Journal of Contemporary Studies...Journal of Contemporary Studies A bi-annual publication of the Faculty of Contemporary Studies Patron-in-Chief Lieutenant General Aamer Riaz , HI

Journal of Contemporary Studies A bi-annual publication of the Faculty of Contemporary Studies

Patron-in-Chief Lieutenant General Aamer Riaz , HI (M), President, National Defence University, Islamabad.

Chairman Prof. Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Dean, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.

EDITORIAL BOARD Editor-in-Chief Prof. Dr. Zulfqar Khan Editor Prof. Dr. Shaheen Akhtar

Assistant Editors

Research Associates

Dr. Shahzad Hussain Dr. Zafar Khan Dr. Afsah Qazi Dr. Muhammad Munir Dr. Rifaat Haque Dr. Shazia Hassan Ms. Anum Babur

Ms. Iffat Pervaz Ms. Hafsah Batool

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD Prof. Ian Talbot, Professor of Modern British History at the University of

Southampton, UK. Prof. Dr. Sally Wallace, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State

University, USA. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Asutay, School of Government and International Affairs, Durham

University, UK. Prof. Marvin G. Weinbaum, Director for Pakistan Studies at the Middle East

Institute, USA. Dr. Andrew Futter, Associate Professor of International Politics at University of

Leicester, UK. Dr. Julian Droogan, Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Macquarie

University, Australia. Dr. S. Gulden Ayman, Associate Professor, Marmara University Istanbul, Turkey. Dr. Nishchal N. Pandey, Director Centre for South Asian Studies, Kathmandu, Nepal. Dr. Ying Rong, Senior Research Fellow, China Institute of International Studies

(CIIS). Prof. Tim Edmunds, Director of Teaching and Learning, School of Sociology, Politics

and International Studies (SPAIS), University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom. Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi, Political and Defence Analyst, Pakistan. Dr. Moonis Ahmar, Dean Faculty of Arts, University of Karachi, Pakistan. Dr. Rashid Ahmad Khan, Dean Social Sciences, University of Sargodha, Pakistan. Dr. Ejaz Hussain, Professor National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam

University, Islamabad.

Winter 2018 Volume VII, Number 2

JOURNAL OF

Editor-in-Chief Prof. Dr. Zulfqar Khan

Editor

Prof. Dr. Shaheen Akhtar

Faculty of Contemporary Studies National Defence University

Islamabad, Pakistan

Editor’s Note

The Journal of Contemporary Studies is a flagship publication of the Faculty of Contemporary Studies (FCS), National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad. It started with the unequivocal objective of advancing critically oriented, inter-disciplinary academic and intellectual discourse. It is a bi-annual, double blind peer-reviewed journal, which offers its readers- in academia, government and the policymaking world- in-depth and scholarly analyses and diverse policy perspectives on important contemporary issues and ongoing debates in the areas of national and international security, public policy, and the wider field of world politics.

This issue comprises of five articles, two book reviews and four documents providing valuable primary information on significant international developments. The first article, Deconstructing India’s Kashmir Policy, 2014-2018, written by Ershad Mahmud examines the BJP-led Narendra Modi government’s muscular policy, promising integration of the disputed State of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union, championing an overtly hostile stance towards Pakistan, escalating tension on the LoC and shunning political engagement with the Kashmiris. It argues that a policy of development without political engagement is a negation of the genuine political aspirations of the people of Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) and denial of their fundamental rights.

The second article authored by Dr. Adil Sultan is titled, Nuclear Ban Treaty: Can it Unravel the Global Non-Proliferation Regime? It argues that the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNWs) was negotiated with the primary objective of creating a new international norm, to bring pressure upon all the nuclear possessor states to work towards nuclear disarmament. However, it has caused more divisions between the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) that could affect the outcome of the 2020 NPT (Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty) Review Conference.

The third article is by Dr. Muhammad Nadeem Mirza titled, The Role of Leadership and Idiosyncrasy in US Foreign Policy towards Pakistan. The author provides a historical record of US foreign policy towards Pakistan and tries to look into the determinants of various postures the US had in different time periods, and during different administrations. The article asserts, in line with the Poliheuristic Theory that domestic political factors, the backgrounds, cognition and personalities of Presidents in the office, and also the input given by their close advisors, always affected the specific shifts in US foreign policy towards Pakistan amidst the changing structural realties and systemic forces.

The fourth article is titled, The Law on Television Coverage of Sensitive Content in Pakistan: A Legal Insight, authored by Muhammad Sajjad and Dr. Juriah binti Abd. Jalil. It asserts that the private media houses need to follow a code of conduct while covering and broadcasting sensitive issues which can have implications for social order and peace in the country. In this regard, the article evaluates the effectiveness of PEMRA Code 2015, i.e. whether the code sufficient to provide an ethical framework and regulatory mechanisms for the said issue. In comparison with the Malaysian code and Ofcom of UK, the study finds the PEMRA code to be in need of a revamping in order to check the irresponsible coverage of sensitive content by media.

In the last article by Misbah Arif and Dr. Raja Qaiser Ahmed is titled The -Trajectory of Pakistan-Russia Relations: Emerging Contours and Future Prospects. The article argues that the change in Russia’s foreign policy and especially its Eastward policy is a response to a set of international, regional and domestic factors. The article posits that both Russia and Pakistan are looking forward to diversifying their foreign policy options amidst changing strategic contexts and share complementary interests for enhancing their bilateral ties. The areas of possible cooperation include trade, energy and defense.

I am grateful to all the contributors who have sent their articles for this issue, and the anonymous peer-reviewers whose valuable comments helped authors to improve their contributions. We hope that the study of this journal will invoke a desire among readers to contribute their perspectives on the ongoing academic debates. Contributions are invited from a broad spectrum of related fields like political science, security studies, political economy, terrorism, politics and religion, politics of energy, feminism, media and politics, management sciences, leadership psychology, military strategy, modern history, international law, sociology, education, conflict management and resolution, urban studies, demography, social anthropology, development studies, foreign policy analysis etc.

We are accepting articles for the upcoming issue of the Journal of Contemporary Studies based on original qualitative or quantitative research, an innovative conceptual framework or a substantial literature review that opens new areas of inquiry and investigation. Case studies and comparative analyses are also welcome. The editorial team at the journal promotes submissions from expert analysts from around the world. The Journal seeks to promote a scholarly understanding of contemporary developments and changes related to aforementioned disciplines/fields of social sciences. It intends to stimulate interdisciplinary research and writing.

Editor Dr. Shaheen Akhtar

CONTENTS

ARTICLES 1. Deconstructing India’s Kashmir policy, 2014-2018

Ershad Mahmud

1

2. Nuclear Ban Treaty: Can it Unravel the Global Non-Proliferation Regime?

Dr. Adil Sultan

17

3. The Role of Leadership and Idiosyncrasy in US Foreign Policy towards Pakistan

Dr. Muhammad Nadeem Mirza

33

4. The Law on Television Coverage of Sensitive Content in Pakistan: A Legal Insight

Muhammad Sajjad & Dr. Juriah binti Abd. Jalil

53

5. The Trajectory of Pakistan-Russia Relations: Emerging Contours and Future Prospects

Misbah Arif & Dr. Raja Qaiser Ahmed

66

BOOK REVIEWS

1. How Nations Succeed: Manufacturing, Trade, Industrial Policy, and Economic Development 82

Murat A. Yülek

2. AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order 85

Kai-Fu Lee

DOCUMENTS 1. India-Russia Joint Statement during Visit of

President of Russia to India - October 5, 2018. 88

2. Joint Statement on the Inaugural U.S.-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue - September 6, 2018.

102

3. Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on Strengthening China-Pakistan All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership and Building Closer China-Pakistan Community of Shared Future in the New Era- November 4, 2018.

106

4. Statement by H.E. Wang Yi State Councilor and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China at the Security Council Open Debate on the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, September 26, 2018.

114

Deconstructing Modi’s Kashmir Policy

1

DECONSTRUCTING MODI’S KASHMIR POLICY, 2014-2018

Ershad Mahmud

Abstract In the years following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ascent to power in May 2014, the Kashmir Valley went through massive protests, commonly called uprising or third intifada. Prime Minister Modi promised to reintegrate disputed State of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union during the election campaign, championing an overtly hostile stance towards Pakistan. In the following years, major contours of the ruling right-wing Bhartiya Janta Party’s Kashmir policy has largely been grounded in unpromising assertiveness. Unexpectedly, a massive uprising erupted in the Kashmir Valley in 2016 which, despite oppressive measures by India, has refused to die down to date. On the other hand, the Line of Control (LoC) has also witnessed unprecedented ceasefire violations while India-Pakistan relations are touching the lowest ebb. This study argues that a policy of development without political engagement is a negation of the genuine political aspirations of the people of Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) and a denial of their fundamental rights. Keywords: Jammu and Kashmir, Line of Control, India-Pakistan, Bharatiya Janata Party, APHC, Peace Constituency

Introduction

ince August 2014, India-Pakistan relations have been on a bumpy road. This unfortunate downwards trajectory began when New Delhi cancelled talks with Islamabad on 19th August, 2014, presumably due

to Pakistani High Commissioner’s intention to have a consultative meeting with the Kashmiri leaders, ahead of foreign secretaries’ talks to discuss the resumption of formal dialogue. The power transfer, from the Congress Party to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by the Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May 2014, sent fairly positive signals. Hoping to capitalize on the momentum of a new government, Prime Minister Nawaz

Ershad Mahmud is the Executive Director of Centre for Peace, Development

and Reforms (CPDR), and Islamabad/Rawalakot based analyst.

S

2 Journal of Contemporary Studies, Vol. VII, No.2, Winter 2018

Sharif hastened to New Delhi to Modi’s swearing-in ceremony on his invitation. It was regarded as a grand initiative across the world but it did not last for more than eight weeks.

The BJP government’s approach towards Pakistan as well as the issue of Jammu and Kashmir went through radical changes. Since attaining power, the BJP government has employed coercive diplomacy coupled with belligerent rhetoric, and the violations of the ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) have increased manifold while dialogue at the official level has been suspended. Above all, cross-LoC interaction and Track II engagement has systematically been discouraged during the last five years.

Additionally, a heavy-handed approach was employed to handle the Kashmir conflict. As a result, political engagement froze. BJP’s approach called off all communication, formal and informal, with the Kashmiri resistance leadership and has shown zero interest in political engagement. Worse, Kashmiri freedom fighters are being imprisoned and political activities are being suppressed by the security forces. The absence of dialogue and engagement in Occupied Kashmir has generated increased disenchantment and despondency. Consequently, a sizeable number of young people, including highly educated individuals, are joining militants’ ranks. This has caused a massive spike in violence.

At the domestic level; the BJP, for the first time in history, ascended to power in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) by partnering with People’s Democratic Party (PDP). This alliance promised to make significant political and administrative inroads to improve the situation in the disputed territory. The BJP, as a partner in the coalition government, tried hard to push its agenda such as erosion of Kashmir’s special constitutional status granted though article 370 and 35-A. These ill-fated plans further strengthened the cynicism about New Delhi’s intent and consequently fuelled the resistance movement.

A decade-long ceasefire along the 720-km long Line of Control (LoC) and 198-km long working boundary, dividing the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir became practically irrelevant. Shelling across the LoC is currently at its highest levels and resident communities live under the shadow of fear and death. Clearly, the Indian military leadership took quite an aggressive stance towards Pakistan, on the pretext of terrorism to win the approval of their hard-core support base. India even claimed that it had conducted a surgical strike inside Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and allegedly destroyed a few so-called terrorist establishments. No real evidence was ever provided to support this declaration.

Against this backdrop, the paper deals with various facets of India’s political, military and diplomatic strategy from 2014 to 2018. Second, it will examine BJP’s overall strategy regarding the domestic Kashmiri politics. Third, it will examine BJP’s relations with Pakistan in the context of Kashmir. Fourth, it will analyze the indigenous Kashmiri


3

response to India’s initiatives such as attempts at mainstreaming Kashmir, its infrastructural developmental plans and heightened use of military oppression. Fifth, it identifies obstacles to conflict resolution mechanisms and discusses steps which can enhance Kashmiri participation in the dialogue process to make it inclusive and grass-rooted. Additionally, it also offers a perspective on the necessary policy changes required to find a just and durable solution of the Jammu and Kashmir issue.

Development but Not Engagement

The BJP came up with a multi-pronged strategy that it thought would change the dynamics of the Kashmir conflict. Given the State Assembly elections in IOK, PDP-BJP coalition got an opportunity to reach out to the people of Kashmir. The coalition promised them mega projects and vast infrastructure development. In fact, Modi, and his party, strived to paint him as a ‘development guru’ to galvanize mass support in the Assembly which was scheduled to be formed in November/December 20141. Moreover, five weeks after assuming premiership, he declared that ‘our priority is to win the hearts of every citizen of this state through development.’2

Then, in his subsequent visits to the Kashmir Valley, he again used development as a tool to convince alienated Kashmiri youth to become a partner in progress and economic growth, and shun the growing resistance towards Indian rule. To that effect, in November 2015, Indian Prime Minister announced a developmental package of 80 billion INR which was unprecedented. However, it failed to significantly change the political climate in the valley. On this occasion, a complete shutdown was observed across Kashmir valley. Sofi Ahsan, an undergraduate journalism student based in IOK, aptly remarked on Modi’s lack of understanding and his flawed approach to deal with the Kashmir issue by sidelining the political dimension of the long-festering conflict. He writes:

There was only a semblance of former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee but in reality, he failed to achieve anything substantial to remove the alienation of people in Kashmir by failing to address their long-pending demand of a political engagement and deliberation. They (people) have revealed their demand of a political resolution and a right to decide their future through continuous resistance, be it by picking up the gun in the early ‘90s or today by throwing stones on the Kalashnikov-wielding

1 “Development only Path to Solve Problems ailing J & K: Modi,” News18,

December 8, 2014, 5:16 PM IST, https://www.news18.com/news/politics/ development-only-path-to-solve-problems-ailing-jk-modi-730236.html

2 “ Modi Flags off Inaugural Train from Katra,” The Hindu, Updated: May 23, 2016 16:59 IST, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/modi-flags-off-inaugural-train-from-katra/article6176580.ece


soldiers.3 On 19th May, 2018, Modi urged the youth in Srinagar to return to

the "mainstream" declaring that there is no substitute for "peace and stability". "I want everybody to invest energy only in the development of Jammu and Kashmir. All problems, all differences have only one solution ... development, development and development.4 Modi never intended to initiate stalled political processes or even engage pro-freedom groups. His successive visits and public talks have always revolved around building infrastructure and creating jobs for locals, while ignoring any serious attempt at political engagement. Modi’s predecessors, both Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and Atal Bihari Vajpayee, pledged that talks would be held within the framework of the “sky is the limit” for autonomy. Moreover, they promised that negotiations will not be confined to the framework of the present Indian Constitution but expanded to include "insaniyat (humanity), jamhuriyat (democracy) and Kashmiriyat (the traditional Kashmiri ethos)", as explained by Congress parliamentarian Mani Shankar Aiyer.5 Unlike his predecessors, he completely ignored the political dimension of the issue and only emphasized on development. A noted Kashmir scholar Farrukh Faheem concisely sums up the Indian dilemma:

This historical discontent of Kashmiris is always met by the state’s brute force, followed by the announcement of economic packages and creation of jobs. This approach not only denies the Kashmiri people their agency, it also keeps India and its masses blinded about Kashmir, whose quest for a political solution remains obfuscated till another cycle of protests and

ominous killings returns.6

BJP Politicking in Occupied Kashmir

For the first time in the history of Occupied Kashmir, BJP pitched a strong fight and ran a hectic elections campaign. Prime Minister Modi and

3 Sofi Ahsan, “How PM Modi Failed Kashmir: A Student Perspective,” The

Citizen, November 10, 2015, https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/ NewsDetail/index/8/5778/How-PM-Modi-Failed-Kashmir-A-Students-Perspective

4 Rifat Fareed, “In Kashmir, India PM Modi says ‘Development is the Solution’,” Aljazeera, May 19, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/southasia/2018/ 05/kashmir-india-pm-modi-development-solution-180519143705227.html

5 Mani Shankar Aiyer, “ What a Week in Kashmir Taught us,” Greater Kashmir, July 29, 2019, http://m.greaterkashmir.com/news/opinion/what-a-week-in-kashmir-taught-us/250870.html.

6 Faheem Farrukh, “Three Generations of Kashmir’s Azaadi: A Short History of Discontent,” Economic & Political Weekly, August 27, 2016, Vol. 51, Issue no. 35.


5

BJP’s President Amit Shah toured every nook and cranny to garner public support. In the state elections, BJP introduced ‘Mission 44+’ that aimed for a simple majority in the 87-member Assembly. Traditionally, BJP has a strong mass base in Jammu region since long. However, to form a government, 44 legislators are required in the Assembly. BJP won 25 seats from Jammu region and could not get even a single seat from the Kashmir valley, while People’s Democratic Party bagged 28 seats there7. Both parties’ political ideologies are poles apart but they jointly formed a collation government.

The coalition government led by Mufti Muhammad Saeed and subsequently, his daughter, Mehbooba Mufti, could not complete its term in office. This was so since both parties pursued divergent agendas and adhered to conflicting sets of political philosophies. Being Kashmiri Muslims, Mufti Saeed and Mehbooba Mufti were quite keen to resume India-Pakistan dialogue and also wanted New Delhi to engage Kashmiri resistance leadership. However, New Delhi did not pay heed to their recommendations even though the two parties had agreed upon these points, prior to formally entering into political alliance.8

Despite repeated calls to do otherwise, New Delhi continued to see Kashmir issue only through the prism of internal security or law and order, extensively used military muscle, and opposed engagement with the resistance leadership as well as Pakistan. Likewise, it consistently attempted to disempower Kashmiris politically and administratively. This, in response, generated stiff mass resistance and disenchantment. Finally, PDP-BJP coalition, which was commonly known as an alliance between the North Pole and the South Pole, came to an end in June 2018. Soon thereafter, Governor Rule was imposed and has only further deepened the mistrust between Kashmiris and New Delhi.

Silencing Kashmiri Resistance

The BJP Government’s Kashmir strategy has been revolving around two key components i.e. provide massive financial support for infrastructure as mentioned above and the use of disproportional force to 7 Shujaat Bukhari, “Result of Polarisation,” Frontline, August 2, 2019,

https://frontline.thehindu.com/politics/result-of-polarisation/article6756763.ece.

8 The PDP and the BJP released a common minimum programme (CMP) for running the coalition government in J&K wherein following key points were agreed: 1) Following the principles of "Insaniyat, Kashmiriyat and Jamhooriyat" of the earlier NDA government led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the state government will facilitate and help initiate a sustained and meaningful dialogue with all internal stakeholders which include political groups irrespective of their ideological views and predilections. The dialogue will seek to build a broad based consensus on resolution of all outstanding issues of the state.


subdue the indigenous resistance struggle. It uses draconian laws such as the Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA) and Public Safety Act (PSA) which provide blanket immunity from accountability to security forces, enable the forces to undermine the resistance’s voice, while facilitating intimidation and personal harassment. To keep a lid on public outcry, it frequently shuts down social media websites and internet services.9

All formal and informal dialogue processes, with all stakeholders were stalled since August 2014. Pro-Freedom leadership was barred from running political activities. All channels of communication with the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), a conglomerate of several political parties, ceased to exist. Most of the leaders, particularly Syed Ali Gilani, Mirwaiz Umer Farooq and Yasin Malik either remained under house arrest or in prison. They were often not even allowed to offer Friday’s prayer, which is unprecedented. The Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons and Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society states:

The state government in Indian administered Kashmir continues to exercise restraint on the freedom of religion and belief and frequently resorts to curbs. In 2018, for 12 Fridays out of 52, prayers were disallowed in the Jamia Masjid and Muharram processions were also disallowed. In 2017, the predominantly Muslim population was prevented from offering Friday prayers in the historic Jamia Masjid for 18

out of 52 Fridays. In 2016, Jamia Masjid was locked down for 19 weeks.10 Even the political workers close to resistance parties were

declared overground militants and treated as militant sympathizers. Indian Army Chief Gen. Bipin Rawat made several statements wherein he warned the protesters and political workers of harsh treatment if they came out on the streets to run protests.11Several top Indian officials have persistently been trying to convey the message that Kashmir cannot have freedom. The struggle for freedom should therefore be stopped and youth should become part of the mainstream. General Rawat said:

Indian Army and the Indian State is strong enough to ensure that Jammu and Kashmir remain part of India… No one else can take it away by force

9 Ravi Agrawal, “The Inside Story of How India Shuts Down the Internet in

Kashmir,” Quarts India, October 3, 2018, https://qz.com/india/1408071/how-india-shuts-down-internet-in-kashmir/

10 Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society, 2018, www.jkccs.net. 11 On 28 April 2017, talking about the stone palters in Kashmir, the Indian Army

Chief Bipin Rawat has said, "In fact, I wish these people, instead of throwing stones at us, were firing weapons at us. Then I would have been happy. Then I could do what I (want to do).”; "Army Chief Bipin Rawat On Kashmir Unrest: Wish Protesters Fired at us Instead of Pelting Stones," India Today, November 6, 2018.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Army_Chief

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Army_Chief

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bipin_Rawat

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/army-chief-bipin-rawat-on-human-shield-row/1/964946.html

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/army-chief-bipin-rawat-on-human-shield-row/1/964946.html


7

or by any other means, because legally, legitimately J&K is integral part of

India.12 The disproportionate use of state force against the protesters

including youth, children and women; jamming internet, social media, cell phones etc.; and debarring newspapers are recurring occurrences in the region.

In October 2017, a significant political outreach was made by the BJP by appointing Dineshwar Sharma, a former chief of Intelligence Bureau, as an interlocutor to initiate a dialogue with all stakeholders. Apart from some initial conversations, Sharma could not succeed in making any headway in breaking the ice with the representatives of the resistance camp. It seems that this initiative has largely been dumped.13 These unsuccessful and ineffective policies massively raised the level of resistance in Occupied Kashmir and the young people started turning towards militant outfits to challenge the state’s writ, despite knowing that it might end their own precious lives. The policy of disengagement produced an immense sense of helplessness and cynicism among the masses. Mani Shanhkar Aiyer spent a week in Srinagar in May 2017 and wrote a perceptive and candid piece for the NDTV’s website wherein he acknowledged that:

No one, not one, in this wide spectrum of Kashmiri opinion had anything commendatory to say about the Government of India's handling of Kashmir. In most cases, the criticism extended back to Jawaharlal Nehru and Delhi's favored leaders of Kashmir, but the condemnation was most virulent about the present national leadership. One highly respected opinion-maker put it succinctly: hitherto, he said, it was Kashmiris getting

alienated from India, now it is Indians getting alienated from Kashmiris.14

The Return of Home-Grown Intifada

Kashmir is festering__ after several years of calm, the Kashmir conflict has once again taken an ugly shape and has become a major source of tension between India and Pakistan. Recent reports show that young and educated people are turning towards violent ideologies. Interestingly,

12 PTI, “Army Chief General Bipin Rawat says Stone Pelters in Jammu and

Kashmir Must be Dealt with Sternly,” Financial Express, Updated: October 27, 2018 4:12:03 PM, https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/army-chief-general-bipin-rawat-says-stone-pelters-in-jammu-and-kashmir-must-be-dealt-with-sternly/1363448/

13 Mudasir Ahmed, “Kashmir Separatists Released, But Still Unconvinced on Dialogue with Government,” The Wire, April 5, 2018, https://thewire.in/politics/kashmir-separatists-released-geelani-mirwaiz-malik.

14 Aiyer Shankar Mani, “What a Week in Kashmir Taught us,” Greater Kashmir.


funerals of the fallen militants are well attended which indicates that public support for the resistance movement is largely intact despite elections and the huge influx of finances from New Delhi to Srinagar. Human rights violations by the State forces and limitations on peaceful political activities are also gradually increasing. Additionally, calm at the Line of Control, which was considered as one of the key confidence-building measures, has almost been broken and hardly a day passes for the last four years without exchange of fire. This has caused colossal damage to life and property of the local people, and forced massive civilian displacement on both sides of the line. This has further alienated the Kashmiri people.

Now, since the killing of 22-year-old freedom fighter Burhan Muzaffar Wani on 8th July, 2016, followed by a mass uprising wherein over 120 civilians died in clashes with the Indian forces; Kashmir has once again been on the world's radar. Burhan was a local Kashmiri who has never been to Pakistan for training or obtaining weapons. Hurriyat Conference leader, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, equated him with defiant nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose, an Indian hero who fought a war against the British rule with the help of Germany and Japan during the World War II, and Bhagat Singh, who resorted to armed resistance and rendered exceptional sacrifices for the liberation of India. Many Kashmiri leaders and intellectuals declared Burhan Wani an icon of the Kashmir struggle. In Azad Kashmir too, Burhan is considered as revered as Maqbool Butt, a pioneer Kashmiri leader who was hanged in Tihar Jail, New Delhi in 1984. A huge number of young people idealized him and romanticized his way of resistance. A young Kashmiri writer, Fahad Shah says:

The impact of Wani’s killing is perhaps the most significant change in Valley since the late 1980s, when an armed rebellion erupted against

Indian rule in the region.15 The Kashmiri youth is at the forefront in the new wave of

resistance. It is widely said that most of these young people, who were born after 1989, are ardent supporters of the current resistance movement. Most of them have neither any positive memories linked with India nor do they feel any association with it. The latest census says that nearly 60 percent of Kashmir's male residents are under the age of 30, and 70 percent are below the age of 35.16 Besides, the registered unemployed people in the State number 2.2 lacs which when coupled with the 15 Fahad Shah, “Kashmir 2 Years after Burhan Wani,” The Diplomat, July 10,

2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/kashmir-2-years-after-burhan-wani/

16 Shamil Shams, “Kashmir Violence: Has Modis Policy Failed?” DW, April 4, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/kashmir-violence-has-modis-policy-failed/a-43247175.


9

unregistered, goes up to 6.5 lacs.17 Therefore, young people are drifting towards militancy in an obvious way. India Today aptly described the situation in a recent report:

Despite better intelligence, a senior officer says the northward spread of local militancy is worrying. According to him, "Local recruitments are up in all the 10 Valley districts." This, the officer points out, is in the face of the army's Operation All Out, which has felled over 380 militants since it commenced in early 2017. Over 170 have been killed in anti-insurgency operations in the past 10 months alone. Still, recruitments are on the rise, the number of active militants has crossed 300 for the first time in the

past decade.18 Noted Indian writer Gautam Navlakha, who frequently travels to

Kashmir observed: In the conditions that operate in J&K there will be many who would take to arms and an even larger number that see value in armed resistance. So militancy will not ebb until there are prospects of a democratic process, and people will not back off from lending militancy support or invest in

the non-violent process unless there is a concrete political offer.19 Unlike past decades, the recent uprising is largely considered

indigenous and driven by political aspirations. New York Times also acknowledged this fact in one of its several articles published over Kashmir in recent years. It writes:

Now, the resistance inside the Indian areas is overwhelmingly homegrown. The conflict today is probably driven less by geopolitics than by internal Indian politics, which have increasingly taken an anti-Muslim direction. Most of the fighters are young men, who draw support from a population deeply resentful of India’s governing party and years of

occupation.20 Besides, several other international and Indian writers have also

publicly testified that resistance struggle in Kashmir is fully backed by its native people and their aspirations are rooted in a history of injustice and

17 Gautam Navlakha, “Kashmir: When Ignorance Begets Tragedy and Farce,”

Economic & Political Weekly, vol. 51, Issue no. 32, August 6, 2016. 18 Mohammad Moazum, “JK Trouble in the North,” India Today, October 27,

2018, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/states/story/20181105-j-k-trouble-in-the-north-1374992-2018-10-27.

19 Gautam Navlakha, “Kashmir: When Ignorance Begets Tragedy and Farce,” 20 Jeffery Gettleman, “In Kashmir, Blood and Grief in an Intimate War: ‘These

Bodies are our Assets,” NY Times, August 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2018/08/01/world/asia/kashmir-war-india-pakistan.html.


constant repression. Veteran Indian writer and author A.G. Noorani acknowledged: since 1989, the people of Kashmir have shown their resolve "to part company from India". It was "expressed" and "clearly and definitely" too.21

Upping the Ante

During the last four and half years, BJP has a consistent policy of not engaging with Pakistan, especially concerning the Kashmir issue. Even, New Delhi’s tone, rhetoric and attitude have hardened towards Islamabad. In August 2015, Pakistani National Security Advisor’s scheduled visit to New Delhi was cancelled as India clearly communicated to Pakistan that New Delhi is only interested to talk about terrorism and that Pakistani NSA’s meeting with the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) would not be acceptable. Therefore, Pakistan refused to make a conditional visit to New Delhi. Another excellent opportunity was lost in this way.

In December 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s brief stopover in Lahore went down well across Pakistan and generated hope that both countries would soon be able to restart a full-fledged, uninterrupted and inclusive peace process leading to the complete normalization of ties and resolution of all outstanding issues, particularly Jammu and Kashmir. However, this goodwill turned out to be a short-lived episode when an Indian Air Force base at Pathankot in Punjab was attacked by an unidentified outfit. This incident not only put a stop on the forward momentum but also derailed the prospects for peace for a long time. As a result, scheduled Foreign Secretaries’ meetings were put off.

Eventually, to up the ante, new fronts of confrontation were opened. On 15th August, 2016; in the Independence Day speech from the Red Fort, Prime Minister Modi made an unusual expression of support for the people of Balochistan, Gilgit and Azad Kashmir. He said:

In the last few days, people of Balochistan, Gilgit, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir have thanked me, have expressed gratitude, and expressed good wishes for me. The people who are living far away, whom I have never seen, never met — such people have expressed appreciation for Prime Minister of India, for 1.25 billion countrymen.22

This statement just goes to show the level of denial and emotional

imagery that fuels the Kashmir crisis. A few days ago Modi said that Pakistan had no business speaking about Kashmir when it is “dropping

21 A. G. Noorani, “Modi & Kashmir,” Dawn, August 25, 2018,

https://www.dawn.com/news/1428808. 22 Suhasini Haidar, “In Policy Shift, Narendra Modi Brings up Balochistan again,”

The Hindu, Updated: September 20, 2016, https://www.thehindu.com/ news/national/In-policy-shift-Narendra-Modi-brings-up-Balochistan-again/ article14572650.ece.

https://www.coventrytelegraph.net/news/motoring/car-reviews/hyundai-santa-fe-review-test-15584598


11

bombs on its own citizens” in Balochistan and other areas23. This line of argument was a bad omen for the policy that India would follow i.e. funding insurgents in Balochistan and elsewhere. The Hindu reported that the Prime Minister had in an all-party meeting on Kashmir, vowed to take up the incidents of atrocities made by the Pakistani Government in these areas to the international stage.24 A few months ago, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar boasted:

India will take "proactive" steps to prevent a 26/11 type attack hatched from foreign soil. "We have to neutralise terrorists through terrorists only. Why can't we do it? We should do it. Why does my soldier have to do it?25

In September 2016, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit, which was scheduled to be held in Islamabad, was adjourned due to India’s refusal to participate in it. It was considered a major setback to bilateral relations for both the States. Consequently, numerous statements came from the top leadership of India which either demonstrated explicit hostility towards Pakistan or indicated minimum appetite for engagement in the dialogue. In the last week of September 2016, India claimed that its forces had conducted a “surgical strike” inside AJK in reaction to an attack in Uri- border town of Occupied Kashmir on the 18th September 2016 that left 19 Indian soldiers dead, and destroyed alleged “terror launch pads” which Pakistan vehemently denied.26 It was a major setback to already fragile India-Pakistan relations. This announcement raised the threshold between the two nuclear neighbours. However, the claim of so-called surgical strikes was successfully used in the Uttar Pradesh state election campaign. It also helped BJP to silence its critics inside the BJP and RSS who were asking to take tough action against Pakistan. Modi and his colleagues presented it as a success story to impress the domestic audience.

