JOINT FORCE QUAR TERLY JFQJOINT FORCE QUAR TERLY 4 pi A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL Joint Experimentation Revisiting JV 2010Deployment Doctrine Force Protection ASIA–PACIFIC SECURITY

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J O I N T F O R C E Q U A R T E R L Y

A P R O F E S S I O N A L M I L I T A R Y J O U R N A L

Joint Experimentation

Revisiting JV 2010

Deployment Doctrine

Force Protection

ASIA–PACIFICSECURITY

JFQ

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Cov 2 JFQ / AutumnWinter 1997–98

Joint Vision 2010 provided thefirst overarching joint operationalframework for the services.

—Henry H. Shelton

0217PGS 4/13/98 7:41 PM Page C2

Autumn/Winter 1997–98 / JFQ 1

Thanks to the dedicated efforts of every sol-dier, sailor, marine, and airman, our margin of su-periority over potential foes is arguably greaterthan it has ever been in the past. With a tempothat included more than forty major operationsand JTF deployments, leaders on every level, from

NCOs to our most senior flag officers, ensuredthat we remained focused on the mission and oncombat readiness.

But there is a risk in focusing so intensely onthe present that we do not give enough thought

JFQ

(continued on page 4)

FarewellMessage

our margin of superiority is arguably greater than it has ever been

W hile packing for the final PCS of my 39-year career, I came across some early issues of JFQ. The Autumn1993 issue caught my eye because it appeared on theeve of my tenure as Chairman. The issue opened

with a farewell by my predecessor, General Powell, who made whatwas a striking but perhaps unnoticed observation at the time. Hechallenged us to safely manage force reductions “without losing thehigh quality that has become the hallmark of America’s military.”In retrospect, his comment has characterized the last four years.

0317PGS 4/11/98 1:17 AM Page 1

1 Farewell Messageby John M. Shalikashvili

6 A Word from the NewChairmanby Henry H. Shelton

■ F R O M T H E F I E L D A N D F L E E T

9 Letters to the Editor

■

13 Joint Experimentation—Unlocking the Promise of the Futureby Dan Coats

20 Leaping Ahead to the 21st Centuryby Dennis J. Reimer

25 Grasping 2010 with Naval Forcesby Roger W. Barnett

32 Joint Vision 2010—A MarinePerspectiveby F.G. Hoffman

39 Airpower and the ChangingNature of Warfareby Richard P. Hallion

■ O U T O F J O I N T

47 Joint Vision 2010: A Red Team Assessmentby Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.

■

50 RMAs and the Dimensions of Strategyby Colin S. Gray

■ F O R U M

55 Shaping Our Future in the Asia-Pacificby Joseph W. Prueher

62 Preparing the Army in thePacific for the 21st Centuryby William M. Steele

67 Information Superiority in the Pacific Fleetby Archie R. Clemins

71 Air Component Support to Joint Exercisesby Eugene D. Santarelli

76 Ulchi-Focus Lens ’97: PuttingJV 2010 into Practiceby John H. Tilelli, Jr.

81 Counterdrug Operations in U.S. Pacific Commandby James C. Kraska

86 ANZUS: A View from the Trenchesby Peter Leahy

91 Evaluating Chinese MilitaryProcurement from Russiaby Dennis J. Blasko

■ C O N T E N T S

2 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 1997–98

The cover features military students practicing free fallover Colorado River (43d Communications Squadron/Howard Blair). The front inside cover shows soldierspreparing to land on Husky Drop Zone, Alaska (U.S.Army/Michelle J. Davis); landing craft off Camp Pendle-ton, Kernel Blitz ’97 (Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific/Michael D. Degner); Republic of Korea subma-rine surfacing near USS Kitty Hawk (U.S. Navy/RobertMorales), and aircrew placing “pogo sticks” under U–2(U.S. Air Force/John K. McDowell). The photo on thetable of contents (opposite) captures USS Hornet, USSConstellation, and USS Kiska during Fleet Week ’97,Naval Air Station Alameda (U.S. Navy/Steven G.

Crawford). The back inside cover depicts landing craft pulling into Kuwaiti port(Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific/Jeff Viano). The back cover shows para-troopers loading onto C–141 during JTF Exercise 98-1 (4th Combat CameraSquadron/Bill Kimble), launching F–117A for deployment to Kuwait (U.S. AirForce/Val Gempis), USS Coronado near Waikiki for Fleet Battle Experiment Bravo (U.S. Navy/Ted Banks), and CH–53 lifting off from USS Wasp (U.S. Navy/Daniel S. Stokes).

P H O T O C R E D I T S

JFQ

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Joint Force Quarterly

A U T U M N / W I N T E R 1 9 9 7 – 9 8 / N U M B E R 1 7


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97 Military Innovation andCarrier Aviation—An Analysisby Jan M. van Tol

110 Changing the Mindset—Army Antiterrorism ForceProtectionby Ronald F. Rokosz and Charles H. Hash

118 Going to Tchepone: OPLANEl Pasoby John M. Collins

130 Defending Inlandia: A FlawedDeployment Doctrineby Drew A. Bennett

■ O F C H I E F S A N D C H A I R M E N

135 Earle Gilmore Wheeler

■ T H E J O I N T W O R L D

136 Doctrine and History

■ O F F T H E S H E L F

137 Modernization of the People’sLiberation Army: A BookReviewby Bates Gill

139 Penetrating the HermitKingdom: A Book Reviewby Robert W. Sennewald

140 America’s Long Road toVietnam: A Book Reviewby Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.

142 The New Living Room War: A Book Reviewby Robert B. Oakley

JFQ is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffby the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National De-fense University, to promote understanding of the integratedemployment of land, sea, air, space, and special operationsforces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare,contingency planning, combat operations conducted by theunified commands, and joint force development.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations ex-pressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defenseor any other agency of the Federal Government. Copyrighted

portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extractedwithout permission of copyright proprietors. An acknowledg-ment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever mate-rial is quoted from or based on its contents.

This publication has been approved by the Secretary of De-fense. All previous issues have been published electronicallyand are available over the Internet at the address indicatedbelow. Paid subscriptions to JFQ are offered through the U.S.Government Printing Office.

The editors invite articles and other contributions on jointwarfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and

topics of common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 144for details). Please direct all editorial communications to:

Editor, Joint Force QuarterlyATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62)Fort Lesley J. McNairWashington, D.C. 20319–5066

Telephone: (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220Fax: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219e-mail: [email protected]: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine

Hans BinnendijkDirector

Institute for National Strategic StudiesEditor-in-Chief

Martin J. Peters, Jr.Production Coordinator

Robert A. SilanoDirector of Publications

Institute for National Strategic StudiesEditor

William A. RawleyU.S. Government Printing Office

Art Director

Patrick M. CroninDirector of Research

Institute for National Strategic StudiesConsulting Editor

Calvin B. KelleyCopy Editor

ISSN 1070–0692 February 1998

0317PGS 4/11/98 1:17 AM Page 3

and energy to preparing for dangers looming overthe horizon. Concentrating all our precious re-sources on handling near-term challenges results inthe assumption of significant risk in the longterm—risk that could place our men and women ofthe Armed Forces in greater danger during conflict.

The new challenge is to remain fully capableof overmatching any potential adversary whilechanneling our enthusiasm, innovation, and re-sources into preparations for the future and en-suring that America retains the finest fightingforce in the world.

Positioning ourselves for continued greatnessin the 21st century is a complex proposition thatinvolves far more than purchasing new weaponsystems. There are various dimensions to this sit-uation which require the thoughtful participationof military professionals on all levels. The revolu-tion in military affairs is not just about husband-ing information age technologies, precisionstrike, and stealth. It is every bit as dependent onnew organizational structures, new operationalconcepts, imaginative approaches to old tacticalproblems, and furthering joint teamwork.

The foundation for ensuring the ability toprotect our vital interests into the next century isunder construction. You see it being built day today, brick by brick, in every joint exercise, witheach joint publication, and even in contentiousbut productive interservice debates over opera-tional concepts. You are the architects andbuilders of our future military. As you carry outthis project, remember that you have beencharged with protecting this great Nation, provid-ing for the welfare of its sons and daughters, andpreserving a legacy of millions of veterans whohave gone before.

I am eternally grateful for your exceptionalefforts and selfless dedication in these past fouryears. Good luck in your careers and God blessyou all.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILIChairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(1993–1997)

■ A W O R D F R O M T H E C H A I R M A N


Joint Force Quarterly

GEN Henry H. Shelton, USAPublisher

ADVISORY COMMITTEE

LTG Richard A. Chilcoat, USA ■ National Defense UniversityChairman

BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) ■ Office of the Chairman

VADM Dennis C. Blair, USN ■ The Joint Staff

A. Denis Clift ■ Joint Military Intelligence College

Col K.A. Conry, USMC ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College

MG John S. Cowings, USA ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces

Brig Gen Jerry M. Drennan, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College

BG Joseph R. Inge, USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Maj Gen Timothy A. Kinnan, USAF ■ Air War College

Brig Gen William R. Looney III, USAF ■ Armed Forces Staff College

Col David M. Lumsden, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College

RADM Thomas F. Marfiak, USN ■ National War College

Brig Gen Ralph Pasini, USAF ■ The Joint Staff

MG Robert H. Scales ■ U.S. Army War College

RADM James R. Stark, USN ■ Naval War College

EDITORIAL BOARD

Hans Binnendijk ■ National Defense UniversityChairman

Richard K. Betts ■ Columbia University

Col J. Lee Blank, USAF ■ National War College

Col Paul Blash III, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College

COL William D. Bristow, Jr., USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Eliot A. Cohen ■ The Johns Hopkins University

COL Robert A. Doughty, USA ■ U.S. Military Academy

Aaron L. Friedberg ■ Princeton University

Col Robert J. Garner, USMC ■ Armed Forces Staff College

Alan L. Gropman ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces

CAPT Chester E. Helms, USN ■ Naval War College

Mark H. Jacobsen ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Thomas L. McNaugher ■ The RAND Corporation

William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr. ■ Joint Military Intelligence College

John J. Mearsheimer ■ The University of Chicago

LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) ■ Hudson Institute

Lt Col Robert C. Owen, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College

James H. Toner ■ Air War College

LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) ■ Harvard University

COL Terry J. Young, USA ■ U.S. Army War College

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

(continued from page 1)

General John M. Shalikashvili, USA (Ret.), who served two terms as Chairman, prepared this contribution in September 1997 for publication after his retirement.

0317PGS 4/11/98 1:18 AM Page 4

The President with theChairman, Chiefs, andCINCs in May 1996.

5

0317PGS 4/11/98 1:18 AM Page 5

Operationalizing JV 2010 is relatively simple.It requires a three-step approach which startsslowly and accelerates as funding and variousother pieces fall into place.

The first step will be significant. Perhaps asearly as 1999 a joint headquarters element will beidentified to monitor CINC and service experi-ments, battle labs, and other activities while italso conducts small JV 2010 warfighting experi-ments. Initial experiments must focus on com-mand and control and operational architecture.The next step will require information superiorityexperiments to test concepts and capabilities vis-à-vis the information revolution. The final step willinclude experiments focused on precision engage-ment, dominant maneuver, full dimensional pro-tection, and focused logistics that will culminate


■

in 2004 with Global Challenge. This massive ex-periment will examine all the operational con-cepts in JV 2010 and their synergy in achievingfull spectrum dominance. The year 2004 will bepivotal because it will set the stage for the Qua-drennial Defense Review in 2005 and inform thecentral decisions that will shape the force of 2010.

I envision several options with regard to jointwarfighting experimentation. First, we could use adistributed net, electronically linking many geo-graphically dispersed forces and test ranges. A keytenet of JV 2010 is the ability to mass effects ratherthan forces. Why not apply this notion to joint ex-perimentation and use superior data connectivityto move electrons, not people? Second, we could

AWord fromthe NewChairman

In July 1996, my predecessor signed a seminal document enti-tled Joint Vision 2010. It established a conceptual blueprint fortransforming emerging concepts and technologies into jointoperational capabilities to deter or defeat threats envisioned

for the early 21st century. That vision provided the first overarch-ing joint operational framework for the services and built upontheir core competencies, institutional values, and cultures. In ad-vancing towards the same beacon on the not-so-distant horizon of2010, we have passed several key milestones—with more to come.The next task is to operationalize JV 2010—transforming its con-cepts of joint warfighting into reality.

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S h e l t o n


enlist service and joint battle labs to maximize thebenefit of experimentation activities. Finally, tomake this work, we must assign the responsibilityfor joint warfighting experimentation to a specificperson, perhaps the commander in chief, U.S. At-lantic Command, who already plays a significantrole in joint training and exercises.

Aggressive joint experimentation will be im-portant in properly assessing JV 2010 conceptsand developing capabilities to realize the vision.

We are creating roadmapsto assess its operationalconcepts. This is a team ef-fort involving the entirejoint community and theOffice of the Secretary ofDefense. To ensure we areon the right azimuth, wewill use warfighters withtheir operational savvy to

rigorously examine these capabilities in the mud,salt water, air, and space. This is where we mustrely on your brain power and support. We needsmart operators to provide ideas on jointwarfighting experiments, enlarge the debate, and

continue the dialogue on JV 2010. We also needsupport to assess the vision’s operational capabili-ties during upcoming exercises. I therefore invitethe CINCs, services, and major commands tocomment on efforts to operationalize JV 2010—and ask that they keep the joint communityposted on warfighting experiments and associ-ated exercises through contributions to future is-sues of Joint Force Quarterly.

Joint experimentation will be the true en-gine for exploring concepts contained in JV 2010.It will examine areas where real breakthroughswill be made in warfare between now and 2010,for discovering those leap-aheads is what JV 2010is all about.

Look at the potential breakthrough areas.One operational concept is precision engage-ment. How will the precision engagement of JV2010 differ from the way firepower is employedtoday? We lose the total effectiveness of both pre-cision weapons and many long range weaponsbecause of inefficiencies in space and time.Ground weapons are assigned to subordinatecommanders and there is a delay in bringingthem to bear elsewhere on the battlefield even iftheir range allows. Our 72-hour air tasking order

Embarking Armyguns on Navy LCAC,JTF Exercise 98-1.

26th

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C.D

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I invite the CINCs, services,and major commands tocomment on efforts to operationalize JV 2010

0317PGS 4/11/98 1:18 AM Page 7

process is good for prolonged campaigns but isoften slow in reacting to changes on the battle-field measured in minutes or hours.

If information technology could provide bat-tlefield commanders with a complete picture ofthreats and opportunities on the enemy side, wecould put many weapons on target in seconds orminutes with available in-range firepower. A jointtask force could drastically increase the effects ofits weapons and take advantage of quick open-

ings when instant firepowermakes the difference. Therudiments of this revolu-tionary breakthrough are acommon operational pic-ture shared across the bat-tlespace, management toolsto facilitate decentralizedexecution under centralized

oversight, and new doctrine and training. If wecan make the necessary changes to pull it off, wecan support much faster battle rhythms and at-tack an enemy in a manner which we can onlydream of today. That is what joint experimenta-tion is all about.

We will use simulation, gaming, and field ex-ercises to develop technology and doctrine toachieve breakthroughs and then subject ourselvesto rigid assessment to see if they can be done.Joint experimentation will demand originalthinking: hooking up dissimilar systems, tying to-gether seemingly incompatible hardware andsoftware, and establishing new processes and pro-cedures. No doubt there will be occasional fail-ures, but that doesn’t concern me. Thomas Edi-son conducted 50,000 experiments to develop anew storage battery. Asked if failures frustratedhim, he replied: “What failures? I now know50,000 things that don’t work.” Experimentationmeans the freedom to fail, because it is throughsuch failures that we discover truths which helpthe next experiment. Thus we will ultimately reapthe benefits of a JV 2010-capable force.

We are making plans on a solid foundation.The publication of Concept for Future Joint Opera-tions expanded on JV 2010. We also created asound management process for implementingthat vision. The Joint Staff is leading a collaborat-ing endeavor with the Office of the Secretary ofDefense, CINCs, services, and defense agencies todesign and sponsor joint experiments and otherassessment events unique to JV 2010. We will alsoconduct analysis to determine the implications ofchanges for doctrine, organization, education andtraining, matériel, leadership, and personnel.Such experiments are more than technological in-fusions or demonstrations. They permit the studyof operational concepts, organizational structure,and doctrine as well as emerging technologies.

We must ensure parallel development in each ofthese areas to maximize capabilities for futurejoint commanders to perform complex missions.

Our next product, Joint Vision 2010 Imple-mentation Master Plan, will appear in Summer1998. This document will be a watershed for inte-grating efforts to assess JV 2010 concepts and op-erational capabilities. More importantly, it willprovide assessment roadmaps for the process ofoperationalizing JV 2010 concepts.

However, there is a major challenge to opera-tionalizing the vision: Where will the dollars,people, equipment, and time for joint experimen-tation come from? Both the CINCs and servicesalready have full rucksacks as they work on cur-rent and near-term issues. Experimentation couldbuild on current and planned activities by theCINCs, services, and defense agencies, thougheven leveraging existing experimentation effortsmay not suffice. The report by the National De-fense Panel identified a need for $5-10 billion an-nually for the transformation effort. This moneywould fund initiatives in joint experimentation,information operations, space, and other areas.The report suggests using offsets realized from an-other round of base closures and other efficien-cies, but the task of finding resources in a zero-sum gain environment is problematic. Regardless,aggressive JV 2010 experimentation must proceedbecause it is an investment in our future.

This is a stimulating time for the ArmedForces and the Nation. In less than two years wehave issued a joint vision, expanded it in Conceptfor Future Joint Operations, devised a process to im-plement it, and will soon publish Joint Vision2010 Implementation Master Plan. The excitingpart and perhaps the most challenging milestoneis still ahead: transforming key JV 2010 conceptsinto capabilities through joint experimentationby warfighters in the field and fleet. I look for-ward to your innovative ideas and comments onoperationalizing this vision.

HENRY H. SHELTONChairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff


aggressive JV 2010 experi-mentation must proceedbecause it is an investmentin our future

■ A W O R D F R O M T H E C H A I R M A N

General Henry H. Shelton, USA, assumed his position asthe fourteenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff inOctober 1997.

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Letters . . .


F R O M T H E F I E L D A N D F L E E T ■

FOR THE RECORDTo the Editor—In “War Criminals—Testingthe Limits of the Military Force” which appeared inyour last issue (JFQ, Summer 97), F.M. Lorenzmakes the following statement about the efforts ofthe Malaysian Battalion (MALBAT) in Somalia onOctober 3, 1993:

When U.S. Rangers were under attack . . . theMalaysian force had the only armored vehicles inMogadishu capable of mounting a rescue effort.But they refused to engage pending approval fromKuala Lumpur, and that took more than five hours.

That assertion is not only untrue but is totallyunfounded. Based on our records, the situation thatevening unfolded as follows:

■ On October 3, 1993, at approximately 1645hours, UNOSOM II Headquarters requested MALBATHeadquarters to provide assistance to the U.S. Quick Re-action Force (QRF) to extricate approximately 70 U.S.Rangers and crew members of Cobra helicopters trappedin the vicinity of the Bakara Market.

■ Earlier the Rangers had mounted an operationto arrest Farah Aideed near the Olympic Hotel whereAideed was meeting with his followers. The U.S. troopsmet with stiff resistance. In the ensuing firefight, two Co-bras were shot down and a third sustained damage butmanaged to land safely at New Port. Subsequently, fourrescue attempts by the remaining U.S. Rangers failed tobreak through the rebel defenses and also suffered heavycasualties.

■ The first MALBAT company assembled at NewPort and was ready for final orders at 1755 hours and thesecond company assembled at 1830 hours. They weremounted on 32 APCs. In just about two hours, the twocompanies under the Malaysian commander, Col Latiff,were ready to deploy and “the decision came from himand never from Kuala Lumpur.”

■ After further planning, the task force comman-der decided that the coalition force for the operation wasto comprise two U.S. QRF companies mounted on MALBAT APCs, but with Malaysian drivers, gunners, sig-nallers, vehicle commanders, and officers. There wasalso another company of U.S. Rangers on HUMVEEs and one troop of Pakistani tanks. The coalition force de-parted New Port for Bakara Market at approximately2325 hours. The rescue operation was under the com-mand of LTC William David, USA.

In the operation MALBAT sustained one sol-dier killed and six wounded as well as having twoAPCs destroyed. It was the combined effort by theRangers, MALBAT, and Pakistani troops that re-sulted in success. It must be stressed that thewhole operation from briefing to deployment andexecution was done at night, which is inherentlydifficult and complex. Any delay was largely due to

the force having to appreciate, coordinate, and planwhat was a dangerous rescue operation.

At all stages of the effort MALBAT actedspontaneously under Col Latiff and did not refer toKuala Lumpur. Testimony by MG Thomas M. Mont-gomery, USA, deputy force commander of UNOSOMII, and LTC William C. David, USA, commander of2/14th Infantry, verifies these facts.

The men and women of the MalaysianArmed Forces are a dedicated, disciplined, reli-able, and courageous force. In peacekeepingmissions, through diligent esprit de corps, willing-ness to cooperate, and self sacrifice, they havegained a reputation for trust and prowess. The“Malaysian Tigers” are respected and acceptedwherever they go.

With the highest esteem for JFQ I requestthat you print this letter to correct the record.

—Col Chia Chan Sing, RMAFDefense AttachéEmbassy of Malaysia

RESCUING THE QDRPROCESSTo the Editor—After reading your series of ar-ticles on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) inthe last issue it seems clear the Armed Forces ap-proached the process by seeking to maintain thestatus quo instead of engaging in a real debate onthe best force structure for the future. The reviewprocess must be rescued to make significantchanges in the size and shape of the force. Unfor-tunately, this recent review reveals that many haveforgotten that the military exists to achieve nationalinterests, not to perpetuate service interests. Secre-tary Cohen appears to have been duped by thissubterfuge.

A basic problem arises in the Secretary’s“Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review.” Heindicates that “we have carefully protected thereadiness of our military to carry out its currentlyassigned missions.” Our force structure can’t sus-tain its current operations tempo let alone maintainit with a reduced force structure. Additional forcereductions will place an increased burden on an already over-tasked military, and if they are madein the wrong areas, as the QDR report proposes,

the Armed Forces will be ill prepared to exploit therevolution in military affairs.

Cohen also asserts, “The information revolu-tion is creating a revolution in military affairs thatwill fundamentally change the way U.S. forces fight.We must exploit these and other technologies todominate in battle.” We need a force structure thatwill capitalize on technology. Yet the “Highlights ofthe QDR Decisions” describe a force structure thatemphasizes a stratagem of maintaining largefielded forces in preparation for the force-on-forcebattles of the past. One must ask the Secretary,“Where are we exploiting the revolution in militaryaffairs and how is this force structure going to fun-damentally change the way U.S. forces fight?” Theproposed structure tells Americans that the militaryis simply planning to fight future wars of attritionwith large fielded ground forces.

As “The QDR Process—An Alternative View”by Jim Courter and Alvin Bernstein points out, “TheAir Force will lose a whopping 27,000 active dutypersonnel and get only 339 new F–22s instead of438. In addition, QDR calls for no further productionof the B–2 bomber despite the findings of a deep-attack weapons mix study that additional B–2scould be decisive in halting aggression overseas.”Courter and Bernstein seem surprised that force re-ductions should fall most heavily on the Air Forcegiven its dominant role in the Gulf War, but theyshouldn’t be.

Although allied airpower was decisive in theGulf War and prevented large numbers of casual-ties, the methodology (read: subterfuge) used in theQDR process had to maintain the status quo. Thusthe Army keeps 10 active combat-ready divisionsso the Nation can plan on having large fieldedforces available for a World War II-era force-on-force battle of attrition in the 21st century. That’samazing. Courter and Bernstein are on target instating that “airpower . . . should continue to receivethe highest priority, not only for MRCs but also todiscourage regional aggression by a rogue statebent on dominating its neighbors.” They seem tohave a better understanding of the force structureAmerica needs than our Secretary of Defense andsenior military leaders.

Possibly the National Defense Panel can cutthrough the word salad in the QDR report and pro-vide an honest account to Congress on force structure. Their strategy as described in “NationalSecurity in the 21st Century: The Challenge ofTransformation,” offers hope. Panel membersshould look long and hard at the changing charac-ter of war along with other considerations and de-velop a force structure recommendation based onAmerican security interests, not service interests.

JFQWELCOMES your letters and comments.

FAX your correspondence to (202) 685–4219/DSN 325–4219 or

send it on the Internet to [email protected]

0417PGS 4/11/98 1:40 AM Page 9



The Secretary of Defense must also take ac-tion. First, he must recognize that the services pos-tured themselves for the largest share of the de-fense budget vis-à-vis the QDR process at theexpense of the American taxpayer.

One need only read issues of Military Reviewfrom the 1950s to find arguments that are preva-lent in the Army today—the only way to fight a waris with soldiers on the ground; it takes a tank to killa tank. What if national objectives are not to holdterritory but simply to influence another state?Might not seapower or airpower as employedagainst the attempted coup in the Philippines in1989 be the correct option? Didn’t Desert Stormprove that airpower can kill tanks? Adhering to adoctrine that emphasizes heavy tank divisions is lu-dicrous and misguided.

The Navy vision statement, Force 2001, Vi-sion, Presence, Power, poses a service positioningitself to stay at the current level of 12 carrier battlegroups through FY03 and increase the number ofcruisers from 46 to 76. Is that force based on na-tional interests or the Navy’s? Imagine the savingsif the Navy decreased its force structure by two,three, or four carrier battle groups. America couldreceive a phenomenal windfall, but is that what isbest for national defense?

In the case of the Air Force, one is told itwill have the ability to find, fix, and kill anythingthat moves on the earth’s surface. Does thatmean the Air Force should receive an inordinateshare of the DOD budget? Although such capabil-ities may exist in the future, they won’t be real-ized in the near term and are thus irrelevant forcurrent decisions on force structure. Wouldn’t na-tional interests be better served if the Air Forceengaged in a debate free of service parochialismto determine the optimum force structure?Wouldn’t Air Force interests be furthered if all theservices acted in the same way?

Common sense tells us that in an era ofbudget constraints America can’t afford to fund aforce structure based upon service interests. Vic-tory on the battlefield of tomorrow will only beachieved if we rise to the challenge and work to-gether today to place America’s interests ahead ofservice interests.

Yet history suggests that significant changeswill occur only when they are forced on the ser-vices. The current era of jointness didn’t comeabout because our military leaders introduced a far-reaching reorganization of the defense establish-ment but because Congress visited the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 on the Armed Forces. The keyfigure in making changes should be the Secretaryof Defense.

The QDR process must be conducted everyfour years only after a healthy debate on defense is-sues without any service parochialism. The Secretary

should direct the services to determine a force struc-ture by employing the operational concepts in JV2010 (dominant maneuver, precision engagement,focused logistics, and full-dimension protection) asfocal points of an optimum force structure. Dominantmaneuver and precision engagement may mean thatthe Army must shed part of its structure in favor ofairpower and spacepower. Focused logistics may re-sult in the Army becoming the single DOD managerin the realm of logistics. Full-dimension protectionmay signal that the Navy theater-wide ballistic mis-sile defense sea-based system is the only such sys-tem. Only after honest debate can we determine theright answers.

Recent experience suggests that changemust be forced on the services—it can’t be in-duced from inside the defense establishment. Wemust overcome service parochialism. The QDRprocess needs to be rescued or America will be the loser.

—Lt Col Andrew L. Giacomini, Jr., USAFInstructor, U.S. Army Command

and General Staff College

EMPLOYER SUPPORTTo the Editor—John Tillson’s article entitled“Improving the Management of Reserve Forces” inyour last issue struck me as a particularly thoroughand insightful look at the Reserve Components andtheir effective utilization. It is no longer a matter ofusing or not using the Reserves, but rather whenand how. I can only think of one issue which ispainfully obvious to me as a Reservist that was leftunaddressed—the role of the employer, civilian orgovernment.

The Nation is rewarded by the cost-effective-ness of available military forces. Individuals receivecompensation and have their other personal needsmet. But the employers of this country have to copewith unanticipated departures of Reservists. Somebenefit and recognition should be provided to them.Failure to do so will only exacerbate the currentproblem and could significantly degrade our Re-serve forces.

—LCDR Charles Schminke, USCGRJacksonville, Florida

THE FOG OF RMATo the Editor—I was bemused by the letterfrom James Blaker in your last issue (see “CrashingThrough the Barricades,” JFQ, Summer 97) com-mending “debate, experimentation, and reasoneddiscussion” on the revolution in military affairs(RMA). It stands in stark contrast to his agenda in

Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs: AGuide to America’s 21st Century Defense (Progres-sive Policy Institute, January 1997) which calls fordismembering current force structure and replacingit with his notion of RMA. That proposal would resultin a massive cut in our land forces (the Army by 39percent and Marines by 28 percent), assets that inlight of today’s strategic environment will be neededover the next twenty to thirty years. Such an argu-ment implies that we are beyond the point of experi-mentation and ready to embark on the RMA course.

The real danger in the argument advanced byBlaker and like-minded observers is an almost blindfaith in what RMA is and where it is going. Theproblem with that dogmatic view is that the lessonsof military history teach us that jumping into the fu-ture without first being grounded in the fundamen-tal and unchanging nature of war, which also de-mands an understanding of history, can result inmilitary catastrophe.

The French army and air force; the Britisharmy, Royal Navy, and Royal Air Force; the U.S. AirCorps; and the Italian army, navy, and air forcejumped into the future without reference to the pastwith catastrophic results for both those at the sharpend of the spear and their nations. Pundits haveeven worse records. As we now know, Basil H. Lid-dell Hart, J.F.C. Fuller, Giulio Douhet, and BillyMitchell got almost everything wrong and only ex-traordinary skills with the pen saved the reputationsof Liddell Hart and Fuller from ruin. Militarily, onlythe German army and American experimenters inamphibious and carrier warfare got it partially right.This is not a really good record on which to basethe huge risks that Blaker advocates.

In 1924 airmen in Britain, trumpeting the ar-guments of Lord Trenchard that a few strategicbombers (which, of course, wouldn’t need fighteraircraft) could replace the army and Royal Navy inthe defense of the United Kingdom, said that whilea counterforce strategy “is the method which thelessons of military history seem to recommend . . .the Air Staff are convinced that the former [an allout attack on cities] is the correct one.” Blaker hasintimated that I and my fellow historians are pes-simists. In this respect he is correct: history doesreveal that the search for the magic bullet in theannals of military technical innovations in peace-time has more often than not led to disaster.Progress is only made when military institutions payattention to the past and innovate in careful, mea-sured steps based on real tests and experiments. Alittle history may help Blaker and his fellow zealotsto innovate while remaining in touch with the worldof fog, ambiguity, and friction.

—Williamson MurrayAir and Space MuseumSmithsonian Institution

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F R O M T H E F I E L D A N D F L E E T ■

CALLING OUT THE MILITIATo the Editor—I take issue with the interpre-tation of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution in“Forgotten Mission: Military Support to the Nation”by David L. Grange and Rodney L. Johnson (JFQ,Spring 97), specifically their use of the term Militia.While it is true that the Constitution provides “forcalling forth the Militia to execute the laws of theUnion,” I question if today the term can be appliedto the Department of Defense as the authors seemto assume. Article I, Section 8, stipulates the fourfollowing points:

■ To raise and support Armies■ To provide and maintain a Navy■ To make rules for the Government and Regula-

tion of the land and naval Forces■ To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplin-

ing, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them asmay be employed in the Service of the United States, re-serving to the States respectively the Appointment of theOfficers, and the Authority of training the Militia accordingto the discipline prescribed by Congress.

