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Joint Study

Soviet Capabilities to Reinforce in Central Europe

i•

Initial Report

DIA review(s) completed.

Declass Review by NIMA/DOD

Top SecretJanuary 1968

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1. TO&E

• A. Design for Nuclear WarB. Slow Introduction of New

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CONTENTS

Page.

Summary 3

I. Introduction 5

II. Definition of the ReinforcementProblem

5

III. Preliminary Findings 7

A. The Size of the SovietDivision 7

B. Special Status of Belorussia • • • 7

IV. Forces Available 7

A. Summary of Forces 7B. Assessment of Forces 9

92. Current Status of Divisions . . 10

C. Disposition of Forces 11D. Organization for Combat 12

V. Movement 14

VI. Buildup 15

VII. Other Tentative Judgments 16

16

17

ANNEX I: Evaluation of Order of Battleand Unit Equipment Levels . . 19

ANNEX II: Soviet Ground Force Tablesof Equipment

24

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I 1 Armies Combat Ready

1 Army Below Strength

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Warsaw Pact Forces Facing the central Region of NATO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYDEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

January 1968

JOINT STUDY

Soviet Capabilities to Reinforce in Central Europe

Summary

This is the initial report stemming from anongoing joint CIA-DIA review of Soviet capabilitiesto reinforce Warsaw Pact forces in Central Eurnnp_

Preliminary findings indicate that motorizedrifle divisions and tank divisions are intendedto function with substantially lower levels ofequipment and personnel than was previously estimated.The bulk of this reduction appears to be in the generalpurpose vehicles which affect logistic and supportcapabilities rather than combat equipment such as tanksand artillery.

In general, Soviet divisions are about half thesize of their US counterparts. The typical USdivision contains about 16,000 men and some 5,000major items of equipment. By comparison, a Sovietmotorized rifle division has an estimated 9,500 menwith 2,600 major items of equipment, and a Soviettank division has about 7,000-7,500 men with 2,000-2,400 items of equipment.

Note: This study was produced jointly by CIA andDIA. It was prepared by the Office of StrategicResearch, CIA, and the Directorate of IntelligenceProduction, DIA.

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The divisions of three armies in Belorussiashow a. completenessand consistency in makeup and inequipment levels which suggest that they are at ornear combat readiness. In contrast, divisions inthe other military districts in the western'USSRmay be at substantially lower levels.

Preliminary analysis indicates that the Belorussianarmies would be ready for commitment as part of aforce of some 60 Soviet and East European divisionsin about three weeks from the time of decision. Theremaining armies in the western USSR would take con-siderably longer to attain a wartime posture.

The research to date has raised serious doubts con-cerning previous estimates of the tables of organizationand equipment of major units, their actual manning andequipment levels, the extent of their capacity forsupport in sustained operations, and their abilityto achieve early massive reinforcement with presentforces. The future work of the joint CIA-DA studygroup will concentrate on these and related questions.

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I. Introduction

On 18 May 1967, the Secretary of Defense requestedthe Director of Central Intelligence and the Director,Defense Intelligence Agency, jointly to undertake anevaluation of Soviet capabilities to reinforce groundforces in Central and Southern Europe. The Secretaryasked that the operational problems inherent inlarge-scale deployment be considered and that USexperience and analogs be applied. In addition, herequested treatment of nondivisional support require-ments and estimates of individual unit training timeand transport capacity, and finally, that the require-ment for concurrent movement of supplies to unitsalready deployed be considered.

The work of the Joint CIA-DIA Study Group is inprogress. Analytical tasks are continuing as themass of data essential to a review of these pro-portions is carefully examined. It is essential tonote, therefore, that this is an initial report andthat the statements and judgments of this papermay be modified as joint CIA-DIA research continues.

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identification of major military units but wasinherently limited in assessing actual manning andequipment levels for the units. Major units werethought to be generally ready for immediate or earlycommitment so that the principal constraint on Sovietdeployment of massive forces against NATO was judgedto be the time required for their movement to thetheater of operations.

