Journal of International Affairs 2009

An AnnuAl PublicAtion of the internAtionAl relAtions students AssociAtion

the university of british columbiA

vAncouver | cAnAdA

2009 edition

Journal of International Affairs | 2009

© 2009 International Relations Students Association | All rights Reserved.Box 197 – 6138 Student Union Blvd.| Vancouver, BC | Canada | V6T 1Z1

ISSN 1913-9314 (print) ISSN 1913-9322 (web)

The UBC Journal of International Affairs is a publication of the International Relations Students Association of the Alma Mater Society of the University of British Columbia. The UBC logo and the name ‘UBC’ are official marks of the University of British Columbia and are used in

accordance with UBC Public Affairs visual guidelines.

All articles published in the Journal of International Affairs represent the opinions of the authors and do not reflect the policies or opinions of the University of British Columbia, the staff of the Journal of International Affairs, or the International Relations Students Association.

The University of British Columbia does not assume any responsibility for errors or omissions in this journal.

vAnessA vAn den boogAArdEditor in Chief

dr. Allen sensFaculty Advisor

Chair of Advertising BRENT LEVENSTADTDirectors of Advertising EMILY BROWN, CAITRIN INNIS, DANIELLE JOHNSON,

JULIANNE PIPERDirectors of Distribution MARGARITA ITURRIAGA B., LISANE THIRSKDirectors of Layout and Design PEGGY CHANG, NICOLE ROSYCHUCK

Director of Faculty Relations SARAH CHUNGContributing Editors EMILY BROWN, AUBRIE CHAYLT, SARAH CHUNG,

ELYSE ECONOMIDES, CAITRIN INNIS, DANIELLE JOHNSON, HELEN LUI, VIVIAN LUK, AMANDA MAGEE, ALEX MCCARTER, MARTIN MCCARVILL,

KATERINA ORTAKOVA, LEANNE PAGE, SARAH PARVANI, JULIANNE PIPER, KATY RAMSDEN, JONATHAN ROSEN, JULIE STRICKER, MICHELLE SZ,

CHELSEA THERIAULT, HANNAH THORNE, PAMELA TOOR

FACULTY REFEREES

DR. Y. DAVID DINGDepartment of Political Science, UBC Okanagan

DR. KAL HOLSTIUniversity of Killam Professor Emeritus:

Centre for International Relations

Dr. Kurt HübnerDirector: UBC Institute for European Studies

DR. CARL HODGEDepartment of Political Science, UBC Okanagan

DR. KYUNG-AE PARKInstitute of Asian Research

DR. DON BAKERDepartment of Asian Studies

DR. JAMES ROCHLINIrving K. Barber School of Arts and Sciences,

UBC Okanagan

DR. ALLEN SENSChair: International Relations Program,

Department of Political Science

DR. LISA SUNDSTROMDepartment of Political Science

4 Journal of International Affairs | 2009

tAble of contents

6 letter from the editor | Vanessa van den Boogaard

8 letter from the President of the internAtionAl relAtions students AssociAtion | Andrea Salvador

9 simons centre for disArmAment & non-ProliferAtion reseArch | Student Policy Research Program

10 the Profit PArAdox: comPetition And finAnciAl meltdown | Rahim Mohemed

18 the Kyoto Protocol: whAt went wrong? looKing At AlternAtive APProAches to future climAte chAnge Agreements | Brent

Levenstadt

27 multinAtionAl energy ventures Preventing nucleAr ProliferAtion And combAting climAte chAnge | Anastasia Telesetsky

41 thinK locAlly, Act globAlly: livelihoods AnAlysis, oPium PoPPy cultivAtion, And the conflict economy in AfghAnistAn | Anthony

Hamilton

49 PAKistAn’s nucleAr insecurity: regionAl And globAl imPlicAtions | Vanessa Nicolson

60 security democrAcy in thAilAnd: the chAllenges of de- thAKsinizing thAi Politics | Jim Wu

70 International Perspective Submission | AmericAn foreign Policy since 9/11: A neoreAlist resPonse to globAl chAllenges | Arnold

Lim, University of Glasgow

80 Photo essAys: isrAel & PAlestine: conflict through the eyes of children | Yashar Keramati, Peace and Love International

2009 | Journal of International Affairs 5

84 contributors’ PAge

85 JiA stAff PAge

89 AcKnowledgement | Arts undergrAduAte society

90 AcKnowledgement | internAtionAl relAtions students AssociAtion

91 finAl thAnK-yous

cover imAge

TitleAcrylic on canvasNicole Rosychuk

Imaios volo volent. Elluptatquis ent qui occati te el eosti quaereh entotate doluptas denimin pella voluptatur?Sapiet laccullum est quae soluptatium hit do-lesed quatqui con pa volumque eos rat porero blab ipsantur, nulpa sint re re voluptae ese-disquam nist et erepelenis utenditas quam il modis rerovit, volum nos maiore eos in na


Letter from the Editor

I am a citizen, not of Athens or Greece, but of the world. -- Socrates

It Is wIth great prIde that I present to you the 2009 edItIon of the uBC Journal of InternatIonal affaIrs (JIa). thIs Journal endeavours to support and showCase the IntelleCtual talent and CapaCIty for hIgher thInkIng that exIsts In aBundanCe wIthIn the fIeld of InternatIonal relatIons (Ir), Both at uBC and wIthIn the wIder aCademIC CommunIty.

the Journal exhIBIts authors wIth dIverse BaCkgrounds and perspeCtIves In an attempt to shed a BalanCed lIght on the gloBal Issues whICh we, as the polItICal agenda set-ters and polICy makers of the future, feel are of the most pressIng ConCern to the Current state of our world. the overarChIng theme of ‘gloBal CrIsIs’ refleCts the tumultuous and often volatIle state of gloBal polItICs and InternatIonal affaIrs that we have wItnessed throughout the past year. the CrIses that we faCe wIll BrIng Cer-taIn reperCussIons that wIll follow us Into the ComIng years and demand aCademIC and polICy attentIon In order to aChIeve the seCurIty and development goals that are at the BasIs of InternatIonal staBIlIty.

thIs edItIon hopes to make sense of some of these seemIngly overwhelmIng CrIses, In-CludIng fInanCIal ma ket volatIlIty; ClImate Change, envIronmental CalamIty, and the potentIal CrIses of nuClear prolIferatIon for Clean energy purposes; the eConomIC de-velopment and seCurIty of afghanIstan; the threat to regIonal and gloBal seCurIty resultIng from pakIstan’s domestIC InstaBIlIty; the polItICal staBIlIty of thaIland; the future of amerICan foreIgn polICy oBJeCtIves; and the very real human Costs of the gaza CrIsIs. John f. kennedy onCe aCknowledged that, “when wrItten In ChInese, the word “CrIsIs” Is Compounded of two CharaCters. one represents danger and the other represents opportunIty.” thIs Is our tIme to reCognIze that CrIsIs - whether related to gloBal markets, seCurIty, polItICal staBIlIty, ClImate Change, or development Is truly our greatest opportunIty to enCourage new Ideas and promote the Change that Is neC-essary to fuel the progress of mankInd, and to BrIng IndIvIduals together as Common gloBal CItIzens who share the same fundamental aspIratIons for human welfare.

GLOBAL CRISIS?

2009 | Journal of International Affairs 7 2009 | Journal of International Affairs 7

the JIa prIdes Itself In provIdIng students wIth an opportunIty to partICIpate In the aCademIC deBate surroundIng these sIgnIfICant gloBal Issues and enCouragIng these fundamental aIms. the overwhelmIng response from students eager to voICe theIr per-speCtIves Is a Clear IndICator of Both the strength of the uBC InternatIonal rela-tIons program and the salIenCe of InternatIonal affaIrs to today’s students of truly gloBal CItIzenry. thIs opportunIty for dIsCussIon would not exIst If you, the reader, dId not share the same CosmopolItan hopes and fears for the future of our world; thus, I would lIke to thank you for takIng the tIme to aCknowledge the ImportanCe of gloBal CItIzenry, refleCted In the authors’ perspeCtIves of the InternatIonal CrIses of our tIme.

addItIonally, I would lIke to personally thank all of the faCulty referees who gen-erously offered theIr tIme and expertIse to help us present to you the fInest qualIty work from our undergraduate CommunIty. I would espeCIally lIke to thank dr. allen sens, our faCulty advIsor, whose generosIty, tIreless enthusIasm and vested Interest In hIs students makes the Ir department and Its ChaIr stand out wIthIn a renowned aCademIC InstItutIon. I would also lIke to thank all the students from uBC and our partner unIversItIes who suBmItted theIr work to the JIa and whose Ideas and InItIa-tIves wIll shape the future of our world. fInally, I offer my deepest thanks to the JIa edItorIal staff and dIreCtors whose energy and dedICatIon to thIs proJeCt made It possIBle. It has Been my pleasure and honour to work wIth you thIs year, and I sIn-Cerely thank you for your ContInuous and generous support.

thIs Journal Is the result of the ColleCtIve effort, dedICatIon and passIon of nearly one hundred ContrIButors, staff and faCulty memBers, and It Is wIth great enthusIasm and prIde that I now present It to you. may we all emBraCe the opportunItIes that lIe Before us, and reCognIze that there Is no Better tIme to unIte as CItIzens of humanIty.

Vanessa Van den Boogaard

8 Journal of International Affairs | 20098 Journal of International Affairs | 2009

dear reader,

on Behalf of the InternatIonal relatIons students assoCIatIon, I would lIke to welCome you to the 2009 edItIon of Irsa’s Journal of InternatIonal affaIrs. the Journal Is one of the most outstandIng endeavors of Irsa’s annual program. the JIa not only provIdes the opportunIty for uBC students to puBlIsh theIr Best-wrItten work and Be reCognIzed for It, But It also allows them to engage In the aCademIC world.

the unIversIty of BrItIsh ColumBIa Is very well known for Its hIgh level of researCh. one of uBC’s 2010 trek goals Is to BeCome the leadIng researCh unIversIty In Canada and one of the leadIng researCh unIversItIes In the world.

the JIa Is a refleCtIon of thIs outstandIng researCh. By seleCtIng some of the Best-wrItten works In the fIeld of InternatIonal relatIons and wIth the exCellent support that the JIa reCeIves from the faCulty and other uBC InstItutIons, thIs student aCademIC Journal has BeCome hIghly reCognIzed among uBC students, professors and others.

I would lIke to not only Congratulate the authors for theIr Immense effort In the pursuIt of the perfeCt paper; But also the JIa edItorIal staff, and espeCIally the edItor-In-ChIef, who have supported the students throughout the puBlICatIon proCess and have made thIs puBlICatIon possIBle.

I hope you enJoy readIng the JIa edItIon 2009 and I wIll look forward to future puBlICatIons By thIs organIzatIon.

sInCerely,

andrea salVador

presIdent 2008/2009

Letter from the President of IRSA

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDENTS ASSOCIATION

UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAUBC STUDENT UNION BUILDING 30-GVANCOUVER, BCCANADA, V6T 1Z1

Tel: 604-822-1604www.irsa.ca


eaCh year, the sImons Centre for dIsarmament and non-prolIferatIon researCh offers an opportunIty for students from all faCultIes and dIsCIplInes to ContrIB-ute to the fIeld of dIsarmament and arms Control through the sImons student polICy researCh program In peaCe and dIsarmament. the goal of thIs program Is to Create a Better understandIng of dIsarmament and arms Control Issues among uBC students and to stImulate greater attentIon to these Issues among students of dIsparate Interests.

the program Is open to all full-tIme uBC graduate or undergraduate students of at least thIrd year standIng. students seleCted for partICIpatIon In thIs program wIll produCe a polICy-relevant paper on a topIC related to an Issue Central to the ConCerns of the sImons Centre. upon satIsfaCtory CompletIon of the paper, the paper authors eaCh reCeIve one thousand dollars for theIr Involvement In the pro-gram; the year’s Best paper Is then puBlIshed In the JIa and Its author Is granted an addItIonal monetary award.

the sImons Centre for dIsarmament and non-prolIferatIon researCh Is a world-leadIng aCademICally-Based polICy researCh Centre foCused on gloBal nuClear dIs-armament. the sImons Centre’s mIssIon Is to promote sustaInaBle nuClear nonpro-lIferatIon and arms Control measures supported By expansIon of law-Based gloBal governanCe. the sImons Centre undertakes a range of eduCatIon, researCh, advo-CaCy, and outreaCh aCtIvItIes, InCludIng researCh programs, polICy ConsultatIon, ConferenCes, puBlICatIons, InvIted speakers, student InternshIps, and CommunIty Involvement.

SIMONS CENTRE FOR DISARMAMENT & NON-PROLIFERATION RESEARCH

student Policy reseArch ProgrAm

LIU INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL ISSUES

6476 NW MARINE DR.VANCOUVER, BCCANADA V6T 1Z2

Tel: 604-822-0552Fax: 604-822-9261

[email protected]

UNIVERSITY OFBRITISH COLUMBIA


The global economic order is governed by the profit principle. All financial players operate with one common goal: to turn a profit. When the market functions properly, profit-seeking investors channel capital toward good ideas, spurring innovation and economic development. This is the essence of neo-liberalism.

Despite its merits, I hypothesize that the profit principle is at the core of periodic financial crises. Such meltdowns frequently occur when investors and larger financial interests are enticed into seeking gains through risky ventures. Though such risks are irrational, they are consistently taken by those who fear getting left behind during an economic boom. Going further, I argue that the competition characteristic of the profit-driven economic order has been the principle impediment to effective state-level and multinational financial

THE PROFIT PARADOX:COMPETITION AND

FINANCIAL MELTDOWN“Only two things are infinite, the universe and human stupidity; and I’m not sure

about the former.” - Albert Einstein

Rahim mohamed


regulation. Here, my analysis centres on the moral hazard which stems from the ongoing interstate struggles for economic primacy. Thus arises the central paradox of this work: the principle which defines the neo-liberal order also threatens its existence.

The first section of this paper will be dedicated to constructing a narrative vis-à-vis the dynamics of financial crises. Building upon Kindelberger’s scholarship on market crashes (2008), as well as the related work of Wright (2000), I seek to connect the macroeconomic phenomenon of financial meltdown with the simple human desire to attain relative prosperity. After outlining this general pattern, my analysis will turn to problems inherent to the multilateral financial regulation as I argue that existing a r rangements cannot tame the externalities e n g e n d e r e d by the pursuit of profit. Specifically, I will comment in detail on how lingering economic rivalries have thus far dashed the hopes of a prospective economic agreement which would lessen the likelihood of future crashes. Here, I will explain how the rivalry between the financial centres of London and New York undermined the Bretton Woods truce, and will identify prevailing power struggles which are likely to impede further global economic cooperation.

I. “KeepIng up wIth the Joneses”: the Banal Roots of fInancIal cRIsIs

With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to identify the causes of a financial crisis. To this end, Kindelberger (2000) has constructed a general model of the market crash. In this framework, such phenomena follow a

period of prosperity brought upon by robust speculative investment in an emerging area of the economy. As investments become more lucrative, more speculators are attracted to the marketplace, driving the price of holdings to levels which exceed their real value. This creates a bubble which inevitably bursts when opinion-leading expert investors sense the risk in the economic environment and begin to divest themselves of their financial assets. Crashes occur when this bubble burst elicits a frenzied reaction in less-sophisticated investors who follow suit, racing to dump underperforming assets. In essence, the model “crash” is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Driven by the fear of a meltdown, investors seal such a fate by withdrawing capital from the market in a destabilizing manner.1

Kindleberger’s narrative is convincing. History provides us with several examples of this very dynamic, most notably the Great Crash of 1929. The phenomenon stemmed from a wave of speculative investment emboldened by lax restrictions on loans. New investors came to Wall Street in droves throughout the 1920s, taking advantage of the profit-making opportunities afforded by the stock market. Bank credit was the primary instrument used to acquire financial holdings. The practice of buying stock “on the margin” and using the resulting profit to finance one’s loans was commonplace. Predictably, many investors were unable to cover their losses when inflated market prices fell. This had serious

“ In essence, the model ‘crash’ is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Driven by the fear of a meltdown, in-vestors seal such a fate by withdrawing capital

from the market in a destabilizing manner.”


consequences on macroeconomic financial stability and was ultimately a contributing factor to broader economic depression.

Unfortunately, the Great Crash was not an isolated occurrence. Investors have conspired to make several similar mistakes over the past two decades. Seeing tremendous financial opportunity in the newly-industrialized economies of East Asia, profit-seeking

foreign actors pumped heavy flows of capital into the region throughout much of the 1990s. Flush with cash, Asian financial institutions made large bets on costly real estate ventures. However, this level of financial activity was not sustainable as negative indicators about the Pacific Rim economy emerged. The situation came to a head in 1997, when the collapse of Thailand’s currency led foreign interests to withdraw from Asian markets. This set off a familiar cycle of panic as newly-insolvent Asian banks floundered. Starting from Thailand, the crisis spread to other debt-ridden, underperforming Asian economies.2

Luckily, the Asian economy at the time was not large enough to throw the global financial system into disarray. The same cannot be said about the United States as it currently limps through a catastrophic credit crisis that was brought on by similar behaviour. The ongoing saga bears the Kindelberger blueprint as problems can be traced to the heavy circulation of mortgage-backed securities, a perceived innovation in housing finance. Put simply, lenders had

devised new ways to package and trade existing mortgage debt. By using market forces to finance debt, financial institutions were in a stronger position to grant loans.3 This abundance of credit stimulated demand for real estate, leading a great number of consumers to buy property they could not afford, resulting in a vicious cycle in which both borrowers and lenders accumulated

debt. This, coupled with declining housing prices, set in motion a financial crisis which spread from the banking sector to the stock market.4 While the final narrative on the present meltdown remains unwritten, it is clear that this story is one of various actors taking irrational risks in the hopes of profiting from a new economic opportunity.

What drives such reckless behaviour? The answer may lie in psychology, as a growing body of literature links personal contentment to one’s relative economic well-being. Wright (2000) argues that people are driven to maximize income because they derive happiness from feeling more successful than those around them. This explains a mass of survey data which suggests that, while individuals become happier as they make more money, increases in GDP do little to enhance the aggregate-level of happiness within developed states. Moreover, it conforms to anthropological theory which indicates that humans are instinctively geared to seek high social status as a means of assuring reproductive success.5

Indeed, it is likely the case that the fear of not sharing in profits of a fertile market is the fundamental impetus which drives high-risk speculative investment. Individuals may be compelled to take irrational financial gambles in order to

maintain or imporve their relative social position.


Applied to the economic realm, Wright’s hypothesis helps explain the “irrational exuberance” characteristic of financial manias. Indeed, it is likely the case that the fear of not sharing in the profits of a fertile market is the fundamental impetus which drives high-risk speculative investment. Individuals may be compelled to take irrational financial gambles in order to maintain or improve their relative social position. Kindleberger himself senses this broad dynamic as he writes: “There is nothing so disturbing to one’s well-being and judgement as to see a friend get rich.”6

The problem of irrational exuberance is compounded when profits attract novice investors with a shallow awareness of economic fundamentals. Such actors may be more apt to finance unpromising ventures as they are less equipped to evaluate stock value. This narrative figures in Rajan and Zingales’ (2003) assessment of the late-1990s “dot.com” bubble. They argue that several high-tech holdings became overvalued when unsophisticated investors rushed to acquire internet-related assets. For their part, firms eager to exploit their ignorance began to re-brand themselves as e-businesses. What followed was a steep crash as “smart money” eventually bet against such gimmicks.7 In the framework of a free market, earning opportunities will always attract naïve investors.

This sentiment is not restricted to the layperson, as even opinion-leading expert investors face incentives to gamble. Cool-headed, strategic vision may be cast aside as a financial executive is often only considered as good as his or her firm’s latest quarterly profits. The story of Jeffrey Vinik, the deposed manager of the Fidelity Magellan fund, epitomises this reality. Fearing that the high-tech bubble was about to burst in

1996, he significantly reduced his fund’s holding of technology stocks. Such assets, which had previously made up nearly 40% of the firm’s portfolio, took up less than 4% under Vinik’s tenure. Unfortunately, Vinik was forced to resign when Magellan showed weak annual figures in relation to its competitors. His conservative plan for stable, long-term growth failed to satisfy a clientele seeking to reap the spoils of the tech boom.8

Ironically, a safer plan for self-interested expert investors may be to follow the insanity of the marketplace. This holds as the performance of such professionals is often measured against a general benchmark of market trends, such as the S&P 500. As such, a dominant strategy may be to acquire commonly-held stock as an “insurance policy” and blame any resulting shortcomings in return on macroeconomic factors. At the very least, financial elites who follow investment trends will shield themselves from a Vinik-style underperformance.9 In other words, “smart” investors who fear for their jobs may be pushed into letting the less-sophisticated, marketplace lunatics run the asylum.

Can the spectre of crashes ever be vanquished under existing conditions? Some neo-liberals express hope in the idea that investors will gradually learn from history. For instance, Rajan and Zingales acknowledge the instructive effect of bubble bursts as they hypothesize that such events punish investors for irresponsible behaviour. The also note that capital is channelled away from the naïve herd and towards more savvy, short selling financial elites as markets contract. This, they argue, helps the financial environment regain equilibrium.10 However, the long term viability of such market-imposed discipline is questionable. It is impossible to tell how future financial innovations will affect investor behaviours as


such advances often engender the widespread belief that innovation has “changed the rules” of financial interaction. This was certainly the case prior to the most recent meltdown. The credit crisis directly followed a period in which financial elites believed that advanced mechanisms designed to distribute credit risk had changed the rules of lending. As Tett (2007) observes, such attitudes can lead to irrational economic behaviour as actors “[throw] caution to wind,” amidst misplaced faith in the soundness of the existing system.11

Albert Einstein once said, “Only two things are infinite, the universe and human stupidity; and I’m not sure about the former.” The narrative of contemporary finance reaffirms Einstein’s wisdom as investors continue to find innovative ways to act irrationally in the pursuit of profit. Perhaps it is not their fault, for social research indicates that man is predisposed to defend his relative position in society at all costs, even if this means making a risky investment in a dot.com stock or financing a real estate acquisition with a subprime loan. Nonetheless, these misguided actors are only part of the story. History shows that competition can make states just as petty. Past and ongoing roadblocks to the effective multinational governance of finance will be discussed below.

II. economIc tuRf waRs and the faIluRe of multIlateRal goveRnance

Can effective multilateral cooperation curb the darker elements of multinational finance? Kindelberger suggests that the answer is “yes.” He notes that the period between 1945 and 1973 was a long economic peace, devoid of financial crisis.12 It is probably not a coincidence that this timeframe coincided with the post-World War II Bretton Woods economic system.