The first two points refer to the Army andNavy; the third states that the Federal Governmenthas the power to govern and regulate the land andnaval forces, that is, the Army and Navy. It is thefourth point that gives concern. Whereas earlier theauthors use the phrase “land and naval forces”when referring to the Army and Navy, here they in-troduce Militia. If they meant the forces already re-ferred to why didn’t they refer to them in the sameway? Or why did they not earlier use Militia insteadof land and naval forces? I believe this difference isintentional and that they were referring to a thirdmilitary force. Further examination of this section ofthe Constitution and other writing at this time sus-tains this position.

The framers of the Constitution gave the Fed-eral Government power to govern and regulate theArmy and Navy (“land and naval Forces”). There isno reason under the fourth point to again give theFederal Government the power “for governing suchPart of them as may be employed in the Service ofthe United States.” That power was alreadygranted—unless they meant to signify that the Mili-tia differs from those forces mentioned earlier. Itshould also be noted that this phrase specificallyrefers to governing only that part “in the Service ofthe United States,” which implies that some othergovernmental body governs the rest.

The fourth quote also gives the States certainpowers over the Militia. The first is the power to ap-point the officers in the Militia, clearly different fromthe current practice in which the officers in theArmed Forces are appointed by the President. Thesecond is the authority for training the Militia “ac-cording to the discipline prescribed by Congress”

which enables the Federal Government to provide auniform set of standards for training.

This view of the Militia as a separate forcefrom the Army and Navy is further substantiated byArticle II, Section 2 of the Constitution which statesthat “The President shall be Commander in Chief ofthe Army and Navy of the United States, and of theMilitia of the several states, when called into theactual Service of the United States.” If the termMilitia referred to the Army and Navy there wouldbe no reason to separately call it out. In addition,this phrase points out that the Army and Navy areentities of the Federal Government, and the Militiabelongs to the States.

What was the Militia when the Constitutionwas being drafted? In 1781 Thomas Jeffersonwrote that the Militia of Virginia consisted of “Everyable-bodied freeman, between the ages of 16 and50.” He also noted that “The law requires everymilitia-man to provide himself with the arms usualin the regular service.” Further amplification ofwhat was meant by the fourth point is found in Fed-eralist Paper No. 29 by Alexander Hamilton thatcites the same section of the Constitution as in thefourth point above. Hamilton then argued that thereason for the Militia is to reduce the necessity ofmaintaining a large standing army. He furtherstated that the Militia consists of the people at largeand underscored that “it will be possible to have anexcellent body of well-trained militia ready to takethe field whenever the defense of the State shall re-quire it. This will not only lessen the call for militaryestablishments, but if circumstances should at anytime oblige the government to form an army of anymagnitude that army can never be formidable tothe liberties of the people while there is a largebody of citizens, little if at all inferior to them in dis-cipline and the use of arms.” James Madison, inFederalist Paper No. 45, wrote that the Militia isclearly so much larger than any military force withinthe realm of possibility that the advantage is clearlywith the States.

On control of the Militia, Hamilton asserted inFederalist Paper No. 29 that “the particular Statesare to have the sole and exclusive appointment ofthe officers,” thereby reiterating Article I, Section 8,which reserves “to the States respectively the Ap-pointment of the Officers.”

Thus the Militia as referred to in the Constitu-tion is not the Army or Navy or any other part ofDOD—despite current opinion to the contrary. Itshould also be pointed out that in the article byGrange and Johnson the quote of Article IV, Section4 of the Constitution omits a key part of the phrasewhich changes the meaning of the quote. This ex-cluded section states “and on Application of the

Legislature, or the Executive (when the Legislaturecannot be convened) against domestic violence.” Areading of the full article makes it clear that theword “legislature” refers to the state, not the Fed-eral, legislature which is consistently referred to asCongress. Therefore the Federal Government can-not send in military support until the State has re-quested it.

A footnote: Grange and Johnson cite theShays Debtor Rebellion in 1786 as an example ofthe “role of the Armed Forces in crises,” thus imply-ing that Federal forces suppressed the rebels. InJanuary 1784 the American military establishmentconsisted of one regiment of 527 infantrymen andone battery with 183 artillerymen. In June 1784under the Articles of Confederation Congress dis-banded the Army because it was “inconsistent withthe principles of republican government” in time ofpeace. All that remained were 80 artillerymenguarding stores at West Point, New York, and FortPitt, Pennsylvania. Until 1789 the Army had no in-fantry forces. In August 1786 Captain Daniel Shays,a veteran of the Revolutionary War, led a mob offarmers against the courthouse at Northampton,Massachusetts, to protest that former soldiers whocould not pay their debts were having farms for-feited and were being sentenced to prison or con-demned to involuntary servitude. In January 1787Shays led some 1,200 rebels to Springfield wherethey confronted 600 militiamen defending a localarsenal. The Militia, having the advantage of ar-tillery, routed the Shaysites who were pursued by anewly arrived force of Massachusetts Militia whocrushed the rebellion in late February. On Septem-ber 17, 1787, the Constitution was signed and onAugust 7, 1789 the War Department was created.The Army was formed on September 29, 1789 andconsisted of 846 men.

—CDR James M. Winterroth, USNRCarson, California

POLITICAL OBJECTIVESTo the Editor—“Keeping the Strategic Flame”by Carl Builder (JFQ, Winter 96–97) should bemandatory reading for every leader or soldier whomust operate in the strategic arena. The future via-bility of the Armed Forces lies in understanding thepolitical context of everything in which they becomeinvolved. All military activities, even training exer-cises, have political purposes that are, or shouldbe, their primary purposes. If this is clearly under-stood, the Armed Forces will be able to significantlyincrease U.S. influence—whether that meanscausing someone to do something or not to dosomething. This is another way of formulating thefamiliar Clausewitzian adage that war is a continua-tion of politics by other means. Adopting this way ofthinking will also rekindle the strategic flame that

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Builder says is almost out or is at least in hidingamong the American military.

Understanding the criticality of political ends(Builder’s strategic interests) is vital for both sol-diers and politicians. The latter must understandthe need for explicit political guidance for the threedays of war—the day before, the day of, and theday after. If this occurs, and the military respondsquickly and appropriately, war will be deterred orfought for the desired outcome. Either outcome canbe considered a victory since the conflict will termi-nate when political goals have been achieved. (AsBuilder properly indicates, this is not necessarilydestruction of an enemy: “military power can some-times be brought to bear when it is applied withoutfirst defeating defending enemy forces.” Sun Tzu’snotion that it is better to defeat an enemy’s strategythan its army is one clear example of this point.)

Politically savvy officers are needed to helppoliticians develop clear political objectives that canbe translated into military objectives. These politicalmilitary operatives should be trained and attuned to function at the intersection of the political and

military—that gray area where the strategist is im-portant. The Army used to have a program for this purpose—the Army Strategist’s Program. Unfortu-nately, it has languished. Bernard Brodie, a notedstrategist of the nuclear era, argued that strategywas too important to be left to military profession-als. He said “we need people who will challenge, in-vestigate, and dissect the prevailing dogmas” offoreign and defense policy. Students of strategymust know the “inevitable limitations and imperfec-tions of scientific method in strategic analysis anddecisionmaking,” particularly shortcomings of prac-titioners “whose greatest limitation is that theysometimes fail to observe true scientific discipline.”

It must be understood that the “most basicissues of strategy often do not lend themselves toscientific analysis . . . because they are laden withvalue judgments and therefore tend to escape anykind of disciplined thought”; and last but not least,the Clausewitzian admonition on the “need to stressthe superior importance of the political side ofstrategy to the simply technical and technological

side” is particularly relevant to nuclear deterrencein the post-Cold War period.

Builder gets to the heart of this dilemma:“The burden of strategic thinkers is to explore be-forehand what may be worth doing and why.” Themilitary should break out of its fixation on planning,programming, and budgeting and its computer-ori-ented mindset and develop a feel for the political bydoing just what Brodie advised. Failure to do sobegs for a repeat of the problems encountered inVietnam and Somalia. Revitalizing and rekindlingthe strategic flame could start at the war collegeswith the formation of a specialized strategist’strack. This would provide skilled practitioners ofstrategy as espoused by Brodie. In time, they couldbe the mentors of a generation of strategists. Suchefforts are necessary to answer Builder’s call torekindle the strategic flame.

—COL Bruce B.G. Clarke, USA (Ret.)Topeka, Kansas

Look for JFQ on the Joint Doctrine Web Sitehttp://www.dtic.mil/doctrineFor more information about the Joint Doctrine WebSite, contact the Joint Doctrine Division, OperationalPlans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), at (703) 614–6469 / DSN 224–6469.

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W hile everyone agrees that the ColdWar has ended, we have yet toachieve a consensus on futuremilitary capabilities and the de-

fense policies needed to realize them. The Qua-drennial Defense Review (QDR) concluded thatwe should pursue a balanced force structure inthe near term but did not set priorities for devel-oping new capabilities. While there is a templatein Joint Vision 2010 to guide this quest it hasfailed thus far to effectively focus developmentefforts since it is regarded as being all things to allpeople. Consequently, those of us on Capitol Hillare presented with a range of competing ap-proaches to future warfare. Some advocate preci-sion strike by airpower and others argue for deci-sive landpower while still others favor rapiddominance that destroys an enemy’s will to resist.The list goes on and on. The problem is that eachapproach requires a radically different investmentpolicy, organizational structure, and doctrine.How can Congress determine which of these vari-ous approaches is best suited for the battlefield ofthe next century?

Defense planning guidance soon will appearfor the preparation of programs which extend all

the way to 2005. Yet it willbe drafted without benefitof an overarching jointprocess to prepare theArmed Forces for the future.

I doubt this guidance will accelerate or terminateprograms in order to prioritize the developmentof warfighting capabilities. Without a coherentprocess on which to base such critical decisions,the Pentagon is likely to default in favor of bu-reaucratic processes which stifle change. Giventhis situation many observers claim that we are

sustaining a Cold War defense establishmentwhich is partly a military anachronism and partlya domestic jobs program.

In a farewell speech before the National PressClub, General John Shalikashvili stated that “ourNation has never been more secure” and that thedelta between U.S. defense capabilities and thoseof any other nation is greater today than at anytime during his career. However, the challengelies in evolving joint warfighting capabilities tomaintain that delta under future Chairmen. Thismay be the most pressing national security chal-lenge Congress faces today.

The real issue, then, involves developing ameans to determine how much of what isenough by when in order to achieve the objec-tive of full spectrum dominance in the 21st cen-tury. While implanting information technologyin extant organizations and operational conceptsis important, I believe that only by integratingsuch technology with changes in organizationand doctrine, based on truly joint concepts, canour capabilities be maximized. It was this type ofintegration that made Blitzkrieg and carrier avia-tion revolutionary—new technology used in newways with new force structures.

During the 1930s, combat aircraft, tanks, andradio communications were available in bothFrance and Germany. But through the efforts ofvon Seekt and Guderian, the Germans leveragedthem with new organizations and doctrine to de-velop more effective warfighting capabilities. Thusthe development of Blitzkrieg offers insight intocreating change. Today we have a different set ofinnovations—Internet data transfer, stealth, preci-sion munitions, space-based communications,and others. The true advances in operational con-cepts enabled by this technology are likely to bejoint and may not be fully appreciated as yet.Consequently, the transformation from post-ColdWar to information age capabilities cannot be rel-egated to decentralized service prerogatives.

The Honorable Dan Coats represents the State of Indiana in the U.S. Senate and chairs the AirLand Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee.

Experimentation—Unlocking the Promiseof the FutureBy D A N C O A T S

Join

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true advances in operationalconcepts are likely to be joint

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Rather, it is a joint challenge to be resolved withjoint processes that drive decisionmaking. Perhapsit is time to establish a joint force specificallycharged to experiment with employing new tech-nologies, in new ways, under new organizationalstructures as a means of finding those genuineleaps ahead in warfighting capabilities.

The Congress is also confronted with a strik-ing dichotomy of views on the scope, pace, andapproach to this military transformation. Secre-tary of Defense William Cohen testified that wecannot transform our military without base clos-ings and defense infrastructure reform, while thenew Chairman, General Hugh Shelton, advocatesan incremental crawl-walk-run approach thattakes until 2004 to produce capstone joint experi-ments. On the other hand, the National DefensePanel (NDP) vigorously argued that challenges inthe early 21st century may place this Nation’s se-curity at far greater risk than we face today. Cor-respondingly, they recommend fundamentalchange by creating a Joint Forces Command withthe mission, forces, and resources needed to drivethis transformation through joint experimenta-tion. The NDP report indicated that the need andtiming for establishing this transformationprocess is “absolutely critical” and “urgent.”

The United States has been unprepared atthe outset of wars in its past. Our Nation ralliedto eventually overcome these threats, but at acost—not only in fiscal terms, but in lives. In thevery near future, technology will enable a differ-ent range of threats we must be prepared for.There is no more pressing issue than the steward-ship of our military capabilities to meet the na-tional security requirements of the next century.

This article offers a congressional perspectiveon this joint challenge that introduces factors todrive development of warfighting capabilities,discusses uncertainties associated with competingoperational approaches, and provides ideas onthe process of joint experimentation.

Development FactorsFuture military capabilities should be

shaped by three factors: an assessment of the en-emies we are likely to face; the technology thatwill enable us to employ military force in new,more effective ways; and the fiscal resources weinvest for national defense.

The QDR report concluded that the worldwill remain a dangerous place with a full spec-trum of uncertainties and evolving threats includ-ing weapons of mass destruction, information op-erations, and an array of asymmetric means toexploit our operational vulnerabilities. Many ofthese threats will be enabled by commercial-off-the-shelf technologies even more advanced thanthose fielded by our forces. Future capabilitiesmust be developed to address these probablethreats to U.S. interests in the 21st century. Buthow should we sort through all the differentopinions to determine which threats matter?Clearly we need an overarching process to priori-tize which threats must be addressed first, whichcan wait, and which do need not to be addressedat all. Notwithstanding these threats, many arguethat we may be in the midst of a strategic pausesince there is no regional or global peer competi-tor on the horizon. This pause does not implythat the Armed Forces are not busy, but ratherthat America has a historic opportunity to mili-tarily prepare now for an uncertain future.

A second component driving development offuture capabilities is the promise of advancedtechnology—things that are achievable by virtueof technological enhancements. Technology al-ready provides significant advances in collectinginformation, processing it to gain situationalawareness, communicating this awarenessthroughout our joint force, and responding withprecise, accurate, and effective combat power.Thus we have the potential to increasingly coordi-nate activities across widely dispersed forces oper-ating at higher speeds and tempos over greaterdistances. Advances in technology drive competi-tion among capabilities that shape our vision offuture warfare, including anti-access capabilitiesversus force projection, information operationsversus precision strike, and missiles versus activedefense. But how should we assess the outcome ofthese and other choices to highlight which tech-nological opportunities will provide leap-aheadcapabilities?

■ J O I N T E X P E R I M E N T A T I O N


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Yet we cannot address each and every threat.And we cannot have all the potential technologysince the development of future capabilities islimited by a third factor—fiscal resources avail-able for defense. The budget resolution concludedlast summer provides about $260 billion annuallyin real terms through 2003. The QDR report indi-cated that this level of funding is adequate toreach the defense procurement goal of approxi-mately $60 billion annually, but only as long asinfrastructure, manpower, and operational re-forms are undertaken. Thus far Congress hasfailed to support more base closings, depot re-form, and other efficiencies. Consequently pro-curement will likely languish in the $50 billionrange, virtually ensuring that all the major sys-tems currently proposed by the services cannotbe procured. Yet given this environment, whatwill drive the cross-service trade-offs to prioritizeinvestments in those areas that will make a differ-ence on the next century’s battlefields?

The threat and technological and fiscal fac-tors can be addressed by an array of evolvingwarfighting paradigms. But how do we determinewhich paradigm provides the utmost in en-hanced capabilities? No briefing on the value ofpaper systems and computer simulations will everanswer this question. I would suggest we aug-ment the efforts of think tanks, white papers, andslide transparencies with something real: aprocess of joint experimentation using real jointforces, with real systems, exercising force-on-force

in a real joint battlespace to determine what goesfirst, what must wait, and what gets terminatedin developing our future capabilities.

Competing ParadigmsUnfortunately, we are not on a course to-

ward making these decisions. The QDR processaddressed only separate service experimentationinitiatives such as Force XXI in the Army, the net-work-centric warfare concept in the Navy, SeaDragon in the Marine Corps, and Air Force battlelabs. In large part these initiatives are not jointor experimental. Yet despite the publication ofConcept for Future Joint Operations, there is littlemeaningful discourse on a joint process that iseither in place or on the drawing board to drivethe implementation of Joint Vision 2010.

Without such a joint focus we will face oper-ational approaches which are uncomplementarysubstitutes and which need radically different in-vestment strategies. But the reality of budget con-straints is that we cannot afford to pursue everyinvestment strategy. Moreover, we have little ifany fiscal maneuvering room for error in select-ing which systems and capabilities to pursue. AsChairman of the AirLand Subcommittee, let meintroduce two diametrically opposed visions—air-power versus landpower—which members ofCongress need help to sort out.

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Airpower. Some observers advocate relying onair and space capabilities to control a potentialenemy through situational awareness, globalreach, and precision strike. They argue that wecan contain massive land assaults with bombers,tactical aviation, and missiles while reducingenemy strength so profoundly that large groundcounteroffensives will never be required. This ap-proach has major implications: increased airpowerinvestment, downsized land forces, and new jointconcepts through which land forces support deci-sive air operations by herding targets, securing thefront, and mopping up the battlefield.

However, there is no consensus even amongardent airpower advocates on this approach. Cur-rent DOD efforts appear to emphasize short-rangetactical fighters over bombers and missiles. Othersadvocate increases in stealthy long-range bomberssince their global response capability can support

the halt of armored forces andswing between two major theaterwars while requiring no forwardbasing. Still others argue that thecombination of long-rangebombers and naval carrier groupswill have increasing value as com-

plementary deterrent and warfighting assets andthat the role of land-based fighters will diminishbecause of their reliance on access to in-theaterbasing and its associated vulnerability to forceprotection threats.

But critics doubt that airpower can do thejob. Can it decisively engage the broad range oftargets we may face? They argue that airpower hasnever been decisive despite great success in theGulf War. They claim that employing it effectivelyin the open deserts of Southwest Asia may be farmore basic than “containing” disjointed infiltrat-ing forces on the Korean peninsula or in Bosnia.

And we must remember that even during themost favorable conditions of Desert Storm wecould not destroy Iraqi Scuds. If an enemy massesits formations deep in the battlespace and segre-gates them from its populace, airpower may workwonders. However, an enemy is likely to disperseits forces to put fewer platforms in the submuni-tion footprint of our precision weapons. This tac-tic can exhaust our inventory of preferred muni-tions or expend them at uneconomical rates.

Furthermore, an enemy may mix combat-ants and noncombatants within the effective ra-dius of our weapons and put the United States ina position of inflicting unacceptable collateraldamage. Through 2010 our integrated jointC4ISR process may still be unable to definitivelydistinguish between friend, foe, noncombatant,and decoy partly because our sensors will con-tinue to generate information faster than we canfuse and analyze it. Consequently, the fog of warwill persist. And it cannot be effectively pene-trated from above by fixed-wing platforms travel-ing at great speed. Therefore, our lack of assuredbattlespace awareness may continue to frustrateour ability to employ airpower to destroy any-thing other than fixed sites which an enemywould probably know was to be attacked.

Therefore, we must jointly experiment to de-termine whether our intelligence system, whencoupled with our targeting and mission planningprocesses, is robust and reliable enough to supportthis airpower approach. If it can, then perhaps weshould pursue more bombers and expeditiouslyreassess the over $300 billion we plan to spend ontactical fighters or landpower enhancements. Butif it cannot, then we may never be able to differ-entiate let alone employ airpower to engage mov-ing targets. Airpower thus cannot be decisive andwe should emphasize investments in landpower.

Landpower. On the other hand, landpowerproponents point to experiences in Desert Stormand Joint Endeavor and argue that on-the-groundstaying power, either real or perceived, is neededto compel an enemy to accede to our strategic ob-jectives. They envision employing ground forcesto conduct dominant maneuver as a means ofgaining a positional advantage which enables theuse of decisive force in attacking enemy centersof gravity. This compels an enemy to either reactfrom an untenable position or surrender.

Like airpower advocates, landpower propo-nents pursue several organizational approaches.The Force XXI initiative retains heavy divisions ofover 15,000 soldiers. Others argue the Armyshould be reorganized into smaller, faster, moredeployable, and more lethal units. They propose



the fog of war cannot beeffectively penetratedby fixed-wing platforms

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separable, information-enabled, high technologycombat groupings of 5,000 soldiers. Still others areconsidering combat teams that can call upon anenhanced array of joint fires. This decision overground warfighting organization is not solely anArmy or Marine decision. Rather, it is a matter ofjointly organizing landpower with air and sea-power to achieve full spectrum dominance.

But critics question whether landpower canachieve positional advantage. Why are we confi-dent that land forces will be assured access to for-ward regions when adversaries are likely to em-ploy cruise missiles, deep-water mines, and otheranti-access means to disrupt strategic deploy-ments? In the future we are unlikely to have sixmonths to build up our land forces as we did dur-ing Desert Shield. And even if we gain access to aregion, could we deploy heavy, logistics-intensiveArmy divisions fast enough to be viable on to-morrow’s battlefield? Moreover, once in theater,would such forces and associated immobile sup-port and command centers be able to conducthigh speed, high tempo operations to lessen vul-nerability to precision strike, information opera-tions, and other asymmetric threats? If not, thenperhaps we should pursue new, smaller organiza-tions such as combat groups to enhance deploya-bility, agility, and survivability.

Landpower skeptics criticize this approachsince it may constrain the potential effectivenessof airpower. Why should we hold back airpowercapabilities for weeks or months while buildingup heavy ground forces for a decisive counterof-fensive that may not be necessary? Again I wouldsuggest that we must jointly experiment to deter-mine whether landpower can overcome chal-lenges in strategic deployment, operational mo-bility, and full dimensional protection. If it can,then we should rapidly increase Army and Ma-rine Corps budgets to recapitalize antiquatedground systems. But if it cannot, then dominantmaneuver will remain an illusion and we shouldinvest in airpower.

Both the airpower and landpower ap-proaches raise several key questions. And eachimplies significant shifts in defense investment.Yet the reality is that we simply cannot affordboth approaches by 2010. So the issue is whethertechnological benefits, when coupled withchanges in force structure and doctrine, decisivelyenhance either of these paradigms or require usto examine a completely different approach. Wemust realize that insights from service initiativescannot be the only basis for addressing this issuesince they are focused on different problems anduse different scenarios, threats, conditions, andenablers. So how do we sort through their con-flicting conclusions? More fundamentally, howdo we determine which even addresses the rightset of problems? Only a coherent process of jointexperimentation will provide policymakers andsenior officers with the insights to address thisissue. Without it, the Air Force will argue for in-creased investment at the expense of Army andNavy programs and vice versa. This is not therecipe for implementing Joint Vision 2010.

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Experimentation ProcessIf we do not put an overarching process in

place very soon, we will fail to motivate thetough decisions necessary to accelerate procure-ment in systems that are really needed and can-cel or stretch ones that are not in order to realizethe joint vision. I believe a joint experimentationprocess can serve as the basis for investment deci-sions both in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill.At a minimum, this process should incorporateorganizations, facilities, resources, and commonterminology.

First we need a viable organization for jointexperimentation with someone clearly in chargeand with the authority to make changes. Whilethis could be the commander in chief of U.S. At-

lantic Command, the process of devel-oping future capabilities is momen-tous enough to consider designating anew CINC, with responsibility forjoint experimentation, training, and

doctrine, such as the “Joint Forces Command”recommended by the National Defense Panel.Various organizations may work as long as theyensure the habitual association of forces from allthe services which are focused, equipped, and re-sourced for experimentation. The force must beequipped with advanced technology in a waythat is both jointly synchronized and fenced.Moreover, this experimentation force must pos-sess or have ready access to all operational andtactical joint enablers which might be used in abattlespace, such as intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance (ISR), C4, logistics, and force pro-tection. Some have proposed a standing JTF withrotational lead among the services. This approachmay work if each service pays attention to itwhen not in charge. But, for example, would theArmy heed the conclusion of an Air Force-led JTFthat divisions should be reorganized into smallercombat elements? Accordingly, some advocate alarger vanguard force that incorporates three-star-level organizations from every service—an Armycorps, numbered Navy fleet, Marine expedi-tionary force, and numbered Air Force. Thesevanguard commanders could undertake a seriesof experimentation initiatives at varied echelonsand establish JTFs from their assets for exercises.Either approach might work given the firm com-mitment and leadership of the Secretary of De-fense and Joint Chiefs.

Second, we should instrument and electroni-cally link a complex of service training sites toprovide a joint facility for experimentation whichcould employ the suite of joint operational andtactical C4ISR, logistics, and other enablers to pro-duce valid conditions for field experimentation.

This would offer the capability, for example, todetermine whether dominant battlespace aware-ness can be actually achieved. Furthermore, thiscomplex would form the basis for joint force-on-force experimentation to investigate enemy reac-tions to new paradigms of warfighting by under-standing our operational vulnerabilities. Forinstance, how would an Air Force-led JTF attackForce XXI? It is through such exercises and the re-sulting knowledge that we can develop the meansto avoid, mitigate, and counter enemy reaction toadvanced capabilities. In short, this netted under-pinning could enable the Joint Chiefs to obtainthe kind of data necessary to assess capabilities,address vulnerabilities, and unlock the futurepromise of technology.

Third, the joint experimentation processmust be adequately resourced. Funding should befenced by DOD and not reallocated to pay billsduring the budget review. In this vein, I agreewith the NDP recommendation that a major forceprogram be established to fiscally support theCINC with the mission of joint experimentation,such as that provided to U.S. Special OperationsCommand. These funds should not only providefor operations and support, but also serve as a re-serve to quickly integrate or develop system en-hancements based on experimentation insights.For example, this reserve could be invested indoubling the bandwidth of a battalion comman-der’s Abrams tank if experimentation demon-strated the need for such a capability. Such initia-tives cannot be postponed until the next DODbudget cycle. They must be pursued right thenand there.

Fourth, we need a consistent joint languageto specify capabilities as the foundation for jointexperimentation. Today we have no commonway to articulate what the Armed Forces are andare not capable of doing. This list of capabilitiesshould then drive a standard set of tasks. And it isthe end-to-end operational architecture for per-forming these tasks that we should investigatethrough joint experimentation. For example,what is the best way to conduct attack operationsfor theater missile defense in terms of sensors,command and control, and weapons?

One further point: joint training is not joint ex-perimentation. While current exercises provide uni-fied commands with superb opportunities to en-hance readiness today, they do not investigate thepotential for tomorrow’s revolution in military af-fairs. We need training and experimentation to re-alize the shape-respond-prepare strategy outlinedin the QDR report. It is the purpose of joint experi-mentation to validate those capabilities that are ontrack, find those that provide leaps ahead, and de-termine those that are failures. It is essentially aprocess of identifying winners and losers across



joint training is notjoint experimentation

C–17A taking off.U.S. Air Force (Paul R. Caron)

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C o a t s


platforms, systems, and operational concepts. Andwe must be committed to accelerating winners andterminating losers. Some will consider the cost ofthese failures wasteful. But to the contrary, identi-fying failure is successful experimentation. Truefailure would mean continuing to invest in sys-tems before knowing what will or will not work onthe battlefield of the next century.

Simply put, the jointconstruct for experiment-ing with technologies,operational concepts,and force structures todiscover true advances inwarfighting capabilities ispoorly acknowledgedand resourced. How arewe determining thetransformation strategythat bridges our forcesfrom current capabilitiesto a revolution in mili-tary affairs? The Secretaryand Chairman must pro-vide guidance and leader-ship to develop a processthat breaks down bureau-cratic barriers and ex-plores ways to achievefull spectrum dominance.The joint experimenta-tion construct presentedhere can identify tech-nologies, systems, and or-ganizational changes thatshould be accelerated,and perhaps more impor-tantly, those that shouldbe divested. The latterwill provide fiscal fuel ina flat defense budget toaccelerate the develop-ment and fielding of ad-vanced technologies.

Establishing this experimentation processwill be difficult since the services jealously guarddwindling force structures, systems, and plat-forms. But we cannot let experiments take a backseat to service initiatives on future capabilities.We may find the key to future capabilities is notonly in tanks, ships, and aircraft they advocate,but in communications, intelligence, and otherenablers. If so, we need a joint process to tell uswhich programs should be slowed or terminated,as well as the joint courage to shift budgets to ac-celerate genuine advances in warfighting. The ul-timate test of jointness may be that the serviceswill lose discretion over major investment deci-sions. But without such jointness each service

may partially implement its stovepiped solutionand thus deny us a coherent joint operationalconcept for the future.

This is not meant to discourage interservicecompetition. Rather, we should foster it within aframework of joint experimentation that answerssome of the troublesome questions posed here.For example, the issue of whether airpower canbe decisive in the containment phase of a conflictis so critical that it cannot be resolved throughinterservice bickering over the results of simula-tions. We need to jointly demonstrate whetherthis concept is viable since it will help us deter-mine where, when, and how our limited defenseresources should be invested.

Congress has taken a first step, though ad-mittedly small, in highlighting this debate on thedevelopment of new capabilities. The SenateArmed Services Committee directed in the Reporton the National Defense Authorization Act for FiscalYear 1998 that the Secretary, in consultation withthe Chairman, review service experimentation ef-forts and submit an experimentation plan aimedat rapidly conceptualizing and developing forcesand operational concepts that will be neededthrough the 2010 time frame (five specific provi-sions are shown in the accompanying list).

Our second step will be to consider legisla-tion in the defense authorization for fiscal year1999 based on the Secretary’s joint experimenta-tion plan and the recommendation of the Na-tional Defense Panel.

In closing I am struck by the words of Gen-eral Malin Craig who, as Chief of Staff of the U.S.Army in 1939, reflected on the lost opportunityof the interwar period:

What transpires on prospective battlefields is in-fluenced vitally years before in the councils of thestaff and in the legislative halls of Congress. Time isthe only thing that may be irrevocably lost, and it isthe first thing lost sight of in the seductive false secu-rity of peaceful times. . . .

We too may live in such times. Yet we mustaccept that the fate of democracy may be in ourhands. We need courage to push through this falsesecurity and prepare for the future. We must notsquander this strategic opportunity to develop newcapabilities that can shape the 21st century. JFQ

This article is a revised and updated version of a presen-tation made at a conference on “Preparing Now—Alter-native Paths to Military Capabilities for an Uncertain Fu-ture” sponsored by the Institute for Foreign PolicyAnalysis in Washington on October 2, 1997.

Joint Experimentation Plan

The report should be submittedby March 30, 1998 and addressthe following:

1. How the fielding of advanced tech-nologies is being synchronizedacross the military services to en-able the development of new oper-ational concepts.

2. How command, control, communi-cations, and computer (C4) and in-telligence, surveillance, and recon-naissance (ISR) capabilities arebeing integrated jointly to achieveinformation superiority.

3. How service experimentation isbeing linked with the joint experi-mentation plan designed to imple-ment the Joint Vision 2010 opera-tional capabilities.

4. How vulnerability assessments ofnew technologies are being con-ducted.

5. Whether an experimentation JointTask Force should be established.

—Report on the National Defense Authorization Actfor Fiscal Year 1998

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The strategy advanced in the recentQuadrennial Defense Review (QDR) re-flects the world as it is, not as we maywish it was. Its strategy is captured by

the terms shape-respond-prepare. First, it recognizesthat we have a unique chance to shape the inter-national environment. Second, we must have theability to respond to a full spectrum of criseswherever national security interests are at riskaround the world. Last, we must prepare for thefuture. This may be the most difficult part of thestrategy because it calls for discipline and courageto manage risk, balancing the needs of todayagainst the requirements of tomorrow.

While shaping and responding to a changingworld we must prepare joint forces to conducttraditional and new missions with innovativemeans. To anticipate the future we must overlook

the constraints imposed today on technology andmilitary capabilities and focus on 2020. Manag-ing risks, making investments, and looking for-ward are keys to retaining the initiative.