23 Special Correspondence, “Modi Questions Pak. on Rights Abuses in

Balochistan, PoK,” The Hindu, October 18, 2016, https://www.thehindu.com/ news/national/Modi-questions-Pak.-on-rights-abuses-in-Balochistan-PoK/article14571403.ece.

24 Suhasini Haidar, “In Policy Shift, Narendra Modi Brings up Balochistan again”. 25 “ We have to Neutralise Terrorists through Terrorists Only: Manohar Parrikar,”

India Today, UPDATED: May 22, 2015, https://www.indiatoday.in/ india/story/parrikar-terrorism-india-aaj-tak-manthan-254206-2015-05-22

26 “Army's Daring Surgical Strike Marks Radical Change in India's Pakistan Policy,” Economic Times, Updated: July 12, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/armys-daring-surgical-strike-marks-radical-change-in-indias-pakistan-policy/articleshow/54593808.cms


In the following years, New Delhi has regularly been making threatening statements against Pakistan. On 22nd October, 2018 Prime Minister Modi himself stated that India will retaliate with ‘double the force’ against any attack on its sovereignty.27 Several other senior officials including the Home Minister, the Defence Minister and the Army Chief frequently accused Pakistan of being responsible for all the trouble in Kashmir. All these attempts and hostile environment yielded nothing but invited more violence and hatred particularly in the Kashmir Valley. The so-called surgical strike further entrenched already prevailing fear syndrome and trust deficit.

Stumbling Roadblocks

It is time to reflect and identify the causes and major roadblocks, such as the top-down approach, limited infrastructure for peace and more importantly absence of Kashmiri representation and limited support to the dialogue process, which have hindered forward movement over the last seven decades. Despite periodical engagement in dialogue, both India and Pakistan largely yielded no tangible result particularly in the context of the Kashmir dispute. Besides, it is imperative to find the key entry points which might help both countries to initiate a continuous, uninterrupted and insulated dialogue process, ensuring involvement of all stakeholders in the process including the civil society representatives.

First, a major obstacle is the inherent constraints of the top-down approach: most of the time, the top leadership interacts and initiates talks. The civil-military bureaucracy, commonly known as the establishment, plays a vital role in constructing the contours of the dialogue process which is not only conservative in terms of generating fresh thinking to engage with each other but also averse to new ideas for the engagements. A well thought out and structured peace process, involving citizens and multi-layer stakeholders, has not been formulated so far.

The leadership has not only remained unable to craft a roadmap which could ensure forward movement but rather created roadblocks instead of facilitating the process. Additionally, seven decades-long acrimonies resulted in the creation of the permanent infrastructures meant to undermine and compete with each other from the diplomatic level to economic gains. Secondly, the institutional structures for peace have not been created which could have served as a platform for dialogue and cooperation. Instead of creating institutions to promote dialogue and reconciliation, prevent conflict, and enable mediation; heavy investment is made to prevent each other’s socio-political growth and international standing.

27 “Modi Vows to Crush Attempts to Undermine India Sovereignty,” Gulf News,

October 21, 2018, https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/india/modi-vows-to-crush-attempts-to-undermine-india-sovereignty-1.2292100.


13

Thirdly, the absence of a sustained back channel between the two governments is regarded as one of the major roadblocks as most of the times they find no reliable interlocutor to convey messages to each other. Several accounts acknowledged the significant role played by the secret back channel set up by the two governments to resolve contentious issues and find common ground on the Kashmir settlement during 2004-2008.28 However, delay in the pronouncement of the agreement made it redundant as changed political environments in both countries made it unfeasible to make the deal public.

Fourthly, several dialogues and even summit meetings hit a dead end quickly because these were not mutually well-designed and there was no strategy to contain backlash in case of failure. Conversely, both New Delhi and Islamabad tried to out maneuver each other at all such meetings instead of resolving contentious issues. Regrettably, politics was played to address domestic audience and larger regional interests were conveniently compromised.

For instance in July 2009, on the side-lines of a Non-Aligned Movement summit in the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh acknowledged Pakistan’s apprehension about Indian involvement in Balochistan’s insurgency. Likewise, on 10th July, 2015, the Prime Ministers of both states met on the side-lines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in the Russian city of Ufa. A joint statement outlined the future course of action to normalize the bilateral relations and mentioned that both sides should strive to combat terrorism. Pakistani media and politicians accused Premier Nawaz Sharif of accepting Indian terms by including the term ‘terrorism’ in the joint statement without mentioning Kashmir in particular. Amazingly, both leaders in India and Pakistan had to face an identical backlash in domestic politics. And people in media and politics described these joint statements as a betrayal of the national interests.

Almost all India and Pakistan meetings are keenly followed by the media which largely promotes traditional narrative, often led by ex-government officials who are driven by the popularity syndrome instead of balanced analysis and reason. The media has made it virtually impossible for the political leadership to move beyond the stated positions or think creatively to find new ways of engagement. In fact, most of the

28 Besides, back channel, multiple paths such as track II diplomacy had greatly

helped both countries to create a conductive environment for the dialogue and engagement. For instance, before Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore both Prime Ministers, without making it public, established a communication channel through R. K. Mishra and Ambassador Niaz A. Naik who represented India and Pakistan respectively. It was the first ever internal mediation mechanism which subsequently resulted in the appointment of the formal back channel interlocutors.


time the media involvement further ruins the prospects of positive engagement.

Kashmiri Participation: An Imperative for Peace

The inclusion of the Kashmiri resistance leadership and civil society actors in the dialogue process is one of the most important ingredients to make this process meaningful and a success story. Evidently, bringing them onto the India-Pakistan negotiation table seems quite unimaginable at the moment. However, an indirect process can be initiated for the consultations and briefings aimed to keep them in the loop and seek their ideas. The absence of a Kashmiri voice has often become a reason in derailing of the dialogue process which ultimately takes both countries back to square one.29 People of Kashmir seldom find any incentive to negotiate. The peace process cannot be successful unless state-level steps are taken to undo the institutionalized biases against each other and the state mechanism meant to harm each other. Change in attitude and particularly in the state polices is a long drawn-out process that needs a persistent backing and encouragement from the top leadership of both the countries.

A number of creative and doable ideas were formulated by the civil society representatives that were fed into the official dialogue process from 2004-2008. Several Indian, Pakistani and international organizations provided platforms to Kashmiri politicians and civil society actors to articulate their stance. It opened up spaces for competitive politics and reduced violence drastically. Additionally, traditional discourse over Kashmir in Islamabad, New Delhi, Srinagar and Muzaffarabad evolved from the non-conformist standpoint to an accommodating one. Both countries had put in place a process in Kashmir at the local level which was gradually altering the status quo.30

29 To overcome this problem a focused peace process was initiated by India and

Pakistan in 2014. Then President Pervez Musharraf had held long meetings with the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) leaders of both sides and even with the militant commanders for brainstorming on the issue. He pursued them to become part of the peace process. A large number of the Kashmiri leaders appreciated his ideas about the future of Kashmir. Some of them resisted too, particularly Syed Ali Gilani, who commands considerable support in Kashmir Valley. http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/mar/ 16inter.htm.

30 In the era of Post-World War II Europe had adopted a conflict transformation approach to radically change societies and people’s attitude towards each other. In this connection, a number of programmes were initiated wherein citizens of different countries got the chance to travel to each other’s countries and enroll in educational institutions of different countries. Professional exchanges take place quite regularly. These people to people contacts created opportunities for business, trade, academic exchanges and


15

The trade and travel initiatives and limited space for cross-Line of Control dialogue stabilized the region and paved the way for the creation of peace constituencies. It provided people with a sense of participation and ownership to a great extent. However, these spaces and the peace constituency gradually vanished when India and Pakistan got disengaged in late 2008 and particularly during the last four and a half years.

Conclusion

As discussed above, hardly any considerable time and energy is being invested across the Line of Control to develop a peace constituency to champion the peaceful resolution of the conflict. The leaders of both countries have failed to inculcate peoples’ stakes in peace and engagement. Therefore, when a crisis erupts, people rarely stand up and challenge the war-mongers to articulate their desire for peaceful settlement of the dispute. To develop a peace constituency across Occupied Kashmir, the exchange of ideas and people is a precondition. The opinion leaders can only play a constructive role when they are allowed to meet and discuss the issues.

To bridge the communication gap and build stakes, some of the steps that should be taken urgently are: people should be allowed to have weekly meetings in the trade centers which were basically built to facilitate trade and travel but also have the potential to become meeting points for families, particularly on weekends when trade does not take place. Elderly people, particularly those above 65 years of age, should be granted a lifetime travel pass so that they can travel whenever they want. Similarly, couples who have spouses from other sides must get one-year renewable pass to visit their families frequently.

The transportation of books, newspapers and academic journals must be ensured without any restriction. To facilitate exchange of ideas, universities on either side of Kashmir should run a scholar exchange program so that the young people living on both sides could benefit from each other’s expertise. In this case, states should not demand reciprocity. These small steps, if taken properly, can be helpful to create an environment conducive to the initiation of more meaningful steps. It has time and again been proved that an iron fist approach could neither bring peace and stability in the region nor subdue the people’s aspiration for the right of self-determination. A solution, therefore, must be based on justice and historical commitments.

Unpredictable incidents of violence, such as an attack on Pathankot Air Force base or Mumbai attacks of 2009, have ruined the gains which were made through years of meticulous parleys and hard negotiations. Hence, it must be recognized that incidents of terrorism should not be

social engagement which helped European societies to transform traditional confrontationist approach with mutual cooperation.


allowed to derail the dialogue process. Political leadership has to show courage in the face of terrorist acts. In this context, it is time for both governments to think how to save possible future dialogues from the traditional outcome i.e. suspension of dialogue for years or military escalation along the LoC.

Substantial progress over the Occupied Kashmir issue is essential to overcome the trust deficit and generate hope among the citizens across the dividing line. Any step forward in this regard will also mobilize public opinion in favor of the grand reconciliation between India and Pakistan which may accelerate the process of resolution of the Kashmir issue. There is a dire need to institutionalize the existing Confidence Building Measures, particularly regarding the ceasefire, trade, and travel to make them insulated from the occasional threats posed by the non-state actors. Back channels, as mentioned above, play a vital role to bridge gaps and quietly negotiate sticky issues. They must be revived on a sustained basis.

The secession of ceasefire violations along the LoC should be ensured so that communities across the dividing line can live a peaceful life. Likewise, frequent human rights violation and un-proportional presence of military forces in the major cities and towns must be drastically reduced. Finally, the battle of ideas and normal political activities of the resistance groups should be allowed and even encouraged so that the people get a space to vent out their grievances.

Nuclear Ban Treaty 17

NUCLEAR BAN TREATY: CAN IT UNRAVEL THE GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME?

Dr. Adil Sultan

Abstract

The Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNWs) was negotiated with the primary purpose of creating a new international norm that could bring pressure upon all the nuclear possessor states to work towards nuclear disarmament. Instead, the TPNW may have led to more divisions between the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) that could affect the outcome of the 2020 NPT (Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty) Review Conference. Parallel initiatives with conflicting obligations, spearheaded by the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and negotiated amongst the NNWS mainly, without taking into consideration security interests of all states, are likely to reduce the incentive for the nuclear possessor states (both NPT and the non-NPT states) to remain constructively engaged with the non-proliferation regime, thus making the goal of nuclear disarmament more elusive.

Keywords: TPNWs, Nuclear Disarmament, NNWS, NPT, NWS,

Non-proliferation Regime

Introduction

he Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) or the nuclear ban treaty is the first ever legally binding international instrument that aims to delegitimize the use, as well as the

possession, of nuclear weapons (NWs). Once entered into force, the TPNW is expected to establish a new international norm that could bring additional pressure upon the nuclear weapon states (NWSs) to show seriousness towards their nuclear disarmament obligations. The opponents of the TPNW do not share this optimism. According to them, the treaty may help rekindle the nuclear disarmament debate, but due to

Dr. Adil Sultan is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Department of War Studies,

King's College London.

T


its inherent conflict with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), it is likely to create more fissures amongst the international community besides complicating the existing non-proliferation regime.

Notwithstanding the noble intent behind the new initiative and considerable support from the international community, none of the NPT and non-NPT nuclear possessor states, including those with nuclear umbrella, appears keen to join the TPNW. Without the participation of these major stakeholders, the TPNW is likely to remain an arrangement negotiated by the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), amongst the NNWS, and for the NNWS.

This paper aims to provide the genesis of the humanitarian-based NGOs-led approach which eventually gained traction at the United Nations (UN) and led to the conclusion of TPNW. This paper also highlights inconsistencies in some of the treaty articles, besides providing a summary of perspectives from the NPT and the non-NPT NWS. Finally, the likely implications of the TPNW on the existing NPT based non-proliferation regime have been discussed, along with recommendations that could help preserve the sanctity of the global non-proliferation regime.

Genesis of the TPNW

NGOs’ Approach to Delegitimize NWs

In Jan 2007, four senior former US officials – George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn co-authored an op-ed building a case for a world free of nuclear weapons. It was followed by another article in Jan 2008 by these four former Cold War hawks, generating excitement amongst the civil society that may have also influenced President Obama's disarmament agenda of committing to a world free of nuclear weapons. With the United States providing the much-needed leadership, several new initiatives were launched across the world to achieve the goal of global nuclear zero. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) - a loose coalition of several civil society organizations working in more than 100 countries, was one of the several entities that played an important role in launching the Humanitarian Impact Movement (HIM), which eventually formed the basis for negotiating a new treaty to ban nuclear weapons. For its efforts in materializing a new disarmament treaty, the ICAN was also awarded the Nobel Peace prize of 2017.

ICAN’s role was crucial in building support for the nuclear ban treaty at the three HIM conferences that were held at Oslo (Norway, 2013); Nayarit (Mexico, 2014); and at Vienna (Austria, 2014). These events were attended by a large number of states and were helpful in building global support towards the TPNW. The US and UK participated in the Vienna conference but opted to stay away from the subsequent process. Amongst the other nuclear possessor states, Pakistan and India


did participate in all the three HIM conferences, signalling support for global nuclear disarmament, but were not part of the treaty negotiations.

Institutional Approach to Ban Nuclear Weapons

In nuclear disarmament debates, the humanitarian issue was initially discussed informally but surfaced for the first time in the 2010 NPT RevCon outcome document that “expressed deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.”1 It became the basis for the subsequent debate held at the NPT PrepComs, as well as the UN First Committee meetings. In 2012, Norway, Mexico, and Austria sponsored a UN General Assembly Resolution 67/56 titled "Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations," which was supported by a large number of countries while the four major NWS (US, UK, Russia and France) voted against it. China, along with the three non-NPT nuclear weapon states (India, Pakistan and Israel) abstained, while North Korea voted in favour of the Resolution.

In 2015, Mexico, with the help of like-minded countries, sponsored another resolution that called for establishing an “open-ended working group to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on concrete and effective legal measures to achieve nuclear disarmament, in particular, new legal provisions and norms to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.”2 Owing to overwhelming support, the UN General Assembly decided to convene an open-ended working group (OEWG) in 2016 that consisted of members from various international organizations and civil society to recommend the next steps. None of the nine nuclear possessor states participated in the OEWG discussions, which possibly made it convenient for the NNWS to conclude that negotiating a nuclear ban treaty without indulging in technical issues would be relatively easy and a more realistic option than negotiating a convention to ban nuclear weapons. Based on the recommendations of the OEWG, the UN adopted a resolution with overwhelming majority to convene a conference in 2017 for negotiating a legally binding treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons.

Amongst the nuclear possessor states, the US, UK, France, Russia and Israel voted against this resolution, while China along with Pakistan and India abstained. Interestingly, states like Norway that were leading the HIM movement but also benefitting from the US nuclear umbrella

1 2010 NPT RevCon Outcome Document, (Reaching Critical Will: May, 28, 2010)

http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament -fora/npt/revcon2010/documents/MCI-WP1.pdf,http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com15/resolutions/L13.pdf.


opposed the UN resolution for negotiating a nuclear ban treaty.

The New Norm of Norms Creation

Both the NGOs’ approach combined with the UN efforts helped build a momentum towards the conclusion of the TPNW. The members of the civil society behind the nuclear ban treaty are of the view that by highlighting the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons they would be able to garner sufficient public support and build pressure on governments. By stigmatizing the possession of nuclear weapons and strengthening the norm of its non-use, the proponents of the TPNW believe that they could challenge the NWS on moral and ethical grounds leading to a ‘norm cascading’3 effect and making it difficult for the nuclear weapon states to defy international consensus against nuclear weapons.

These norm entrepreneurs however have failed to explain why NWSs would relent under public pressure, if they had been able to successfully withstand similar pressures in the past by refusing to give up nuclear weapons as part of their NPT related obligations. The new approach may not necessarily have significant impact on the powerful NWSs but could bring negative spotlight on the relatively smaller nuclear states, who may eventually find it useful to align themselves with the NWS and oppose the calls for nuclear disarmament, thus strengthening the camp of ‘haves’ and creating further divisions within the ‘have-nots.’

In demonstrating insensitivity to the security dilemma being faced by at least a few of the nuclear possessor states, the supporters of the ban treaty believe that they can push for nuclear disarmament on the pattern of anti-personnel mine treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). There, however, lies one fundamental difference between nuclear weapons and the rest of the weapons of mass destruction. BTWC and CWC, negotiated in 1972 and 1993, were follow-ups of an agreement on the ‘Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,4 commonly known as the Geneva Protocol of 1925. There existed a global norm on the non-use of chemical and biological weapons and since the major powers were already in possession of nuclear weapons with more destructive power, therefore, this made it relatively easy to negotiate treaties banning chemical or biological weapons. In the case of the nuclear ban treaty, the process

3 Lawrence Freedman, "Disarmament and other Nuclear Norms," The

Washington Quarterly 36:2, May 3, 2013, 95. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2013.791085.

4 “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare”, United Nations Office for Disarmament (UNODA), http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/ t/1925.


seems to have been reversed with an unrealistic expectation that it would evolve into a new norm acceptable to all states.

Emphasizing that the western democracies would have more acceptability for a treaty that could establish new norms leading towards nuclear disarmament also remains debatable. Over 69 percent of the world population from 37 countries has opposed the TPNW, and out of these 37 countries 89percent enjoy nuclear umbrella or have security alliances with the US. Apparently, the majority of the 147 states that support the ban treaty consist of only 39 percent of the world population,5 and out of these only 4 percent have nuclear umbrella.6 This according to George Perkovich could be due to inherent conflict between the international state system, where democracy within state collides with democracy amongst states due to disproportionate power and influence of the few over the majority.7

Perkovich also points out an interesting aspect of the influence of democratic norms on national military decision-making. According to him, the evolving public debate on humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons may constrain some of the western democracies from using or threatening the use of nuclear weapons, while the less democratic states may not be inhibited from the use of nuclear weapons as they are less susceptible to public scrutiny.8 This differentiation could also be because none of the western countries face an existential threat that would justify the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. If these countries faced a serious threat to their national security, it is unlikely that democratic norms would be a major restraining factor for their national leadership. Moreover, if domestic pressure was indeed a defining factor in statecraft, especially amongst the leading proliferators, nuclear disarmament would not have been a major problem confronted by the international community.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

TPNW was opened for signatures on September 20, 2017 and will enter into force once 50 countries have ratified it. After almost one year of

5 Paul Schulte, in Shatabhisha Shetty and Denitsa Raynova, (eds.),

“Breakthrough or Breakpoint? Global Perspectives on the Nuclear Ban Treaty,” European Leadership Network (ELN) Global Security Report. 20.

6 Jennifer Knox, "Haves, have-nots, and need-nots: The nuclear ban exposes the hidden fault line," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. July 3, 2017, https://thebulletin.org/haves-have-nots-and-need-nots-nuclear-ban-exposes-hidden-fault-lines10879.

7 George Perkovich, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: What Would Follow?” CEIP, May, 2017, 15.

8 Ibid., 10.


its existence, so far only 69 nations have signed it, and only 19 have ratified it.9

The ban treaty, in its preambular part subsumes the key principles of the NPT and recognizes its importance as the central tenet of the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. TPNW also endorses the importance of CTBT and its verification mechanism and acknowledges the right of all states to have access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology (NPT Article IV). Some of the main articles of the TPNW and their implications for the nuclear possessor states as well as those having extended nuclear assurances are briefly discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

Banning of NWs

Article 1 of the TPNW bans possession and development of all nuclear weapons, which according to the proponents of the ban treaty would help fill the legal gap towards nuclear disarmament.10 In fact, there was no such gap. The reasons for varied interpretation of NPT’s Article VI are political, along with a lack of will on the part of most nuclear states to give up their nuclear status. If at all there was an issue of interpretation, it was adequately addressed in ICJ’s Advisory Opinion of 1996, which stated:

There exists an obligation [upon NPT NWS] to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiation leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.11

Notwithstanding this unambiguous advisory opinion, the NPT

NWSs remain reluctant to work towards nuclear disarmament. It is not clear how the TPNW would be able to bring further clarity on the matter that could otherwise help nuclear disarmament efforts. Instead, the argument offered by the proponents of the TPNW would further reinforce the NWSs’ position that there existed inherent ambiguity in NPT’s Article VI that needs to be addressed before moving towards nuclear disarmament.

9 "Signature/ratification status of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear

Weapons,” International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons,

http://www.icanw.org/status-of-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-

weapons/ 10 Tariq Rauf, “Fiftieth Anniversary of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Preparing

for a Successful Outcome”, APLN & CNND Policy Brief No. 48, November, 2017,8.

11 International Court of Justice, “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: Advisory Opinion,” July 8, 1996, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/95/095-19960708-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf.


Delegitimizing Deterrence

The Nuclear Ban Treaty delegitimizes the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, directly or indirectly, thus rendering the entire edifice of nuclear deterrence obsolete. States committing to the new treaty would be held accountable if they ever use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against their adversary, or in support of their allies. This, however, appears gratuitous, since the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons would only arise if states are in possession of nuclear weapons, and those in possession of these weapons would otherwise not be part of the TPNW.

Rendering nuclear deterrence illegal would also have implications for the NATO countries who have been the principal beneficiaries of the US extended deterrence. The US would no longer be able to place its NWs on the territories of its allies or make port calls to the countries that choose to become a party to the TPNW. It is for this reason that none of the NATO members have agreed to join the new treaty. The Netherlands was the only exception that supported initial discussions but eventually decided not to vote in favour of the UN resolution that led to the start of TPNW negotiations.

The TPNW does de-legitimize deterrence, but the ICJ’s 1996 Advisory Opinion in its findings had stated that "it does not have sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance." In view of the present state of international law, the ICJ observed that “[I]t cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self defense, in which its very survival would be at stake.”12

More recently, some scholars have also argued that the use of nuclear weapons could also be criminalized by seeking an amendment in the statute of International Criminal Court (ICC).13 Such an amendment, if agreed unanimously and with the inclusion of major powers may criminalize the ‘use’ but not necessarily the ‘possession’ of nuclear weapons. Most states would still want to retain nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterrence, so as to cater to unforeseen threats in the distant future.

12 Ibid. 13 Zia Mian, "After the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty: A New Disarmament

Politics," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July 7, 2017, http://thebulletin.org/after-nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-new-disarmament-politics10932.


National Declarations

Article 2 of the ban treaty obligates a state party to submit declarations within 30 days of the treaty’s entry into force that it has eliminated its nuclear weapons program, while also submitting information whether it owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons in the past. Once the treaty materializes, it could bind all NATO states that were either in possession of their nuclear weapons or were stationing the weapons of other countries on their territories, to share relevant information that should also be verifiable, but with no designated entity to do this work. In the absence of a credible verification mechanism, the declarations submitted by state parties could be misleading, as was the case for CWC implementation where at least one of the state parties (India) ratified the CWC in 1996 as a non-possessor, but later declared to be in possession of 1,044 metric tonnes of sulphur mustard stockpiles.14

The proponents of the TPNW acknowledge these limitations in the TPNW and argue that technical issues could be handled at a later stage; but it would also be unrealistic to expect that the nuclear possessor states would commit to an abstract treaty with uncertain contours.

Universalizing Comprehensive Safeguards

Article 3 of the TPNW carries obligations for all non-nuclear weapon states to conclude and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153) that would remain in perpetuity. Since the treaty does not differentiate between the NWSs and NNWSs, therefore all NPT and non-NPT NWSs would have to give up their voluntary offer or facility-specific agreements with the IAEA and instead accept comprehensive safeguards arrangements. The TPNW text does not include the precondition of Additional Protocol (AP), which may be due to the reason that the treaty was negotiated amongst the NNWSs and these states would not want to bring unnecessary obligations upon themselves while knowing the fact that nuclear possessor states are likely to remain outside the treaty.

Reporting Progress

Article 4 of the Nuclear Ban Treaty obligates nuclear possessor states to provide a time-bound roadmap for dismantling and elimination of their nuclear program to a competent authority, which has not been identified. While the IAEA could be a potential contender with requisite technical expertise, but it does not have the mandate to venture into the realm of nuclear weapon programs and neither has the resources to verify nuclear programs of all nuclear possessor states. Without effective verification mechanism that must take into consideration national

14 Fact Sheet, Arms Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/

factsheets/india profile# chem.


sensitivities, it would be difficult to convince most of the nuclear possessor states to accept a legally binding treaty that in the end may not lead to its intended objective of complete and global nuclear disarmament.

Strengthening Domestic Controls

Article 5 of the treaty obligates state parties to strengthen their domestic legal systems and penalize all such actions that are considered illegal. The 2004 UNSC Resolution 1540 passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter contains similar provisions and the TPNW could be intended to further reinforce this commitment. Nevertheless, as was the case with the UNSCR 1540, the TPNW cannot be viewed as providing legitimacy to various counter-proliferation initiatives, like the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Container Security Initiative (CSI) or the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).

Conflict with the NPT

The proponents of TPNW claim that it is not a parallel treaty but compliments the existing NPT. In essence, the TPNW overrides all previous disarmament treaties and may have weakened the existing NPT based non-proliferation regime. For instance, Article 18 of the TPNW states that “[It] shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing international agreements, to which they are party….”15 As per the NPT, there exist different sets of obligations for the NWSs and the NNWS, but the TPNW does not recognize such differentiation thus making it difficult for any of the NPT NWSs to join the new treaty without giving up their nuclear weapons.

TPNW and the Nuclear Possessor States

Since the TPNW does not differentiate between the NWSs or the NNWSs; therefore, for the purpose of ban treaty all states that possess nuclear weapons would be considered as the NWS, which also include India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. As the TPNW is based on a premise that it would help increase awareness about the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons amongst the general public level, it would therefore be useful to review national positions of all the nuclear weapons states and the potential public support for the new initiative.

The European Leadership Network’s (ELN) report, “Breakthrough or Breakpoint? Global Perspectives on the Nuclear Ban Treaty,”16 provides

15 Text of the TPNW, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-

content/uploads/2017/10/tpnw-info-kit-v2.pdf. 16 Shatabhisha Shetty and Denitsa Raynova, (eds.), Breakthrough or Breakpoint?

Global Perspectives on the Nuclear Ban Treaty, Global Security Special Report, European Leadership Network, December 2017.


interesting insight into the thinking of NPT recognized nuclear possessor states, which is briefly summarized in the subsequent paragraphs along with the national positions of the non-NPT nuclear possessor states towards the ban treaty.

The United States: The US has opposed the new treaty for political

and technical reasons. A legally binding TPNW would make it difficult for the US to deploy its nuclear arsenal on the territories of its allies. And in the absence of security assurances, it would be difficult to maintain the sanctity of the NATO alliance structure that is already under stress due to various ongoing political developments. TPNW is also seen as an unnecessary distraction by the United States since it could bring increased focus on the ongoing modernization of its nuclear arsenal as part of the new National Security Strategy.17 The ban treaty enjoys limited support in the civil society and most consider it a distraction from the existing disarmament efforts that could unnecessarily complicate the NPT review process.

Russia: Russia’s opposition towards the TPNW has been more restrained. Like other NWSs, it supports gradual disarmament but also considers nuclear deterrence essential for the stability of international security environment. Russia believes that sudden elimination of nuclear weapons would increase the chances of volatility, and if nuclear disarmament has to be pursued, it would require inclusive approaches involving all nuclear possessor states through an integrated approach catering for the conventional as well as nuclear balance. Unlike the US or other western countries, there seems to be negligible support at the public level for the new treaty. Instead, a large majority of the public consider nuclear weapons as a necessary evil to maintain deterrence and counter threats from the US led Western security alliance.

UK and France: Both the European nuclear weapon states, who are often faced with the challenge of justifying their nuclear deterrents in the absence of existential threats to their national security have opposed the TPNW. Unlike some other European countries, the general public in these two countries remains relatively less vocal about the humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons. It is therefore unlikely that the TPNW would be able to generate enough momentum from within these two nuclear states that could force their national leadership to give up their nuclear weapons and join the ban treaty.

China: China is the only country amongst the five NPT NWSs that provides unconditional ‘No First Use’ (NFU) commitment, which could be seen in line with the principles of the ban treaty. While China is unlikely to

17 National Security Strategy of the United States, December 2017, 30.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.


join the TPNW, it continues to maintain a cautious approach and has not demonstrated any visible hostility towards the new treaty. Due to the absence of any meaningful debate on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons at the public level, it is unlikely that the TPNW would emerge as an important national issue which could force the leadership to unilaterally give up nuclear weapons.

India: It is one of the two declared nuclear weapon states that never signed the NPT and has also opposed the nuclear ban treaty. India participated in the 2013 open-ended working group (OEWG) on nuclear disarmament but decided to stay out of the 2016 OEWG that eventually led to the TPNW negotiations. India’s opposition on the TPNW is in line with its traditional approach towards other international arms control and disarmament treaties. In the past, it supported and participated in the negotiations on NPT and CTBT but eventually refused to sign any of the two treaties by terming these as ‘nuclear apartheid’ and detrimental to its national security interests.