In essence, the Bretton Woods regime

entailed the cartelization of global finance. The financial powers of the day agreed to put in place limits on the cross-border flow of capital in order to give states greater economic sovereignty. Specifically, the ability of investors to direct resources towards speculative ventures abroad was constrained. What resulted was an environment in which state-level financial institutions obtained a de-facto monopoly over domestic finance. With this authority, states had increased ability to moderate fluctuations in the market through intervention. They could temper “irrational exuberance” through tactics such as limiting entry into certain sectors of the economy and freezing capital flows.13 This system was by no means a panacea, and it reaped several well-documented economic consequences. However, it did contribute to the development of a stable financial order. Stricter rules on capital transfer meant the cessation of ungovernable manias driven by speculative investment. The events which hastened the downfall of Bretton Woods exemplify problems inherent to international economic cooperation.

It could be argued that the system was doomed from the start. American delegates to the Bretton Woods Conference ensured that capital controls were less than airtight. However, it was resurgent British banks who were the first to exploit these loopholes. By the end of the 1950s, London-based financial institutions began to accept foreign deposits valuated in dollars, sidestepping Bretton Woods-friendly controls on the trade of Pound Sterling levied by the British government. This newly-formed “Eurodollar” Market became an attractive site for investment as it was largely free from government intervention. Westminster ultimately turned a blind-eye to the Eurodollar Market as it stood to benefit from London’s


restoration as the capital of global finance.14

The noise from London was not well-received in New York. Amidst uncertainty generated by the Vietnam War, dollar holdings drifted away from Wall Street and towards the more lucrative financial environment of its rival. Washington could do little to reverse this trend within the Bretton Woods framework as financial interests could simply sidestep domestic regulations by becoming more heavily-invested in the laissez-faire Eurodollar Market. As tensions between London and New York grew, the United States left the Bretton Woods system in 1971, adopting an open-border policy in an effort to reassert its threatened financial hegemony.15

While the London-New York rivalry was not the sole agent of the demise of the Bretton Woods system, it underscores the difficulty of maintaining multilateral economic cooperation in an environment of interstate competition. Holistic economic agreements like Bretton Woods necessarily preserve a set of norms and hierarchies. In this case, states were compelled to accept limits on the transfer of capital, forsaking economic opportunities. The temptation to cheat was overwhelming for an ambitious London who seized an opportunity to regain financial primacy by exploiting the shortcomings of the existing regime. In the words of economist Susan Strange, “the laws and morals of the jungle took over” as the gentleman’s agreement on finance was compromised.16

It is tempting to place this story in context with the larger neorealist narrative of

states fighting for economic security within an anarchic global environment. However, it would be inappropriate to cast a capital control tiff between two “friendly” states in such stark terms. As the United States and United Kingdom had already demonstrated a measure of mutual trust through military integration under NATO, there is no indication that either country would seek to constrain the security of the other. Instead, the London-New York rivalry was probably born out of

a more nuanced struggle for prestige as both actors involved were willing to undermine the Bretton Woods compact in order to lay claim to the capital of global finance. Models dealing solely with state security cannot explain such status-seeking behaviour.

There is little reason to believe that a future multinational financial agreement will succeed where Bretton Woods failed. If anything, major actors are currently in a worse position to build economic cooperation. The global order is more fragmented now than in the aftermath of World War II. The economically hamstrung and politically isolated United States presently faces legitimate challenges to its position of global primacy from a rising China and an increasingly-integrated Europe. Moreover, contemporary strains on commodities like oil have made resource-rich states, such as Russia and the OPEC

Albert Einstein once said, “Only two things are infinite, the universe and human stupid-

it; and I’m not sure about the former.” The narrative of contemporary finance reaffirms

Einstein’s wisdom as investors continue to find innovative ways to act irrationally in the

pursuit of profit.


countries, major wildcards in the global economy. If history is any indication, the emerging prospect of a multi-polar system is more likely to lead to intensified competition between power-seeking states than further economic cooperation. Moreover, there exist deep divisions on how best to govern the international fiscal landscape. The model of economic liberalism, which was hailed as a world-unifying cornerstone of “the end of history”17 just over a decade ago, is undergoing a serious re-evaluation from even its most stalwart supporters in the shadow of the ongoing crisis on Wall Street. Without an undisputed hegemon18 or a clear paradigm for a new financial order, the prospect of any

global action which lessens the likelihood of another crash is bleak. In fact, present conditions indicate that the immediate economic future will be characterised by fierce competition amongst evenly-matched Great Powers. Kindelberger’s narrative of “manias, panics and crashes” remains relevant as the international community is in no position to govern volatile channels of global finance.

The recurrence of financial crises is as much a political problem as it is an economic one. The wholesale absence of market crashes during the Bretton Woods-era hints that the global financial system can be stabilized through the robust multilateral governance of speculative capital transfers. However, putting such an agreement in place entails overcoming significant barriers to collective action as such capital flows can make a vital contribution to a state’s

relative economic fortune. The dynamic at play in individual economic behaviour is mirrored in international political economy as competition inhibits the ability of states to build a consensus around rational activity.

conclusIon and fuRtheR dIscussIon The same principle of profit that

structures marketplace interaction is the root of the periodic crashes which threaten the existence of global financial order. Such meltdowns are triggered when the investment of profit-seeking interests causes a certain economic property to become overvalued, and are exacerbated when an inevitable correction sends the same actors

scrambling to cut their losses. Moral hazard invariably plays a role in these phenomena as market-savvy interests attempt to profit from the ignorance of the irrational, profit-seeking herd, often taking irrational action themselves in the process. Though all parties involved are simply acting out of self-interest, a negative macroeconomic outcome emerges. This narrative fits the Great Crash of 1929, as well as more recent crises in Asia (1997) and on Wall Street (2008). Moreover, the cycle’s repetition indicates that the prospect of the market ever “learning its lesson” and policing itself is bleak.

The problem of cyclical crashes has been compounded by the fact that the international community has thus far failed to develop a method of reconciling the imperative of financial stability with the benefits of profit-seeking. In fact, the

If history is any indication, the emerging prospect of a multi-polar system is more likely to lead to intensified competition between power-seeking states than further economic coop-

eration


competitive nature of states themselves has been a major impediment to cooperation in this area. As states continue to jockey for economic primacy, it seems clear that they prefer the instability of the present financial environment to the ingrained hierarchies which would be inherent in any viable general agreement on marketplace conduct. Like investors, states would rather “gamble” in hopes of improving their relative prestige than accept a more stable permanent fate.

Perhaps there can be no purely economic solution for what is, essentially, a human

problem. For all the complexity of the financial environment, crashes can often be traced to individuals who do not want to be left to watch as their peers exploit fertile markets. Perhaps this widespread culture of one-upmanship can be managed as more is learned about what makes humans apt to derive emotional well-being from relative economic prosperity. However, the facts indicate that crashes will continue to be a part of economic life as financial freedom entails the freedom to make bad decisions.

ENDNOTE

1. Charles P. Kindelberger, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, 4th ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2000), 2-3. 2. Morris Goldstein, The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures and Systemic Implications, (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1998), 18. 3. BBC News, “The layman’s financial crisis glossary,” 29 October 2008, <http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/7642138.stm#mbs> Accessed 16 December 2008. 4. Niall Ferguson, “The End of Prosperity?” Time, 2 October 2008, <http://www.time.com/ time/business/article/0,8599,1846450,00.html> Accessed 16 December 2008. 5. Robert Wright, “Will Globalization make you Happy?” Financial Post, September-October 2000, 57.6. Kindelberger. 15. 7. Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales. Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists: Unleashing the Power of Financial Markets to Create Wealth and Spread Opportunity, (New York: Crown Business, 2003), 100-101. 8. Ibid, 103.9. Ibid, 103.10. Ibid, 101.11. Gillian Tett, “Doomed to repeat it?” Financial Times, 27 August 2007, 1-2.12. Kindelberger, 1. 13. Rajan and Zingales, 243-246. 14. Ibid, 261-262. 15. Ibid, 262, 263. 16. Susan Strange, Mad Money, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 155.17. Francis Fukayama, The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: Free Press, 1992), 44.18. Robert Gilprin, “The Political Economy of International Relations”, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 74.


The Kyoto Protocol has been accused of possessing, as stated by climate scientist David Victor, a “giddy ambition” for countries to reduce GHG emissions.1 The most industrialized nations, all of which have ratified Kyoto except the USA, are legally obligated to reduce emissions collectively, on average, by 5% below

1990 levels.2 The lynchpin of this framework is the “cap and trade” system, in which states that succeed in lowering emissions beyond Kyoto’s goals are permitted to sell carbon permits to states that fail to meet the Protocol’s targets. It has been more than ten years since the treaty was signed and 2008 is the first year when countries need to begin reducing emissions to the levels outlined in Kyoto. As such, it is now time to analyze this international agreement in an effort to examine where this treaty excels and where it falters. The following evaluative

THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: WHAT WENT WRONG?

looKing At AlternAtive APProAches to future climAte chAnge Agreements

BRent Levenstadt


exercise is important, as it should enable the global community to construct more effective climate change accords.

Throughout the course of this analysis it will become clear that that the Kyoto Protocol has failed to meet its stated objectives; it accomplishes little and the crux of climate change mitigation agreements needs to be re-examined. This treaty is unsuccessful because countries are not meeting expectations. Countries are not complying for several reasons, including the US’s failure to ratify the treaty, the absence of China and India (two heavy emitters), and the fact that the treaty itself is littered with deficiencies. It neglects to discuss how countries will be monitored and how the market-based mechanism will work. It assigns emission caps unfairly, includes unnecessary parties to the treaty, and groups together several greenhouse gases (GHGs) which need to be approached independently. Following my analysis, I will address appropriate next steps for climate change international agreements.

Kyoto’s pItfall

The Protocol focuses on industrialized countries that have historically contributed the most to GHG emissions. One of the key problems is that the majority of these industrialized countries are not on pace to meet the Protocol’s objectives. Australia is projected to be emitting 109% of 1990 levels in 2008, while in 2005 Canada was 33% above 1990 levels. In 2006, Japan’s GHG emission levels rose 6% above 1990 levels.3 US emissions, although not bound by the treaty, are rising annually.4 The primary measuring stick of international treaties is obedience, and parties to Kyoto are not

compliant. Although there are penalties for failing to meet the outlined objectives, a state can defect from the treaty without any serious ramifications.

This is not the only loophole in the agreement. The emission quotas provided to Russia and several other Eastern European countries are too modest; even without the existence of mitigation policy it is unlikely that these countries will exceed their cap as a result of extreme economic stagnation following the collapse of the Soviet Union.5 As a result of this phenomenon, known as “hot-air” trading, it is estimated that Russia and other Eastern European countries will remain about 6.3 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide below their emission cap.6 Other major emitters will exceed their caps by at least that much, if not more so. Under the market scheme used in Kyoto, 6.3 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide can garner about $20 - $170 billion by selling the extra carbon permits to nations that overshoot their cap.7 Russia and Eastern European countries insisted on unattainable caps as a pre-requisite in order for them to ratify the protocol. This arrangement undermines the treaty’s goal, because an excess of credits are available to heavy polluters. This, in turn, encourages the heavy polluters to strive for merely modest emission cuts, because they will take comfort in the fact that a greater amount of carbon permits will be available to purchase at a reasonable rate on the open-market.

The generous headroom that was afforded to these countries was permitted so that their

Kyoto Protocol has failed to meet its stated objectives; it accomplishes little and the crux of climate change mitigation agree-

ments needs to be re-examined.


economies could attempt to fully recover from the end of the Cold War; however, this logic is inherently flawed, because “it is impossible to predict accurately a nation’s economic state and emission levels one decade into the future.”8 When negotiators begin to predict the future for one country, they set a gratuitous precedent; if Russia and Eastern European countries receive special economic treatment, other countries will either demand similar treatment or defect from the treaty.

The notion of setting undue precedents exists elsewhere in the treaty—developing countries, like China and India, were regrettably excused from Kyoto commitments. Historically, the thirty-eight advanced industrialized countries were responsible for most of the GHG emissions, and per-capita

emissions in China are only one-tenth those of the United States; however, it is predicted that by 2020 developing countries will account for half of world emissions.9 China and India are the world’s two fastest growing economies, and it is widely understood that curbing their GHG production would slow their economic progress. This notion is extraordinarily problematic. Excluding China and India from negotiations discourages other nations from participating. In fact, this is precisely the United State’s mantra: in 1997, the US Senate passed a resolution, 95-0, nullifying any climate change agreement that does not include “specific scheduled commitments” for developing countries.10

The US emits 25% of the world’s GHGs, and so its absence severely undermines the treaty.11 It should have been a priority of negotiators to meet US demands, because American obedience to the treaty is vital to its success. By failing to gain the requisite agreement from the world’s largest GHG producers – the US, China and India—the treaty essentially loses its significance.12

Another major reason why all large emitters must participate in this treaty is that abstaining countries will be afforded a comparative advantage in carbon-intensive industries. For instance, if policy in Canada requires industry to cut emissions drastically, a firm might escape the policy by simply relocating to a developing country, such as China.13 This movement of capital has

led economists to predict that “emissions in developing countries might increase by a quarter ton for every ton of cuts in carbon emissions from the industrialized

countries.”14 This kind of consequence is precisely the reason why international relations scholar Scott Barrett asserts that “an effective international agreement must not only tell countries what to do; it must create incentives for countries to do what the treaty says must be done.”15 Kyoto is effective at merely informing countries what to do, but does not provide incentives for countries to act in accordance with the accord. In fact, because of all its shortcomings, it induces countries to ignore their commitments to the treaty.

The problem resulting from the lack of incentives is intensified because of the lack of enforcement mechanisms. Without enforcement measures or incentives (a

By failing to gain the requisite agreement from the world’s largest GHG producers – the US, China and India—the treaty essentially loses its significance.


positive-enforcement tool), it is unlikely that states will abide by treaty regulations. Examining another international ordinance illustrates how enforcement mechanisms can be effective. If the Kyoto agreements serve as a case study for how treaties can fail without oversight, the steel trade case under the WTO shows the difference that these mechanisms can make. In 2002, the US imposed 30% steel tariffs on exports, such as Harley Davidson motorcycles. The European Union (EU) complained to the World Trade Organization (WTO) that these tariffs were illegal, and the WTO agreed, authorizing Europe to impose trade restrictions against the US for illegal steel tariffs. The Bush administration could have ignored the ruling and maintained the tariff, but in doing so, would have exposed the US to the possibility of the EU retaliating with trade sanctions. President Bush later removed the tariffs to avoid the repercussions for not complying with the WTO’s ruling, thereby illustrating how enforcement mechanisms can be effective.16 This dynamic exemplifies one kind of tool that can be used to ensure international commitments are met. The cap and trade system—the foundational basis of Kyoto Protocol—lacks both incentives and enforcement provisions.

The Kyoto Treaty also fails to address how the emission trading system will operate. Victor interestingly brings attention to the fact the countries “achieved agreement by setting emission targets that are politically impossible to implement without an emission trading system; yet they deferred discussion of all the details about how the system will operate.”17 At this time, the beginning of the commitment period, there

is still no outline of how this system will operate, and there are no rules that govern this system of trading. Kyoto fails to provide guidelines to the parties of the agreement as to how the system of trading—the core of the treaty—will operate. A treaty cannot be effective unless states have clearly defined rules to follow and fall back on.

At first glance, it might seem that the sheer number of signatories, 170 countries, would render Kyoto effective. This perspective is emblematic of the notion that climate change requires a universal response; however, this perception is misguided. Many of those signatories require little action, are permitted to increase emissions, or are afforded an unrealistically high cap on emissions, which leads to hot-air trading. Fewer than twenty countries are responsible for about 80% of the world’s emissions.18 GHG emission may be a global problem, but it does not require a worldwide solution.

In fact, obtaining 170 signatories likely hinders the negotiation process, as the lowest common denominator (LCD) phenomenon, an occurrence within large negotiation processes, will minimize the effectiveness of Kyoto. The LCD phenomenon assumes that the more parties to a negotiation, the greater the need to please each individual actor, all of whom possess individual stakes and agendas. This usually results in

a consensus that inadequately addresses the issue at hand; however, the only alternative is often no agreement at all.19 To that end, political scientist Aynsley Kellow,

The cap and trade system—the foundational basis of Kyoto Protocol—lacks both incen-

tives and enforcement provisions.


compares negotiation processes, specifically Kyoto, “to a convoy of ships, which can only move at the speed of the slowest boat.”20 This inter-play between diverging interests and large bargaining assemblies is epitomized in the Kyoto negotiations.

Another pitfall in the Protocol is combining all greenhouse gases into a single group. Victor asserts that the Protocol treats all the gases “as freely interchangeable commodities.”21 This is detrimental to the treaty’s effectiveness because all the gases have different effects and lifetimes, and require different measures to combat them. At one extreme of this group of gases are sulphur hexafluoride and perfluorocarbons, which are much stronger than carbon dioxide and linger in the atmosphere for thousands of years.22 The long-term hazardous effects of these gases require separate, more drastic measures. At the other end of the spectrum, methane is not as strong as carbon dioxide and only remains in the atmosphere for ten years, while carbon dioxide can stay in the atmosphere for several hundred years.23 Implementing methane controls is seen a ploy to take action against climate changes only in the short term, but for effective long term results the international community must treat GHGs independently. Kyoto mainly addresses carbon dioxide, ignoring stronger gases like PFCs, or equating methane to carbon dioxide. Evidently, its concentration on carbon dioxide undercuts the entire process, and could be harmful because of the focus on relatively innocuous chemicals which ignores the more seriously harmful varieties.

The final setback of the Protocol is the public uncertainty that still infects climate change discourse. States will avoid expending scarce resources, like time and money, if the reward will not be seen within that government’s term in office. Indeed, the

benefits of mitigating climate change today will not be noticed for many years. Although the scientific evidence is unequivocal, some legislators maintain scepticism whether action is necessary or sufficient at this time. Public uncertainty coupled with the deferred reward discourages governments from taking action.24 The Kyoto agreement is insufficient in counter-balancing government inertia. Politicians will not take action unless it is demanded by the electorate, as politicians aim to satisfy the majority in order to get re-elected.

vaRIaBle next-steps foR futuRe agReements

My first recommendation is to reach out to the public and inform them of the severity of climate change. This is currently being done, through worldwide concerts like Live Eight, but continual and enhanced efforts are necessary. If the public believes mitigation policies are needed, then politicians at all levels will participate in and comply with international agreements.

I propose a treaty that will be geared to the twenty largest emitters, as the majority of the 170 Kyoto signatories are not heavy emitters. The countries that are currently skewing the carbon trading system will be eliminated from the equation; however, countries that are projected in the long-term to be heavy emitters should be retained in a new treaty. This will prevent the LCD phenomenon from playing a part in the next round of negotiations.25 To focus on gaining widespread participation, emission caps need to be set justly, but not too aggressively; a fine balance must be reached.

When governments set rigid emission caps, as they did in Kyoto, they commit themselves to potentially undertaking “enormous economic costs” to meet the targets, and so rational governments


acting in their best interests will be more conservative when negotiating.26 Heavy emitters will refrain from seriously agreeing to and complying with emission limits that are drastically below “business-as-usual” targets, because that would hinder economic growth.27 As this is an unavoidable consequence of climate change agreements, it is one of the main arguments against international agreements, which implement a cap-and-trade tool for mitigation.

If this is indeed true, I would suggest we counteract the effects of lackadaisical emission caps with a coordinated carbon tax system; I propose a hybrid tax-and-trade system, whereby every country will have both a tax and cap on emissions. This two-tiered system will assist negotiators in achieving that balance. Firstly, quota systems will be used to encourage developing countries to participate, because their quotas will have significant headroom for growth, and more aggressive long-term quotas will only take effect when a specific per-capita income threshold is met.28 In the short-term, developing countries will be able to continue with business-as-usual, while in the long-term more aggressive caps and stronger taxes will be implemented. In addition, trading of carbon permits from developing to developed countries will offset the cost of the tax on the developing countries.29 Implementing a tax system is beneficial to developed countries, because it allows them to institute more modest caps on emissions, by diffusing the requirements on countries through two programs.

The cost of controlling emissions to countries is variable and spread over many

years; thus, carbon taxes are advantageous. Victor believes that taxes are “more efficient” and more “economically intelligent” than emission caps, because they substantially reduce the need for firms to make upfront capital investments, and instead encourage them to invest in sustainable technology.30 Carbon taxes, harmonized globally at a common rate, will breed the greatest success and reduce emissions faster than strict caps. The monies from the taxes will be revenue-neutral; they will be re-distributed back to parties of the agreement

to develop new sustainable technology, or be used to fund climate change research.

Even if international measures have broad participation from all developed and developing countries, employing state and local-level programs will expedite the process of GHG emission mitigation. Victor states that a “global federalism of climate policy” is needed for mitigation policies to be optimally effective.31 A prime example of the pervasive benefits of local programs is in California. The state legislature recently passed a law that requires all automakers selling cars in the state to cut carbon dioxide emissions by 29% by 2015. Given that 10% of all cars sold in the US are sold in California, it is likely to be more efficient for automakers to adapt their entire fleet to Californian efficiency standards.32 With that in mind, local governments should not rely on national-level governance to combat

If the public believes mitigation policies are needed, then politicians at all levels

will participate in and comply with inter-national agreements.


climate change. Although national-level governments did not play a part in this policy, the scope of the legislation is nation-wide.

An international oversight body should be created for monitoring and regulation purposes; this organization will regulate the treaty, encouraging government transparency. Additionally, it will prevent the cost of compliance from skyrocketing, because it will earmark a set quantity of emission permits at fixed prices, to act as a “safety-valve” to the international trading scheme.33 This will encourage participation, by ensuring that states cannot benefit from gauging prices of permits.