Our analysis of the future also indicates thatthe United States needs a capability identified asstrategic preemption, either preventing or halting acrisis before it gets out of control. This will in-volve speed and agility to analyze contingenciesand the capability to respond with coherent andeffective joint forces. The competence needed todeal with such challenges must be matched bythe physical and mental agility of forces that canreact anywhere in the world and conduct a fullrange of military operations in combination withother government agencies and allies.

The Pentagon has accepted that diminishingmanpower and resources will further drive the re-quirement for joint organizations in the future.These constrained resources, the greater need forjointness, and a credible strategy bring us to a

General Dennis J. Reimer, USA, is the thirty-thirdChief of Staff, U.S. Army.

Leaping Ahead

to the 21st CenturyBy D E N N I S J. R E I M E R

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Joint Experimentation and Integration

Naval Weapons Center,China Lake Nellis Air Force Base

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strategic crossroads. Should we stay on a ColdWar glide path or exploit the strategic window ofopportunity to leap into the next century?

Creep or Leap?Joint forces must be designed from the

ground up as a total package to meet the diverseand robust requirements of the future. This de-mands a complete integration of joint doctrine,training, deployment, and equipment. Theseforces must be smaller, more mobile, and harderhitting. They must exploit the potentiality of in-formation age technology on all levels of war.Headquarters must be continually streamlinedand modified to meet new situations. Conflicts inthe 21st century will require major advances inmobility and information processing. The Nationcan no longer afford the ponderous forces andconstraints of the past.

Our forces must be more strategically mo-bile, capable of moving quickly anywhere aroundthe world. They must be strategically, opera-tionally, and tactically agile, flexible, and versatileby design. The versatility to handle complex mis-sions and to pivot from one to another is essen-tial. A characteristic of missions in the next cen-tury will be the ability to quickly transitionbetween the use of lethal and nonlethal means.

To achieve essential strategic and tacticalmobility and flexibility, our forces will also haveto be logistically unencumbered. No service canafford the level of combat equipment and sup-plies that were pre-positioned during the ColdWar. As we become more mobile and capable, lo-gistical systems must also be agile. The key en-ablers, both now and in the future, are informa-tion and technological solutions that place theright logistics in the right place at the right time.

The issues that prepare the Army for tomor-row are in many ways the same as those facingthe other services and DOD as whole. In the lasttwo years the Army has expended a lot of energymapping a path forward. It appears that duringthis “strategic opportunity” both the Army andthe United States are at an historic crossroads. Weknow where we must go.

Recent experience has indicated how to leapahead. Last spring we conducted an advancedwarfighting experiment (AWE) at the NationalTraining Center—the premier Army combat train-ing center—to explore the potential of informa-tion technologies on the tactical level. This experi-ment provided us with a glimpse of the future.That was exciting because the Army realized aquantum leap in force effectiveness by leveraginginformation technologies with current equip-ment. But it was disconcerting because we learned

■ designs, tests, and fields new joint organizations

■ develops and tests new joint doctrine and JTTPs

■ rapidly prototypes, tests, and fields leap-aheadsystems

■ links troops, combat developers, matérieldevelopers, testers, and industry

■ establishes prototype for full spectrum, seamlessjoint training

■ a catalyst for cultural change

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first hand the magnitude of testing, training, andintegration needed to increase our effectiveness tothe full potential of 21st century capabilities. Theresult was that AWE revealed a unique opportu-nity to make the transformation from an indus-trial age force to information age force with un-paralleled capabilities—if we do it right.

The principles of this transformation areclear. All our forces—land, sea, and air—must bebalanced, appropriate, and relevant. They mustbe strategy-driven; that is the only way to de-velop and maintain coherent forces with reducedresources. The national military strategy shouldalso be the gauge by which forces are measured.

Most importantly, se-nior leaders mustbreak the service-parochial paradigmsof the past and aligndefense resources withnational strategy.

With continued pressure on resources and globaldemands for U.S. forces, future capabilities mustbe linked to a strategy and built from a coherentand integrated plan.

While we must “train the way we fight,”both fighting and training will be joint in thenext century. The Army learned long ago thattough training up front means readiness and sav-ing lives in the long run. This basic truth appliesto joint forces as well. A force of such diverse ca-pabilities and complexity will necessitate rigorousexperimentation and training to meet the de-mands of team cohesion, high operationaltempo, and operational agility.

To chart our future, three areas must bechanged. First, a process of joint experimentationand integration must be established. Second, ourdefense modernization strategy must be realignedto meet a new security strategy. And third, therevolution in business affairs must be exploitedby the Department of Defense.

Joint Experimentation and Integration It is generally agreed that our forces will al-

most always fight jointly in the future. A look atoperations conducted since 1989 indicates that25 out of 27 were joint. The road ahead startswith the concept of a standing JTF to accomplishtruly joint experimentation and integration.Forming it may not be as difficult as it seems.

Joint experimentation and integration offers amechanism to promote ideas, develop tactics,techniques, and procedures, and produce the doc-trine and systems for the joint force. A standingexperimental JTF would also realize the conceptsand capabilities advanced in Joint Vision 2010. Theterm standing in this context means not ad hoc ortemporary. The JTF charter would not call for de-veloping capabilities just because they were neededor absent in the past; rather it would build capabil-ities for future challenges as consistent with rapidtechnological advancements and strategy.

Although establishing a standing JTF wouldbe a bold step, the risks could be mitigated by anincremental and layered approach. The task forcecould add capabilities gradually as concepts andinterservice procedures evolve. Initial work couldbegin with existing assets and joint doctrine de-velopment. The pace of evolution would be afunction of how quickly complementary servicecapabilities are integrated. The size and composi-tion of the JTF headquarters would be based ontwo compelling needs: experimentation and inte-gration. Further requirements for deployabilityand warfighting could be added as the organiza-tion matures.

One way of initiating this process would beto link training and experimentation centers inthe southwestern United States functioning in realtime through a virtual environment with existingsimulation technologies. This could be done witha standing JTF headquarters and elements fromeach service. A standing JTF is the only efficientway to conceptualize and develop genuine jointforces. Through simulations, a JTF could create asynthetic battlefield to design and test doctrineand organizations. That would begin to harnesscomplementary core service competencies.

while we must “train the way wefight,” both fighting and trainingwill be joint in the next century

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R e i m e r


Joint experimentation would initially exploitservice battle labs by electronically connecting fa-cilities at Fort Irwin, Twentynine Palms, Nellis Air

Force Base, Coronado,and China Lake in aconsortium. A JTF alsocould develop and testoperational conceptsand doctrine. Conceptsthat spring from the

classroom and simulations must be validated be-fore investing in equipment.

Next, simulation and integration could stim-ulate exploration of virtual weapon prototypesand then model systems exactly as they would befought in a joint organization. As such virtual

weapons function in a virtual battle both theirperformance and cost effectiveness can be evalu-ated. Interface designs and interoperability testscan reveal how well future equipment will meetmultiple service requirements. Users of virtualprototypes will provide feedback on design inputs.Designs could be tested for warfighting utility andstreamlined acquisition by rapid convergence ofvirtual prototyping and hands-on experimenta-tion by soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen.

The second level of experimentation and in-tegration would include joint field exercises andmaneuvers. A JTF would experiment with the bestideas on the ground to see if they really work inthe hands of troops. Experimentation would notbe constrained to doctrine but would also includethe development of tactics, techniques, and pro-cedures at echelons down to the individual sol-dier. We have learned that exciting things canhappen when troops have the freedom to experi-ment. This leap-ahead approach offers the ser-vices tremendous opportunities.

As the fidelity of future simulation and inte-gration increases, the task force would begin tosee the continued overlap and merger of collec-tive training domains: virtual, constructive, and

we have learned that excitingthings can happen when troopshave the freedom to experiment

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live. Tomorrow’s simulation will witness the con-tinued reduction of live training as simulationprovides a better return on investment. But insome cases troops could remain in tactical opera-tions centers, control centers, cockpits, and com-mand information centers and train with actualunits in the field. The capability to mix andmatch the various training domains and unitswill be limitless.

One of the most exciting aspects of this pro-posal is that such an organization, if properly de-signed, could become a cultural catalyst for bothintra- and interservice changes. Certainly itwould assist our leaders in removing institutionalbarriers that preclude the synergistic capabilitiesour forces will require in the 21st century.

Defense ModernizationThe second major requirement in seizing

this strategic opportunity for change is to realignour defense modernization strategy. This is a wayto ensure that service modernization programsare complementary—a genuine joint, integratedmodernization strategy. It requires that we refo-cus modernization investments. Current capabili-ties, with some enhancements, are adequate totake us through 2010. We must refocus our scien-tific and technology base on legitimate jointwarfighting requirements—pulling forward thetechnology that will be needed for 2020.

Once such a JTF exists questions aboutwhich weapon systems and technologies shouldbe developed become almost inseparable fromthe capabilities and efficiencies required by a newjoint force. If we are indeed at a strategic cross-roads, then it is time to recapitalize and exploreuntested joint capabilities and ensure that theyare coherent with national military strategy.

As technological breakthroughs occur andpotential enemies are outmatched by our mili-tary innovations, it is prudent to focus our mod-ernization strategy on improving equipmentthrough software upgrades and technical inser-tions. Until the next generation of procurementprograms is tested and integrated, new starts ofmajor weapon systems should be carefully evalu-ated in light of recommendations emerging froman experimental JTF.

Refocusing modernization in concert withan experimental task force will stimulate changein thinking, planning, organizing, and trainingwithin the Armed Forces. Such a JTF will becomethe centerpiece for change and catapult us aheadin joint military capability.

Revolution in Business AffairsA revolution in military affairs and the strat-

egy of shaping-responding-preparing cannot be re-alized on an integrated joint level without a simul-taneous revolution in business affairs. We must notoverlook changes in innovation and productivitythat are revolutionizing American industry.

A new partnership with industry and Con-gress is required to fully develop the forces of thefuture. Even in light of the tremendous downsiz-ing since the Cold War, we still need to stream-line our headquarters, reduce infrastructure, andoffer incentives to make management more effi-cient. DOD must learn from the corporate world’sability to rapidly adjust to shifts in the market-place and make that part of military culture.

The experimentation and integration taskforce is an important link between a revolution-ary modernization strategy and allocating re-sources. As technological changes accelerate, thedefense establishment is not well equipped to an-alyze joint resource allocation. The Cold War ap-proach of large homogenous modernizing willquickly make U.S. forces irrelevant as technologycontinues to impact equipment capabilities andorganizations. The unprecedented pace of changewill make it impossible for the military of tomor-row to maintain coherence without an institu-tionalized process to help make investments tomaximize scarce resources. The linchpin andfocus for such decisions will be a fully function-ing integrated JTF.

The Quadrennial Defense Review reveals astrategic window that provides the opportunityto fundamentally reshape our forces for the nextcentury. It requires that the defense communityas a whole embrace an alternative way of leapingahead. To make that path a reality, we must initi-ate the concept of joint experimentation and in-tegration. We must also identify those synergiesfound in service modernization plans and trans-form them into a coherent defense moderniza-tion plan while adopting those efficiencies foundin the industrial sector.

We are all pressed by the demands of day-to-day operations, but we must embrace reform. Ourleaders must adopt the new strategy of shaping-responding-preparing and ensure that JV 2010 be-comes a reality. We do not need a smaller versionof the Cold War force; the future will require aforce designed for a changing world. That is theessence of the QDR process. JFQ

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To achieve U.S. security objectives it isnecessary to anticipate the environ-ment in which future military opera-tions may be conducted. Projections

about the politico-military scene in 2010 influ-ence current defense policies, from force structureto contingency planning. National security re-quires that both planners and programmers get itright, for the stakes are high. A systematic way isneeded to anticipate:

■ what the Armed Forces will be called upon to do■ where, when, and against whom they will operate■ what joint and multinational forces will be

available■ how to employ forces in the optimum manner■ what risks must be run under various employ-

ment schemes.

This article focuses on how naval combatforces should be employed in 2010. Narrowingthat focus presumes the Nation will want tomaintain capable forces to underwrite its securityand that of its allies and friends around the globe.It also accepts that use of force will be circum-scribed by a variety of organizational, opera-tional, legal, and moral constraints. Moreover, itemphasizes naval combat operations, not human-itarian operations or presence.

Joint Vision 2010 provides an operationalstructure for operations in the early 21st centurythrough four operational concepts: dominant ma-neuver, precision engagement, full dimensionalprotection, and focused logistics. These conceptsare part and parcel of Naval Operational Conceptand Operational Maneuver from the Sea issued bythe Navy and Marine Corps, respectively. For ana-lytical purposes they can be applied within thecontext of the accompanying illustration as a

Roger W. Barnett is professor of naval warfare studies at the Naval WarCollege and coeditor of Seapower and Strategy.

Grasping 2010

with Naval ForcesBy R O G E R W. B A R N E T T

Naval forces in Arabian Gulf.

U.S. Navy

0717PGS 4/13/98 6:29 PM Page 25

means of grasping 2010 with naval forces. Whilethe concepts describe the environment of the fu-ture in terms of critical tasks being faced by navalforces, operations cannot be factored into its con-stituent parts because of inevitable overlap andduplication.

Dominant ManeuverManeuver is accomplished relative to some-

thing else. In operational art, maneuver helps togain positional advantage over enemies. Impor-tantly for force planning and military operations,all our enemies will be located overseas as theyhave been throughout this century. Force move-ment, maneuver, and sustainment over long dis-tances will remain hallmarks of the Armed Forces.Thus the success of overseas movement will be afunction of protecting both lines of movementand communications.

Being relational, successful maneuver willrely on the ability to identify, locate, and trackstrategic and operational targets. For centuries a

defining characteristic ofwarfare at sea, selecting,finding, and tracking theright target continues to bethe most difficult and im-portant action in the realmof naval warfare. This will

require on-scene forces in addition to space-basedsensors in the time frame under consideration. Tofind and track the right target, commanders mustbe capable of staring, not merely looking.Manned and unmanned airborne platforms per-form this function in the most effective way.

Once a target has been identified, opera-tional maneuver can take place with respect to it,to operational depths, for either offensive or de-fensive purposes. Once a target has been locatedand tracked, a commander can optimize the ef-fectiveness of maneuver. Being relational, maneu-ver also includes actions to contain or constrainenemy movements or mobility.

Maneuver constitutes an integral part of acommander’s plan, and actions will be organized,integrated, and coordinated to facilitate it. Bothoperational security and deception will heightenits impact, for they offset enemy efforts to neu-tralize or negate it.

An enemy’s capabilities to reduce the effectsand value of operational maneuver in the futurewill depend on its intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance (ISR) and command and control(C2), and whether it has forces agile enough tooffset its adversary’s ability to maneuver. Anenemy will likely control interior operationallines while we operate on exterior lines.

In the final analysis, operational maneuverenables operations in depth to achieve strategicor operational objectives. Tasks within this opera-tional list might include:

■ shows of force■ demonstrations■ forcible entry through airborne, amphibious,

and air assault■ reinforcing and expanding lodgments■ raids■ penetrations, direct assault, and turning move-

ments■ direct actions■ unconventional warfare■ taking the battle to an enemy, countering its

initiative, defeating its attack, and conducting retro-grade operations

■ overcoming operationally significant barriers,obstacles, and mines

■ operational countermobility through employ-ment of an operational system of obstacles, carrying outsanctions, embargoes, or blockades, and undertakingmaritime interception.

Operational maneuver also includes actionstaken to control operationally significant landareas, gain and maintain air and maritime superi-ority, isolate the theater of operations, or provideassistance to friendly nations in resource andpopulation control.

Potential enemies may seek to preventfriendly forces from achieving dominant maneu-ver, which implies that the success of the abovetasks will be highly situation-dependent. Recog-nizing that strategic and operational objectiveswill probably be located ashore, which tasks canbe achieved in pursuit of the objectives will de-pend not only on an enemy, location, and time,but on the ability to enable and facilitate tasksthrough operational maneuver. Maneuver also in-creases the effectiveness of precision engagement,full dimensional protection, and focused logistics.

Precision EngagementThe delivery of ordnance on target has

evolved to the point where brilliant munitionscan achieve virtual pinpoint accuracies. Whereasin 1943 it took 1,500 B–17 sorties dropping sixone-ton bombs each to destroy a 60 by 100 foottarget with 90 percent probability of a kill, by1970 it required 176 F–4 sorties in the VietnamWar. Today, it takes one laser-guided bomb deliv-ered by one strike aircraft (10 foot circular errorprobable). By 2010 this will not change muchsimply because significantly greater accuracy willnot be needed—the problem will become one oflocating and identifying targets.

Precision engagement includes bombs, rock-ets, missiles, artillery, and nonlethal means thatare delivered to operational depths. It also encom-passes placement of troops ashore. As described

■ G R A S P I N G 2 0 1 0


successful maneuver will rely on the ability to identify, locate, and track targets

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above, order of magnitude increases in accuracyhave reduced the need for weight of ordnance ontarget and the explosive power of individualweaponry. Greater accuracy means fewer weaponswith smaller warheads to accomplish the same ef-fects with much less collateral damage.

In the future precision engagement will be-come first an exercise in targeting and then in al-locating targets to the most appropriate weaponsystem. Targeting involves identifying, locating,classifying, tracking, and prioritizing targets. Op-erational targets are those that will have a deci-sive effect on campaigns and major operations.Precision engagement will most likely be a jointand multinational undertaking.

Precision engagement can be employed foroffensive counterair, suppression of enemy air de-fenses, and interdiction of air, surface, and sub-surface operational targets. Special operationsforces can be deployed as part of precision en-gagement for many of the same purposes as at-tacks by air or non-air breathing weapons. Theyare especially useful for negating or neutralizingenemy weapons of mass destruction.

Other operational concepts are also supportedby precision engagement. It can facilitate dominantmaneuver, underwrite full dimensional protection,and provide cover for focused logistics. It can alsodisrupt enemy command and control networks oreven put them entirely out of commission.

The speed with which attacks can be deliv-ered on the right target will have greater importas 2010 approaches. This is because of the diffi-culty in target location and identification andenemy interest in countertargeting. Few key tar-gets will be stationery even on the strategic andoperational levels, and deception will be a major

part of countertargeting plans. Thetime from location and identifica-tion of a target to weapon arrivalwill become more significant forsuccess. This means weapon sys-tems will need great responsivenessand flexibility and that weapon

flight time must be minimized. Proximity oflaunchers to a target, the line of acceptable risk,and high flight speeds will help to compress thesensor-to-shooter-to-target sequence. The full se-quence—including the shooter-to-target seg-ment—must be included.

Damage and munitions effects assessmentshave always been part of targeting and will be noless crucial in the future. Four related factors areexercising a growing influence on precision en-gagement: friendly casualties, fratricide, collateraldamage, and unintended consequences.

The threshold for accepting casualties hasunquestionably dropped since World War II, but

how far is debatable. The effect on precision en-gagement is that risk of own-force casualties mustbe factored in with greater care.

As the speed with which war is conductedon the tactical, operational, and strategic levelshas increased—thus shortening decision time—the danger of blue-on-blue engagement hasgrown. Weapons lethality, moreover, adds an-other sort of risk. The premium on fast decision-making and trigger-pulling together with accurateweapons increases the chance of fratricide. Im-provements in determining locations broughtabout by the global positioning system and ad-vances in identification technologies will help,but the sensitivity will remain.

Collateral damage has been ameliorated byprecise weapons with smaller explosive yields.Nevertheless, the advent of precision has in-creased the demand for greater accuracy whichagain underscores the necessity of selecting andidentifying the right target.

The last factor, unintended consequences,has a further depressing influence on precisionengagement. The possibility of unintended conse-quences arises when force is used. Yet problemsmultiply when potential unintended conse-quences with low risks begin to have a serious im-pact on targeting. One case was the nuclear win-ter debate of the 1980s, but the question appearsin much less catastrophic situations when the useof force is considered. Potential environmentdamage and anticipated costs of reconstructingwhat may be damaged fall in this category.

Considerations of collateral damage and thelike have increased interest in nonlethal or less-than-lethal precision engagement. Nonlethalfires can take the form of psychological opera-tions, electronic and information attack, andnonlethal munitions. Their object is the same aslethal fires, but their application and utility aremore restricted. The difficulty of damage assess-ment and lack of confidence in its effectivenessmay well require that their targets also be at-tacked by lethal fires.

Sensors for damage and munition effect arebecoming more discerning but remain quite com-plex and difficult. Imperfect as such assessmentsare by necessity, commanders will use them tomake decisions on reprioritization and reattack.

Fire support coordination will remain signifi-cant. Its complexity, difficulty, and relevance allincrease when ground forces are introducedashore (requiring a need for tactical and opera-tional precision engagement to support them),enemy activity increases, and operations are morejoint and multinational.

nonlethal fires can take the form of electronic and information attack

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Traditionally the purpose of an offensive at-tack was to delay, disrupt, destroy, or degradeenemy forces or critical tasks and facilities and af-fect their will to fight. With precision engage-ment, operational and strategic targets can be at-tacked with the intention of directly influencingthe course and outcome of the conflict.

In sum, while weapons have become bril-liant, other considerations weigh heavily upon

the ability of precision engagement to achieve itsobjectives. An enemy will try to deny the requi-site targeting information and keep targets mov-ing. Joint and multinational forces will be con-strained by the concern over hitting the correcttarget, risk of friendly casualties, collateral dam-age effects, and difficulties with assessing the re-sults of attacks.

Full Dimensional ProtectionFinding and successfully attacking the right

target represents the greatest operational impedi-ment to achieving strategic and operational ob-jectives. Clearly, then, countertargeting must be akey concern for the commander. This is under-scored by the necessity to keep friendly casualtiesas low as possible.

Attaining the ends for which force is beingapplied is the overriding issue for commanders.They cannot be insensitive to the survival and ef-fectiveness of their own forces; yet survival is notthe goal but merely a contributor to it. Thus, fulldimensional protection for the force is importantbut is neither the highest concern nor the objec-tive of commanders.

Commanders seek to conserve their fightingpower. Full dimensional protection is a way toachieve that goal. It may be passive (deception,armor, electronic countermeasures, operationsand communications security, and dispersal) ortake the form of three dimensional active de-fenses. Full dimensional protection includes thedefense of joint and multinational land, sea, air,space, and special operations forces; bases; andlines of communication from:

■ enemy operational maneuvers and concentratedland, sea, and air attack

■ natural occurrences—primarily weather ■ terrorist attack.

Also included are protection of operationallevel forces, systems, and civil infrastructure offriendly nations and groups in military opera-tions other than war.

As noted above, each operational concept islinked to the other three. In the case of full di-mensional protection, both dominant maneuverand precision engagement will perform majorroles in a commander’s plan to protect his forces.Operational command and control, focused logis-tics, and ISR will likewise contribute synergisti-cally to protection.

Full dimensional protection in 2010 willbenefit from decades of recognition that protec-tion of one’s force begins at enemy launchpoints. Attacking enemy offensive systems by de-stroying missile launchers, aircraft on the

■ G R A S P I N G 2 0 1 0


Ends, Means, Ways

WHAT

Strategic

Operational

TacticalAGAINST

WHOM

ENDS MEANS

RISKS

WAYS

WHOMWHEREWHEN

WITH

JOINT

NOT JOINT

HOW

HOW

HOW

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COMBINED

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NOT COMBINED

NOT COMBINED

Ends, Means, WaysAlthough the above illustration containsnothing new, it depicts the issues addressedin this article. Ends are provided to opera-tional commanders by higher authority andare circumscribed in place, time, and inten-sity. That is, they are not unlimited and donot pertain to unconstrained political goalssuch as unconditional surrender. Instead,they can require removing an enemy forcefrom friendly territory, restoring interna-tional borders, quelling an insurgency, pro-tecting access to important resources such asfuel oil and water, or offsetting a coercivethreat. Of major interest and the focus of of-fensive efforts by commanders, strategic andoperational targets are on land. It is unlikelyin the 2010 time frame that operationalobjectives will be located at sea. There willbe no battlefleets to confront, ballistic mis-sile launching submarines to attack, or at-sea assets to neutralize or destroy whichwould have an effect on the operational orstrategic level.

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ground, ships in port, and tanks and artillery be-fore they come into range of friendly forces willremain the preferred action. The rule will be thefarther from the defended force, the more desir-able the defensive action.

Another straightforward principle of full di-mensional protection is that layered defenses aremore effective than nonlayered ones. Two layers,each 60 percent effective, will have a combined ef-fectiveness of 84 percent. A third 60 percent layerincreases overall effectiveness to 94 percent. (If lay-ers are each 80 percent effective, the second layerprovides 96 percent overall and the third 99 per-cent.) Given a choice operational commanders willerect layered defenses—whether against aircraft at-tack, tanks, ballistic missiles, or submarines.

For the same reason, while moving targetsare difficult to attack, they are easier to defend.Commanders will probably be obliged to provideoperational protection for fixed points—bases,airfields, supply depots, ports—but where possiblekeep their forces mobile for increased security.

Operational defense from three dimensionalattack for forces at sea will fall primarily, but notexclusively, on naval forces. Mine and antisubma-rine warfare are primarily naval activities. Opera-tional air and missile defense, on the other hand,will likely be joint or multinational.

In the time frame under consideration few ofthe potential threat countries for expeditionaryoperations will have robust over-the-horizon sur-veillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Many,however, will be capable of indiscriminate attackslike the 1987 Iraqi assault on USS Stark. Fewer stillwill be capable of operating naval or air forces atappreciable distances from home bases, whichmeans that lines of communication in open seasshould be relatively secure, depending on theenemy. As naval forces approach land, however,the operational environment becomes more dan-gerous and operational protection more challeng-ing. This vulnerability can never be fully negatedbut has been ameliorated, and can be in the fu-ture, by a combination of increasing the stand-offranges of naval sensors and weapons, greaterstealth, dominant maneuver, operational decep-tion, and better tactical warning and attack as-sessment. The commanders of joint and multina-tional forces must not only secure the at-sea linesof communications, but the land and air lines.

Although chemical and biological warfare(CBW) threats will be of concern to land forces,they are less vexing for naval forces becauseenemy targeting problems are dominant. If anenemy can target a ship, why should it not put ahitting weapon on it rather than a chemical war-head, which is less reliable, more costly, and more

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difficult to deliver? The logic against CBW use onships, especially at long ranges, is strong.

Nevertheless, commanders will be responsi-ble to protect their force from weapons of massdestruction. Deterrence against their use has been

weakened by the lack of acounterthreat in kind and bytheir increased value as anasymmetrical response to sys-tems deployed by the UnitedStates and its allies. Indeed,chemicals and biologicals have

become “the poor man’s atomic bomb” andmany countries either have these capabilities orwill have them by 2010.

Focused LogisticsAll things considered, it is the ability to pro-

vide focused logistic support to project forces thatmakes those forces and their deterrent threat soeffective. The United States is by far the worldleader in intertheater lift, both sea and air, and ithas the only force of prepositioning ships placedstrategically around the globe. Strategic sealift,land prepositioning, and host nation supportround out the significant, unparalleled U.S. infra-structure designed to lend operational support.

Naval forces are the most self-sustaining of allmilitary formations. They invariably arrive at thescene with filled fuel bunkers, magazines, andstorerooms. Demands for focused logistic supportstemming from high-intensity combat operationsare great, however, and failing to attend to themwill place any campaign or major operation at risk.

Each operational theater will be different interms of in-place operational support available tocommanders and the difficulty faced by lift forces.Operational commanders are responsible for orga-nizing required support from wherever it is based.

They must identify operational needs as soon aspossible and establish priorities for employing re-sources. They must prepare to sustain both thetempo and continuity of all engaged forcesthroughout a campaign or major operation.

Support is complicated by the number andtype of forces assigned. Joint and multinationalforces will massively increase arms, ammunition,and equipment replenishment requirements overthe comparatively simple needs of a naval expedi-tionary force. Responsibilities include not onlysynchronizing the flow of fuel, food, and ammu-nition, but also maintenance of equipment in thetheater, coordination of manning to provide un-interrupted flows of trained units and replace-ments, management of casualties, and support ofpersonnel and health services. The latter includesboth personal welfare and comfort (finance,chaplain, legal services, clothing and individualequipment, laundry, bath, evacuation ofwounded and sick blood management, andgraves registration). The range of support isbroad, dynamic, and demanding, and it is amajor part of the planning process.

ISR and C2

In the words of JV 2010: “We must have in-formation superiority: the capability to collect,process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flowof information while exploiting or denying anadversary’s ability to do the same.” The success ofdominant maneuver, precision engagement, fulldimensional protection, and focused logistics allpivots on information superiority, which is abyproduct of high quality C2 underwritten by ISR.

Joint and multinational operations are inher-ently more complex, and thus much more taxingon command and control arrangements, thansingle service operations. It is anticipated thatmost combat on the operational level in the fu-ture will be joint, multinational, or both. Theconcomitant increase in complexity and diffi-culty of command and control must be plannedwell in advance.

The first level of activity in gaining informa-tion superiority involves collecting informationon the theater of operations, tasks to be per-formed, and friendly and enemy orders of battle.These and geophysical factors vary from theater totheater. Insofar as U.S. and multinational forceshave been previously or routinely deployed in agiven theater, the task of setting the stage will beeased. Depending on objectives, commanders willdetermine their critical information requirements,thus prioritizing the information flow.

Operational intelligence includes decidingwhen, where, and in what strength an enemy willstage and conduct military activities. As such, itunderwrites each of the four operational concepts.

■ G R A S P I N G 2 0 1 0


information superiority is a byproduct of high quality C2 underwritten by ISR

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Assumptions and assessments made about opera-tional intelligence will have a key influence onthe conduct of campaigns and major operations.

Important tasks will include preparing anoperational collection plan. In 2010 this will beaided by new systems in the atmosphere andspace. Much intelligence collection, reconnais-sance, and surveillance will be directed at finding,identifying, and tracking targets. Enemies, how-ever, will become more sophisticated even withmore supportive technologies.

This task, which includes determining pro-spective enemy courses of action and intentions,is vital. Enemies will seek to present friendlyforces with faits accompli or at least take advan-tage of surprise. Thus indications and warning fortheater operations will be an essential output ofthe process. U.S. collection and analysis effortsmust also anticipate the various levels of surpriseand plan to negate their effects. Friendly forcesprobably cannot prevent surprise but should becapable of withstanding and offsetting its effects.

Intelligence collection, processing, exploita-tion, and dissemination is a continuing demandthroughout a campaign or operation. It must nottire of aggressively discerning enemy intentionsor providing positive identification and locationof all theater forces.

Commanding subordinate forces requires de-lineating responsibilities among commanders.The overall commander issues orders and rules ofengagement. Because maneuver, engagement,and protection benefit from attacking an enemyearly, special rules of engagement or relaxationsmay be needed. Coordination and synchroniza-tion are also high priorities.

Among the command and control tasks is or-ganization of a joint force headquarters. Theremust be procedures to develop a joint C2 structure,

establish liaison structures, integrate joint forcestaff augmentees, deploy headquarters advance ele-ments, and institute command transition criteria.

Information warfare will become more im-portant because, among other things, it carries thepotential for significant destruction with little vio-lence. Commanders will integrate and coordinatethe use of operations security, military deception,psychological operations, electronic warfare, andphysical destruction for command and controlwarfare, probably in ways not yet fully considered.Information and C2 warfare have offensive and de-fensive dimensions. Future commanders will bemore attuned to their requirements and will mon-itor and adjust operations as they occur.

Finally, commanders will need to providepublic affairs within their theater of operations.Media relations will become more complex anddifficult because the ability of the media to col-lect information will undoubtedly increase.

The analysis of naval forces on the opera-tional level in 2010 begins with a consideration ofthe tasks to be accomplished. Such tasks and theirlocations are confined in size and difficulty andare finite in number. Since operational objectiveswill likely be ashore, the focus will be on land.