While the initial discussions were being held at the third HIM meeting at Vienna, India’s representative stated that instead of focussing on the possession of nuclear weapons, “there is a need to strengthen the international norm of nearly seventy years of non-use of nuclear weapons.”18 This concern emanates from the possibility of a nuclear use by its principal adversary Pakistan in response to India’s limited conventional war Cold Start doctrine.

India has been a staunch supporter of nuclear disarmament in the past and had also offered a comprehensive plan towards nuclear disarmament in 1988;19 however, once the TPNW was formally negotiated, India stated that it cannot be bound by any of the obligations that may arise from it. And to avoid being held accountable for its past public support towards nuclear disarmament, India made it clear that this “Treaty in no way constitutes or contributes to the development of any customary international law.”20

A large majority of the civil society members in India view nuclear weapons as a tool to enhance international standing. Since these are seen as political weapons, there seems to be little or no concern on the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. It is therefore

18 Statement by Indian Representative at Vienna, Conference on the

“Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons,” December 8-9, 2014. https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/Statements/HINW14_Statement_India.pdf

19 “Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan on Nuke Disarmament Relevant after 30 Years,” National Herald, June 10, 2018, https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/ opinion/rajiv-gandhi-plan-on-nuclear-disarmament-is-more-relevant-even-after-30-years.

20 Statement by India’s Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson, July 18, 2017. ,http://www.mea.gov.in.


unlikely that the TPNW would be able to generate sufficient interest amongst the civil society groups or encourage the general public to force the Indian government towards nuclear disarmament.

Pakistan: Pakistan’s approach towards global arms control and disarmament related treaties is shaped by its regional security concerns emanating mainly from the existential threat it faces from its principal adversary. This was also evident in the Pakistani response at the third HIM meeting held at Vienna that highlighted its security compulsions and the need to address the underlying causes of insecurity.21 Although Pakistan has traditionally remained supportive of global nuclear disarmament but has refused to offer unilateral concessions and give up its nuclear weapons. Therefore, once the TPNW was finally negotiated, Pakistan maintained that: “[It] does not consider itself bound by any of the obligations enshrined in this Treaty,” and that “this Treaty neither forms a part of, nor contributes to the development of customary international law in any manner.22

Israel: Israel is one of the three states that never signed the NPT and is believed to be in possession of a sizeable nuclear arsenal. Unlike the other two non-NPT nuclear states (India and Pakistan), Israel continues to maintain ambiguity about its nuclear status and has not formally declared itself as a nuclear weapon state. Israel is one of the earlier signatories of the CTBT but has linked its ratification with the regional security environment and at an appropriate time.23

Israel voted against the 2016 resolution that gave the mandate to negotiate TPNW and did not participate in the treaty negotiations, as it could bring additional problems for Israel in the form of renewed calls for declaring Middle East as a zone free of nuclear weapons at the next NPT RevCons. Israel’s continued refusal to provide more transparency regarding its nuclear program, and the fact that its regional rival Iran voted in favour of the 2016 resolution and also actively participated in the treaty negotiations, could bring additional pressure on Israel. At the domestic level, there seems to be no major support by the civil society that could otherwise pressurize the government and change Israel’s position towards the TPNW.

North Korea: North Korea left the NPT in 2003 and declared itself as a nuclear weapons state in 2006. It supported the 2016 UN resolution to

21 Statement by Pakistan. https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/

user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/Statements/HINW14_Statement_Pakistan.pdf

22 Press release by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 7, 2017, http://www.mofa.gov.pk.

23 “Working On The "When" Of Israel’s Ratification,” CTBTO,

https://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2016/working-on-the-

when-of-israels-ratification/


negotiate the TPNW but did not participate in its negotiations. Without firm security assurances and complete de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it is not likely to join the TPNW or revert back to the NPT. The June 12, 2018 US-DPRK joint statement issued after the leadership-level summit was significant from the North Korean perspective, since it offered US security guarantees in return for a commitment by North Korea to work towards “complete de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,”24 which could also mean that the US will not be permitted to place its nuclear weapons in the region, besides North Korea promising to give up its nuclear weapons. This interpretation nevertheless, is likely to be contested by the US as well as South Korea and Japan, who have their separate definition of regional de-nuclearization.

For North Korea, humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons seem to be of little concern and may not have any meaningful impact on the civil society. North Korea seems to be the least affected state from the HIM, especially taking into consideration the fact that Japan, which has been the leading proponent of nuclear disarmament and the most affected state having faced humanitarian disaster itself, also remains opposed to the TPNW.

TPNW and its Implications for the Non-Proliferation Regime

The nuclear ban treaty carries an ambitious agenda that is likely to create further dissent amongst the ‘norm-compliant’ states since these are being asked to accept overlapping obligations, while the ‘norm-defiant’ states are likely to remain outside the new treaty. The supporters of the TPNW, in their eagerness to negotiate a new legally binding disarmament instrument with little or no consideration for the existing initiatives, may have in fact weakened the existing non-proliferation regime, which could possibly lead to “the end of current disarmament efforts.”25 Following is an analysis of how the various components of the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime may be affected:

Non-Proliferation Treaty

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) based global nonproliferation

24 “Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America

and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit,” White House, June 12, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/.

25 Jeffrey Lewis, "An Award for the Collapse of Disarmament," Foreign Policy, October 9, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/09/an-award-for-the-collapse-of-nuclear-disarmament/amp/


regime continues to remain under stress because of the issues of non-compliance by some of the treaty members and its lack of universality. The TPNW may have added to these challenges, thus making it difficult to reconcile the growing void between the NWSs and the NNWSs and could also undermine the NPT review process.26 TPNW may provide an “additional justification for the NWSs not working towards their disarmament commitments by arguing for the need to reconcile different set of obligations under the NPT and the TPNW before moving further on nuclear disarmament.

The proponents of the TPNW, nevertheless, remain optimistic and are of the view that the ban treaty would supplement the existing international treaties and arrangements, which may not necessarily be true since there exists inherent conflict between the NPT and the TPNW. The former clearly defines the NWS and the NNWS (Article IX) with a different set of non-proliferation and disarmament obligations, while the TPNW has removed this distinction thus making it unrealistic for the nuclear possessor states to become a party to the new treaty without completely giving up their nuclear weapons.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

The text of the nuclear ban treaty recognizes the importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its verification mechanism as the core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, but beyond this reference and that too in the preambular section of the treaty text, no effort has been made to benefit from CTBT’s extensive verification infrastructure that could otherwise have been useful for the treaty implementation. There is also a possibility that some of CTBT’s Annex II states27 could contest the need to sign/ ratify the CTBT in the presence of a new treaty that comprehensively deals with all aspects, including the ban on its use, the production and possession of nuclear weapons etc., thus making the issue of nuclear testing irrelevant.

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

Under the TPNW, state parties would have to give up their nuclear weapons program and submit declarations that they do not own, possess or control nuclear weapons and materials used for nuclear weapons. States joining the TPNW would be accepting obligations to provide credible assurances regarding the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the state. If the new treaty could be

26 Rauf, APLN & CNND Policy Brief, 8. 27 These are eight Annex II states without their ratification CTBT cannot enter

into force. These include, US, China, Egypt, North Korea, Israel, Iran, India and Pakistan.


universalized, it would preclude the possibility of fissile material production by the state parties and the need to engage in technically and politically difficult FMCT negotiations.

The Way Forward

The humanitarian appeal of nuclear ban treaty may help the civil society to launch follow-up initiatives but, without the participation of nuclear possessor states who remain principal stakeholders, it would be unrealistic to assume that nuclear disarmament could be seriously pursued. Instead of erecting new structures which would lead to further dissent within the global non-proliferation regime, it would be more useful to develop a consensus on the NPT based non-proliferation regime by addressing its existing shortcomings. Following are a few suggestions as to the way forward:

Resetting Priorities

International focus over the last several years seems to have drifted from non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament towards strengthening of nuclear security and export controls. These issues are important and do supplement the broader non-proliferation goals but may also put additional burden on states to meet their international obligations by diverting resources and energy from the disarmament and non-proliferation related issues. Resetting of priorities could bring back the focus on the NPT related obligations that enjoy near universal consensus rather than making concerted efforts to build a new consensus for a nuclear ban treaty.

Universalize the NPT Based Non-Proliferation Regime

NPT may have several weaknesses but has been successful in limiting the number of nuclear weapon states and preventing much feared nuclear cascading effect. Amongst its major shortcomings is NPT’s failure to integrate the three ‘original’ non-NPT signatories that have nuclear weapons. Unless India, Pakistan and Israel are brought into mainstream non-proliferation regime through a realistic and tangible quid pro quo, the goal of a universal non-proliferation regime cannot be achieved. A universal NPT will reduce the incentive for countries intending to build latent nuclear capabilities and break away from their non-proliferation obligations, thus precluding the need for erecting new arrangements in the form of a ban treaty. North Korea’s nuclear issue would have to be dealt separately as it is believed to have developed its nuclear capability while it was part of the NPT and therefore cannot be equated with the other three non-NPT states.


Revitalize the Conference on Disarmament

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) was established in 1979 and remains the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. Contrary to general perception, the CD has an impressive record of negotiating major international treaties, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Environmental Modification and Seabed treaties, Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Since 1996, the CD has not been able to make progress due to varying priorities of the different countries. The disproportionate focus on the issue of FMCT has led to an assumption that the CD is in a stalemate. Instead the CD could work to develop consensus on other issues that are on its agenda including nuclear disarmament, prevention of arms race in the outer space (PAROS), and the negative security assurances (NSAs).

Conclusion

The NPT based non-proliferation regime is inherently discriminatory, but it has helped limit the number of nuclear weapon states by preventing some states from pursuing nuclear weapons, while encouraging others to give up their nuclear weapons and join the NPT as NNWSs. It is not an ordinary achievement by a single multilateral treaty, which despite its shortfalls has been able to withstand several internal and external pressures. Instead of building on the earlier successes, the non-state actors have ventured on a radically new path by introducing a separate treaty to stigmatize, ban and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. Despite its good intentions, this ambitious approach risks unravelling the whole edifice of the NPT based global non-proliferation regime with several threshold states using it as a justification to break away from their existing non-proliferation and disarmament obligations.

The use of nuclear weapons could lead to unimaginable humanitarian consequences, but if managed with responsibility nuclear weapons could also help deter large-scale conventional wars and prevent humanitarian crises. If the objective of the nuclear ban treaty is indeed to reduce the risks associated with nuclear weapons, this could possibly be achieved by adopting a comprehensive approach involving conflict resolution, and working collectively towards complete and general disarmament within the established international framework. Piecemeal solutions without taking into consideration national security interests of individual states are unlikely to produce a meaningful outcome but could lead to further fragmentation within the already fractured international non-proliferation regime.

Role of Leadership and Idiosyncrasy

33

THE ROLE OF LEADERHSIP AND IDIOSYNCRASY IN US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN

Dr. Muhammad Nadeem Mirza

Abstract How does leadership in the United States specifically affect

its foreign policy decision-making towards Pakistan? Using

the poliheuristic theory of decision-making, this paper

explores how idiosyncratic factors such as leaders’

perceptions, past experiences, and ideological orientations –

along with the dynamic geopolitical environment of the

world – affect the US foreign policy making process. It

argues that the role of leadership increases when issues

involve high-risk situations – for example after the 9/11

attacks, President Bush was autonomous ‘enough’ to devise

the national security strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan. In a low-

risk situation the role of leadership is either constrained by

different actors, or the leadership utilizes the same actors

such as the US Congress as leverage against Pakistan to

entice or force it to bring its policy in line with the US

national interests as perceived by the decision-makers.

Keywords: Poliheuristic Theory, Leadership, Idiosyncratic

Factors, United States, Decision Making, Pakistan

Introduction

he precarious national security concerns of the United States vis-à-vis South Asia, both in the immediate aftermath of Soviet Union’s demise and after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,

reinforced Pakistan’s geostrategic significance for the US. These concerns also strengthened the role of US leadership in devising the direction and priorities of its foreign policy towards Pakistan. Coupled with certain other variables such as the nuclear capabilities of Pakistan, and the geopolitical setting of the world, the role of leadership often acts as one of

Dr. Muhammad Nadeem Mirza is Assistant Professor at School of Politics and

International Relations (SPIR), Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad.

T


the most important variables affecting the foreign policy formulation process in the given case. For example, the dynamic geopolitical setting of South Asia resulted in the transformation of the role of leadership in the US ‘nuclear’ policy towards Pakistan – this transformation is quite evident from the nuclear policies of President Eisenhower to President Kennedy and subsequent American administrations. The US President Eisenhower’s ‘Atom for Peace’, while being supportive to all countries, provided incentive to Pakistan to use nuclear technology through the similar program for peaceful purposes. Since the South Asian strategic environment changed because of India’s desire to become a nuclear weapon state, the successive US administrations were quite sceptical of providing Pakistan and many other countries with the nuclear technology. Leadership, thus, at times affects the decision making process, and at other times is itself constrained by the geopolitical environment of the world.

Tchantouridze notes that “political decision making is not a set of algebraic processes, and decision makers do not follow unbreakable laws of classical mechanics.”1 Leaders usually conduct a subjective analysis of available and at times vague data provided by different institutions of the state such as intelligence agencies. Although they ‘try’ to follow principles of objectivity, yet their personal preferences, history, ideology and several other attached factors do transform this rather objective phenomenon into a subjective one. Theories of international relations often do not emphasize upon the link between objective material capabilities and decision maker’s subjective assessment, which indeed is one of the important issues in the decision making process. Poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making attempts to explain this anomalous behaviour of the leaders by saying that: the leaders while analysing the situation do not ‘necessarily’ go for the option which is in the best interest of the state, but also the one which is in congruence with their personal self-interests and less risky for their political life. Decision-makers thus reject the policy-options utilising non-compensatory principle.2

Associated constraints on foreign policy decision-making, most important being time, cost, quality and quantity of information, and the cognitive abilities of the leaders, –also play significant role in influencing leaders’ perceptions. Resultantly the final decision that leaders make may not necessarily be ‘optimal’. Herbert A. Simons discusses this problem

1 Lasha Tchantouridze, "Review: Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of

Foreign Policy Decision Making by Alex Mintz," Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 38, no. 1 (March 2005): 256–58.

2 Alex Mintz, "How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective," Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 1 (2004): 3–13.


35

while elaborating the theory of ‘bounded rationality.’3 He opines that most of the decisions are not the ‘optimal’ ones rather are ‘satisficing’ decisions i.e. those are satisfactory to the existing conditions and sufficiently address the constraints on the decision makers.4

Pakistan, since 9/11, has never been ‘off the radar’ of US public debates; every presidential candidate, during his election campaign, has to present a strategy about dealing with the country. After the elections, although the unfolding events dictate the terms of engagement, the ‘general outline’ of foreign policy is primarily dictated by the president himself.5 Change in the administration at the White House has thus always had a profound impact upon the US foreign policy towards Pakistan.6 The US leadership has been very cautious since 9/11 in dealing with Pakistan, fearing a popular backlash in Pakistan that might support the rise of extreme right-wing forces in the country, or can contribute to anarchy therein - a nightmare for US interests in the region.7 On the other hand, there is a worry about Pakistan’s alleged ‘two-faced’ role in the war against terrorism, especially in Afghanistan. In addition, the United States desires strong ties with India to cater its own economic interests in general and geopolitical interests in particular.

In order to address multifaceted challenges in the region, the US

3 Herbert A. Simon, "Theories of Bounded Rationality," Decision and

Organization 1 (1972): 161–176. 4 Guru, "Herbert Simon," The Economist, March 20, 2009,

http://www.economist.com/node/13350892; Simon, "Theories of Bounded Rationality.”

5 Micah Zenko noted, ‘the goal of policymakers ... is to develop the best means based on the available resources to implement the ... national strategy.’; Micah Zenko, "U.S. National Security Strategy: Rhetoric and Reality," Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), August 15, 2011, http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2011/08/15/u-s-national-security-strategy-rhetoric-and-reality/.

6 Scholars usually raise certain questions that, what would have been the situation of the world had President Clinton, or for that matter, Al Gore might have been the president of United States at the moment of 9/11? Whether they might have attacked Afghanistan or not? Whether they might have pursued the policies as being pursued by President George W. Bush? Iraq War might have been started or not?

7 In the case of contemporary Pakistan, American leadership has certain fears which if materialized could cost hugely not only to United States, but also to the South Asian region and to the world as a whole. One such fear is its lurching into extreme rightists’ hands. In such a situation, American leadership feared of a backlash against West – especially in the scenario that Pakistan has the nuclear weapons. It will also prove to be a bad sign for the American war in Afghanistan.


de-hyphenated Pakistan and India8 and hyphenated Pakistan with Afghanistan in the form of Af-Pak – and designated a Special Representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) with the purpose to “coordinate across the government to meet U.S. strategic goals in the region while engaging NATO and other key friends, allies, and those around the world who are interested in supporting these efforts.”9 In the final years of his administration and with the draw-down of the US presence in Afghanistan, President Obama had initiated the phasing out of the office of SRAP. In June 2017, President Trump further circumvented the office and appointed an Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (Alice G. Wells), as the Acting SRAP.10 Another sign of the US’ limited engagement with Pakistan is President Trump’s Afghanistan and South Asia Strategy, which he announced in August 2017. Although its major contours could have been predicted much earlier, yet the details indicated several important elements. First, it contained the usual allegations that Pakistan is not doing well with targeting those elements creating trouble for the US in Afghanistan. Second, the US will increase its involvement in Afghanistan. Third, the operational details will not be disclosed in advance. Fourth, greater role should be played by India in Afghanistan. And fifth, it included a warning to Pakistan in case it continued to support the belligerent elements.11 Pakistan had conveyed several reservations on the strategy, yet had we learned any lessons from history, this was a long shot in the making. It could well be predicted that whenever the US’ interests in the region would get served, it’ll minimize

8 Teresita C. Schaffer, India and the United States in the 21st Century:

Reinventing Partnership (Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2009), 121; Stanley A. Weiss, "America’s De-Hyphenating India-Pakistan Approach,", April 19, 2009, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle.asp?xfile= data/opinion/2009/April/opinion_April88.xml&section=opinion&col.

9 Department Of State, ‘Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan’, US Department of State, November 5, 2009, http://www.state.gov/s/ special_rep_afghanistan_pakistan/.

10 Mark Landler, "State Dept. Moves to Shut Office Planning Afghanistan Strategy," The New York Times, June 23, 2017, Asia Pacific, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/world/asia/trump-obama-afghanistan-pakistan.html; Alice G. Wells, "Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, and Acting Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP)," U.S. Department of State, 2017, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/230750.htm.

11 Donald Trump, "Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia", White House, August 21, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/21/remarks-president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-and-south-asia; Donald Trump, ‘President Unveils New Afghanistan, South Asia Strategy’, US Department of Defense, August 21, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/ 1284964/president-unveils-new-afghanistan-south-asia-strategy/.


37

its engagement with Pakistan.12 President Obama’s decision of de-hyphenating India and Pakistan

was resented by the leadership in Pakistan, which considered it as being contrary to the ground realities in the region, but the American leadership since is trying to pursue its policy objectives in this direction. President Trump has completed the process of further alienating Pakistan and aligning with India in his recent South Asia strategy – the process that was started by President Obama with his 2009 Af-Pak Strategy.13

While reading all these policy statements, one question that comes to mind is that whether and how the American leaders are different from each other as far as their foreign policy outlook is concerned.Whether President Trump is different from President Obama as far as the US policy towards Pakistan is concerned, or is it just a change of the person in the office? This paper addresses the question as to how the leadership in the United States affects its foreign policy in general and towards Pakistan specifically. It builds upon the empirical evidence taken from history of US leaders, while trying to dissect the effects of idiosyncratic factors on their overall policy outlook.

Poliheuristic Theory: Simplifying the Decision-Making Matrix

Most of the US foreign policy decisions generally and vis-à-vis Pakistan specifically are taken by the President with the help of his advisors such as Secretary of State, Secretary of Defence, National Security Advisor, and Special Representatives.14 In other words, the President’s team does the job of ‘problem representation’, which is “a mental model of goals, constraints, preferred solutions, and expectations about the effectiveness of various tactics.”15 For this purpose the team invites input from different experts, agencies, institutes, and think tanks. The final detailed account of the situation, with the possible policy options is drafted and presented before the president, thus simplifying his job of decision making. At times, the advisors hold different and often contrasting pre-dispositions about the issues, resulting in a variety of input reaching the President. For example, in President Jimmy Carter’s era,

12 Muhammad Nadeem Mirza, "American National Interest Vis-a-Vis Pakistan: A

Retrospect," Pakistan Journal of American Studies 32, no. 2 (Fall 2014): 57. 13 Bureau of Public Affairs Department Of State. The Office of Electronic

Information, "President Obama’s Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) Strategy," March 27, 2009, http://fpc.state.gov/120965.htm.

14 Steven B. Redd, "The Influence of Advisers on Foreign Policy Decision Making An Experimental Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 3 (January 6, 2002): 335–364.

15 Thomas S. Mowle, "Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict," Political Psychology 24, no. 3 (2003): 564.


it was the often diverging viewpoints held by his National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski , and the Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that shaped his administration’s general foreign policy outlook.

The role of leadership falls under the unit level of analysis – in which individuals become the focus of an analytical endeavour. Supporting the individual level of analysis, Jenice Gross Stein noted, “It is a well-established fallacy to give the properties of an individual to a collective entity. Bureaucracies and states do not think or feel—the individuals within them do. A government, as a collective entity, does not calculate and make rational choices, policy makers do.”16 Similarly Goldgeier and MacFaul support the argument by stating, “Individual actors — not states, structures, or bureaucracies — make choices about what foreign policy to pursue. People with names and faces, not the ‘United States’ or ‘Russia’ or ‘globalization’ or ‘the international balance of power,’ make foreign policy.”17 Leaders formulate the foreign policy according to their estimations and perception of the situation. Poliheuristic theory (PHT) postulates that, “in reaching a final decision, foreign policy makers use a set of heuristics”18 to drop the policy options unacceptable to them on the basis of their perception about the national and personal political interests. They “measure success and failure, costs and benefits, gains and losses, and risks and rewards using political units”19 because they have to look for their winning prospects in the next elections; hence domestic politics works as an important constraint while making a decision. PHT states that the first phase of decision-making involves the cognitive-psychological processes in which the leaders drop some of the policy options unacceptable to them on the domestic political front and also because of being too risky for the state interests. It results in the simplification of the decision matrix. The second stage involves the rational decision-making phase in which “the remaining of alternatives are considered in more detail, again by using heuristic reasoning.”20

16 Jenice Gross Stein, "Foreign Policy Decision-Making, Rational, Psychological

and Neurological Models," in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne (Oxford University Press, 2012), 113.

17 James M. Goldgeier and Michael Anthony MacFaul, Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia after the Cold War (Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 8.

18 Tchantouridze, "Review: Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making by Alex Mintz," 257.

19 Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz, Decision making on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 82.

20 Tchantouridze, "Review: Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making by Alex Mintz," 257. Heuristic reasoning is a problem-solving method that closely resembles human reasoning. According to heuristic models in computational sciences, a decision is reached after considering a set of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ alternatives.


39

As the process involves heuristic reasoning, there are plenty of chances that errors are committed because in the decision making process, perceptions of the leaders are involved and subjective analysis is being done by the president and his team. One example of such errors was the US decision to withdraw from Afghanistan in the late 1980s, after Soviet withdrawal and leaving Pakistan alone. They still consider it a result of leadership’s failure to fully appreciate the situation, resulting in disastrous consequences for the US interests in the region, and in the international system.21

Leadership Change and its Impacts on US Foreign Policy

In the United States, the intellectual community generally forecasts foreign policy of the president even before he is elected. Every president in his election campaign draws the general foreign policy outline about important issues. Although, at times, those campaign slogans remain only rhetoric, yet they provide a glimpse of the president’s mind-set and his possible future foreign policy priorities. Though the Democrats and Republicans have different foreign policy orientations, it does not imply that their foreign policies are radically different. Since the issues faced remain the same most of the times, the difference only occurs in how each leader prioritizes these as foreign policy concerns, and the means or tools chosen for achieving the ends defined by policy. Difference between the foreign policy priorities of Democratic Presidents Carter, Clinton, Obama, and Republican Presidents Reagan, Bush Sr., Bush Jr., and current President Trump is evident from the actions they have taken in their respective administrations.

With the onset of Obama’s presidency in 2008, certain foreign policy priorities regarding Pakistan and Afghanistan saw radical change, and there was a strategic shift in the policy formulation process. He discarded Republican President Bush’s expression of “global war on terror” and “replaced it with a covert, laser-like focus on Al-Qaida and its

21 Hillary Clinton stated in a testimony that, “We also have a history of kind-a

‘moving in and out’ of Pakistan. Let’s remember that people we are fighting today, we funded twenty years ago... but let be careful, because what we sow, we will harvest. So we then left Pakistan. We said, OK, Fine! You deal with the Stingers that we have left all over your country. You deal with the mines that are along the border. And by the way, we don’t have anything to do with you, and fact that we are sanctioning you. So we stopped dealing with the Pakistani military and ISI ”; Hillary Clinton, Hillary Clinton Testimony: American Leaving Pakistan Alone after Afghan Jihad, Youtube (US Congress, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= Dpx8VrFmd3U&feature=youtube_gdata_player.


spawn.”22 Obama even changed its title from ‘Global War on Terror’ to ‘Overseas Contingency Operations.’23 The role of US leadership in the policy formulation process increased with the changing geopolitical environment in the region. President Trump has been blunter in his approach towards Pakistan and has even used a threatening tone to pressurise the country for desired gains. In the past decade, the US leaders could not corner Pakistan despite their wish to do so. Pakistan was repeatedly accused of playing a ‘double game’24 given its role in the war against terrorism and the American desire to find an honourable exit from Afghanistan. President Trump has now adopted a harsher tone towards Pakistan because he failed to give a time-bound plan to exit from Afghanistan. Hence with a change in leadership at the White House, coupled with the changing global geostrategic environment, the US foreign policy outlook has undergone change.

Presidents do not always succeed in implementing what they campaign about, but they do succeed, most of the time, in at least imparting a new outlook to the foreign policy. For example, during the election campaign while President Obama gave ‘hope’25 to the American people and the world, he also repeatedly called for allowing bombing of terrorist safe-havens (credibly known) in Pakistan without its approval–

22 Michael Hirsh, " On the Verge of Appeasement in Syria ," National Journal, May

5, 2011, sec. Vantage Point. https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/71521/ verge-appeasement-syria. Very quickly upon taking office as president, Obama reoriented the Iraq War back to where, in the view of many experts, it always belonged. He discarded the idea of a “global war on terror” that conflated all terror threats from al-Qaida to Hamas to Hezbollah.

23 Al Kamen, “The End of Global War on Terror," The Washington Post, March 24, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/03/23/the_end_of_the_ global_war_on_t.html .

24 Thomas L. Friedman, "The Great (Double) Game,", The New York Times, July 31, 2010, sec. Opinion, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/01/opinion/ 01friedman.html.

25 AP, "Economic Meltdowns, Global Warming, and No End to Guantanamo: How the World Is Disappointed in Obama’s Performance (and His Broken Promises)," Daily Mail, May 13, 2012; William Michael Davis, Barack Obama: The Politics of Hope (OTTN Publishing, 2007); Marc Hujer, "Dashed Hopes: How Obama Disappointed the World," Spiegel Online, August 9, 2011; Kevin McCullough, No He Can’t: How Barack Obama Is Dismantling Hope and Change (Thomas Nelson Inc, 2011); Mitch Michener, Barack Obama: Hope Destroyed (Tate Publishing, 2011); Barack H. Obama, The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream (Canongate Books, 2007). On the contrary, there are scholars such as Michener and McCullough who claimed that he had actually destroyed the hope and promises made in his election campaign. Marc Hujer noted, “His decline in popularity has also destroyed the hope that Obama could bring new momentum to America and the world.”


41

and that is exactly what he claimed after his entry into the White House.26 Some Pakistanis were quite hopeful for betterment of the situation after Obama’s victory in the United States. They were optimistic because of Obama’s campaign promises for addressing Islamophobia in the world – such a step, had it succeeded, would have resulted in decreased terrorist recruitment worldwide. Pakistanis were also hopeful regarding a reduced frequency of drone attacks based on a presumption of US understanding of Pakistan’s sensitivities. The approval rating in Pakistan, of the US leadership, rose from 13 percent in 2008 to 24 percent in 2011. However, it has gone down since 2011 and the disapproval rating increased to about 92 percent in 2012.27 Main reasons for the increase in the disapproval rating can be listed as: increase in drone attacks, new strings being attached to assistance to Pakistan, and increased cross-border attacks on Pakistani posts. These factors brought an all-time low in Pak-US relations, especially in 2011. Preble notes that “for all his talk of change, Obama has continued on the path set by his predecessors. Like George W. Bush and Bill Clinton before him, he sees the U.S. military as the world’s sole policeman.”28 Similarly during his election campaign, President Trump had

26 Jason Burke, "Barack Obama’s Election 2012 Win: The World Reacts," The

Guardian, November 7 2012, sec. World news; Anwar Iqbal, "Pakistanis in US Show Soft Corner for Obama," Dawn, March 28, 2013; Peter Walker, "The World Reacts to the New US President", The Guardian, November 5, 2008, sec. World news. Some Pakistanis were happy for Obama’s election in 2008 elections … Walker noted that Pakistan’s former prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani said, the election “marks a new chapter in the remarkable history of the United States”. Iqbal noted that most of the Pakistanis living in Pakistan favoured Republican Romney in 2012 elections – because of the bad experience they had with President Obama – yet those living in United States supported Democrat Obama. Burke noted that in a BBC World Service pre-election opinion poll around the world, conducted between July and September, Pakistanis said they favoured Romney. Pakistan was the only country out of more than 20 sampled to do so. However, large numbers of people polled said they were indifferent to, or unaware of, the election ... “There is some apprehension. There are fears of more drones, more demands, a sense that [Obama] was going to be bad for Pakistan. Pakistanis in general didn't like Obama and identified their anti-Americanism with him so were rooting for [Romney]”.

27 Andrew Dugan and Mohamed Younis, "Pakistani Disapproval of U.S. Leadership Soars in 2012," Gallup, February 14, 2013, http://www.gallup.com/poll/160439/2012-pakistani-disapproval-leadershipsoars.aspx?utm_source=alert&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=syndication&utm_content=morelink&utm_term=All%20Gallup%20Headlines%20-%20USA.

28 Christopher Preble, "A Plan B for Obama: Cut (Really Cut) Military Spending," Foreign Policy, November 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/ 2010/10/11/a_plan_b_for_obama?page=0,8. 28 It is this all-encompassing


used harsh words for Pakistan because of its allegedly dubious role in the war against terrorism and specifically cajoled Indian audience. After the elections and since the declaration of Trump’s South Asia strategy, he could be seen as enacting what he had campaigned for, putting Pak-US ties on a downward spiral set in motion by President Obama.