Nonetheless, I believe that the most-

effective way to achieve full compliance is through the promotion of friendly competition among states with a significant reward for the best results – as opposed to threats of unenforceable punishment. In doing so, in addition to funding for research and development, I propose that a portion of the revenue earned from carbon taxes be given back to the top five performing countries (i.e. the countries with the five greatest percent reductions below their cap) as a reward for success. I hope that this will induce countries to strive for greater results. Interestingly, this concept is not original. Robert Rotberg, a conflict resolution scholar at Harvard, created a governance index to rank the quality of African leaders. Through a private philanthropist organization, Africa—a region of the world beleaguered with corrupt leaders—is using

this index to reward good governance. The $5 million prize awarded to the best African leader should provoke a dialogue about the possibilities of using rewards to motivate changes in climate change policy.34

puttIng It all togetheR Climate change agreements can be

productive if structured properly. Kyoto was unsuccessful because of its weak architecture, and, as a result, parties to the agreement are not on track to meet Kyoto’s targets. Developing countries such as China and India, who are projected to be heavy emitters in the near future, were left out of the agreement. This provided the US, who

emits 25% of the world’s emission, with a reason to withdraw from the agreement. Hot-air trading greatly undermines the purpose of a climate change agreement. Although states are legally bound to the treaty, there are no enforcement mechanisms in place, or institutions to monitor government reporting of emissions. Finally, the Protocol does not acknowledge how the carbon market will operate, and places all GHGs in one basket, when they should be addressed separately.

The international community needs to learn from the mistakes of Kyoto and negotiators need to begin developing productive next steps. Because of the trade benefits inherent in a market system, it should be included in the next agreement with fewer light emitters. States like China and India should be included too, because of their long-term emission prospects. A hybrid

The outright eradication of climate change from public dialogue is a very serious danger, because public interest is the major measuring stick used by politicians to formu-late policies.


tax-and-trade system should be implemented to off-set the effects of conservative emission caps, and to act as revenue to be used to fund climate change research and an incentive to reward the top five performing states. This, in turn, will induce greater participation.

This paper sheds some light on the reasons behind Kyoto’s lacklustre performance, and presents the appropriate next steps; however, it is not inclusive, and there are many formulas that the international community can utilize to address climate change. Every blueprint should be analyzed for participation and compliance potential. An international agreement cannot eliminate public uncertainty; if public unnerve exists,

politicians acting in the hope of getting re-elected will be hesitant to implement genuine mitigation policies. Nevertheless, citizens need to continue to discuss the issue, and, in doing so, realize that Kyoto can be a building block to the development of an equitable agreement for all parties in the future. International agreements like Kyoto contain climate change discourse within the public arena; abolishing international agreements could potentially allow climate change, as a political issue, to fall by the wayside. The outright eradication of climate change from public dialogue is a very serious danger, because public interest is the major measuring stick used by politicians to formulate policies.

ENDNOTE

1. Scott Barrett, “How Not to Repeat the Mistakes of the Kyoto Protocol”; available from http:// yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=9970; Internet; accessed 23 February 2008.2. Frankel, “Greenhouse Gas Emissions.”3. Barrett, “How Not to Repeat the Mistakes of the Kyoto Protocol.”4. Ibid.5. Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol, 7.6. Steve Rayner, “Time to Ditch Kyoto,” Nature: International Weekly Journal of Science 449, no. 1038 (2007): 974.7. Kellow, International Environmental Policy, 3.8. Ibid.9. Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol, 23.10. Gwyn Prins and Steve Rayner, “The Wrong Trousers: Radically Rethinking Climate Policy”; available from http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/mackinderProgramme/pdf/mackinder_ Wrong%20Trousers.pdf; Internet; accessed 23 February 2008.


11. Ibid.12. John Browne, “Beyond Kyoto”; available from http://www.foreignaffairs. org/20040701faessay83404-p10/john-browne/beyond-kyoto.html; Internet; accessed 23 February 2008.13. Sugiyama, Governing Climate, 110.14. Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol, 65.15. Ibid.16. Scott Barrett and Robert Stavins, “Increasing Participation In International Climate Change Agreements,” Journal of Politics, Law and Economics 3, no. 4. (2003): 360.17. Ibid.18. Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol, 76.19. Ibid.20. Nigel Purvis, “US,” The Kyoto Protocol: Beyond 2012. Report on the United States, 5-8; available from http://www.pelangi.or.id/publikasi/2007/beyond_2012.pdf; Internet; accessed 22 February 2008. 21. Henry Jacoby and Danny Ellerman, “The Safety Valve and Climate Policy,” Journal of Energy Policy 4, no. 32 (2004): 481.22. Brookings Institution, “How To Rank Good Governance: The Mo Ibrahim Prize For Achievement In African Leadership”; available from http://www.brookings.edu/ events/2007/1025ibrahim.aspx; Internet; accessed 29 February 2008.


The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is not a Cold War artifact. The phenomenon of climate change has breathed new urgency into implementation of the treaty to ensure access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear energy may be a key resource to

combat the unrelenting increases in greenhouse gases by both developed and developing countries. The need for greater and cheaper energy is soaring as a number of large and dynamic economies such as China and India are expanding their power infrastructure.

In the context of a growing environmental climate crisis and a power-hungry population, Article IV of the NPT takes on new meaning with its description of an “inalienable right … to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without

MULTINATIONAL ENERGY VENTURES:Preventing nucleAr ProliferAtion And

combAting climAte chAnge

anastasia teLesetsky


discrimination...” 1 To supply greenhouse gas free energy, states have identified nuclear power as an important alternative energy source.

While nuclear power supplies a surprising 20% of electricity in the United States2, and 17% of the worldwide need,3 there is room for additional generation to meet current needs. As a case in point, China generates only 2% of its electricity needs through nuclear energy.

4 While there is understandable enthusiasm among institutions with a nuclear energy mandate such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to expand nuclear power as a clean energy source, caution in expanding nuclear capabilities is advisable. As scholar Timothy Garton Ash wryly observes in an editorial in The Guardian, the

devIl lIes In the detaIl: If you have the faCIlItIes to enrICh uranIum to the level needed for CIvIl nuClear power generatIon, It’s But a small step to produCIng weapons-grade uranIum. one small step for the nuClear sCIentIst, one gIant leap for the terrorIst and the tyrant.5

Recognizing the Faustian bargain inherent in nuclear energy, this paper works from the presumption that nuclear energy is an economically viable and environmentally clean energy source for stable states. However, before nuclear energy should be promoted as a sustainable clean energy source, nations must reach some consensus about how best to allow for the development of nuclear energy

without inadvertently creating new dangers that fissile material will fall into the hands of unstable state or non-state based actors.

This paper argues that the best approach for ensuring energy security and preventing further nuclear weapon proliferation is a dual multinational strategy that 1) reduces the numbers of nuclear energy fuel production sites and 2) provides the tools for non-nuclear

energy autonomy to NPT countries that pose immediate p r o l i f e r a t i o n risks. These two non-proliferation s t r a t e g i e s

are discussed in further detail in the following sections.

cuRRent multInatIonal nucleaR eneRgy ventuRes: the Roots

The idea of institutionalizing a multinational nuclear fuel cycle through a consortium is not new. After the horrific nuclear display in Japan, there was a worldwide recognition that nuclear power needed to be controlled or it would destroy us. In 1946, US presidential adviser Bernard Baruch circulated to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission an outline that supported the peaceful use of nuclear energy and proposed at the international level a “complete managerial control of the production of fissionable materials in dangerous quantities.”6 His plan was not adopted because of an impasse with the Soviet Union bloc, but Baruch had planted a seed. On 8 December 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed to the United Nations General Assembly an ‘Atoms for Peace’ proposal, which offered peaceful nuclear cooperation in exchange for safeguards over nationally operated nuclear facilities. 7

Climate Change has breathed new urgency into implementation of the treaty to ensure access to the peacefull uses of nuclear energy


Lawrence Scheinman, in his 1981 seminal essay on multinational organization and nuclear non-proliferation, proposed that states create multinational joint ventures to control the nuclear fuel cycle and ensure that nuclear energy materials would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.8 Scheinman recognized that new institutional arrangements were fundamental in providing the framework for ensuring a reliable energy supply that could not be easily diverted to build nuclear weapon capacities. He acknowledged that creating these new arrangements were not a quick fix because a multinational institution would involve questions of a “political, economic, and managerial nature” as well as require “states’ agreement forsaking exclusively national control over energy technology.”9

Bilateral agreements to cooperate on nuclear fuel technology are more common than the multinational arrangements contemplated by Scheinman. For example, A r g e n t i n a and Brazil are presently e n g a g i n g in bilateral enrichment talks where Argentina may supply 1%-enriched uranium to Brazil to be used as feedstock for a uranium enrichment plant in Brazil that could be used to fuel both Brazilian and Argentinean nuclear energy reactors.10 While bilateral agreements may be sufficient to address the need for clean nuclear energy, such agreements, unless drafted to allow international intervention or oversight, may be insufficient to prevent profit-oriented states who are not signatories to the NPT11 from selling or sharing fissile materials for weapon research or manufacturing.

The first multinational effort to create a joint fuel cycle began in Europe, where nuclear energy accounts for 35% of the energy production. Europe is home to several semi-multinational ventures that provide possible management models for a larger scale multinational fuel cycle. The restrictions placed by various multinational uranium enrichment and processing arrangements such as URENCO and EURODIF, on the transfer of technology to any parties outside the multinational venture have both prevented other groups from gaining competitive advantage while indirectly ensuring that nuclear materials are not traded outside the venture.

URENCO has provided a unique multinational ownership and control system that has furthered the goals of non-proliferation. The enrichment facilities in the three member countries—Great Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands—provide

services to a third party based on unanimous agreement by all parties. For example, when West Germany attempted to sell URENCO fuel from the enrichment facility located in Germany, the Dutch Government opposed the sale and required West Germany to renegotiate the agreement to ensure that any URENCO-supplied fuel would be properly managed and stored according to existing non-proliferation guidelines and policies.12 Research and development is divided among the three countries with the British responsible for plant design, the Dutch with

After the horrific nuclear display in Japan, there was a worldwide recognition that nuclear power

needed to be controlled or it would destroy us.


centrifuge production, and the Germans with centrifuge research and design. Even though it is a multinational system because of its different national members, URENCO lacks full integration between ownership and control at the multinational level since 90% of the enrichment facilities continue to be nationally owned by the member states. URENCO is simply an umbrella for British, German, and Dutch national interests. In terms of creating a multinational solution to both disarmament and the need for cleaner energy sources, URENCO is not an ideal global model because it remains grounded in a primarily nationalistic approach to nuclear energy, albeit there is key decision-making oversight from URENCO partners.

The EURODIF model presents a different approach. As originally conceived, ownership and control were more closely connected when France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and Iran agreed to a financial joint venture for an enrichment facility to be located within the nuclear weapon state of France. Unlike URENCO, the nuclear materials produced within the EURODIF system were intended to be used exclusively by the EURODIF members. When the system was originally implemented, no single shareholder had a majority interest.

Subsequently, a single French company became the majority shareholder that shifted the balance of power within the organization so that EURODIF became a primarily French controlled body. France is the only technology holder in the consortium and

presently completely manages the facilities. The other nations (with the exception of Iran) simply have drawing rights on the nuclear material enrichment services.

While URENCO and EURODIF represent important steps by multinational ventures to ensure safe supplies of nuclear materials for peacetime energy generation, these organizations, as they currently exist, cannot provide the answer for supplying global peacetime nuclear resources to developing states where adequate governance remains an issue. Major nuclear powers such as the United States refuse to accept the URENCO model because it allows for the exchange of sensitive technologies to nations that could then develop their indigenous fuel cycle capabilities for possible sales outside of the joint venture to countries that pose a proliferation threat.13

futuRe nucleaR fuel cycle InteRnatIonal consoRtIum: BRanchIng out fRom the Roots

Acknowledging the successful contributions of URENCO and EURODIF to creating conditions for nuclear cooperation Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) Mohamed El-Baradei,14 calls for an even

larger integration within multinational systems to provide adequate nuclear material for civilian energy production. While previous multinational ventures such as

EURODIFF and URENCO have provided some root structures for the sharing of nuclear materials among certain nations, the time may be ripe for the proponents of nuclear energy to branch into an even larger international consortium that would

The time may be ripe for the proponents of nuclear energy to branch into an even larger international consortium


include the largest owners of fungible fissile material: Russia and the United States.

The idea of going global is not new. In the mid 1970s, the IAEA proposed Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers. In the late 1970s, the IAEA coordinated an International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. Between 1980 and 1987, the IAEA’s Committee on Assurances of Supply explored methods to guarantee supplies of nuclear fuel for countries without fuel cycles. Most recently in 1987, the United Nations held a Conference for the Promotion of International Cooperation on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy which considered various multilateral initiatives.15

Some global efforts are already underway including the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) and the recent non-profit Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). The twenty-five member GNEP partnership includes China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and has dedicated one of its international working groups to advising on how best to deliver reliable nuclear fuel supply.16 The GNEP initiative is a US-led initiative and its future is uncertain with President Barack Obama’s expected de-emphasis on nuclear power as a viable energy source.17 Co-chaired by Ted Turner and U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, the NTI is focused on reducing nuclear threats. One of its recent projects is promoting an International Nuclear Fuel Bank. NTI pledged $50 million to the IAEA to create a fuel bank to be made available to countries which are not pursuing indigenous nuclear fuel cycles. 18

Both GNEP and NTI are initiatives designed intentionally to manage the nuclear fuel cycle. The number of nuclear fuel

fabrication and fuel making plants has grown over the last decade from just a few plants to sixty-five plants.19 One of the driving forces behind the promotion of multinational and international fuel cycle centers is to shrink the number of processing and enrichment plants in order to have greater international oversight, and to ensure that those non-nuclear

countries that have signed the NPT have the necessary access to nuclear materials for energy production.20 Scholars believe that if fuel supplies, waste management, and storage can be guaranteed through a multilateral agreement that potential proliferators would lose the incentive to develop national supply, waste management, and storage capabilities.21

Countries that do not have an assured supply of nuclear fuel are particularly enthusiastic about the possibilities of a multilateral institute being able to guarantee supplies. International Atomic Energy Association Expert Groups convened by Mohammed El-Baradei have proposed a number of international approaches to meet long-term energy needs while dealing systematically with uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, spent fuel repositories, and spent fuel storage. The initial motivation for these multilateral proposals was the impression that many non-nuclear states were taking on increasing obligations without receiving any tangible benefits. One tangible benefit that might become available in an international system would be an assured supply of fuel.

The IAEA made five proposals.22 The first proposal relied on existing strengthening

Nations are not interested in ceding their individual interest to a single central body.


commercial market mechanisms through fuel leasing and fuel buy-back programs. It was unclear whether this would have truly multinational or international applications. Under the second proposal, the commercial consortium, the IAEA would administer a nuclear “fuel bank” supplied by commercial suppliers working under intergovernmental contracts and serve as a guarantor for fuel supplies.23 Under the third and fourth

proposals, existing or proposed nuclear facilities would be converted to multilateral nuclear facilities with participation from nuclear weapon states, non-nuclear weapon states and states who had not signed the NPT.24 Under its most ambitious proposal, the IAEA would manage or operate a number of regionally or internationally owned enrichment and reprocessing centers that would closely control the fuel cycle.25

Findings in a 2005 research paper on multinational nuclear fuel initiatives suggest little enthusiasm for a venture owned by the IAEA.26 Nations are not interested in ceding their individual interest to a single central body. For example, Canada, as the world’s largest uranium producer, wants to retain the option to develop enrichment or reprocessing facilities in the future even though it currently does not have any such facilities.27 As the world’s second largest uranium producer and exporter, Australia is also unwilling to release its control over Australian-enriched and Australian-spent fuels.28 Brazil has also indicated that, as the nation with the sixth largest uranium reserves in the world, it is interested in developing its uranium reserves for its own domestic nuclear electricity

needs and not for global energy needs. 29

Some officials from nuclear nations support the creation of a broader commercial consortium building on the existing models of EURODIF and URENCO where IAEA would occupy a supra-managerial role;30 however, countries are reluctant to give IAEA any substantial managerial roles in a commercial consortium. The United States has indicated that it would not

turn over ownership of any American-supplied uranium to an IAEA managed consortium without

reserving a right to veto what facilities are entitled to receive the uranium.

The commercial consortium approach, which restricts the number of commercial actors permitted to provide services, is most attractive to those states where many of the nuclear services are already provided by commercially-based entities. Some of the challenges for such a consortium to function effectively and efficiently include attracting a diversity of suppliers, creating a single licensing approach for the transfer of goods and services, and finding enough fissile material that is free of specific “flag” conditions imposed on its distribution (e.g. no reprocessing and no enrichment).31

In spite of its appeal to certain sets of nations, the commercial consortium model will not be able to uniformly address all entities seeking nuclear materials. Ongoing threats of nuclear proliferation make it clear that any commercial impulse on the part of the private nuclear service providers must be tempered with state security policies to ensure that non-nuclear weapon states who pose a security threat (e.g. Iran, Libya) receive sufficient benefits from the commercial consortium to outweigh the advantages of seeking nuclear

There is no fundamental right to specific nuclear materials or technology.


independence outside of the NPT fold. Ensuring an ongoing benefit may mean

fixing prices for nuclear services at rates that remain accessible to non-nuclear weapon countries which have recently developed or are still developing their nuclear energy sector. Periodic negotiations among commercial suppliers, nuclear weapon nations, and non-nuclear weapon nations are essential for fixing maximum prices in the nuclear energy markets for different groups of countries pursuing peaceful nuclear energy programs. Arguably if negotiated price ceilings are too low for commercial nuclear service providers to make a profit, nuclear service providers will cease to provide their services to those markets. In these cases, nuclear weapon nations may need to subsidize some portion of the commercial costs of nuclear services designated for non-nuclear weapon states, particularly in the developing world.

While the commercial consortium approach seems reasonable especially for non-nuclear weapon nations that have been safely and responsibly producing nuclear energy over the last several decades, this approach seems riskier for certain parts of the world that are the subject of ongoing nuclear security debates.

How should a commercial consortium treat requests from non-nuclear-weapon countries whose past actions and statements suggest future proliferation risks? Are they entitled to the same access to nuclear material or equipment under the NPT as countries that have established a track record of complying with nuclear safeguards? The final section of this paper suggests that Article IV and V of the NPT should be interpreted to

emphasize the sharing of the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology rather than any obligation for the exchange of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology.

Re-InteRpRetIng npt aRtIcle Iv and v In the context of nucleaR pRolIfeRatIon thReats

Many of the Middle Eastern states have signed and ratified the NPT. Even though Article IV of the NPT calls for the fullest possible exchange of peaceful nuclear technology to further “peaceful uses of nuclear energy”, there is understandable reluctance in sharing technology or materials with nations such as Iran and Libya who have previously sought to acquire weapon material under the claim of building a nuclear program for energy generation.

Interpretations of rights under the NPT have evolved since its adoption as a treaty. While some countries continue to claim that the NPT stands for a one-way provision of technology and equipment from nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states who agreed to the IAEA safeguards, officials in major nuclear weapon states such as the US read Article IV as creating no duty or obligation to supply

enrichment or reprocessing technologies to any country.32 Other nations interpret the same language as an implicit recognition of “the specific or per se right of signatories to any nuclear technological activities that can be conceivably labeled ‘peaceful,’ short of actually inserting fissile material into a nuclear

A better approach is to provide countries like Iran with Article V nuclear benefits in exchange for continued nuclear non-

proliferation commitments.


explosive device.”33 These latter nations are misinterpreting the treaty language.

The preamble of the NPT contemplates nuclear and non-nuclear parties sharing in the benefits of nuclear technology and atomic energy derived from the development of nuclear explosive devices.34 While not creating any binding obligations, the preamble provides the context for the treaty. Importantly, no mention is made in the preamble of any necessity or expectation that specific technology and materials be shared.

In Article IV, the treaty contemplates that states with access to nuclear technology

shall also Cooperate In ContrIButIng alone or together wIth other states or InternatIonal organIzatIons to the further development of the applICatIons of nuClear energy for peaCeful purposes, espeCIally In the terrItorIes of non-nuClear weapon states party to the treaty, wIth due ConsIderatIon for the needs of the developIng areas of the world.35

In Article V the authors of the treaty elaborate on the need for sharing peaceful applications of nuclear technology by inserting a more detailed equity principle requiring

[e]aCh party to thIs treaty…to ensure that…potentIal BenefIts from any peaCeful applICatIons of nuClear explosIons wIll Be made avaIlaBle to non-nuClear –weapon states party to thIs treaty on a non-dIsCrImInatory BasIs and that the Charge to suCh partIes for the explosIve devICes used wIll Be as low as possIBle and exClude any Charge for researCh and development.36

When Article IV is read in conjunction with Article V, there is no fundamental right to specific nuclear materials or technology. Parties simply hold general rights to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. Significantly, the right described in Article IV Section I to “develop ….production….of nuclear energy” is never explicitly tied to the territory of each and every NPT party. There appears to be no guarantee in the text that nuclear states must supply materials to non-nuclear states in the non-nuclear states’ territory so that non-nuclear states can develop indigenous production. It could be argued that this right is included by implication; however, if that were the case, then the language in Article IV Section 2 that explicitly refers to the “territories of non-nuclear-weapon States” is surplusage. What is guaranteed in Article IV Section 2 is that nuclear states who are in the position to do so shall contribute “to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States.”37 Based on the text of the treaty, non-nuclear states are entitled to the “further development of the applications of nuclear energy” within their own territory but not necessarily to the production of nuclear energy in their territories.

While there remains some uncertainty as to which parties are in a position to contribute to the “application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” this portion of the text contains a specific mandatory (rather than aspirational) obligation for nuclear weapon states. In contrast, Article IV Section 1 only broadly provides for NPT parties to “undertake to facilitate.” Meeting a responsibility to “facilitate” is a lower threshold


of action than contributing to the application of nuclear energy in non-nuclear states.

Under Article IV, nuclear states obligations are limited to undertaking to facilitate “the fullest possible” exchange of materials. The key word here is “possible.” The use of this subjective word in the treaty does not create any defined affirmative duty to trade fissile material with Iran but rather leaves each party to define for itself what “possible” means . From the perspective of a nuclear state, the “fullest possible” exchange with a country such as Iran is justifiably limited by current governance and proliferation concerns. While Iran may argue that its interpretation of “fullest possible” should be given equal weight, political reality suggests that what is “possible” will be defined by the transferor states rather than the recipient states.

Given the above interpretations of Article IV and V, how can nuclear state signatories such as Russia, US, France, United Kingdom, and China meet their Article IV and V obligations to ensure that non-nuclear State signatories such as Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq receive the “application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” and the “potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions” without inadvertently also causing the future proliferation of nuclear materials?

One possibility discussed in the above section is to directly supply nuclear materials to non-nuclear weapon States’ energy facilities through a multinational consortium that would rigorously apply IAEA safeguards. Such a multinational consortium could be a regional based organized such as EURODIF, an

international fuel center owned by IAEA, or a commercial consortium managed by IAEA. Under any of these models, third-party oversight and accounting of the transfers of nuclear material would provide some protection against proliferation.