Maneuver by naval forces takes place at seawhere they enjoy broad freedom of movement.Ships can be vectored to a given location withoutcommitting to action. Operating on the highseas, they incur no political costs in repositioningfor advantage. This will not change in 2010. Rela-tive to an action taken by an enemy, at-sea mobil-ity translates into dominant maneuver.

From areas secured by dominant maneuverand by full dimensional protection, naval forcescan engage with precision. Targets can be at-tacked by aircraft, missiles, and guns and by land-ing Marine forces. Such areas can be secured untiljoint air and land forces arrive to exploit criticalvulnerabilities. Operations are sustained as longas required by focused logistics.

The differences between today and 2010 canbe found in the relative ability of friendly andenemy forces to locate, identify, and attack tar-gets. High quality ISR in conjunction with up-dated C2 procedures and organizations will give anadvantage to friendly forces. Executing the con-cepts found in JV 2010 will bring success so longas the risks remain low. Refined doctrine, im-proved organizational relationships, and focusedand purposeful training must be combined withnew weapon systems to ensure future success. JFQ

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By F. G. H O F F M A N

The strategic environment today ismarkedly different than the bipolarcontext that shaped defense prioritiesand organizations for decades. In con-

trast to a monolithic enemy, we confront myriadthreats arising from geopolitical change, an inter-national economy, and the proliferation of tech-nology. Moreover, despite hyped predictionsabout a revolution in military affairs, the nature of

war has not and will not change though its char-acter will undergo a major transformation. Thiswill be manifest in the forms of warfare, techno-logical developments, and enemies who appear onthe battlefield of the future. Preparing for such di-versity requires a capacity to adapt and innovate.

To stimulate such a capacity within a jointwarfighting framework, the Joint Chiefs of Staff is-sued Joint Vision 2010: Preparing for the Future in July1996. This article compares that vision with the pri-mary operational concept of the Marine Corps, Op-erational Maneuver from the Sea, and evaluates itsutility in the current strategic environment.

F.G. Hoffman is an analyst at the Marine Corps Combat DevelopmentCommand and author of Decisive Force: The New American Way of War.

Joint Vision 2010— A MarinePerspective

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Those familiar with the business world rec-ognize the use of a common vision to stretch theimagination of a corporation, create new expecta-tions, and cause a sense of urgency for proposedchange.1 The services routinely issue vision state-ments or white papers (such as Force XXI by theArmy, Forward . . . From the Sea by the Navy, andGlobal Presence by the Air Force) to conveychanges in direction and highlight the horizon offuture warfighting capabilities. The Commissionon Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces foundsuch visions helpful if somewhat self-serving andrecommended that they be “harmonized” by acentral vision to drive joint requirements.2

As a result of the commission’s report, JV2010 was published to provide a “template” tochannel the collective efforts of the Armed Forces.Its issuance was accompanied by controversy.Early drafts were decidedly technical and didn’tmention the requirement for high quality person-nel supported by effective training and education.They also conflicted with the way military doc-trine looks at warfare—which is essentially Clause-witzian. Critics of these early drafts emphasizedthe enduring human dimension of war over the

transitory impact oftechnology. The draftsintroduced new buzz-words and ahistoricalassumptions on techni-cal innovation in lieuof time-tested concepts

about the inherent friction and ambiguity of war-fare. One got the feeling that the term enemy didnot exist in the document’s lexicon. Basic conceptslike fog, friction, chance, and the independentand adaptive will of an enemy were replaced byan unrealized information dominance. Just as seri-ous, these early drafts imposed a centralized styleof command and control (C2), enabled by infor-mation technology, to achieve dominant levels ofsituational awareness.

The direct involvement of the Joint Chiefswas critical to rectifying the faults in the drafts.Ultimately the need for quality people, real pres-ence, and a range of capabilities across the entirethreat spectrum was included. The final versionwas heralded as a new warfighting strategy.3

The VisionThe Marine Corps view of the future strate-

gic environment reveals danger and opportunity.Danger—chaos in the littorals—is characterizedby myriad clashes of national aspirations, reli-gious intolerance, and ethnic hatred. Opportu-nity emanates from advances in information

management, battlefield mobility, and the lethal-ity of conventional weaponry. Such changes inthe operational environment, representing bothnew threats and enhanced capabilities, raisemany questions.

Specific answers to these questions are un-known today. However, Marine preparation forthe future is captured best in the concept Opera-tional Maneuver. Building on the foundation laidby . . . From the Sea and Forward . . . From the Sea,Operational Maneuver describes what naval forcesshould be able to do in the near term. It will notdefine every naval involvement in the next cen-tury, but the skills, techniques, and capabilitieswhich it suggests will provide naval forces with asolid basis for innovation. The heart of Opera-tional Maneuver is “the maneuver of naval forcesat the operational level, a bold bid for victorythat aims at exploiting a significant enemy weak-ness in order to deal a decisive blow.”4

What makes this concept differ from othersis the extensive use of the sea as an operatingbase—simultaneously a major avenue for movingforces and a barrier. Operational Maneuver uses sea-based logistics, sea-based fire support, and theocean as a medium for tactical and operationalmovement. In both of these cases the sea is anoperational advantage.5

JV 2010 and Operational ManeuverThere is no single answer to future chal-

lenges. Operational Maneuver is not the completesolution, but it has applicability over a range ofrequirements. A joint vision is needed to coverthe entire spectrum and provide focus to develop-ing an array of capabilities. It must be tied toboth projected security needs and enduring goalsand interests. JV 2010 is intended to accomplishthis with “a common direction for our services indeveloping their unique capabilities.” It definesthis direction through four generalized opera-tional concepts that should be applicable acrossthe conflict spectrum. It stresses that each con-cept is based on information superiority. Its ob-ject is to create a military that is “persuasive inpeace, decisive in war, and preeminent in anyform of conflict.”

The best way to appreciate the relationshipbetween JV 2010 and operational capabilitiesbeing sought by the Marine Corps is to comparethe operational concepts and end state of JV 2010with key elements of Operational Maneuver. Theconceptual template in JV 2010 is grounded infour concepts—dominant maneuver, precision en-gagement, focused logistics, and full dimensionalprotection, supported by information superior-ity—to achieve full spectrum dominance. As wewill discover, each of these concepts can be com-pared to and is supported by Operational Maneuver.

the Marine Corps view of the future strategic environment reveals chaos in the littorals

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■ A M A R I N E P E R S P E C T I V E


Dominant ManeuverJV 2010 defines dominant maneuver as “the

multidimensional application of information, en-gagement, and mobility capabilities to positionand employ widely dispersed joint air, land, sea,and space forces to accomplish the assigned oper-ational tasks.” The aim of maneuver is to achievea decisive advantage by controlling the breadth,depth, and height of the battlespace. The heart ofOperational Maneuver is the maneuver of navalforces on the operational level for a decisive effectfrom the sea. It strives for victory by exploiting asignificant enemy weakness in order to deal adominant or decisive blow. It is multidimensionalin its applying C2 and intelligence systems to dis-cern enemy disposition and critical weaknessesand in employing shipborne or aviation assets tomaneuver against or engage an enemy. It also re-quires joint forces to attain battlespace superiorityover the littoral region.

Operational Maneuver is more than move-ment of forces through the littoral region itself.The movement of units through the battlespace

alone may be indecisive or even counterproduc-tive. It does not qualify as operational maneuver,which is an effort directed against a vulnerableenemy capability—something basic to its abilityto effectively continue the struggle. In short, Op-erational Maneuver is designed to accomplish ex-actly what JV 2010 seeks, the application of “deci-sive force to attack enemy centers of gravity at alllevels and compel an adversary to either reactfrom a position of disadvantage or quit.”

Precision EngagementThe joint framework in JV 2010 consists of “a

system of systems that enables our forces to locatethe objective or target, provide responsive C2, gen-erate the desired effect, assess our level of success,and retain the flexibility to reengage with preci-sion when required.” It seeks to shape the battle-space from extended ranges. Operational Maneuver,on the other hand, seeks to employ highly respon-sive fires from extended ranges or from ship-basednaval aviation assets. Aviation elements must beprepared to operate ashore in an expeditionarymode to ensure responsiveness to maneuveringground forces. The concept is also based on im-proved mobility ashore and will take advantage of

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sea-based fires and shore-based fire support sys-tems with improved tactical mobility. To supportrapidly maneuvering forces, Operational Maneuverrequires improved fire support coordination sys-tems and procedures to increase responsiveness.Forces afloat and ashore can thus deliver fires withincreased range and improved accuracy andlethality—a central aim of precision engagement.

Finally, in Operational Maneuver the Marinesseek to employ supporting engagement fires toexploit maneuver which capitalizes on and maxi-mizes the effects of fires. This is predicated on ro-bust C4ISR architecture that enhances situationalawareness as well as assured responsive fire sup-port. JV 2010 supports a similarly robust networkthat can enhance situational awareness. But Oper-ational Maneuver provides for a wide array of en-gagement options for joint force commanders in-cluding nonlethal technology for use when lessthan deadly force is desirable. This option offers aunique capability to implement JV 2010 at thelower end of the conflict spectrum.

Full Dimensional ProtectionJV 2010 emphasizes controlling the battle-

space “to ensure our forces can maintain freedomof action during deployment, maneuver, and en-gagement while providing multi-layered defensesfor our forces and facilities at all levels.” Navalforces executing Operational Maneuver can assistcommanders in meeting this concept. Onceagain, what distinguishes this concept from allother forms of operational maneuver is the exten-sive use of the sea as a means of gaining and sus-taining advantage. This is what preserves freedomof action and, by layering air, surface, and subsur-

face defenses, what af-fords “full dimensional”defense. A sea-based pos-ture, situated over thehorizon and supportedby C3I systems, organictheater air defense, and

theater missile defense provided by the Navy, canbe extended over the maneuver forces as theymove towards assigned objectives.

This offers an advantage when an enemy hasthe capability to employ weapons of mass de-struction. A naval posture offers unique abilitiesby matching demands for full dimensional pro-tection with responsive maneuver and engage-ment capabilities. This posture avoids the use offixed sites such as airfields, ports, and preposi-tioned stocks (see photo on opposite page ofequipment stored in Norway), all of which mayhave been precisely targeted by an enemy forstrikes early in an intervention.

Focused LogisticsFocused logistics is achieved by “the fusion

of information, logistics, and transportation tech-nologies to provide rapid crisis response, trackand shift assets even while en route, and delivertailored logistics packages and sustainment di-rectly at the strategic, operational, and tacticallevel of operations” in JV 2010. Operational Ma-neuver seeks the same level of fusion on all levelsof war. For most of the 20th century, the utility ofsea-based logistics was limited by the voraciousappetite of landing forces for fuel, large caliberammunition, and aviation ordnance. As a result,the options available to such forces were reducedby the need to establish, protect, and make use ofsupply dumps. Opportunities for decisive actionwere then lost as needed supplies accumulated onshore. Operational Maneuver requires rapid move-ment, not merely from ship to shore but fromship to objectives distant from blue water. Speedand mobility comparable to assault forces will benecessary for logistics elements responding to thedemands of Operational Maneuver. Logistics flowmust be efficient, secure, and timely, with the op-tion to remain sea-based or buildup support areasashore. While some operations may require theestablishment of bases ashore, the practice of sep-arating ship-to-shore movement from the tacticaland operational maneuver of units ashore will bereplaced by maneuvers in which forces arerapidly moved from ships at sea directly to as-signed objectives hundreds of miles inland.

Operational Maneuver—like JV 2010—recog-nizes that logistics support must be efficient, se-cure, and timely. The Marine Corps is pursuingvarious “precision logistics” projects through itswarfighting lab and CSS Enterprise, an initiativeof the combat service support (CSS) community.The option to remain sea based or buildup sup-port ashore gives JTF commanders means to en-sure the efficiency, security, and timeliness ofCSS. Delivery and matériel handling means, sup-ported by C2 systems able to communicate re-quirements, provide the “right time, right place”support set forth in the framework of JV 2010.

The combination of long-range weapons pre-cision and greater reliance on sea-based fire sup-port will greatly reduce the need for supply facili-ties ashore in the near future. As a result, thelogistical tail of landing forces will be smaller,ship-to-shore movement faster, and operationsashore able to start without the traditional“buildup phase.” The mobility of maneuver forcesand their reduced infrastructure ashore will facili-tate rapid reembarkation and redeployment. This

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will enable landing forces to quickly deploy—fightand then recock for other crises faster than before.In sum, “focused logistics” can be met by tailoredlogistics support in Operational Maneuver.

Information SuperiorityInformation superiority is defined in JV 2010

as “the capability to collect, process, and dissemi-nate an uninterrupted flow of information whileexploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to dothe same.” This superiority underpins the opera-tional concepts in JV 2010. While it properly re-flects the relational and competitive nature of in-formation in combat, this definition is narrowlyfocused on technology and the movement of in-formation rather than the idea of gaining knowl-edge or the more basic concept of enabling com-manders to apply professional judgment whileexercising command and control in combat.

The execution of Operational Maneuver isbuilt on a solid foundation of operational theoryand proven C2 techniques as issued in MarineCorps Doctrinal Pub 6, Command and Control.6

This doctrine emphasizes the human dimensionof warfare to complement the scientific elementof communications technologies or intelligencesystems. By contrast, existing joint doctrine,while acknowledging and citing some elements of

Marine doctrine, stresses technology and systemsover fundamental C2 doctrine. In fact the princi-pal joint C2 volume, Joint Pub 6.0, Command,Control, and Intelligence Systems Support to Joint Op-erations, primarily considers technology and sys-tems. Moving electrons or collecting vastamounts of data is not the same as effective C2.Marine Corps doctrine stresses effective leader-ship, articulation of the commander’s intent toguide subordinates, maximum initiative fromsubordinates, and decisionmaking with less thanperfect information.

When combined with a robust C2 systemand effective training and education oriented onrapid decisionmaking on all levels of command,the added speed and flexibility generated trans-lates into a high tempo of operations. Withgreater tempo, vulnerabilities can be exploited be-fore they are reduced, opportunities seized beforethey vanish, and traps sprung before they are dis-covered. In short, Marine forces seek to actquickly so that an enemy cannot react effectively.Operational Maneuver stresses the need to acquire,maintain, and exploit information and deal with

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uncertainty. The importance of advanced infor-mation technologies is acknowledged by C3I ca-pabilities desired for this concept, but the cogni-tive and creative elements brought about by awell trained leader also are stressed. Simply put,information superiority serves as a key enablingelement in the C2 tenets of Operational Maneuver.7

This is a central difference between JV 2010and Operational Maneuver. The operational envi-ronment for the latter is characterized by a dy-namic, fluid situation. In such a chaotic setting,JTF elements require commanders and staffs whocan tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty and makerapid decisions under stress. The Marines seeksimilar leaders and develop them by improvingtheir capacity to identify patterns, seek and select

critical information, and makequick decisions. This intuition-based decisionmaking cycle willbe enhanced by extensive in-vestments in education, gam-ing, and combat simulation ac-tivities, and by battlefield

visualization techniques. Interest in tactical deci-sionmaking games, wargaming vignettes, and Ma-rine Doom computer games reflects this bedrockunderstanding. Such investments will yield lead-ers who make informed judgments, act decisively,and ensure that Operational Maneuver and JV 2010are successfully executed.

From a Marine perspective, the key to thiscapability lies more in doctrine and training thanin hardware and computer technology. JV 2010suggests that information superiority is generatedby technology alone and underestimates the basiccontribution of trained and properly educatedleaders who have been immersed in tactical deci-sionmaking environments over many years.

Full Spectrum DominanceThe ultimate objective of JV 2010 is a mili-

tary that can achieve “full spectrum dominance,”an Army term for competence across the conflictspectrum. The quest to be “preeminent in anyform of conflict” is stated but rarely addressed indetail. By contrast, Operational Maneuver is notlimited to the high end or conventional side ofthe conflict spectrum. Indeed, in a world wherewar will be conducted in many different ways,the very notion of conventional warfare is likelyto fall from use. For that reason the techniques inOperational Maneuver must be applicable in situa-tions ranging from humanitarian relief to a high-stakes struggle against a rising superpower. Opera-tional Maneuver is designed to meet the need forengagement, crisis response, conflict prevention,and fighting and defeating various threats.

JTF commanders can employ C3I capabilitiesand the tactical mobility systems inherent in Op-erational Maneuver to maneuver forces preciselyand decisively in peacekeeping, humanitarian,counterterrorism, and sanction enforcementtasks. The sea-based posture of the concept per-mits “the freedom of action for our forces andlimits their vulnerability during combat and non-combatant operations,” as called for in JV 2010.Operational Maneuver also provides precision en-gagement ranging from one well trained individ-ual to an expeditionary force. Overall, OperationalManeuver appears more applicable to gaining“preeminence in any form of conflict.”

Operational Maneuver is a concept that islargely compatible with the desired capabilitiessought in JV 2010. It provides commanders withdominant maneuver and precision engagementacross the conflict spectrum and from the sea. Seabasing provides additive force protection whileenhancing logistics and operational flexibility. In-formation superiority as outlined in JV 2010 doesnot do justice to C2 requirements as the Marinesdefine them, but it does pose the requirement foroffensive and defensive information warfare, anemerging field which neither the Marine Corpsnor Operational Maneuver from the Sea have ad-dressed explicitly.

Although the overall intent and content of JV 2010 are laudable, considerable work remains to validate and implement it. The devil is in thedetails and creating a process that allows the jointcommunity to move from general concepts to con-crete combat capabilities. The evolution will haveits challenges. Until they are addressed, bringingJV 2010 to fruition will be an elusive goal.

JV 2010 makes a few references to high qual-ity people, professional training, and the need for

Directing HMMWV off landing craft,Kernel Blitz ’97.

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physical presence in the form of “boots on theground,” but it has a clear technological focus. Wemust avoid the illusion of attempting to imposecertainty on the battlefield.8 Technology offers im-provements in the speed and accuracy of humandecisionmaking, but it can’t eradicate the impactof friction, fog, and chance in warfare. We knowthat it can enhance both the ways and means offighting. But it can’t eliminate the myriad factorsthat make war a distinctly human endeavor.

Another potential downside exists in whatsome call “strategic monism”9—the reliance on asingle strategic approach. Diverse threats do notallow us to only have hammers in our toolbox. Ifyou only have a hammer every problem lookslike a nail. JV 2010 seeks to integrate rather thansupplant strategic concepts and functional servicecapabilities, but the dangers of strategic monismare never far away.10 Time will reveal what sort oftoolbox JV 2010 creates: all hammers or a set ofreliable capabilities for a range of tasks.

Successful innovation requires institutionalprocesses to explore and to systematically testand refine stated concepts or visions. Such empir-ical processes and concepts are “literally a sine quanon of successful military innovation in peace-time.”11 Experimentation takes place in a climatethat tolerates diversity and debate. This is the bestbreeding ground for substantive innovation andis a solid defense against doctrinal and institu-tional rigidity.

In a brief preface to JV 2010, General Sha-likashvili said: “Our organizational climate mustreward critical thinking, foster the competition ofideas, and reduce structural or cultural barriers toinnovation.” To prevent JV 2010 from becominga static fixation or procrustean bed that arbitrarilyhampers innovation, experimentation is needed.Since its appearance, however, the Joint Staff hasyet to develop such a process.

JV 2010 will ultimately be evaluated by howwell it supports national objectives. To meet fu-ture challenges, our strategic means must be farmore agile. We will increasingly require flexiblepeople and adaptive organizations to function influid environments. Our national security strat-egy calls for proactively shaping the internationalenvironment, emphasizing relationships withfriends, allies, and coalition partners. JV 2010, onthe other hand, has a warfighting focus withstress on the upper end of the conflict spectrum.Implementing it literally would structure ourforces purely for warfighting rather than engage-ment, presence, or crisis response. The Chairman

and CINCs will not let this happen, but thedilemma must be resolved.

A joint vision should guide the Armed Forcesfrom rigid or single service solutions toward anevolving, comprehensive framework to deal withany and all challenges. Operating in such an at-mosphere requires flexible, adaptive forces thatcan reorganize and reorient rapidly in response tonew tasks and missions. JV 2010 must promoteadaptation and innovation. It must generate bothdoctrine and forces to proactively shape the secu-rity environment of the next century. Ratherthan channeling it must advance innovation on awide front. We live in a period of uncertainty andmust be capable of operating and even thrivingin that medium. The sooner this reality is ac-cepted, the sooner we can implement JV 2010and really prepare for the future. JFQ

N O T E S

1 See James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras, Built toLast: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies (New York:Harper, 1994), and Perry M. Smith, Taking Charge: APractical Guide for Leaders (Washington: National De-fense University Press, 1986).

2 Directions for Defense: The Report of the Commissionon Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (May 1995), p. 2–2.

3 Robert Holzer, “JCS Forms Strategy for Future War-fare,” Defense News, July 22, 1996, p. 4; Robert Holzer,“Shali Pushes Future Force Strategy,” Defense News, Au-gust 29, 1996, p. 4.

4 “Operational Maneuver from the Sea,” MarineCorps Gazette, vol. 80, no. 6 (June 1996), special insert.

5 Charles C. Krulak, “Operational Maneuver fromthe Sea,” Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 123, no. 1 (Jan-uary 1997), pp. 26–31.

6 U.S. Marine Corps, Command and Control (October1996).

7 For an overview of Marine Corps views on C2 relat-ing to the fundamentals of warfare and decisionmaking,see Paul K. Van Riper, “Information Superiority,” MarineCorps Gazette, vol. 81, no. 6 (June 1997), pp. 54–62.

8 This has been updated as Marine Corps DoctrinalPub 1, Warfighting (June 1997). See also Barry Watts,“Clausewitzian Friction and Future War,” McNair Paperno. 52 (Washington: National Defense University Press,October 1996).

9 MacKubin T. Owens, Jr., “The Hollow Promise ofJCS Reform,” International Security, vol. 10, no. 3 (Winter1985–86), pp. 98–111.

10 Mackubin T. Owens, Jr., “Goldwater-Nichols: ATen-Year Retrospective,” Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 80,no. 12 (December 1996), pp. 48–53.

11 Barry Watts and Williamson Murray, “Military In-novation in Peacetime,” in Military Innovation in the In-terwar Period, edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R.Millett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996),p. 410. See also Williamson Murray, “Innovation: Pastand Future,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 12 (Summer1996), pp. 51–60.

0817PGS 4/13/98 6:54 PM Page 38


By R I C H A R D P. H A L L I O N

This century has been characterized bythe widespread impact of technologyin many fields. Mechanization, com-munications, and data processing have

profoundly influenced every significant aspect ofhuman activity. The internal combustion enginetransformed transportation. Journeys that tookweeks or months in the past now take days orhours. There are few if any places in the worldthat are truly unknown or unexplored. Out of ne-cessity the nature of warfare also has changed.

Swords, muskets, machine guns, artillery, tanks,airplanes, and rockets have all had their day onthe evolution chain of weaponry. Warfare as weknow it today combines the most modern ofthese elements to create a third dimension thathas irrevocably transformed land and seawarfighting. While airmen can point to numer-ous evolutionary steps in airpower dating back toWorld War I, it is the second great war that gavethe first convincing demonstrations of air warfareto a disbelieving military community.

The Historical RecordDuring World War II, when British land

forces were too weak to fend off an invasion bythe Wehrmacht, the Royal Air Force defeated theLuftwaffe and forced the dispersal of barges andships massing for attack. Britain thus became thefirst nation whose national survival was securedby airpower. Later, hammered by air attacks thatdisrupted his operations in the Western Desert,Rommel complained after the battle of AlamHalfa that the Royal Air Force:

had pinned my army to the ground and rendered anysmooth deployment or any advance by time-schedulecompletely impossible. . . . Anyone who has to fight,even with the most modern weapons, against an enemyin complete command of the air, fights like a savageagainst modern European troops, under the same hand-icaps, and with the same chances of success.1

Besieged in Normandy in summer 1944,Rommel echoed his desert commentary in diaryentries and conversations with fellow comman-ders: “The enemy’s air superiority has a very grave

Richard P. Hallion is the Air Force Historian; the author of 14 books on aerospace history, he was curator of the Air and Space Museum,Smithsonian Institution.

Airpowerand the Changing Nature of Warfare

British F.E. 2b beingreadied for night attack, World War I.

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effect on our movements. There’s simply no an-swer to it.”2 His naval aide, Vice Admiral FriedrichRuge, ruefully wrote, “Utilization of the Anglo-

American air force is themodern type of warfare,turning the flank not fromthe side but from above.”3

The same held true inItaly, where the Germancommander, General Fridovon Senger und Etterlin,

complained that Allied air attacks had put him inthe position of a chess player who could makeonly one move to an opponent’s three.4

Accompanying this impact of airpower onsurface mobility was a decided shift away from thetraditional means of winning surface campaigns,namely inflicting heavy casualties and materialloss on an enemy by battering its fleets or landarmies. In land combat after 1943, German armycasualties increasingly came from Allied air attack,with artillery second and infantry weapons third.By the end of 1944, air attack was the overwhelm-ing cause of German casualties in the field due tohostile action. In the Pacific Theater, naval war-

fare saw a similar evolution from tradi-tional naval strategy. A joint U.S.Army-Navy postwar assessment ofJapanese ship losses found that 48 per-cent stemmed from submarine attack,45 percent from air attack, and only0.45 percent from surface vessels.5

High technology since 1945 hasgenerally borne out the lessons of theairpower campaigns prior to V-E andV-J days. During the Korean War, themajority of communist losses camefrom U.N. air attack: 47 percent oftroops killed along with 75 percent oftanks, 81 percent of trucks, and 72percent of artillery destroyed.6 Moresignificantly, the situation in Koreawas in fact saved by joint and coali-

tion air operations during the critical openingweeks of the war, down through the bitter fight-ing on the Pusan perimeter. As Lieutenant Gen-eral Walton Walker, the commander of all U.S.ground forces in Korea in 1950, commented, “Ifit had not been for the air support that we re-ceived from the Fifth Air Force we would nothave been able to stay in Korea.”7

In the Gulf War decisionmakers recognizedthat air attack constituted the logical means todefeat Iraq. Testifying before Congress during theair campaign, General Colin Powell declared:“Airpower is the decisive arm so far, and I expectit will be the decisive arm into the end of thecampaign, even if ground forces and amphibiousforces are added to the equation.”8 In the Persian

Gulf most Iraqi prisoners cited fear of air attack—or the experience of having survived one—as thereason for surrendering.9

Today the capabilities available to the aircampaigner, particularly in precision attack,mean even more remarkable achievements maybe obtained, as the two most recent experiences,the Gulf War and Bosnia, have clearly demon-strated. The current Air Force posture statement,Global Engagement, argues that in the next cen-tury “the strategic instrument of choice will be airand space power.” 10

Warfare NeedsThe last hundred years have witnessed a mil-

itary revolution: 3–D warfare (particularly air andnow space) that has overturned previous traditionand experience. Ironically, sculptures in theBritish Museum from the age of savage Assyriankings reveal how court artists visualized the valueand versatility of aerial war, with gods on flyingdisks shooting arrows into their foes as Assyrianforces charged forward on the ground.

Perhaps the best indicator of what the air-power revolution has meant is that surface andair forces increasingly select air armament as theirweapons of choice: attack helicopters, battlefieldmissile systems, submarine-launched cruise mis-siles, carrier-based strike airplanes, and land-basedfighters and bombers. For this reason, armies andnavies worldwide are developing air and spaceforces, supplanting traditional expenditures ontroops, tanks, and warships.

The most dramatic example of this shift isthe proliferation of attack helicopters in militaryinventories worldwide and the growing recogni-tion that they represent more than “flyingtanks” or adjuncts to artillery and armor. Thenewsletter of the British Army Air Corps (whichwill field the Apache in December 2000) recog-nized the challenge of going beyond conven-tional thinking:

The attack helicopters will be a divisional manoeuvreasset, capable of operating in the deep, close, and rearbattles, perhaps simultaneously. Some attack heli-copters will almost certainly be allocated to supportthe close battle in a tactical role with battle groups,but it is the training to operate effectively across thewhole spectrum of operations that presents the greatestchallenge. . . . Apache may well discharge its missilesfrom up to eight kilometers behind forward troops, andthese troops will rarely see the aircraft once battle isjoined. Moreover, the pace of attack helicopter opera-tions will be faster than armour, for instance.11

■ A I R P O W E R A N D W A R F A R E


German casualties increasinglycame from Allied air attack,with artillery second and infantry weapons third

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To generations of soldiers schooled in the su-premacy of the tank and mechanized infantrysupported by artillery, these are challenging no-tions. Today, army aviators around the worldshare a view of conflict that recognizes that airwar permits simultaneous theater-wide paralleloperations. Such strategies are rarely available toa traditional army focused on a sequential visionof conflict.

Though long-standing, the advent of “airmobility” thinking—the trend of changing focusfrom traditional surface forces (infantry andtanks) to aerospace forces—has dramatically in-creased over the last two decades. In the United

States, the advent of the Army’s AirLand Battledoctrine of the early 1980s signalled a shift insurface-oriented doctrinal thought that had im-plications both at home and abroad.

For example, European armies have beendramatically restructured for airpower projectionin the last decade. Britain, Belgium, Sweden, andSpain have reduced army manpower and armorwhile increasing aviation assets. Even Germany,France, and Italy—which have downsized forcesacross the board—have reduced aviation to alesser extent. Leading navies also exhibit similartrends with the United States and Britain reduc-ing manpower, surface combatants, and sub-marines by margins that outweigh slight reduc-tions (or increases) in aircraft.12

Aircraft and aerospace weapons constitute alarge proportion of U.S. procurement dollars. Forexample, the Army spent $1.36 billion duringFY96 on aircraft (18 percent), $839 million onmissiles (11 percent), and $1.6 billion on trackedweapons (21 percent). Thus missiles and aircraftaccounted for 29 percent of Army procurement.In the same year the Navy devoted $4.44 billionto aircraft procurement (28 percent) and $6.5 bil-lion to shipbuilding and conversion (41 percent).

H–13 joining mecha-nized forces, 1952.

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F4F taking off fromUSS Enterprise in CoralSea, 1942.

U.S. Navy

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Again, the investment in surface ships is poten-tially misleading since much of this funding wentto aircraft carriers, guided missile destroyers, and

supply vessels—all critical tomaritime airpower projec-tion. By contrast, Air Forcepurchases of aircraft in FY96amounted to more than $7billion (43 percent) and mis-siles $334 million (2 per-cent). Overall direct aero-

space weapons expenditures (aircraft andmissiles) accounted for over 32 percent ($14.1 bil-lion) of a total procurement budget of $43.4 bil-lion for active and Reserve components of theArmy, Navy, and Air Force in FY96.13

Cultural Conflict versus RealityThis growing interest in airpower projection

by surface forces acknowledges a new reality inwarfare: the diminution of the battlefield as thearbiter of victory. Not surprisingly this is an un-popular notion. Armies have built on traditionsdating across millennia emphasizing that victory

can only come on the battlefield. The Army pos-ture statement in 1995 unequivocally stated:

Wars are won on the ground. Success or failure of theland battle typically equates to national success orfailure. The culminating or decisive action of a war ismost often conducted by land forces. . . . The applica-tion of military force on land is an action an adver-sary cannot ignore; it forces a decision.14

The view that only land combat can be deci-sive leads to a belief that the most legitimate rolefor airpower is in support of land warfare. But asAir Commodore Andrew Vallance of the Royal AirForce has indicated:

There is no factual basis to the belief that, in land/aircampaigns, the purpose of aviation forces must al-ways be to support the land forces. Airpower can andoften has acted as lead element in land/air as well asmaritime/air operations, and—as capabilities grow—it is likely to do so with increasing frequency.15

The most recent examples of that view arethe Gulf War—which had no Gettysburg, Stalin-grad, or El Alamein where one could erect monu-ments stating “on this spot Iraq lost the war” noreven a series of battles that together merit recog-nition for having doomed Saddam Hussein’sarmy; and the Balkans—where the 1995 air cam-paign was credited with having forced the Bosn-ian Serbs to the Dayton peace table. As former ne-gotiator Richard Holbrooke stated after the aircampaign, precision bombing had “the decisiveeffect” on forcing the Serbs to negotiate.