The study conducted by Margaret G. Hermann found a strong causal relation between the personality factor and the foreign policy decision-making process.29 In the case of Pakistan, the personalities of former US presidents did play an important role. For instance, President Eisenhower had a military background and thus, his priority list included recruiting maximum number of allies to contain the Communist Soviet Union. Defence contracts with Pakistan were signed and it received considerable weapons’ supplies to modernise its military.30 With the onset of Kennedy era, especially after 1962, weapons supply to Pakistan was reduced, and by the end of Johnson administration, it was almost halted.31 Similarly President George W. Bush being the son of a former President, and having an aristocratic background, lacked a public “touch” to his foreign policy and most were ‘hawks’ in his administration who affected his general foreign policy orientation.32 This time again, the personality traits, along-with the geopolitical setting of the world played its part and the US foreign policy towards Pakistan got ‘refashioned’ and unabated assistance started flowing.

Afterwards as President Obama ascended the office, the situation changed. He did not have any aristocratic background. His personality gave a “humane” impression to his foreign policy. He was an “everybody’s man” but he proved more insensitive in his dealings with Pakistan.

mission that requires a large military -- and a very expensive one. Americans today spend more on their military, adjusting for inflation, than at any time during the Cold War, even though the threats that they face are quite modest.

29 Alan S. Gerber et al., "Personality and Political Attitudes: Relationships across Issue Domains and Political Contexts," American Political Science Review 104, no. 01 (2010): 111–133; Margaret G. Hermann, "Personality and Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Study of 54 Heads of Government," in Foreign Policy Decision Making: Perception, Cognition, and Artificial Intelligence, ed. Donald A. Sylvan (Praeger, 1984), 53–80.

30 It does not imply that personality is the only factor that determined US foreign policy towards Pakistan in that era. Geopolitical setting of the world, and other variables also played their part in the decision making process.

31 Besides personality, international issues, like Cuban Missile Crisis, Sino-Indian war, Indo-Pak War, also played crucial role in the policy options chosen by the presidents. Internationally geopolitical setting were undergoing transformation in that era and diplomatic channels between Eastern and Western Blocs were strengthened thus easing down the tensions.

32 Michael Lind, "The Weird Men behind George W Bush’s War," New Statesman, April 7, 2003; Ed Vulliamy, "Two Men Driving Bush into War," The Guardian, February 23, 2003, sec. World news.


43

Professor Mead noted, “President Obama, precisely because he seems so liberal, so vacillating, so nice, is a more effective neoconservative than President Bush … (He) is pushing a democracy agenda in the Middle East that is as aggressive as President Bush’s; he adopts regime change by violence if necessary as a core component of his regional approach and, to put it mildly, he is not afraid to bomb.”33 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism named Obama’s term as “Reaper Presidency”34 because of the increase in the number of drone attacks, and the covert operations throughout the world.

Autonomy of Leaders in Decision Making Process

Another issue that needs elaboration is autonomy of leadership in conducting foreign policy. There is no doubt that domestic politics have a profound impact on foreign policy; proponents of poliheuristic theory claim that the “domestic is the most important dimension in the foreign policy decision making.”35 Given that, there are certain areas where the leadership enjoys relatively higher level of autonomy, including decision-making in the ‘high risk situations’ related to national security i.e. situations where state security is at stake, the leadership enjoys greater autonomy in decision making. In such cases the US Congress and the general public usually follow the decisions taken by the president and his team, considering those as best for national interests. Referring again to 9/11 attacks, President Bush had almost a freehand in devising the US national security strategy in its aftermath. Although Congress may make certain modifications in the decisions made by the president, yet they mostly choose to follow the policy lines set by the President in such high-risk situations.

Since 9/11, President Bush was autonomous ‘enough’ regarding the US foreign policy decision-making vis-à-vis Pakistan. By 2006-07, war in Afghanistan was relegated to the background and the Iraq war dominated the policy discourse, making the Afghan war a low risk situation. As a result, the ‘autonomous’ status of the US leadership with regard to Pakistan diminished and the US Congress, along-with many other factors/actors started influencing the decision making process – hence more strings being attached to aid given to Pakistan, and asking president for certifications about Pakistan’s behaviour.

33 Walter Russell Mead, "W Gets a Third Term In The Middle East’" The National

Interest, August 22, 2011. 34 Alice K Ross, Chris Woods, and Sarah Leo, "The Reaper Presidency: Obama’s

300th Drone Strike in Pakistan," The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, December 3, 2012; Reaper is a type of an armed drone extensively used by the US in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

35 Mintz, "How Do Leaders Make Decisions?"


Idiosyncratic Factors, Perceptions, and Foreign Policy

How do various psychological, ideational, and cultural factors affect the decision making process? How do political actors perceive their own and others’ intentions and capabilities, and which intervening processes translate these perceptions into foreign policy? An American president’s personality traits which include his convictions, past experiences, cognitive-psychological characteristics, his assumptions about the world, and his ideological orientations, matter a lot while making the decisions about Pakistan. His perceptions or misperceptions about Pakistan’s role in the international and regional system influence not only the foreign policy processes but also its outcomes. Little knowledge of Pakistan, of its political and strategic culture, its social norms and values, and inaccurate depictions by the Indian-American lobby (United States India Political Action Committee – USINPAC), and other interest groups have been major concerns for Pakistan. These have resulted in the formulation of short-term and often counter-productive policies by the US towards the country.

Preston mentions two types of characteristics in leaders: “static leader characteristics [such as the ones which have cognitive complexity and the need for power] and non-static, changeable leader characteristics [such as the one preferring the policy experience or expertise].”36 He noted that the interplay of these two characteristics gives rise to two leadership styles: First involves the “leader control and involvement in which leaders desire to personally control or be involved in the policy process in a given issue-area.” In the second leadership style “leader’s general sensitivity to context, their general cognitive need for information, their attentiveness and sensitivity to the characteristics of the surrounding policy environment, the views of others”37 are involved. Similarly, different psychologists have discussed the personality traits of the American presidents and have divided them into certain categories such as, “Three Dominators - Andrew Jackson, Lyndon Johnson , Richard Nixon ; two Inventors - John Adams, Woodrow Wilson ; two Good Guys - Dwight Eisenhower , Gerald Ford ; one Innocent - Ulysses S. Grant; two Actors - Warren Harding, Ronald Reagan ; two Maintainers - Harry Truman , George H.W. Bush ; three Philosophers - Thomas Jefferson, Abe Lincoln, Jimmy Carter ; three Extraverts - Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, John Fitzgerald Kennedy ; and special cases - George

36 Thomas Preston, The President and His Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the

Advisory Process in Foreign Affairs (Columbia University Press, 2012), 14–20. 37 Ibid.


45

Washington, Bill Clinton.”38 President Obama is considered an extravert, and President Trump an outsider.

Another pertinent question is, whether the election of the president and his being in the White House affects his psychology and has any impact on his personality traits and the decision making, i.e., whether it is the ‘chair of presidency’ that affects the presidents, or is it the other way round ? George Reedy noted that the Oval Office “neither elevates nor degrades a man. What it does is to provide a stage upon which all of his personality traits are magnified.”39 These traits, along with the historical experiences, have affected the important decisions made by different US leaders in history.40 Secretary of State under President Eisenhower , John Foster Dulles, was the son of a Presbyterian minister. His uncle and grandfather had been the Secretaries of State in different US administrations. He was a staunch believer in the Christian morality of good vs. evil.41 This legacy affected his perception of the worldview and he adopted a black and white shade in the US foreign policy. He favoured Pakistan over India which he disliked because of two factors: First, Nehru ’s socialist tendencies and second, India’s Non-Aligned posture. He, along with President Eisenhower, had the perception that “either you are with us, or you are against us,” considering non-alignment to be a curse in the era of intense global geopolitical rivalry. Eisenhower’s team acquainted him with the newly independent state of Pakistan and its strategic importance, and above all Pakistan’s willingness to join the Western alliance system. It was during his era that Pakistan gained importance in the US foreign policy discourse regarding the region and became part of South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).

President Kennedy was second among nine children from an overly disciplinarian mother and a dominant father. “Growing up with tough family expectations made him tougher” and a competitor, especially after recovering from a childhood illness.42 He was open-minded and often

38 Steven J. Rubenzer and Thomas R. Faschingbauer, eds., Personality, Character,

and Leadership in the White House: Psychologists Assess the Presidents (Potomac Books, Inc., 2004).

39 George E. Reedy, The Twilight of the Presidency (World Publication Company, 1970), 18–19.

40 F. Ugboaja Ohaegbulam, A Concise Introduction to American Foreign Policy (Peter Lang Publishing, 1999), 75–84.

41 Richard H. Immerman, ed., John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War (Princeton University Press, 1992), 18; Spencer C. Tucker, ed., "John Foster Dulles," in The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History (ABC-CLIO, 2011), 315; The son of a Presbyterian minister, Dulles 's public record is replete with seemingly evangelical diatribes.

42 Jonathan Dunder, "John F. Kennedy Biography," The Free Information Society, 2013, http://www.freeinfosociety.com/site.php?postnum=118.


took bold decisions contrary to the general trend in American foreign policy towards Pakistan. He always asked his advisors to give him more policy options to the problems he faced, and searched for ‘out-of-box’ solutions. Though there was a prevalent dislike between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Nehru, yet in his era the United States got much closer to India and seeds of discord were sown in Pak-US relations – the US’ changing priorities in South Asia, particularly after the Sino-Indian war also acted as an intervening variable in the decision making.

President Carter promoted human rights, global peace, economic development, and nuclear non-proliferation. In the 1920s, his mother “crossed the then-strict lines of segregation in 1920s’ Georgia by counselling poor African American women on matters of health care.”43 Though a Southerner, he held close acquaintances with African Americans during his childhood. In 1950s and 1960s, he supported the civil rights movement for desegregation and ending racial discrimination in the United States. His parents were deeply religious and brought him up in Christian moralism. Pakistan by his time was undergoing revolutionary changes - opposition groups were up against Prime Minister Bhutto, who was using all possible means to deal with the situation, which resulted in rampant human rights violations. Soon General Zia -ul-Haq imposed Martial Law and political freedoms and certain basic human rights were withheld by the state.44 Parallel to this, Pakistan had started seeking a nuclear program/capability using all possible means. All this was against Carter’s aspirations and his stated goals. The obvious result was severe pressure on Pakistan to be eased only by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 .

President Woodrow Wilson shared somewhat similar history as Carter. His father was a pastor of church, and his mother was a priest’s daughter.45 Wilson once mentioned, “I was swollen with pride as I listened to my father’s preaching.”46 During his childhood, he had a first-hand experience to see the horror of war – American civil war of 1861. With such a background, his election gave him a chance to exercise his ideas at the domestic and international level; he was a humanist and advocated policies based on moralism. Initially he kept the US out of the First World War for about three years and later entered war only to fight a ‘war to end

43 Robert A. Strong, "Jimmy Carter: Life Before the Presidency," Miller Center of

Public Affairs, University of Virginia, October 4, 2016, https://millercenter.org/president/carter/life-before-the-presidency.

44 Peter R. Blood, Pakistan: A Country Study (US Federal Research Division, 1996), XXXV.

45 Jan Willem Schulte Nordholt, Woodrow Wilson: A Life for World Peace, trans. Herbert H. Rowen (University of California Press, 1991), 6–11.

46 Robert Alexander Kraig, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost World of the Oratorical Statesman (Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 14.


47

all wars’.47 Certain scholars object to this line of reasoning, considering him to be a typical Southern white supremacist. Pakistan did get the benefits from his idea of national self-determination during the independence movement, though under Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Truman, the US was against the idea of Pakistan.

President Ronald Reagan was a conservative, nationalist, and had a thirty years long acting career.48 The result was the introduction of novel and dramatic terminology in the American politics such as ‘star wars’ and ‘evil empire’. He also coined the term ‘War on Terror’ in the American politics. As Pakistan had already started supporting the Afghan mujahedeen against Soviet supported government in Kabul, Reagan’s coming to the White House proved very helpful for Pakistan. It soon started one of the biggest guerrilla operations in Afghanistan with the help from the United States and other allies.

Moving on, Presidents Bush Sr. and Bush Jr. had aristocratic backgrounds. They had held high offices; resultantly they lacked the “common touch” in their foreign policy towards Pakistan in particular. Bush Sr. decided to withdraw from Afghanistan and Pakistan without taking care of the sensitivities and the future repercussions of his actions, thus pushing Afghanistan into a civil war having adverse consequences for Pakistan. His proposed New world Order brought the US and India closer to each other while distancing Pakistan from the US. Several sets of sanctions were imposed on Pakistan in his era. President Bush Jr.’s foreign policy towards Pakistan was determined by the high-risk situation in which his administration held sway over foreign policy decision making. As mentioned earlier, he lacked the ‘common touch’ in his foreign policy and was strongly influenced by a group of highly influential foreign policy elite – the neoconservatives such as Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.

47 Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New

World Order (Oxford University Press, 1992). Max Boot had distinguished between ‘soft’ and ‘hard Wilsonians’ as: “Liberal ‘soft Wilsonians’, such as former. U.S. President Jimmy Carter and ... Woodrow Wilson himself, share a faith that multilateral organizations such as the League of Nations of the United Nations should be the main venues through which the United States promotes its ideals, and international law should be the United States’ main policy tool. They are willing to use force, but preferably only when (as in Haiti and Kosovo) the intervention is untainted by any hint of national interest ” ... the neocons are hard Wilsonians, “who place their faith not in pieces of paper but in power, specifically U.S. power.” Max Boot, ‘Myths about Neoconservatism’, in The Neocon Reader, ed. Irwin M. Stelzer (Grove Press, 2004), 49.

48 Jules Tygiel, Ronald Reagan And the Triumph of American Conservatism (Longman Publishing Group, 2006).


President Clinton was enthusiastic and gave hope to the United States and the world. During his era, it was suggested that the sanctions put on Pakistan were counter-productive, so through Brown ’s Amendment the sanctions were somewhat eased, allowing humanitarian aid flow to Pakistan.49 President Obama having a modest background was outspoken, open minded, and took certain bold steps. His stay in a Muslim country, in his childhood, gave him first-hand experience with Muslim societies – indeed he even held a Muslim middle name: Hussain.50 All these factors affected his foreign policy postures positively or negatively - he had to live at a distance from Muslims for not giving the opposition a chance to make an issue over his Islamic leanings (if there were any). Also the response of Muslim states to his foreign policy decisions was influenced by these facts mentioned above. As far as his foreign policy towards Pakistan is concerned, he proved more of a hard-liner than his predecessor. Since 2008, the relations between Pakistan and the United States saw a downward trajectory.

President Trump – a billionaire and a business tycoon having a conservative orientation, a brash attitude, and an overtly chauvinistic and xenophobic outlook is attracted more towards India and believes its claims of being also a victim of terrorism. Besides, India offering a market of more than a billion people is a huge economic opportunity for the US. The American grand strategy in the region – encompassing Afghan war, access to the Central Asian natural resources, containing China,51 aligning with India – are few of the factors affecting Trump administration’s decision making regarding Pakistan.

Launching covert operations against the assumed terrorists hiding in foreign lands such as Pak-Afghan border region, Somalia, Syria, Libya and Yemen has become a ‘new normal’ in the US foreign policy behaviour. US leadership usually authorises such operations without taking care of Congress’ views and general public opinion. President Bush , for example, throughout his tenure, launched several covert operations in South Asian, Middle Eastern and African countries. He had even tried sending American soldiers in pursuit of militants inside Pakistani territory, but because of severe Pakistani response he had to halt the boots-on-ground operations.

49 Michael Benson, Bill Clinton (Twenty-First Century Books, 2003); David

Maraniss, First In His Class: A Biography Of Bill Clinton (Simon and Schuster, 2008).

50 Andrea Elliott, "Muslim Voters Detect a Snub From Obama," The New York Times, June 24, 2008, sec. U.S. / Politics; Radhika Parameswaran, "Facing Barack Hussein Obama Race, Globalization, and Transnational America," Journal of Communication Inquiry 33, no. 3 (2009): 195–205.

51 Muhammad Nadeem Mirza, "Contending Interests of Big Powers in Central Asia: China’s Perspective,"(Regional Security and Foreign Policy in South, Central and West Asia, Islamabad: Strategic Vision Institute-SVI, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung-KAS, 2017)


49

President Obama , soon after oath-taking, changed the battle procedures and started relying more on technology i.e. the use of drones became a norm.52 In his State of the Union address in February 2013, he announced that while the bulk of American forces will be out of Afghanistan by the end of 2014, yet “we will continue to take direct action against those terrorists who pose the gravest threat to Americans.”53 In other words, he was directly pointing to the continued use of drones in Pakistan and elsewhere. Covert operation resulting in Osama Bin Laden’s death deep inside Pakistan is one such example, where President Obama and his team took the decision unilaterally. While discussing the covert operation that killed Osama Bin Laden , author Rachel Kleinfeld drew differences between different presidents’ approaches in dealing with the militants abroad. She noted:

President Clinton was deliberate -- so much so that he was famously risk-averse and more concerned with popularity. That meant that he shot cruise missiles rather than committing ground troops when Osama bin Laden was in Sudan, missing a crucial early chance in the 1990s. President Bush had the opposite character: a lot of bluster and risk-taking, little deliberation or follow-through. As a result, we lost Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora because of poor planning and closed down the C.I.A. unit in 2005 that was dedicated to catching bin Laden. It took a leader (Like Obama ) who could combine deliberation -- waiting months while special forces practiced on a mock compound built to exact specifications on U.S. soil -- with the risky strategy of committing ground forces to finally get our target.54

A Leader’s Power of Persuasion

A related question that may be asked is, whether it is the leadership which engineers the public opinion or is it the domestic public pressure which forces the leaders to make the appropriate decisions? The answer can be: it is not a one-way business but a two way process. Although the leadership is at the deciding end, yet at times it has to engineer public opinion especially if the decisions involve some ‘high risk’ situations such as intervention in other countries. For example, Roosevelt did not jump immediately into World War-II. American public opinion was against Germany , but not enough to declare war against it; it was possible

52 Muhammad Nadeem Mirza et al., "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: A Revolution in

the Making," South Asian Studies 31, no. 02 (December 2016): 625 – 638. 53 Barrack H. Obama, quoted by Anwar Iqbal, "US War in Afghanistan will be

over by End of 2014: Obama Direct Attacks on Militant Hideouts to Continue," Dawn, February 14, 2013.

54 Rachel Kleinfeld, "Presidential Temperament," The New York Times, May 3, 2011, sec. Room for Debate.


only after the Pearl Harbour attacks.55 Similarly Woodrow Wilson joined World War-I when the American public opinion was ripe against Germany after the sinking of RMS Lusitania by German subs, and the publishing of Zimmerman Telegram which not only challenged the basic principle of the US foreign policy of that time i.e. Monroe Doctrine, but also threatened its survival.56 It takes some time to ‘tame’ the general public opinion and thus getting the domestic support for such actions. America's president, as the political scientist Richard Neustadt once noted, may be the most powerful man in the world, but he has only one real power i.e. “the power of persuasion.”57

Using this power the leader tries to mould the public opinion in favour of the policy options he wishes to pursue. For this purpose he has different tools at disposal, most notably the media. In the case of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, President Bush did not jump-start the invasion. It took months of homework and producing ‘fabricated’ reports58 by intelligence agencies claiming that Iraq was developing the WMDs, so as to convince American public of the dangers posed by Saddam regime.59 A report issued as early as September 2002 by the Department of State noted, “Iraq has stepped up its quest for nuclear weapons and has embarked on a worldwide hunt for materials to make an atomic bomb.”60 Similarly CIA reported in October 2002 that “Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions: if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade (italics added).”61 All these reports helped President Bush to build up his case for invading Iraq in front of the public. This process may also be termed as 55 Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public

Opinion, and the War against Nazi Germany (Oxford University Press, 2001); Waldo Heinrichs, Threshold of War : Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II (Oxford University Press, 1988).

56 Justus D. Doenecke, Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America’s Entry Into World War I (University Press of Kentucky, 2011).

57 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan (Free Press, 1991). Quoted by Gregor Peter Schmitz, "Obama’s Weakness Is a Problem for the Global Economy," Spiegel Online, August 9, 2011, sec. World.

58 Joby Warrick, "Some Evidence on Iraq Called Fake," Washington Post, March 8, 2003.

59 Conrad Molden, What Were the Consequences of the Iraq War Contracts? From Eisenhower’s Warnings to Halliburton’s Profits (Lambert Academic Publishing, 2012), 4–5.

60 Department Of State, A Decade of Deception and Definace: Saddam Hussein’s Defiance of the United Nations, (The White House, September 12, 2002).

61 CIA, Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, (US Government, October, 2002).


51

‘manufacturing fear’ or ‘manufacturing consent’, in order to get public support for the desired policy issues.62 Former Head of the Iraq Survey Group David Kay noted in a hearing, “we were almost all wrong, and I certainly include myself here.”63

In the case of Pakistan, the United States did not commit its ground troops though they tried to send these across the border many times in the last decade; use of drones has emerged as the US leadership’s weapon of choice in this case. However, the use of drones has become distasteful to the American public because of the attached legal and moral constraints especially after some American nationals were killed in drone attacks. Congress and the American public has been demanding since 2010 a more in-depth scrutiny of the drone operations as well as the kill-list.64 President Obama had to deal with this challenge on the domestic front. Congressmen were so angry over the non-transparency of the drone program that Betty McCollum went so far as presenting an amendment to block the CIA funding being used for conducting drone operations.65

Despite such resistance, Obama went ahead with drone operations in Pakistan but the intensity of drone attacks decreased substantially. The US public pressure may have played an important role in reduction in the number of such attacks. In response to the increased domestic pressure, Obama promised to bring in more transparency in the drone operations.66 President Trump, though leaving the operational details to be dealt by the

62 Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political

Economy of the Mass Media (Random House, 2010). 63 David Kay, "Hearing on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs", Senate

Armed Services Committee (Washington D.C., January 28, 2004) https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/kaytestimony.pdf

64 Tom Campbell, "Drone Strikes: Who’s on the “Kill List,” Los Angeles Times, February 17, 2013; Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Laura Litvan, and Greg Stohr, "Obama Faces Bipartisan Pressure on Drone Big Brother Fear," Bloomberg, March 8, 2013; Joshua Hersh, "Obama Drone Program Secrecy Reaches “Alice-in-Wonderland” Extremes", Huffington Post, February 6 , 2013.

65 AFP, "First US Drone Strike in Pakistan since Sharif Sworn In," France 24, June 7, 2013; Josh Lederman and Rebecca Santana, "Drone Strike Shows That Secret CIA Attacks Will Continue despite Obama Pledge for Transparency", Fox News, May 30, 2013; Betty McCollum, Betty McCollum, "The McCollum Amendment to the FY14 Defense Appropriations Bill Prohibiting Funds for CIA Lethal Drone Strikes," Congressional Record Volume 159, Issue 85, (U.S. Government Publishing Office: June 2013) https://www.govinfo.gov/ app/details/CREC-2013-06-14/CREC-2013-06-14-pt1-PgE861.

66 Joshua Hersh, "State Of The Union: On Drones, Obama Pledges Greater Transparency," Huffington Post, February 12, 2013; Barack H. Obama, "Obama’s Speech on Drone Policy," The New York Times, May 23, 2013; Editor, "Barack Obama Promises More Transparency on Drones," The Telegraph, February 15, 2013.


troops on ground, has adopted a tone that is suggestive of his harsh approach dealing with Pakistan.67

Conclusion

Poliheuristic theory explains how domestic politics, leaders’ idiosyncrasies and perceptions play their part in foreign policy decision making process. The role of American leadership in the foreign policy formulation towards Pakistan has changed with the change of geostrategic and geopolitical situation at both international and regional levels. Yet one constant has been the ‘relative’ autonomy of the American leadership in the foreign policy choices towards Pakistan. Even though the events of September 11 changed the situation and made Pakistan an important part of the domestic discourse, yet policy regarding Pakistan remained one of the domains where the leadership exercised their influence to their fullest. It does not mean that the American leadership is the only deciding authority; certain other actors/factors continue to act as intervening, and at times as independent variables affecting the policy - e.g. war against terrorism, geostrategic position of Pakistan, Indian influence in Pak-US relations, and the like. But ultimately all these factors have to be processed through the leaders’ cognition and their advisors’ feedback.

President Trump refused to certify to Congress that Pakistan is “doing enough” against Haqqani Network and other terrorist groups, thus withholding instalments of Coalition Support Fund in 2017. This process of putting pressure on Pakistan using different economic and military carrots and sticks was started much earlier by President Bush, and was reinforced by President Obama. Pakistan, which went off-the-radar in the US foreign policy priorities after the killing of Osama Bin Laden in 2011, and the announcement of President Obama’s 2014 withdrawal plans, has once again come to the forefront since the announcement of Trump’s South Asia strategy. It has become a part of the high-risk security situation, thus augmenting the role of US leaders in decision making vis-à-vis Pakistan. Signs indicate that Pak-US relations are going to take a downward trajectory in the coming years, but the continuity of their relations will see several ups and downs in which US leadership and geopolitical environment would play a determining role.

67 Max Boot, "Trump’s Path to Indefinite Afghan War," Council on Foreign

Relations - CFR, August 22 2017, https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/trumps-path-indefinite-afghan-war.

The Law On Television Coverage

53

THE LAW ON TELEVISION COVERAGE OF SENSITIVE CONTENT IN PAKISTAN:

A LEGAL INSIGHT

Muhammad Sajjad & Dr. Juriah binti Abd. Jalil

Abstract In Pakistan the war on terrorism has been fought at two fronts: the battleground and in media. In this case, television coverage of violence, conflict and religious matters becomes highly sensitive and media generated sensationalism, hype and ill-scrutinized use of User Generated Content (UGC) may lead to public panic and undermine security interests of the state. The diverse religious and ethnic sensibilities of Pakistanis make it incumbent on the media, especially the private sector, to play its role in promoting peace and harmony in the society and provide information that caters to public’s right to information while keeping in view legal and ethical requirements of acceptable television news content. This article seeks to address the content compliance issues associated with private television news from a regulatory perspective; a thorough scrutiny of the content delivered by Pakistan’s private TV Channels does not compromise either public’s right to information or the freedom of media. Keywords: Security, Media, Coverage, Sensationalism, Conflict, Violence, UGC.

Introduction

akistan has faced the severe brunt of being a front-line ally in the War on Terror and has long been a target of terrorist attacks. A series of suicide bombings in public and militarized areas have been

telecasted as breaking news, especially by private TV Channels and media houses. Security operations were conducted to hunt down the terrorists, which were widely covered by private television channels, and at times live coverage of such operations possibly exposed the strategy of security Muhammad Sajjad is a practising lawyer, currently Head of Corporate &

Commercial at a law firm in Muscat Oman. Dr. Juriah binti Abd Jalil is Associate Professor at Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyyah of

Laws, International Islamic University Malaysia.

P


agencies to the terrorists. Reporting such conflict and violence became a source of sensationalized content for the private, commercially-driven media.

Sensationalism, exaggeration and hyped media content created panic and distress in the public by portraying for them their possible vulnerability. This sensationalism became a norm in reporting all types of news -- especially news related to conflicts. On the other hand, with advanced cameras in mobile phones, there is a growing trend of capturing incidents and quickly sharing on social media or directly sending them to television channels. Such User Generated Content (UGC) is frequently aired by television channels to outpace their competitors in telecasting the breaking-news which effects their relative rating.

The private television sector in Pakistan is regulated by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA), established in 2002,1 which mandates, inter alia, improving the standard of information. PEMRA has a set of rules, regulations and a code of conduct to regulate private sector broadcasting: television and radio. Regulating the private television industry includes regulation of the content produced and aired by private TV channels. The Electronic Media (Programmes and Advertisements) Code, 20152 (PEMRA Code, 2015) is the latest regulatory development, which provides some fundamental principles and standards for acceptable content. The present research will analyze, in a comparative manner, the practices followed by private news channels in the light of this PEMRA Code, 2015. Previously, some studies have been conducted on the negative role played by private TV channels. These sources highlight how media played into the hands of terrorists by providing sensational coverage and footage of events during the Taliban conflict.3 Also there have been studies regarding conflict coverage and how it should be conducted by the journalists.4 Literature on journalism in Pakistan also explores ethics of conflict

1 It was established under Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority

Ordinance, 2002 (XIII of 2002). 2 Schedule A to Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009,

and issued pursuant to Rules 2(1)f) and 15(1) vide SRO No. 1(2)/2012-PEMRA-COC dated August 19, 2015.

3 Syed Adnan Haider, “A Critical Study of How Taliban Capitalize on Electronic Media Sensationalism in Pakistan,” Journal of Mass Communication and Journalism, 6 (2016) https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/a-critical-study-of-how-the-taliban-capitalize-on-electronic-mediasensationalism-in-pakistan-2165-7912-1000292.php?aid=72453.

4 Bashir Ahmed Tahir, Practical Guide: Tips for Conflict Reporting (Islamabad: Intermedia, 2009) https://docplayer.net/52740066-Practical-guide-tips-for-conflict-reporting-bashir-ahmed-tahir.html.


55

coverage, especially in the context of war on terrorism.5 Issues like sensationalism, coverage of conflict, violence and religious issues, lack of professionalism etc. were studied in the context of journalism and the challenges they pose to Pakistani media in the 21st century.6 It appears, however, such literature is mostly biased in terms of journalistic, social or political contexts it deals with.

International sources relate sensationalism with yellow journalism, and explain how sensational reporting contributes to creating media hype for commercial and political interests.7 Some studies identify how sensationalism affects the perception of religious minorities in a country, raising questions on the reliability of news media.8 In international media, use of UGC is a new phenomenon in the present century which has been studied in various disciplines raising concerns over legality and reliability of its use.9 Journalistic research reveals the volume of UGC in television news.10 In view of regulatory concerns, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has also published guidelines on regulation of UGC,11 and relatively recent literature stresses the need for regulating it.12 Currently available literature on the issue has not investigated the case of private news channels in Pakistan from a regulatory perspective. It is a

5 Pakistan Press Foundation, “Ethics in Conflict Coverage,” (Discussion paper,

Pakistan Press Foundation in collaboration with Pakistan Coalition for Ethical Journalism), Islamabad (2014).

6 Abida Eijaz et al., “Challenges and Options for Pakistani Media in the 21st Century,” Journal of Political Studies 21 (2014) 243-257.

7 Jessica E. Jackson, “Sensationalism in the Newsroom: Its Yellow Beginnings, the Nineteenth Century Legal Transformation, and the Current Seizure of the American Press,” Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 19 (2014): 789-816.

8 Ali Parvin, “Sensationalism in Media: Perspective of Non-Muslim Malaysians towards Reliability of Media Content,” International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Research 4 (2016): 547-556.

9 Terry Flet et al., “User-generated content and the Future of Public Broadcasting: A Case Study of Special Broadcasting Service,” (paper presented at the conference of Centre for Media and Communications Law, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia, 20-21 November 2008).