II. Definition of the Reinforcement Problem

Assessment of reinforcement capabilities restson an accurate understanding of the current statusof the forces concerned and a realistic evaluationof the reinforcement process applied in the contextof the principal contingencies to be met. Previousestimates of Soviet capabilities to reinforce depended'

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Our work to date has raised doubts as to whethera substantial portion of the ground forces in thewestern USSR is available for early commitment.Evaluation of Soviet reinforcement capabilities isthus revealed to be more complex than a simple matterof assessing movement and supply factors togetherwith the need to call up trained reserves to top offunits which are otherwise combat ready.

The assessment under way has so far identifiedonly about a dozen divisions, all in the BelorussianMilitary District, which meet the general criteria ofcombat readiness--that is, ready for immediate deploy-ment westward. In addition, it is likely that thefour airborne divisions in the western USSR are combatready. Many other western USSR divisions, however,appear to have serious deficiencies and would requirea more complex mobilization including the provisionof 1,000 or more additional vehicles per division.While such a process could take many weeks for completion,a confident judgment of the time required will dependon comprehensive and detailed analyses of the nature ofpresent deficiencies.

Because analysis of the reinforcement process dependsso heavily in the first place on an accurate understandingof the status of the forces in being, the assessment ofthe forces is still incomplete. It has not yet beenpossible to deal with problems involved in the movementphase of reinforcement or in the assembly and preparationfor combat in the theater of operations.

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III. Preliminary Findings

A. The Size of the Soviet Division

As new information was examined and the equip-ment levels of units were assessed it became apparentthat Soviet units are considerably smaller than scribed in current estimates ITheTO&E's hitherto thought to bl vaila were not consistent

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with the size and organization of the actual unitsand could not be used as a basis for assessing unitreadiness. This applies both to the division andto the amount of combat and service support at army

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The assess-ment of the Belorussian MD has been completed andreveals an apparently unique status for its forces. Thethree armies in this district appear similar in terms ofthe size and readiness of their divisions, and areprobably the main force intended for early reinforcementof the Central Region. This is in contrast to the remain-der of the military districts in the western USSR, wherethe armies as a whole appear--at this stage of analysis--to be at a considerably lower level of readiness.

IV. Forces Available

A. Summary of Forces

The Warsaw Pact ground forces which areconsidered relevant in assessing the immediatethreat to the Central Region of NATO are those inthe forward area--that is, the northern tier ofEast European states--and those in the westernmilitary districts of the USSR. (In addition tothese, some forces could become available overthe long term from other districts in the USSR.)The distribution within these areas is as follows:

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Forces Facing NATO Central Region*

Army MRD TD Abn

Forward

GSFG** 5 10 10East Germany 2 4 2NGF*** 2Poland 3 8 5 1Czechoslovakia 2 5 4

USSR

Belorussia 3 4 7 1Carpathia 3 4 5Baltic 1 4 1 1Moscow 2 2 1Kiev 2 2 5Leningrad 1

Total 21 43 43 5

* Forces in Hungary are considered to be assigneda holding and security mission. It is possiblethat if an extended period of buildup or conflictdeveloped, their duties could be assumed by othersecurity forces and they would play a more activerole vis-a-vis the Central Region. This table doesnot include Soviet cadre divisions or East Europeandivisions of low strength.** Group of Soviet Forces, Germany.

*** Northern Group of Forces (the Soviet units inPoland).

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The existing organization, the apparentvariations in equipment status, and the geographicrelationships among deployment areas suggest thatthe Soviets view the mission of their forces, andthose of the three Northern Tier countries, alongthese lines:

Primary SecondaryForward Reinforcement Reinforcement Reserve

GSFG Belorussia Baltic (11th MoscowNGF Guards Army) KievEast Germany CarpathiaPolandCzechoslovakia

B. Assessment of Forces

1. TO&E

A re-examination of current publishedestimates of Soviet tables of organization andequipment in the light of new evidence revealsthat the actual unit strengths are considerably.lower than previously believed. The differencesare primarily in wheeled vehicles, probably thoseof a general support nature although some elementsof combat and engineer support also appear to beabsent. Accordingly, a reduced table of equipment(TE) based on identified unit equipment and calcu-lated minimum requirements has been developed formotorized rifle divisions (MRD's) and tank divisions(TD's) for use in this study. This new TE resultsin some revision downward in manning requirementsand presumably in sustained combat capability,although no attempt is made in this report toassess the latter.