However, even with the additional oversight of a multinational consortium, directly supplying nuclear materials to countries, such as Iran, who have indicated intent to pursue their own nuclear weapon goals has inherent risks. Once nuclear material is within the territorial boundaries of a party where there are issues of state credibility, the potential for unintended proliferation arises. As one author suggests,

If a non-nuClear-weapon state has aCquIred fuel-makIng CapaBIlItIes suffICIent to aCCumulate stoCks of fIssIle materIal (prInCIpally In the form of hIghly enrIChed uranIum or separated plutonIum), then that state has Cleared the most dIffICult oBstaCle on the path to Its fIrst nuClear explosIve.38

Under the NPT, there is no obligation for countries to participate in any existing or proposed multinational consortium unless a consortium can be considered a necessary safeguard under Article III. Arrangements for a consortium would probably be concluded by independent agreements between the IAEA and its members or among states within a

The offer of alternative energy in exchange for promises to cease indigenous nuclear

activities would challenge the argument by some would-be proliferators that they

are entitled to nuclear materials for energy autonomy.


particular region. To become a safeguard, IAEA would need to negotiate protocols for existing comprehensive safeguard agreements, voluntary offer agreements, or item specific safeguards agreements.

Consortium agreements would be negotiated separately from the NPT. Unless previously agreed by all members, a multinational consortium would have no obligation to sell to non-consortium members even if they are parties to the NPT. Most likely a multinational fuel consortium will take on the character of the GNEP, a self-selected subset of NPT countries operating independently of the NPT.

Not being able to participate in a multilateral fuel cycle could escalate problems in a country such as Iran, but allowing Iran to participate has its own unintended risks. For instance, Iran could tentatively cooperate and then defect from the consortium arrangement and withdraw from the NPT. If a state withdraws from the NPT, any comprehensive safeguards agreement would automatically terminate and all nuclear materials within the defecting country would be fair game for a nuclear weapons program.

A better approach is to provide countries like Iran with Article V nuclear benefits in exchange for continued nuclear non-proliferation commitments. In this second approach to supply the “further development of the applications of nuclear energy” and the “benefit of peaceful application of nuclear explosions,” nuclear weapon state signatories would provide selected high-risk non-nuclear weapon state signatories with access to nuclear energy generated power transmitted across a grid at prices that are, as mandated by NPT Article V, “as low as possible.” The provision of nuclear energy without the sharing of nuclear materials would produce a win-win situation for the global goals of

clean energy and non-proliferation. The non-nuclear weapon state parties would have at-cost or near-cost nuclear-supplied energy while the nuclear weapon state parties would be assured of the non-proliferation of nuclear materials in states such as Iran. Nuclear weapon states would maintain their effective control on the nuclear materials which El-Baradei, the IAEA Director General, refers to as the “choke point” for preventing nuclear weapon development.39 In return for the low cost energy, recipient countries would agree by a particular negotiated deadline to restrict or forgo current and future indigenous nuclear energy production. For countries to enter the agreement, the price of the imported nuclear energy production would need to be equal or less than indigenously produced nuclear energy.

A number of countries presently share cross-border power transmissions such as France and Germany, Canada and the US, and Vietnam and China. To extend power transmissions from nuclear energy producing states to the Middle East should be technically feasible but would require a multinational approach to ensure adequate transmission from supplier states.

Where it would be cost-prohibitive to provide nuclear energy through the grid because of geographical obstacles or technical problems such as an insufficient grid (e.g. North Korea), the nuclear weapon nations in cooperation with other allied non-nuclear weapon nations (e.g. Japan, Germany) could agree to supply a reasonable amount of energy to a high-risk non-nuclear weapon state through the construction of alternative energy sources. Unlike nuclear energy generators, the alternative energy plants such as a wind farm or solar array would be built entirely within the territory of the non-nuclear state.

Providing alternative energy materials


would contribute to a country’s energy autonomy. The offer of alternative energy in exchange for promises to cease indigenous nuclear activities would challenge the argument by some would-be proliferators that they are entitled to nuclear materials for energy autonomy.

Since a supply of clean energy that could also be a deterrent for proliferation is likely to be expensive, the multinational provision of nuclear energy or alternative energy under Article IV and V would be reserved for those nations, such as Iran, where nuclear proliferation presents a substantial

security risk. The costs for providing energy could be supplied through a combination of development aid, national donations, or possibly tariffs on nuclear energy services participating in a multilateral consortium. Formal agreements would provide both energy-recipient and energy-supplier nations with a dispute resolution mechanism, such as arbitration, if the agreed upon amounts of energy were not delivered or the cessation of indigenous nuclear activities did not occur before a given deadline.

While the financial costs to supply a certain reasonable amount of energy through either nuclear energy transmissions or alternative energy projects may be substantial, this approach of providing energy or alternative energy materials rather than the materials and technologies for nuclear energy is preferable from a proliferation risk perspective. Take the example of North Korea. In the early 1990s, the US, Japan, and South Korea

provided North Korea with the materials and labor to build civilian nuclear reactors in exchange for North Korea suspending its construction of three military nuclear reactors. The civilian nuclear reactors were unable to go fully online because of North Korea’s inadequate grid. In spite of having received nuclear equipment and materials, North Korea ultimately withdrew from the NPT and continues to pose a proliferation problem.40 Subsidizing direct energy costs either by supplying the energy or supplying the alternative energy infrastructure is infinitely preferable to sharing any nuclear

technology where a recipient country lacks stability or is likely to become unstable.

From a legal perspective, the proposal of providing energy in exchange for additional non-proliferation guarantees is logical. Where adequate alternative non-nuclear energy sources are supplied to compensate for lost opportunities to indigenously generate nuclear energy, the issue of energy autonomy becomes a moot point. With the exception of a few medical and scientific purposes, a nation’s only purpose for demanding a supply of nuclear materials when it has access to alternative energy sources would be for weapon development purposes.

An energy offer under the NPT posits a litmus test. If a state accepts the offer and enters negotiation to receive alternative energy sources, the acceptance reveals a genuine intent to achieve energy autonomy independent of the source of the energy. Where a state rejects the offer, the

With an ever-pressing need for clean energy, we will need large-scale multilateral cooperation and renewed commitments from states that our future exists in atoms

harnessed for peace and in low-cost alternative energy.


presumption would be that a state is not seeking nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes such as energy autonomy but instead has an alternative motive of weapon design.

conclusIon

If nuclear weapon states guarantee to provide certain reasonable amounts of direct energy or alternative energy infrastructure through a multinational effort and non-nuclear weapon states agree to accept the energy as satisfying their right to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”, then new seeds of peace can be sown. At the time that the NPT was in negotiation, Ali Mazrui observed that

[t]he proBlem of peaCe has InCreasIngly BeCome one of tryIng to keep a mInImum a memBershIp of the nuClear CluB. on the other hand, the proBlem of human dIgnIty Is InCreasIngly BeComIng one of maxImIzIng partICIpatIon In the nuClear age.41

Forty years later, the same problem persists. Internationalization of the fuel cycle with negotiated caps on service rates and materials plus the provision of energy to non-nuclear states may help to achieve the tricky balance

between non-proliferation and promoting full participation in this growing nuclear age.

While there are justifiable concerns about how best to proceed in a peaceful atomic age facing climate change, the goals of non-proliferation and increasing nuclear energy capacity provide two reasons for optimism in our world where human violence and apathy are contributing to environmental degradation. In particular the historic negotiations of the NPT provide a source of hope. In the 1960s when mutual assured destruction from nuclear weapons loomed large in the imaginations of citizens, states focused on the long-term interest of the global community. States locked in the Cold War agreed to resolve some of their ideological differences and slow the stockpiling madness in order to create a different future. Now, with anthropogenically caused climate change exacting its price through an increase in droughts, floods, and severe storms, states must seek solutions for this generation and future generations. Part of this solution is likely to be the extension of nuclear energy power to meet increasing energy needs. With an ever-pressing need for clean energy, we will need large-scale multilateral cooperation and renewed commitments from states that our future exists in atoms harnessed for peace and in low-cost alternative energy.

ENDNOTE

1. Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty UNTS, Vol 729, pp. 169-175, Yearbook of the United Nations 1968 (adopted 12 June 1968, in force on 5 March 1970). The Text of the NPT is available at http://www.state.gov/t/np/trty/16281.htm#treaty.2. Timothy Walsh, Turning Our Backs: Kyoto’s Mistaken Nuclear Exclusion, 16 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 147, 155-156 (2003).


3. Denis E. Beller, Atomic Time Machines: Back to the Nuclear Future, 24 J. Land Resources & Envtl. L. 41, 42 (2004).4. Ibid. 5. Timothy Garton Ash, Comment & Debate: Achieving a world free of atomic weapons will require full international control of the nuclear fuel cycle, Guardian, page 31, (November 13, 2008). 6. Baruch Plan, June 14, 1946 available at http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear- weapons/issues/arms-control-disarmament/baruch-plan_1946-06-14.htm7. Congressional Research Service, Nuclear Proliferation Factbook, S.Prt. 103-111, December 1994, pp. 13-21.8. Lawrence Scheinman, Multinational Alternatives and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 35 Int’l Org. 77, 80 (1981) reprinted in Lawrence Scheinman, The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: A Challenge for Non proliferation, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 76, March/April 2004, available at http:// www.acronym.org.uk/textonly/dd/dd76/76ls.htm9. Ibid. 10. Mike Hibbs, Argentina, Brazil negotiating future enrichment joint venture11. Nuclear Fuels, October 6, 2008, Pg. 6.12. The only states that are not signatories to the NPT are Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea. 13. See Scheinman, supra note 7. 14. Stephen A. LaMontagne, Multinational Approaches To Limiting The Spread Of Sensitive Nuclear Fuel Cycle Capabilities, April 5, 2005 available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/ publication/2121/multinational_approaches_to_limiting_the_spread_of_sensitive_nuclear_fuel_ cycle_capabilities.html?breadcrumb=%2F 15. Mohamed El-Baradei, Towards a Safer World, The Economist, 16 October 2003, available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebTE20031016.html16. Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report submitted to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, INFIRC/ 640, February 22, 2005 available at www.iaea.or.at/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc640.pdf at pp. 30-3117. http://www.gneppartnership.org/18. Miles Pomper, Obama Likely to Scale Back GNEP, But Bush Administration Recommends Ambitious Plan, GNEP Watch, No. 11, November/December 2008 at http://www.igloo.org/ cigi/downloadnocache/Research/nuclear/publicat/gnep_watch~319. NTI in Action: Creating an International Nuclear Fuel Bank http://www.nti.org/b_aboutnti/ b7_fuel_bank.html20. Henry Sokolski, Assessing the IAEA’s Ability to Verify The NPT, in (Henry Sokolski, ed.) Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom, February 2008, available at www. npec-web.org/Essays/20080327-FallingBehind.pdf21. “Expert Group Report to the Director General of the IAEA: Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” supra note 15 at 30-31. 22. Marius Stein, Gotthard Stein, Bernd Richter, and Caroline Jorant, Multi- or Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Revisiting the Issue, Journal of Nuclear Material Management, Summer 2004, Volume XXXII, No. 4, p. 54. 23. Rauf, supra note 4 at page 17.24. Id. at 18.25. Id. at 19-20..26. Id. at 21. 27. LaMontagne, supra note 14 at 23-25. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Harald Müller, Multilateral Nuclear Fuel-Cycle, (2005) available at www.wmdcommission.org/ files/No35.pdf at pp. 4-5.


33. Assessing ‘‘Rights’’ Under The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Hearing 34. Before the Subcommittee On International Terrorism And Nonproliferation 35. Of the Committee On International Relations, House Of Representatives 36. One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, March 2, 2006, Serial No. 109–148 37. p. 28. (Referencing Department of State Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Verification and Compliance Christopher Ford.) 38. Robert Zarate, The NPT, IAEA Safeguards And Peaceful Nuclear Energy: An “Inalienable Right,” But Precisely To What? In (Henry Sokolski ed.) Falling Behind International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom (2008), p. 223.39. See NPT supra note 1. 40. Id. (Emphasis added.)41. Id. (Emphasis added.)42. Id. (Emphasis added.)43. Zarate, supra note 22 at 222. 44. Mohammed El-Baradei, “Statement to the 2005 NPT Review Conference”, May 2005. Avaible at http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0505/doc10.htm.45. Henry Sokolski, Towards an NPT constrained world that makes economic sense International Affairs, 83: 3 (2007) 531–54846. Ali Mazrui, Numerical Strength and Nuclear Status in the Politics of the Third World” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 29, No. 4, Nov 1967, pp. 809-810.


In Afghanistan, there exists a proverb: Without investigating the water, do not take off your shoes to walk through it. This proverb should read as a warning to the development community that it is crucial to understand the local context. Unfortunately, the local context continues to be ignored. Since the 1970s, academics have been developing

an analytical framework, in the hopes that it would help the development community gain a local understanding of the “waters.” This framework, a livelihoods analysis, was designed to discover and understand the strategies that vulnerable people in conflict economies use to cope with a conflict economy (the economic activities that facilitate political violence between warring parties). This is accomplished by looking at “where people are, what they have, and what their needs and interests are” rather than focusing solely on income and employment.1

THINK LOCALLY, ACT GLOBALLY:

livelihoods AnAlysis, oPium PoPPy cultivAtion, And the conflict economy

in AfghAnistAn

anthony hamiLton


By the time the “War on Terror” commenced in Afghanistan, livelihoods analysis had been adopted by development organizations under the name of alternative livelihoods. In their hands, it should have revealed new entry points from which to

disaggregate the Afghan conflict economy. Unfortunately, the development community has yet to reflect the insight of livelihoods analysis or the antagonistic stance it takes towards its traditional practices and global outlook. Global doctrines and attitudes still undermine local practices.

The label of livelihoods has been appropriated, but its values have been ignored. Consequently, the term is used to raise funds to support the traditional counter-narcotic policy of alternative development, which is the replacement of an “illicit” crop with a “licit” alternative in order to reduce drug supply.2 The potential of livelihoods analysis to transmit a local understanding of conflict economies to the development community is being suppressed by a synthesis that prioritizes globalization over localization. A sincere adoption of this approach would create a synthesis of development practices that would improve the circumstances of vulnerable people in conflict economies, and improve the likelihood of a transition to a peace economy.

This paper attributes the failure of alternative development in Afghanistan to the development community’s failure

to incorporate local understandings into practices. This paper draws upon a livelihoods approach to analyze how the development community understands and combats opium poppy cultivation. This is done in the hope that the true nature of this opium poppy

will be reflected within development practices and the livelihoods of conflict dependents will be safeguarded. This new synthesis will engage with local experience by accepting the role of the

opium poppy in Afghanistan and adopt the institutions that are dependent on that crop to create an economic intervention that is positive and meaningful for local actors as a first step towards a disaggregated conflict economy, general rural development, and eventually a strengthened Afghan government.

lIvelIhoods analysIs

Proponents of livelihoods analysis accuse traditional development practices of focusing exclusively on global structures.3 Livelihoods analysis refuses to cast people as victims of global forces and instead recognizes the central role that natural resources play in the agency of local actors.4 Alternative development addresses the relationship between people and natural resources as well, but focuses exclusively on conflict entrepreneurs: the actors who financially profit from conflict. In this manner, this policy assumes a single, material, and illicit relationship between people and resources. By adhering to it, the development community is ignoring the primary incentive for most people who enter a conflict economy: survival, not profits.5

Embracing the Afghan proverb that if a forest catches fire, both the wet and dry

The potential of livelihoods analysis to transmit a local understanding of conflict economies to the development community is being suppressed by a synthesis that prioritizes globalization over localization.


will burn up, livelihoods analysis explores the multiple relationships that exist between actors and natural resources. Livelihoods analysis pays particular attention to conflict dependents: the actors who use low-risk activities to cope with conflict and secure their livelihoods. Consequently, livelihoods analysis is better situated than alternative development to explore the multidimensional and informal nature of natural resources in conflict economies. 6 For example, in Afghanistan the ability to work (a human asset) in an opium field (a natural asset) can result in access to local credit (a financial asset) or one’s own plot of land (a physical asset). 7 Livelihoods analysis recognizes that natural resources are more than a source of income or employment for conflict dependents. It

acknowledges that they are capital goods, used in the production and attainment of other goods. In the Afghan context, opium poppy cultivation is a way of developing and diversifying one’s asset base in order to reduce vulnerability in the conflict economy.

By prioritizing lived experience, a livelihoods approach focuses on vulnerability to conflict, which it understands to be inversely related to the strength of entitlements to natural resources. 8 Natural resources form the foundation of many livelihoods strategies because they allow conflict dependents to “reproduce, challenge, or change the rules” that govern their lives. 9 It is important to be cognizant of conflict dependents when trying to disaggregate a conflict economy because they are the most vulnerable to external shocks to the local economy, like international

intervention. Their vulnerability stems from their dependence on natural resources. Consequently, if they lose their entitlements they are losing more than a source of income or employment, they are losing their ability to survive in a conflict economy.

Admittedly, the livelihoods approach does have some weaknesses. The most important being what one scholar calls the Faustian Bargain: the role that people play in creating their own subordination and vulnerability to others. 10 Because livelihoods analysis reflects the priorities of conflict dependents, namely how to secure entitlements and ensure one’s survival, it can sometimes lose the international context. However, this need not be the case for Afghanistan if the development community were to be mindful of situating

local needs into the general development of a stronger central government.

According to the development community, opium poppy cultivation has no role in the future development of Afghanistan because it is an illicit drug. A livelihoods analysis suggests that opium poppy has a central role in the future of Afghanistan as a licit crop and a source of credit. There exists a crucial dialectic, one that needs to be embraced but is being ignored because the development community fails to recognize that a different understanding of opium poppy cultivation founded on local knowledge and experience can co-exist alongside their own global interpretation.

Despite the different conclusions that are drawn from a livelihoods analysis and global doctrine on drugs, livelihoods

If they lose their entitlements they are losing more than a source of income or employment, they are losing their ability

to survive in a conflict economy.


analysis has failed to have a critical impact on practices. Organizations like the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, reflecting the tendency to think only globally, use the label of livelihoods to justify the destruction of opium poppy fields without using a livelihoods framework to understand what will be destroyed in the process.

thInKIng gloBally: the case of afghanIstan

Operating under the assumption that subsistence agriculture is the foundation of livelihoods, the development community aimed to reduce the amount of arable land dedicated to opium poppy cultivation. 11 While initially successful, Afghanistan’s Nanghar province soon experienced an economic downturn, which demonstrates the importance of that crop.12 This downturn extended beyond opium cultivation into construction, trade, and retail, resulting in the loss of farm, non-farm, and credit opportunities.

The effort to eradicate the opium poppy “target[ed] the low-hanging fruit and adversely impact[ed] ordinary people” who were drawn into the conflict economy not for profits, but for security.13 Conflict dependents were particularly affected by the downturn because alternative crops are less labor-intensive then opium poppy and without jobs

they lost their entitlements. 14 Consequently, the number of conflict dependents entitled to credit and farmland declined.15 Without

the entitlements associated with opium poppy cultivation, the coping strategies of Afghans unraveled and the economy as a whole suffered. It is clear that this is not just an issue of employment, as a traditional economic analysis would suggest.

Alternative development alone does not provide a sustainable solution for conflict dependents because it does not address the local realities that drive opium poppy cultivation. This includes the fact that opium poppy, unlike alternative crops, does not require significant investments in fertilizers or irrigation. Additionally, alternative crops spoil more easily and are thus a riskier crop to grow. Furthermore, it is a reality that in Afghanistan, credit, which is used to buy clothes, food and seed, is almost exclusively tied to one’s willingness to grow opium poppy.

16 This illustrates that the socio-economic conditions that drive opium poppy cultivation are more complex then global doctrine acknowledges and alternative development can address. As a result, attempts at alternative development are doomed to either fail or cause economic downtowns, as occurred in the Nanghar province.

Thinking globally affects which the process of problems identification in a region. For instance, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs describes Afghanistan as lacking social

credit and institutions;

17 however, a local analysis shows that the system of entitlements associated with opium poppy require both. As traditional analysis favors formal

practices and institutions, the development community is starting from scratch and missing an opportunity to strengthen and

The socio-economic conditions that drive opium poppy cultivation are more complex then global doctrine acknowledges and alternative development can address.


potentially adopt existing relations and systems into the development of Afghanistan.

Thinking globally not only affects problem identification, but more importantly, as far as Afghans are concerned, this mindset affects the realities of problem solving. One of the issues identified is the problem of poverty, which, in a global mindset, is attributed to low-income. According to the global doctrine, alternative development alleviates poverty by raising incomes through the introduction of economic alternatives. In contrast, however,

local experience associates poverty with weak entitlements to natural resources;

18 thus, the development community’s objective should be to strengthen access to credit and land. The global understanding is materialist; it is suitable for solving problems of material consumption like hunger. The local understanding is, in a sense, pre-material because Afghan conflict dependents recognize that they have needs that are more fundamental than material consumption, such as livelihoods security. By creating solutions that reflect global interpretations, the development community is projecting its own materialism onto the Afghan people. Ironically, the global doctrine on poverty alleviation actually creates poverty at the local level by weakening entitlements to resource endowments.

For the Afghan people, a qualitative difference exists between opium poppy crops and alternative crops. In contrast, the development community’s use of alternative development acknowledges only quantitative differences. The qualitative difference that

exists between opium poppy and alternative crops cannot be addressed by a policy that recognizes only quantitative differences. By adhering to a materialist analysis of opium poppy cultivation, the development community is failing to recognize the crops’ significance in the lives of local actors.

Thinking globally has allowed assumptions of Afghanistan to replace local experience and inform the objectives of the development community. One such assumption is that the country was once

agriculturally self-sufficient, despite the fact that both historical and oral evidence suggest otherwise.19 Subsequently, a central objective of alternative development is to make Afghanistan agriculturally self-sufficient. This quixotic goal does not reflect the knowledge or experience of local actors and privileges certain types of knowledge over others. In this case, the knowledge of project experts is held in higher esteem then the knowledge of local actors.

Thinking globally allows external agendas to drive development through planning frameworks that discourage adaptation with short-term, easily quantifiable goals. 20 One such example of this is the above-mentioned plan to reduce the amount of arable land dedicated to opium poppy crops. Instead of receiving aid that is meaningful, conflict dependents have to accept what is offered to them.