10 Claire Wardle et al., Amateur Footage: A Global Study of User-Generated Content in TV and Online-News Output (Columbia: Columbia Journalism School, 2014), http://towcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/80458_ Tow-Center-Report-WEB.pdf,( accessed October 18, 2018)

11 Martin Scott, Guidelines for Broadcasters on Promoting User-generated Content and Media and Information Literacy (London: Commonwealth Broadcasting Association, 2009).

12 Turner Hopkins, Report for Ofcom: The Value of User-Generated Content (2013),https://www.ofcom.org.uk/data/assets/pdf_file/0016/32146/content.pdf


fact that private television channels sensationalize news, use UGC, and cover conflict and violence in a way that makes the public panic. Therefore, the question that arises is whether there are any standards regulating these issues, and if there are any, how efficiently they address the problem? This study is significant as it provides a legal perspective over the issue, when compared to earlier studies that have discussed the issue from psychological, journalistic, social and political aspects.

In order to conduct research in a productive manner, doctrinal and qualitative research methodology has been applied -- the former is helpful in analyzing the existing legal sources like PEMRA legislation, whereas the latter assists in exploring the current phenomenon of news content in the private television industry in Pakistan. Application of both helps in evaluating the content issues and gauging the efficiency of the present PEMRA Code, 2015.

Analyzing the Telecast of Peace Sensitive Issues by Private TV Channels

The analysis given below has been done on the basis of categorization of issues telecasted by private TV Channels, which are sensitive regarding peace and order in the society i.e. such issues, reporting on which is counter-productive for social order, public’s sense of freedom and thus, peace. The list includes sensationalism; reporting incidents of violence such as killings, crime, accidents etc.; telecasting details of operations against terrorists; user generated content promotion; and religiously biased content.

Sensationalism

In the context of television journalism, sensationalism refers to an intentional presentation of news stories in a provoking, shocking and exciting way that may compromise accuracy, rights of privacy or given facts to convey a story subjectively and by blowing it out of proportion, for attracting maximum viewership. Sensationalism seeks to paint events in a way that induces the viewers to take sides. The origin of sensationalism dates back to sixteenth century when the print media emerged.13 In the nineteenth century American press, sensationalism was noted to have contributed to the Spanish-American War.14 In 1890, it was advocated by some US jurists that there was need for introducing new tort against

13 Syed Adnan Haider, “A Critical Study of How Taliban Capitalize on Electronic

Media Sensationalism in Pakistan,” 292. 14 Role of US press in the Spanish-American War has been subject of research

and there is credible evidence that some newspapers did sensationalize its reporting on Cuba that was one of the driving factor for armed conflict between America and Spain.


57

emerging sensational media.15 This can be termed as the first era of sensationalism in media, precisely the print media.

Sensationalism went a level ahead with the advent of electronic media: radio, television, and now the internet. A growing number of television channels owned by corporate businesses have saturated the present day media markets. The media products have become consumption products, where each product has its shelf-life. The growing competition has brought in sensationalism for increased consumption to survive in a competitive market. Pakistani viewers are a victim of this sensational reporting. It is believed that sensationalism sells better and would help attract more viewership as compared to telecast of real-time issues related to development.16

Unfortunately, the PEMRA legislation has neither defined sensationalism, nor has provided any rules, despite growing public complaints against increasingly sensational coverage. At best, it can be assumed, that the present PEMRA Code deals indirectly with the issue in certain provisions like prohibition on broadcasting statements of banned outfits.17 However, given the magnitude of this issue, proper regulation is needed to curb it in the public interest.

Sensationalism, in the present age of complex electronic media, is not an expressly articulated subject in current media regulatory codes. For example, even UK Ofcom Broadcasting Code,18 Malaysian Code19 and Australian Code20 do not define sensationalism, and neither provide any provisions on how to control it. It is important to note that sensationalism might be good at times, when used positively and without maneuvering, a tool for public awareness on important social and economic issues. Well-articulated regulations on this subject can specify on what type of issues require a sensational approach, on conditions of accuracy, fairness and protection of privacy.

Justification for devising legislation on sensationalism is necessitated by a number of eye-opening incidents for the legislature and policy makers. Case of Arnold Schwarzenegger,21 former Governor of

15 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law

Review 4, (1890): 193 16 Syed Adnan Haider, “A Critical Study of How Taliban Capitalize on Electronic

Media Sensationalism in Pakistan,” 292. 17 PEMRA Code, Section 3(3). 18 The UK Ofcom Broadcasting Code, 2017. 19 The Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Content Code,

https://www.mcmc.gov.my/skmmgovmy/files/attachments/ContentCode.pdf ( accessed on August 26, 2018)

20 Australian Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice, 2015. 21 Arnold Schwarzenegger, film star turned politician, ran for gubernatorial

election in California. At the climax of political campaign, just days before the elections on October 2, 2003 a media organization, Los Angeles Times


California in USA is a befitting example of how sensationalism can be used for political ends. In Pakistan, during the last one and half decades, news segments, current affairs programmes and coverage on terrorism, heinous crimes, violence, tragedies and child abuse were highly sensational, which not only lowered public sensitivity but also created a panic and terror in public life.

Tragedies, Accidents, Crimes and Acts of Terrorism22

Apart from journalism ethics, the regulation also puts some restrictions on reporting accidents, crimes and violence. The purpose of regulating such coverage is to protect the viewers from panic and distress, and not to infringe upon the victims’ privacy. The PEMRA Code devised certain standards for coverage of unfortunate events. For reporting on crimes and violence, the licensee is to ensure that such reporting does not portray the crime or violence as a heroic act or in a glamorous manner.23 As a fundamental principle of the Code, it is prohibited to air programme content that encourages, condones or justifies criminal activities, terrorism or disorder.24 Victims’ suffering and gory scenes of bloodshed and close-ups of the injured or killed should not be shown on the screen.25 Even in case of reporting such tragedies, the licensee is required to exercise caution and give appropriate warning26 so the viewers can make an informed decision. The broadcaster is to ensure that coverage of natural calamities, accidents or acts of terrorism do not disrupt activities of those involved in rescuing the victims.27

From a regulatory perspective, the most sensitive aspect of reporting journalism is covering sex crimes, like rape and sexual violence, where the victims find themselves highly vulnerable. Their traumatic condition requires legal protection for them and their families’ identity. It

published a sensational story alleging Arnold had been groping women in the past and had even attempted to remove his colleague’s clothing on each encounter in the lift. The story, tactically mentioned ‘rape’ as a question: Did he rape…? No. But as a matter of fact, he was scandalized. Arnold, despite these allegations, won the elections but did not take the matter to the court. However, this campaign due to its timing and based on later investigations was not less than politically motivated. Reference, Gary Cohn, et al., “Women Say, Schwarzenegger Groped, Humiliated Them,” The Los Angeles Times, October 2, 2003, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/oct/02/local/me-women2(accessed October 5, 2018)

22 Terrorism is defined under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The definition is quite exhaustive which enumerates actions that amount to terrorism.

23 PEMRA Code, Section 8(1). 24 Ibid., Section 3(1)(h). 25 Ibid., Section 8(3). 26 Ibid., Section 8(2). 27 Ibid., Section 8(4).


59

becomes rather sensitive if the victim of sexual offence is a minor. Different regulatory codes tend to provide rules restricting broadcasters from revealing not only minor victims’ identity but also that of witnesses and even of the offender.28 PEMRA Code also seems to employ a very restrictive approach by requiring ‘extreme caution’ in dealing with content involving rape or sex offences.29 It prohibits revealing victim or victim’s family unless it is expressly permitted by them. In case of minor victim, such permission will be given by legal guardian of such minor.30 Re-enactment of any sex crimes is prohibited by the Code31 irrespective of whether the victim is an adult or a minor.

On the coverage of violence, the main principle is to restrict the violent content to a minimum level. Violence may take place in more or less rigorous forms. The regulation may allow presentation of a crime story where, to convey the theme, violence would be allowed to a certain extent. Ofcom Code, in this regard, provides principle of ‘context’ as an exception to prohibition of depicting violent content on television -- that is, presentation of violence must be justified by the context.32 The Code defines ‘context’ in a non-restrictive manner by including editorial justification, programme timing, reaction of viewers who may be exposed to the content suddenly, the nature of content before and after the subject programme, the offensive impact of airing the violent portion in a programme, viewers expectations, the extent allowable for broadcasting the content by informing the viewers etc. This is equally applicable in case of both information and entertainment content. The Malaysian Code allows portrayal of violence in a restricted way by providing specific rules on violent content in news and analytical programmes. It is identical with the Ofcom Code in terms of an editorial aspect, use of cautionary approach and alerting the viewers on the nature of content in advance.33

PEMRA Code, 2015 restricts portrayal of violence in broadcast of information content; however, like other concepts in the Code, the subject of violence has not been dealt with in considerable detail. Overall, the provisions of the Code on reporting, analyzing and documenting on violence, accidents, tragedies, crimes and acts of terrorism need to be revisited. The PEMRA Code, like the Malaysian Code,34 needs to deal with the concept of permitted portrayal of violence and its justification. Further the Code calls for inclusion of the psychological form of violence in the classification of violence. The subject of violence in today’s television

28 Ofcom Code, Rule 1.8. 29 PEMRA Code, Section 8(5). 30 Ibid., Section 8(6). 31 Ibid., Section 9(2). 32 Ofcom Code, Section Two, Rule 2.3. 33 Malaysian Code, Section 4.3(i)(d). 34 Ibid., Section 4.


reporting is not avoidable, as the public has right to get information on things happening around, yet at the same time, public should be protected from the harms of displaying violent content on television. Therefore, the PEMRA Code requires an update of its provisions on violence by including certain principles from journalism ethics.

Security Operations against Terrorists

Conflict coverage is a complex issue for both reporting ethics and regulation. It is important to define what does conflict coverage mean. In simpler terms it is coverage of any ongoing conflict of any kind, violent or non-violent, between groups or individuals or between state and non-state actors. Conflict journalism defines conflict as an open clash between two individuals or groups.35 It may be internal or external. Irrespective of its type, parties to the conflict always try to get sympathy of the media or to influence it so to use it for propaganda purposes, by getting media to propagate their side’s narrative. In the particular case where state and non-state actors are involved in a conflict, the media can play the responsible role of a peace driver. The second dimension of conflict reporting is access to the conflict area and the conduct of media crew in the field while collecting material for reporting. The regulation ensures that certain basic principles are followed by the media while covering a conflict.

Reporting conflict in Pakistani media had specific dimensions during the war against terrorism, especially in relation to private televisions, when the internal law and order situation deteriorated due to conflict in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, causing a wave of terrorist activities in other major cities. During that time, there was a trend in the media of hunting for sensational and breaking-news, undermining the security operations of law enforcement agencies. This situation triggered incorporation of conflict coverage related provisions in the present PEMRA Code which specifically restricts broadcasting of any information linked with an ongoing security operation, or related to the victims of any acts of terrorism, except with the permission of the particular law enforcement agency.36 The same restriction is applicable in case of coverage37 of such operations.38 Entry of television channels’ reporters, camera-men or other support staff into a conflict zone and reporting on activities there is also

35 Bashir, Conflict Reporting (Definitions of Conflict, 1.1). 36 PEMRA, Section 8(7).d 37 This restriction seems to have inspired from a real incident in Lahore city,

where some terrorists attached Sri Lankan cricket team. The coverage of terrorists firing and running away from the scene, and anti-terrorism operations was broadcast by a local television. This was seen as a threat to compromise any future operations in a similar situation if the television channels would continue to cover such events

38 PEMRA Code, Section 8(8).


61

allowed only with the permission from concerned security agency,39 and the broadcaster is obligated to train its crew and equip them with necessary gear required to be used in a conflict zone.40

Television channels are required by the PEMRA Code to not broadcast any speculations that may negatively affect such operations.41 Also the licensee is prohibited from giving voice to any banned organizations and their spokespersons who are, or have been involved in terrorist activities. Statements of such organizations and individuals shall not be aired, except in circumstances where it is in the public interest to expose their agenda, cruelty and abuse of religion. Even in that case, the broadcaster will not glamorize, support or show it like a heroic activity.42

Other codes like Ofcom and Malaysian do not deal with this subject in explicit details. For example, the Malaysian Code deals with the concept of reporting on violence, and gives certain general principles and guidelines only.43 In the Ofcom Code too, there are no specific provisions on conflict coverage and reporting on terrorism. The Ofcom standards are also related to coverage of violence.44 Conflict and violence are not synonymous to each other, as violence is one of the manifestations of conflict.45 Hence, it cannot be expressly assumed that the above codes have specifically provided any standards on conflict reporting. The reason for PEMRA having such basic standards is the special circumstances in Pakistan’s context where war on terror in the immediate neighbourhood had an immediate effect on law and order both within the country.

User-Generated Content (UGC)

User-Generated Content can be defined as videos and photographs made by those who are neither journalists by profession, nor are affiliated with any media houses,46 that is, anybody from general public recording such content for the purposes of broadcasting through television channels.47 UNESCO refers to UGC as citizen journalism.48 With increasing use of camera-phones and internet, UGC has developed as a source of

39 Ibid., Section 8(10) and 8(12). 40 Ibid., Section 8(13). 41 Ibid., Section 8(11). 42 Ibid., Section 3(3). 43 Malaysian Code, Section 4 and 3.12 more specifically. 44 Ofcom Code, Section One, Rule 1.11 and 1.12 45 Peter du Toit, Conflict Sensitive Reporting: A Toolbox for Journalists (South

Africa: Sol Plaate Institute of Media Leadership, Rhodes University), 8. 46 Claire, Amateur Footage, 10. 47 Sophia Drakopoulou, User Generate Content. An Exploration and Analysis of the

Temporal Qualities and Elements Of Authenticity And Immediacy in UGC (London: Middlesex University, 2011), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/ 17301870.pdf.

48 Martin, UNESCO Guidelines on, 10.


information for television journalism. Undeniably television broadcasters are using UGC frequently and especially in covering places which are going through civil war or internal conflicts.

A recent example of the use of UGC by international media is the coverage of Syrian civil war, where people from Aleppo and other affected areas were sharing photographs and videos on social media, which were then used by internet sites and TV channels frequently in their news bulletins. Overall, events in the Syrian war were widely reported through UGC.49 Despite this, there is a lack of regulation on how the UGC should be used and what are the restrictions that may apply on airing such content, though UNESCO has come up with guidelines on regulation of this new subject.50 A report for Ofcom also suggests there is need to regulate UGC.51

Private TV channels in Pakistan also use UGC in their news reporting and current affairs. Massive use of social media on camera phones has increased production of UGC, which is ultimately being used by the news channels. However, there are no rules or guidelines in PEMRA legislation on how a news channel should use such content. UGC in Pakistan comes from users who are neither professionals nor aware of the journalism ethics. At the same time, it has become the de facto source for news channels, which is an unavoidable phenomenon. UGC requires special editorial scrutiny before being aired. There have been numerous examples where UGC led to suo moto actions by the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Recently, the Supreme Court of Pakistan fined a member-elect of Sindh Provincial Assembly after a UGC footage of him assaulting a person in a traffic brawl was aired by TV channels and went viral on social media sites. Taking suo-moto action, the Supreme Court (SC) slapped him with a fine of three million Pakistani Rupee, to be deposited in the dam fund.52 Another example was a video showing Taliban flogging a woman in Swat; investigation was launched following the SC’s suo moto action. However, it was later discovered by the Interior Ministry that the video was fake. Surprisingly, however, the apex court did not fix responsibility on those involved in airing the fake video that threatened to tarnish the country’s image.53

It is, therefore, required to regulate the use of UGC on private TV channels and to provide rules for special editorial supervision followed by sanctions in the PEMRA Code. This is important because the moment UGC is

49 Claire, Amateur Footage, 13. 50 Martin, UNESCO Guidelines on UGC, 10. 51 Turner, Report for Ofcom. 52 “CJP’s Rs.3 million Imran Shah Fine Destined for Dam Fund,”, The Express

Tribune, September 1st, 2018, https://tribune.com.pk/-story/1792783/1-ptis-imran-shah-fined-rs3-million-cjp-assaulting-citizen/

53 “Video of Swat Woman being Whipped was Fake, SC told,” The Express Tribune, January 16, 2016, https://tribune.com.pk/-story/1028332/lashing-of-woman-swat-flogging-video-was-fake-ministry-tells-sc/


63

used by a professional news organization, it is no more in the non-professional hands of those who generated it, but in the hands of media-houses which must bear responsibility for what they display or broadcast.

Religious Content

Religious content on television always gets a good number of viewers. However, such content, if not handled with caution, may offend the viewers due to inaccurate or biased content, thus acting as a contributor to religious extremism. Regulating the broadcast of religious content, specifically in a state like Pakistan, is a vital need if religious and sectarian hatred is to be curbed and religious harmony is to be promoted instead.54 For overcoming disharmony based on an individual or group’s beliefs, the religious sensitivities of other communities must be respected. In a country where the official religion of the state is constitutionally specified, it is even more important to regulate this subject.

While the PEMRA Code does not provide a separate section on religious content like the Malaysian Code, there are certain provisions scattered in the Code which are related to it. As a fundamental principle, the code prohibits the broadcast of any content against Islamic values;55 however, unlike the Malaysian Code,56 PEMRA does not expressly prohibit propagation of any religion other than Islam. While Malaysian Code reiterates Islam as the state religion, the PEMRA Code does not re-assert this, perhaps on the presumption that this is already provided in the Constitution of Pakistan.57

In order to protect religious freedom, the Code prohibits broadcast of derogatory or offensive religious content.58 This is identical with the provisions of the Malaysian Code ensuring protection of religious freedom59 and prohibiting any attack on other communities that may disrupt religious harmony.60 PEMRA Code further provides on promotion of religious and inter-faith harmony by requiring the licensee not to broadcast any content that may create bias, disharmony or hatred among different sects and communities61 -- just like relevant provisions of the Malaysian Code.62

Keeping in view the sensitivities of different religious groups, the licensee is obliged under PEMRA Code to ensure that the information regarding beliefs and practices of all religious communities be provided in

54 UNESCO Guidelines, 50. 55 PEMRA Code, Section 3(1)(a). 56 Malaysian Code, Section 3.15. 57 Constitution, Article 2. 58 PEMRA Code, Section 3(1)(d). 59 Malaysian Code, Section 3.12. 60 Ibid, Section 3.13. 61 PEMRA Code, Section 10(1). 62 Malaysian Code, Section 3.16.


an accurate manner.63 For ensuring the accuracy of Islamic religious content, the Malaysian Code requires approval from the concerned and appropriate religious authorities; the broadcaster must do the same even for religious content related to other religious communities.64 PEMRA Code employs expressions like sect or sectarian in the context of sectarian tension and violence which has been a continuous trend since the nineties. The Code borrows the term ‘sectarian’ from the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Act defines ‘sectarian’ as “pertaining to, devoted to, peculiar to, or one which promotes the interest of a religious sect, or sects, in a bigoted or prejudicial manner.”65 Hence, broadcast of religious content that has sectarian attitude is prohibited by the Code in the public interest of inter-sectarian harmony.66 It is relevant to mention here that Pakistan has blasphemy law in place,67 which the PEMRA Code does not refer to. Also it is not defined in the Code what may constitute blasphemous content for a television broadcast.

For audio-visual religious discussions, PEMRA Code is comparable to the Malaysian Code since both share identical values: Islam is the official religion in both states, both have a Muslim majority along with other religious minorities, and both aim to regulate broadcast of religious content for promoting religious harmony. It is strange, however, that neither of the Codes define what a religious programme is. Ofcom Code defines a religious programme as one dealing with religious matters as a main subject or as its major portion.68 Based on that, Ofcom Code approaches the subject by laying down principles and then provides detailed rules for explaining those principles.69

Unlike the Malaysian and PEMRA codes, Ofcom does not seek to protect a state religion; instead it seeks to restrict propagation of any religious beliefs in disguise70 or by inviting people on television to join a particular religion except in the case of special religious television.71 It prohibits content in a religious programme that degrades other religions or offends their followers by manipulating their religious sensitivities.72 The television broadcaster is required to act responsibly while claiming any individual to be having any extra-ordinary capabilities in the religious

63 PEMRA Code, Section 10(2). 64 Malaysian Code, Section 3.14. 65 Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, Section 2(u). 66 PEMRA Code, Section 3(1)(d). 67 Pakistan Penal Code 1860, Sections 298, 298A, 298B, 298C, 295, 295A, 295B

and 295C. 68 Ofcom Code, Section 4.1. 69 Ibid., Section Four. 70 Ibid., Rule 4.4. 71 Ibid., Rule 4.4. 72 Ibid., Rule 4.2 and 4.6.


65

context and must not air such content without a caution note for minors.73 While the Code lacks orientation toward any particular religion, it seeks to protect the viewers from offensive or exploitative content.

Internationally, religious content regulation is more a matter of state policy and depends on whether there is a defined state religion in the relevant jurisdiction. Therefore, international guidelines on this do not have an impact until local legislature devises regulations depending on the role of religion in the country and to what extent it is debatable. In countries where the state religion has been declared or where the majority follows a particular religion, the regulation will have regard to these aspects; Pakistan and Malaysia are examples. In jurisdictions where it is otherwise like in the UK or Australia, the regulatory approach is different. However, the purpose in both cases is to ensure that exercise of right to freedom of expression, especially in religious matters, shall not offend religious susceptibilities of others.74

Pakistan being an Islamic state, having a Muslim majority population associated with different schools of thought, is in dire need that the PEMRA code should have detailed rules based on some defined principles. The country has previously experienced sectarian violence and a lack of tolerance among different religious groups; sectarian harmony has to be ensured with well-articulated regulation that attempts to cut down on disharmony among different sects and minorities.

Conclusion

The PEMRA Code was hastily issued to comply with the directives of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Given the volume and complexity of the electronic media industry in Pakistan, there is need to overhaul the Code in order to address the issues discussed in this article. Issues like sensationalism and UGC are not even the subject of the present Code. Other issues like coverage of conflict and violence require detailed regulatory guidelines keeping in view the history of last one and a half decade. On religious content in news, the Code does not provide any principles and rules on how religious content in informative programmes will be handled and how its accuracy and objectivity will be ensured by the broadcaster. The above issues are vital to peace building, and cultivating tranquility and harmony in the society, where media has an important role to play. A well-articulated regulatory code, devised in consultation with industry professionals, is the need of the hour.

73 Ibid., Rule 4.7. 74 UNESCO Guidelines, 50 (Religious programmes).


THE TRAJECTORY OF PAKISTAN-RUSSIA RELATIONS: EMERGING CONTOURS AND

FUTURE PROSPECTS

Misbah Arif& Raja Qaiser Ahmed

Abstract Changes in Russia’s foreign policy demonstrate Moscow’s effort to integrate itself into the Asia Pacific region. This research analyzes the international, regional and domestics factors responsible for change in Moscow’s foreign policy and studies its likely implications for Pakistan. At the international level, this change is an attempt to balance against the American led unipolar world. At the regional level, Russia wants to curb the increasing American influence and is thus actively participating in regional affairs and strengthening ties with the regional states. Increasing engagement with South Asian nations as a part of this strategy would not only affect the regional security complex, but will also impact Pakistan. Pak-Russia emerging entente will provide multi-faceted opportunities to Pakistan in the fields of trade, energy and defense. Pakistan needs to diversify its foreign policy by opening up for Russian engagement based on mutual interests and reciprocity.

Keywords: Russia, Pakistan, Eastward Policy, Mutual Interests

Introduction

uring the Cold War, there was a constant struggle between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union to maximize their spheres of influence in the South Asian region. With the disintegration of the USSR, both

Moscow’s influence and interests declined in the region for obvious reasons, but now, with the changing geo-strategic environment, Russia is trying to regain its lost status. Russia is actively engaging with Pakistan Misbah Arif is an independent researcher with postgraduate degree in

International Relations and visiting faculty at Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi.

Raja Qaiser Ahmed is a lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations of Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, Pakistan and previous visiting Research Fellow at Columbia University.

D

The Trajectory of Pakistan-Russia Relations 67

and other states to project its influence in the region. These evident changes in the Russian foreign policy towards the South Asian region will have implications for all the regional states. Likewise, the changing regional dynamics are re-shaping the contours of security architecture in South Asia. Additionally, the conflicting interests of the extra-regional actors, primarily the U.S., Russia, and China make South Asia the most volatile, complex, unpredictable and ambiguous region in the world. The research aims to analyze the determinants of Moscow’s foreign policy as well as the dynamics of evolving Pak-Russia equation and its impact on Pakistan.

This paper uses the theoretical explanation given by structural realism to understand the said subject. Structural realists argue that balancing is inevitable but its exact timing remains unpredictable. John Mearsheimer is of the view that states should maximize their power in order to attain hegemony since the best way to survive in an anarchic world is to maximize one’s power relative to others. According to him, power is not an end in itself, it is a means towards the ultimate end of state-survival. Material capabilities of a state determine its power and its sphere of influence. Sources of power can be many, depending upon the internal capabilities of a state. The list includes military might, socio-economic well-being, scientific and technological prowess, political clout or demographic strengths; different combinations of these attributes might be uniquely contributive to different states’ international stature. States, being unaware of other states’ foreign policy objectives are bound to strive to acquire certain capabilities to ensure their survival.

John Mearsheimer claims that state policies and capabilities go hand in hand. Thus, Russian capacities will dictate its policies. Russian interests, capabilities and presence in the region is far less than that of the U.S. It will face numerous challenges in order to materialize its policy and achieve the desired objectives. The neo-realists make two claims: first, power is an integral factor in determining end goals of states, and second, a multi-polar global order is more unstable and conflict-ridden than a bi-polar one. Therefore, the re-emergence of a multi-polar world will trigger insecurity and instability at the international level.1 All these arguments can be applied to the present day geo-political scenario, where states’ capabilities define their influence.

Russian Foreign Policy: An Overview

The domestic situation as well as the external geopolitical and geo-economic environment influence policy formulation in Moscow. Russia’s desire of regaining its lost status has constantly driven its foreign policy

1 John Mearsheimer, “Back to Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,”

International Security 15, no.1 (Summer 1990): 5-56.


since the demise of USSR. Thus, Moscow, along with Beijing, promotes the idea of ‘multi-polarity’.

The prevailing strategic environment since the 1990’s has affected Russia in many ways: first, it opened avenues for accountability and criticism in the domestic sphere;2 second, it increased the number of actors taking part in policy formulation process; third, these changing domestic politics and economic concerns influenced the country’s priorities, and last but not the least, the administration tried maintaining an intransigent foreign policy orientation so as to cover up for its failures at domestic front. The post-Cold War era saw the end of Soviet totalitarianism and move towards apparently democratic government.

The current foreign policy objectives of Moscow revolve around economic security, defense capabilities and power projection beyond its borders; the relation between domestic capabilities and foreign policy formulation being evident in this case. The internal capabilities have helped Russia translate its words into actions. There are various important domestic and international factors which play a significant role when looking at policy-making process in Russia.

After a long time, Russia has emerged as a challenge to the U.S. and is asserting itself globally. Russia-U.S. relations have undergone transition as the latter’s policies are challenging the former’s power and prestige. The increasing influence of the U.S. in the countries bordering Russia is viewed as an immediate national security threat by Moscow. Installation of democratic governments in Russia’s vicinity aids the West in undermining the increasing Russian sphere of influence. Russia’s strengthening ties with the West, China and Iran are all focused on countering the U.S. in Russia’s “Near Abroad.”3 The desire to build profitable economic relations and increased sphere of influence has directed Russian involvement towards Asia and the Middle East. Similarly Russian policy towards China has changed over time in line with its global ambitions. Both Russia and China are competing against the U.S. However, despite competition in the political, economic and strategic sphere, Russia and the U.S. need each other to fight against terrorism and to curb nuclear proliferation.

Although Russian foreign policy seems aimed at countering interests of Washington only, but that is not the only force driving Moscow’s decisions. The first and foremost objective set by Moscow is to strengthen its economy which is an important determinant of internal capabilities. Russia’s economic development is mandatory to ensure

2 Bobo Lo, Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era (New York: Palgrave,

2002): 27. 3 Stephen Blank, “The NATO Russia Partnership: A Marriage of Convenience or

a Troubled Relationship?” Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, November 2006.


domestic stability. A growing and prosperous economy is a pre-requisite in today’s world for attaining long-standing international prestige.

Structural realists discuss anarchy and self-help and their respective role in shaping international relations and policy formulation. Kenneth Waltz has discussed the structure of the international system and the distribution of capabilities in terms of power. His focus remains on systemic level of analysis rather than state-level or individual-level. In Waltz’s world, the structure of the international system dictates state behaviour.4 Structural realism provided a great analytical tool for discussing bipolarity, role of leadership and patterns of attitude of the two competing blocks during Cold War. Likewise, the offensive-versus-defensive realism debate also contributed in understanding the role of military capabilities in relation to foreign policy. For defensive realists, state survival is the utmost priority whereas for offensive realists maximizing power in an anarchic world is the prime concern.5

With disintegration of the United Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) a number of questions were raised over the validity of the theory of structural realism since it provided no space to explain the internal determinants responsible for disintegration. Since the end of bipolarity, Russia has constantly criticized the unipolar world and is supportive of a multipolar order that promotes equality of all states.6 Material capabilities dictate the influence of a state. Russia’s policy formulation is very complex as it is influenced by Russia’s perception of itself as the world’s largest country, but constrained by its own limited economic capabilities. Also, the experience of disintegration has taught that issues related to economy and domestic politics must be addressed to have a sustained power-maximization campaign.

Despite Russian decline after the end of Cold war, it has always been viewed as a major International player given its nuclear-weapon-state status, its natural resource potential and it being the world’s largest country by landmass. Soon after disintegration, by 1991, Russia revisited its conception of national interests and re-adjusted its policies vis-à-vis other states since it now faced newer kinds of political, economic and societal challenges. Russia enjoyed a limited international influence amid the evolving global distribution of power due to decline of its capabilities;

4 Kenneth Waltz, “Neorealism: Confusion and Criticism,” Journal of Politics &

Society XV, 2-5, (2004), http://archive.helvidius.org/2004/ 2004_Waltz.pdf. 5 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism

Revisited,” International Security 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000/01), 128-130.Doi:10.1162/016228800560543

6 Liu Ying, “The Discourse and Possibility of Forming China-Russia Alliance and Its Challenge to the Regional Order in the Asia Pacific,” The International Studies Association, June 2016, http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/ AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/a5c538f0-9c29-4a50-929c-22899464f6e4.pdf


the US outnumbered Russia in terms of political, economic and strategic assets and potential.