The following table shows the previous• and the newly adjusted TO&E figures for personneland for major items of equipment. These adjust-ments are undergoing continuing research, andfurther refinement is expected, particularly withregard to personnel requirements.

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Size of Soviet Divisions(Previous Estimate in Parentheses)

MRD • TD Abn

Men

Equipment

9,500 7,000- 3,000-5,0007,500

(10,600) (8,300) (7,300)

2,600 2,000- 800-1,2002,400

(3,200) (2,900) (1,700)

2. Current Status of Divisions

It appears that Soviet units in EastGermany and Poland are generally manned and equippedat the level of the revised TO&E, and that IA Polishand Czechoslovakian divisions are probably not farbelow. However, the divisions in the western USSRappear to have substantially lower equipment levels.A significant exception to this is in Belorussia,where three MRD's are clearly up to the lev(pls ofthe new TE and the units in the forward area.

Detailed analysis of the Belorussianforces indicates that the seven tank divisions inthis military district are generally similar inappearance. The apparent lack of some supp6rtingunits, notably artillery, results in a TO&E require-ment of about 6,000 men and some 1,600 major . itemsof equipment for these divisions (as compared withthe 7,000 to 7,500 men and 2,000 to 2,400 items ofequipment of a normal TD).

In terms of armies the westernmOst ofthe three in Belorussia contains two of the high-strength MRD's and would be likely to have the thirdassigned in a reinforcement role. This army also

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contains one TD of the type estimated to have 6,000men and 1,600 items of equipment. The otherwisehigh state of readiness of this army suggests thatthe TD would be expected to move forward about asis, i.e. with little or no artillery. The simi-larity of the TD's in the remaining two armiessuggests that they too are intended to move forwardwith a minimum of mobilization.

Armies in the Baltic, Carpathian, andKiev military districts appear at a generally lowerlevel of readiness than those in Belorussia., How-ever, the apparent presence of portions of majorsupporting elements within the divisions suggeststhat these armies are intended to be brought up towartime requirements before they are moved out ina reinforcement role. The analysis on these forcesis at an early stage and work is continuing.

C. Disposition of Forces

The Soviet concept for reinforcement to beapplied in a specific instance will depend on therelative emphasis to be given the conflictingrequirements of rapid response versus maximumforce. This decision in turn will rest in largepart on where the initiative lies and on theurgency of the situation. Obviously many compro-mises between the attainment of speed and forceare possible.

The nature of the development of forcesin the western USSR suggests that the peacetimedisposition of Soviet forces is designed to pro-vide a rapid reinforcement by some units, alongwith a broader base for a larger, more time-consuming mobilization. As might be expected,the forces in East Germany and most of the Czecho-slovakian and Polish forces are immediately availa-ble for all cases. In Belorussia the combined armsarmy and the two tank armies appear to be at highreadiness levels though lacking some supporting

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units. The •high activity levels of their divisionsand their generally similar appearance suggestthat they can be moved forward with little mobili-zation. It should be noted, however, that theseunits are considerably smaller than previouslyestimated and that there are only 100,000 to150,000 men in this immediate reinforcement force.

Armies in the Baltic and Carpathian MD'sprobably are generally lower in readiness withapparently greater variance among divisions. Theirpresent structure is better suited to employment inthe later phases of a buildup to permit the moreextensive augmentation necessary to bring themto effective combat levels. Although presentorganization does not suggest such an intent, inan emergency it is possible that some of the moreready divisions and regiments could be regroupedto form one or two armies more quickly. Thiswould delay the availability of additional armieslater in the buildup period.

The forces in the Kiev and Moscow MD'sappear comparable to the Carpathian and Balticdivisions in equipment levels although the Moscowunits are not subordinate to an army and there issome indication that the Kiev units are low inpersonnel. It appears that these units areintended as a reserve.

D. Organization for Combat

The overall organization for combat 'postu-lated here is based on a theater force in theCentral Region of Europe composed of the readyforces in the forward area organized into threefronts (north, central, and south); a reinforce-EeTIE—Torce from Poland and the western USSR; anda reserve.

In Phase I the principal units availablefor immediate reinforcement from the Soviet Unionare the Belorussian armies and the western airbornedivisions.