Another shibboleth often trotted out at theexpense of airpower is the notion that since aircannot “occupy or hold” ground, it cannot be de-cisive. Yet this line of reasoning increasingly ig-nores that the most important role of militaryforces is not in actual physical presence, butrather in using airpower or artillery to dominateand control access to and progress across theground. In this way airpower is a gatekeeper withmany examples, from World War I to the GulfWar, which attest to this role.

In brief, growing investments in air warfareby armies is a clear recognition that the nature ofwarfare has changed, that armies can no longerbe built exclusively—even primarily—around sur-face-to-surface systems. Unsurprisingly, as this vi-sion drives acquisition of aerospace systems suchas helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, and bal-listic missiles, armies still reflect the rhetoric ofthe past which prevents them from totally aban-doning the “heroic era” of land operations.

Future WarThe “one size fits all” approach is neither ap-

plicable nor appropriate to the enemies and con-flicts the United States and its allies may face. But



European Army Force Modernization

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1985–1986, and The Military Balance, 1995–1996.

growing interest in airpower projection acknowledges thediminution of the battlefield as the arbiter of victory

AviationManpowerTanks

United Kingdom

Belgium

% Change in Force Structure

Spain

Sweden

Germany

France

Italy

-60-70 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

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UH–1 landing troops in Vietnam.

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A–20 over EnglishChannel on D-Day.

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A4E firing 3-inch rockets,Southeast Asia.

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such enemies may possess some of the followinggeneric characteristics in addition to “traditional”infantry and armor forces:

■ weapons of mass destruction programs■ information warfare capabilities■ small conventional submarines with smart tor-

pedoes, together with both simple and sophisticated seamines

■ precision weaponry such as laser-guided bombs,antishipping missiles, and even longer-range cruise andballistic missiles

■ global positioning system technology■ satellite reconnaissance through third party

vendors■ small unmanned air vehicles for intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance■ an integrated air defense network tied to ad-

vanced surface-to-air missiles, advanced fighters (at leastMiG–29 equivalent), and antiaircraft artillery

■ battlefield rocket artillery with advanced antiar-mor submunitions

■ robust command and control bunkered in un-derground facilities.

In fact, a study by the Defense ScienceBoard looked at a similar 21st century enemy.Soberingly, such capabilities are within the bud-getary range of many Third World nations, someof which have decidedly militaristic intentionsand could not be defeated by traditional surfacewarfare.

Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, Amer-ican planners proposed a series of imaginative de-fenses (such as the assault breaker study) tocounter armor-heavy scenarios of a NATO-War-saw Pact exchange in Central Europe. From thiscame enlightened approaches that used sophisti-cated air warfare-based means to defeat anenemy, typified by AirLand Battle.

Meanwhile, at the heart of American defensewas an attempt to combine emerging stealthtechnology, newer generations of precision muni-

tions, and increasingly so-phisticated intelligence andreconnaissance systems intoan offset strategy to wreakhavoc on an enemy force.That work, validated in theGulf War, forms a point ofdeparture for future regional

conflicts of the post-Cold War variety. As formerSecretary of Defense William Perry commented:

What we had done in the offset strategy—the applica-tions of the reconnaissance strike force, the applica-tion of proceed and strike—had a second policy objec-tive, an alternative policy objective when used in amajor regional conflict like Desert Storm. When usedagainst an opponent with equal numbers, [it] did notsimply offset the other side, it gave us the ability towin quickly, decisively, and with remarkably few ca-sualties. And when we . . . studied that result, we

looked at the kind of policy problems and military op-erational issues we’re going to be facing in the yearsahead, we said the very same technology that was de-veloped to deal with superior numbers of Sovietswould become the key to our new systems.16

That statement enumerates what have be-come the characteristic goals of modern post-Gulf, post-Somalia military operations: “to winquickly, decisively, and with remarkably few casu-alties.” Simply put, the American people do nothave a willingness, desire, or mind-set to acceptlong, ambiguous, and costly conflicts. To someleaders, this poses a serious problem. As the Chiefof Staff of the U.S. Army has warned:

The world has witnessed our infatuation with preci-sion strike, apparent unwillingness to commit forcesfor a long period, aversion to casualties, fear of collat-eral damage, and sensitivity to domestic and worldopinion. Those who don’t wish us well understandwhere our strengths and weaknesses lie and may actaccordingly. Therefore, it is even more important tomaintain balance between dominant maneuver, par-ticularly on the ground, and precision engagement.Ground forces employing dominant maneuver in ashow of force or demonstration may be able to resolvemany issues without employing lethal means. Moreimportant, employment of maneuver forces sends anunequivocal message of U.S. resolve.17

But is such fear on one hand and promise onthe other well founded? Sequential models of sur-face warfare stress punishing contact between ro-bust opposing forces, with horrendous levels ofcasualties and mutual destruction even under thebest of circumstances. For instance, prior to theGulf War, General Edward Meyer, a former Chiefof Staff of the U.S. Army, estimated that up to30,000 American casualties would be sustained indislodging Iraq from Kuwait.18 This mindset read-ily accepts casualties as “necessary to get the jobdone.” But wars in this century have shown thatwhen airpower—an inherently maneuver-ori-ented force—is applied, the land effort is not onlyincreasingly reduced in cost and complexity butoften deflated in importance.

Inserting ground forces in a region todaymay create more problems than it resolves. Forexample, in Bosnia U.N. peacekeepers becamehostages to hostile forces who used them ascheap air defense systems to guard against NATOairpower. Further, peacekeeping forces served aseasy targets for snipers and land mines. In addi-tion, moving vehicle-heavy surface forces into acrisis region created problems. Before the fightingended in Bosnia after a swift air campaign, a



wars in this century haveshown that when airpower is applied, the land effort isoften deflated in importance

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major concern of both American and Europeanstaffs was what to do if it became necessary to ex-tract the large numbers of ground forces whowere supporting the U.N. effort. What if theywere attacked? What if the local population at-tempted to prevent them from leaving? Whatwould happen to their vehicles? How could theybe extracted?

In short, strategists must realize that if landforces are deployed, the “unequivocal message”sent may not be one of “U.S. resolve,” but ratherone of how the U.S. military is trapped in an op-erational morass. The penalty, as in Somalia, maybe an embarrassing withdrawal.

Joint Vision 2010 provided a common vectorfor achieving “full spectrum dominance” over anenemy via four concepts: dominant maneuver, pre-cision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimen-sional protection. What modern airpower offers—and what the Air Force has staked out in GlobalEngagement as its key contribution to joint force—is a series of mutually supportive core competen-cies that, linked by space-based global awarenessand command and control, provide the criticalairpower and spacepower that the Armed Forceswill need to preserve the advantage gained bothin the Gulf War and in Bosnia.

Those nations that are potentially hostile toU.S. interests are unlikely to ignore the lessons ofrecent history as they reshape air and surfaceforces for the next century. They will evaluate thevalue of advanced weaponry demonstrated re-peatedly in Yom-Kippur, Falklands, Bekaa, and

DO

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Remains of North Korean formationalong Naktong River.

Pointing out air defenses during Desert Storm.

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Wreckage on highwayoutside Kuwait City.

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Iran-Iraq and observe that warfare has increas-ingly seen the smarter, more technologically so-phisticated protagonist seek to strike at enemiesfrom a distance. When that advantage was lost,unnecessary casualties or defeat followed. In thewars of tomorrow, a new airpower and artilleryparadigm for military force will predominate, notthe old infantry-armor team. Except for a few sce-narios, the need (as opposed to the ability or thedesire) to commit friendly ground forces to closecombat with an enemy simply will not exist. Airweaponry—such as battlefield missiles, attack he-licopters, fixed-wing aerial attackers, and re-motely launched cruise missiles—will not onlysuffice but will be the most desirable means ofconfronting an enemy. If the Armed Forces donot transform their thinking on future war, theNation will expose its men and women in uni-form to unnecessary and foolish risks. And that isan alternative that is no longer acceptable. JFQ

N O T E S

1 B.H. Liddell Hart, editor, The Rommel Papers (NewYork: Harcourt, Brace, 1953), pp. 284–86.

2 Ibid., p. 491.3 Friedrich Ruge, Rommel in Normandy: Reminiscences

by Friedrich Ruge (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1979),p. 187.

4 Frido von Senger und Etterlin, Neither Fear NorHope (New York: Dutton, 1964), p. 224.

5 Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee, JapaneseNaval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World War IIby All Causes (Washington: Government Printing Office,1947), table II, p. vii.

6 “The Air War in Korea: A Statistical Portrait of theUSAF in the First Hot Conflict of the Cold War,” AirForce Magazine, vol. 79, no. 4 (April 1996), p. 66.

7 Barcus Board Report, book 2, vol. 1, pp. 227–28.The commander of Fifth Air Force controlled all tacticalair support provided to Eighth Army and liaised directlywith Walker.

8 Transcript of testimony of Colin L. Powell beforethe Senate Armed Service Committee, January 21, 1991.

9 A.P.N. Lambert, “Synergistic Operations,” in RoyalAir Force, Chief of the Air Staff’s Air Power Seminar, paperspresented at the Church House Conference Centre,London, March 24, 1995, p. 8. See also J.M. Marcumand D.W. Cline, “Combat Stress Reaction in Iraqi Pris-oners of War,” Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, vol. 57,no. 4 (Fall 1993), p. 479.

10 Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century AirForce (Washington: Department of the Air Force, 1996).

11 R.A. James, editorial, Army Air Corps Newsletter, October–December 1996, p. 3.

12 See The Military Balance, 1985–1986, and The Mili-tary Balance, 1995–1996, published by the InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies.

13 “Procurement Dollars,” Sea Power, vol. 40, no. 1(January 1997), p. 88.

14 A Statement on the Posture of the United StatesArmy—Fiscal Year 1996 (Washington: Department of theArmy, 1995), pp. 26–27.

15 Andrew G.B. Vallance, The Air Weapon: Doctrines ofAir Power Strategy and Operational Art (London: Macmil-lan, 1996), p. 91.

16 Statement by William J. Perry to the PrecisionStrike Association in Arlington, Virginia, on January 15,1997, and quoted in “For the Record,” The WashingtonPost, January 16, 1997.

17 Dennis J. Reimer, “Balancing Dominant Maneuverand Precision Engagement: A Strategy for the 21st Cen-tury,” draft manuscript (1997).

18 John J. Fialka and Andy Pasztor, “Grim Calculus: If Mideast War Erupts, Air Power Will Hold Key to U.S.Casualties,” The New York Times, November 15, 1990.

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German tanks hit byfighter-bombers inTunisia.

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By C H A R L E S J. D U N L A P, J R.

H ow will the Armed Forces fight futurewars? Joint Vision 2010 professes tooffer some answers by furnishing atemplate to “channel the vitality and

innovation of our people and leverage techno-logical opportunities to achieve new levels of ef-fectiveness in joint warfighting.” The vision hasgenerated considerable interest and praise. Aquintessentially American document, it relies ontechnological preeminence and an uncompro-mising faith in the superiority of the individualsoldier. JV 2010 suggests that the United Statesplans to approach warfare in the future by em-bracing the fundamentals that have marked itswarfighting strategy for most of the 20th century.

Potential enemies, however, may approachwarfare differently. Some experts contend con-flicts in the future are likely to occur between dis-parate civilizations whose peoples may not shareWestern values or democratic ideals. Similarly, itis asserted that the post-Cold War world is experi-encing a reemergence of warrior societies whichare psychologically distinct from the West.

However well JV 2010 fits the future Americanway of war, it must be evaluated from the perspec-tive of potential enemies. Given our template, howmight such enemies prepare to fight us? In short,what is the red team analysis of JV 2010?

Organized, Trained, and EquippedA red team may conclude that there is no fu-

ture in force-on-force symmetrical warfighting.Defeating U.S. forces on the battlefield has beenvery difficult in the modern era and those na-tions who have attempted it, such as Iraq, haveoften suffered crushing defeats. In fact, the awe-some U.S. conventional capability in the GulfWar prompted the chief of staff of the Indianarmed forces to assert that the only way to fightthe United States is with nuclear weapons.

So long as America maintains its nuclear de-terrent, it is unlikely that an enemy will resort toweapons of mass destruction. During DesertShield/Desert Storm the ambiguities of possibleU.S. responses dissuaded Saddam Hussein fromusing such weapons and would likely affect allbut the most irrational actors in a similar way.With defeat of the U.S. military seemingly be-yond reach, how might an enemy confrontAmerica in the future?

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Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, serves as staff judge advocate atU.S. Strategic Command and is the author of “The Origins of AmericanMilitary Coup of 2012.”

Joint Vision 2010:A Red Team Assessment

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Many might conclude that it is not neces-sary to overcome U.S. forces. Instead, they mightfocus on another leg of Clausewitz’s trinity, thepeople. Taking a cue from North Vietnam,which vanquished the United States withoutsubduing its forces, future enemies might seepublic opinion as America’s center of gravity. Alikely red team strategy thus could aim toweaken that support.

One way to achieve this objective would beto exploit the phenomenon of casualty aversionthat is so influential in U.S. political and militarythinking. JV 2010 recognizes this and notes thatthe “American people will . . . expect us to bemore efficient in protecting lives and resourceswhile accomplishing our mission successfully.”

The response to the deaths of 18 U.S.Rangers in Somalia may lead an enemy to con-clude that this is an effective way to blunt Ameri-can power. Those casualties were seeminglyenough to erode support at home and instigate awithdrawal. Thus an enemy may focus on caus-ing casualties regardless of their own losses orwhether they achieve a tactical win.

Moreover, depending on the success of fulldimensional protection as depicted in JV 2010, anenemy may seek to produce casualties among the

expanding ranks of civil-ians who accompany forcesrather than among militarypersonnel per se. The high-tech military envisioned inJV 2010 will likely requiresupport technicians whoare less capable of defend-

ing themselves. Assaults on civilians could causethem to abandon their jobs at critical moments.

An especially Machiavellian and populousenemy might deliberately induce U.S. forces tokill large numbers of its own people to create areaction that undermines public support. Tomany in the United States, even the deaths ofbrutal enemy combatants is somehow offensiveto notions of fair play. During the Gulf War, forexample, television images of wrecked Iraqi ve-hicles along the so-called “highway of death”contributed to the early termination of hostili-ties, thereby allowing elite Iraqi forces to escapedestruction.

In short, the red team may take a completelyopposite view from JV 2010 by considering thephysical defeat of U.S. forces as a secondary ob-jective or non-objective.

Values and PeopleSuccess depends on the moral strength of in-

dividual soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen, ac-cording to JV 2010. Yet ironically American val-ues may be seen as a weakness to be exploited. A

red team might conclude that such exploitationis an effective means of diminishing a high-techadvantage. For example, JV 2010 asserts that“long-range precision capability . . . is emerging asa key factor.” The Libyans reportedly threatenedto counter such high-tech weapons by using theirown people as human shields around key facili-ties. The precedent? The Serbs resisted NATO’sprecision munitions by the simple expedient ofchaining U.N. hostages to potential targets.

The lesson is that the United States mustfind ways to deal with streetfighters who refuse toplay by the rules. Their viciousness has the poten-tial to create corrosive moral dilemmas for U.S.troops and even traumatize them into inaction.Advocates of JV 2010 must insist that enemieswho engage in such actions are held accountableto discourage barbarism in countering high tech.

JV 2010 states that U.S. forces are the besttrained in the world. But a red team analysis re-veals that this may not be as advantageous assome believe. First, we may need more trainingthan our future enemies. Relative to the emergingwarrior societies, those in the West make poorsoldiers and can achieve parity in fighting spiritonly through intensive training of selectively re-cruited forces.

Where we have excelled is in technical train-ing. Yet red team analysis reveals that low-costtechnology substantially narrows that advantage.Computerized instruction and simulation alreadyfurnish a cheap way of teaching technical skills.Moreover, a $49 computer simulation programcan provide instruction in tactical combat skills.

More fundamentally, forces may not requireas much technical skill as JV 2010 expects. So-phisticated, user-friendly software may so sim-plify the operation of otherwise complexweapons systems that advanced training is un-necessary. Many systems will also have computer-ized self-diagnosis and repair capabilities.

As implied by JV 2010, technology is becom-ing available to provide individual soldiers withunprecedented access to all kinds of informationon the battlefield. If its cost declines as radicallyas that of other information devices, enemiescould deploy masses of technically untutored sol-diers in the belief that their forces could obtainthe necessary expertise anywhere on the battle-field. Technology-created “virtual” noncommis-sioned officers, for example, could obviate an ad-vantage long enjoyed by the United States.

The training which the Armed Forces willmost need in the future is not in technical skillsper se, but in the warrior spirit, unit cohesion,and other intangibles unique to warfighting.

■ J V 2 0 1 0: A R E D T E A M A S S E S S M E N T


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Technological Superiority?JV 2010 places heavy emphasis on high-tech

weaponry. This focus reflects much of the debateover the so-called revolution in military affairsoccasioned by computer and communications

technologies. But a variety offactors conspire to deny U.S.forces the technological ad-vantage that JV 2010 seems todemand.

Most important is theplain fact that high-tech, in-formation-based weapons in-

creasingly rely on technology that has commer-cial applications. An enemy could leverage theglobal research and development base for the lat-est systems. In many instances, especially in less-developed parts of the world, international aidand other incentives may be available to build adual-use information systems manufacturing basewith great military potential. Because it also fos-ters economic development, the usual guns orbutter debate need not arise.

In sum, an enemy will be able to purchaseon the open market the same capability that theUnited States employs—and perhaps morequickly and efficiently. Consequently, it would bewise to urge a radical reform of the procurementprocess to ensure that America has the most ad-vanced weaponry available.

According to JV 2010, “We must have infor-mation superiority.” Few aspects of JV 2010 aremore vexing than its unwarranted confidence inthe capability to achieve information superiorityon tomorrow’s battlefields. All indications pointto a future where an avalanche of details on cur-rent operations is open to anyone for a modestinvestment. Commercial satellites will providehigh-resolution images that were previously theexclusive domain of intelligence services in devel-oped nations. The Internet is a simple, cheap,risk-free way of collecting intelligence data. An-other innovation, individual telephones linkedby satellite for soldiers on the battlefield, will beextremely vulnerable to monitoring by un-friendly forces. Perhaps the greatest source of redteam information will be the media. Equippedwith the latest technology and free from relianceon or control by any government, the media willbe able to report on every aspect of U.S. militaryoperations nearly instantaneously.

In truth, the proliferation of informationsources will defy attempts by any one party togain genuine superiority; there will simply be toomany information sources, many of which can-not be degraded because of legal or political con-straints. Therefore it is troubling that JV 2010 ap-pears to be so dependent upon informationsupremacy. What if that capability is not

achieved? We should prepare to fight in the morerealistic environment of information parity,which would also have the benefit of even greaterdominance should information superiority some-how be achieved.

One should not conclude that JV 2010 isfundamentally flawed. To the contrary, in broadterms its genius is that it is built on what can beviewed as a postmodern American way of war.However, like any template its ultimate effective-ness will be determined by the quality of theideas that fill it.

It is critical, however, to consider a red teamanalysis in implementing JV 2010. Such an ex-amination might reveal a phenomenon that par-allels thinking on the unintended consequencesof technology. For example, JV 2010 touts preci-sion engagement as a means to reduce the “riskto forces and minimize collateral damage.” Tomany Americans the advent of smart weaponsheralds a more humane era of warfare; indeed,some find precision strikes against purely mili-tary targets to reflect favorably on the moralcharacter of precise weaponry.

Do others accept this view of the benevo-lence of precision weapons? Apparently not theRussians. As David Markow reported in the Febru-ary 1997 issue of Air Force:

Many Russian military theorists believe nuclearweapons provide the best answer to the challenge posed byconventionally armed precision guided munitions . . . Russiangenerals fear that, in a general war, Western nations couldemploy such “smart munitions” to degrade Russian strategicforces, without ever having to go nuclear themselves. Conse-quently, said General Volkov, Russia “should enjoy the rightto consider the first [enemy] use of precision weapons as thebeginning of unrestricted nuclear war against it.”

As this passage illustrates, the high techwhich underpins so much of the template foundin JV 2010 might have wholly unintended effects.Accordingly, decisionmakers should insist that itstenets be continually tested not only against U.S.perspectives, but also against those of potentialenemies.

If JV 2010 assumes a mantle of infallibilitywhereby merely challenging its assumptions is re-garded as blasphemous, it could be a catastrophicfailure. Unless leaders demand a rigorous andcontinuous red team analysis, the Nation mayfind itself vulnerable to enemies whose 21st cen-tury vision is profoundly at odds with all that wehold dear. JFQ

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Strategy and war are holistic enterprises.U.S. strategic culture is wont to functiontaking one thing at a time on its ownmerits. Monochronic defense perfor-

mance leads to a focus on only one or two di-mensions of what is almost always a more com-plex challenge. Strategy has a variety ofdimensions, each of which matters though differ-ently from one historical case to another. Eachhas the potential to undo a strategic venture. Thegeneric dimensions of strategy are ubiquitous and

fixed, but their details often change. The gram-mar of strategy can altar radically, even to thepoint where one can argue that a revolution inmilitary affairs (RMA) has occurred. Presently Iidentify 17 working dimensions of strategy:ethics; society; geography; politics; people; cul-ture; theory; command (political and military);economics and logistics; organization (includingdefense policy and force planning); militarypreparation (administration, research and devel-opment, procurement, recruitment, training, andnumbers or mass); operations; technology; infor-mation and intelligence; adversary; friction,chance, and uncertainty; and time. Some (liketechnology or command) figure more promi-nently than others, but none can be taken for

Colin S. Gray is the director of the Centre for Security Studies at theUniversity of Hull; his books include The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War.

RMAs and the Dimensions of StrategyBy C O L I N S. G R A Y

On the offensive inKuwait.

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granted. Having so many interdependent dimen-sions means that advantages derived from im-proving one are seriously limited.

Two SchoolsCultural anthropologists note that America

is a preponderantly monochronic culture, whichmeans that it considers challenges one at a time,in isolation, pragmatically.1 As a result nationalstrategy in the United States reflects this one-thing-at-a-time, each-on-its-merits approach. De-fense intellectuals have a way of validating theWatergate investigatory tactic of “following themoney.” The trail of dollars for studies leads fromone “big idea” to another—monochronically. Al-though there is essential unity, indeed a poly-chronicity, to strategic experience, defense issuesrapidly fall into and out of fashion. There hasbeen controversy over détente, nuclear strategy,

ICBM basing, SDI andmore SDI, competitivestrategies, and so forth.The tide of issues comes inregularly with new or new-sounding ideas, and then

inexorably it goes out. Today it is RMA and infor-mation warfare. To point out the fluctuating na-ture of these issues is not to dismiss them; but itis to admit that only historical perspective can re-veal just how useful they are.2

Herman Kahn was a defense intellectualwhose primary instinct was to put things togetherrather than disassemble them for monochronic,piece-by-piece analysis.3 One cannot emulate hisgenius, but one can follow his methodology. Thisarticle presents strategy and war holistically withemphasis on the totality of the subject no matterhow formidable it may appear. Indeed, the more astrategic phenomenon is examined, the morecomplex it seems. Readers may have noticed thatthe more professional historians scrutinize mili-tary experience, the more RMAs appear. It is notunlike probing the universe with more powerfultelescopes. When additional historians join in thedebate, they are apt to attest to the plausible exis-tence of one or more RMAs in their century nomatter what their periods of expertise may be.4

A hard core of interconnected ideas formsthe thread of this argument, specifically:

■ Strategy and war have many dimensions (while17 is my preference, the list is open).

■ Every dimension matters though interactionamong them varies from case to case.

■ All dimensions of strategy matter so much thata severe national or coalition disadvantage in any onecan have a lethal strategic effect overall.

■ Dimensions of strategy and war are genericallyas eternal and ubiquitous as their details, and like de-tails of their interconnections change from one contextto another. The nature and structure of strategy are ef-fectively immortal.5

■ But the character and conduct of war (or to mis-quote Clausewitz, who wrote of its “grammar”), thegrammar of strategy, how strategy is achieved by tactics,6

must change—possibly radically—along with political,social, economic, and technological conditions.

■ Although the nature and structure of strategyand war remain constant, changes in the character andconduct of war can arguably be described as revolutionsin military affairs. The term revolution, however, doesrisk devaluing those variables that change more slowly.

■ It follows that we know a great deal about strat-egy and war; and, ipso facto, we know quite a lot aboutwhat we do not and cannot comprehend.

While this argument is profoundly conserva-tive, it allows for the certainty of change. Early inthe 20th century the rapid pace of technical andthus tactical developments in Britain provokedbitter debate in the Royal Navy between “mater-ial” and “historical” schools of thought.7 Advo-cates of the former asserted that great—even notso great—technical change meant that the entiresubject of war, at all levels and in all dimensions,was effectively changed or revolutionized. Therival historical school argued that strategy and warare as unchanging in their essentials as technol-ogy and tactics are permanently in flux. The termsof this debate in the 1900s between materialistslike Admiral Jackie Fisher and historical thinkerslike Admiral Reginald Custance still persist to thisday with evolving levels of detail. To the materialschool the world may be made over whenever anew technology comes along.

Everything MattersMichael Howard provided the most direct

stimulus to thought on the dimensions of strat-egy by identifying the logistical, operational, so-cial, and technological.8 Writing within the con-text of an active debate about SALT II andnuclear strategy, Howard was concerned that theUnited States appeared to be focusing unduly onthe technological at the expense of the socialand operational.

When considering strategy vis-à-vis the de-bate over RMA and information warfare, I preferto use no fewer than the 17 dimensions alreadymentioned. These work with, on, and aroundeach other simultaneously. Anyone who arguesthat strategy really has only one or two dimen-sions will oppose this approach. One should bereluctant to rank-order the dimensions of strat-egy; hence the order in which they are citedabove is largely random. By analogy, the modelrange for auto makers typically emphasizes en-gine type and size as leading edge or dominant

the historical school arguedthat strategy and war are unchanging in their essentials

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for each vehicle in its range. Nonetheless, carscannot operate without drive trains, electrical sys-tems (including batteries), or tires. Furthermore,there are restrictions on what improvements toautomotive dimensions can achieve unless bal-ancing refinements are made in others. Twin tur-bos are nice to have, but not without betterbrakes and tires and—returning to the question ofstrategy—a better driver.

An excellent military may, even with faultypolitical guidance, fight the wrong war well. Con-versely, a wretched force may fight the right warbadly. The primary point is the stupefyingly obvi-ous one that everything matters. The secondarypoint is that even wonderful improvements inmilitary effectiveness—as might be delivered byU.S. forces multiplied by the so-called “system ofsystems” 9—are likely to disappoint if politicalleadership is poor. After all, Germany was secondto none in fighting during two world wars, but itwas awesomely incompetent in waging war.

Beyond GeographyThere is no correct answer to the question:

How many dimensions are there to strategy? Theexact numbers or labels of the dimensions donot matter, but it is important that everything of

significance about strategy has been includedsomewhere among them. A country or coalitionneed not be outstanding or even excellent in alldimensions of strategy. Wars can be won—whichis to say, enough strategic effect can be gener-ated—despite unsound plans, uninspired politi-cal leaders, undistinguished generalship, badluck, or inconvenient geography. Three pointsrequire prompt registration. First, each dimen-sion is a player. It is part of national strategy—inevery conflict, in every historical era.

Second, some substitution is feasible among,between, and even within the dimensions of strat-egy.10 It is rare for a nation to be equally compe-tent on land, at sea, in the air, and in space (or cy-berspace). Or, in the case of Germany’s Östheer (itsarmy in the East), the quality and quantity of oneside’s technology may be degraded during thecourse of war, but some useful compensation maybe found in the realm of motivation (fightingspirit, morale, and ideology). Or information onan enemy may be in short supply, but some mixof luck, better logistics, superior organization, andhigher morale may enable a nation to survive un-pleasant surprises. Yet specific circumstances al-ways differ. Because of inadequate operational in-formation, Anglo-French forces were taken bysurprise in both World War I and II, recoveringfrom their ignorance in 1914 but not in 1940.

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Third, there is, or should be, a level of com-petitive performance in each dimension which, ifone falls below it, has the inexorable consequenceof adversely deciding the conflict. You lose.

The argument advanced is that a whole rangeof strategic dimensions influences conflict, notjust those either preferred or designated. Whichamong them does not matter? It has been debated

whether geography mat-ters much in the age of cy-berspace.11 If cyberspacerules, and cyberpower iseverywhere and nowhere(placelessly “beyond geog-

raphy”), perhaps we are witnessing a radical de-parture from previous strategic experience. Yetperhaps there are grounds for skepticism.

The argument that the holistic nature ofstrategy and war can be ignored only at one’speril is considered by one analyst who advisesthat “Human limitations, informational uncer-tainties, and nonlinearity are not pesky difficul-ties better technology and engineering can elimi-nate, but built-in or structural features of theviolent interaction between opposing groups wecall war.”12 To take just one of these features, thelimits in the human (and command) dimensionof strategy can easily restrict or offset any gains ofa technological edge. (And the human dimensionplays at every level of conflict from tactics tostatecraft.)

If one accepts the promise of immaculateperformance by technology-rich, information-ledwarriors, what can one assume about U.S. com-petitiveness in other dimensions of strategy? Is itreasonable to anticipate excellence in politicalleadership, enthusiasm on the part of the public,and superiority in making, executing, and moni-toring the means of strategic performance?13

Cookbook StrategyWhether or not one thinks appropriately

about an RMA or implements one competently inall its requisite aspects (technology, weaponiza-tion, doctrine, training, organization, acquisitionof critical mass of numbers) may have little actualbearing on future U.S. strategic performance. Thisis because the friction that degrades national per-formance most insistently may well lie betweenthe government and the Armed Forces, or be-tween the government and society. This is not arebuke of military modernization or hostility to-ward the concept of RMA, nor by implication acritique of information warfare in its severalguises. Instead, it is simply an argument thatcountries conduct conflict, wage wars, and makeand execute strategy as a whole. Clausewitz made

this point clearly when he referred to the trinityof passion, uncertainty, and reason, which are as-sociated primarily with the people, the army andits commanders, and the government respec-tively.14 Unfortunately, there is little analysis inOn War about the vital subject of the difficultiesthat can and do arise when policy and militaryinstruments are not both excellent and operatingin harmony.

There is no need to belabor the blindinglyobvious point that the dimensions of strategy areinterdependent. However, it may be worth offer-ing the caveat that to every robust-looking theorythere is apt to be the odd exception. One shouldrecall that Clausewitz, unlike Jomini, declined tooffer a cookbook of rules for strategy.15 Hence theargument here has a Clausewitzian rather than aJominian message. No general theory of strategyor architecture of understanding can truly beproof against folly or bad luck on a heroic scale.Although it is true that each dimension of strat-egy is important and poor performance in anyone could decide the ultimate outcome of a con-flict, and that no degree of superiority in any oneor two can deliver victory if performance else-where is too low, an exception is always possiblein practice. Military genius (or folly) on a heroicscale writes or rewrites the principles of strategy.

Again, the nature, purpose, and structure ofstrategy are eternal and ubiquitous. Any war, inany period, between any adversaries (like or un-like), can be understood with reference to theseparticular dimensions. What must vary, how-ever—sometimes quite radically—is the detail ofthe complex interplay among and within them.But when advocates of the historical school claimthat strategy is strategy and war is war regardlessof the time, place, adversaries, and technology,this is what is meant. Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan,and Liddell Hart were right in stating that the na-ture of strategy and war does not, indeed cannotchange. The components and structure of thesubject remain constant—only the details change.Each dimension of strategy considered aboveplayed a part in the Peloponnesian War, thePunic Wars, and the Crusades.