Eastward Hedging: New Dispensation of the Russian Policy

In 2010, Russian president Vladimir Putin announced his policy of “Turn to the East” in order to increase interaction with Asian states in economic, military and political domains.7 This was a year ahead of the U.S.’ “Rebalancing” initiative. Many perceived Russia’s realignment with the Asia Pacific as a tactical move. Russian foreign policy is mainly focused on efforts to materialize a multi-polar world against the existing American-led unipolar order. In this regard, Putin’s 2007 speech in Munich, 2008 war with Georgia, the Syrian crisis, the Crimean annexation, and growing strategic ties with China offer a few proximate manifestations of the changing policy.8 Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and interests of the West in the southern republics of the former USSR acted as catalysts for Russia’s reorientation. It is not a sudden change in policy; it was initially proposed back in 1995 when the Defense Minister of Russia, Pavel Grachev, stated that it was obvious for NATO’s eastward encroachment to automatically result in Russia’s eastward expansion in search of new allies.9

Geopolitics and the global strategic environment, especially events like the Ukrainian crisis have become hallmarks in the implementation of this policy. President Putin, in his 2013 national address proposed that the resources of a state and its private businesses should be devoted towards the progress of the state and achievement of its desired goals. He highlighted the development of Siberia and the Far East as the most urgent tasks to be accomplished in the 21st century.10 Similar statements were made by the Prime Minister in 2014 to the effect that economic links with the Asia Pacific region are useful in an environment where Russia is facing difficulties in other markets.11

7 Ian Storey, “What Russia’s 'Turn to the East’ Means for Southeast Asia,”

Perspective, no. 67, Singapore, December 3, 2015. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2015_67.pdf 8 Alexander Korolev, “Russia’s New Pivot to Asia: The Emergence of a new

Geopolitics,” Asia Pacific Memo, October 8, 2015, http://www.asiapacificmemo.ca/russias-new-pivot

9 ITAR-TASS, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, November 22, 1995, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/ 1141056.html

10 Poslaniye , Address of the President to the Federal Assembly,” December 12, 2013 news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/19825.

11 Sovesshchaniye, Meeting on the Development of Cooperation with the Countries of the Asia-Pacific Region,” May 12, 2014, government.ru/news/12293.


Today, Russia’s military presence in Asia is at an all-time high since the end of Cold War. This is not the first time Russia has turned towards the East; it previously made such foreign policy changes with changing geopolitics. Leaders like Gorbachev highlighted the significance of developing relations with China in particular and other states in general. The rationale behind this shift in Moscow’s policy towards the East is evident: Moscow wants to regain its lost status. Like the U.S. and other countries, Moscow is also of the view that a major global shift from the West to the East is inevitable due to the presence and interests of great powers in this region. Russia is focusing on projecting its influence beyond its border and bridge the gap between its own policies towards Asia and Europe.

There are a number of triggers behind the current policy such as: Putin’s rejection of partnership with the West, the 2008 global financial crisis, political and social underdevelopment in the Russian Far East (RFE), opening of new zones of exploration, and the general belief in the 21st century being the ‘Asian century’ or the ‘Pacific century’.12 All these factors were further exacerbated by the Ukrainian crisis. It is generally believed in Russia that problems can be easily resolved through rational policymaking by the state. Russians believe that this policy will serve Russia’s national interests through discovering new opportunities in Asia and avenues for development. Moscow and Beijing are also enjoying a good relationship and cooperating in economic and political spheres.

The 21st century political landscape offers a new image of Moscow as a Euro-Pacific country, not only as a Eurasian or European one.13 The geographical location of Russia makes it a Eurasian country but its active political participation in affairs of the pacific region makes it a Euro-Pacific power. Russia is a resource-rich country, having the largest natural gas reserves. Its significant coal and oil reserves are main contributors to exports and constitute an estimated 24 percent of Russian Gross Domestic Product (GDP).14 Numerous Asian countries import oil, gas and defense equipment from Russia, including New Delhi, Tokyo, Beijing and Seoul, and Moscow intends to pull up its traded volume with the Asia Pacific region. Russia is also a chief arms exporter to many countries, especially

12 Stephen Fortescue, “ Russia’s “Turn to the East”: a Study in Policy Making,”

Post-Soviet Affairs 32, no. 5 (June 2015):1-32. doi: 10.1080/1060586X.2015.105175.

13 “Going East: Russia’s Asia-Pacific Strategy, Russia in Global Affairs,”Report by the Russian National Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific, December 25, 2010, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Going-East-Russias-Asia-Pacific-Strategy-15081.

14 Masaaki Kuboniwa, Shinichiro Tabata and NataliyaUstinova, “How Large is the Oil and Gas Sector of Russia?” Research Report, Slavic Euroasia Studies Sopporo, Japan no. 11, (2006), http://133.50.171.227/coe21/publish/ no11_ses/contents.html.


China15 and is expanding its arms sales to Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia in the Asia Pacific. 16

Since 1996, Russian foreign policy has been quite diverse. Many Asian players, including China, Japan, India, Pakistan, and members states of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), have provided a conducive environment for achieving Russian objectives. Russia, being a Eurasian power, must pursue a multi-vector approach in foreign relations and play a vital role in both Western and Eastern affairs if it wishes to secure its stature as a strategic great power.17 So, in addition to forwarding the political rhetoric of a multi-polar world, Russia needs to act proactively in the eastern hemisphere.18 China and Russia, being important regional players, also share same concerns regarding this uni-polar world and U.S. dominance.

The emergence of regionalism and the current regional architecture of Asia-Pacific provided Moscow a platform to get into regional organizations along with other key players. The emergence of regional organizations such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) limit states’ action by enmeshing them into institutionalized codes of conduct given by multilateral regional-security and regional-economic organizations.19 As a consequence, bilateral relations of Russia with both China and India have dramatically strengthened. China and Russia established Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 which has constantly expanded since then.

In 2014, amid the changing geo-political environment, Russia devised new set of strategies in the aftermath of imposition of economic sanctions. Policy changes were designed to achieve domestic and foreign policy objectives. It started finding opportunities/foreign investors for the development of the Russian Far East (RFE) and Eastern Siberia where the pace of development had been slow because of the demographic imbalances between Russia’s east and west. Rising tensions between the West and Russia have made the latter vie for economic integration with nearby Asian economies.

Prior to 2014, the mainstay of Moscow’s policy were the former Soviet states and Western countries. Afterwards, Russia started looking for new energy markets in its east. China, being the fastest growing energy

15 “Facts and Details,” China, http://factsanddetails.com/china.

php?itemid=286&catid=8&subcatid=52 16 Ibid. 17 “Russia's New Foreign Policy Concept: Key Aspects,” NewTimes.az, March 12,

2013, at http://newtimes.az/en/politics/1465/#.UWJFraLimVN 18 Thomas Ambrosio, Challenging America's global preeminence: Russia's quest

for multi-polarity, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2005):100-101 19 Paradorn Rangsimaporn, “Russian Perceptions and Policies in a Multipolar

East Asia under Yeltsin and Putin,”International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 9, (2009): 209.


market appeared a great opportunity that Russia was bent upon utilizing to pursue to new-set agenda of becoming an integral player in Asian politics by means of expanding trading relations and economic interdependencies. This was a need too, since major Russian oil and gas companies like Rosneft and Gazprom were having a tough time facing economic sanctions. They were looking for new opportunities and rising Asia Pacific economies, surrounded by great-power politics, presented one.

Russia’s tilt towards the East is aimed at cutting down its economic dependence on the West. Since coming to office in 2012, President Vladimir Putin’s policies in Asia have largely remained China centric. Many see Sino-Russia cooperation as formation of a new revisionist axis trying to target the West’s supremacy at all fronts.20 However, Russia, for avoiding the label of a China-dependent state started looking for engagement alternatives in Asia for putting its natural resources, energy, technological and military potentials to best use.

Pakistan-Russia Relations: A Historical Perspective

Pak-Russia relations have gone through many ups and downs, lack of trust being a major factor in having cold relations. While Pakistan moved into Western camp, Russia cultivated ties with Pakistan’s declared rival i.e. India. For this reason, Russia’s changing policy towards Pakistan is being viewed as a new beginning for both states. Pakistan, due to its advantageous geostrategic location, nuclear arsenal, and demographic strength appears an appropriate option for Russia in an effort to diversify its foreign policy.

The 2014 Defence Cooperation Agreement between both states is regarded as a “milestone” in their relationship.21 The document called for Pak-Russia cooperation in promoting international security, curbing terrorism, and exchanging information on politico-military issues, among other guidelines. Russia has provided around U.S. $1 billion to Pakistan for energy projects; arms embargo has been lifted and Mi35 attack helicopters have been sold to Pakistan.22These initiatives indicate that both states are willing to come closer to each other keeping in view the changing geo-political and geostrategic realities.

The relationship between the two countries has gone through

20 Dimitri K. Simes, “How Obama Is Driving Russia and China Together,”

National Interest, June 24, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/ how-obama-driving-russia-china-together-10735.

21 Sudha Ramachandran, “New Era in Russia Pakistan relations,” The Diplomat, December 3, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/new-era-in-russia-pakistan-relations/

22 Ibid.


tough times because of misinterpretations.23 Policy differences have always proven to be a major hurdle in cooperation since Islamabad joined the anti-Soviet, Western club during the Cold War. Another reason for cold relations, was a consequence of the first. Moscow developed a close equation with India and became its major arms supplier; given that Pakistan’s foreign policy was India-centric, this made Pakistan’s security dilemma even more acute – hence the ingrained mistrust in Pakistan-Russia (USSR) equation.

Changing Geopolitical Scenario and Imperatives of Cooperation

The two counterparts, i.e. Russia and Pakistan have different rationales for this change in policy, even though both have common goal of diversifying their foreign policies. Russia is seeking an enlarged sphere of influence and Pakistan is seeking alternatives for fulfilling its rising economic and energy sector needs. That said, there are other factors also playing a part in strengthening bilateral ties.

Historically, South Asia has been a complex region because of its inherent and never ending insecurities. It is a region of prime importance and concern due to the presence of two nuclear rivals, proximity to Afghanistan, the rising influence of China, warm-water ports, presence of the U.S., and much more. Nuclearization of India and Pakistan brought more complexity to a region having other big spoilers such as: protracted Kashmir dispute, repeated episodes of Pakistan-India military stand-offs, and rising menace of terrorism in the region.

U.S. and China have played a vital role in South Asian politics, each by supporting one of the two main rivals. India claims that its military capabilities are China-centric, while Pakistan’s defensive measures are India-centric. Unfortunately, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has been largely unproductive in promoting a regional approach; South Asia remains the least integrated region despite having so much in common – thanks to extra-regional states’ interventions for adding to this complexity.

Afghanistan, which is a gate-way to energy-rich Central Asian Republics (CARs), is a country where interests of the regional and great powers converge. Instability in Afghanistan is counter-productive since it spills-over to CARs, and from there has a potential to spill-over to other neighbouring states. Given this fear, Russia has realized the geopolitical significance of Pakistan in stabilizing Afghanistan24, which is a vital

23 Nazir Hussain, “Pak-Russia Relations: Lost Opportunities and Future Options,”

Journal of Political Studies 19, no. 1 (Summer 2012): 79. 24 Stephen Blank, “Russia’s Quite Rapprochement with Pakistan,” Eurasia Daily

Monitor 9, no. 107 (June 6, 2012), http://www.jamestown.org/single/? tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39462&no_cache=1.


requirement for bringing stability to the entire region and to in the adjoining areas. Islamabad is key to settlement in Afghanistan as many of the extremists have hide-outs and safe-havens close to Pakistan’s border regions where Pakistan army has access; it has conducted successful operations to clear-out the area of these restless elements. Thus, Russian finds a common ground with Pakistan in bringing stability in Kabul.

Politics of Energy and Bilateralism

Russia is the largest producer of oil and gas in the world.25 Pakistan seeks Russian investment in the energy sector for meeting the domestic energy needs. The Russian giants like Rosneft and Gazprom can greatly help in developing Pakistan’s oil and gas potential. Russia has offered Pakistan the export of 5000 MW electricity through Kyrgyzstan-Afghanistan route26 that will fulfill its energy needs to some extent.

The Gwadar Port has great economic significance and holds a special position for Moscow. Gazprom is expected to join the energy grid of Asia; proposals to link Russia and CARs to Gwadar through a north-south energy corridor already exist.27 This sounds attractive for Pakistan too as it will connect Pakistan with China, Russia and the Central Asia. Russia will also get long-sought access to sea transit routes for trade. Russia is also interested in Central Asian and South Asian (CASA) power project and Thar Coalfield Project for promoting trade in electricity between the two regions.

Russia is also willing to invest in Guddu and Muzaffargarh power plants in Pakistan and the Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline (TAPI) gas project.28 TAPI is a 1,640 km long gas pipeline – with an estimated cost of $7.5 billion, it has been delayed due to a constant tussle between the U.S., Russia and other members. TAPI is estimated to bring 3.2 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day from Turkmenistan to Pakistan.29 Russia is also interested in the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline project as it proposed Gazprom to take part in this project and Pakistan welcomed the offer. According to one source, many other Russian companies like Techno prom

25 Energy Information Administration, Data includes crude oil, lease condensate,

natural gas plant liquids, and refinery processing gain, February 11, 2016, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=22392.

26 “Russia Offers Pakistan for Exporting 5000MW Electricity,” Dawn, September 20, 2013, http://www.dawn.com/news/1044116.

27 Farooq Hameed Khan, “Pakistan Russia: Can Old Rivals be Strategic Partners?” News, September 10, 2012, http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-17390-Pakistan-Russia-can-old-rivals-be-strategic-partners.

28 “From Chicago to Shangre La and Beijing”, Politact, June 4, 2012. http://politact.com/analysis-of-perception-and-perspective/from-chicago-to-shangri-la-and-beijing.html.

29 Ramtanu Maitra, “Improved Pakistan Russia Relations A Necessity for Stability in Eurasia,”EIR February 24, 2012.


export, Rostec Global Resources, Rushydro International, Stochinsky Institute of Mining etc. have also shown interest in engaging with Pakistan.”30

Previously, Russia supported Pakistan’s Oil and Gas Development Company Limited, which was authorized for oil and gas exploration. Now Russia’s Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel factory is also interested in increasing production capacity of Pakistan Steel Mills (PSM) from one million to three million tons of production per year.31 Russian companies can be a great help in purification of gas, modernization of oil and gas infrastructure and building various generating units in Pakistan like Tarbela and Jamshoro.

The first strategic dialogue between Pakistan and Russia was held in 2013.32 The dialogue laid down an institutional framework for closer bilateral ties in almost all sectors including politics, economy and defense, among others. On 21st October, 2014, the second round of strategic dialogue was held in Pakistan to enhance bilateral collaboration in various fields. Later, on 20th November, 2014, Defense Ministers of both states signed an agreement to expand strategic ties.

Russian Defense Minister, during defense expo IDEAS 2014, appreciated the efforts of Pakistan armed forces in combating terrorism. In July 2015, General Raheel Sharif was welcomed with a guard of honor at a meeting with Russian military leadership; this was the second time any Pakistani Chief of Army Staff (COAS) had visited Russia. In 2015, Pakistan and Russia inked a defense deal including sale of four Mi 35 ‘Hind E’ attack helicopters. Pakistan also signed a deal to import Klimov RD-93 engines for the JF-17 Thunder aircrafts – the engines previously came through China. 33

Pakistan is also looking forward to the sale of the Sukhoi Su35 jet from Russia that would augment Pakistan’s capability to conduct maritime guards and penetrate into enemy’s area. Russia’s increasing bilateral defense cooperation with Pakistan might have implications for the decades old Russo-Indian alliance. Pakistan is also looking forward to purchase of the Yak-130 combat trainer aircrafts.

A strategic alliance between Beijing and Moscow is also developing for regional peace and stability. An emerging troika will bring Beijing and Moscow even closer, only to add to Pakistan’s opportunities.

30 “Russian Bank Offers $1bn Credit Line to Pakistan,”Dawn, November 29,

2014, http://www.dawn.com/news/1147615 31 “Russia’s Revival : Opportunities and Limitations for Pakistan,” IPRI, February

4, 2016, http://www.ipripak.org/russias-revival-opportunities-and-limitations-for-pakistan/

32 Arif Rafiq, “Pakistan: Russia's New Best Friend?” National Interest, September 27, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/pakistan-russias-new-best-friend-13945?page=3.

33 Arif Rafiq, “Pakistan: Russia's New Best Friend?”National Interest.


Pakistan's Foreign Policy: From Anachronism to Multilateralism

The world is moving beyond the unipolar moment towards bipolarity and multi-polarity and so is Pakistan.34 Rise of India and China in Asia and strengthening of ties between China and Russia is bound to challenge the U.S. dominance in the region.35

In line with the geostrategic realities, Pakistan is bent upon diversifying its foreign policy options instead of restricting itself to a few; maintaining favorable ties with other nations will benefit Pakistan.36The ongoing tensions between Islamabad and Washington have forced Pakistan to look for options available. Incidents like the Osama Bin Laden operation in Abbottabad, Salala check post incident, and use of drones in Pakistan have made many believe that American hegemony is nearing its end and Islamabad should look elsewhere for cutting down its dependence on the US.37 In 2009, Russia’s state television blamed Washington of trying to destabilize Islamabad so as to blight Pakistan’s historical ally, Beijing.38

Emerging Contours and Future Prospects for Pak-Russia Collaboration

The changes taking place at the regional level, importantly the deepening India-U.S. ties, are alarming for Pakistan. Pakistan’s security policies have always been India-centric because of historical animosity and un-ending strategic competition between the two. Cementing of Indo-U.S. ties has negatively affected Pak-U.S. relations, which gives an apparent upper-hand to India in Pak-India strategic equation.

In the given context, the contours of emerging Pak-Russia relations can be based on energy and trade cooperation. Pakistan can try to make Russia and the CARs part of a cooperative and interdependent equation by linking them up via TAPI with the South Asian states. These initiatives are economically practicable and can help in oil and gas explorations, construction of floating LNG terminals, North South gas pipeline from Gwadar to Nawabshah and finally modernization of oil and gas groundwork.

34 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Clashing Titans: Military Strategy and Insecurity

among Asian Great Powers,” Observer Research Foundation, (New Delhi: 2012) 35 Jeffrey Mankoff, “The Wary Chinese-Russian Partnership,” International

Herald Tribune, July 12, 2013: 6. 36 Tim Craig, “Pakistan is Reaching out to Russia,” Guardian, February 4, 2015,

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/03/pakistan-russia-us-obama-india.

37 Arif Rafiq, “Pakistan: Russia's New Best Friend?” 38 Rossiya TV, May 13, 2009.


Russia is interested in joining Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in the CASA-1000 energy project, providing Afghanistan and Pakistan cheap electricity.39 Kazakhstan is the biggest Central Asian Republic, the largest repository of oil and gas among CARs and thus holds a significant position in regional politics. The competing goals of China, U.S. and Russia in the region are bound to benefit Kazakhstan, but what is important is Pakistan aligning its benefit to the dividends that would accrue to Kazakhstan because of China and Russia’s investment in Kazakh oil and gas supplies.40 On 12th May, 2016, Ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif inaugurated a $1 billion project, to be completed in 2018, aimed at procuring electricity from Central Asia to lessen Pakistan’s energy shortage41 and connecting Central and South Asia in the process. Pakistan is an energy-scarce country and faces multiple challenges as a consequence. Russia, with all its competencies and knowledge, can help Pakistan in diversifying paths to energy generation.

Although Pak-Russia nuclear cooperation seems farfetched now but it might be possible in future. Civil nuclear cooperation will not only strengthen bilateral ties but will also help Pakistan meet its basic needs by enabling it to formulate long-term plans for utilizing nuclear energy for civilian purposes. Ironically, in 2008, India was granted a waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for participating in civil nuclear trade with advanced countries without meeting certain set criteria.42 Contrarily, Pakistan, possessing the credentials same as India, was given no such waiver. Russian Ambassador to Pakistan, Ambassador Alexey Dedov, stated that he has no doubts or objections when it comes to Pakistan’s case of membership for the NSG.

Furthermore, Russia wishes to benefit from the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and in this regard, can contribute in bringing stability to Pakistan in many ways as discussed above.43 CPEC has raised a number of concerns in India, making New Delhi anxious about various direct and indirect consequences of growing China-Pakistan nexus for

39 Arif Rafiq, “Pakistan: Russia's New Best Friend?” 40 “Regional Geo-strategic Challenges and Opportunities for China-Pakistan

Cooperation,” China-Pakistan Joint Think Thank, Working Paper, May 2013, : 13.

41 “P M Nawaz, Central Asia Leaders Launch CASA1000 Project in Tajikistan,”, Express Tribune, May 12, 2016, http://tribune.com.pk/story/1102022/casa-1000-project-launched/.

42 Vladimir Moskalenko and Petr Topychkanov, “Russia and Pakistan: Shared Challenges and Common Opportunities,” Carnegie Moscow Center, (May, 2014): 13.

43 Shaukat Qadir, “Russia Warms to Pakistan as Opportunity Knocks all over Asia,” The National, September 20, 2015, http://www.thenational.ae/ opinion/comment/russia-warms-to-pakistan-asopportunity-knocks-all-over-asia.


India. Now that its long-term partner Russia also seems interested in CPEC and has already enhanced engagement with China, India’s concerns have multiplied. Energy projects and deals with Russian companies would increase oil supply to China and reinforce the Sino-Russia bond;44 this dovetails with Chinese desire to create a front for checking US influence in areas like South China Sea.

Since 2014, Russia started to engage with Pakistan in defense and security matters. Islamabad has already acquired four MI-35M attack helicopters with the number expected to expand to twenty very soon. Kremlin went forward with the deal despite India’s itching and argued that these would be used in a campaign against terrorism which is a common threat to regional and international security. Russia also supplied Pakistan several M17 helicopters back in 2002. It was unveiled in 2016 that Islamabad and Moscow were working on sales of helicopters, air defense systems and modernized tanks.45 Pakistan is looking forward to increase ties with Russia in all spheres, especially regional security and counter-terrorism. Pakistan is thinking of replacing the US-made AH-1 Cobra Gunships with superior Russian gunships as the former are expensive to maintain in ongoing anti-Taliban operation while the latter are cost-effective.46

In 2013, the Russian Air Force Chief visited Pakistan. The same year Pakistan’s naval ship PNS Aslat made its first port call to Moscow while PNS Rahnaward made two port calls to Russia. In April 2014, Russian naval unit of the pacific fleet made a port call to Pakistan. Russia and Pakistan also conducted a military exercise in 2016.

In 2001, Pakistan and Russia also cooperated in outer space exploration and Pakistan’s telecommunication satellite, Al Badr, was launched by a Russian space vehicle.47 Pakistan and Russia can cooperate further in this field as both states jointly oppose space weaponization. In this context, Russia and China came up with a new draft of a treaty on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) in 2014, aiming at non-placement of weapons in outer space. Pakistan, along with China and Russia, welcomed this initiative at the Conference of Disarmament (CD).48

44 Ibid. 45 “Pakistan Interested in Russian Air Defense System, Advanced Tanks,” Nation,

April 26, 2016, http://nation.com.pk/national/28-Apr-2016/pakistan-interested-in-russian-air-defence-system-advanced-tanks

46 Naveed Ahmed, “Russia’s Pakistan Volte Face, The Central Asia Caucasus,”CACI Analyst, January 7, 2015, http://www.cacianalyst.org/ publications/analytical-articles/item/13117-russias-pakistan-volte-face.html

47 Rouben Azizian and Peter Vasilieff, “Russia and Pakistan: The Difficult Path to Rapprochement,” Asian Affairs 30, no.1 (Spring 2003):48.

48 “Proposed Prevention of An Arms Race in Space Treaty,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-prevention-arms-race-space-paros-treaty/(accessed date May 15, 2016)


Pakistan’s position on the issue was further clarified as the Pakistani delegation reiterated its support for an effective mechanism, and its willingness to take any steps to deal with space weaponization in order to ensure global peace and security.49PAROS needs to materialize timely because otherwise, it would be problematic to stop states from following suit if anyone acts in defiance. Russia and Pakistan also took part in the Joint Consultative Group on Strategic Stability.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The regional political dynamics offer ample avenues for Pak-Russia cooperation in all aspects including economic, societal, cultural and strategic. Pakistan is in need to diversify its policy options to secure itself amidst the changing strategic scenarios. Engagement with and assistance from Russia is significant for dealing with emerging challenges, including – but not limited to – the fear of economic meltdown and foreign efforts promoting disintegrative tendencies, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Baluchistan.

As indicated in this research, there are a number of avenues that can be exploited for deepening Pak-Russia engagement. Certain recommendations are being proposed in this regard, which might act as a considerable input for policy-makers dealing with the matter at hand.

First and foremost, mutual and shared benefits must be the centrepiece of this engagement instead of harming other entities. It must also be understood that engaging Russia to diversify policy options is not synonymous to compromising ties with old partners, since that would run counter-productive to the very goal. Secondly, in order to have a long-standing engagement, the two sides must act politically mature so as to understand the other’s constrains at any given time. Only then small distortions, such as cancellation or delay of planned official visits would be appropriately dealt with. Third, the principle of un-called-for interference in other’s internal affairs must not be forgotten for having a sustained partnership. Talking of the avenues of cooperation, Afghanistan appears to be a good starting point of interest for both states. Pakistan and Russia can work together by jointly devising an effective strategy to defeat extremism and militancy in Afghanistan. This is the only path that would lead to peace and stability in the country. Pakistan needs to get Russia interested in its market potential by showcasing the opportunities that lie within, if it wishes to engage Russia economically. This however, must not be done at the expense of other significant historic partners, including both the US and China. Pakistan offers a big market for selling Russian oil and gas

49 “Pakistan Calls for Boosting Efforts to Prevent Outer Space

Weaponization,”Samaa TV, October 25, 2015, http://www.samaa.tv/ pakistan/2015/10/pakistan-calls-for-boosting-efforts-to-prevent-outer-space-weaponization/


resources; therefore, continued energy cooperation shall bring mutual benefits to both. Additionally, Russia can be of great help to Pakistan for improving domestic industrial capacity which it badly requires. Though Russia is not amongst the most developed world economies, it is far ahead of Pakistan and had been a great power in the past – its assistance to Pakistan in setting up traditional and basic industrial infrastructure can have a tremendous effect. Russian help can be sought in matters of socio-economic development and societal security such as education and public health sectors, fighting infectious diseases and raising nutritional profile of population; particularly the underprivileged areas of interior Sindh, Baluchistan and KPK must be focused.

Defense and space cooperation appears to be a major area of mutual interest, where Pakistan must seek Russian collaboration. Moreover, Russian help can be taken for connecting the Gwadar Port with national railway lines so as to reduce the time and cost of transporting heavy goods from South to Central Asia. Moreover, deepening state to state relations demand a greater degree of civil society interaction between the two, since stronger inter-governmental ties would only sustain on the basis of stronger people-to-people contacts.

Pakistan needs to be aware of the dividends of having a trilateral China-Pakistan-Russia axis, which can help in bringing closer South, Central and East Asia, in the best interests of the three partners and the regions at large. For that, Pakistan should continue to strive for getting China and Russia included as full members in SAARC, which would also alter the organization’s fate.

For all these strategies and plans to bear fruit, Pakistan first needs to put its own house in order: domestic peace and harmony is of utmost importance. Only then, Pakistan would be able to develop and execute its own independent world view based on its specific identity, national interests and strategic values. Russia and Pakistan must utilize their membership in various international and multilateral fora to advance their mutual interests. Pakistan’s membership in Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) provides it a great chance to enhance ties, both at governmental and people-to-people levels. Pakistan needs to act smart in SCO to garner Russian support for reducing if not resolving India-Pakistan tensions which have cost regional peace and stability so far.


Book Reviews

Book: How Nations Succeed: Manufacturing, Trade, Industrial Policy, and Economic Development

Author: Murat A. Yülek Publisher: United Kingdom, Palgrave Macmillan: 2018, 284.

ews bulletins in 2018 have been occupied by the forty-fifth President of the United States’ (POTUS’) contempt for free trade agreements and imposition of tariffs on both foes and allies. The

pretexts range from national security to de-industrialization and loss of jobs for American workers, undoubtedly placing the global economy premised on the liberal tenets of free market and trade in jeopardy. With the rise of Chinese economic juggernaut, skeptics have regularly criticized its predatory practices and raised the fears of its susceptibility to get caught in the middle-income trap. Automation adds to the quandary. In this milieu, Murat A. Yulek’s book ‘How Nations Succeed’ traces the developmental trajectory of select countries, placing manufacturing and industrial policy at the core of a nation’s prosperity. Director of the Center for Industrial Policy and Development at the Istanbul Commerce University, Professor Yulek has an extensive teaching career at renowned institutions such as Georgetown and Yale and advisory experience with international organizations including the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the Islamic Development Bank. His proficiency in the subject is thus, self-evident.

The first part of the book deals with the evolution of industrial societies which was indeed no marvel but rather a result of carefully calibrated schemes to support manufacturing over long periods of time. Perhaps the most riveting section, it speaks volumes about the pillage and bloodshed by European colonial powers. Beginning in the fifteenth century in the name of Christ and the quest for lands and valuables, colonization heralded a new world order and shifted the balance of power from the east to the west and from Mediterranean Europe to the rim of the continent. Fulcrum of civilization and riches in the past, the territories adjoining the Silk and Spice routes became a specter of subjugation and the grisliest of human and economic exploitation. Same holds true for the Americas where indigenous people were almost wiped out with utmost hauteur. Slave trade flourished. Symbols of grandeur were made out of precious metals extracted from colonies which also provided raw materials to run factories in the motherland and markets for their finished goods. Moreover, industrial manufacturing was outlawed in the colonies. At the zenith of imperial power, weaker countries were forced to open up to superior European products, virtually handing walking papers to local businesses. At times, these unequal ‘free trade’ agreements were agreed to

N

Book Reviews 83

by the weaker nations while looking down the barrel of a gun; those eons are still decried as periods of humiliation by affected nations.

Colonization granted the hegemonic powers mastery over the trade routes and generated enormous wealth for them. While it facilitated industrialization in some countries, it did not do so in others. As the study explains, countries that successfully industrialized did so at the back of policies extended over centuries to support the manufacturing sector. Manufacturing not only creates jobs but enhances productivity in other sectors too through linkages, creating an overall positive impact on the society. It enables developing economies to graduate from the category of low-income countries to the cadres of developed countries and abridge disparities between nations. Mechanization does not simply entail the operation of factories but is an intricate process of capacity-building by experience and acquisition of technology. This process is steered by state and private finances, skilled labor and innovative attitudes to foster economic growth over long periods of time. It is complemented by trade policies focused on maximum exports of competitive value-added products and only necessary imports to maintain a healthy current account. Trade surplus generates prosperity whereas large deficits retard economic growth and employment.

Yulek goes on to emphasize the centrality of succinct state policies and efficient industrial layer to the progress of a country. This layer comprises of finance, firms, entrepreneurs, managers and labor. The appropriateness of policy to the stage of industrialization is crucial. During the first two stages which involve the import and better utilization of machinery, a general strategy would suffice to increase the firms’ and the country’s productivity. Moving on from technology adaption, stage three and four consist of replication of existing and generation of new scientific knowledge and equipment. Most countries fall into the low or middle income trap due to their failure to move past stage two or three. At this stage, focused policies are necessary to target select sectors that can engender more value to the economy, have additional backward linkages and greater potential for research and learning. The book lays out several examples of countries providing direct and indirect incentives to chosen winner enterprises that assist them to climb up the industrial ladder. The United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, South Korea and other industrially advanced states have successfully employed these policies at different stages of their development.