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Phase II adds to the reinforcement forcetwo of the three armies in Carpathia and the onein the Baltic MD totaling, when fully mobilized,some 100,000 to 150,000 men from the USSR. OnePolish army of four divisions would also becomeready for movement during this period. With theaddition of the remaining army in Carpathia andthe two in the Kiev MD, the force would be enlargedby approximately another 100,000 to 150,000 troops.

The organization for combat of these forcesis postulated as follows:

Phase I

ForwardArea Belorussia Total

Armies Divs Armies Divs Armies Divs

Northern Front 4 17 1 4 5 21Central Front 5 20 2 7 7 27Southern Front 2 9 2 9

Total 11 46 3 11 14 57

At the End of Phase II

Assembled in

AdditionalPhase I

Reinforcement TotalArmies Divs Armies Divs Armies Divs

Northern Front 5 21 2 9 7 30Central Front 7 27 2 7 9 34Southern Front 2 9 3 8 5 17

Total 14 57 7 24 21 81

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The tables omit five airborne divisions,one in Poland and four in the western USSR, thatare also considered available for immediate deploy-ment. It should be noted, however, that thesedivisions are substantially smaller than themotorized rifle and tank divisions included above.

•V. Movement

Reassessment of the movement aspects of rein-forcement must take account of the changed viewof the status of present forces which is emergingfrom current analysis. In addition, new informationwill permit a more detailed evaluation of loadingand transloading facilities. In general, trans-portation does not appear to be a major constrainingfactor in the conduct of a Soviet buildup in theCentral Region.

Rail transportation would probably be theprincipal means of movement used by the forcesinvolved in a buildup in the Central Region.Of the available transportation systems, railoffers the most effective combination of capacity,speed, and control. Previous studies have indicatedthat the Soviet and East European rail systems arecapable of moving about 300 trains per day intoEast Germany and western Czechoslovakia. The samestudies have also suggested that utilization ofroad transport does not materially affect thereinforcement schedule and offers no clear ad-vantage over rail.

Air and sea transportation would probably notbe used appreciably for reinforcement. Sea trans-portation, as well as the oil pipeline system,would probably be used only for logistical problemsrelating to maintenance of forces in the forwardarea.

Further study of the transportation aspect ofthe reinforcement problem is planned.

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VI. Buildup

From the point of view of the Soviets, twomajor considerations probably govern the planningfor a buildup against NATO: timing, and the ratioof opposing forces. The Soviets would probablydevelop reinforcement plans for two basic con-tingencies: one requiring maximum speed to dealwith a sudden or rapidly developing crisis, theother requiring the most advantageous balance offorces which could be achieved prior to the com-mencement of hostilities.

In the first case, where speed is the maincriterion, the force goal would be limited tothose combat-ready units already in the pro-spective theater of operations, plus any readyunits which could be moved quickly to the theaterafter minimal preparation.

In the second case, the force goal woulddepend upon Soviet estimates of the rates atwhich NATO and the Warsaw Pact could accumulatecombat-effective forces in the theater.

The assessment under way suggests that thecurrent status of Soviet ground forces is con-sistent with these concepts. The uniform natureof the forces in the Belorussian MD and theirstrategic location suggest that these units areintended for early commitment. They could bedeployed into the Central Region as part of aWarsaw Pact force of some 60 divisions in aboutthree weeks from the time of decision. Thiswould include a week to ten days of preparation.

Analysis of western USSR forces outside theBelorussian MD is incomplete but, thus far, itsuggests that the divisions in the six Baltic,Carpathian, and Kiev MD armies are so short ofequipment that they could not be made ready forcommitment without substantial mobilization.The analysis is not far enough along to permitan estimate of the precise time required for

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this mobilization but it appears that the processwould be so substantial and complex as to requiremany weeks for its completion.

It is likely that further analysis of theseforces will reveal differences in their levelsof equipment and readiness. For example, it nowappears that the divisions in the Kiev MD may havesubstantially lower manning levels than is thecase in the Baltic and Carpathian MD's. Thesevariations, if confirmed, would imply similarvariations in the Soviet schedule of availabilityof units for reinforcement.

There are, of course, a number of possiblevariations on the two basic contingencies. Givena long-term objective, the Soviets might aim fora gradual increase of the readiness, or even theoverall size, of their peacetime forces, thusincreasing the size of the theater forces theycould build up in the Central Region in a giventime period.