The complexity of war and the diversity ofthe instruments of strategy with which we wageit have increased over the past century. Technol-ogy, tactics, doctrine, and organization have beenadjusting to experience and in anticipation of theadvantages to be gained or the disadvantages tobe avoided. Novel though each additional envi-ronment for war certainly is, however, we findthat as we have proceeded to fight in the air, toconsider combat in and for space and in cyber-space—as well as on land and at sea—the samerules govern strategic performance everywhere.Whether or not forces specialized for combat in

no general theory of strategycan truly be proof against follyor bad luck on a heroic scale

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various geographies (or perhaps anti-geographyin cyberspace) can win wars by independent ac-tion, each must follow the guiding rule of classi-cal strategy. That rule mandates securing militarycontrol in each geography as a prerequisite forstrategic exploitation. The same logic applies forland, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. If sea, air, orcyberspace forces are to exercise their roles asteam players, each must first succeed in its dis-tinctive environment. To understand why onemust be ready to fight at sea is to grasp why onemust be ready to fight in the air, in space, or incyberspace. The logic of strategy and war is thesame.16 If an environment is militarily important,we must be ready to fight for the right to use it.

Overall, we know almost everything that weneed to know, and probably all we can know,about the future of strategy and war. Indeed, ifone is willing to engage in reductionism, it canbe claimed that Thucydides recorded almosteverything worth considering about the causes ofwar and the political need for strategy by empha-sizing just three impulses: fear, honor, and inter-est.17 It is not obvious that modern scholarshipon the motives for empire or the causes of warhas produced conclusions superior to that trini-tarian hypothesis.18

What is not known about the future of strat-egy and war is almost all of detail, significant andinsignificant. Many pundits have a weakness forinvoking the phrase “the foreseeable future.” Butthe future has not happened and cannot be fore-seen in detail. Under political guidance that is cer-tain to be unsatisfactory, likely to contain contra-dictions, and almost bound to bear the stamp ofsome unsound assumptions, defense planners areobliged to decide what is a good enough defenseestablishment when one cannot know preciselywhether, when, where, or for what ends war willbe waged. But if it is any consolation, at least theyknow what strategy and war are made of—the 17dimensions—and should be rendered immune byeducation, including the education provided byexperience, to persuasion by unsound theories ofmiracle cures for strategic ills. JFQ

N O T E S

1 Edward T. Hall, Beyond Culture (Garden City, N.Y.:Doubleday, 1976).

2 See the discussion in Colin S. Gray, The AmericanRevolution in Military Affairs: An Interim Assessment, Oc-casional Paper 28 (Camberley: Strategic and CombatStudies Institute, Joint Services Command and StaffCollege, 1997).

3 Kahn’s instinct for synthesis is represented in OnEscalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Praeger,1965).

4 For example, see Clifford J. Rogers, ed., The Mili-tary Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transfor-mation of Early Modern Europe (Boulder, Colo.: Westview,1995).

5 This argument is a central theme in Colin S. Gray,Understanding Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford Univer-sity Press, forthcoming).

6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and trans-lated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 605.

7 Battlelines for debate were drawn most clearly inReginald Custance, “Introduction” to “Barfleur,” NavalPolicy: A Plea for the Study of War (Edinburgh: WilliamBlackwood and Sons, 1907), pp. vii–ix.

8 Michael Howard, “The Forgotten Dimensions ofStrategy,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 57, no. 5 (Summer 1979),pp. 975–86.

9 James R. Blaker, Understanding the Revolution in Mil-itary Affairs: A Guide to America’s 21st Century Defense,Defense Working Paper 3 (Washington: Progressive Pol-icy Institute, January 1997).

10 See Andrew G.B. Vallance, The Air Weapon: Doc-trines of Air Power Strategy and Operational Art (London:Macmillan, 1996), chapter 2.

11 See both Colin S. Gray, “The Continued Primacyof Geography” (and “A Rejoinder”), and Martin Libicki,“The Emerging Primacy of Information,” Orbis, vol. 40,no. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 247–59, 261–76.

12 Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and FutureWar, McNair Paper 52 (Washington: National DefenseUniversity Press, October 1996), p. 122.

13 On strategy as process, see Williamson Murrayand Mark Grimsley, “Introduction: On Strategy,” inWilliamson Murray, Macgregor Knox, and Alvin Bern-stein, eds., The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, andWar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994),chapter 1.

14 Clausewitz, On War, p. 89.15 Contrast Clausewitz, On War, p. 141, with Antoine

Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (Novato, Calif.: Pre-sidio, 1992), pp. 16–17, 70, 114. Michael I. Handel, Mas-ters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 2d ed. (London:Frank Cass, 1996), offers a comparative treatment.

16 This proposition pervades Edward N. Luttwak,Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1987).

17 Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: AComprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War (New York:Free Press, 1996), p. 43.

18 See Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War and thePreservation of Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1995),which is influenced by Thucydides; and Hidemi Sug-anami, On the Causes of War (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1996).

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Today, U.S. Pacific Command(PACOM) forces are readyand work closely with ourallies to prevent conflict in

the Asia-Pacific region. This has not al-ways been the case. America largelywithdrew its military presence follow-ing the defeat of Japan in 1945. Thenon July 5, 1950, a hastily deployedSergeant First Class Loren Chambers, aWorld War II combat veteran with fivePurple Hearts, became engaged in anew Asian conflict. His unit had onlyrifles and light artillery to fire at the

Inmun Gun’s T–34 tanks when it wasoverrun near Osan in South Korea.Chambers and the 1st Battalion, 21st In-fantry, put Kim Il Sung on notice thatthe United States would fight aggres-sion in Asia; but our unreadiness costthe lives of thousands of Americansand millions of Koreans.

Containing aggressors whodoubted our commitment has exacteda dreadful price in Asia. Since 1950more members of the U.S. military


Shaping Our Future in the Asia-PacificBy J O S E P H W. P R U E H E R

Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN, iscommander in chief, Pacific Command,and formerly served as vice chief ofnaval operations.

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have died in this region than in therest of the world combined. Yet thesteadfastness of America and its allieshas succeeded in laying the foundationfor the greatest economic growth inhistory. The sharp contrast betweenprosperous democracy in South Koreaand impoverished repression in theNorth illustrates the value of our in-vestment.

PACOM is ready and engaged forthe long haul, advancing U.S. interestsin Asia-Pacific security and stabilityinto the 21st century. It is pursuingpositive security relations with all na-tions to prevent conflict and respondto crises. The forward presence of ourforces will remain essential to regionalsecurity, stability, and opportunities forprosperity far into the future. Improve-ments in joint warfighting will also benecessary to sustain our military suc-cesses into the future.

The PACOM area of responsibility(AOR) stretches from California toIndia and the eastern shore of Africa,encompassing 43 nations. The regionincludes over half the world’s surface,half its population, and—when com-bined with the United States—half itseconomy.

Economic, political, and militaryinterests converge in the region. Eco-nomically, America and the other Asia-Pacific nations have become interde-pendent over the last generation. Theregion accounted for only 4 percent ofworld economic output in 1960. By1995 it exceeded 34 percent. By 2020 itis estimated the region will account for50 percent of the world’s economicoutput. American consumers benefitfrom trade in the region. Imports tothe United States amounted to morethan $312 billion in 1996. Exports tothe region were over $200 billion andaccounted for 3 million U.S. manufac-turing jobs. This represents 36 percentof our two-way merchandise trade,matching that with Canada and LatinAmerica combined and almost doublethat with the countries of the Euro-pean Union. In addition, the UnitedStates exports another $81 billion inservices to the region and has investedover $140 billion. Instability in Asia isthus a threat to our economy.

Though the current financial cri-sis is causing turmoil with Asian cur-rencies and stock markets, the affectedeconomies will likely recover to sus-tainable growth rates as long as re-gional stability and the market systemendure. America’s economic future islinked to continuing commercial ac-cess and freedom of navigationthroughout the region.

Our cultural and political interestsare also increasingly tied to Asia. Ac-cording to the 1990 census, Asian-Americans are the fastest growing seg-ment within the American middleclass and are no longer confinedlargely to the west coast but are nu-merous in New Jersey, Texas, Georgia,and elsewhere. By 2020 the U.S. popu-lation is likely to include over 20 mil-lion Asian-Americans.

Internationally, successful man-agement of challenges such as pollu-tion and the proliferation of weaponsof mass destruction depends on coop-eration in the Asia-Pacific region,which includes over a fifth of U.N.membership. Its 3 billion people pre-sent the world’s largest opportunity foradvancing democracy, and democra-

cies are more likely to work togetherand less likely to fight.

Militarily, the major enduring U.S.regional interest is to ensure that nohegemon or hostile coalition arises inthe Asia-Pacific. Such a challenge couldprovoke a costly hot war or a pro-tracted cold war. The United Statesshares sufficient security interests inthe region that five of our seven mu-tual defense treaties bind us to alliesthere and sustain our presence—withJapan, Republic of Korea, Republic ofthe Philippines, Australia, and Thai-land. JFQ

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An Interview with J O S E P H W. P R U E H E R

JFQ What do you see as the major con-cerns for security in the Asia-Pacific?

PRUEHER There are four. The mostimmediate threat is the situation onthe Korean peninsula. Only a thin de-militarized zone separates NorthKorea’s million-man military from thecombined forces of the United Statesand South Korea. At some point thisstandoff will end. Our readiness en-sures peace until that occurs.

Then there is potential instabilityresulting from the Asian financial cri-sis. We are working closely with ourallies and friends in the region to alle-viate the pressure. The size, shape,and timing of U.S. military contactshave been adjusted to maintain ourengagement with them. Next is theChina-Taiwan dispute. Although thisis potentially the most contentiousissue between the United States andChina, we are building mutual under-standing to resolve differences.

The third challenge is the peacefulresolution of territorial disputes oversmall island groups in the South ChinaSea which sit astride shipping lanes link-ing the Persian Gulf and Southeast andEast Asia. They contain exploitable de-posits of both oil and natural gas. Eightnations—including China, the Philip-pines, Malaysia, and Vietnam—assertsovereignty over various island groupsin the South China Sea. The UnitedStates takes no position on the legalmerits of these competing claims butencourages the claimants to exercise re-straint and avoid destabilizing actions.

JFQ How is U.S. involvement importantto the stability of the Asia-Pacific region?

PRUEHER The region is generally atpeace but is not free from the possibil-ity of major conflict. As HenryKissinger recently noted, “Wars, whilenot likely, are not inconceivable. . . .Peace will require deliberate efforts.”There is no status quo to which everyregional power adheres. There is no in-tegrating organization such as the Eu-ropean Union or NATO to reconcileconflicting goals.

While expanding commercial tiesgenerally tend to promote peace, they can also produce new pressures.Continued growth will increase ten-sion over access to scarce resourcessuch as oil. Conversely, if economicgrowth rates continue to decline,dashed expectations among expandingpopulations could trigger instability.

America is unusually well posi-tioned among Asia-Pacific militarypowers. Our economic, diplomatic, andmilitary capabilities can help maintainstability and prevent major conflict.Thus the United States is particularlysuited to join with other nations as apartner to broker regional security,cushion tensions, and defuse crises.

JFQ What are America’s strategic alter-natives in the region?

PRUEHER For the immediate futureour best choice is what Joseph Nye, theformer Assistant Secretary of Defensefor International Security Affairs,called “deep engagement”—activepresence and partnership with otherstates there. By aiding the security ofothers we further our interests.

While the notion of engagingonly in great emergencies and thenwith commanding force is seductive,in practice it could be disastrous. As in1950, our resolve and capability wouldlikely be doubted. Some nations couldbe pressured to pursue far more inde-pendent policies and to maintainmuch higher levels of military capabil-ity. Absent a forward basing structure,crises could provoke conflict fasterthan we could mobilize and overcomethe vast distances of the Pacific.

A cooperative security systemmight eventually reduce the require-ments for U.S. military presence. Butuntil such a system includes every re-gional power the need for American for-ward deployed forces will persist, even ifstable peace is established on the Koreanpeninsula. We can expect such a systemto emerge gradually, matching the ratesat which Asia-Pacific states advance trustand consensus among themselves.

JFQ What are the premises of PACOMmilitary strategy?

PRUEHER Our first premise is a no-tion of confluence: political, eco-nomic, and military aspects of securityare interdependent and cannot be ad-vanced separately. Because of this con-fluence the command works closelyunder the interagency process whichincludes the Departments of Defenseand State, National Security Council,and U.S. embassy country teams in theregion to ensure that our military ac-tivities reinforce other national efforts.The military alone cannot resolve dis-putes among governments but it canhelp set the conditions and providetime for other elements to work.

Our second premise is that secu-rity (especially military) establishes sta-ble conditions that are a prerequisitefor economic growth and prosperity.This stability does not mean maintain-ing the status quo. Change will con-tinue—mostly for the better—in eco-nomics, government, and the waysstates relate to each other. What is im-portant is that adjustments take placewithin the overall context of politicalprocesses rather than violence.

PACOM abilities to anticipate,avert, and react to challenges are en-hanced by military-to-military rela-tions with regional countries.

JFQ What is the PACOM militarystrategy?

PRUEHER Preventive defense. Just aspreventive medicine promotes condi-tions that support good health, pre-ventive defense supports security and stability. Our strategy puts intopractice the concepts of national mili-tary strategy that shape the interna-tional environment, respond to crises,and prepare for an uncertain future.U.S. strategy involves peacetime activities, crisis response, and the capability to fight and win in major regional conflict.

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U.S. Pacific Command

C–130 taking off fromElmendorf AFB, Alaska.

Army troops boardingC–130 for Cobra Gold ’96.

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Fifty years ago, U.S. PacificCommand (PACOM) becameAmerica’s first unified com-mand. Today the PACOM area

of responsibility, stretching from theWest Coast of the United States to theEast Coast of Africa, has enormous geographic and strategic value. It contains over half of the surface of theglobe, 56 percent of the world’s popu-lation, 43 countries, and the two mostpopulous nations (China and India). Inaddition, five of our seven mutual de-fense treaties safeguard the regionwhile the six largest militaries operatein the Asia-Pacific.

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PACOM


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Peacetime activities include en-gagement and preparedness which re-assure the region of our commitmentand deter conflict. Peacetime engage-ment embraces combined exercises,port calls, meetings, and exchanges ofinformation and people. Successful en-gagement develops trust and confi-dence among states and establishesmechanisms for working together. Pre-paredness works unilaterally and withothers to position our forces and readythem to respond to crises across thefull spectrum of conflict.

Nothing can prevent all crises.When specific events threaten to bringone about, PACOM is prepared to re-spond with military forces. The goalsof these efforts are to deter larger con-flict, reinforce diplomacy, and positioncritical capabilities for action shoulddeterrence fail.

Underwriting our objective of pre-venting major international conflict isthe ability to fight and win. PACOMtrains to do that quickly and decisivelywith minimum loss of life, preferablywith the support of allies and coalitionpartners but unilaterally if necessary.For the foreseeable future, every aspectof strategy will depend on a network offorward forces and cooperation withother nations for bases and logisticalsupport.

JFQ Can you offer some examples to illustrate the strategy in practice?

PRUEHER Our peacetime activitiesare akin to an investment, building uptangible assets that can be drawn on incrisis. For example, the United Statesworks closely with Thailand. Whenfactional fighting broke out in Cambo-dia in July 1997, Americans and otherforeign nationals there were at risk.U.S. leaders wanted to position specialoperations forces nearby in case evacu-ations proved necessary. Following atelephone conversation with the Thaisupreme military commander, PACOMsecured permission to deploy theseforces to Utapau.

When China fired missiles nearTaiwan in March 1996, the UnitedStates deployed two carrier battlegroups near the Taiwan Strait. This re-action was carefully tailored to contain

the crisis. Simultaneously, we conveyeddiplomatic messages to each side, af-firming a “one-China” policy and com-mitment to peaceful resolution of dif-ferences across the Taiwan Strait. WhileChinese-Taiwan relations remain con-tentious today, all parties generally rec-ognize that it is in no nation’s interestto precipitate another crisis.

JFQ What forces are available toPACOM?

PRUEHER The command has over300,000 military personnel from allservices. Our forward presence aloneconsists of approximately 100,000.This number is widely perceivedthroughout the region as a metric ofAmerica’s commitment and representscapabilities of U.S. Eighth Army andSeventh Air Force in Korea, III MarineExpeditionary Force and Fifth Air Forcein Japan, and Seventh Fleet. Adjust-ments focus on capabilities of the unitsrather than the numbers themselves.

The other 200,000 assigned per-sonnel are forward based in Alaska orHawaii or are located along the U.S.west coast. Many spend time in the re-gion executing peacetime engagementtasks. In crisis or war, PACOM can callon the other resources of the U.S. mili-tary, including strategic lift, nationalresponse forces, and strategic reserves.

JFQ Does the defense guidelines reviewchange our relationship with Japan?

PRUEHER Not fundamentally. Closerelations between the United Statesand Japan remain the cornerstone ofEast Asian security. The U.S.-Japanesedefense guidelines review concluded inSeptember 1997 will enable us to worktogether more closely in crises that af-fect Japan’s security. They provide forbetter interoperability and more mu-tual support. They are not directedagainst any particular country or in-tended to give the Japanese military anew role in the region.

JFQ What is the state of our relationswith China?

PRUEHER China is modernizing itsmilitary. As “paid pessimists,” the

PACOM staff is watching carefully. ButChina will not possess a power projec-tion capability that could threaten U.S.interests for at least a decade and ahalf. We are pursuing a long-haul, bal-anced national policy of constructiveengagement with China to encourageits emergence as a secure, prosperous,and nonthreatening member of the in-ternational community. Increased Chi-nese transparency on security objec-tives and military modernizationwould help reassure the region.

Contacts between the U.S. militaryand the People’s Liberation Army haveexpanded significantly in the last year.These exchanges are important. AsPresident Jiang Zemin said to me dur-ing his recent visit to Hawaii, “Beforewe can build trust, we need to buildunderstanding.” Expanding relationsamong officers who will lead the nextgeneration is especially important.

The trend of U.S.-Chinese rela-tions is steadily upward, although per-turbations can be expected. Commoninterests in regional peace and securityoutweigh our differences. Successfulmanagement of relations among theUnited States, Japan, and China islikely to be the principal determinantof regional peace and security in thedecades ahead.

JFQ What are your expectations for rela-tions between North and South Korea?

PRUEHER We avoid attempting topredict the future of the Korean penin-sula and instead, with U.S. ForcesKorea, prepare for a range of possibili-ties. We can envision three: a lashoutby the North, a collapse of the NorthKorean regime, or a process leading topeaceful reconciliation and eventualreunification.

The peninsula is a volatile flash-point. North Korea’s economic condi-tions are dire, but it retains a seriousmilitary capability. Although the likeli-hood of war is not high, the conse-quences would be severe. Our forces inKorea, under the command of GeneralJohn Tilelli, work in close concert withour ally South Korea to prevent thispossibility.

Averting the total collapse ofNorth Korea’s economy is in the hu-manitarian and strategic interest of

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everyone. But success depends on thewillingness of North Korea to acceptassistance, reform its economic poli-cies, and reduce its military posture.Today the North is so focused onmaintaining tight control that they arereluctant to accept outside help.

Clearly, we would prefer to see thethird scenario resulting in peaceful rec-onciliation. It is likely to proceedslowly due to the costs and the culturaland economic differences that havearisen over the past fifty years. Pursu-ing a peaceful and secure reconciliationis an opportunity for states in North-east Asia to work together, especiallythe United States, China, and Japan.

JFQ What about other nations of the region?

PRUEHER Southeast Asia is increas-ingly important to U.S. interests. Weare pursuing closer partnership withthe nations in that area. As part of thisengagement, the United States en-dorses further development of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) Regional Forum. Though limited in scope, this assembly is apromising venue for discussing secu-rity issues.

The United States also has a spe-cial interest in improving relationswith Indonesia, a vast country of over200 million people, the world’s fourthlargest population. So far its securityforces are coping with a tough situa-tion—arising from the financial cri-sis—in generally responsible ways,maintaining stability among 5 majorcultures and more than 300 subcul-tures spread across 17,000 islands. Re-gional stability will be enhancedthrough the broadest possible U.S.-In-donesian military-to-military relations.

U.S. engagement with other na-tions in the area is just about where itshould be. As indicated earlier, wehave adjusted our engagement pro-grams, where necessary, to help lessenthe strains of the financial crisis. Wealso work closely with Singapore, Thai-land, and Australia. Looking to the fu-ture, India will have increasing re-gional importance and our

military-to-military relationship isgradually improving.

While it does not enjoy greatprosperity, Russia remains an impor-tant Pacific power. The forces of theRussian Far East Military District aresignificantly smaller and less activethan during the Cold War but its Pa-cific Fleet maintains very capable sub-marines and ships.

JFQ What are the implications of the so-called revolution in military affairs?

PRUEHER There are three. First, thetools of war are changing. Weapons aregetting much more accurate. We havesensors which detect battlefield activ-ity that provide far more information,and friendly forces now have betterways of passing it back and forth. If weplan properly, RMA will also providenew tools for conducting “low-end”operations such as peacekeeping,counter-terrorism, and humanitarianassistance.

Second, asymmetric forms of war-fare may challenge us. Weapons ofmass destruction, information warfare,and terrorism are becoming means bywhich nations with less traditionalmilitary power might try to wage war.

Third, more advanced weaponry,sensors, business practices, and deci-sionmaking tools offer possibilities forachieving greater efficiency which cansustain security capabilities at reducedcosts or with fewer personnel.

The U.S. military is investing innew technology as well as experiment-ing to develop the doctrine, organiza-tion, and experience that can exploitemerging capabilities and respond tonew challenges. However, RMA is nopanacea. It will not yield substitutesfor forward presence of ready forces,high quality personnel, or close inter-national partnerships.

JFQ How can joint operations be mademore effective?

PRUEHER Broadening joint conceptsbeyond the command and control ofservice components promises to in-crease the effectiveness of joint war-fare. Three concepts that we are nowpursuing are greater interagency andcoalition cooperation, a concept of tac-

tical air (TACAIR), and more efficientflow of forces between AORs.

While the importance of effectiveinteragency and coalition integration incrisis and war is recognized, this doc-trine is infrequently exercised, and jointcommanders devote inordinate energyat the outset of an operation to ensureinteragency and coalition team build-ing. Practice develops procedures andtrust. We must expand training oppor-tunities for interagency coordination.

Joint task force commanders areconcerned about the responsivenessand effectiveness of TACAIR support,not the color of a pilot’s uniform. Con-sidering TACAIR as a whole is a usefulway of leveraging the complementarynatures of airpower. For example, Navycarrier air wings, Air Force air expedi-tionary forces, and long range bombershave differing deployability, operatingtempos, and aircraft characteristics, butthis mix of complementary capabilitiesoffers opportunities for synergisticemployment.

Finally, the demand to share ordual earmark forces among CINCs willincrease. Defining new AOR bound-aries is less important than operatingsmoothly across them. The willingnessof CINCs to work together informally,assume prudent risk, and avoid inflat-ing requirements pays dividends. For example, PACOM and U.S. ForcesKorea are accepting prudent risk byproviding forces to stand ready withU.S. Central Command in the ArabianGulf. These forces include our only for-ward-based carrier battle group. Oppor-tunities also exist to reduce OPTEMPOand conduct more efficient training byaccepting each other’s training stan-dards. JFQ

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In August 1898 Admiral GeorgeDewey had to wait 90 days afterdefeating the Spanish at ManilaBay for a 15,000-strong Army force

from California to put boots on theground and secure his victory in thePhilippines. As U.S. Army Pacific (US-ARPAC) celebrates 100 years of servicein the Asia-Pacific region, it can ac-count for two-thirds of the Army cam-paign streamers awarded for action out-side North America. It also reflects the

changing role of America as a Pacificpower. Today, U.S. Pacific Command(PACOM) relies upon trained and readyforces to support military operationsand peacetime engagement. As we nearthe 21st century, USARPAC has the vi-sion and direction to keep the Armycomponent of PACOM relevant, re-sponsive, and ready.

Tyranny of DistanceThe American commitment to the

Pacific over the last century can be di-vided into two major periods: Japaneseexpansionism and confrontation with

Lieutenant General William M. Steele, USA, is commandinggeneral of the U.S. Army, Pacific.

Preparing the Army in the Pacific for the 21st Century

Uirson, Korea,August 1950.

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the Soviet Union. These two experi-ences challenged the Army to assumevarious roles—expeditionary, occupa-tion, counterinsurgency, and deter-rent—in a theater where vast oceanspaces and faraway land masses pre-sented another passive but significantforce, the tyranny of distance.

The central strategic issue for ourmilitary in the Pacific during the firsthalf of this century was maintaining acredible presence in the Philippinesand countering the growing power ofJapan. The United States could not de-fend the Philippine Islands because theAmerican people would not committhe needed assets until the eve of war.Consequently Hawaii became the cen-ter of gravity for our strategic positionin the Pacific. It was home to Armyand Navy commands as well as the in-dustrial facilities which supported op-erating forces that would be projectedinto the Pacific.

With the Japanese surrender onAugust 15, 1945, the free world soonfaced an even greater danger than thatformerly posed by the Axis powers.The central strategic threat wasthought to be prevention of nuclearwar. The Cold War and lines of con-frontation in the Pacific area, however,were clearly drawn in another way inEast Asia as Task Force Smith jumped,poorly equipped and manned, fromoccupation duty to combat on the Ko-rean peninsula. Both Korea and Viet-nam were major conflicts—proxy warsin a bipolar Cold War world centeredin Europe. PACOM forces and the de-fense establishment as a whole strug-gled with new strategic and opera-tional concepts before and after thosetwo Asian wars. Finally, we adopted adeterrent strategy that has achieved 22years of regional security and stabilityand established a forward presencethat we maintain to this day. We areexperiencing the longest period ofpeaceful engagement in the Asia-Pa-cific for a century.

Nevertheless the shadow of theCold War still extends over the Armyin this region. Today USARPAC hasthree major combat formations: 25th

Infantry Division in Hawaii with onebrigade located at Fort Lewis, Washing-ton; 1st Brigade, 6th Infantry Divisionin Alaska; and 1st Battalion, 1st Special

Forces Group on Okinawa. Supportforces include U.S. Army Japan andU.S. Army Hawaii. USARPAC head-quartered in Hawaii and I Corps at FortLewis provide operational and tacticalcommand and control (C2) respec-tively. This current force mix is the re-sult of the situation in Korea, the re-cent drawdown, and our Cold War

posture. Ultimately, the situation inKorea will resolve itself through atreaty, reconciliation, or reunification,with resultant changes in the size andfunction of Army forces in theater. Thehistory of the region, our security rela-tionship with Japan, and the strategicposition of Japan near force projectionrequirements suggest continued pres-ence of Army support forces in north-east Asia.

The Tyranny of Distance

Javelin anti-tankweapons system.

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The Pacific, the largest ocean inthe world, dominates this region andpresents a tyranny of distance of over5,000 miles from the west coast of theUnited States to the Pacific Rim coun-tries of Japan and the Philippines. In1898 it took IX Corps 90 days to sailfrom California to Manila. By WorldWar II that was cut to 30 days steam-ing time. It still requires 21 days tomove troops, equipment, and suppliesby sea from Oakland to Manila and 16

more to reach the western limits of thePACOM and USARPAC area of respon-sibility (AOR) in the Indian Ocean. Wehave reduced but not eliminated thetyranny of distance with airlift andfaster ships. Control and security ofthe sea, sea and air lines of communi-cation, and theater power projectionplatforms remain an essential task formilitary forces in the Asia-Pacific.

The 21st CenturyThe end of the Cold War has led

to another transitional period for themilitary in the Pacific. Few signs ofconfrontation remain. Korea is in thethroes of political and military con-tention under a 44-year-old armistice.

The world is increasingly multipolar.The predictability and stability thatsprang from the bipolar alignments ofthe Cold War have eroded. Stability isthe result of regional security and eco-nomic prosperity. This is certainly truein the Pacific where emergingeconomies and developing nations aredivided by enduring tensions alongtheir borders. The relative stability en-joyed across the area results from thepresence of U.S. forces together with

military contacts and eco-nomic prosperity. PACOMand its components reflectthis presence and affordthe security for continued

growth in the region. They also main-tain military overmatch to prevail inany conflict.

While there is no Asia-Pacificequivalent of the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization, five of the seven mutualdefense treaties signed by the UnitedStates involve the PACOM AOR. Rela-tions with countries in the region tendto be bilateral and limited in scope. Yetthere is growing interest in both multi-lateral dialogue and partnership in theface of challenge. The Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) isthe foremost multinational partner-ship, but it has no military charter.

This region will become central tothe global economy in the next cen-tury, replacing Europe in many regards.It contains 56 percent of the worldpopulation. China’s total is 1.2 billionpeople while India’s is 950 million andis expected to surpass China early inthe next century. Indonesia, the mostpopulous Muslim nation, has 206 mil-lion and is the fourth largest in theworld. By 2020 there may be 25 citiesin Asia with populations over 10 mil-lion. Such huge markets are impressivebut are only partially developed today.

U.S. ties to Asia are growing as thepercentage of Asian-Americans in-creases. Trade with Asia in 1996 was$920.8 billion, 37 percent of the U.S.total, more than with Europe, Canada,or Latin America. Some 60 percent ofglobal economic growth in the nextdecade will occur in East Asia. As a re-sult, the Asia-Pacific region will de-velop a powerful new middle class of500 million. It will create market-dri-ven economies and shift from labor-oriented production to both industrialand information age technology. Theeffect on area culture and societies willbe equally profound. New wealth anda powerful middle class will transformtraditional social structures to comple-ment economic well-being and meetrising expectations. This prosperity willlead to development that is commen-surate with political, informational,and military potential. To maintain re-gional stability in this dynamic futureit is vital to shape the security environ-ment to facilitate economic growth.

While we often think of the Asia-Pacific region as primarily maritime be-cause of the Pacific and Indian Oceans,armies rather than navies dominatemilitary organizations. Asia claimseight of the ten largest militaries in theworld, and substantial modernizationprograms reflect new wealth and di-verse security concerns in the region.Spending on modernization has in-creased 35 percent over the last sixyears. This contrasts with the generaldecline in military spending elsewheresince the end of the Cold War. Whilethese forces are likely to shrink, theywill undergo modernization in the in-terim. Short- and mid-range ballisticmissiles, weapons of mass destruction(WMD), and limited power projection

there is no Asia-Pacific equivalent ofthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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will be common and increase the scopeand lethality of regional conflict. More-over, the demands of natural/humani-

tarian disasters will expand the role ofregional militaries.

The proliferation of nuclear, bio-logical, and chemical weapons risksplacing them in the hands of roguestates or terrorists. Countering prolifer-ation requires multinational and mul-tiagency efforts as will combating thedrug trade, terrorism, maritime piracy,and insurgency.

Foreign policy will continue todictate that the United States accept amantle of international leadership andbuild alliances and institutions. In aJuly 23, 1997 address to the PacificCouncil on International Policy, Secre-tary of State Madeleine Albright saidthat the objective of U.S. strategy mustbe to “work with our many friends inthis region of rising powers to ensure

stability, build prosperity, and promotedemocracy.” The Nation should “fortifycore alliances” while remaining for-

ward deployed and sup-porting multinationalsecurity dialogues. TheUnited States mustfocus on peacefully re-

solving disputes and avoid “misunder-standings that could lead to armedconflict.” Forward basing and engage-ment enables this strategy by means ofUSARPAC involvement with regionalmilitaries. Maintaining strong army-to-army relations is a principal role of US-ARPAC in peacetime to support ourpreventive defense strategy.

Shape, Respond, PrepareNational military strategy uses the

three concepts of shape, respond, andprepare to provide an integrated ap-proach to promoting peace and stabil-ity and defeating adversaries whennecessary. PACOM and its componentswill continue to pursue these objec-tives through regional engagement toshape the Asia-Pacific and create con-ditions favorable to U.S. interests. US-ARPAC forces will support PACOM and

maintain the ability to respond world-wide across a full crisis spectrum.