The current synthesis of livelihoods analysis in development practices has failed; a “think global” mindset continues to dominate and facilitates locally insensitive

The current failure of alternative development is ultimately a symptom of the drive for increased globalization that is

embedded within development practices.


behavior. A synthesis that privileges location would rectify this issue by making it easier to identify and understand the socio-economic activity and needs of local actors in order to satisfy them and disaggregate the Afghan conflict economy.

thInKIng locally: the domInant tRuth

Many Afghans are clamoring for development, but they recognize that replacing opium poppy with an alternative crop in an effort to increase incomes is not addressing their needs and priorities. 21 The development community’s introduction of false needs (the need for more income) is marginalizing conflict dependents by weakening their entitlements to the assets that come with opium poppy cultivation. The failure of the current synthesis stems

from the development community’s lack of engagement with the local causes of opium poppy cultivation. Without this knowledge, the demand for development will not be met in a manner that respects and protects the livelihoods of conflict dependents. An approach built upon a livelihoods analysis will create greater acceptance of development, because livelihoods analysis alters the relationship between development donors and recipients, creating a partnership that allows for greater local input into development projects. Because of this partnership, development recipients are more likely to receive interventions that reflect their priorities and are

consequently more meaningful to their lives.The current failure of alternative

development is ultimately a symptom of the drive for increased globalization that is embedded within development practices. This agenda has created the conditions that permitted the misuse of livelihoods analysis; however, if the development community can sincerely adopt and apply livelihoods analysis they can become advocates for localization.

Despite its weakness at situating actors and communities in a global context, livelihoods analysis is a method of putting the needs of vulnerable people ahead of global forces and agendas. It achieves this end by emphasizing the importance of locality and contextualization. The truth that it advocates is by no means the whole truth, but rather a partial, yet dominant, truth; livelihoods analysis, therefore, needs to be included

in the development c o m m u n i t y ’ s understanding of recipient communities because it represents the dominant experience – the local experience.

Like people everywhere, Afghans live locally and interact with local conditions. Local history forms them and local practices socialize them. That is not to say that they are immune from global forces; the existence of a thriving opium poppy market that feeds international demand suggests otherwise; however, the priority of local context over global context requires that the development community think locally when acting globally. Development is contested, and projects based around global considerations rather than local ones create a collision of global and local forces. In the process, it is creating resistance to development within local communities. In Afghanistan, this has meant a failure to

Local experience provides rich, untapped entry points from which to disaggregate actors from conflict economies


disaggregate the conflict economy, and has resulted in the continuing weakness of the central government as conflict dependents turn to insurgent groups for survival. Therefore, there exists an incentive to work within the local context instead of against it.

In Afghanistan, a culture of resistance to central power predates both the Soviets and the Taliban. 22 This resistance has created parallel credit and labour markets that provide social security for Afghans. The development community needs to accept that if it wants to develop stronger governance, it needs to work alongside local coping strategies and capitalize on the reciprocal obligations that already exist. Local experience provides rich, untapped entry points from which to disaggregate actors from conflict economies and strengthen the Afghan government.

The actors who envision development is critical, as they will inevitably bring normative judgments into the debate. In Afghanistan,

a critical dialectic revolves around the illicit/licit nature of opium poppy and its role in Afghanistan. What is important is that these judgments do not increase the vulnerability of conflict dependents and inadvertently strengthen regional leaders who are often the source of credit. The development community needs to move beyond a purely materialist understanding of issues, because in the Afghan context prosperity alone will not create peace, nor secure entitlements for conflict dependents. Using livelihoods analysis as an end rather than a means to eradicate opium poppy will take the development community beyond its materialism. It will allow the development community to disaggregate the Afghan conflict economy in a manner that strengthens entitlements and is thus meaningful for conflict dependents. That is what is signified by thinking locally and acting globally.

ENDNOTE

1. R. Chambers, “Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: A Key Strategy for People, Environment and Development,” in The Greening of Aid, ed. C. Conroy and M. Litvinoff (Earthscan: 1988), 1. 2. David Mansfield and Adam Pain, “Alternative Livelihoods: Substance or Slogan,” Briefing Paper Series (2005): 8.3. Alberto Arce, “Value Contestations in Development Interventions: Community Development and Sustainable Livelihoods Approaches,” Community Development Journal vol. 38 (2003): 207.4. Leo de Haan and Annelies Zoomers, “Exploring the Frontier of Livelihoods Research,” Development and Change vol. 36 (2005): 32.5. Arce, “Value Contestations in Development Interventions,” 204.6. Leo de Haan and Annelies Zoomers, “Development Geography at the Crossroads of Livelihood and Globalization,” Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie vol. 94 (2003): 359.


7. Adam Pain, “Understanding and Monitoring Livelihoods Under Conditions of Chronic Conflict: Lessons from Afghanistan,” Working Paper 187 (2002): 15.8. de Haan and Zoomers, “Exploring the Frontier of Livelihoods Research,” 28.9. Ibid., 32.10. Geof Wood, “Staying Secure, Straying Poor: The Faustian Bargain,” World Development vol.31 (2003): 457-457.11. Michael Bhatia et al., “Profits and Poverty: Aid Livelihoods and Conflict in Afghanistan,” HPG Background Paper (2003): 21.12. Mansfield and Pain, “Alternative Livelihoods,” 2.13. Jackson, “Protecting Livelihoods,” 173.14. Mansfield and Pain, “Alternative Livelihoods,” 10.15. Ibid., 2.16. Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Meets Counterterrorism,” The Washington Quaterly vol 28 (2005): 57, 67.17. Pain, “Understanding and Monitoring Livelihoods Under Conditions of Chronic Conflict,” 8.18. Bhatia et al., “Profits and Poverty,” 21.19. Mansfield and Pain, “Alternative Livelihoods,” 13.20. Arce, “Value Contestations in Development Interventions,” 201.21. Barnett R. Rubin, “The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan,” World Development vol. 31 (2003): 1800.22. Rubin “The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan,” 1802.


Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is posed to be one of the greatest non-proliferation challenges of the next decade. In contrast to realist perceptions of nuclear weapons as necessary balancers of state power, the insecurity created by nuclear weapons threatens global peace and stability. “Nuclear

insecurity” results from the following characteristics of a nuclear state: 1) the inadequate protection of nuclear materials, 2) the presence of domestic instability that facilitates proliferation, or 3) the reliance on nuclear weapons to deter foreign threats. All three of these conditions apply in Pakistan’s case. The insecurity produced by Pakistan’s deterrence posture toward India is exacerbated by its political and economic turmoil, while Pakistani nuclear weapons remain unprotected from potential theft and sabotage.

PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR INSECURITY:

regionAl And globAl imPlicAtions

vanessa nicoLson


This paper discusses the state of Pakistan’s nuclear program, including threats posed by non-state actors and disloyal officials in the context of domestic social, economic and political tension. It then reviews Pakistan’s proliferation ambitions

and the triangular relationship between the United States, Pakistan and India, and assesses potential channels through which Pakistan’s nuclear insecurity, and thus regional tensions, could be reduced. Pakistan poses a serious threat to the global non-proliferation regime as a result of its internal instability, deterrence policy, and weakly controlled arsenal. Furthermore, although the United States has become increasingly concerned with the horizontal proliferation of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, it has failed in its attempts to effectively promote the non-proliferation of Pakistan’s nuclear program itself. In contrast, some of its actions have had negative implications for individual, regional and international security. The only way to fully prevent nuclear proliferation is to abolish nuclear weapons altogether; however, unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures could reduce the threat of wrongful acquisition, vertical proliferation, and detonation of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

paKIstan’s nucleaR aRsenal

The status of its nuclear arsenal is one of the main causes of Pakistan’s nuclear insecurity. Only “guards, gates and guns” protect Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials from theft and sabotage.1

Furthermore, its missiles lack internal safety devices to prevent unintentional or illegal detonation.2 The lack of proper control-and-command mechanisms, physical safeguards, and loyal personnel increase the possibility of horizontal proliferation to outside actors.

While the theft of an intact weapon remains unlikely, nuclear material could be stolen more easily and used to create a “dirty bomb” (radiological dispersal device). The rarity of this occurrence may appear to make nuclear terrorism an exaggerated threat. However, even a low-yield explosion would have disastrous consequences, as this type of attack could produce tens or hundreds of thousands of casualties.3 Therefore, increased action is necessary to secure Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal from proliferation to state and non-state actors.

Pakistan’s history reveals the vulnerability of its nuclear arsenal to such threats. In 2001, Pakistani scientists Sultan Mahmood and Chaudiri Majeed admitted that they had informed Al Qaeda officials on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons production.4 Further, in 2003, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal became the focus of international attention after the exposure of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan’s illegal transnational network for nuclear proliferation. This organization took advantage of Pakistan’s weak national export controls and political instability, as well as the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s (NSG) discriminatory and voluntary export control regime, which excludes Pakistan. Despite international pressure, the Pakistani

The insecurity produced by Pakistan’s deterrence posture toward India is exacerbated by its political and economic turmoil, while Pakistani nuclear weapons remain unprotected

from potential theft and sabotage


government hesitated to arrest Khan because of his perceived role by the public as a national hero.5 This reflects the view of many Pakistanis—that the country’s nuclear program is not only a security measure, but part of their national identity. Eventually the government arrested Khan, although it disallowed foreigners to contact him or other network leaders.6 This failure to prosecute Khan only increases opportunities for future nuclear proliferation and terrorism initiatives.

In addition to scientists, Pakistani military officers were involved in the Khan network. The group’s proliferation activities included the sale of nuclear centrifuge parts to Iran and Libya, uranium-enrichment technology to North Korea, and offers of assistance to Saddam Hussein before the Gulf War.7 Although former President Musharraf banned Islamic militant organizations and replaced many senior officials connected to the Taliban after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, disloyalty may still exist within the Pakistani military. Proliferation experts argue that support remains for pro-Taliban militant groups from Pakistani officials, especially those within Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).8 Unfortunately, the risk of proliferation from Pakistan’s nuclear facilities caused by poor protection measures and lack of personnel loyalty is further increased by domestic instability.

polItIcal, secuRIty and socIo-economIc challenges

Pakistan’s four main provinces (Punjab, Sind, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan) have been ruled by varying military and civilian governments

since the country’s independence. Recent elections in February 2008 returned Pakistan to civilian rule after almost a decade of Pervez Musharraf ’s military dictatorship. While this event reflects a step forward for the country’s democracy, militants in tribal areas continue to threaten Pakistan’s newly elected government. Political tension increased, especially in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, after Musharraf declared Pakistan’s support for the United States and its “War on Terror.” The country’s political crisis worsened when Musharraf forced a Chief Justice and ten other judges to resign in March 2007. Furthermore, in December of that year, former opposition leader Benazir Butto was assassinated after returning from exile. Bhutto was replaced by her widower, Asif Zardari, who led the Pakistani People’s Party to victory in the 2008 election. However, due to a reputation of corruption and violence, Zardari remains deeply unpopular

in Pakistan. This political instability could have significant consequences for Pakistan’s nuclear insecurity as the government attempts to maintain its tenuous control.

Conflicts between the Pakistani government and Islamic militants have become increasingly violent in the past decade, resulting largely from the sudden significance of Pakistan’s tribal areas for the war in Afghanistan. Poorly conducted government military operations and a failure to provide good governance have encouraged militant growth in these regions. 9 In response, the Pakistani government

The risk of proliferation from Pakistan’s nuclear facilities caused by poor protection

measures and lack of personnel loyalty is further increased by domestic instability.


has launched ground and air strikes against pro-Taliban insurgency groups. However, the bombing of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad on 20 September 2008 reflects the growth of terrorist capabilities, and the increased power of the Tehrik-e-Taliban (Pakistan’s Taliban movement).10 Despite the Pakistani government’s efforts to quell extremism, Taliban and Al-Qaeda members continue to use Pakistan’s tribal regions as a safe-haven for their activities.

In addition to political tension and violent conflict, Pakistanis face serious socioeconomic challenges. In reaction to Pakistan’s nuclear tests of 1998 and 1999, the international community imposed strict economic sanctions on the country, causing it to face near economic collapse. However, these sanctions were lifted after 9/11, when Pakistan declared its allegiance to the US. Despite high levels of overall economic growth from 1999 to 2006, Pakistan’s economy plummeted in 2007. Political crisis and subsequent neglect

increased Pakistan’s deficit to 7.5% of its gross domestic product, increased inflation to 25%, and depreciated the rupee by over 20%.11 The country suffers from over thirty-nine billion dollars of debt, high levels of poverty, and low levels of foreign direct investment.12 While Pakistan negotiated a $7.6 billion loan with the International Monetary Fund on 25 November 2008, the effects of this agreement remain to be seen.

In addition, Pakistan has received over ten billion dollars in US aid since 2001.13 However, due to its imbalanced distribution,

American funding has not stabilized the Pakistani economy. While eight billion dollars went toward security measures, less than one billion dollars were distributed to economic or social issues.14 This reflects the general trend for Pakistani government expenditures. Socio-economic challenges are especially pronounced in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan. In this region, nearly 60% of people live below the national poverty level, and receive only one-third of the amount of per capita public development spending than the national average.15 Little government support for FATA residents encourages anti-government sentiment. Moreover, Pakistan’s lack of broad economic development and the state’s failure to improve the welfare of its poorest citizens further destabilizes the country’s nuclear insecurity by increasing social and political conflict.

One effective unilateral policy to increase Pakistan’s nuclear security would be to strengthen measures to prevent future

p r o l i f e r a t i o n networks. The Khan network could not have evolved without corrupt and

dishonest Pakistani governments. Therefore it is necessary that the government becomes more transparent in its activities. Also, the recovery of physical materials that could provide for future networks remains a necessary course of action. In order to prevent future networks, Pakistan should create a strict national export control system, place additional controls on nuclear scientists, and prosecute Pakistani members of the Khan network. Without transparency however, unilateral actions will not reduce international concerns.

Without transparency however, unilateral actions will not reduce international concerns.


Therefore, it is necessary Pakistan cooperates with other countries and international organizations to improve its nuclear security.

paKIstan’s deteRRence postuRe

Despite the vulnerability of its nuclear program to domestic and external interference, Pakistan perceives international pressure for non-proliferation as a threat to its national security. As reflected by the Pakistani public’s reaction to A. Q. Khan, Pakistan pursues its nuclear program to maintain both national security and identity. The key reason, however, for Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions is protection of state sovereignty from India, a state who also relys on the bomb to enforce their national identity. Cohen and Chollet reflect, “the bomb is the currency of self-esteem” used to achieve the “great power status” that is derived from India’s membership in the nuclear club.16 Such goals enforce Pakistani fear of Indian hegemony. While this fear has dominated Pakistan’s security policy since independence, nuclear weapons only became an inherent part of its policy in the early 1970s.17 Early military ties with the United States supported Pakistan’s disinterest in nuclear weapons. However, the nation’s defeat in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 increased Pakistan’s sense of insecurity and sparked the desire for nuclear weapons.18 In addition, by the 1980s Pakistan realized that it would never meet the costs of a conventional arms race with India.

The national identity of Pakistanis is not only related to India, but to Muslim countries as well. As the first ideological Muslim state of the 21st century, Pakistan’s strategic location and ambitious political and military

elite supported aspirations for the country to become a prominent Muslim power. Former prime minister Z. A. Bhutto claimed that “among the rich and security conscious Arab states ... [a nuclear bomb] would enhance Pakistan’s stature and importance

incalculably.”19 Furthermore, after the first Gulf War and failed Middle East peace process, anti-American views increased in Muslim countries and Western powers became concerned about the development of an “Islamic bomb.” These suspicions revolved around the idea that radical and wealthy Islamic states in the Middle East, especially Libya, may have financed Pakistan’s nuclear program in return for information to develop their own nuclear weapons.20 Pakistan’s long periods of military dictatorship, often supported by the United States, enabled the military to control the country’s nuclear program and to set its priorities.

us-paKIstanI RelatIons

Pakistan began to develop its nuclear program following the Indo-Pakistani War.21 In 1974, Pakistani nuclear ambitions and non-adherence posture toward the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) were strengthened by India’s “peaceful” nuclear explosion. Reacting to these developments, the United States created anti-proliferation laws to constrain, freeze, and ultimately reverse Pakistan’s nuclear program.22 The Pakistani government and public perceived these laws as discriminatory, and claimed that they targeted Pakistan to justify

The American government turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear developments,

and ceased to promote non-proliferation to the Pakistani government.


sanctions in 1978 and 1979.23 However, after the Soviet invasion of Kabul in 1979, the US and Pakistan experienced a fervent period of cooperation. The negative aspect of this relationship was that the American government turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear developments, and ceased to promote non-proliferation to the Pakistani government.

In exchange for Pakistan’s resistance to the Soviets, US Congress restored aid and liberalized the non-proliferation conditions of Pakistani aid suspension.24 Although Pakistan met these new conditions through its nuclear developments of 1985, US officials merely changed its cutoff criteria again. The new cutoff maintained that Pakistan could not “possess a nuclear explosive device”.25 These changes reflect a reversal of American non-proliferation policy during the 1970s. However, when the war ended and Pakistan lost its strategic importance to the US, the American government re-implemented sanctions against Pakistan for its nuclear development efforts, and shifted its focus to repair damaged relations with India. It also sought to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, and along with Russia, the United

Kingdom (UK), France and China, settled on a de facto “marginalization of nuclear weapons strategy.”26 These efforts eventually failed as Pakistan (with the help of China) remained steadfast in its nuclear ambitions and continued to weather the effects of American sanctions. After Pakistan’s nuclear tests of 1998, American officials increased their attention to the preservation of the non-proliferation regime. This revival of American concerns focused on Pakistan’s refusal to

sign the NPT or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the potential for nuclear war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and the development of an “Islamic bomb.”27

After 11 September 2001, the US government paid increasing attention to the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal from acquisition by “rogue” states and non-state actors. Pakistani officials claim that they discussed nuclear safeguards with the US Deputy Secretary of State within days of the attacks.28 Moreover, following the exposure of the A. Q. Khan network in 2003, the US turned its attention to the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal from internal sabotage. The American government also developed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to prevent the transportation of nuclear materials. By 2004, Pakistani and US officials met every two months on the issue, and spent millions of dollars to secure Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.29 Discussions regarding the security issues of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal reflected a US policy reversal from the Clinton administration’s imposition of severe economic sanctions. The Bush administration not only eliminated sanctions,

but it restored aid and publicly supported General Musharraf ’s dictatorship. As a result of this

personal diplomacy, US officials scarcely spoke out about returning Pakistan to democracy, or advocated the vertical non-proliferation of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

Nuclear instability in South Asia threatens the global campaign against Islamic terrorism. Thus it is in US interests to promote political stability in Pakistan by reducing the influence of Islamic militant groups and eradicating Al Qaeda from Northwest Frontier Province. However, many

Pakistan views Indian nuclear development as a threat to its national security


problems exist with US intervention in Pakistan’s domestic policies. For example, increased pressure could create a backlash of anti-American, and as a result, anti-government sentiments within Pakistan. To decrease the likelihood of theft, in the short term the US could focus on suppressing Islamic militants and Al Qaeda. However, increased pressure on Zardari to carry out more severe crackdowns on Islamic groups could create further divisions within the military or possibly cause a coup. As a result, the American government must be careful as to what kind of assistance it provides to Pakistan.

The provision of command-and-control technologies (physical safety mechanisms) would conflict with US non-proliferation obligations and increase opportunities for Pakistan and India to operationalize their weapons. Furthermore, some assistance may increase regional insecurity by leading India to demand similar assistance or take countermeasures. Also, direct US assistance could increase concerns about US intentions to control Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Therefore a more feasible option would be the provision of general information on how to design security systems and establish personnel reliability programs. The US could share broad information and encourage Pakistan to work with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to implement security systems. It could also maximize, consistent with the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and domestic law, sharing unclassified information on personnel reliability programs and security mechanisms to help Pakistan secure its arsenal.

us-IndIa nucleaR deal

In 2005, President George W. Bush asserted the United States’ commitment to attain “full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India.”30 To do so, he claimed that he would “seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. Laws and policies, and the United States [would] work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes” to allow the sale of nuclear reactor and fuel to India.31 In exchange, India would separate its civil and military nuclear programs, and impose international safeguards on civilian facilities. Furthermore, the Indian government agreed to refrain from nuclear testing, to participate in discussions on a fissile material cutoff treaty, and to follow international nuclear export regulations.

Proponents of this deal argue that it supports American strategic goals, acknowledges India’s role as a major power, improves India’s energy supplies, benefits the US nuclear industry, and is an environmentally sound initiative.32 While these arguments are not false, the deal comes as a major blow to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and as a source of increased tension with Pakistan. The exemption of India from US and international Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) regulations undermines non-proliferation efforts. These guidelines ban the transfer of civilian nuclear technology to states that have not accepted the NPT and its safeguards. Furthermore, if abandoning the NPT does not harm a

Like the United States and Russia, India and Pakistan would benefit from establishing

common ground for the reduction and security of nuclear weapons.


state’s nuclear energy supplies, it may be more likely to leave the regime. In addition, concern exists over the possible reignition of a nuclear arms race in the region. Pakistan views Indian nuclear development as a threat to its national security, and has voiced its desire for a similar deal with the United States. However, as this is unlikely, Pakistan may resort to other sources, such as China. Thus, the US-India nuclear deal not only undermines non-proliferation efforts, but increases regional tension in South Asia.

IndIa and paKIstan

Only India, Pakistan, and Israel remain outside the Nonproliferation Treaty, and out of these countries only India and Pakistan have tested their nuclear weapons and declared their status as nuclear weapons states. Established in 1968 to prevent global nuclear proliferation, the NPT has had a tumultuous past. By 1999 the treaty had

obtained signatures from 182 non-nuclear weapons states which rejected nuclear weapons, while the five NPT nuclear powers (the US, UK, Russia, France and China) accepted its disarmament obligations.33 However, both Pakistan and India reject the idea of cooperative security and refuse to share the details of their nuclear programs. Rather, they depend on the unreliable strategy of mutual deterrence to prevent nuclear conflict.34 Indo-Pakistani tension has risen in recent years due to the insecurity of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and surge of terrorists activities within Pakistan.

