sea postingshe/ore undertaking I he Mine Warfare andClearance Diving Officer Course in 1990.CMDR Mead served as Executive Officer ofClearance Diving Team One from 1991-92.h'rom 1993-94. lie undertook the PWO Course.specialising in ASW. CMDR Mead served as theASW officer onboard HMA Ships Melbourneand Arunta, before fulfilling the duties as theFleet ASW Officer in 201)0. In 2001. C.l//)/\'Mead was posted as F. \ccuti\ e officer <>t. \runtii.he/ore undergoing staff and command trainingat ACSC in 2002. CMDR Mead is currentlyserving as the Staff Officer to the ( 'hiefoj 'Navy.

J.H. Moore. The American Alliance: Australia. NewZealand and the L'nitcd States 1940-1970. Cassell.Melbourne. 1470. p. 44.~ Department of Del'ence, Defence 2000: Our FutureDefence Force, AGPS, Canberra, 2000, p. 34.

J Camilleri, ANZUS Australia's Predicament in theNuclear Age, Westview Press, Colorado, 1987. p. xi.

ibid, p. 3.Moore, The American Alliance: Australia, New

Zealand and the United States 1940-1970. p. 73.6 Foreign Relations of the United States 1951. YolVI: Asia and the Pacific. Washington USGovernment Printing Office, 1977, p. 137.

Camilleri, ANZUS Australia's Predicament in theNuclear Age. p. 5.

ibid p. 7." ibid." The Mi l i t a ry objectives of ANZUS were: to deter

aggression and other threats to ANZUS interests bymaintaining and exercising mil i tary forces: and ifdeterrence fails to conduct ANZUS operations tosecure the threatened area and contain the aggressiondefeat the enemy liberate enemy occupied territory;and deter future aggression.

On 25 July 1969 President Nixon outlined a newUS foreign policy in Guam, known as the 'NewStrategy for Peace". It 's premise was that US foreignpriorities were to be focused around luirope ratherthan Asia. N Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend.University of Queensland Press. 1987, p. 333.12 ibid. p . 13.

Gary Brown and Laura Rayner, Upside. Downside:ANZUS After So Years, Current Issues Brief 3 2001-02, Parliamentary Library. Canberra. August 2001.wvvvv.aph.uov.au/librarv/Pubs/CIB/2001-

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Journal of the Australian Naval InstituteA ii mher 107

02/()2eih()3.htmHarper, A Great and Power Friend, p. 346.

13 ibid. p. 16.I 6T.D. Young. 'AN/US Nava l Relations: 1951-85'in Goldrick. Frame and Jones. Reflections on theRoyal Australian Navy. Canberra, 1991, p. 298.17 US Department of State, ANZUS CouncilPreparations - Background Paper, Honolulu, August1952.I X

T.I). Young. The Radford-Collins Naval Control ofShipping Agreement. The Graduate Ins t i tu te ofInternat ional Relations Universi ty of Geneva,Geneva. 1985. p. 3.' " i b i d . p. 300." In 1955 USSR Premier Kruschev appointed

Admiral Gorshkov as Admiral of the Soviet Fleet.His char ter was to match and surpass the US inmarit ime supremacy. As part of his modernisationprogram Gorshkov embarked upon a massivesubmarine construction agenda. For further details ofGorshkov's plan see: D Chipman, 'AdmiralGorshkov and the Soviet Navy ' Air UniversityReview. July-August 1982. and H Germain. TheEvolution of the Soviet Navv, US Army RussianIns t i tu te . Germany. 1979.

'!".[). Young, The Radford-Collins Naval Control ofShipping Agreement, p. 302.:: ib id ." www.global seeurity.org/militray/ops/bell-buoy.htm. 30 August 2002.:4 i b id"^ ibid:" ibid:7T.D. Young. 'AN/US Nava l Relat ions: 1951-85'p.305.:s G Priestnal l . ' ANZUS and the Radford C o l l i n sAgreement: Austral ia 's naval mission' Journal of theAustralian Naval Institute. January/March 1997, p.51." www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/2001-02/02cib03.htm. dated 25 August 2002.30 Young, ' ANZUS N a v a l Relat ions: 1951-85' p.310." Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, p. 36.'" Young, The Radford-Collins Naval ('ontrol ofShipping Agreement, p. 3." Department of Defence, Defence Report 1973.AGPS, Canberra, 1973. p. \().

www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/ClB/2001-02/02cib03.htin. dated 25 August 2002.' 5 ibid, p 20.''' .1 C ' a m i l l e r i . Australian-American Relations: Thewch of dependence, Macmillan, Melbourne. 1980, p.146.