Dr. Murat Yulek’s book ‘How Nations Succeed’ touches important themes such as protectionism, technology transfer and the national security implications of economic policies. As such, it is very informative and relatable to contemporary international events. A conversely captioned book ‘Why Nations Fail’ similarly regards national policies critical to the industrial development of a country. Unlike Murat, Acemoglu and Robinson place inclusive political and economic institutions and not


manufacturing at the heart of economic prosperity. As such, it is guided by democratic practices and rule of law. Besides, the itinerary of industrialization runs through state patronage, mercantilism and at times, theft of technology. All of this sits at odds with the liberal fundamentals of market-driven economy, free trade and intellectual property rights presently in vogue, depicting a palpable paradox in discourse and deeds. Furthermore, it is very trying to define success in our times. Industrialization has undoubtedly benefited mankind immensely but the environmental impact of the process has been catastrophic and ironically, poorer, less developed countries have to bear most of the brunt of it. With no tangible concerted efforts to contain rising temperatures of the planet, upheaval and displacement is certain, if not the scale of it. At the same time, advances in artificial intelligence threaten the relevance of human beings and nuclear weapons hang like Damocles’ sword on the continued existence of Homo sapiens. One may then, not be able to determine success by the measure of industrialization. Reviewed by Ms. Saria Benazir, M. Phil scholar, Department of IR, NDU, Islamabad.

Book Reviews 85

Book: AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order Author: Kai-Fu Lee Publisher: New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018. 272.

e live in the most exciting times in world’s recorded history and yet they are, by their very essence, the most frightening times too. The onslaught of technological advancement that makes life

so enjoyable also uncovers new risks to the human civilization that hitherto have been confined to the realm of science fiction. One such opportunity that can easily transform into a man’s worst nightmare is the rise of Artificial Intelligence (AI). The discussion in the academic circles mostly revolves around the existential nature of the opportunities and challenges presented by AI. However, the discourse among policy circles is largely centered on each nation’s competitive advantage in the field.

The slim volume under discussion penned by Taiwanese-American venture capitalist, ex-Google China chief and AI expert Kai-Fu Lee seeks to do justice to both aspects. Looking at the rapid competition between China and the US Silicon Valley, and overall economic scope of the technology, the author purports that the nation leading in this field will also take a lead in the emerging world order shaped by the AI. He weighs both economic and cultural aspects of Chinese and American societies and through a nuanced look at various dimensions of the technology, attempts to predict which country will lead in a given dimension. Written in a very accessible manner, the author simultaneously focuses on the evolution of the technology, what makes it evolve, and its future impact on human society. He also attempts to suggest possible ways in which AI and human society can co-exist in a mutually beneficial way.

The book is divided into nine chapters, all of which have intriguing titles: China’s Sputnik Moment; Copycats in the Coliseum; China’s Alternate Internet Universe; A Tale of Two Countries; The Four Waves of AI; Utopia, Dystopia and the Real AI Crisis; The Wisdom of Cancer; A Blueprint for Human Coexistence with AI; and Our Global AI Story. Together these chapters narrate a breathtaking tale of AI evolution and competition with a personal touch.

The author believes that AI as a technology has seen quite a few cycles of ebb and flow since scientists started working on it in 1950s. When the technology was first conceived, two approaches were devised to teach computers to think. One method called the rule-based approach offered basic definitions to the technology to process data. For instance, in order to make it identify a living creature, its characteristics were defined and then the technology was expected to recognize the creature based on those characteristics. This needed a lot of time and energy. The other approach, and ostensibly the better one, was through what is now known as the neural networks. In this approach the computer network is

W


organized in a neural pattern and offered more and more data and through a trial and error method it learns to think. And it is obvious here that the more data it has access to, the more it can learn from it.

Now, to the competition between the US and China, this is where the author’s understanding of the Chinese culture and economy helps us comprehend the country’s strides in the field. At the beginning of the book the author identifies what he calls China’s Sputnik moment. Like Sputnik propelled America into a race to put a man on the moon, a widely televised Go competition between Lee Sedol, the world Go champion, and Alpha-Go, an AI programme, in 2016 was viewed by 260 million Chinese viewers. In this 2500 years old board game, with virtually infinite positions, the AI managed to beat the human champion. This was China’s sputnik moment in AI, and the government immediately started encouraging interest the field.

Here, another very important nuance is also highlighted. The author distinguishes between what he calls the light touch and the heavy touch approaches. The US and the Silicon Valley approach technology with a light touch. An example is ride-sharing technology called Uber, which only engages drivers and cars, not gas stations or workshops to ensure smooth service. The Chinese version of the service is called Didi which also owns gas stations and workshops. Since the Chinese approach is the heavy touch, it generates more data which is more useful for the computer learning.

Lee then identifies four waves or categories of AI. He calls them internet AI, business AI, perception AI and autonomous AI. The internet AI is visible in the shape of software like YouTube, offering suggestions extrapolated through complex algorithms based on your consumption data; this is where China has competitive advantage because it generates more data. However, business AI, where sound profit making advice and decisions are generated, sees the US leading due to the meticulous long-term record keeping practices. In perception AI characterized by facial recognition technology China again has more advantage, that too in sheer numbers, as the US customers are inherently wary of technologies spying on them. In autonomous AI where AI meets robotics, the US for now has advantage because of the heavy investment in drones and autonomous cars. This can of course change as China also is investing heavily.

Looking at the future of AI-human interaction, the author recognizes two schools of thought, the dystopian and the utopian schools. The dystopian outlook sees AI jeopardizing human life while the utopian worldview sees it as a universal remedy. Since a wide range of assessments on the impact of AI exist, ranging from minimal impact to almost total displacement, the author does not make it a big deal. He calls himself a techno-optimist and frankly admits that his view is colored by his recent cancer experience. He believes that while high profit making jobs can be taken by AI, jobs on the lower spectrum can be offered to

Book Reviews 87

humans after enhancing the pay scale. This however seems a view borne out of his self-confessed optimism and bout with his medical condition.

In conclusion it is a book worthy of the readers’ time and while it does not debate more pressing ethical and existential issues in greater detail, it brings in a unique perspective that is a feast for a thinking mind. Reviewed by Mr. Farrukh Khan Pitafi, M. Phil scholar, Department of IR, NDU, Islamabad.


DOCUMENTS Document: 1

India-Russia Joint Statement during Visit of the President of Russia to India, India-Russia: An Enduring Partnership in a

Changing World, New Delhi, India, October 5, 2018.

rime Minister of the Republic of India H.E. Mr. Narendra Modi and President of the Russian Federation H.E. Mr. Vladimir V. Putin met for the 19th edition of the Annual Bilateral Summit in New Delhi on

October 4-5, 2018. India-Russia cooperation is based on the solid foundations of the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of India and the USSR, 1993 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of India and the Russian Federation, 2000 Declaration on Strategic Partnership between the Republic of India and the Russian Federation and 2010 Joint Statement elevating the Partnership to a Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership. Cooperation between India and Russia spans across the whole gamut of sectors and rests on the fundamental pillars of political and strategic cooperation, military and security cooperation, cooperation in the spheres of economy, energy, industry, science and technology, and cultural and humanitarian cooperation.

India and Russia highly evaluated the contemporary relevance and significance of the informal summit in Sochi on May 21, 2018 which was a unique meeting in international diplomacy, reflecting the deep trust and confidence between Prime Minister Modi and President Putin, underlining the desire of both countries to maintain regular contacts and hold frequent consultations on issues of mutual interest, and further enhanced mutual coordination and convergence of views on all major issues. The Sochi Summit manifested the role of interaction and cooperation between India and Russia in building a multi-polar world order. The two Sides agreed to continue the practice of such informal meetings and to maintain strategic communication at all levels on a regular basis.

The Sides reaffirmed their commitment to the Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership between India and Russia. They declared that this relationship is an important factor for global peace and stability and appreciated each other’s respective roles as major powers with common responsibilities for maintaining global peace and stability.

Both Sides agreed that their relationship is mature and confident, covering all areas and is marked by deep trust, mutual respect and close understanding of each other’s position. They reaffirmed that being multicultural, multilingual and multi-religious societies, India and Russia bring civilizational wisdom to address modern day challenges. Together, they contribute to creating a more interconnected and diverse world.

P

Documents 89

The Sides called upon all states to work towards the lessening of global tensions and promoting the ideals of tolerance, cooperation, transparency and openness in inter-state relations. They stressed that the primary challenge in large parts of the world remains ensuring rapid and environmentally sustainable economic development, removal of poverty, reducing inequality among and within states, and providing basic health care. India and Russia pledged to cooperate with each other to achieve these goals.

The Sides noted with satisfaction the intensification of contacts between the two countries, in all spheres – more than 50 visits at ministerial level, which have injected new vigour into their relationship. Subsequent to the successful implementation of the Protocol on Foreign Office Consultations for the period 2017-18, the Sides agreed to extend the period of Consultations for five more years (2019-2023) and signed a Protocol to this effect. Russia welcomed the appointment of Honorary Consuls General of India in Ekaterinburg and Astrakhan, which would further facilitate closer interaction amongst people and regions of both Sides.

The Sides welcomed the agreements reached in November 2017 between their concerned authorities, for cooperation on internal security, drug trafficking and disaster management, including the Joint Action Plan between the Narcotics Control Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs of the Republic of India and the Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation for the period of 2018-2020. The Indian Side acknowledged the Russian Side’s technical expertise in the field of disaster management and agreed to explore cooperation, including through training of trainers and development of emergency response structures.

The Sides noted that the successful conclusion of the 70th anniversary celebrations of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Russia witnessed enthusiastic response among people of both countries and further consolidated people-to-people ties. The Sides are satisfied with the implementation of the Cultural Exchange Programme for 2017-2019 signed in 2017. They welcomed annual Russian Festivals in India and Indian Festivals in Russia and highly appreciated the ongoing youth exchange programme, exchange of writers and reciprocal support of the National Film Festivals. The Sides welcomed mutual growth in tourism flows in the last two years, and agreed to facilitate this positive trend. India complimented Russia for successful organization of the 2018 FIFA World Cup. The Sides recognized the immense contribution made by the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, to the promotion of India-Russia relations over several decades. Prime Minister Modi underlined that India would contribute to the success of the 200 year celebrations of the foundation of the Institute.


Economy The Sides welcomed the outcomes of the 23rd meeting, co-chaired

by Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Yuri I. Borisov and Minister of External Affairs of the Republic of India Sushma Swaraj, of the India – Russia Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economy, Science, Technology and Cultural Cooperation, held in Moscow on September 14, 2018.

The Sides reviewed the progress on the achievement of the goal to increase two-way investment to USD 30 billion by the year 2025 and noted with satisfaction that both countries were on the way to achieving this target. They noted that in 2017 bilateral trade increased by more than 20% and agreed to work towards its further increase and diversification. The Sides expressed their support to promoting bilateral trade in national currencies.

The Sides noted that the first meeting of the Strategic Economic Dialogue between NITI Aayog of India and the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation would be held later in 2018 in Russia.

The Sides welcomed the start of consultations on the Free Trade Agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and its member states, on one side, and the Republic of India – on the other, and supported the idea to expedite the negotiation process.

The Sides appreciated the Joint Study commissioned to work out a Joint Strategy of Action for the development of trade and economic relations and investment cooperation and noted that, to take this forward, the Sides have nominated, respectively, the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade and the All-Russian Academy of Foreign Trade.

The Sides appreciated the work done by "Invest India’’ to facilitate Russian investors in India and the planned launch of a "Single Window Service” by the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation for facilitating operation of Indian companies in Russia.

The Sides welcomed the holding of the India-Russia Business Summit on the margins of the 19th Annual Summit on October 4-5, 2018 in New-Delhi with the participation of large business delegations from both sides, representing important areas of bilateral cooperation, sending a strong signal of the willingness and capacity of the business sectors of both countries to further strengthen economic, trade and investment partnerships.

The Sides reviewed progress in the implementation of Priority Investment Projects in the spheres of mining, metallurgy, power, oil & gas, railways, pharmaceuticals, Information Technology, chemicals, infrastructure, automobile, aviation, space, shipbuilding and manufacturing of different equipment. The Sides welcomed the establishment of a pharmaceutical plant by Advance Pharma Company in Russia. The Indian Side conveyed its intention to increase import of

Documents 91

fertilizers from Russia. The Sides noted the importance of expansion of collaboration in the aluminum sector.

They welcomed the signing of the MoU between National Small Industries Corporation of India and the Russian Small and Medium Business Corporation.

The Sides emphasized that infrastructure development is an important national priority for both countries offering immense opportunities for cooperation. The Indian Side invited Russian companies to participate in the development of industrial corridors in India, including in areas of road and rail infrastructure, smart cities, construction of wagons and creation of a joint transportation logistics company.

The Russian Side offered its expertise in tax collection based on satellite navigation technologies for the realization of joint projects in India including in the framework of above mentioned industrial corridors.

The Russian Side expressed its interest in participating in the international competitive biddings as and when the Ministry of Railways of India decides to execute the railway speed raising projects.

The Sides noted the importance of cooperation in the area of transport education, personnel training and scientific support in the implementation of international transport corridors. For these purposes the Sides maintain cooperation between the National Rail and Transportation Institute (Vadodara) of the Republic of India and the Russian University of Transport (MIIT).

The Sides underscored the vital importance of increasing connectivity between them. They called for the development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) through intensified efforts by finalizing pending issues related to Customs authorities, development of road and rail infrastructure and financial facilitation through bilateral discussions as well as discussions with other partner countries at the earliest. The Sides welcomed the proposed trilateral meeting between the Republic of India, the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran on the sidelines of "Transport Week - 2018” in Moscow, on the issue of Indian goods transportation through the territory of Iran to Russia. The Indian Side informed the Russian Side of its accession to the Customs Convention on International Transport of Goods under cover of TIR Carnets. The Sides agreed to make efforts to convene the INSTC Ministerial and Coordination meeting on priority.

In order to promote trade, the Sides agreed to mutually share on best endeavour basis the mandatory inspections/regulations requirement to be fulfilled at the time of exporting/importing of any product so that any delay related to such inspection could be reduced.

The Sides agreed to share the list of their trade exhibitions and fairs as well as of institutions/export promotion councils and other export related institutions from where one can get the details of exporters/importers from both sides to facilitate their interaction.


The Sides supported the early launch of the Green Corridor project aimed at the simplification of customs operations in respect of goods being transported between India and Russia. They regarded this as an important step towards enhancing mutual trade. After the start of the project Customs administrations of both countries will be committed to its further expansion.

The Sides appreciated the efforts to further cement and institutionalize cooperation between Indian States and Russian Regions. To carry forward the momentum of cooperation between the States and Union Territories of the Republic of India and Subjects of the Russian Federation, both Sides directed further intensification of direct contacts between business, entrepreneurs and governmental bodies on both sides. The Sides welcomed further efforts aimed at signing of agreements between Assam and Sakhalin, Haryana and Bashkortostan, Goa and Kaliningrad, Odisha and Irkutsk, Visakhapatnam and Vladivostok. The Sides agreed to encourage participation by regional delegations in major events like Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, Eastern Economic Forum and Partnership/Investment Summits and also welcomed the intention to organize and hold the India-Russia interregional forum.

The Sides agreed to work together to explore joint projects for productive, efficient and economic use of natural resources in each other’s country through application of appropriate technologies while ensuring affordable environment friendly utilization of natural resources.

The Sides acknowledged the agriculture sector as an important area for cooperation and committed themselves to eliminating trade barriers, greater production and trade in agricultural products.

The Sides praised the level of cooperation achieved in diamond sector, including the signing of new long-term contracts for rough diamond supplies by PJSC ALROSA to Indian companies, opening of the ALROSA representative office in Mumbai and joint financing by the ALROSA and the Gem & Jewellery Export Promotion Council of India of the International Diamonds Producers Association on the development of programmes of generic marketing of diamonds, including in the Indian market. Both Sides noted recent investments by Indian companies in the diamond manufacturing in the Russian Far East.

The Sides agreed to explore opportunities of joint collaboration in precious metals, minerals, natural resources and forest produce, including timber, through joint investments, production, processing and skilled labour.

The Russian Side invited the Indian Side to invest in the Russian Far East. The Indian Side welcomed the decision to open an office of the Far East Agency in Mumbai. The Indian delegation, which was led by the Minister for Commerce & Industry, and Civil Aviation Suresh Prabhu, participated in the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in September

Documents 93

2018. A high level Russian delegation would visit India to organize investment road-shows and promote greater Indian investments in the Far East.

The Sides agreed to actively promote joint projects in third countries in sectors such as railways, energy and others where there is a complementarity between them in terms of technology and resources. Science and Technology

The Sides noted the necessity to further intensify cooperation in the Science and Technology sector and welcomed the successful conduct of the 10th Indian-Russian Working Group on Science and Technology, which is jointly supervised by the Department of Science and Technology of India and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation, in February 2018.

The Sides noted the successful collaboration between the Department of Science and Technology of India and the Russian Foundation for Basic Research which celebrated their 10th anniversary of joint research in the field of Basic and Applied Sciences in June 2017. The Sides also recognized with satisfaction the collaboration between the Department of Science and Technology of India and the Russian Science Foundation. Both Sides agreed to revive cooperation under the Integrated Long Term Programme for cooperation in the field of Science, Technology and Innovations between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Russian Federation by drawing up a roadmap for further cooperation between different Laboratories, Academia, Universities, Institutions and Organizations in scientific and technology areas of mutual priority.

The Sides agreed to further enhance their cooperation in the field of Information and Communications Technology, particularly in Electronics System Design & Manufacturing, Software development, Supercomputing, E-Government, Public Services Delivery, Network Security, Security in the use of Information and Communication Technologies, Fin-tech, Internet of Things, standardization, radio control and regulation of radio frequency spectrum. The Sides resolved to continue mutual support and synergies at various platforms including BRICS and ITU.

The Sides welcomed the signing of the Joint Declaration – "India-Russia Economic Cooperation: The Way Forward” by Minister of Commerce and Industry of India Suresh Prabhu and Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation Maxim Oreshkin in March 2018 in New Delhi. They highly appreciated the decision to hold the first ever India-Russia Start-Up Summit in December 2018 by the Confederation of Indian Industries and Skolkovo Foundation. They welcomed the idea to launch an online portal that would enable startups, investors, incubators


and aspiring entrepreneurs of both countries to interact and provide relevant resources to expand and enable globalization of start-ups.

The Sides stressed the importance of the longstanding and mutually beneficial India-Russia cooperation in outer space and welcomed the activity on setting up measurement data collection ground stations of the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System NavIC and the Russian Navigation Satellite System GLONASS in the territory of the Russian Federation and the Republic of India respectively. The Sides agreed to further intensify cooperation in the field of exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, including human spaceflight programmes, scientific projects, as well as agreed to continue developing cooperation on BRICS remote sensing satellite constellation.

The Sides expressed interest in the development of mutually beneficial cooperation in the Arctic, inter alia in the sphere of joint scientific research. The Sides noted with satisfaction the longstanding cooperation of Indian and Russian scientists in the Antarctic.

The Sides noted the expansion of linkages between higher education institutions of two countries that became possible thanks to the activities of the India-Russia Network of Universities, which has already met thrice since its establishment in 2015, and whose total membership has reached 42. The Sides noted the great interest in academic exchanges of teachers and students, as well as in working on joint scientific and educational projects. Energy

The Sides noted the importance of further widening of energy cooperation between India and Russia taking into account the Indian Side’s interest in Russian energy assets, including natural gas, as well as in implementation of prospective joint projects in the field of renewable energy sources.

The Sides acknowledged the potential for mutually beneficial cooperation in the energy sector, and encouraged their companies to consider a wide range of opportunities for cooperation, including long-term contracts, joint ventures and acquisitions of energy assets in both countries as well as possible cooperation in third countries.

The Sides welcomed the ongoing cooperation between the Russian and Indian energy companies, including investments of Indian consortium in Vankorneft and Taas-Yuryakh Neftegazodobycha in Russia and the participation of the PJSC Rosneft oil company in the Essar Oil capital. The Sides noted with satisfaction the progress made by the companies in the development of comprehensive cooperation and expressed the hope for the completion of negotiations on the Vankor cluster at an early date.

The Sides acknowledged the interest of Russian and Indian companies in cooperation in the field of LNG and welcomed the

Documents 95

commencement of supply of LNG under the long-term contract between Gazrpom Group and GAIL India Ltd.

The Sides expressed their support for continuing the expansion of the dialogue between PJSC NOVATEK and the energy companies of India and welcomed the joint intention to develop cooperation in the field of LNG.

The Sides expressed their support to companies from both sides for development of cooperation and exploring opportunities for joint development of oil fields in the Russian territory, including in the Arctic shelf of Russia and joint development of projects on the shelf of the Pechora and Okhotsk Seas.

Welcoming the joint-study conducted in 2017 on the gas pipeline supply routes from Russia and other countries to India, both Sides noted the ongoing consultations between the Indian and Russian ministries and companies to explore possibilities of constructing the gas pipeline to India and agreed to continue to consult each other on the possible conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding between the two Ministries.

Civil nuclear cooperation between India and Russia is an important component of strategic partnership contributing to India’s energy-security and its commitments under the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. The Sides noted the progress achieved in the construction of the remainder of the six power units at Kudankulam NPP as well as the efforts being made in the components manufacturing for localization. The Sides welcomed consultations on the new Russian designed NPP in India, as well as on the NPP equipment joint manufacturing of nuclear equipment; cooperation in third countries

The Sides highlighted the progress achieved in fulfillment of the agreements envisaged in the Memorandum of Understanding on trilateral cooperation in implementation of the Rooppur Nuclear Power Project in Bangladesh. The sides expressed satisfaction over signing of the Action Plan for Prioritization and Implementation of Cooperation Areas in the Nuclear Field Identified Jointly.

The Sides also decided to further explore possibilities of closer cooperation on hydel and renewable energy sources, energy efficiency, including in order to reduce the negative effects of climate change. Military-Technical Cooperation

The Sides noted that Military and Military-Technical cooperation between the two countries is an important pillar of their strategic partnership. They welcomed the forthcoming meeting of the Indian-Russian Intergovernmental Commission on Military-Technical cooperation to be held in December 2018. The Roadmap for Military Cooperation has paved way for greater interaction between the militaries of both countries, including in training, exchange of senior functionaries of the militaries, Staff talks and Exercises. The Russian Side positively evaluated the Indian


participation in the Army Games 2018, Army 2018 and Moscow Conference on International Security. Both Sides commended the successful completion of the first ever Tri-Services Exercise INDRA 2017 and committed to continue their Joint Military Exercises – INDRA Navy, INDRA Army and Avia INDRA – in 2018.

The Sides welcomed the conclusion of the contract for the supply of the S-400 Long Range Surface to Air Missile System to India.

The Sides reaffirmed their commitment to enhance military technical cooperation between India and Russia, which has a long history of mutual trust and mutual benefit. Both Sides expressed satisfaction at the significant progress made on the ongoing projects of military technical cooperation and recognized the positive shift towards joint research and joint production of military technical equipment between the two countries. They highly evaluated the Military Industrial Conference process as an important mechanism to promote the "Make in India” policy of the Government of India.

The Sides positively evaluated the meeting of the High-Level Committee on Cooperation in High Technologies set up in November 2017 that identified concrete projects in areas of mutual interest for joint research and development. International Issues

The sides affirmed "equality, mutual respect and non-interference as universally acknowledged norms of international law as reflected in the United Nations Charter and the 1970 Declaration on principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among states in accordance with the UN Charter.”

The Sides, mentioning the results of the 10th anniversary BRICS Summit in South Africa in July 2018, acknowledged the intention of India and Russia to continue productive interaction in order to enhance strategic partnership within the association, defending priorities of building fair, just, and multipolar world order on the basis of strict observance of international law and the UN Charter.

The Sides declared their support to Afghan government’s efforts towards the realization of an Afghan-led, and Afghan-owned national peace reconciliation process. Concerned with the unabated violence and severely undermined security situation in Afghanistan and its adverse effect on the region, the Sides resolved to work through the Moscow Format, SCO Contact Group on Afghanistan, and all other recognized formats for an early resolution to the long-term conflict in Afghanistan, end to terrorist violence, external safe havens and sanctuaries for terrorists and the worsening drug problem in the country. Both Sides called upon the international community to join efforts to thwart any external interference in Afghanistan, to restore its economy, contribute to sustaining peace and security, economic and political development of a

Documents 97

stable, secure, united, prosperous and independent Afghanistan. The two Sides will direct their activity to launch joint development and capacity building projects in Afghanistan.

The Sides reaffirmed the commitment of India and Russia for a political resolution of the conflict in Syria, through an inclusive Syrian-led, Syrian-owned political process which safeguards the state sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria in pursuance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015). They reiterated their support for the Geneva process and the mediation offered by the UN, as well as the Astana process, and stressed the complementarity between the two initiatives. Both Sides called upon all stake holders to actively engage in building a peaceful, stable and sovereign Syrian nation and support the intra-Syrian dialogue without preconditions or external interference. Both Sides called for enhancing efforts to provide necessary humanitarian assistance to bring the long drawn suffering of the Syrian people to an end soon, bearing in mind urgent reconstruction needs and return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

The Sides underlined the importance of the full and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme in order to support international peace and security, to strengthen non-proliferation regime and to develop normal economic cooperation with Iran. They called for all issues related to the Iranian nuclear programme to be resolved peacefully and through dialogue.

The Sides welcomed the positive developments in the Korean peninsula and conveyed their support for efforts to bring about lasting peace and stability in this sub-region through diplomacy and dialogue. Both Sides agreed that while drawing-up the mechanism to resolve the Korean Peninsula issues it is necessary to take into account and address concerns related to its proliferation linkages.

The Sides expressed the serious concern about the possibility of an arms race in outer space and of outer space turning into an arena for military confrontation. They reaffirmed that the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), would avert a grave danger for international peace and security. The Sides welcomed the deliberations of the first session of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on PAROS to discuss possible elements for a legally binding instrument on PAROS including inter alia, on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space. They stressed that practical transparency and confidence building measures might also contribute to the objectives of PAROS.

The Sides reaffirmed their determination to support efforts and initiatives aimed at preserving the role of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, and preventing the politicization of the activities of the Organization for the Prohibition of


Chemical Weapons. The Indian Side welcomed the Russian Federation's early completion of destruction of its chemical weapons' stockpiles, which represents a significant contribution to achieving the goal of creating a world free from chemical weapons.

The Sides denounced terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and reiterated the need to combat international terrorism with decisive and collective response without any double standards. The Sides agreed to converge their efforts to eradicate terrorist networks, their sources of financing, arms and fighters supply channels, to counter terrorist ideology, propaganda and recruitment. The Sides condemned all kinds of state support to terrorists including cross border terrorism and providing safe havens to terrorists and their network. Recognizing the importance of adopting the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, pending in the United Nations, to become part of the international law, both Sides called upon the international community to make sincere efforts towards its early conclusion. То address the threats of chemical and biological terrorism, the Sides supported and emphasized the need for launching multilateral negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on an international convention for the suppression of acts of chemical and biological terrorism.

The Sides reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of international law and the centrality of the United Nations in international relations. Both Sides share the view that implementation in good faith of generally recognized principles and rules of international law excludes the practice of double standards or imposition by some States of their will on other States, and consider that imposition of unilateral coercive measures not based on international law, is an example of such practice. Both Sides would continue to work together to promote a democratic world order based on global and shared interests.

The Sides reaffirmed the need to reform the UN Security Council to better reflect the current world order and make it more effective in dealing with emerging global challenges. Russia reiterated its unwavering support to India for Permanent Membership in an expanded UNSC. Both Sides resolved to work closely to ensure peace, security and equitable development both regionally and globally and to coordinate their efforts to address challenges to the stability of the world order.

The Sides reaffirmed their commitment to fully implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Both Sides will pursue equitable, open, all-round, innovation-driven and inclusive development, to achieve sustainable development in its three dimensions - economic, social and environmental - in a balanced and integrated manner. They reiterate the important role of the United Nations, including the High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, in coordinating and reviewing global implementation of the 2030 Agenda. They agree on the need to reform the UN Development System with a view to enhancing its

Documents 99

capability in supporting Member States in implementing the 2030 Agenda. Both Sides urged the developed countries to honor their Official Development Assistance commitments in time and in full and provide more development resources to developing countries.

The Sides committed to further promote green development and low-carbon economy, in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication. They called upon all countries to fully implement the Paris Agreement adopted under the principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change including the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and urged developed countries to provide financial, technological and capacity-building support to developing countries to enhance their capability in mitigation and adaptation.

The Sides reiterated their commitment to further strengthen global non-proliferation. Russia expressed its support for India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The Sides stated the necessity of early adoption of rules, norms and principles of responsible behavior of States in the use of ICTs, as well as enhancement of international cooperation in the field of countering the use of ICTs for criminal purposes by developing international legal instrument in this sphere. In this regard the Sides underlined importance of adoption of relevant resolutions by the UN General Assembly during its 73rd session. The Sides acknowledged the necessity to establish a framework of cooperation among BRICS states on ensuring security in the use of ICTs and confirmed intention to work towards elaboration of a BRICS intergovernmental agreement on cooperation on this matter.

The Sides underlined common approaches to ensuring security in the use of ICTs and their willingness to strengthen bilateral interagency practical dialogue in furtherance of the intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in the field of Security in the Use of Information and Communication Technologies.

Both Sides supported the idea of the establishment of Regional Security Architecture, that provides equal and indivisible security to all countries in Asia and in the regions of Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Sides emphasized the importance of the continuation of the multilateral dialogue on this theme within the framework of the East Asia Summits and other regional fora. Both Sides agreed that all new initiatives aimed at strengthening of the regional order are to be based on multilateralism, principles of transparency, inclusiveness, mutual respect and unity in the common pursuit of progress and prosperity and not directed against any country. In this regard, the Sides welcomed the constructive consultations held at Moscow on 24 August 2018 between Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Igor Morgulov and Foreign Secretary of the Republic of India Vijay Gokhale.


The Sides confirmed their determination to enhance interaction and coordination of efforts in the regional multilateral fora such as BRICS, G-20, SCO, RIC and East Asia Summits. India expressed its aspiration to broaden cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union.

The Sides noted that the participation of the Prime Minister of the Republic of India Narendra Modi in the SCO Heads of State Council Meeting in Qingdao in June 2018 marked successful involvement of India in the work of the Organization as a full-fledged member. The Sides, confirming their commitment to the SCO Charter, norms and principles of international law, will continue coordinated efforts to further realize the potential of the Organization in all directions of its activities.