Hostilities between the countries have

increased due to the dispersion of Al Qaeda, efforts to rein in religious extremists in Pakistan, and terrorist attacks against India’s Parliament. In addition, the recent nuclear deal between the United States and India has further intensified tension between the two countries. Most importantly, the war over Kashmir jeopardizes the nuclear security of both countries. Kashmir remains the major source of contention between India and Pakistan due to the region’s symbolic significance. Both countries perceive Kashmir’s Muslim majority as part of their respective “secular” and “Islamic” identities.35 This conflict has exacerbated the Pakistan-India nuclear arms race, which is seen as a measure of power by both sides. Little progress has been made by India and Pakistan on the improvement of nuclear security. However, the Lahore Declaration of 1999 committed cooperation on a number of issues, including reducing risks of accidental

or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Like the United States and Russia,

India and Pakistan would benefit from establishing common ground for the reduction and security of nuclear weapons. One way this could be achieved is by employing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The IAEA has issued many reports and adopted several resolutions to protect countries against nuclear terrorism. In addition, it sponsors training courses and provides physical protection advisory services to members that request them. While neither Pakistan nor India is party to the NPT both are members

Promotion of Pakistan’s cooperative security with India should remain a top priority for the United States and the

international community


of the IAEA. They could potentially use the organization to increase their nuclear security and cooperation. The countries could move to place all of their nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision and pay attention to the IAEA’s threat analysis, physical security recommendations, and suggestions regarding existing implementations. Furthermore, the IAEA could be used as an integral instrument of the war on terror to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons from Pakistan to other states and non-state actors.

conclusIon

Pakistan poses a serious threat to the global non-proliferation regime as a result of its internal instability, deterrence policy, and weakly controlled nuclear arsenal. The theft or sabotage of nuclear weapons in any country threatens global security. Therefore unilateral, bilateral and multilateral efforts are necessary to combat the risk of nuclear proliferation and terrorism in Pakistan. In order to reduce this threat, Pakistan should improve its civilian nuclear security, establish common ground and increase communication with India, and expand the role of the IAEA in its nuclear program. Pakistan should also take steps to increase physical security of nuclear weapons, and the reliability of its personnel. As Pakistan’s prominent military ally, and India’s supplier of nuclear material, the United States also

plays a major role in the South Asian conflict. While US attention to the security of

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal remains a valuable and necessary endeavour, to a large extent US policy toward Pakistan has been ineffective in its promotion of nuclear non-proliferation. From 1970 to 2008, the two countries experienced volatile relations mostly dictated by the United States, with fleeting episodes of intense cooperation. Throughout this period, the US placed too much emphasis on its short-term interests, such as relations with Pakistani dictators, and ignored long-term concerns, like the viability of Pakistan’s democratic political system. Moreover, American dependence on Pakistani support in Afghanistan has eased pressure on Pakistan to stop its nuclear development. However, sanctions have also failed due to the strong societal identity attached to Pakistan’s nuclear program. Therefore, promotion of Pakistan’s cooperative security with India should remain a top priority for the United States and the international community. Furthermore, Pakistan’s internal stability is crucial for peaceful Indo-Pakistani relations, counterterrorism, and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime; thus, consistent support for Pakistani human development and democratization should become an intrinsic part of the American security policy toward Pakistan.


ENDNOTE

1. Nathan Busch, “Risks of Nuclear Terror: Vulnerabilities to Theft and Sabotage at Nuclear Weapons Facilities,” Contemporary Security Policy 23, no.3 (2002): 40, in Informa World [data base online], accessed December 2, 2008. 2. Charles Ferguson and William Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Monterey: Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, 2004), 87.3. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks,” The Washington Quarterly 28 (2005): 114, in MIT Press Journals [database online], accessed November 14, 2008. 4. David Albright, “Al Qaeda’s Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents,” Policy Forum Online (2002): 6, available from http://www.ippnw-students.org/Chapters/ Pakistan5. /Al%20Qaeda’s%20nuclear%20program.doc., accessed November 14, 3008. Sara Daly, John Parachini and William Rosenau, “Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor: Implications of Three Case Studies for Combating Nuclear Terrorism,” RAND (2005): 6, in Rand Online [database online], accessed December 2, 2008, Scott D. Sagan, “How to Keep the Bomb From Iran,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (2006): 50, in Search Ebsco Host [database online], accessed December 10, 2008.6. Albright and Hinderstein. “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan,” 116.7. Ibid., 116. 8. Sagan, “Keep Bomb,” 55.9. Anatol Lieven, “The Pressures on Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs (2002): 110, in Foreign Affairs [database online], accessed December 10, 2008. 10. The International Crisis Group (ICG), “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,” Asia Report no 125, no. 3, (December 2006): 3, available from http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/ index.11. cfm?id=4568&l=1, accessed November 14, 2008.12. Alexander Nicoll and Sarah Johnstone, eds., “Pakistan on the Brink: Threefold crisis rocks coun try’s foundations,” The International Institute for Strategic Studies 14, no. 9 (November 2008), 1.--> Who was the author who was the editor? (they are both editors, since I wrote “eds.”)13. ICG, “Pakistian Appeasing,” 3.14. Busch, “Risks of Nuclear,” 41.15. Nicoll and Johnstone. “Pakistan on the Brink,” 2.16. Ibid., 2.17. ICG, “Pakistan Appeasing,” 9.18. Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet, “When $10 billion Is Not Enough: Rethinking U.S Strategy toward Pakistan,” The Washington Quartlery 30, no.2 (2007): 16, in Project Muse [online data base], accessed on November 14, 3008. 19. Farzana Shaikh, “Pakistan’s nuclear bomb: beyond the non-proliferation regime,”20. International Affairs 78, 1 (2002): 41, in Interscience Wiley [online database], accessed on December 2, 2008. 21. Ibid., 41.22. Ibid., 46. 23. Ibid., 39.24. Bhumitra Chakma, “The NPT, the CTBT and Pakistan: Explaining the Non-adherence Posture of a De Facto Nuclear State,” Asian Security 1, no.3 (2005): 269, in Informa World [database online], accessed on November 20, 2008. 25. Shaikh, “Pakistan’s nuclear bomb,” 32.26. Ibid., 32.27. Teresita C. Schaffer, “U.S. Influence on Pakistan: Can Partners Have Divergent Priorities?” Washington Quarterly (Winter 2002-2003), 170.


28. Ibid,. 170.29. Shaikh, “Pakistan’s nuclear bomb,” 32.30. Ibid., 30.31. Douglas Frantz, “US and Pakistan Discuss Nuclear Security,” The New York Times, October 1, 2001, availble from http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E06E4D7153DF932A357 53C1A967932. C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2, accessed on December 2, 2008.33. Ferguson and Potter, 87.34. Sumit Ganguly and Dinshaw Mistry, “The Case for the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement,” World Policy Journal (Summer 2006): 11, in MIT Press Journals [database online], accessed on December 2, 2008. 35. Ibid., 11.36. Ibid., 11.37. Strobe Talbott, “Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia,” Foreign Affairs (March-April 1999): 110, in Foreign Affairs [database online], accessed on November 20, 2008. 38. Zulfiqar A. Bhutta, and Nundy Samiran, “Nuclear Terrorism: The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia”, Biomedical Journal (2002): 358, in Pub Med Central [database online], accessed on December 2, 2008. 39. Shaik, 35.


On 19 September 2006, the Thai military, with support from the Royal Privy Council, staged a bloodless coup that removed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra from power. Much of Bangkok’s middle class welcomed the coup.1 The middle class had become dissatisfied with Thaksin’s overt corruption,

and many sought to voice their opposition by joining the anti-Thaksin pressure group known as the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). When the army finally ousted Thaksin, the middle class believed it had cleared the path for an honest new government to take over.

One year later, following an election that led to Thaksin’s ally Samak Sundaravej becoming Prime Minister, Bangkok became embroiled in a series of violent protests that, until mid-December of 2008, effectively paralyzed the city.2 The protests started as a reaction to Samak’s

SECURING DEMOCRACY IN THAILAND:

the chAllenges of de-thAKsinizing thAi Politics

Jim Wu*


attempt to modify the new constitution, wherein he proposed to eliminate laws that banned vote buying.3 This proposal angered Bangkok Thais who regarded Samak and his People Power Party (PPP) as a proxy of Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party. Samak continued many of Thaksin’s rural development policies in the North and

Northeast provinces where the PPP retained a strong foothold. More disturbing was the fact that several PPP members were ex-TRT members, leading to suspicions that Samak sought to grant amnesty to Thaksin.4 While Thaksin is no longer the Prime Minister, he remains popular among millions of rural Thai supporters. This was most evident on 1 November 2008, when he told a tearful crowd of over sixty-thousand supporters via phone call broadcast, “I want to return but I can’t, although I miss you all”.5

The Thai middle class had hoped that by ousting Thaksin, the country would undergo a process of de-Thaksinization, in which a responsible and clean elected government would fill the political vacuum. Evidently, this naïve outcome has not taken place. Given Thailand’s socio-economic divide between the poor and rural populations of the North and Northeast and the educated middle class in Bangkok, I argue that Thaksin’s influence will remain a necessary evil in the development of Thai democracy.

I will begin by discussing how Thailand’s socio-economic composition impedes the existence of a proper democracy. Then, I will look at the successes and failures of Thaksin’s policies and elaborate on how these policies have shaped the current political environment in Thailand. Finally, I will conclude by

considering the future of Thai politics.

thaIland’s Rough landscape foR democRacy

Democracy has always been a contentious issue in Thailand. Much of the contention comes from Thailand’s socio-economic make up. Nearly two-thirds

of Thailand’s population “live in villages and more than one half are classified as farmers.”6 This rural majority produces 55% of Thailand’s economy, while the remaining 45% of the economy originates from the city of Bangkok, which comprises only 17% of Thailand’s population but houses over 80% of the middle class.7

From this rural-urban divide, Thailand’s democratic system has become what Anek Loathamata terms a “tale of two democracies.” On one side, there is the rural conception that democracy serves as “a means to bring greater benefits and official attention to [rural Thais] and their villages”.8 Rural Thais care little about “political principles, policy issues, or national interest.”9 Rather, they vote for the party that is capable of bringing into the countryside the “largest budget allocations and public infrastructure projects.”10

In contrast, Thailand’s middle class perceives that democracy should focus on “recruiting honest and capable persons to serve as lawmakers and political executives” rather than having “a process through which voters [would] get parochial and personal benefits.”11 Often times, the middle class enforces measures to ensure the formation of a responsible government. These measures include supporting coups, staging

Democracy has always been a contentious issue in Thailand.


protests, and modifying the constitution to include a minimum education requirement.

What precipitates from these two democracies is a battle of ideas over the fate of democratic rule in Thailand, wedged between the rural masses and the elitist middle class. The ongoing contention

has prevented a healthy development of Thai democracy as “the tyranny of the rural masses” all too often comes under attack by the “urban uncivil society.”12

electIng thaKsIn shInawatRa

Initially, Thaksin appeared as a remedy to Thailand’s democratic dilemma. With Chavalit Yongchaiyudh’s mishandling of the economy during the 1997 Baht crisis, over “7,000 [Thai] companies disappeared [while] 55,000 others faced debt and bankruptcy suits.”13 The subsequent Chuan Leekpak government attempted to restore the economy by imposing IMF-directed measures. However, these efforts backfired as angry farmers, infuriated over their government’s unwillingness to bail them out of their debts, marched to Bangkok.

Amidst Chuan’s unpopularity, Thaksin devised a clever political campaign that appealed to both rural and middle class Thais. To attract support from the rural masses, his election posters illustrated a three-point plan aimed to provide agrarian debt relief, village capital funds, and cheap health care. According to Baker and Phongpaichit, “this was the first time a Thai party had campaigned on a public platform in this way.”14

To Thailand’s middle class, Thaksin

represented a new face of economic reform needed to revive Thailand’s battered economy. As Baker notes, Thailand’s middle class engaged in a “competitive and volatile modern global economy” where the establishment of a “political regime which can manage the modern urban

economy [was crucial for the middle class’ well-being].”15 With his successful business background and his overseas education, Thaksin appealed to the desperate Thai middle

class as “someone who [could] manage globalization for the country.”16

Duncan McCargo summarizes Thaksin’s appeal to both the rural and middle class Thai:

thaksIn was a representatIve of the nouveau rIChe sIno-thaI BusIness elIte… yet hIs populIst agenda, hIs CourtIng of speCIal Interests [separated hIm from] the Image of BureauCratIC InflexIBIlIty and hIgh-mInded dIsdaIn that had CharaCterIzed the 1997-2000 Chuan government.17

Thus, it was no surprise when Thaksin won his first election with an overwhelming majority.

oustIng thaKsIn

While Thaksin’s image was at first appealing, his policies would soon end the honeymoon period. His rural development programs were earning him political points at the expense of the middle class. Social schemes such as the ‘Thirty-baht per Hospital Visit’ program were “hastily implemented, poorly managed and underfunded, [which resulted] in overworked and demoralized medical staff and near-bankruptcy at many

Initially, Thaksin appeared as a remedy to Thailand’s democratic dilemma.


rural hospitals.”18 Also under heavy attack were his micro-credit programs, which sought to elevate poverty by supplying rural Thais with cell phones and motor scooters. Kasian argues that the micro-credit programs “saw average household indebtedness rise from 70,586 baht, or 5.7 times the average household monthly income in 2000, to 84,603 baht or 6.1 times the monthly income in 2002.”19 Worse still, Kasian notes that the “cash nexus replaced community solidarity for [young rural] workers,” leading them to rely increasingly on “middlemen” who acted as “local [TRT canvassers].”20 Nevertheless, the rural masses remained supportive of Thaksin, as they felt that he was fulfilling his promises.

Eventually, Thaksin’s policies failed to sustain the Thai economy. Kasian notes that “deflation gave way to burgeoning inflation and increased interest rates.” 21 In 2005, a looming recession weakened Thaksin’s hold on the two democracies. With the memories of the 1997 Baht crisis still fresh in their minds, the urban middle class was “the first to let go.”22 Although Thaksin did pay off Thailand’s IMF debt, that in itself was not enough to sustain the support of the middle class. His image as a corrupt, authoritarian, and borderline anti-monarchical leader collided with the middle class perceptions that the Prime Minister must serve the interests of the nation through democratic and royalist means. 23

At the forefront of the opposition was the People’s Alliance for Democracy, a movement whose membership consisted largely of members of Bangkok’s middle class. The PAD’s main objective was to remove Thaksin from office and dismantle his regime through new constitutional

changes.24 In direct opposition to PAD, came “two contingents of villagers from the North and Northeast,” known as the Column of Buggies and the Caravan of the Walking Poor which were sent by the government “to give moral support to the Prime Minister, buttress democracy via election, and call for further government help in alleviating the manifold problems of the poor.”25 The presence of these groups demonstrated that the poor could just as easily use demonstrations as a way to voice their political opinion. Even if the TRT had funded these demonstrators, their arrival in large numbers showed that the rural masses were willing to ensure the survival of Thaksin’s regime. At that very moment, it appeared as if Anek’s two democracies

would clash violently with one another. King Bhumibol’s intervention,

however, prevented immediate violence from taking place.26 Dismissing Thaksin’s government as undemocratic, he indirectly authorized the army to “look carefully into the administrative issues.”27 The long awaited coup finally took place on 19 September 2006. However, this alone would not suppress Thaksin’s determination or his continued influence in Thailand.

polItIcal atmospheRe In thaIland afteR the coup

Despite being ousted, the poor continued to favour Thaksin and the proxy PPP party. One peasant woman stated, “I’m a poor person, Thaksin made us feel important, like

While Thaksin’s image was at first appealing, his policies would soon end

the honeymoon period.


we had a voice.”28 Kasian argues that Thaksin’s leadership brought a people’s politics movement, which “gave pride of place to the peasantry and the countryside”29 This was ironic as Thaksin remains one of Thailand’s richest men, and his only connection to the poor masses was his place of birth.30

Thaksin’s party engaged in vote buying, similar to all other Thai parties, though on a much larger scale. The poor, however, did not regard vote buying as forms of bribes; rather, they perceived the practice as “[obtaining] modest gifts upon purchasing quality merchandise.”31 Thaksin retains his popularity in the North and the Northeast largely because his policies resounded with the poor. The PPP leaders, Samak and his

successor, Somchai Wongsawat,32 were able to continue in office because they followed Thaksin’s policies. As Anek argues, “it is a well-known fact among candidates that money given out by unpopular canvasser tends to be wasted.”33 No doubt, Thaksin has built solid rapport with the poor masses. He was the first prime minister to exploit the deep-rooted resentment that rural Thais harbour against their “privileged” and “high-living” urban counterparts. In addition to paying each of his voters five-hundred Baht, Thaksin would spend additional sums of money at villages while kissing babies and dancing with villagers. Although his policies as prime minister resulted in heavy government spending and ballooned national debt, these policies helped him foster what Diane Mauzy calls a “folksy populist” image among the rural masses.34 To this day, rural Thais continue

to regard Thaksin as a champion for the poor. As one woman indicates, “he gave us a health care scheme and he paid Thailand’s national debt; nobody can do what he did.”35

Nevertheless, to the middle class, Thaksin’s long list of scandals resonates more loudly than his actions. On their website, PAD argues, “Thaksin completely got the hearts of grass-root people with several corrupt populism policies and used his money to buy votes, the election committee, and whatever got in his way.”36 The website indicates that the “majority of Thai still lack [the] education [needed] to understand what democracy really is.”37 PAD accused Thaksin of not only buying the support of the rural masses but also of corrupting large portions of the Thai

middle class into supporting him initially. As such, PAD sought to reveal the extent of Thaksin and Samak’s crimes, both of whom the organization argues “used their power in fraudulent activities and put in place corrupt policies [that] violate all forms of decency.”38

Indeed, charges of corruption were among the long list of other criminal allegations directed against Thaksin. In addition to his selling of Shin Corp Telecommunications for US$1.9 billion and his subsequent attempt to avoid paying any taxes on the massive profits, Thaksin also tried to undermine democracy by eliminating the watchdog institutions of the Good Governance Constitution.39 Critics accuse Thaksin of “dismissing competitive pluralistic democracy as an unsuitable Western import” and claim that he “preferred a model based on the authoritarian populist regimes of Latin America.”40 These accusations derive largely from his brutal

Sadly, Thailand’s middle class does not have a concrete solution to end Thailand’s political turmoil


crackdown against the Muslim insurgents in the South and his “war on drugs” campaign, both of which authorized extrajudicial executions and killings and caused uproar among domestic and international human rights organizations. Finally, his refusal to abide by the advice of the King caused several of Thaksin’s opponents to accuse the former prime minister of attempting to undermine the significance of the monarchy and possibly establish a republic.41

Nonetheless, one must realize that the PAD may not fully represent the voice of Thailand’s middle class. A close analysis of online forums and editorials reveals that PAD was growing less popular with increasing numbers of middle class Thais who were becoming alarmed over the debilitating impact of continued confrontation between the PPP and PAD.

Sadly, Thailand’s middle class does not have a concrete solution to end Thailand’s political turmoil.42 Although some members of Thailand’s academia have advocated a peaceful resolution and an end to violent confrontation, they represent a minority voice.43 It appears that the middle class’ inability to propose a solution stems from their overreliance on their King’s ability to arbitrate. Consequently, King Bhumibol’s declining health, coupled with societal concerns over the credibility of his son, Maha Vajiralongkorn, as a successor, have led to a nationwide panic over the future of Thai politics. Nevertheless, it is clear that Thais desire an end to their political instability. As one journalist from the Nation indicates:

thIngs have Come a long way [or] we haven’t aCtually gone anywhere. It’s stIll aBout one man, vIolatIons of the Charter(s), how alleged CrImes Can Be whItewashed

through Charter amendment, and how that Can Be done wIthout muddyIng the natIonal ConsCIenCe or trIggerIng vIolenCe.44

Forum threads on the Bangkok Post reveal that some Thais are willing to forgive Thaksin and let his legacy continue as a way to foster democracy within Thailand. As one comment reads:

demoCraCy needs tIme to grow and mature. we’ll hIt Bumps But these Can Be amended and InCluded In the ConstItutIon as we move forward. however, we wIll have no ChanCe of thIs If the mIlItary Comes out and [reduCes thaI demoCraCy] BaCk to square one every Couple of years!45

It appears that more members of the middle class are directing their anger towards PAD instead of Thaksin. One post accuses PAD leaders and followers of “betray[ing] their country by creating an atmosphere that has perpetuated a decline in Thailand’s economic situation.”46 Another post reads:

yes, the polItICal deBaCle Caused By thaksIn has de-raIled thaIland’s eConomIC growth [and has Caused] the Current ClImate of InstaBIlIty for the Country; yet sondhI Is CausIng Just as muCh dIsarray, perhaps even more deBIlItatIng. at least thaksIn had helped the Country out of the devastatIng Imf CrIsIs, along wIth superfICIally ImprovIng the lIves of the poor.47

While these posts may not represent the majority of Thailand’s middle class, they do indicate that there is a level of


acceptance for Thaksin among some of its members. Despite his overt corruption, his brutal suppression of dissent in the South, and his questionable policies for the poor, 48 Thaksin fulfilled his promise to the middle class by bringing Thailand out of out of a serious recession. One forum post reads:

we have to aCknowledge that thaksIn was the fIrst eConomICally effeCtIve pm; [therefore], we [should] not gIve hIm all the praIse, nor [should] we Blame hIm for playIng the game [that hIs] equally Corrupt predeCessors had Created.49

conclusIon: solutIons foR thaIland’s cuRRent polItIcal sItuatIon

On 2 December 2008, after witnessing the economic-debilitating effects of PAD’s massive weeklong sit-down at Suvarnbhumi

Airport, the Constitutional Court of Thailand dissolved the government by dismissing Somchai as prime minister on vote-buying charges. On 17 December 2008, Oxford trained economist, Abhisit Vejiajiva of the Democrat Party was elected Prime Minister. A number of anti-Thaksin Members of Parliament (the majority of who form Abhisit’s government) were also elected in the by-elections. Having spent a great deal of his life in England, Abhisit’s outsider perspective and image may help heal Thailand’s political scars. However, this will depend largely on his policies particularly those directed toward the poor. Currently,

Thailand is still far from becoming politically stable as pro-Thaksin forces continue to contest Abhisit’s power by holding large rallies and demonstrations across the nation.

Traditionally, King Bhumibol’s intervention as an arbiter has solved many, if not all of Thailand’s previous political instabilities and upheavals. However, the King’s declining health has prevented this intervention from happening. Even if the King were to recover and bring about political stability, Thais must realize that such a solution is at best short-term. Thais must recognize that a healthy democracy rests not in the hands of a king but in those of the civilians.