Another option, at least theoretically opento the Soviets, would permit increasing the forcesavailable for early commitment by cannibalization.This would mean a wholesale reorganization of alarge number of partially equipped and mannedunits to produce a smaller number of combat-effective units. This alternative has not beenexamined in detail but it is clear that its!selec-tion by the Soviets would result in their gettinga somewhat enlarged theater force for earlycommitment at the expense of serious degradationof their long-term mobilization capability.

VII. Other Tentative Judgments

A. Design for Nuclear War

Appraisal of the characteristics of theunits studied to date supports the view . thatSoviet emphasis on preparing ground forces fornuclear war has been dominant since the late1950's. There is no evidence that the Soviets

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have changed the organization or equipment oftheir ground forces opposite NATO to produce asubstantial improvement of capabilities for con-ventional war.

B. Slow Introduction of New Equipment

The analysis of Soviet ground forcesperformed to date indicates that the rate ofintroduction of new equipment has been ratherslow. This has been reflected in particularin the types of armored personnel carriersobserved. 25X1

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ANNEX I

Evaluation of Order of Battle and Unit Equipment Levels

An initial evaluation has been made of the orderof battle (0B) of 12 divisions in the BelorussianMD and of ten additional divisions in the Carpathianand Kiev MD's. The equipment levels of each of thesedivisions have also been assessed. The results aresummarized in the accompanying tables.

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ANNEX II

Soviet Ground Force Tables of Equipment

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Equipment levels of the Soviet ground forces areconsiderably lower than had been previously estimated.The greater portion of the reduction is in the supportequipment of both divisional elements and the supportelements of the armies. Actual combat equipment, withthe exception of armored personnel carriers, remainsclose to the level projected in current estimates.Tailoring of TO&Es for specific unit missions mayreduce support equipment, as in the case of engineerponton units.

Specific CIA-DIA findings include a reduction in thenumber of armored personnel carriers assigned to a

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Soviet combat unit. Personnel carriers used forreconnaissance and command functions may includeUAZ-69's, BRDM's, BTR-40's, or other command model APC's.The BTR-152 remains the most frequently observed APCin use by the Soviet Army but is being replaced bythe BTR-60. The BTR-50 tracked APC is believed to be astandard item only in a few forward-area tank divisions.In audition, the estimated number of UAZ-69 utilityvehicles has been reduced by 50 percent from theprevious levels. Considerable TE reduction occursin the number of general purpose cargo trucks, trailers,and POL supply vehicles.

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ADJUSTED TABLE OF EQUIPMENTMotorized Rifle Division

Division Headquarters

Reconnaissance Company

WheeledVehicles

Tracked •Vehicles

52

22 10

Motorized Rifle Regiments (3) 912 to 966 117

Tank Regiment 182 111

Division Artillery Headquarters Battery 16

Artillery Regiment 217

FROG Battalion 48 5

Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion 122

Multiple Rocket Launcher Battalion 58

Antitank Battalion 50 12

Artillery Instrumental ReconnaissanceBattery 22 2

Engineer Battalion 124 44

Signal Battalion 45

Medical Battalion 33

Motor Transport Battalion 279

Maintenance Battalion 63 5

Chemical Defense Company 31

Field Bakery .12

Traffic Control Company 11

Air Flight Support Unit 10

Total 2,309 to 2,363 306

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ADJUSTED TABLE OF EQUIPMENTTank Division

Division Headquarters

WheeledVehicles

TrackedVehicles

52

Reconnaissance Company 22 10

Motorized Rifle Regiment 304 to 322 39

Tank Regiments (3) 546 333

Division Artillery Headquarters Battery 16

Artillery Regiment 167

FROG Battalion 48 5

Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion 122

Multiple Rocket Launcher Battalion 58 12

Artillery Instrumental ReconnaissanceBattery 22 2

Engineer Battalion 124 46

Signal Battalion 45 2

Chemical Defense Company 31

Motor Transport Battalion 307

Medical Battalion 33

Repair and Maintenance Battalion 75 5

• Air Flight Support Unit 10

Traffic Control Company 11

Field Bakery 12

Total 2,005 to 2,023 454

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