Special attention will be paid to the issues of security and stability, including combating terrorism, illegal drug-trafficking and organized crime, thereby increasing effectiveness of cooperation within the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure.

Russia welcomed the participation of India in the counter-terror military exercise "Peace Mission – 2018”. Both Sides consider the goal of developing an economic component of SCO as an important one, including realization of transportation and infrastructure projects aimed at providing interconnection within the SCO Organization and with observers, partner countries, as well as other interested states. They stood for increasing the role of SCO in the international affairs and believe it necessary to expand contacts and cooperation of SCO with the UN and its structures, other international and regional organizations. The Sides agreed to deepen cultural and humanitarian ties within the SCO.

The Sides stand for strengthening of open, inclusive, transparent, non-discriminatory and rules-based multilateral trade system and prevention of fragmentation of international trade relations and trade protectionism in all forms.

India welcomed the initiative of Russia to create a Larger Eurasian Partnership that stipulates conjugation of national development strategies and multilateral integration projects in the interests of building effective platform of constructive cooperation based on strict observance of the international law, principles of equality, mutual respect and taking in account each other national perspectives.

The Sides expressed their satisfaction on the progress in India - Russia relations, shared interests and similar positions on issues of bilateral and international importance and agreed to continue this trajectory of closer cooperation, coordination and consolidation of gains to surge ahead the Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership of India and Russia for the mutual prosperity of people of both countries.

President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin thanked Prime Minister of the Republic of India Narendra Modi for the hospitality extended and invited him to visit Russia for the 20th Annual Summit in

Documents 101

2019. Prime Minister Narendra Modi accepted the invitation with great pleasure. Source: https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/30469/ IndiaRussia_Joint_Statement_during_visit_of_President_of_Russia_to_India_October_05_2018


Document: 2 Joint Statement on the Inaugural U.S.-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, Media Note-Office of the Spokesperson, Washington D. C., September 6, 2018.

inister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj and Minister of Defence Nirmala Sitharaman welcomed Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo and Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis to India on

September 6, 2018, for the inaugural U.S.-India Ministerial 2+2 Dialogue. They welcomed the launch of the 2+2 Dialogue as a reflection of the shared commitment by Prime Minister Modi and President Trump to provide a positive, forward-looking vision for the India-U.S. strategic partnership and to promote synergy in their diplomatic and security efforts. They resolved to continue meetings in this format on an annual basis.

Celebrating over 70 years of diplomatic cooperation, the Ministers reaffirmed their view that India and the United States, as sovereign democracies founded on the values of freedom, justice, and commitment to the rule of law, must continue to lead global efforts to promote peace, prosperity, and security.

Recognizing their two countries are strategic partners, major and independent stakeholders in world affairs, the Ministers committed to work together on regional and global issues, including in bilateral, trilateral, and quadrilateral formats. The two sides further decided to establish secure communication between the Minister of External Affairs of India and the U.S. Secretary of State, and between the Minister of Defence of India and the U.S. Secretary of Defense, to help maintain regular high-level communication on emerging developments. Strengthening the Defense and Security Partnership

The Ministers reaffirmed the strategic importance of India’s designation as a Major Defense Partner (MDP) of the United States and committed to expand the scope of India’s MDP status and take mutually agreed upon steps to strengthen defense ties further and promote better defense and security coordination and cooperation. They noted the rapid growth in bilateral defense trade and the qualitative improvement in levels of technology and equipment offered by the United States to India in recent years. They welcomed the inclusion of India by the United States among the top tier of countries entitled to license-free exports, re-exports, and transfers under License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA-1) and also committed to explore other means to support further expansion in two-way trade in defense items and defense manufacturing supply chain linkages. They welcomed the signing of a Communications

M

Documents 103

Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) that will facilitate access to advanced defense systems and enable India to optimally utilize its existing U.S.-origin platforms. The Ministers also announced their readiness to begin negotiations on an Industrial Security Annex (ISA) that would support closer defense industry cooperation and collaboration.

Recognizing their rapidly growing military-to-military ties, the two sides committed to the creation of a new, tri-services exercise and to further increase personnel exchanges between the two militaries and defense organizations. The Ministers reviewed the recent growth of bilateral engagements in support of maritime security and maritime domain awareness, and committed to expand cooperation. Toward that end, the Ministers committed to start exchanges between the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) and the Indian Navy, underscoring the importance of deepening their maritime cooperation in the western Indian Ocean.

Acknowledging the unique role of technology in the U.S.-India defense partnership, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to continue to encourage and prioritize co-production and co-development projects through the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), and to pursue other avenues of defense innovation cooperation. In this regard, they welcomed the conclusion of a Memorandum of Intent between the U.S. Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) and the Indian Defence Innovation Organization – Innovation for Defence Excellence (DIO-iDEX).

Welcoming the expansion of bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation, the Ministers announced their intent to increase information-sharing efforts on known or suspected terrorists and to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2396 on returning foreign terrorist fighters. They committed to enhance their ongoing cooperation in multilateral fora such as the UN and FATF. They reaffirmed their support for a UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism that will advance and strengthen the framework for global cooperation and reinforce the message that no cause or grievance justifies terrorism. The Ministers denounced any use of terrorist proxies in the region, and in this context, they called on Pakistan to ensure that the territory under its control is not used to launch terrorist attacks on other countries. On the eve of the 10-year anniversary of the 26/11 Mumbai attack, they called on Pakistan to bring to justice expeditiously the perpetrators of the Mumbai, Pathankot, Uri, and other cross-border terrorist attacks. The Ministers welcomed the launch of a bilateral dialogue on designation of terrorists in 2017, which is strengthening cooperation and action against terrorist groups, including Al-Qa’ida, ISIS, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Hizb-ul Mujahideen, the Haqqani Network, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, D-Company, and their affiliates. The two sides further reaffirmed their commitment to ongoing and future cooperation to ensure a stable cyberspace environment and to prevent cyber-attacks.


Partners in the Indo-Pacific and Beyond The Ministers reviewed cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region,

noting that the common principles for the region articulated in the India-U.S. Joint Statement of June 2017 have been further amplified by President Donald Trump at Danang, Vietnam on November 10, 2017, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Singapore at the Shangri-La Dialogue on June 1, 2018. Both sides committed to work together and in concert with other partners toward advancing a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region, based on recognition of ASEAN centrality and on respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, rule of law, good governance, free and fair trade, and freedom of navigation and overflight. Noting the importance of infrastructure and connectivity for the Indo-Pacific region, both sides emphasized the need to work collectively with other partner countries to support transparent, responsible, and sustainable debt financing practices in infrastructure development.

The Ministers reaffirmed their shared commitment to a united, sovereign, democratic, inclusive, stable, prosperous, and peaceful Afghanistan. The two sides expressed support for an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation process. The United States acknowledged India’s longstanding and ongoing contributions of economic assistance to Afghanistan and also welcomed India’s enhanced role in Afghanistan’s development and stabilization.

India welcomed the recent U.S.-North Korea summit. The two sides pledged to work together to counter North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programs and to hold accountable those countries that have supported them.

The United States welcomed India’s accession to the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Missile Technology Control Regime and reiterated its full support for India’s immediate accession to the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Promoting Prosperity and People-to-People Ties

The Ministers recognized the importance and the potential for increasing bilateral trade, investment, innovation, and job creation in both countries. Both sides committed to further expanding and balancing the trade and economic partnership consistent with their leaders’ 2017 joint statement, including by facilitating trade, improving market access, and addressing issues of interest to both sides. In this regard, both sides welcomed the ongoing exchanges between the Ministry of Commerce of India and the Office of the United States Trade Representative and hoped for mutually acceptable outcomes.

Both sides looked forward to full implementation of the civil nuclear energy partnership and collaboration between Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) and Westinghouse Electric Company for the establishment of six nuclear power plants in India.

Documents 105

Observing the strong ties of family, education, and business, and the spirit of entrepreneurship and innovation that unite their people, the Ministers highlighted the unmatched people-to-people ties between their countries and recognized the benefits to both nations and the world from these ties, including the free flow of ideas and collaboration in health, space, oceans, and other areas of science and technology.

Source: https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/09/285729.htm


Document: 3 Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on Strengthening China-Pakistan All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership and Building Closer China-Pakistan Community of Shared Future in the New Era, Beijing, November 4, 2018.

t the invitation of H.E. Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, H.E. Imran Khan, Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, paid his first official visit to China on

November2-5, 2018. During his visit, H.E. Imran Khan called on H.E. Xi Jinping, President of China, held talks with H.E. Li Keqiang, Premier, and met with H.E. Li Zhanshu, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the the National People's Congress, and H.E. Wang Qishan, Vice President of China respectively. Meetings were marked by traditional warmth, mutual understanding and trust, and the leaders of the two countries had an in-depth exchange of views on bilateral, regional and international issues of mutual interest. Prime Minister Imran Khan also delivered a speech at the Party School of CPC Central Committee. Besides Beijing, Prime Minister Imran Khan also visited Shanghai to attend the First China International Import Expo.

Reviewing with satisfaction the historical development of China-Pakistan relations and the great strides made, both sides reiterated that the friendship between Pakistan and China has withstood the test of time, notwithstanding the changes in domestic, regional and international environments. The two sides agreed to further strengthen the China-Pakistan All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership, and build closer China-Pakistan Community of Shared Future in the new era in line with the principles set forth by the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-neighborly Relations between the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan signed in 2005. 1. Political Relations and Strategic Communication

Both sides stressed that China and Pakistan are good neighbors, close friends, iron brothers and trusted partners. The friendship and cooperation between China and Pakistan serve the fundamental interests of the two countries and peoples, and contribute to peace, stability and development in the region and beyond. Both sides will continue to view China-Pakistan relations from a strategic and long-term perspective.

The Chinese side reiterated that China's relationship with Pakistan is always a matter of highest priority in its foreign policy. China appreciated the consistent and strong support by Pakistan to China's

A

Documents 107

issues of core interest, and reaffirmed its support and solidarity with Pakistan in safeguarding its sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and security. It appreciated Pakistan's important role in promoting regional peace, stability and security and efforts for the peaceful resolution of all outstanding issues with its neighbors.

The Pakistani side stressed that Pakistan-China relationship is the cornerstone of its foreign policy, and friendship with China represents national consensus and the common desire of all Pakistani people. Pakistan appreciated the strong support and assistance provided by the government and people of China to Pakistan in its economic development. It unequivocally upholds the one-China policy and supports all efforts made by the Chinese government to realize national reunification.

Both sides agreed to maintain frequent exchange of visits and meetings at the leadership level and continue to hold bilateral meetings between their leaders on the sidelines of major multilateral conferences and events. The two sides agreed to further strengthen links between their legislative bodies. China welcomed the establishment of Pakistan-China Friendship Groups in Pakistani Parliament.

Both sides agreed to establish the mechanism of China-Pakistan Foreign Ministers' Strategic Dialogue and rename the former Strategic Dialogue at Vice Foreign Minister-level to Political Consultations. They also agreed to continue exchange programmes pertaining to training of diplomats. 2. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

Prime Minister Imran Khan commended President Xi Jinping's visionary Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that aims at enhancing regional and international connectivity. The two sides reiterated that BRI represents a win-win model of international cooperation and provides new opportunities for economic rejuvenation and prosperity of all countries. As a signature project of BRI, the fast development of CPEC has played a significant role in the Belt and Road cooperation.

Both sides reviewed the early harvest phase of CPEC and expressed satisfaction that rapid progress has been made in all areas especially in the energy sector. The two sides reaffirmed their complete consensus on the future trajectory of the CPEC, timely completion of its on-going projects and joint efforts for realization of its full potential with a focus on social-economic development, job creation and livelihoods and accelerating cooperation in industrial development, industrial parks and agriculture.

Both sides agreed to task the CPEC Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) to explore new areas of cooperation. In this regard, it was decided that the eight session of the JCC will be held in Beijing before the end of the year. To further expand cooperation under CPEC, the two sides announced


the setting up of a working group on social-economic development to assist with livelihood projects in Pakistan.

Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to CPEC and agreed that it was a win-win enterprise for entire region and would bring regional prosperity and development through enhanced connectivity. They agreed to discuss the CPEC-related issues including through China-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, political consultations and JCC.

Recognizing the significance of Gwadar as an important node in cross-regional connectivity and the central pillar of CPEC, both sides agreed to speed up progress on the Port and its auxiliary projects.

Both sides dismissed the growing negative propaganda against CPEC and expressed determination to safeguard the CPEC projects from all threats. Pakistan recognized the immense contribution of the Chinese personnel working on various economic projects in Pakistan. The Chinese side expressed its appreciation for the measures taken for the security of Chinese personnel and projects in Pakistan. 3. Trade, Investment and Financial Cooperation

The two sides agreed to further consolidate and expand bilateral economic relations as a matter of high priority and to strengthen multi-faceted pragmatic cooperation in trade and investment. They agreed to boost Pakistan's industrial capacity including through joint ventures in priority areas, relocation of labor-intensive industry and SMEs collaboration.

The two sides noted the growing volume of bilateral trade and agreed to take concrete measures to address trade imbalance. These would include exchange of trade missions, broadening market access for agricultural and ICT products, and simplifying customs, quarantine and phytosanitary procedures. In this context, the two sides agreed to conclude the second phase of the China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement as early as possible, and continue discussions on the Pakistan-China Agreement on Trade in Services.

The two sides agreed to strengthen economic cooperation by fully leveraging the existing cooperative arrangements such as China-Pakistan Business Council, which is composed of China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) and the Federation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI), and those between Stock Exchanges of the two countries. The two sides agreed to hold the next round of the Joint Economic Commission early next year.

The two sides attached importance to friendly cooperation between the People's Bank of China and the State Bank of Pakistan. They expressed satisfaction at the operationalization of the currency-swap agreement and reaffirmed the need to further strengthen cooperative ties of financial and banking sectors between the two countries. Both sides noted with satisfaction that Chinese and Pakistani banks have operations

Documents 109

in both countries. Both sides agreed to strengthen cooperation on tourism promotion. 4. Marine, Science and Technology, Space, Environmental and Agricultural Cooperation

Both sides agreed to further strengthen policy dialogue and strategic communication on maritime issues and expressed satisfaction on the China-Pakistan Maritime Cooperation Dialogue. They agreed to continue their close cooperation on navigation security, marine economy, exploration and utilization of marine resources, marine scientific research and marine environmental protection.

Both sides agreed to further expand and deepen their collaboration including in the areas of new and emerging technologies, nanotechnology, biotechnology, ICT, which can contribute to improved living standards through their applications in the fields of health, agriculture, water, energy and food security.

The two sides agreed to actively promote 2012-2020 Space Cooperation Outline between China National Space Administration (CNSA) and Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) . Expressing satisfaction on the launch of Pakistan Remote Sensing Satellite (PRSS) earlier this year, both sides agreed to further strengthen bilateral cooperation in space technology applications. The two sides agreed to strengthen cooperation in the field of manned space, and the China Manned Space Engineering Office (CMSEO) and SUPARCO will sign a framework agreement on cooperation.

Both sides agreed to enhance their cooperation in the areas of climate change, desertification control, desalination, water management, afforestation and ecological restoration, wetland protection and restoration, wildlife protection, forestry industry development, disaster management and risk reduction, and other areas of mutual interest.

Pakistan side recognized the great strides made by China in the field of agriculture. Both sides agreed to build on existing cooperation in the area of agriculture and explore new areas of joint collaboration. 5. Social Sector Cooperation

Pakistan expressed a desire to learn from the Chinese poverty alleviation model, which has lifted over 700 million people out of poverty over the last forty years. China is willing to strengthen policy dialogue, experience sharing and capacity building in the field of poverty reduction with Pakistan, and support Pakistan to establish poverty alleviation demonstration projects. The Chinese assistance will also be directed towards agriculture, education, health, poverty alleviation, safe drinking water and vocational training.

Both sides also agreed to enhance collaboration in the field of health care,medical and surgical treatment. Both sides will share best


practices and explore collaboration in the fields of disease surveillance and control, vaccine production as well as traditional medicine.

The Pakistan side recognized China's unremitting efforts to combat corruption and its great achievements, and evinced interest in learning from the Chinese experience and accomplishments in the field of anti-corruption. 6. People-to-People and Cultural Linkages

Both sides reiterated the importance of people-to-people contacts and cultural exchanges and agreed to encourage mutual visits of national of the two countries. Both sides agreed to improve visa facilitation for mutual visits.

Both sides decided to celebrate Pakistan-China Year of Friendship/Sister Cities in 2019 and to establish friendship city relationships between corresponding Chinese and Pakistani cities and provinces. It was agreed to enhance exchanges and dialogue between leaders at provincial and local levels. The two sides agreed to further enhance cooperation between neighboring regions of the two countries, particularly in the areas of economy, trade, transportation, energy, industry, tourism, education, people-to-people contacts and livelihoods.

Both sides expressed satisfaction at the growing cooperation in the field of education and agreed to intensify educational linkages especially between higher education institutions. China is a popular destination for Pakistani students with about 25,000 Pakistanis enrolled across universities in China. China will offer additional scholarships for Pakistani students.

They agreed to encourage respective universities to develop bilateral linkages including through joint degree and exchange programmes. They further agreed to promote teaching of Pakistan Studies and Urdu language at Chinese Universities and Sinology and Chinese language at Pakistani Universities. Both sides agreed to negotiate agreements on mutual recognition of higher education degrees, diplomas and certificates as early as possible.

The Chinese side agreed to continue supporting Pakistan in technical and vocational training to develop a skilled manpower for employment in CEPC projects, including through assistance in upgrading vocational training institutes, vocational training exchanges, and capacity building of the trainers.

Both sides agreed to further promote exchanges between the think tanks including through conferences, seminars and fellowships. Both sides would encourage cooperation between their media houses and exchange visits and training programmes for journalists/media personnel.

Both sides agreed to further enhance cooperation in culture, arts, broadcasting, films, publication and sports under the Executive Programme of the Cultural Agreement between the two countries. The two

Documents 111

sides shall enhance exchanges and cooperation in museums and promote exchanges in the conservation and presentation of heritage and artifacts and exchange of archaeologists between the two countries. The two sides shall discuss the possibility to organize an Ancient Pakistan and Gandhara Artifacts Exhibition in Beijing. They also agreed to strengthen cooperation in the field of sports. The respective sports authorities will discuss further details. The two sides will actively encourage and support their publishing houses to translate and print literary classics so that the people of the two countries can appreciate each other's rich culture.

The two sides also agreed to establish China-Pakistan Youth Communication Committee, which will coordinate the exchange of youth and cooperation on youth affairs. 7. Defence, Security and Counter-terrorism Cooperation

Both sides agreed to further enhance defence cooperation, maintain high-level visits and exchanges at various levels between relevant departments of the two armed forces, make full use of the China-Pakistan Defence and Security Consultation mechanism, deepen cooperation in areas such as military exercises, training cooperation, personnel exchanges, and equipment and technology cooperation.

Both sides agreed to further enhance cooperation against "Three Evils" of extremism, terrorism and separatism. Both sides will continue to regularly utilize their existing mechanisms of Strategic Dialogue and Counter-terrorism and Security Consultations to further promote communication and cooperation in relevant fields.

The Chinese side conveyed its support to Pakistan's commitment and efforts to counter terrorism, assured Pakistan of its support in implementing its counter-terrorism strategy, and commended the tremendous sacrifices made by the Pakistani nation in fight against terrorism and for Pakistan's immense contribution to regional and international peace and security through its achievements and successes. The Chinese side recognized Pakistan's efforts in actively strengthening financial regulations to combat terrorism financing, and called on all relevant parties to view Pakistan's counter-terrorism efforts in an objective and fair manner.

The Pakistani side reaffirmed its support to the Chinese side in safeguarding its sovereignty and security, and combating separatism, terrorism and extremism including East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). 8. International and Regional Issues

Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, promoting international peace and security, and safeguarding the contemporary world order and the UN-centric international system. They agreed to jointly promote multilateralism, free


trade and win-win cooperation. The two sides support a consensus-based reform of the United Nations so that it responds to the interests and concerns of all Member States. Being major contributors to the UN Peacekeeping Operations over the years, the two sides agreed to enhance policy coordination, capacity building and sharing of good practices on peacekeeping.

Both sides believed that peace, development, cooperation and win-win are shared aspirations of the peoples in the region. All nations should promote cooperative and sustainable security, refrain from developing relations targeting any third country, contribute more to the mutual trust between regional countries, and respect sovereign decisions of countries in determining their development paths and respective foreign policies, so as to jointly safeguard the peace and stability of the region.

Both sides believe that a peaceful, stable, cooperative and prosperous South Asia is in the common interest of all parties. Both sides emphasized the importance of pursuit of dialogue and resolution of all outstanding disputes to promote regional cooperation and advance the goals of lasting peace, stability and shared prosperity. China appreciates Pakistan's quest for peace through dialogue, cooperation and negotiation, on the basis of mutual respect and equality, and supports Pakistan's efforts for improvement of Pakistan-India relations and for settlement of outstanding disputes between the two countries. Pakistan supported active participation of China at the platform of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Both sides agreed to strengthen cooperation on the Afghan issue and support the 'Afghan-owned and Afghan-led' peace and reconciliation process. China appreciates that Pakistan and Afghanistan are coordinating closely through the Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS) to enhance cooperation between the two countries in all areas. Both sides agreed on the importance of China-Afghanistan-Pakistan consultations at the Foreign Ministers level aimed at deepening trilateral cooperation for shared progress, development and security and for strengthening peace and stability in Afghanistan. Both sides supported Afghanistan to host the second tripartite foreign minister dialogue within this year.

The two sides underlined the importance of peaceful settlement of all disputes in the Middle East on the basis of mutual respect and in accordance to the precepts of international law.

The two sides agreed that JCPOA is an important outcome of multilateralism and a good model of negotiated settlement of complex issues through dialogue and diplomacy. They called on parties to uphold their respective commitments and to resolve all issues through dialogue. They opposed unilateral measures and long-arm jurisdiction that is inconsistent with the principles of international law.

Documents 113

The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to multilateral, non-discriminatory arms control and non-proliferation endeavours. They noted with concern the continued pursuit of double standards in the application of non-proliferation norms and procedures and called for policies upholding rule of law and long-standing rules. China appreciates and supports steps taken by Pakistan for strengthening the global non-proliferation regime. In this context, China supports Pakistan's engagement with the Nuclear Suppliers Group and welcomes its adherence of NSG Guidelines.

Recalling the commitments of all states for implementation of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions relating to international terrorism, both sides underscored the need for all States to avoid politicization of the UN Sanctions regime and the work of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Both sides also reiterated the need to evolve the text of Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism on the basis of consensus.

Both sides agreed to strengthen coordination and cooperation on international and regional issues of common interest; and maintain close communication and coordination within international and regional organizations and mechanisms such as the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), SAARC, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). China welcomed Pakistan's membership of SCO and appreciated its active participation in the SCO Summit in Qingdao in June 2018.

During the visit, the two sides also signed fifteen (15) Agreements/MoUs on a range of bilateral issues.

Prime Minister Imran Khan expressed his appreciation to the leadership and people of China for the warm hospitality accorded to him and his delegation and invited Chinese leaders to visit Pakistan at a mutually convenient time. Source: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_ 665393/t1610025.shtml


Document: 4 Statement by H.E. Wang Yi State Councilor and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China at the Security Council Open Debate on the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, UN Headquarters, New York,September 26, 2018.

r. President, Safeguarding world peace and security is the primary responsibility of the Security Council entrusted by the UN Charter

and a shared responsibility of all the Council members. Facing complex challenges to international peace and security, how can the Security Council fulfill its responsibility and play its due role? This is a question that deserves serious consideration. In this context, China would like to suggest the following: - The Security Council should remain committed to performing its duties under the Charter in a just manner. It should uphold multilateralism, the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and universally-recognized international law and basic norms governing international relations, and safeguard the authority and role of the United Nations in international affairs as well as the sovereignty, independence and legitimate rights and interests of all countries. - The Security Council should remain committed to the basic orientation of political resolution. It should act as a strong advocate and be closely engaged in efforts for political settlement, and work to resolve differences and disputes through dialogue and consultation. It should enhance preventive diplomacy with effective use of good offices, mediation, peacekeeping and peace building in the service of the general objective of political resolution. - The Security Council should remain committed to enhancing solidarity and consensus building. Keeping in mind their responsibility for safeguarding world peace and security, Council members should enhance solidarity and coordination, reject geopolitical maneuvering, and work together to ensure that the Security Council functions effectively and the common interests of broad members of the UN are upheld. - The Security Council should strengthen synergy through closer coordination. It should coordinate and cooperate with the UN General Assembly, ECOSOC, the UN Secretary-General and the UN development system for mutual support between the political pillar and the development pillar, and for mutually reinforcing progress of their efforts for lasting peace and sustainable development. Mr. President,

M

Documents 115

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery pose a real threat to global peace and security and a common challenge to the international community.

China believes that efforts should be stepped up in the following three areas:

First, we need to uphold the rule of law and consolidate the international non-proliferation regime. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the UNSCR 1540 and other Security Council resolutions constitute the legal basis of the international non-proliferation regime. We should earnestly safeguard the universality, effectiveness and authority of the non-proliferation regime. In particular, efforts should be made to prevent and stop terrorists and other non-state actors from getting hold of WMD materials and technology.

Second, we need to take multi-pronged measures to implement the non-proliferation conventions in a balanced manner. All countries need to stand by their commitments, honor non-proliferation responsibilities and fulfill international obligations. The non-proliferation conventions and agreements must be implemented in their entirety; any double standards, discriminatory arrangements or selective enforcement must not be allowed.

Third, we need to strengthen international cooperation and build the non-proliferation capacity of all countries. As governments bear the primary responsibility for non-proliferation, we should support them in developing their own non-proliferation policies in line with national conditions, and encourage continued efforts to enhance relevant law enforcement capabilities and engage in more exchanges and practical cooperation with the aim of shoring up the weak links and promoting universal security.

Mr. President, The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian

nuclear issue is a hard-won outcome of multilateralism. It contributes to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as peace and stability in the Middle East. No international agreement is impeccable. The JCPOA was unanimously endorsed by the Security Council, and has proved to be effective during the past three years. China encourages Iran to continue to fulfill the commitments it has made. At the same time, the lawful right of parties to conduct normal economic and trade cooperation with Iran should be respected. We call on the relevant parties to keep in mind the bigger and longer-term interests and uphold the sanctity, integrity and efficacy of the JCPOA.

Over the past few months, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has eased significantly. China welcomes this development, and has made tireless efforts to this end. We support the important common understanding reached by the leaders of the DPRK and the US in Singapore


and the all-round improvement in inter-Korea relations. We call on all parties to cherish and seize the opportunities at hand, turn political commitments into concrete actions, and continue to work toward the complete denuclearization and the setting-up of a peace mechanism on the Peninsula, with a view to attaining lasting peace there at an early date.

Mr. President, China has stood by its solemn commitment to the purposes and

principles of the UN Charter. We are committed to upholding the contemporary international system with the UN at its core and have conscientiously fulfilled our international responsibilities and obligations. Let us all work together to advance peace and security for the benefit of all.

Before I conclude, let me stress that China has all along followed the principle of non-interference in other countries' internal affairs. This tradition of China's foreign policy has won extensive acclaim in the international community. China has not, is not, and will not engage in any such interference. Unfounded accusations in this regard cannot be accepted. We call on other countries to also observe the purposes of the UN Charter and not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Source: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/ zyjh_665391/t1600859.shtml

Guidelines for Contributors Journal of Contemporary Studies is published bi-annually in Winter and Summer by the Faculty of Contemporary Studies, NDU. Research Scholars who wish to contribute their original, unpublished articles and book reviews to the Journal may submit these by the end of March for the Summer edition and by the end of September for the Winter edition. Manuscript submitted for JCS should be original and not submitted anywhere else. Once accepted for publishing after peer review, the author cannot withdraw the article. Papers/articles should not be longer than 7000 words or less than 5500 words, with an abstract of about 150-200 words. Reviews of recent books by scholars of standing in their field may comprise 1100-1500 words. Authors are required to submit both soft and hard copies, along with their brief introduction, in MS Word format to the editor at the following address:

Postal Address: Editor, Journal of Contemporary Studies, Faculty of Contemporary Studies National Defence University, Sector E-9 Islamabad Ph: (92-51-9262066 (ext 8406); Fax: 92-51-2853655

Email: [email protected] [email protected] Deadline for Submission: March 31st for the Summer issue & 30th September

for the Winter issue. Referencing: Footnotes should be based on The Chicago Manual

of Style, 16th edition, e.g. observe the following examples before submitting your paper:

Reference to a Book: S.M. Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988), 118.

Reference to a Journal: Ali A. Mazrui, “Has a Clash of Civilization Begun? From the Cold War of Ideology to a Hot War of Religion,” NDU Journal VI, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 17-27.

Reference to a Newspaper Article: Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “London Moot & the Kashmir Dispute,” Pakistan Observer (Islamabad), December 4, 2007.

Reference to a Newspaper: Dawn (Islamabad), July 30, 2007. Reference to an Internet Source: Hamid Hussain, “The Tale of a Love Affair that Never

Was: United States-Pakistan Defence Relations,” Pakistan Horizon June, 2002, www.pakistanhorizon.com/2002/june/loveaffair.html. (accessed September 2, 2009)

For reference already cited in full, use Ibid. For reference cited already elsewhere, use short title form (i.e., Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 118.) instead of op.cit or loc.cit. Give page number or date, if different from the one already cited. Avoid citing too many references. Cite only the most authentic reference. Writing Style:

1. British spellings should be used. 2. Date should be written as December 7, 2007. 3. Abbreviations should be written in brackets after writing within bracket after

spelling the acronym in full at first use, e.g., the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Subsequently only SAARC should be used without bracket.

4. Word “per cent” should be used instead of sign “%”. Submissions not based on Guidelines for Contributors will not be accepted.

Journal of Contemporary Studies

Faculty of Contemporary Studies

All rights are reserved. No portion of the contents may be reproduced or reprinted in any form without the written permission of the Editor/Publisher.

Opinions expressed in the articles published in the Journal of Contemporary Studies are those of authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the FCS, NDU. The editors are responsible for the selection and acceptance of articles. However, the responsibility for accuracy of the statements made therein rests with the authors.

Subscription Rates

Pakistan: Rs.200.00 per copy inclusive of postage. Rs.350.00 annually (two issues) inclusive of postage.

Overseas: US$10.00 per copy inclusive of postage. US$20.00 annually (two issues) inclusive of postage.

The Journal of Contemporary Studies is a bi-annual, refereed publication.

The editor welcomes scholars to submit well-researched, unpublished papers, along with a statement that this is an original work and has not been submitted anywhere else for publication.

Contributions and publication of articles or comments on published material should be addressed to the Editor, through post or email at the following address:

Editor, Journal of Contemporary Studies Department of International Relations, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Sector E-9, Islamabad, Pakistan Email: [email protected]; [email protected]

Printed by NDU Press, Islamabad