Thaksin understood Thailand’s “tale of two democracies,” and he knew that the masses were the key to securing his power. In an interview conducted this January with Al Jazeera, he lamented that “there is a group that opposes me, but it is not much.”50

Labelling himself as a “champion of democracy,” Thaksin asserts, “they will not last long…this is the first time they’ve staged

a coup against a popular government.”51 The only way that Thailand can

develop long-term political stability is for the rural masses and the middle class to reach a compromise. Their compromising acknowledgment of Thaksin’s image as a philanthropist and a CEO brought him initially to power. Despite the animosity directed toward him by Bangkok elites and PAD supporters, Thaksin retains his popularity among the poor people who reside in the North and Northeast regions. Labelling Thaksin as corrupt is not enough to commence de-Thaksinization in a country where every previous leader has

Labelling Thaksin as corrupt is not enough to commence de-Thaksinization in a country where every previous leader has been involved in some form of corruption.


been involved in some form of corruption. If Thailand is to remain a democracy, Bangkok elites must accept Thaksin’s legacy as a necessary evil. Instead of discontinuing Thaksin’s policies for the poor, the Abhisit government should research ways to develop Thaksin’s policies into more durable and sustainable forms. By focusing its agenda on the poor, the new government would become a supporter of the poor masses and would help reduce the rural-urban gap that has plagued Thailand for generations. Only with the gradual improvement of their living standards and education will rural Thais foster an understanding of democracy that is similar to that of the

middle class. Continued marginalization of the poor will only lead to more incidences of political instability that will further paralyze Thailand’s economy and exacerbate its hopes of developing a strong democracy. As Thaksin himself remarks, “clapping hands, you need two hands,” and given the current situation, the middle class has no choice but to join the rural masses to “clap hands.”52

* I am indebted to Vipapat (Aim) Sinpeng and Dr. Wasana Wongsurat for their peer-reviews and offering me their views and feedback on this complex topic. As well, I would like to sincerely thank Dr. Diane Mauzy for directing me to the necessary reading materials needed to tackle such a difficult subject.

ENDNOTE

1. Throughout this paper, I associate the term “middle class” with Anek Laothamata’s definition as “city-based, middle-income persons employed in managerial, executive, or technical positions in the private sector, as well as self-employed professionals such as doctors, nurses, journalists, architects, and lawyers.” Definition quoted from: Anek Loathamata, “A tale of two democracies” in The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, ed. R.H Taylor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 209. 2. Information on the extent of the violence can be retrieved from www.bangkokpost.com.3. Dr. Wasana Wongsurat believes that the major cause for the protests was the fact that Samak sought to restore elements of the 1997 constitution. However, as the new constitution sought to keep Thaksin and his cohorts out of politics, Samak’s attempt to modify it was perceived as a challenge to Thaksin’s opponents. From Dr. Wasana Wongsurat, email message to author, 24 November 2008.4. In addition to fleeing the country, Thaksin currently faces a two-year jail sentence for corruption. He evaded the sentence by fleeing Thailand, and he remains a fugitive.


5. Ambika Ahuja, “Thaksin says Thai enemies make return impossible,” Associated Press, 1 November 2008. 6. http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2008/11/01/thailand_braces_for_phone_ call_from_ousted_pm/.7. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, “Democracy, Capitalism and Crisis: Examining Recent Political Transitions in Thailand” (Princeton University, 15 November, 2001), 1. 8. Ibid. 9. Anek, 202. 10. Ibid, 212. 11. Ibid, 222. 12. Ibid, 221.13. Kasian Tejapira, “Toppling Thaksin,” New Left Review 39 (2006): 7, http://www.newleftreview. org/?getpdf=NLR27301&pdflang=en/.14. Phongpaichit and Baker, 8. 15. Ibid, 9.16. Ibid. 17. Ibid, 10. 18. Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press Inc, 2005), 1. 19. Kasian, 27.20. Ibid, 27.21. Ibid, 28. 22. Ibid, 32. 23. Ibid. 24. Thaksin’s efforts to establish close ties with the Crown Prince had placed him at odds with the King and the Privy Council. He re-started the war in the South against Muslim separatists, which greatly angered the King and his chief advisor Prem Tinsulanonda, and set him at odds with the Royal Establishment. Moreover, Thaksin tried to intervene in the Royal Family’s succession policy, and he sought to usurp the position of the ‘king-maker’ from the Privy Council. My thanks to Dr. Wasana Wongsurat for highlighting that latter bit of information. From Dr. Wasana Wongsurat, email message to author, 24 November 2008.25. Kasian, 7.26. Ibid. 27. That said, one could argue that the King’s intervention had prevented Thailand’s democratic growth. Had the military not intervened, the violent confrontation between the Pro-Thaksin and Anti-Thaksin forces may have resulted in a rude but essential maturation of Thailand’s democracy. I thank Dr. Wasana Wongsurat for providing this insightful perception. From Dr. Wasana Wongsurat, email message to author, November 2008.28. Kasian, 36. 29. Thaksin Shinawatra, Interview with Veronica Pedrosa, Talk to Al Jazerra (Al Jazeera: 07 January 2008).30. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p4qqjrGLtWY&feature=channel/.31. Kasian, 22. 32. Thaksin was born in the Northern province of Chiang Mai. 33. Anek, 207-208.34. After Samak was dismissed by the Constitutional Court of Thailand for contravening the conflict of interests law, Thaksin’s brother-in-law, Somchai Wongsawat was nominated successfully to lead the PPP as Prime Minister. 35. Ibid, 207.36. Dr. Diane Mauzy, email message to author, 18 February 2009.37. Shinawatra, Interview, Part 1. 38. People’s Alliance for Democracy, “About this Website,” People’s Alliance for Democracy website, http://pad.vfly.net/about/837/about-this-website/. One should view the political


nature of PAD’s objectives with extreme caution. Dr. Wasana has pointed out that PAD’s top leaders Sondhi and Chamlong share a long history of hatred against Thaksin. Sondhi in particular, viewed Thaksin as an enemy, not through political vengeance, but rather Thaksin’s attempt to drive Sondhi into bankruptcy. From Dr. Wasana Wongsurat, email message to author, 24 November 2008.39. Ibid. 40. Ibid.41. These included the National Counter Corruption Commission, the Election Commission, and the Constitutional Court.42. Dr. Diane Mauzy, email message to author, 18 February 2009.43. Ibid. 44. Since this paper was written, there has been recent developments in Thailand. Between 25 November and 2 December 2008, PAD launched a massive sit-down on all runways of Suvarnbhumi Airport, which resulted in the cancellation of all flights to Bangkok. On 2 December 2008, the Constitutional Court of Thailand dismissed Somchai as Prime Minister on vote-buying charges and systematically dissolved the Thai government. The following elections installed Democrat Party leader, Abhisit Vejiajiva as Prime Minister, who formed a government with anti-Thaksin forces winning many of the by-election seats. However, Thailand is still far from becoming politically stable, as Abhisit’s election immediately sparked a series of pro-Thaksin rallies across Thailand. 45. I thank Vipapat (Aim) Sinpeng for pointing this out. From Vipapat (Aim) Sinpeng, email message to author, 25 November 2008.46. “Thai political crisis: Dumber and dumber,” The Nation, 12 November 2008.47. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/option/print.php?newsid=30088168/. 48. “Should we expect another coup?,” Bangkok Post Forum. 49. http://www.bangkokpost.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=652/.50. Ibid.51. “Can I be Anti-Sondhi & PAD without labeled Pro-Thaksin?,” Bangkok Post Forum. http:// www.bangkokpost.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=793/.52. Thaksin took a stern and aggressive stance against the Malay Muslims’ separatist movements in the southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, Songkhla, and Narathiwat. His policies precipitated several incidences of human rights abuses, including the extrajudicial killing and massacring of Thai Malay Muslims by the local police and the Royal Thai Military. The policies escalated the violence in the South and turned the King and his chief advisor, Prem Tinsulanonda against Thaksin.53. Ibid. 54. Shinawatra, Interview, Part 1.55. Ibid, Part 2.56. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5_asDPYJKwg/. By “they”, Thaksin is most likely referring to his archenemies in PAD, as well as members of Privy Council, both of whom were responsible in persuading the army to stage a coup.57. Ibid.


This essay intends to demonstrate how neorealism offers the best theory for rationalizing American behaviour as an international state actor. Accordingly, the Bush administration’s “War on Terror” should not be seen as an isolated response to a particular problem, but must be viewed as part of a larger

strategy in a world determined by neorealist principles. The tragic events of September 2001 are therefore significant only insofar as they reinforced the option of military action amongst policymakers –an option they already had lined up on the table. This argument is supported by US interactions with two distinct foreign interests: Iraq, a state formerly considered a US-security ticking time bomb and also China, a state that continues to lend vast sums of financial capital to the US and which is considered to be no immediate threat.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

SINCE 9/11:neoreAlist resPonse to

globAl chAllenges

aRnoLd G. LimInternational Perspectives Submission:University of Glasgow


By contrasting these two case studies, I aim to demonstrate how neorealism offers the best approach for rationalizing hegemonic behavior in regard to all global challenges, not just obvious aggressors. Therefore, I shall begin by outlining a definition of neorealism as proposed by John Mearsheimer, followed by an examination of US foreign policy with regards to Iraq and China. States are no longer the only actors considered in policymakers’ agendas; hence, I shall conclude by considering how a state-centric neorealist analysis of US hegemony may be reconciled with a world of increasingly politicized non-state actors.

According to Mearsheimer, global politics operates according to five key assumptions: first, that the international system is anarchic, meaning that there is no legitimate authority that regulates inter-state behavior. Second, all states have offensive capabilities; although these capabilities vary widely, if one state intends to inflict harm on another, it has the ability to do so. Third, states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. One might comfortably predict that China is not going to deploy a nuclear missile on New York City tomorrow, but this much is not guaranteed. Fourth, all states seek survival and by maximizing military power the odds of survival improve, since the more offensive capability a state has, the less other states will want to challenge it. Finally, states are rational actors which understand the aforementioned assumptions and make foreign policy calculations with them in mind. 1 In accordance with these assumptions, the definition of neorealism employed hereafter entails that these five claims and nothing else, account for state

behavior within the international system. From this definition it follows, according

to Mearsheimer, that the most preferable position for a state to hold in the international system is that of the hegemon. Since the burden of projecting military force across long distances prevents a single state from asserting hegemony across the entire world, hegemony must be limited to a given region. Mearsheimer therefore divides those areas of the international system dominated by hegemons into three regional sub-systems:

North America, Europe, and Northeast Asia. He postulates that hegemony in North America is occupied by the US but that within Europe, the US is further balanced by the regional hegemony of Russia. Similarly, in Northeast Asia, Russia simultaneously competes for power with the US and China. Currently, it is claimed that the US is the only state powerful enough to challenge the authority of all other states across the globe. However, since geographical distances make any non-local conflict involving the hegemon extremely costly, Mearsheimer posits that the US will opt to balance the struggle for power between other states outside its region, instead of attempting a costly pursuit of world domination. Having applied this five-point definition of neorealism and its subsequent understanding to rationalizing hegemonic behavior, one may next ask how effectively this explains US foreign policy.

Following 9/11, the Bush administration worked out a new national security strategy which declared that the nation could not “remain idle while dangers gather” and that it must identify any threat and destroy it

Most preferable position for a state to hold in the international system is that of the hegemon


pre-emptively “before it reaches [American] borders.”2 It was presumed that an Iraq with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) posed a threat to domestic security in the US and that such a threat had to be dealt with immediately. However, if neutralizing

a potential aggressor was all that mattered, why did the US not also go after Iran; a country that was known to be arming Hezbollah –the sworn enemy of America’s ally –and was suspected of conducting, or attempting to conduct, a nuclear weapons program as well?3 Furthermore, Paul Wolfowitz , the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 2003, admitted in an interview that:

Contrary to so many ClaIms from the whIte house, Iraq’s supposed CaChe of wmd had never Been the most CompellIng Casus BellI. It was sImply one of several: for BureauCratIC reasons, we settled on one Issue, weapons of mass destruCtIon, BeCause It was the one reason that everyone Could agree on.4

Indeed, the decision to invade Iraq rather than Iran and to take action generally raises certain questions. If Wolfowitz’s assertion is valid, then this goes some way to undermining neorealism as a total theory for explaining state behavior, since it suggests the importance of ideas in determining international politics—something that neorealism categorically precludes. On the other hand, it also suggests that precisely because nobody knew what Iraqi intentions

were, the possibility of WMDs was a sufficient cause in moving the US to action; and this, for neorealists, proves the only factor of relevance. Even if constructivist theories address certain motivating influences in the decision to go to war that

neorealism cannot account for, this does not impinge on neorealism’s overall coherence and its ability to explain war as an eventual outcome since the conflict in Iraq correlates with Mearsheimer’s third, fourth, and fifth assumptions. Furthermore, the seemingly arbitrary decision to prioritize the nuclear threat from Iraq as more pressing than the threat from Iran is perhaps less an indictment of neorealist logic, but rather, indicative of an overall difference in purpose between rationalist and constructivist approaches. Although the specifics surrounding the Iraq-Iran quandary may require the employment of psychological or normative based analysis, there is evidence to suggest that in terms of predicting hegemonic behavior more generally, neorealism has got it right. Indeed, it could be argued that one of the major reasons for invading Iraq was to allow for the future invasion of Iran. This is supported by the fact that in September 2007, the Kyl-Lieberman Amendment (No. 3017) was passed in the Senate which permits the US to take defensive measures against Iran from within Iraq.5 In addition, it has also been alleged that the US has been operating elite commando units inside Iran since 2005 and that the frequency of these operations has been intensifying.6 Moreover, although federal law demands

For neorealists, international law offers nothing more than the illusion of order and self-regulation in a world that remains fundamentally anarchic and driven by state interest


that all Central Intelligence Agency activity be reported to Congress, it does not require the dissemination of military intelligence. This may explain why such activities have gone largely unreported in the media.

A further issue raised by the Iraq War was the lack of support offered by the French and German governments. The facts in this case might well be seen as grounds for suggesting something of an informal anti-hegemonic pact. Marc Champion describes France and Germany’s coming together on the issue of Iraq as “nothing less than the reining in of what they saw as a rogue superpower.”7 This argument is supported by the German ambassador to the UN, who “boasted in one confidential email to colleagues at his foreign ministry that their strategy was to isolate the US and make it repentantly come back to the [UN Security] Council seeking compromise.”8 Furthermore, Marc Trachtenberg writes that “for the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, the issue at hand was nothing less than the question of a new world order after the end of the Cold War” and that France, although initially cooperative, had “stabbed the United States in the back” after reneging on informal assurances that it would support the war.9 The Germans and French, therefore, had their own interests to play out in Iraq and were not about to let the US dominate the situation without considerable opposition. Consequently, the continental governments were often “more interested in balancing the American “hyperpower” than in dealing seriously with real problems.”10 With some irony Trachtenberg comments that “Europe was standing up for law and for justice, for a ‘multipolar world,’ a more balanced world, a world in which there were limits to what any single country could do.”11 Arguably, the US decision to act unilaterally was less

the result of stubbornness in a cause which the Administration believed worthwhile, but rather, the behavior of a hegemon looking to ensure its survival whilst fending off insubordination from smaller state actors. Kenneth Waltz notes that such behavior replicates the unilateral actions of hegemonic leaders throughout history such as Charles V, Louis XIV, Napoleon Bonaparte, Wilhelm II and Adolf Hitler.12 Furthermore, as a tool in their protestations over Iraq, France and Germany also appealed to international law; something which the US chose to ignore:

largely as a result of the unIted states’ own efforts, a legal system had Come Into BeIng at the end of world war II. that system, emBodIed In the un Charter, and Based on the prInCIple of the sovereIgn equalIty of all states, had “served as the framework of InternatIonal relatIons for the past half Century.” the un regIme had estaBlIshed real lImIts on the use of forCe; InternatIonal polItICs had Been “legally domestICated;” Instead of a world of unConstraIned vIolenCe, one had a world Based at least to some extent on the rule of law—that Is, on respeCt for BasIC legal prInCIples… however, the Bush admInIstratIon “was determIned to take whatever measures It felt were needed to deal wIth development whICh In Its vIew threatened amerICan seCurIty.13

The US is no stranger to breaking promises; this is evident from a tendentious history of bilateral and multilateral treaty defections. In the case of the Iraq War, it was not just a treaty, but an entire legal system


which the US turned its back on. Proponents of international law are quick to point out that such pessimism neglects the many instances in which the US has honoured its obligations; however, for neorealists, international law offers nothing more than the illusion of order and self-regulation in a world that remains fundamentally anarchic and driven by state interest. Thus, when the dictates of international law were not to the liking of the Bush administration, it “opted for a ‘strategy of violence’ –for a world in which the strong did whatever they wanted, unconstrained by any legal principle whatsoever.”14 Denny Roy writes that “Washington has tried to hijack international law, institutions and norms to help cloak the pursuit of narrow US national interests,” and this argument is supported by the fact that out of the five permanent UN Security Council members, not one has been prepared to limit its use of force to accord with the Charter proper,

which greatly undermines the extent to which international law can be regarded as binding.15 It would appear, therefore, that international law, if one should bother to include it in calculations at all, operates as a framework subordinate to anarchy. Whether France or Germany decided to invoke international law with the best of intentions proves irrelevant. What remains important is that European interests were ignored, and US interests prevailed. In this case then, the sword proved mightier than the pen.

It can also be argued that the “US government would have been willing to live with the Saddam Hussein regime if it

had not thought that this regime had active nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs.”16 This would imply that the US held only a weak interest in the significant human rights abuses present under the dictatorship and that intervention only became attractive after the threat of WMDs was recognized (that is, assuming Iraq was genuinely believed to possess such weapons). Alternatively, if Iraq was not genuinely believed to be a threat to national security, the case for neorealism is also strengthened since one would be considering nothing less than a power-politics conspiracy. Either way, by opting to go to war, US behaviour fully supports Mearsheimer’s claim that states act primarily to ensure their survival, whilst simultaneously making calculations under a precondition of uncertainty regarding other states’ intentions. It will be interesting to see whether such behaviour will be repeated in future with China, as by pledging American

support for Taiwan as a de facto d e m o c r a c y , the US has e f f e c t i v e l y

cornered itself into a potential conflict in years to come.

Mearsheimer predicts that in the future, China will increase military forces and try to dominate Asia—this being the rational behavior of the regional hegemon. In return, the US will put in place a balancing coalition for the purposes of containing China. This would take the form of building greater military forces in Asia for the purposes of containing and possibly destroying China, the same way the US did with Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.17 This is certainly supported by the fact that before being elected president in 2008, Barack Obama explicitly stated that

The evidence would suggest that the US has adopted a policy of containment; a policy that pre-empts the threat of rival powers


he intended to “strengthen [US] alliances in the Asia-Pacific region” and “retain [US] forward deployment there as well.”18 Chinese Academy of Military Sciences researcher Yao Youzhi concurs that the US has controlled and incorporated Europe and Japan, and suppressed and contained Russia and China, thus precluding competition from other potential poles.19 Accordingly, “many Chinese perceive America’s recent upgrading of alliances with Japan and Australia as being the ‘two parts of an anti-China pincer.’”20 With regards to whether China is happy to be contained, Roy comments that “the Chinese would certainly hope to see China replace the United States as the main security player and arbiter in Asia,” but whether the US will allow this to happen is a different story.21 Yong Deng writes that “Chinese assessment sees the United States as a hegemon on the offensive for power aggrandizement,” and this claim would seem to be reinforced by an increase in US military spending, as well as attempts to expand NATO, to strengthen American alliances and military presence in Asia and to develop a missile defense system.22 Thus, from China’s perspective:

the planned us BallIstIC-mIssIle defense system Is at Best a gross overreaCtIon to the danger of a mIssIle attaCk from a rogue Country or terrorIst group, and more plausIBly a veIled attempt to neutralIze ChIna’s nuClear retalIatory CapaBIlIty.23

The “War on Terror” is perceived by many Chinese as simply a campaign to solidify a global hegemony which sees the US as preeminent in North America and all other regional hegemons checked and balanced under conditions of American

choosing. Although US-Chinese relations have recently improved, the Chinese remain suspicious of the intentions behind US foreign policy. As illustrated:

ChInese polICymakers InCreasIngly realIze that a ConfrontatIonal posture towards the us, and even voCIferous ComplaInIng aBout us “hegemonIsm”, wIll lIkely elICIt a tougher amerICan polICy towards ChIna… thIs would explaIn why, as roBert sutter and others argue, the relatIvely tough Bush II posture towards ChIna—CharaCterIsed By less wIllIngness than the ClInton admInIstratIon to offer ChIna ConCessIons and more wIllIngness to tolerate a deterIoratIon In BIlateral relatIons—resulted In a more ConCIlIatory approaCh to amerICa from the ChInese.24

This would suggest that improved relations with China are not demonstrative of any real changes, but rather, that such diplomacy only masks the power struggle between a hegemon and an aspiring hegemon disguised under the pretence of liberal cooperation. In opposition, many liberals would claim that the US is only seeking to improve diplomatic relations with a country that is increasingly integrated with its own economy. However, this possibility is greatly undermined since the majority of improvement in diplomatic relations comes as a result of Chinese rather than American efforts. Indeed, it was China who chose to support the war to overthrow the Taliban and there is little evidence to suggest that the US has done much to repay the favor. If anything, the US has sought to degrade China’s legitimacy in the international community and to reduce its


power regionally by selling arms to Taiwan. President Obama has also said that “he will act to ensure that Taiwan, a thriving democracy, is not coerced into accepting a change in its status against its will” – the implications of which remain ominous.25 For now, however, China seems prepared to let this happen, until perhaps it finds itself in a position of greater power in the future. Thus, although China poses no immediate challenge to American hegemony, the evidence would suggest that the US has adopted a policy of containment; a policy that pre-empts the threat of rival powers (whether indeed such a threat exists) and a policy that operates according to the same basic survivalist rationale which inspired the invasion of Iraq.

In sum therefore, Mearsheimer’s model of hegemonic behavior has been effective in rationalizing US behavior in two distinct cases. It is unclear whether the US government seriously believed that Iraq was a threat to US security and even had WMDs been found, America’s pre-emptive approach still supports neorealist assumptions regarding state behavior. China is not believed to pose any immediate threat to the US; nevertheless, American actions, whether or not reflecting ulterior intentions, have provided ideal foundations for the containment of an aspiring hegemon. Nonetheless, although neorealism has offered insights in these two particular cases, it remains inadequate as a total system for rationalizing US behavior. Neorealism postulates that the state is the only relevant unit for calculation within the international system; this position, however, is becoming less and less tenable with the upsurge in transnational terrorist activity and one might reasonably ask how neorealism could explain the significant attention policymakers have given to these non-state actors in the post-9/11 era. The best neorealist

approaches can do is to try to evaluate the logic of states that assist terrorists, but by its very nature, neorealism is precluded from analyzing sub-state or transnational activities.