R Lim, WAV AV.gloeomnet.or.jp/okazaki-ins t / robyn.ausmari .h tmI, dated 30 August 2002.

3S Sydney Morning Herald. 28 September 2002, p.20.C Barrie, 'Strategic Implicat ions of New

Technologies in the Asia Pacific' ANZUSAnniversarv Conference on the United Slates in anEast Asian Context, University of Sydney, 30 June2001.

' Jo in t Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade,The ANZUS alliance: Australia United StatesRelations. AGPS, Canberra. 1982. p. 84.

Barrie, Strategic Implications of NewTechnologies in the Asia Pacific.

~ wwAv.australianpolities.com.au/Toreign an/us 01 -0630reith.shtml. dated 20 August 200243 Camilleri, Australian-American Relations: Theweb of dependence, p. 146.*4 ibid, p. 2 1

Lim.46 .,ibid.

v\ ww.australianpolitics.com.au foreign an/us 0 1 -06-3()reith.shtml, dated 28 August 2002.48

49

•, • ,ibid..,ib id .Priestnal l . ' ANZUS and the Radford C o l l i n s

Agreement: Australia 's naval mission' p. 50.M wwvv .aph .gov .au / l ib ra ry pubs C'lB 2001-02/02cib03.htm dated 2 September 2002"ibid, p. 21Xl Joint Standing Committee on Foreign AffairsDefence and Trade, September, ANZUS After 45Years Seminar Proceedings 11-12 August 1997,AGPS. Canberra, 1997. p. 245.M Barrie. Strategic Implications of NewTechnologies in the Asia Pacific.

Gary Brown and Laura Rayner. Upside. Downside.ANZUS After 5o Years.56 ibid

37Summer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute\iiin her 10'

Extended Operations in EstuarineWaters - Life in the North Arabian

Gulf

By Captain Ray Griggs, CSC, RAN

Irl anv thanks to,/errv Liilliii forlast edition \s

article on the Fly River, it was great to getsome in/>i/l inn! I must in/mil it eased thepressure on me producing another article mid-deplovment. If there is anvone else out therewith similar articles (long or short) I wouldappreciate hearing from von.

In this edition I thought I might offer a shortpiece on l i fe in the Northern Arabian G u l f (orthe NAG as it affectionately known). I h a \ cbased this article on my own experiences fromHMAS Anmta's Operation SLIPPERdeployment in the second half of 2002. I haved r a u n pr imar i ly on in fo rma t ion tha t isavailable in the pub l ic domain so as not tocompromise security gi \en that \\e ha\e shipss t i l l committed to the task.

triiiitd ( in thi- p rowl w i t h IHT four RigidM u l l l u l l . l i a b l e Boats ( K l l l l i s i : Roy, I K .I also and ( cdric

W h i l e conducting Mari t ime InterceptionOperations (MIO) in the NAG is nothing newto the R A N (we have been doing it for over 1 1years), the past few months have seen somesub t l e changes. Our ships ha \ e been pushingfur ther north, closer to the Iraqi coast andessent ia l ! ) operat ing for extended periods inconfined estuarine waters. The smugglers haveincreasing!) used motor dhows as well as steel

icd vessels to ply their trade and thephenomenon of coordinated mass dhoubreakouts has kept the MIO team extremelybusy. The main operating area is no more than100 square miles with much of this area unsafefor navigat ion given the plethora of wrecks andshoal water that exists. In these waters theconduct of safe navigation is the cornerstonefor successful operations, every cable of sail-water is invaluable and one's navigationalsi tuational awareness simply has to be topnotch .

T

An Anintu Hoarding Part) conducting analongside query w i t h the ship keeping aclose eye on proceedings

The sanctions enforcement miss ion in theNAG is fa i r ly straightforward: intercept, andboard as required, inbound and outboundtraff ic from Iraq to ensure t h a t United Nationssanctions are not being \ i o l a t e d . This iseffected w i t h three types of boardings: theCompliant Boarding, where the crew obviouslycomplies u i t h instructions to do so. aResolution 986 boarding, a very structured anddetailed search of a vessel, and the often morecomplex Non-Compl ian t Hoarding ( \ C M ) . I 'hcRAN provides a unique capability, as it is theonly navy whose ship's companies are t r a inedand permitted to conduct all three types ofboardings. Boarding parties can he insertedei ther by R H I B or hel icopter fast rope u i t hboarding teams often operating at extendedrange from the ship. The bu lk of the compliant

Slimmer 2001

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute\nmher Iff

and non-compliant boardings are conducted upclose to or inside Iraqi territorial sea while theResolution 986 boardings arc normallyconducted at the UN inspection point calledC 'OMISKKY. Boardings arc conducted on arange of vessels from 400-500 tonne dhows to300,000 tonne plus supertankers.