PACOM theater engagement strat-egy supports our national military ob-jectives. So long as the region remainsdevoid of a substantial multilateral se-curity mechanism, most nations willdesire the continued presence of theU.S. military and its Pacific Army. InJanuary 1997 Japanese Prime MinisterHashimoto cited “the presence of theUnited States in Asia” as the most im-portant factor in assuring stability.

USARPAC helps to shape the re-gion through forward basing and de-ployments. Combined training and en-gagement activities such as engineering,medical, and civic projects also con-tribute to forward presence by sendingour soldiers abroad. The Pacific Army ofthe 21st century must maintain forwardpresence to provide access to army-dominated military organizations. Exer-cises such as Cobra Gold in Thailandand Balikatan in the Philippines are ex-amples. Forward presence demonstratesour commitment and negates some ofthe tyranny of distance.

As USARPAC presence and engage-ment shape the security environmentthey also serve as a preventive defense.Forward basing and engagement activi-ties signal the readiness of our forces tomore than friends and allies. Exercisesalso demonstrate readiness in supportof PACOM and contribution to jointand combined warfighting.

Shaping enables the Nation tomaintain an objective role as a re-gional power. The benefits of mutualtraining and increased interoperabilityamong countries helps set the stage forconducting combined operations withallies or coalition partners. Althoughwe will be ready to act unilaterally,combined operations are the preferredmethod. Our ability to conduct suc-cessful operations is well known bystates that might consider destabilizingthe region. The PACOM strategy of en-gagement and presence is the rightway to shape regional stability andU.S. interests into the next century.

Since shaping efforts alone cannotguarantee peace and stability, ourforces must be capable of responding

forward basing and engagement signalreadiness to more than friends and allies

City of Pará with soldiers leaving for thePhilippines, 1898.

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to a full spectrum of crises. On an aver-age day USARPAC has 3,000 soldiers in20 countries. Just 3 percent of the U.S.Army, the Pacific Army, conducts 10percent of total Army deployments.That is a high payoff.

The Army has fought four wars inthe Asia-Pacific over the last century. InWorld War II and Korea, it was unpre-pared and paid the price. Tomorrow’sPacific Army, like its predecessors, willnot have forces in theater to prosecutea major war, so it must be able to pro-ject USARPAC forces from CONUS.

PACOM needs a ground detach-ment with a limited forced entry capa-bility that can respond quickly and de-cisively. It can evolve from the currentforce and address regional crises. It alsorequires access to CONUS land forcesfor either theater engagement or strate-gic power projection to protect Ameri-can citizens and interests or preventconflict. Speed argues for a responseforce in a central location and the abil-ity to project forces by air and sea withprepositioned stocks.

The Army in the Pacific must be atheater engagement force and a strate-gic projection force. Theater engage-ment serves as a deterrent to aggres-sion by demonstrating the capabilityto fight and decisively win smallerscale contingencies. Its secondary mis-sion is engaging regional militaries aspreviously discussed. The strategic pro-jection force, like the engagementforce, must be forward based andquickly augmented by CONUS-basedforces which deploy worldwide to rein-force either in-place theater forces oruse air and sea lines of communicationthrough the theater in support of amajor theater war.

Strategic mobility is critical whenprojecting power into or through theAsia-Pacific region. It largely resides insealift and airlift, though infrastruc-ture plays a significant role. Preposi-tioned equipment together withstrategic lift enables us to react withthe appropriate speed for strategicallydecisive maneuver.

The FutureThe Army of the 21st century must

be built on a sound foundation andsupporting pillars. That foundation iscomprised of quality people; com-mand, control, communications, com-puters, and intelligence (C4I); and atheater infrastructure to support powerprojection. The four pillars are atrained and ready force, forward pres-ence, an expeditionary force, and mod-ern equipment. Our training today andtomorrow should range from the low-est tactical echelon to operational exer-cises to improve interoperability withother armies. Additional efforts to en-hance and sustain readiness include es-tablishing multicomponent units aswell as other forms of active and Re-serve integration in training and oper-ations. We participate in joint andcombined exercises to maintainwarfighting capabilities just as we mustcontinue to expand relations with thearmies in the region.

The cost of current training pro-grams is too high because of thetyranny of distance. Army forces musttravel to the Joint Readiness TrainingCenter or National Training Center totake part in priority tactical training.Moving equipment to either center,even with prepositioned brigade setsfor training, is costly and time consum-ing. We need joint training areas in theAsia-Pacific located within proximity ofour bases and along air and sea lines ofcommunication in the theater.

The chief means of achieving fullspectrum dominance for the PacificArmy in a peacetime environment isrealized by the second pillar, forwardbased forces. Even though I Corps is lo-cated on the west coast at Fort Lewisand USARPAC is headquartered inHawaii, the latter remains five timezones from the eastern edge of theAsian mainland and fourteen from thewestern edge of the Indian Ocean. Po-sitioning forces and Army C2 head-quarters farther in the AOR enhancesregional presence and tangibly im-proves the ability to conduct crisis re-sponse, forward presence, and C2.

The third pillar is creating an ex-peditionary force capability from Armydivisions, brigades, and battalions.These force packages would be capableof rapid deployment to crisis spots

within the Asia-Pacific from powerprojection platforms and the preposi-tioned stocks placed in the theater in-frastructure force. Much of this capa-bility already exists.

The last pillar is modern equip-ment to sustain the first to engage op-erations and keep pace with regionalpowers. Forward presence, regardless ofits other advantages, also demonstratesthe quality of U.S. equipment to areamilitaries. The requirement for contin-ual C4I modernization is obvious giventhe tyranny of distance in the AOR.We also need improved strategic mo-bility from more fast sealift ships, justin time logistics, Crusader, Javelin,Apache Long Bow, and other newweapons and equipment to conductpreventive defense well forward.

The future is certain. The promi-nence of the Asia-Pacific region isgrowing and so are both the impor-tance and the contributions of US-ARPAC to national security. We canand must achieve a trained and readyforce, one with expeditionary capabili-ties postured and positioned well for-ward in the area with the training, in-frastructure, C2, and quality people toperform its missions. It must be a mod-ern, tailorable theater engagementforce based to provide effective initialentry forces that contribute to fullspectrum dominance. It must be ex-pandable to supply sufficient groundforces, theater Army C2, and sustain-ment to support a joint and combinedmajor theater war. We are able to per-form these tasks. Today our challengein the dynamic Asia-Pacific environ-ment is to remain relevant, responsive,and ready for tomorrow. JFQ

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T hroughout this century theNavy has pioneered the de-velopment and use of tech-nology to achieve the im-

possible. Ideas that once seemedradical—such as carrier aviation, nu-clear powered submarines, and am-phibious warfare—became realities. Asthe century draws to a close the Navymust continue to push the envelope to

accomplish its mission. Its most effec-tive tools in this effort will be informa-tion sharing and technology.

In the last fifty years communica-tions have evolved from flags andflashing lights to secure radios to e-mail. The information revolution hascreated new technologies and opportu-nities which alter the way information

is acquired and used to again make theimpossible reality. Continuing its roleas an innovator, the Navy initiated aprogram known as “Information Tech-nology for the 21st Century” (IT–21) toshape warfighting capabilities, supportsystems, and information processing.In fact, information sharing—knowl-edge sharing—already dominates therelationship of the Navy with theArmy, Marines, Air Force, and allies.

Employing IT–21 technology, Pa-cific Fleet is examining afloat andashore force structure, capabilities, andmethods of operation in anticipation


Admiral Archie R. Clemins, USN, is commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and has served at sea in both ballistic missile and attack submarines.

InformationSuperiorityin the Pacific FleetBy A R C H I E R. C L E M I N S

Fire control trackingsystem aboard USS Seawolf.

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of reduced force levels and decliningbudgets. This means we must placegreater importance on joint operationswith the other services and allies. Wemust seek a capability greater than thesum of the parts. In fact, we must findefficiencies and force-multiplyers to re-main engaged with nations in theAsia-Pacific. IT–21 technology achieves

all this by offering an efficient, effec-tive, and easily integrated system.

Unlike ground forces which mea-sure force levels by the number of peo-ple in uniform, the Navy evaluates itsforce level by the capability of ships,submarines, and aircraft and howmany of those platforms can be oper-ated by its people. In the future fewersailors will operate more capable sys-tems that perform more missions.

The Armed Forces are pursuinginitiatives that will increase our capa-bilities tremendously. Revolutionaryideas are being examined, includingnew systems like the smart ship andjoint strike fighter and concepts such

as outsourcing, Reserve contributorysupport, and acquisition reform.

The engine that propels these con-cepts is sharing information throughthe best technology. IT–21 ensures thatand follows seven precepts to achieveits goals.

■ If the boss doesn’t use it don’t buy it!IT systems must be used by those in com-mand; otherwise they won’t be used at all.Bosses must lead implementation of newtechnology lest they hold their organizationsback. Likewise, designers and purchasersmust ensure that leadership is completelysold on plans for information managementbefore precious dollars are spent.

■ Integrate tactical and tactical sup-port areas. With IT–21 one system allowsunits to merge tactical business (sharing op-erational pictures, browsing intelligenceproducts, and collaborative planning) withtactical support (logistics, personnel, train-ing, medical, and supply). We must fightand run ships from a single PC-based sys-tem. That technology exists. Separate work-stations and networks for tactical and non-tactical uses are unreliable, burdensome,unnecessary, and costly.

■ Stay common with industry whenacquiring new technology because of time,money, and ease. Industry standards are de-veloped at a pace the military can’t match.And by capitalizing on commercially pro-duced hardware and software, considerableR&D costs can be avoided. Staying common

with industry also saves greatly on trainingand troubleshooting. With “help” buttons,vendor web sites, books, and trainingvideos, industry products come with exten-sive support. And our people are more fa-miliar with it. While it may take an expertweeks to learn a complex operating system,the youngest sailor can understand andnavigate Windows systems. In short, stay-ing common with industry is the best wayto remain on the cutting edge of technol-ogy while providing a user friendly system.

■ Drive everything to a single PC. Allour applications must be connected to aWindows NT-based PC in a client-server en-vironment using off-the-shelf software. Theone exception is when it is necessary to usea higher level operating system and work-station. Such instances are becoming rare.Going to a single PC doesn’t mean aban-doning established information systems.On the contrary, efforts toward one com-mand and control system are needed toforce integration. But driving users of thesesystems to PCs empowers the warfighter asnever before with an array of detection, tar-geting, operational, and logistics informa-tion from joint sources and satellites deliv-ered to a single point.

■ Use commercial off-the-shelf(COTS) products for almost everything.With commercial technology, there is littlethat can’t be done with a good office suiteand e-mail package running in a client-server environment. Additionally, COTSguarantees interoperability with the com-mercial sector, which will be increasinglycritical as we outsource some support func-tions. Not only must we use COTS; we mustchange the way it is purchased. Antiquatedacquisition procedures—with long lagtimes, reams of paperwork, and needless lifecycle management—must go. We must notlook at computers as physical property butas consumables.

■ Have seamless transition from shoreto sea. A ship in San Diego, connected viafiber-optics on a pier to the metropolitanarea network, must get underway andswitch to satellite so that it is completelytransparent to the user. The process must beas seamless as switching from shore to shippower and as easy as roaming on a cellulartelephone as the ship moves around theworld. Likewise, marines embarked on Navyamphibious ships must be able to plug andplay with laptops in a ship’s “green” spaceswhen they come aboard and continue com-municating seamlessly ashore. The MarineCorps concept, Operational Maneuver fromthe Sea, states that the capability exists tomake the concept truly operational.

■ We cannot allow stovepipes to de-velop within C4I architecture. We must buyicons, not hardware. Money is wasted by

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staying common with industry is the best way toremain on the cutting edgeof technology

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Network Decision Processes in Action

developing stovepipe communications forone segment or another of the military totalk to itself. Though well-intentioned, thishas created a labyrinth of protocols, soft-ware, and hardware that fills ship spaces,burdens users and technicians, and pre-vents us from staying on the cutting edge ofemerging technologies.

The object of IT–21 is to link U.S.forces and eventually allies in an asyn-chronous transfer mode network to

enable voice, video, and data transmis-sions from a single desktop PC. With-out this ability the Navy will wasteprecious resources, time, and effort.

Pacific Fleet maintains a strong,capable forward deployed force in thewestern Pacific and provides two-thirdsof the battle groups in the ArabianGulf. With 194 ships, 1,600 aircraft,and skilled sailors, marines, and civil-ians operating them, the challenge for

Pacific Fleet is developing new ways toacquire and use information to accom-plish missions efficiently and effec-tively at each level of command. IT–21gives it that ability.

IT–21 is not just a theory; itworks. Commander, Third Fleet, in SanDiego implemented it in his role as di-rector for the Navy’s battle lab, devel-oping systems and field testing themto prove capabilities. With its relativeproximity to other Navy labs, universi-ties, and industry, Third Fleet can testalmost any system and quickly providefeedback. One test area, Fleet Battle Ex-periment ALFA (FBE–A), first imple-mented and tested many experimentalsystems in March 1997.

FBE–A explored the potential oflittoral warfare, including the ring offire concept designed at the JohnsHopkins Applied Physics Lab. In thepast specific units have been tasked toprovide fire support to ground units.Using laptop computers and satellitelinks during the ring of fire test,marines ashore sent information rightto the battle group commander, whothen directed shipboard missiles orordnance from the most effective unit.Shipboard weapons were dedicated totargets rather than the entire ship, giv-ing the commander more capability toemploy his forces. Web pages and e-mail were used to rapidly and rou-tinely transmit information andknowledge—classified and unclassified,tactical and tactical support. This dra-matically increased the speed of com-mand and compressed the time re-quired for coordinating events.

Also during FBE–A, an Air Forcejoint surveillance target attack radarsystem (JSTARS) aircraft transmittedreal-time pictures of hostile land forcesto the command ship, USS Coronado.In this test of transmitting such datadirectly to a ship, the joint operationscenter onboard quickly relayed infor-mation to ground troops, aircraft, andships for appropriate action. Thisproved that littoral command posts ofthe future can use this method to di-rect campaigns.

Proving the viability of IT–21 inoperations, FBE–A quickly revealed

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Location of forceswhen Typhoon Justinstruck during Tandem Thrust ’97.

Transmitting report,Kernel Blitz ’97.

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both the strengths and weaknesses ofthe technology and its application.Such on-scene evaluations permit in-stantaneous refinement and reconsid-eration depending on the level of suc-

cess. The challenge remains to ensurethat these capabilities are disseminatedto Pacific Fleet forces that deploy tothe western Pacific and Arabian Gulf.The ultimate goal is to have such capa-bilities in all units regardless of fleet.

The Forward Deployed NavalForce (FDNF), which is based in Japanand centered around USS Independencebattle group and USS Belleau Wood am-phibious readiness group, contributesto stability in Asia and serves as aquick response “911” team in a crisis.Always present and often used, theseforces were available on short noticeduring recent tensions in Korea andthe Taiwan Straits. A week closer toAsia than ships steaming from the westcoast, the Seventh Fleet FDNF immedi-ately projected naval capability in bothsituations.

Aside from crises, the commanderof Seventh Fleet is a joint task forcecommander and the primary Navy im-plementor of cooperative engagementwith regional allies. With responsibil-ity for introducing proven IT–21 tech-nology and concepts to FDNF, hedemonstrates the capabilities with bi-lateral partners in the region.

In March 1997 Seventh Fleet em-ployed IT–21 operationally during Tan-dem Thrust ’97 in Australia. Con-ducted immediately after FBE–A, theexercise included a combined U.S.-Aus-tralian force in a mock invasion ofnortheast Australia. Web technologyand satellites allowed seamless com-munications among all forces. TandemThrust architecture enabled horizontaldissemination of information while al-lowing the commander to preserve hi-erarchical decisionmaking. The exten-sive information exchange betweenunits was increased enormously byusing web technology.

For example, meteorologistsposted daily or even hourly updates onthe Tandem Thrust ’97 web page gath-ered from a range of U.S. and Aus-tralian military and commercial

sources to keep all the partici-pants informed about Ty-phoon Justin. Rather thansending e-mail or reams ofmessage traffic, the web pro-vided the latest weather. Withthis information, exerciseplanners were able to adjust

schedules to work around the typhoonand complete all events on time.

Subordinate commands and spe-cialty areas followed this model andposted information on the TandemThrust home page. This resulted in avirtual command center, with criticalinformation available at the touch of akey which enhanced the scope of theexercise.

Putting such an exercise on lineencouraged leaders to utilize IT–21technology to its fullest. Lessonslearned from the daily use of networktechnology enabled Tandem Thrust ’97participants to develop and then refineprocesses on the strategic, operational,and tactical levels.

Throughout FBE–A, TandemThrust ’97, and the recent Pacific JointForces Exercise 97–2, Pacific Fleet oper-ationally tested information technol-ogy and its applications. IT–21 empow-ers us to redesign the processes used bywarfighters which makes them betterinformed and enables them to operatejointly and be more responsive whenneeded. This technology permits Pa-cific Fleet and the entire Navy to workmore closely with the Army, Marines,Air Force, and allied forces.

IT–21 is not an end in itself; it is ameans of changing processes. Once acritical mass is achieved it saves re-sources that more than pay for thetechnology. More importantly, it pro-vides more capability. By leveraging in-formation technology to reengineerthe way we do business, we avoid sig-nificant costs as we meet new chal-lenges. These efforts will increase ourcapabilities and the opportunities for

Pacific Fleet to improve joint opera-tions while fulfilling the Pacific Com-mand strategy of cooperative engage-ment with the nations of theAsia-Pacific region.

To foster stability in this critical re-gion, Pacific Fleet must lead in technol-ogy, and precious resources must notbe squandered. Information sharing ischanging rapidly, and we have seen theNavy completely alter its outlook oninformation technology over the lasttwo decades. We have moved fromlink-11 teletypes and rudimentaryweapons control computers to websiteinformation management on commer-cially available Pentium processors.

Some may say that using IT–21 ca-pability is the realm of the impossible,but it is clearly the way ahead. TheChairman has articulated a warfightingvision for the future in Joint Vision2010. The bases of battlefield domi-nance are dominant maneuver, preci-sion engagement, full dimensional pro-tection, and focused logistics. But theyassume that we will have informationsuperiority. IT–21 is the Navy plan forobtaining that information superiorityand Pacific Fleet is employing it to leadthe way into the next century. JFQ

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Tandem Thrust architecture enabledhorizontal dissemination of infor-mation while allowing hierarchicaldecisionmaking

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The use of computer simula-tions to create the environ-ment for joint exercises hasincreased dramatically over

the last decade. Since the Gulf War ithas become apparent that a change inthe dynamics of warfare is underway.In what some describe as a revolutionin military affairs, joint warfighting ischaracterized by compressed planningcycles, precision weapons, and vastlygreater battlefield awareness. Thishighly active, technology-driven at-mosphere creates unique challengesfor exercise planners. Unlike thescripted, paper-driven exercises of the

past, computer simulation has becomea must. In fact, it may be the only wayto represent the complexities of futurewarfare. This article describes the de-velopment of simulation-driven exer-cises and offers some insights on theintegral role of air component involve-ment in joint training.

Ulchi Focus LensThe largest, most complex com-

puter simulation-driven exercise in theworld is known as Ulchi Focus Lens(UFL). With the temporary cessation ofthe Team Spirit field training exercise,

UFL has become the major opportunityfor the commander in chief, CombinedForces Command (CINC CFC) andcomponent staffs to exercise criticalwarfighting procedures and decision-making tasks. In this exercise, the train-ing audience—CINC CFC and his staff;the ground, maritime, air, and uncon-ventional warfare component staffs;and a field Army and corps headquar-ters—requires a complex infrastructureof computer simulations, temporarygaming centers, and communicationsequipment and links to create a realis-tic, reasonably detailed wartime envi-ronment. Given training objectives andthe scale of the exercise, this infrastruc-ture poses a significant challenge to thestate of the art in simulations and joint


Lieutenant General Eugene D. Santarelli, USAF, is vice commander, Pacific Air Forces.

Air ComponentSupport to Joint ExercisesBy E U G E N E D. S A N T A R E L L I

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Component Role inExercise Simulation

Data Base SoftwareDevelopment Development

Technical Pre-exerciseSupport Planning/Testing

Response Cell TechnicalAugmentees Training

Component StaffInteractions

Force Apportionment

Planning and Execution

Intelligence,Surveillance, andReconnaissance

Joint TrainingEnvironment

JFC Exercise: Complex Simulation Environment

exercise planning. Currently, the jointtraining confederation (see figurebelow), a collection of service- and

agency-provided simulations, is theonly means of creating a suitable exer-cise environment for UFL.

Often overlooked in the world ofsimulations are the contributions of ser-vice components to database develop-ment, pre-exercise plans, response cellaugmentees, controllers, and pre-exer-cise tests which are critical to creatingan effective exercise environment forthe joint force commander and otherservice components in his command.

In UFL ’95, the air componentcommander in Korea—the commanderof the Combined Air ComponentCommand (CACC) who is dual-hattedas commander, Seventh Air Force—dis-covered that a greater level of effortwould be required to fully realize simu-lation-driven joint exercises.

UFL ’95Air component training and con-

tributions to joint exercises reached alow point in UFL ’95. Primarily be-cause of failures in the exercise simula-tion system, major air component

training goals were not met, and theair component contribution to train-ing was diluted. In UFL ’95, intelli-

gence reporting and the flow of in-formation critical to the battledamage assessment process did nottake place. In this case CACC haddifficulty assessing the effectivenessof support for CFC strategic priori-ties. After thousands of sorties,

CACC simply was not getting feedbackon the effectiveness of air forces insupporting the joint campaign.

Other anomalies caused added dif-ficulties. Combat results were implausi-ble and disjointed. In some casesweapons performed brilliantly. In oth-ers significant capabilities were unrea-sonably diminished. Rather than creat-ing a realistic wartime environment,simulations gave CACC, CFC, and mar-itime and ground component com-manders fragmented, uneven views ofcombat in general and—where the aircomponent was concerned—an inaccu-rate portrayal of employing air forces.From the air component standpoint,the result was that neither JFC nor anyservice component had the opportu-nity to fully integrate air forces into theexecution of the exercise scenario.

All participants were shortchanged by the partial representationof air component combat processes,intelligence assessment processes, andstaff-to-staff interactions, all of whichdepended upon a balanced representa-tion of the warfighting environment.

With all the promise of advanced sim-ulation technology, what led to thissituation? As usual the devil was inthe details.

The air component difficulties inUFL ’95 stemmed from a lack of re-sources for sufficient integration ofsimulation support into exercise plan-ning and execution. Unlike commandsin both Europe and CONUS, little inthe way of manpower and funding hasbeen available for simulation-basedtraining for air components in theAsia-Pacific. Consequently, in UFL ’95the temporary air component simula-tion center established for the exerciseat Osan Air Base, Korea, was illequipped and staffed. The equipmenton loan arrived late and was insuffi-cient. Qualified simulation center aug-mentees were in short supply. The out-come was ineffective control of thesimulations, lack of training realism,and lost training opportunity. Pre-exer-cise planning was one culprit.

Development of simulation data-bases was not coordinated with corre-sponding command, control, com-puter, communication, and intelligence(C4I) systems databases. This was tellingfor the air component since target data-bases are essential to battle damage as-sessment, and intelligence combat as-sessment was insufficiently coordinatedwith simulation databases. Accordingly,targets struck in simulations did notconform to those in the air componenttraining audience warfighting plan. Ex-pected damage did not occur or wasnot reported, and rational adjustmentsto warfighting plans and intelligenceestimates were made difficult if not im-possible. Unstructured developmentand testing of databases led to similarincongruities in other areas. This re-sulted in further losses in effectivenessof air component interaction with theother components.

CACC; commander, Pacific AirForces (PACAF); and the Chief of Staffof the Air Force turned that situationaround, thereby signalling a commit-ment to joint training. The Chief ofStaff instructed the director of Model-ing, Simulation, and Analysis at Head-quarters, U.S. Air Force to gather ateam and implement a $10 million ef-fort to remedy the shortfall. Their taskwas to design, man, equip, test, and

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operate a new simulation center lo-cated at Osan Air Base in less than ayear with a virtual program manage-ment office which included organiza-tions from around the world.

IntegrationThe Air Staff program office led

the overall effort, hired contractors topermanently operate a simulation cen-ter at Osan, and developed a programto select and train Air Reserve Compo-nent personnel to augment the centerfor UFL ’96. The Warrior PreparationCenter (WPC) contributed expertisefrom Einsiedlerhof, Germany, and theElectronic Systems Center (ESC) atHanscom Air Force Base tested reengi-neered systems. PACAF developedtechnical options, coordinated real-world and simulation databases, de-signed and installed the simulationlocal area network, and with the guid-ance of the CACC staff acted as focalpoint for integrating technical plansand pre-exercise milestones. Plannersand specialists tied efforts together in

Korea by developing physical facilitiesand doing hands-on work to createtechnical infrastructure at Osan. Fi-nally, contractors analyzed the UFL ’96exercise information flow and came upwith a design to support technical sys-tems in the new facility. Attaining thisgoal in under a year was difficult.Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, PACAF,and CACC worked together with theKorea Battle Simulation Center (KBSC),the CFC activity responsible for simu-lation-driven exercises in the theater.

Through video teleconferencing,planning conferences, in-process re-views, and thousands of e-mail mes-sages, an implementable plan tookshape. Simulation systems and commu-nications networking equipment weredelivered to Korea in record time. Abuilding at Osan Air Base was remod-eled and the local infrastructure was expanded to include more than a hun-dred simulation workstations. Commu-nications links between the simulation

center and actual air component C4Isystem were established. One spin-offwas improvement of the joint simula-tion infrastructure in Korea. For thenew Air Force simulation center to in-teroperate with the joint simulationsystem, aging communications net-work components were upgraded. Theresult was a much more capable, robustexercise communication infrastructurefor all participants.

With the installation of the simu-lation infrastructure in Korea, the AirForce team planned and implementeda pre-exercise test of simulations anddatabases. One month before UFL ’96,as the technical infrastructure wasbeing established, exercise simulationsand actual databases were installed onWPC computer systems. In addition,PACAF collaborated with the CACCstaff and WPC to install a contingencyautomated planning system—the aircomponent C4I system—on the WPCsimulation network. Subsequent test-ing of simulation systems was effectiveand represented the first pre-test of

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U.S. and Japanese officers monitoring simulation, Keen Edge ’96.

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UFL simulation systems, databases,and C4I systems prior to the exercise.

The result of this effort was the es-tablishment of the Korea Air Simula-tion Center (KASC), a small, perma-nent site at Osan. Its staff was selectedto cover the spectrum of expertiseneeded to plan complex, simulation-driven events. Experts in operations,logistics, intelligence, databases, com-munications technology, and com-puter systems were identified in timefor UFL ’96. Although Murphy’s Lawhaunted the exercise, CACC declared it

the best air component simulation todate. More importantly, KASC con-tributed significantly to achievingCINC CFC exercise objectives and laidthe basis for greater success in UFL ’97.

Proof of ConceptKASC contributed greatly to “flaw-

less simulation support” of UFL. Withthe Directorate of Command and Con-trol at Headquarters, U.S. Air Force;PACAF; the Air Force Agency for Model-ing and Simulation (AFAMS); ESC; andWPC, KASC fielded a greatly improvedversion of the air warfare simulation

(AWSIM), used a newly developed inter-face between C4I and simulation sys-tems, and implemented an ESC soft-ware solution that allowed simulationsto feed the exercise air picture to theglobal command and control system.

The performance of KASC duringUFL ’97 set a new standard for trainingin the exercise and was the proof ofconcept for the effort to establish asimulation site in Korea. The KASCrole in a pre-exercise load test elimi-nated many technical problems plagu-ing previous exercises. More impor-

tantly, the KASC effort improved thequality of training for all participants.The quality and realism of theater mis-sile defense play was vastly enhanced.The responsiveness of air forces to JFCrequirements was demonstrated moreclearly than in previous exercises inwhich simulation anomalies inter-fered. The training audience executedair operations in support of CINC goalsin an environment unmatched in exer-cises in terms of realism and employ-ment of actual C4I systems. Whilechallenges remain in providing simula-tion support to exercise intelligenceprocesses, UFL was a solid success. Be-yond establishing a simulation site to

support joint and air component train-ing in Korea, this effort led the Air Forceto reassess its support of simulation inthe Pacific theater and to review theway it organizes for major joint exer-cises worldwide. The outcome of this re-assessment was the PACAF modelingand simulation program and keylessons about Air Force exercise support.

LessonsAs the Air Force implemented bet-

ter support of UFL and established theair component simulation facility inKorea, a number of valuable lessonsemerged about Air Force support of itsair components in joint exercises.

Simulation planners and techni-cians must be stationed in theater tobe thoroughly involved in the JFC ex-ercise planning process on a daily basisas needed. Unless the subject area ex-perts (on simulation planning, data-base development, simulation control,communications planning, pre-exer-cise training, and technical testing) arepresent and accountable to the aircomponent for routine involvement inexercise planning, simulation-drivenexercises are unlikely to accurately rep-resent air component capabilities forthe JFC training audience. KASC suc-cess supports this assertion.

KASC has simulation experts invarious areas who have vastly im-proved the quality of air componentplay in exercises by being directly en-gaged with KBSC, the CFC exercisesimulation organization charged withoverall planning responsibility for sim-ulation-driven exercises in Korea. Thisengagement has run the gamut fromsimulation control and communica-tions architectures to database coordi-nation. This level of cooperation can-not be achieved by long distance andrequires a minimum presence of airsimulation experts in-theater to workwith exercise simulation planners who,unlike single service training events,are members of the JFC staff. KASC is agood model for describing the mini-mum presence needed in-theater tosupport this interaction.

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Walker Battle Simulation Center.

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Another issue is interaction amongmembers of the air simulation cadreand air component commander’s staff.Daily interaction between KASC andCACC staff at Osan Air Base has beenextremely effective in supporting train-ing goals, developing simulation inter-faces to C4I systems, and integratingsimulations into real-world warfightingprocesses. The presence of KASC atOsan allowed more effective coordina-tion than in earlier events. The PACAFmodeling and simulation program ispatterned on the KASC formula of pres-ence in the theater and routine engage-ment of air simulation cadres in jointexercise simulation planning.

Key joint exercises should be sup-ported by an integrated Air Force cross-functional team. Because major exer-cise goals include testing joint doctrineand emerging technology in additionto battlestaff training, air componentsneed more expertise than is commonlyfound on air component staffs. For ex-ample, Air Force specialists on employ-ing unmanned aerial vehicles or othersystems not yet fielded may providekey insights into capabilities, limita-tions, and employment proceduresduring the exercise. Having the besttechnical expertise on scene is essentialto correct assessment of employmentprocedures and combat performance ofnew weapon systems.

Essential elements of the Air Forcesimulation infrastructure are likely tofunction properly if established perma-nently at the exercise site. For example,simulation communications links arefar more likely to function well duringan exercise if used and tested often.The same logic applies to automatedinterface between simulations and aircomponent C4I systems. In-place sys-tems will be far more reliable if techni-cal components and interfaces are usedonly as an exercise approaches.

Air component play can be im-proved with trained exercise simula-tion support and response cell aug-mentees. In UFL ’96, 80 Reservecomponent augmentees were trainedfor the Korea Air Simulation Center;during UFL ’97, 100 augmentees wereinvolved. Trained in AWSIM and C4I,the Reservists enhanced the quality ofair play. If continued, air componentrepresentation will be improved asaugmentees gain experience.

Finally, exercises such as UFL meritdedicated support by Headquarters,U.S. Air Force, major commands, andagencies responsible for developing AirForce training simulations. During UFL’97, ESC (the AWSIM developer) played

a critical role in simula-tions. Having the soft-ware developer presentwas invaluable in resolv-ing technical problems.Similarly, assistance fromboth AFAMS and the Di-

rectorate of Command and Control atHeadquarters, U.S. Air Force, broughtexpertise from across the service to bearon an exercise critical to the readinessof JFC in Korea.