Central to Mearsheimer’s model is not only the claim that all states seek survival, but also that from this existential disposition, states with less military power will be disinclined to challenge those with more.26 Thus, even supposing one is charitable to the theory and reconstructs it by extending Mearsheimer’s approach beyond its state-centric confines, a problem of incoherence arises when a similar reasoning is applied to terrorist organizations. The base assumption that small respects big in the international system is undermined by terrorist groups with the audacity to challenge any state actor no matter how militarily predominant. This completely contradicts the importance that neorealists place on an international system ordered by a balance of power. Therefore, so long as terrorist organizations play an influential role in determining US actions –and considering that the “War on Terror” has proven the central issue of US foreign policy for the past seven years – neorealism will remain insufficient as a total theory of hegemonic behavior.

Even with these limitations acknowledged, the explanatory power of neorealism is far from exhausted. This is suggested by the National Security Strategy of 2002 which redefines what entitles the US to launch a “pre-emptive” strike.27 Historically, the doctrine of pre-emption required a high degree of certainty that one’s enemies had both the capability and intention to attack. In the updated Security Strategy however, pre-emption does not require the same degree of certainty; instead, it is capability that forms the most important criterion in deciding whether to launch military action.


In this sense, Gallucci describes America’s modern approach to pre-emptive warfare as something more akin to “preventive war.”28 The US now recognizes that if it wishes to retain its global influence, it must reinforce its ability to act offensively in the pursuit of survival, since nowadays, with the potential spread of nuclear weapons to rogue states or terrorist organizations, the lives of civilians in the West are seriously threatened. If terrorists managed to obtain a nuclear weapon with the correct knowledge,

it would be very easy to obliterate any major western shipping port.29 The stakes are high and in redefining its policy on pre-emption (assuming it will act on such a policy), US behavior suggests an approach largely explicable under neorealism but applied to a world not wholly defined, although primarily dominated, by states. Accordingly, American behavior continues to endorse the validity of Mearsheimer’s claims when transacting with states; however, alterations in policy also indicate America’s need to update its application of traditional concepts such as sovereignty, just war, and international law, in order to maintain its own survival in a world of increasingly accessible nuclear weapons that give no regard to state borders. Despite a shortcoming in neorealism’s ability to account for the logic of non-state

actors, in terms of explaining US foreign policy it remains the dominant theory.

In summary, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the US employs a pre-emptive rationale to all its foreign policy and not simply as a response to obvious aggressors. Such indifference to circumstances of tension and those of relative peace is demonstrated by the handling of Iraq and China with equal suspicion. This is something which affirms neorealism’s continued relevance in explaining US behavior. However,

the events of 9/11 highlight the growing importance of terrorist organizations and the need for greater consideration of non-state actors in the future analysis of foreign policy. With a new age beckoning, the world now looks to the Obama administration for closure on a troubled chapter of American history. At the first US presidential debate of 2008, President-Elect Obama said that he was prepared to sit down with anybody (Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Hugo Chavez and Raul Castro included), if it would keep America safe.30 One can only watch with bated breath to see how long such idealism will last, since the age-old concerns of conflict, uncertainty, and survival did not descend on America overnight and so long as the international system remains anarchic, they will not be gone in the morning.

There is considerable evidence to suggest that the US employs a pre-emptive rationale to all its foreign policy and

not simply as a response to obvious aggressors


ENDNOTE

1. T John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 360–402.2. Marc Trachtenberg, “ Preventive War and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Security Studies 16, no.1, 2007. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all?content=10.1080/096364107013045233. Council on Foreign Relations, “State Sponsors: Iran,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/9362/4. Sam Tanenhaus, ‘‘Bush’s Brain Trust,’’ Vanity Fair, July 2003, 169.5. United States Senate Legislation and Records, “U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 110th Congress - 1st Session,” United States Senate, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_ vote_cfm.cfm?congress=110&session=1&vote=003496. Seymour Hersh, “Preparing the Battlefield,” New Yorker, July 7, 2008, 80.7. Marc Champion, Charles Fleming, Ian Johnson, and Carla Anne Robbins, ‘‘Allies at Odds: Behind US Rift With Europeans. Slights and Politics: Schroder and Chirac Discover How Popular Tweaking a Superpower Can Be,’’ Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2003.8. Ibid9. Research Papers in Economics, “The Iraq Crisis and the Future of the Western Alliance: An American View,” Ideas. http://ideas.repec.org/p/erp/euirsc/p0143.html10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Kenneth Waltz, “Alone in the World,” (paper presented in a lecture at the University of California Berkeley, California, USA, February 10, 2003).13. Research Papers in Economics, “The Iraq Crisis and the Future of the Western Alliance: An American View,” Ideas, http://ideas.repec.org/p/erp/euirsc/p0143.html14. Ibid. 15. Denny Roy, “China’s reaction to American Predominance,” Survival 45, no.3, 2003. http:// www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a714052609~db=all16. Research Papers in Economics, “The Iraq Crisis and the Future of the Western Alliance: An American View,” Ideas, http://ideas.repec.org/p/erp/euirsc/p0143.html17. John Mearsheimer, “The Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations” (paper presented in a lecture at the University of California Berkeley, California, USA, April 8, 2002).18. Barack Obama and Joe Biden: The Change We Need - Foreign Policy, “Barack Obama’s Plan to Actively Engage China,” Barack Obama and Joe Biden: The Change We Need, http://www. barackobama.com/pdf/FactSheetChina.pdf19. Yao Youzhi, “US Strategic Orientation in the 21st Century as viewed from the Kosovo War,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, 1999, 1114.20. Denny Roy, “China’s reaction to American Predominance,” Survival 45, no.3, 2003, 60. http:// www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a714052609~db=all.21. Ibid. 22. Yong Deng, “Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on US Global Strategy,” Political Science Quarterly 116, no. 3, Fall 2001, 352.23. Denny Roy, “China’s reaction to American Predominance,” Survival 45, no.3, 2003, http:// www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a714052609~db=all.24. Ibid. 25. Barack Obama and Joe Biden: The Change We Need - Foreign Policy, “Barack Obama’s Plan to Actively Engage China,” Barack Obama and Joe Biden: The Change We Need, http://www. barackobama.com/pdf/FactSheetChina.pdf.26. John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 360–402.27. Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002,” Office of the Under Secretary for Defense of Acquisition Technology and Logistics, http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncb


dp/nm/docs/Relevant%20Docs/national_security_strategy.pdf.28. Robert Gallucci, “Rogue States and Weapons of Mass Destruction” (paper presented in a lecture at the University of California Berkeley, California, USA, February 11, 2002).29. Ibid. 30. Election Center 2008, “Transcript of First Presidential Debate,” CNN Politics.com, http:// edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/09/26/debate.mississippi.transcript/.


ISRAEL & PALESTINE:conflict through the eyes of children

Artworks Provided by Peace and Love International

“I WANT TO LIVE IN PEACE”

Peace & Love International was officially started in January 2008 with a mandate of empowering those in war-torn and less-developed countries around the world by providing the ways and means for aid, development, and education in a self-sufficient and sustainable way. Three months before

the charity was officially started I came across an article on the BBC about a school in Palestine by the name of Hope Flowers, which is located in the occupied territories and acts as a centre of growth for the children who range from kindergarten to grade 6. This school quickly caught my attention, particularly because it teaches its students about

yashaR keRamati


Photo Essays

conflict resolution, religious tolerance, and peace. Additionally, it provides women with vocational training, and the community-at-large with trauma relief. Given the dismal conditions in the region, I was pleasantly shocked to see such forward-thinking.

After much research, I got in touch with the director of the school. I wanted to help the children there to help themselves in a unique way, by showing their struggle to those in the more developed world. In this way, the children could help educate by illustrating their hardships, hopefully inspiring the international community to take further action towards helping the Palestinian children. I asked the director to get the children to create drawings that simply depicted how they felt about their lives, accompanied by a short statement by the child as well as a picture of him or her. I raised some money and sent it to the school in order to pay for the art material and the shipping of the children’s work. In late December I returned from a volunteer trip to Haiti and found a package from Palestine at my home.

Over the next two months, and with the help of a handful of hardworking, selfless, passionate, and dedicated Agents of Change, we put together an exhibit of the children’s artwork to raise both awareness and funds for them. Thousands were spent on framing the artwork, and in early February Peace & Love International hosted its first exhibit called “Art for Hope.” The money that was raised from this event went directly to the school to fully cover the costs of two children’s tuitions, whose parents were either deceased or could not afford it due to financial hardships brought about by the occupation.

The beauty of this event was that it told the story of the occupation through some

“I REFUSE THE DIVID-ING OF MY LAND

RIFAT


Photo Essays

of the most honest, innocent and purest eyes; those of children. While the pieces were all very unique and beautiful in their own way, the overall message was the same: the children did not want to suffer and wanted their land and families to be free of occupation, misery, violence, and hatred. Furthermore, tanks, occupational forces, blood, the apartheid wall, guns and young Palestinian children were, disturbingly, on almost all drawings. Essays can be, and have been, written at great lengths about the conflict defending different sides and views; however, no person can argue with unacceptable, inhumane and wanton suffering of children. There is no room for debate when the topic at hand is the well-being of innocent kids. The issue is plain and clear: these children are in dire pain and are being punished for only one crime: being Palestinian. Through our exhibit we sought not only to help these students have a chance at growth through education in order to overcome their hardships, but also to show as many people as possible about the horrible realities that these children are burdened with everyday.

“Art for Hope” is an on-going exhibit and has been displayed both in Canada and the United States. Peace & Love International is equally concerned for all human rights abuses around the world and strives to achieve human security for all. Currently Peace & Love International has unique projects in Palestine, Ecuador, and will be building the Peace & Love Growth Centre in Nigeria in 2009. For more information on these projects, how to get involved, or how to help please visit www.PeaceandLoveInternational.com.

“I LOVE LIFE, WHY MUST WE LIVE IN FEAR?”

AZHAR


“I FEEL SCARED. I CAN’T PLAY WITH MY FRIENDS. I CAN’T SLEEP BECAUSE OF THIS.”

MOHAMMED YACOUB SALAH

edItor’s note:

We have chosen to include selections from the “Art for Hope” exhibition not as a po-litical statement in regards to the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine, but in order to present a perspective of conflict that is often forgotten. It is our goal to illus-trate the very real ramifications of conflict zones that are overlooked by media reports and high politics alike. As global citizens, we are concerned with the well-being and human security of men, women and children the world over, and we hope that this presentation helps, in any small way, to broaden our own perspectives of this and other international conflicts.


Contributors

ANTHONY HAMILTON is a recent graduate who majored in History and Po-litical Science. His interest in international relations revolves around international norms and institutions, particularly in how they affect resource governance. Antho-ny hopes to pursue graduate studies in Public Policy.

BRENT LEVENSTADT is a third year History Honours student, specializing in the origins of the Cold War. He is originally from Toronto, and plans to attend law school one day.

ARNOLD G. LIM is a fourth year student at the University of Glasgow double majoring in Political Science and Philosophy. Whilst spending his junior year at the University of California Los Angeles, he acquired a particular interest in US foreign policy and its global consequences. After graduation, Arnold plans on becoming an officer with the British Army.

RAHIM MOHAMED is a fourth year Political Science major and International Relations minor. He is interested in the dynamics of multilateral politics, specifically vis-a-vis the governance of international trade and finance. After graduation, Rahim plans to pursue further studies in Comparative Politics.

VANESSA NICOLSON is a Masters student in International Relations. Her research interests are in international security studies, broadly conceived. Her work focuses on the security dilemmas of and within developing states, including issues of nuclear non-proliferation, human security, and forced migration. She intends to write her Masters thesis on the dilemmas of addressing the human security concerns of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Vanessa completed her undergraduate degree in Political Science (Honours) at the University of Western Ontario.

ANASTASIA TELESETSKY is a Masters of law student at UBC. She is finish-ing a Masters on climate change and insurance law. She will start as an Assistant Professor of Law at University of Idaho in July 2009.

JIM WU is a graduating History Honours with International Relations student. His graduating thesis looks at official, foreign-academic, and individual recollections of post-Mao Shanghai between 1976 and 1989. His academic interests focus on socio economic developments within China and Russia, particularly their recent adapta-tion of capitalist systems. After graduation, he plans to either pursue further studies in law or to work in the Canadian Foreign Service.



JIA Directors and Editors

EMILY BROWN is a third year Economics major with a minor in Commerce. Her areas of interest include international trade and finance, and the economics of climate change. She hopes to spend a semester on exchange in Europe before pursuing a graduate degree in Economics.

PEGGY CHANG is a fourth year US Studies Major with a minor in Political Science, graduating in 2009. Her areas of interests include international trade and finance and American political thought. Post-graduation, she plans to pursue a practical business degree and start contributing to society.

AUBRIE CHAYLT is a fourth year English Literature major. Her areas of interests include modern North American and Canadian indigenous literature. After a healthy dose of traveling following graduation, she plans on picking up and heading east to pursue graduate studies in either journalism or literature.

SARAH CHUNG is a first year Arts student who plans on pursing a major in International Relations with a minor in Political Science. Her areas of interests include security, international law, and global journalism. She writes regularly for the Ubyssey Newspaper is very excited to be part of the editorial team for JIA.

ELYSE ECONOMIDES is a third year international student who hails from California and is majoring in English Language and minoring in Family Studies. Once she graduates, she hopes to pursue a career in the publishing industry, particularly in the area of magazine publications. Her goal in life is to one day become the editor-in-chief of the newly created Food Network magazine.

CAITRIN INNIS is a fourth year, European History major and English Literature minor. She is graduating in 2009 and hoping to continue her studies in journalism at UBC.

MARGARITA J. ITURRIAGA B. is a third year Political Science major with a minor in International Relations. Her areas of interest include international law, international development, and global politics, specifically focusing on the politics of Mexico, her home country, and the Middle East. She plans to spend some time in the the Middle East after she graduates. After her trip she wishes to pursue a graduate degree in Law combined with a Masters in Public Policy at Harvard University.

DANIELLE JOHNSON is a graduating Political Science student with a minor in History. Her academic interests include Canadian international relations and North American politics. She plans to pursue a graduate degree and career in


86 Journal of International Affairs | 200994 Journal of International Affairs | 2009


journalism. Danielle also hopes to become involved with local government management, working on the issues which face the province of British Columbia and its communities.

BRENT LEVENSTADT is a third year Honours History student, specializing in the origins of the Cold War. He is originally from Toronto, and this is his second year working on the Journal of International Affairs. He plans to attend law school one day.

HELEN LUI is a third year Arts student, who plans to complete an English Language major with a minor in Geography. Her interests include English literature, urban studies, studio and interactive arts, as well as the study of various languages. Upon completion of her degree, she hopes to travel in Europe and Asia before pursuing a teaching degree.

VIVIAN LUK is a fourth year International Relations major. Her interests are international political economy, country risk analysis and international development. She spent an exchange term in Australia in 2008, focusing on Australia foreign relations with Southeast Asia. After graduation, she hopes to volunteer in either Latin America or Southeast Asia on development projects, and to pursue a Masters in journalism.

AMANDA MAGEE is a fourth year Political Science major with a minor in English Literature. Her academic areas of interest include foreign policy and international development, with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa. After obtaining her degree this spring, she plans on completing an internship abroad and continuing to travel in Africa, with the ultimate goal of pursuing a career in international law.

ALEXANDRA McCARTER is a third year Honours Political Science with IR major, with a minor in Asian Studies. Her particular interest is in South Asian identity politics. When she is not studying IR she likes to go to the mountains and have adventures. After UBC, Alexandra hopes to go to on a long trip, and then to grad or law school.

MARTIN McCARVILL is a first-year MA student in English from Victoria. He got involved with the JIA simply because he is interested in keeping up on the state of the world. As for career plans, anything that lets him write and go sailing on weekends is fine by him!

KATERINA ORTAKOVA is in her last year of the English major program. She will be graduating in May 2009 and hopes to attend Journalism school in the fall.

2009 | Journal of International Affairs 87 2009 | Journal of International Affairs 95


Her desire to become a journalist stems from her interest in international relations. She has enjoyed being a member of the JIA 2009 editing team tremendously and would like to congratulate everyone on the team for putting together such a relevant and interesting edition!

LEANNE PAGE is a rabid Victorianist from Victoria, BC. She is currently working on a MA Thesis in English entitled “Masochistic Pleasures of Detection in the Sensation Novels of Wilkie Collins.” Her career goal is to become a professor of English (specializing in Victorian literature, of course).

SASHA PARVANI is a third year student majoring in International Relations from Vancouver. She believes that in an increasingly interconnected world, the study of international relations facilitates our understanding of the world around us. After graduation, she plans on studying international law. Furthermore, she intends to work for the UN at some point in the future.

JULIANNE PIPER is a fourth year International Relations major. She studied in the UK for a year on exchange, and hopes to see much more of the world before pursuing either further education or work within the international community.

KATY RAMSDEN is a third-year History major whose interests include biology, Near Eastern studies and Canadian literature.

JONATHAN ROSEN is a fourth year English Literature major and History minor. His interests in international relations primarily revolve around the Canada-US relationship, particularly in discovering the nature of Canada’s domestic and international identity as it exists within the shadow of our enormous neighbour to the south. After graduation Jonathan plans to pursue MA studies in American Literature.

NICOLE ROSYCHUK is a second year Arts student who plans to major in Inter-national Relations with a minor in Women’s and Gender Studies or Philosophy. She is a member of IRSA and the External Model United Nations Delegation which is traveling to New York in April 2009. Her particular interests are in human rights, so-cial and cultural development and international law.

JULIE STRICKER is a fourth year English major, minoring in International Relations. She hopes to pursue a Masters of Public Administration after she graduates in May, which she aims to use at an NGO that combats human trafficking.

MICHELLE SZ is in her fifth year at UBC, undertaking a double major in both



Science and Arts in the fields of Astrophysics and English Literature. She loves to travel, and spent an exchange semester at the University of Birmingham in the United Kingdom in the year 2007. She hopes to pursue a career that will allow her to work internationally, and is considering further studies and work in the area of journalism.

CHELSEA THERIAULT is technically Canadian, but has spent most of her life in South Asia. She is a fourth-year student of English Literature, and hopes to get involved in the publishing industry.

LISANE THIRSK is in her final year of a double major in Latin American Studies and Spanish. She is interested in international development theory and mental health in postcolonial nations. She plans on taking a year to travel and write before continuing with grad school.

HANNAH THORNE is a fourth year student at UBC, pursuing a major in Philosophy and a minor in English literature. Upon graduation she aspires to work in the publishing industry or in a magazine, as an editor and hopefully one day a writer. Her ultimate goal is to be a fiction novelist.

PAMELA TOOR is a fourth year International Relations and Sociology double major. Her areas of interest and study include: urban development, migration and ethnic/cultural studies. Following her undergraduate degree she plans on pursuing graduate work in Public Administration with the hopes of working in the public policy sector in the future.

VANESSA VAN DEN BOOGAARD is a fourth year International Relations major graduating in December 2009. Her primary academic interests include international humanitarian law, conflict analysis and security studies, focusing regionally on the Middle East and South-Central Asia. Upon graduation she hopes to pursue an internship abroad to supplement her studies, before continuing with a graduate degree in International and Public Affairs - all in a desperate effort to avoid facing the ‘real world’ for as long as is reasonably possible.


thIs year, the edItIng staff of the JIa emBraCed uBC’s trek 2010 vIsIon By enCouragIng and expandIng an InternatIonal opportunIty for students aCross uBC’s partner unIversIty network to share theIr researCh and dIstInCt perspeCtIves regardIng Contemporary InternatIonal affaIrs. the peer-led proJeCt, whICh seeks to BuIld ConneCtIons Between undergraduate students aCross the unIversItas 21 (u21) network, allows for students of the 21 InternatIonal partner unIversItIes to suBmIt relevant artICles to the JIa for puBlICatIon. the edItors of the JIa feel that the InItIatIve ContrIButes to the InternatIonal relatIons students assoCIatIons’ CommItment to faCIlItatIng praCtICal dIalogue on Issues pertaInIng to InternatIonal relatIons By welComIng Ideas from students of InternatIonal unIversItIes and provIdIng them a new audIenCe wIth whICh to share theIr work.

the edItors of the JIa would lIke to reCognIze the arts undergraduate soCIety (aus) for Its generous sponsorshIp whICh allowed thIs InItIatIve to take plaCe. through the dean’s grant the aus has shown tremendous support to the numerous proJeCts InItIated By uBC’s undergraduate students. the aus’ ContInued CommItment to the students It serves allows uBC undergraduates to provIde InnovatIve, peer-led proJeCts whICh enhanCe theIr greater aCademIC experIenCes.

Acknowledgements

ARTS UNDERGRADUATE SOCIETY


uBC has long enCouraged gloBal CItIzenshIp as a key part of aCademIC development. for twenty-fIve years, Irsa has ConsIstently worked to develop Co-CurrICular programs that help aChIeve thIs goal. Irsa produCes puBlICatIons suCh as the JIa, as well as dIreCtIng for-CredIt semInars, sendIng memBers to ConferenCes all over the world, and CreatIng opportunItIes to host leadIng fIgures and IntelleCtuals at uBC. people don’t Just Come to uBC to speak to our CommunIty, But to engage wIth It.

Our core projects include:

the uBC Journal of InternatIonal affaIrs the uBC model unIted natIons ConferenCe

nIght of a thousand dInners In support of demInIng BI-annual foreIgn polICy ConferenCes

InternatIonal relatIons program graduate assIstanCe external model unIted natIons delegatIon

model nato delegatIon

model european unIon delegatIon

InternatIonal opportunItIes Career faIr

InternatIonal relatIons soCIal events

weekly meetIngs

Irsa memBershIp Is avaIlaBle to all uBC students and alumnI.www.Irsa.Ca | +1.604.822.1604 | [email protected] uBC student unIon BuIldIng, room 30gvanCouver, BC, Canada v6t 1z1

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDENTS ASSOCIATION

Acknowledgements


The Journal of International Affairs and the International Relations Students Association would like to thank the follow-ing organizations and departments for their generous support for our programs:

UBC Alma Mater SocietyUBC Arts Undergraduate SocietyThe Centre for International RelationsDepartment of National DefenceUBC Institute for European StudiesLiu Institute for Global IssuesUBC International HouseUBC International Relations ProgramSimons Centre for Disarmament & Non-Proliferation Research

Thank You...