The Boarding Party inspecting an oilsmuggler's tanks. Also visible is thepumping set up to transfer the oil.

While the mission may be straightforward,these sorts of operations demand an extremelyhigh qua l i ty surface picture in what is a verybusy patch of water. On any given day ourships are operating in close proximity to 150-200 tlshing dhows and trawlers (of varyingsizes), 20-30 inbound and outbound legitimatemerchant vessels, 40-50 vessels plying the Iranto Kuwait trading route, 20 anchored merchantvessels awaiting an alongside berth andanything up to 40 smugglers a day attemptingto run the blockade. Add in operatingtemperatures of up to 50°C, poor visibi l i ty dueto heat ha/e or dust storms, some foreignmil i tary vessels and the ever-present threat ofan asymmetric terrorist attack and you had allthe ingredients for an interesting day at theoffice.

Whi le the focus was primarily onillegal activity, one of the important aspects ofour work was to ensure that our UN operationsdid not interfere with legit imate local trafficgoing about its business. As such it wasimportant then for the bridge. Gun DirectionPlatform (GDP) and Operations Room teamsto qu ick ly come to understand what thepatterns of normalcy were.

One of the great advantages of thehigh traffic densities and the tight navigationalconstraints was that the Officers of the Watch(OOW) gained a wealth of experience inmanaging m u l t i p l e activities. In a normalwatch the OOW could reasonably expect to

have to handle :

a. running a patrol l ine with 3 minute fixing;b. launch, recover and maintain

communications with m u l t i p l e R I I I B S ;c. conduct VHP radio queries wi th vessels to

ascertain whether they need to beboarded:

d. launch and recover the aircraft:e. make constant course and speed

alterations to avoid sh ipping and largenumbers of f ishing nets by the distancesdesignated by command;

f. routinely work wi th underkeel clearancesof 2-3 metres;

g. main ta in s ta t ionary positions in up to 2.5-3 knots of t idal stream;

h. maintain constant tac t ical awarenessparticularly for potential surface, air andmissile threat; and

i. main ta in appropriate engineering statedependent on tactical situation.

While traditional in-company time was l imited,th i s was more than compensated for by therequirement to manage at least 5-6 of thesetasks simultaneously and often for the vastmajor i ty or all of the watch. There is no doubtthat the OOW certainly knew that he or shehad been 'working' by the end of the watch.

In Ariiiiln. w i th up to 4 R I I I B S 'feetwet' simultaneously, the tempo on the bridgewas often hectic, particularly during the massbreakouts that were a feature of Aruntu'sdeployment. For the OOW. orchestrating thesimultaneous communications flow from fourboarding parties to the Operations Room addedanother layer of complexity. Because of thesheer size of some of these breakouts (up to 30vessels at a time) the ship itself often needed tobecome part of the action and be manoeuvred

A typical cargo dhow that would carry 400-700 tonnes of i l legal oil. The larger dhowscould carry in excess of 1000 tonnes.

39Summer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute\umber 10'

at close quarters into the path of recalcitrantvessels to ensure compliance.

Ship positioning was always a tradeoff between avai lable safe water, trafficdens i t ies (pa r t i cu l a r l y fishing fleets and nets)and being able to best support deployedboarding teams. This often meant very small ,constrained areas for the OOW to work in andrequired constant attention to detail wi thpassing traffic and not ins igni f icant t idalstreams to contend with.

The Navigating Officer was kept busyinvestigating shoals and Position Approximate( P A ) wrecks. Whenever he could get a R i l l I Ihe would conduct mini surveys around keyareas of interest using hand-held GPS and therelatively new hand-held echo sounders. Thesetorch l ike echo sounders are a real boon andcertainly reduced the setup time compared tothe old 'portable' boat echo sounders. I foundthe clarification of the position of PA wrecksof particular value as it s ignif icantly increasedthe amount of useable water. The spotchecking of key shoals and banks alsoincreased my confidence in the survey. Thatsaid, a deal of prudence st i l l needed to beexercised particularly as we watched the Iraqiharbour authorities raise a large uncharteredcement barge that had sunk a number of yearsago. \ a \ i g a t i o n a l buoys \\ere numerous innumber but invariably unl i t and posed aconstant hazard for boat crews at n igh t .

The Endeavour navigator electronicraster chart system ( ins ta l led on a laptop) wasanother inva luable piece of k i t . I t wasgenera l ly used as a command tool as I wasalways keen that the OOW maintain terrestrialf ix ing as the pr imary method. To have theelectronic chart and ship's position availableon the bridge. Operations Room and CO's daycabin meant I uas i i ' t t ied to one spot and tha t Icould lead some semblance of a normal life.Again one had to resist the temptation ofbecoming overly reliant on the tool. I have nodoubt that the OOWs prayed regularly for acorrupt hard drive on the laptop to rob me ofwhat 1 am sure they considered to be 'far toomuch information'.

The bridge team's understanding ofmerchant shipping increased exponentially.Reports became far more specific than 'I havea large merchant vessel at Red 30' as theOOWs improved the i r merchant vesselrecognition skills. This was useful as it isalways good for one's credibility if you don't

ask a 300.000 tonne VLCC tanker inbound forthe Mina Al Bakr oil terminal with about eightmetres of underwater p a i n t showing \ \ h a tcargo they are carrying! l iven knowledge ofbasic information regarding the key flags andports of registry proved useful. Melbourne andAmniii conducted some 1400 \ ' I 1 I ; oralongside (from the R H I B ) queries during theirdeployment and many a time, not quite t ru thfu linformation was passed back. As theinformation collected was often the basis uponwhich boarding decisions were made, thebridge teams needed to be alert to known Hagof convenience states and unusual flag and portof registry combinations. One enterprisingyoung officer taught himself enough Farsi andArabic to conduct queries in both languages,th i s made an enormous difference in the ship'sability to effectively query passing traffic and,of course, to the amount of time he spent onthe bridge!

Amnta and H.MS Argyll taking time out tokeep some core mariner ski l l s current.(Photo ABPH Barclay-Jeffs)

Working International Mari t ime Mobile VHPin the Gulf is notoriously d i f f i cu l t ; w i t hAnomalous Propagation exaggerating what isan already crowded band. It was tough enoughgetting the right vessel to answer on Channel16 let alone trying to establish a workingchannel, particularly when there was more thanthe odd incidence of anti-western sledging onthe circuit . The noise that the cluttered VI I Fband induced on the bridge also took somegetting used to; monitoring VHP was essentialso turning down the volume was not an option.

In company activity was limited due tothe high operational tempo but everyopportunity was seized with fellow RAN orcoalition ships to maintain important marinerand warfare skills. Arunta was able to interactwi th a number of ships i n c l u d i n g a mostvaluable two day Passage Exercise with HMS

40Summer 2003


Argyll whilst enroutc to a port visitReplenishment ot" course provided

regular interaction wi th other uni ts . Thepar t icular challenge in the NAG was the depthof water and close attention had to be paid topotential interaction effects. I t was however agreat opportunity to replenish from USN, RN,Canadian and Spanish tankers and to keep theseamanship sk i l l s honed.

The author keeps an eye on replenishmentwith USNS John Kricsson. Arunta's helo isabout to collect another VERTREP load asUSS Mobile Kay makes her approach.

Number 107

The un ique combination of an intense temposet by a relentless and determined group ofsmugglers, a tense strategic and tacticaloverlay and d i f f i cu l t navigat ional andenvironmental conditions made the task anextremely challenging one. 1-ach rotation to theGulf has been quite different, as the dynamicsof the s i tuat ion have continued to evolve; wewere fortunate to be there dur ing anextraordinary period of activity where theship's boarding teams conducted 377boardings and played a key role in all butshutting down the mar i t ime smuggling in toand out of Iraq. Much of our a b i l i t y to do thathowever was due to the cumula t ive effect ofthe entire MIO operation and in part icular theunrelent ing pressure that coal i t ion navies haveapplied in the last 1 X months.

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41Summer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval InstituteA ii in her 10"

BOOK REVIEWS

Lost Subs: From the Hunley to theKursk. The Greatest Submarines EverLost - and Foundby Spencer Dunmore (u i t h an introduct ion by Robert M a l l a r d )Al len and UnwinHardcover, 171 pages, index. RRP $49.95

Spencer Dunmore has written previously on submarine history (/;;Great Waters) as well as co-operating with Robert Ballard onExploring the Lusitania. Ballard's influence on this book is particularly evident : the style and formatarc s imi la r to his pictorial books on famous ships, which he has located, inc lud ing Titanic, Bismarckand Lusitiinia.

For this book Dunmore joins wi th Ballard to produce a superbly i l lustrated volume which w i l l enhanceany naval collection, particularly if one has an interest in submarines or marine archaeology.

In Lost Sn/is Dunmore combines nava l history with recent underwater photographs and diagrams oflost submarines to provide a valuable record of a fascinating subject. He does not draw on primaryresources and many of his secondary authorities are similar pictorial-type publ icat ions, l i e also u t i l i sesthe in ternet , which is becoming more wide ly used as a source of information, par t icu lar ly whenresearching recent events such as the s inking of the Kursk.

The first three chapters deal wi th the creation and early development of the submarine, looking at theTurtle and lesser-known examples of early submersibles. The Confederate submarine /fiin/ev is a focalpoint of this chapter. The reader is g iven an insight into the recent sa lvaging of the vessel , andillustrations, photographs and diagrams are well combined to tell a fascinating story. The story of theHunley has been told before, but here we can follow the story of the salvage operation, which exposedthe human aspect of a vessel lost for over 130 years. Other early submarines dealt wi th includeHolland I. which represented the first class of submarine produced in signif icant numbers.Photographs of Holland I dur ing and after salvage once again l ink past and present.

Chapter four covers the First World War, and Dunmore shifts focus towards victims of submarinewarfare as well as the perpetrators of sinkings. He uses material from Ballard's Exploring thel.nsiiania. i n c l u d i n g some of Ken Marschall's excellent i l lustrations. Of particular interest is theaccount of the Australian submarine AE II. Although Fred and Elizabeth Brenchley's book Stoker'sSubmarine tells the story of its operation in the Dardanelles, the exploits are still not well known.Dunmore dedicates only four pages to AE II. but the photographs of the wreck prov ide a fascinat inginsight into one of Australia's first submarines.

Early examples of submarine rescue are the focus of chapter five. Dunmore looks at the successfulrescue of 24 survivors from the USS Sana/us, and contrasts this with the tragic sinking of HMS Thetisu ith the loss of 99 men. These cases prov ide a useful introduction to the rescue attempt on the Kursk.cov ered in a later chapter.

No account of lost submarines would be complete wi thout reference to at least one of the 780 GermanU-boats lost during the Second World War. Dunmore looks at several lesser-known U-boats lost off

42S ii miner 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Institutelumber 107

the US coast, and poignant photographs of U352 provide a sobering reminder of the human cost ofsubmarine disaster. Although several pages are dedicated to US submarines, it is unfortunate thatDunmore was not able to access official Japanese photographs of the famous USS Wahoo. TheJapanese submarine 152, sunk by Al l ied aircraft off France in 1944, is also included. This submarinewas found by an expedition in 1998, which was hoping to find gold. Hvidence of treasure beingcarried on this submarine is unrel iable, however, and none was found, but the expedition's contr ibut ionto submarine history is significant.

The loss of two nuclear submarines of the US Navy has long fascinated modern submariners. Thesudden and catastrophic nature of their loss with all hands h ighl ights the signif icant risk associatedwith undersea operations. Robert Ballard undertook expeditions in the 1980s to photograph both theUSS Thresher and the USS Scorpion while looking for Titanic. Some of the photographs taken areincluded in Dunmore's book and once again provide a sobering reminder of what can happen whenthings go wrong beneath great waters.

Chapter eight covers the loss of the Kursk. The recent book A Time to Die: The Kursk Disaster byRobert Moore is a more comprehensive study, but Dunmore's coverage of the salvage operationhighl ights what an impressive engineering feat it was to raise an I S.OOO ton submarine.

Lost Suits is a fascinating read and h igh ly recommended. The strength of this book is not its historicalcontent but the way it combines history with marine archeology, supported by superb i l lustrat ions, int e l l i n g compel l ing stories. The selection of case studies is excellent, covering early submarines r ightthrough to those of today. Readers wanting a comprehensive historical account of submarineoperations and disasters may wish to supplement this book with others, but those seekingentertainment and information about historically significant lost submarines need look no further.

Reviewed hv Lieutenant Matthew Hoffman. RAN

Don rt Tell the Prime Ministerby Patrick Wei lei-Scribe Short BooksPaperback, vi i & 104pp. RRP SI4.95

This short book on the 'children overboard' affair should interest manyreaders, part icularly members of the naval community who would likesome analysis of what happened in Canberra during the episode, as well as £iserious students of Australian politics and public policy. Patrick Weller iswell qualif ied to analyse Government handling of the affair. He isprofessor of polities and public policy at Griffith Un ive r s i ty and haspublished numerous books and articles on public administration inAustral ia. He was an expert witness at the Senate inquiry into 'A Certain Maritime IneideiA'.

Weller concludes that a lot went wrong in Canberra during the 'children overboard' affa i r . Pol i t ica l -mi l i ta ry relations went astray and some normal conventions and traditions of Governmentaccountabi l i ty went 'out the window'. Most importantly, the public should not have been misled. ThePrime Minister's own ministerial code st ipulates that misleading statements should be corrected assoon as they are known to be wrong. Clearly this did not occur during the 'children overboard' affairand according to evidence now well established, the then Minister for Defence and his staff werepar t icu la r ly culpable. The ends appear to have just if ied the means.

The Prime Minister has claimed throughout that he did not know that reports of children being thrownoverboard were incorrect. The t i t l e of this book suggests that he was protected from the truth. As

43Summer 2003

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute\iiinbcr 10"

\Veller po in t s out. there were people all around him who knew that the reports were incorrect. SeniorGovernment officials recoiled from the truth to allow Ministers to maintain their political positions.

Wel le r draus a t t e n t i o n to the 'ever-useful fiction' that 'formal advice' is required before Min i s t e r s w i l lrespond. Oral briefings, wri t ten comments and warnings at meetings do not constitute formal briefing.Officials may h a v e protected the (iovernment during the affair, inc luding by not offering formaladvice, but in the case of the senior mi l i t a ry officers involved, it dragged them in to a po l i t i ca l lypartisan si tuation.

The current Minister for Defence has acknowledged problems of communication wi th in his portfolioduring the 'children overboard' affair . Emails and mobile phones have created unof f ic ia l and informalchannels of communicat ion , w h i c h can run ahead of formal channels. As Weller claims, the phone callb e t w e e n Commander Banks in I l \ l AS . [delaide and Brigadier Silverstone in D a r w i n is t he on l \source of the myth that children were thrown overboard. As in a game of Chinese whispers, the storywas passed on to Defence Headquarters in Canberra and then to the Department of Prime Minis te r andCabinet. It was sei/ed upon by po l i t i ca l spin doctors and manipu la ted to unconscionable poli t icaladvantage.

What can be done about this sort of situation? It is inevitable that in a h i g h l y charged atmosphere,bureaucrats and min i s te r i a l staff wi l l seek information from the operational level on u h i c h to basead\ ice to t h e i r Min is te rs . Mobi le phones are readily at hand, but for officers at the coal face phonecalls can be highly distracting. The same might be said wi thin the Defence Force about phone ca l l sfrom higher up the operational chain of command. Hopeful ly , protocols and procedures are no\\ inplace to ensure that s imi l a r problems do not arise in the future .

M i l i t a r y officers seem to have been left behind in the h e a v i l y pol i t ic ised environment of the 'childrenoverboard' af fa i r : an environment largely created by aggressive, 'shoot from the hip' bureaucrats andstaffers. Subsequently such people were not held accountable and some have even been promoted.Weller argues strongly that reforms are needed to make ministerial staff accountable so as to restoreconfidence in the senior levels of the bureaucracy. The same might be said about the state of polit ical-mi l i t a ry relations. These have been the subject of an article by Hugh Smith dealing with the " c h i l d r e noverboard" affair and the subsequent Senate inquiry ('A Certain Mari t ime Incident and Po l i t i ca l -Military Relations'. Quadrant, June 2002. pp. 38-43). This article is h igh ly recommended along vv i l hl~)on't Tell the Prime Minister.

At the end of his book. We l l e r makes reference to Winston C h u r c h i l l . Al though 'always partisan,blithely opportunistic, and often cynica\\ Churchi l l was prepared to take responsibility. When told ofthe loss of Singapore and the demonstrable weakness of its defences, he is said to h a v e commented: 7did not know. I was not tola. I should have asked.

Reviewed hv /)/• Sam Bateman. University of'Wollongong

44Summer 2(1(13

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute › wp-content › uploads › ... · Number 107 institutions and interests. In addition to purely military concerns, these interests should