Based on the UFL experience,PACAF established a modeling andsimulation program to support jointand air component exercise require-ments throughout the Pacific theater.

Modeling and SimulationPACAF modeling and simulation

is designed to address the void in train-ing experienced by Pacific air compo-nents. PACAF air components face sim-ulation shortfalls identical to thoseencountered in Korea. Key exercises inJapan such as Keen Edge and bilateraltraining by the Japan Air Self DefenseForce and U.S. Air Force lack supportfor robust air component play.Eleventh Air Force, the Alaskan aircomponent, faces a similar need forbetter simulation supported trainingand supplemental assistance with thesimulation component of joint exer-cises. Thirteenth Air Force, the PACOMdeployable air component staff forJTFs, lacks the simulation capability totrain on the operational level. Inwartime air component staffs con-

tribute augmentees to JFC staffs orform the core of air component staffs.Lack of adequate simulation capabili-ties makes it difficult for PACAF aircomponents to produce realistic com-mand and control training for wartimeroles.

PACAF modeling and simulationwill include support facilities at bothOsan and Hickam Air Force Base. Thisprogram is designed to provide theaterair component staffs with the means ofconducting in-place computer-assistedexercises and training on real-worldC4I systems. It will supply trainingevents as small stand-alone air compo-nent exercises to reinforce core compe-tencies or a strengthened part of exist-ing joint exercises in Korea andthroughout PACOM.

While separate organizations, thesesites will be mutually supportive interms of personnel, equipment, and ex-pertise. For example, PACAF modelingand simulation resources will be placedagainst requirements generated by peakevents such as UFL. Key to the successof relatively small simulation sites willbe assistance from the new AFAMS andthe Air Force ESC, the developer of exer-cise simulation system software.

Air Force support for joint exer-cises in the Asia-Pacific region hascome a long way since UFL ’95. Follow-ing that exercise, a corporate Air Forceapproach to simulation support of jointtraining events emerged to the benefitof all participants. Considerableprogress has been made in areas such aspresentation of a common operationalpicture driven by simulations. Theatermissile defense procedures are exercisedmore realistically based upon improvedsimulations. Promising long-term bene-fit, lessons from establishment of theair component simulation capability inKorea are being applied to principal ex-ercises across the joint exercise pro-gram. The outcome is certain to in-crease readiness for JFC and aircomponent staffs. JFQ

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PACAF established a modeling and simulation program to support exerciserequirements throughout the theater

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T he concepts articulated inJoint Vision 2010 and ex-panded in Concept for FutureJoint Operations are essential

if the U.S. military is to remain thedominant fighting force in the world.In Korea, Combined Forces Command(CFC) put the concepts into practiceduring a theater wide joint and com-bined command post exercise (CPX),Ulchi Focus Lens ’97 (UFL ’97).

The mission of United NationsCommand/Combined Forces Com-mand/U.S. Forces Korea is to maintainthe armistice, deter war, and if deter-rence fails defeat a North Korean at-tack. Some 700,000 Korean and 37,000American soldiers, sailors, marines,and airmen are able to accomplish theCFC mission through a commitmentto training readiness and force mod-ernization. The basis of readiness is acombined and joint exercise programthat includes events designed to train

joint and combined commanders andstaffs on warfighting skills, exercisecampaign plans, and practice variouscontingencies in case of renewed hos-tilities. It also enables complex staff or-ganizations to practice new processes,coordinate with each other, and refineCFC standard operating procedures.Moreover, exercises permit us to sharenew concepts, practice tactics, tech-niques, and procedures, and experi-ment with emerging technologies.

The keystone exercise for CFC isUFL, the largest simulation supported,theater wide joint and combined com-mand post exercise. In 1997 this exer-cise involved the governments of both

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General John H. Tilelli, Jr., USA, is currently commander inchief, Combined Forces Command, and also has served as Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

Ulchi-Focus Lens ’97:

Putting JV 2010 into PracticeBy J O H N H. T I L E L L I, J R.

UFL ’97 briefing.

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the Republic of Korea (ROK) and theUnited States, including some 16,000service members, DOD civilians, andcontractor personnel. It was conductedAugust 18–29, 1997, with participantsconnected by simulations and a real-world C4I architecture from sites inSouth Korea, at Fort Hood, Texas, andafloat. UFL ’97 was the 22d annual CPXin this series which began in 1975.

Practicing ConceptsThere are several reasons for sus-

taining UFL at its current level. Themost obvious is the North Koreanthreat to freedom and stability on thepeninsula and throughout northeastAsia. That threat is real, unpredictable,and dangerous. The situation in the

North is uncertain because of its eco-nomic dilemma. Yet the Kim Jong-Ilregime appears firmly in control andthe North Korean military, the world’sfourth largest, continues to modernizedespite a bleak economic outlook.

As the economy of North Koreadeteriorates it is certain that theregime and its military will look forsigns of weakness or waning in ourcommitment to South Korea. Forwardpositioning of Pyongyang’s forces just26 miles from Seoul is another causefor concern.

UFL is an exercises that helps usremain strong and vigilant. It has theadditional benefit of reminding theNorth and other potential adversariesof a firm allied resolve to protect free-dom and stability on the peninsulaand in the region. It strengthens theteamwork between the governmentsand militaries of the Republic of Koreaand the United States. It is a forum forexchanging ideas on doctrine, organi-zation, and technology. Most of all, itis the backbone of training readiness.

While we are confident that Wash-ington and Seoul will resolve regionaltensions through diplomacy and peace-time engagement, it remains the primeresponsibility of our combined defenseteam to deter conflict and, should thatfail, to fight and win. UFL ’97, like our

other exercises, is a significant part ofthis deterrence package.

An underlying theme for UFL ’97was the CFC goal to put JV 2010 con-cepts into practice. On reflection it wasconcluded that battlefield situationalawareness, partly enabled by a com-mon relevant picture, is a prerequisitefor full spectrum dominance. Thus itwas decided from the outset to config-ure simulations, C4I systems, and ex-perimental technologies in order tobetter understand the enemy and bat-tlespace to make effective decisionsand take action before the enemycould react.

The ultimate outcome sought wasto maximize joint and combined rela-tive combat power to fight and win de-

cisively. We lookedfor ways to achievesynergy with com-bined capabilitiesin an asymmetric

manner to offset the enemy’s numeri-cal advantage and sustain operationalinitiative.

One goal was to use our decisionsupport tools to focus on when to de-cide rather than labor over what to de-cide. This is a key distinction. Theconcepts in JV 2010, enabled by infor-mation warfare capabilities, allow usto focus on future decisions and out-comes instead of on present or pastoperational situations.

To practice dominant maneuver,precision strike, full dimensional pro-tection, and focused logistics we builtand tested a C4I system that allowedjoint and combined commanders andstaffs to climb the cognitive ladder. Weemployed UFL ’97 to gauge how wellmembers of the command understooda particular battlefield situation and vi-sualized a future outcome.

The C4I concept was ambitious.Because of the daily theater wide oper-ations tempo and an influx of newcommanders and staff members, wemaximized opportunities during theexercise. In simple terms we adoptedthe framework for JV 2010 experimen-tation using a common operating pic-ture. The first step was integrating the

joint confederation of models underthe aggregate level simulation protocolso that each service component modelcould feed data to others linked to theconfederation. The joint models in-cluded the Army corps battle simula-tion system at Yongsan and CampCasey, Korea; the Navy research, evalu-ation, and systems analysis model atSuwon; and the Air Force air warfaresimulation model at Osan.

Next an interface was establishedbetween many real world C4I systems,including several experimental tech-nologies so each system could ex-change data and information. Thethird step was to build an electroniclink, with redundant pathways, be-tween the simulation models and C4Isystems to replicate realistic nationaland theater level sensor feeds to theC4I systems.

The final step was creating a the-ater wide classified internet, completewith CFC home page and web browserso command posts could access perti-nent common operating picture infor-mation, send recurring status reports,and communicate via e-mail.

Assessment and EvaluationWhile transitioning to the global

command and control system (GCCS)-common operating picture, the nervecenter of this system is the theater auto-mated command and control informa-tion management system (TACCIMS)designed exclusively for the theater ofoperations. TACCIMS is the classified,U.S./ROK tactical English/Hangulmeans of moving digital information.

CFC tested this system of systemsbefore the exercise. Once some refine-ments were made the common operat-ing picture was broadcast over com-mand and control personal computer(C2PC) terminals at command poststhroughout Korea. It was also broadcastover several joint force air componentcommand (JFACC) joint situationalawareness system (JSAS) workstationslocated at component command head-quarters and on a three dimensionalscreen at the CFC theater air, naval,ground operations command center,Command Post Tango.

It took many subject matter ex-perts to build the CFC common oper-ating picture including members of the

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an underlying theme of UFL ’97 was the CFCgoal to put JV 2010 concepts into practice

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Korea Battle Simulation Center, com-mand staffs, 1st Signal Brigade (opera-tional control to Eighth U.S. Army),and military and civilian agencies offthe peninsula.

To help evaluate the effectivenessof theater wide situational awarenessduring UFL ’97, CFC used the Army Vi-sion 21 information management sys-tem to compare the battlefield situa-tion from the simulation models withthe common operating picture dis-played by CFC. The exercise directorand senior observers used Vision 21 todevelop C2 and JV 2010 lessons learned

for after action reviews. Vision 21aided discovery learning by membersof the combined defense team.

Another important CFC assess-ment and evaluation method was thedecision to solicit help from researchand evaluation consultants who lookedat CFC battlefield visualization andcommon operating picture systemsused in the exercise, evaluated them,and recommended improvements. Thisfirm provided the command with anextensive post-exercise report. CFC waspleased to learn that its own observa-tions and internal assessment closelymatched those in the report.

Considering the many objectivesCFC established for its CPX, UFL ’97was a tremendous success. We madegreat strides in practicing JV 2010 con-cepts and achieving a common rele-vant picture. During the exercise weimmersed commanders and staffs inthe warfighting plan, trained essentialwarfighting skills, and strengthenedteamwork between both governmentsand militaries.

Many new warfighting methodsworked well in UFL ’97. A highlight ofthe exercise was the improvement inthe CFC ability to plan and direct alethal counter-fire battle that took ad-vantage of experimenting with severalconcepts from a newly created counter-fire primer for Korea.

With one U.S. field artillerybrigade from III Corps acting as the

counter-fire headquarters, CFC used animproved common operating pictureand the synergism of air componentclose air support with the ground com-ponent counter-fire systems for unpar-alleled success in reducing the signifi-cant fire support capability of theenemy. The CFC creative counter-fireprogram was just one of severalwarfighting improvements over previ-ous UFL exercises.

The improvements in commonoperating picture enabled by C4I archi-tecture also allowed experimentationwith tactics, techniques, and proce-

dures. Two examples were thecombined naval componentcommand maritime interdic-tion operations campaign andCFC simultaneous commandand control of air interdictionsorties, close air support sorties,

and attack helicopter operations fordecisive, synergistic effects throughoutthe depth of the theater.

For the first time, largely becauseof improved situational awareness, creative thinking, and enhanced com-munications, the naval componentcontrolled Army attack helicoptersquadrons, in coordination with 6th Cavalry Brigade from the groundcomponent command, to interdictenemy amphibious unconventionalwarfare penetrations. The naval com-ponent headquarters aboard USS BlueRidge vectored AH–64s to enemy land-ing sites before it could disembarkfrom submarines or landing craftthereby offering a new level of littoral,maritime interdiction versatility. Alliedsensor technologies and communica-tions between the naval componentcommand and 6th Cavalry Brigade en-hanced the ability to rapidly respondto the infiltration.

While events unfolded offshore,CFC aggressively pursued enemy oper-ational formations, artillery groups, lo-gistics nodes, and surface to surfacemissile units from skies over the the-ater of operations. Using the commonoperating picture, enhanced by effec-tive C4I, CFC combined the effects ofstrike capabilities by the air compo-nent command with those of attackhelicopters by the combined aviationcomponent.

The combined air componentquickly achieved air superiority in thecampaign. Capitalizing on early aircampaign successes, the CFC Com-bined Targeting Board, Air Space Man-agement Center, and component com-mands worked together to blanketenemy formations with the lethal firesof the combined Air Force and com-bined aviation component.

While air interdiction sorties wentdeep to target enemy second opera-tional echelons and reserves, close airsupport and attack aviation squadronsworked together in the main battlearea to attack leading enemy forma-tions and artillery groups.

The net effect of these simultane-ous, around the clock operations wasto upset enemy attack plans. Theenemy sustained heavy losses and alsofound it extremely difficult to move at-tacking mechanized and armoredunits, support infantry with effectiveartillery, or reposition reserves.

Man and MachineCFC successfully exploited the

synergism of its air platforms by visual-izing the sky over the Korean theaterand the enemy on the ground in realtime. That battlefield visualization en-abled the orchestration of precisionstrike and dominant maneuver.

Another first for UFL ’97 was de-ploying a joint space support team(JSST) to the theater, complete with asupporting space based campaign planand joint tactical ground station(JTAGS). JSST was tied into the theatercommon operating picture for real timewarning of a Scud surface to surfacemissile launch against CFC. Locating itin Korea with JTAGS strengthened over-all theater missile defenses. It gave newmeaning to full dimensional protection.

Success in implementing JV 2010concepts began with the common op-erating picture that was based upon anextensive C4I architecture involvingman and machine. Many C4I systemsand automated technologies workedwell, although some were more capa-ble than others. UFL ’97 was the beston record for the joint simulation con-federation. The simulations came to-gether smoothly and yielded a stress-ful, real time exercise scenario forcombined and joint staffs. The mastery

■ J F Q F O R U M


creative counter-fire was one of several warfighting improvementsover previous UFL exercises

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of simulation technology by the KoreaBattle Simulation Center enabled play-ers to direct their energy on warfight-ing and experimenting with JV 2010concepts and to attain a common rele-vant picture.

All C4I systems used during UFL’97 gave CFC staffs the potential tobuild a common operating picture,which is the vital first step toward fullspectrum dominance.

Of the systems available to CFC inUFL ’97, JSAS offers tremendous utility.It provides real time U.S. multi-sourceintelligence data and models a range ofU.S. sensor capabilities. It is a usefulanalytical planning tool, has three di-mensional display capability, and in-corporates its own communicationssuite. The ability to fuse data rapidlyand disseminate the information the-ater wide is the real strength of the sys-tem. It is an interim step towardachieving situational awareness untilthe potential of the GCCS-commonoperating picture is maximized and vi-sualization requirements are met.Meantime, JSAS provides an importantfirst step among the many steps wewill take to provide the theater a fullycapable situational awareness tool.

C2PC is worth pursuing. It is a rel-atively inexpensive, user friendly, NT-based server with access to GCCS.Sixty-four TACCIMS workstationsthroughout the command had accessto a PC-based common operating pic-ture, releasable to ROK.

The focused intelligence system ofsystems offers significant capabilitiesand will continue development and re-finement. Focused intelligence inte-grates and fuses information fromground, sea, and air components into acommon view of the battlespace. Fo-cused intelligence is an automated wayto portray the battlespace to all com-ponents and allies and is the result ofanalysis and synthesis of collecteddata. It accepts data feeds from a host

of national and theater intelligencesensors and provides a three dimen-sional view of the battlespace includ-ing radar, artillery, terrain, and com-munications networks. It has alsotaken the peninsula into the first stepsof an interactive wargaming processthat will greatly assist planners’ course-of-action development.

This system has notable implica-tions for our ability to analyze recon-naissance information, perform realtime battle damage assessment, directartillery fire, and determine enemyand friendly dispositions anywherewithin the theater. Focused intelli-gence is not a common operating pic-

ture, but it is a majorinput device to a com-bined picture.

Another system—used by the Theater DeepOperations CoordinationCenter at Command Cen-ter Seoul—was the auto-mated deep operationscoordination system. It isan effective aid to firesupport and deep opera-tions. Yet it is a tempo-rary replacement for the

common targeting system until theArmy fields its field artillery target datasystem in Korea.

CFC evaluated the utility of sev-eral other systems during UFL ’97. Weencouraged staffs to experiment withsystems such as the joint operational

visualization environ-ment, which portrays athree dimensional view ofthe battlespace, blue andred forces, terrain, andScud attacks on an 18 by20 foot screen. Each sys-

tem had unique capabilities and limi-tations. The CFC experience with themis similar to that of other theaterswhere emerging technologies arebrought together to support a theaterlevel warfighting exercise.

The command found it had muchto learn about combining current andfuture information technologies to pro-vide a seamless common operating pic-ture that ultimately will enable us tomake decisions more quickly and effec-tively than an enemy. With the adventof this technology on the peninsula,

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the automated deep operations coordination system is an effective aidto fire support and deep operations

USS Blue Ridge.UFL ’97 situation update at Korean command post.

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we are on the verge of full spectrumdominance which will save lives andresources.

CFC determined that the com-bined effectiveness of various systemsused during UFL ’97 is proportional tocompatibility with each other, trainingproficiency of the operators, connec-tivity to theater communication andautomation systems, and ease of use byallied personnel.

The Relevant and IrrelevantSeveral conclusions were drawn

from the exercise. CFC experience sug-gests that the joint community is righton target in its method of building aC4I system of systems from the bottomup. It is more compatible, userfriendly, and functional and less re-dundant than the stovepiped systemsthat proliferated after the Gulf War. Byutilizing a systems engineering ap-proach to C4I structure, we can achievea common relevant picture with thepotential to achieve full spectrumdominance. We are merging joint andcombined systems with a cogent C4Iconcept, including a demanding train-ing regimen and evaluation of factorsaffecting our ability to attain a com-mon relevant picture.

The information operations chal-lenge was approached like any othertactical or operational problem. In thiscase we began with a mission analysisthat concerned a unique informationage enemy which was neither anotherperson nor an opposing weapons sys-tem but rather was possible incompati-bility between joint and combined C4Isubsystems and English/Hangul.

Part of the solution to problems ofthe information age involves organiza-tional structures as well as hardwareand software. We are studying thosestructures and related roles and mis-sions commensurate with the degree offuture uncertainties, the task or func-tion each must perform, and the mini-mum information each needs to com-plete its mission.

The layout of command posts isalso being investigated. As we continueto add enhanced information systems,the physical design of these facilities

must maximize information ex-changes. They must also filter a bur-geoning volume of information. Wemust assist by pursuing the right infor-mation and enabling subordinate com-ponents to pull what they need.

The CPX demonstrated that ampleinformation can be generated. As inother commands, the concern is differ-entiating between the relevant and ir-relevant. Using the critical require-ments of the commander as a filter, C4Iarchitecture can be manipulated to de-select information irrelevant to effec-tive and timely decisionmaking.

A sustainment training programfor C4I systems must be established.We cannot wait for periodic exercisesto train operators on systems. CFC isfinding ways to employ the same sys-tems daily. Both our C/J-3 and C/J-6are considering how to make TACCIMSinto a theater wide internet system forall everyday peacetime business.

Another lesson is that informalcommunications and decisionmakingchannels will remain as valid in the 21st

century as in the past. In an age whenour command posts manage and ana-lyze increasing amounts of information,commanders need an informal way tobalance the demands of the C4I systemof systems through their own intuitionand that of their subordinates.

Korea has bilingual, bicultural, andsecurity considerations that magnifythe C4I challenge for the alliance. Bothparties have cultures that are uniqueand rich in tradition. The differencesare what make our alliance strong. Eventhough each side brings complimentarystrengths to the table, cultural and lin-guistic distinctions may be the most im-portant consideration for joint andcombined theater wide C4I architecture.Consequently Americans and Koreansare collaborating every day to deter-mine the best methods of enabling acommon relevant picture.

There is another UFL ’97 lesson:more is not always better. After assess-ing the results of our varied experi-ments, training, and demonstrations,we must decide the minimum effectthat C4I architecture must achieve ateach level and what system or systemof systems to employ. Also, since wedid not exercise the potential effects ofan enemy attack on our C2 systems, we

must put them to the test of simulatedcombat. The enemy will always have avote; we must be prepared.

We must develop a simulationtool that accurately portrays an enemycapable of attacking or deceiving ourC4I structure. How well we understoodthe battlefield situation during UFL ’97is far less important than how well wemight understand it during a conflict.

UFL ’97 was enormously success-ful. CFC took a major step in movingJV 2010 concepts from theory into ap-plication. Advances in information agetechnologies have ushered in a new erain the evolution of warfare. Whiletechnology will never provide perfectinformation or certainty, innovationsover the last ten to fifteen years placeus on the verge of providing timelyand accurate enough information togive commanders sufficient certaintyto make quicker and better decisionsthan our enemies. With better deci-sions commanders can seize and retainthe initiative.

CFC is searching for combined sit-uational awareness and battlefield vi-sualization each day. It is obvious thatattaining a common relevant picture isabsolutely fundamental to moving JV2010 concepts from theory to practice.Our C4I system is the nerve center thatconnects the muscles of the commandto its brain. Situational awareness restsin the brain and from there conceptsemerge to ensure full spectrum domi-nance. We are moving even closer toturning the concepts contained in JointVision 2010 into an operational way oflife within the Korean theater. JFQ

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COUNTERDRUGOperations in U.S. Pacific CommandBy J A M E S C. K R A S K A

T he first duty of governmentis to protect its citizensagainst all threats, both for-eign and domestic. The Pres-

ident’s national drug control strategyidentifies one such danger as illegaldrugs because they attack and subvertthe social and economic fabric of theNation. The volume of drugs whichenter the country and the demand forthem continue to be a cause of greatalarm. While cocaine use has dropped,consumption of marijuana and otherillegal drugs is increasing amongyoung people. Perhaps most troublingis that the rate of heroin and metham-phetamine use is also growing.

The social and health impact of il-legal drug use amounts to $70 billionin illness, death, and crime each year inthe United States.1 Drugs destroy fami-lies and overwhelm the criminal jus-tice, health, and social service systems.Most Americans identify it as one ofour most acute problems.2 Moreover, inthe source nations of Asia and SouthAmerica, crime and profits related totrafficking in drugs erode emerging de-mocratic institutions and legitimateeconomic activity. These worldwide ef-fects make drug trafficking a major in-ternational security issue.Lieutenant James C. Kraska, USNR,

is legal advisor for Joint InteragencyTask Force West.

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DOD Counterdrug SupportAt the height of the cocaine epi-

demic of the late 1980s both Presi-dent Bush and Congress recognizedthat assets unique to the militarycould bolster counterdrug efforts. Leg-islation enacted in 1989 tasked DODto serve as lead agency in detectingand monitoring illegal drugs enteringthis country. The Armed Forces werealso authorized to provide counter-drug-related training and other sup-port to domestic and foreign law en-forcement agencies. The NationalDefense Authorization Act of 1990broadened that basic mandate to in-clude intelligence analysis and lin-guistic expertise, the establishment ofdedicated counterdrug C3I centers,and air and sea transportation.

The President has outlined fivecomprehensive strategic goals for re-ducing illegal drug use in the UnitedStates and assisting friendly nations incombatting both consumption andtrafficking. Each is underpinned bysupporting goals; the first three focuson demand reduction, drug-relatedcrime, and health and social costs.Studies indicate that demand reduc-tion policies are among the most effec-tive means of reducing drug useamong Americans. Success dependsprimarily on law enforcement, schools,and social institutions. In cooperationwith other agencies on the Federal,state, and local levels, the militaryplays a principal role in supporting thefourth goal, shielding our land, sea,and air frontiers from the drug threat,and the fifth goal, disrupting foreignand domestic sources. By creating sev-eral geographically-focused joint taskforces, DOD exercises a lead role in thedetection and monitoring of interna-tional drug traffic and supports law en-forcement efforts.

Counterdrug Task ForceU.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)

relies on Joint Interagency Task Force(JIATF) West for support of nationalcounterdrug objectives in the Asia-Pa-cific region. Both Joint Task Force (JTF)Six and JIATFs South and East comple-ment such efforts in their respectiveareas of responsibility. Located in

Alameda, California, JIATF West is astanding organization with participa-tion by all the services and the Federallaw enforcement and intelligence com-munities. It brings resources to bear insupport of law enforcement agenciesand country teams to disrupt interna-tional drug traffic.

Because PACOM includes or bor-ders on the primary production andtransshipment centers for both heroin

and cocaine, JIATF West divides coun-terdrug efforts between heroin flowingfrom Southeast Asia and cocaineshipments across the eastern Pacific.Heroin and cocaine have entirely dif-ferent production and transshipmentcharacteristics, complicating counter-drug activities. Grown domestically inHawaii and other states and also im-ported from Mexico, marijuana isprevalent in the Pacific as are varioussynthetic methamphetamines. Toidentify illegal drugs coming into theUnited States through internationalwaters and airspace, JIATF West main-tains a vigilant detection and monitor-ing force comprised of aircraft andships in the eastern Pacific. Operations

conducted by this flexible force arecued by information collected by taskforce assets and others.

In Asia the command has devel-oped an operations and intelligenceprogram that enhances efforts byAmerican embassies and countryteams working with host nations tocombat heroin and other drugs. Suchactivity complements the President’semphasis on fostering peace, democ-

racy, and stability abroad andmakes the task force a relevant in-strument in the counterdrug com-munity. This support is directedat reducing the flow of contra-band into the United States while

preventing the profits of traffickersfrom contaminating emerging democ-racies and market economies.

The Eastern PacificMuch of the attention on illegal

drugs in the last decade has focused oninterdicting cocaine from South Amer-ica. While cocaine use has declined 74percent since its high in 1985, thereare still 1.5 million U.S. users. Disrupt-ing trafficking is the chief interna-tional drug control priority.3 Despite adramatic fall in the number of occa-sional users, frequent users have re-mained constant at more than


heroin and cocaine have entirely different production and transshipment characteristics

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550,000. Since this category accountsfor two-thirds of demand, the amountof cocaine consumed has not gonedown measurably in recent years.4

Although the U.S. Governmentseizes 100 metric tons of cocaine peryear, this interdiction has little impacton price or availability.5 It is estimatedthat up to two-thirds of the cocainewhich enters this country passes eitheron or over the eastern Pacific en routeto Mexico and ultimately the UnitedStates.6 All international waters andairspace off Mexico west of 92 degreeswest longitude are within the PACOMarea of responsibility, and JIATF West ischarged with patrolling this busysouth-north smuggling corridor. Thechallenge for interdiction is difficultfor the same reasons that bedevil oper-ations in PACOM—dealing with timeand distance. It is twice as far fromPanama to San Diego as from Panamato Miami, and a lack of chokepoints inthe eastern Pacific contrasts with nar-row passages in the Caribbean andGulf of Mexico. Yet despite these ob-stacles, JIATF West has had consider-able success, including recent opera-tions that have led to several multi-tonseizures of cocaine or marijuana by lawenforcement authorities.

The Golden TriangleAlthough widespread cocaine use

has generated national concern,heroin—processed from opium grownprimarily in Asia—is attracting in-creased attention. Heroin productionhas grown 60 percent in the past eightyears to 360 metric tons. The numberof addicts in the United States grewthroughout the 1970s and 1980s and isnow estimated to exceed 600,000.7

Though just as deadly and addictive ascocaine, the special opiate properties ofheroin permit addicts to develop long-term tolerances, thus ensuring a steadydemand. It is especially dangerous be-cause it has hooked many addicts andis viewed as a partner to cocaine, capa-ble of moderating that drug’s stimulat-ing effects. Once regarded as the drugof dead-end derelicts, heroin is surfac-ing in the rock music and fashion in-dustries and may be acquiring a chicglamour and respectability.

High-purity Southeast Asianheroin dominates the American mar-ket. The PACOM area of responsibilityincludes the world’s predominantsource and transit countries for ship-ments entering the United States.Opium and its derivative heroin are

produced in or transshipped via everynation of Southeast and SouthwestAsia. The Golden Triangle, the pointalong the Mekong River where Burma,Laos, and Thailand meet, produces thegreatest amount of opium and refinedheroin. The largest single producer ofheroin is Burma, which accounts fornearly 65 percent of the estimatedworld opium poppy cultivation and 60percent of potential opium gum pro-duction, enough to make 250 metrictons of refined heroin.8 Productionand trafficking in Burma are controlledby groups of armed ethnic bands, in-cluding the United Wa State Army andthe Myanmar National Democratic Al-liance Army. Laos produces about 200metric tons of opium gum, enough for20 tons of refined heroin. Because of a

long and successful anti-drug cam-paign, Thailand produces very littleheroin; but its excellent transport, fi-nancial, and communication systemsare used by drug traffickers.

China, Vietnam, and Cambodiado not produce large amounts of

heroin for international markets,but they include centrally lo-cated transit routes from theGolden Triangle. China, whichhad once all but eliminatedheroin, is again experiencing arise in consumption. Southern

China is a key route for SoutheastAsian heroin destined for ports alongits east coast, where the drug trade en-counters shipping bound for theUnited States and other markets in theWest. Eliminating drugs featuredprominently in China’s tough “StrikeHard” anti-crime crackdown of 1996,but economic growth is expected to in-crease heroin and opium consumption.Vietnam produces 25 metric tons ofheroin per year, much for domestic use.

The vast expanse of the PacificOcean has dictated a strong maritimecomponent to PACOM strategy andplanning, and this focus is reflected in

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the vast Pacific Ocean has dictateda strong maritime component toPACOM strategy and planning

E–2C patrolling theCaribbean.

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counterdrug operations. Some 70–80percent of drugs shipped to this coun-try arrive on board every manner ofcommercial and noncommercial vesselfrom container ships to fishing boats.Burgeoning economic growth in Asiaand a dramatic growth in interna-tional trade across the Pacific haveprovided new routes and means forheroin and opium trafficking amongAsian nations and to the UnitedStates. Varied modes of shipping,ocean distances, and a lack of choke-points pose a unique challenge for theUnited States and its allies in Asia andmake interdiction far more difficultthan in the relatively confined area ofthe Caribbean. Large heroin cachestravel through busy, sophisticatedports such as Singapore, Hong Kong,and Kaohsiung in containerized ship-ping bound for America. The scarcity

of real-time intelligence and impracti-cality of examining the 4.2 millioncontainers that enter the United Statesfrom Asia yearly make containers oneof the most secure and effective waysof transporting contraband.9

Unlike cocaine traffickers, whogenerally operate within hierarchical,linear organizations, many separateheroin trafficking groups forge ad hocarrangements to move drugs via Asia totheir Western markets. This linked ap-proach is especially difficult to targetbecause traffickers rely upon ethnic orfamily ties. Elimination of one link isunlikely to stop the overall enterprise.Intelligence analysts at JIATF Westapply analytical tools to help law en-forcement agencies decipher complexcriminal organizations and identifyfront companies and their internationalaccomplices who import drugs into theUnited States. Such analysis promoteseffective cooperation between U.S. andhost nation law enforcement, leading tojoint investigations and the extraditionof heroin traffickers.

In recent decades a number ofAsian cities have become banking cen-ters and have attracted millions of dol-lars in drug profits and have engagedin money laundering. Intelligence ana-lysts are able to assist law enforcementagencies in dissecting complicated fi-nancial transactions to separate naturaland lawful economic activity fromcriminal profits.

The Golden CrescentThree drug producing and traf-

ficking countries in Southwest Asia—Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran—makeup the Golden Crescent, the secondlargest area of opium cultivation in theworld according to the Department ofState. Afghanistan, second only toBurma as an opium producer, grows 30percent of the global supply, or 1,230metric tons each year. Many heroinand morphine base laboratories are op-erated along the Afghanistan-Pakistanfrontier. Because of porous borders

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Golden Triangle alongthe Mekong River.

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K r a s k a


among Pakistan, Iran, and the centralAsian region, heroin from the GoldenCrescent often winds its way throughTurkey and the Middle East to marketsin Europe. Although Western Europehas been a major market in the past,the economic revival of Eastern Europehas bred new consumers. Because thecommander in chief, U.S. Central

Command, does not receive counter-drug support, JIATF West also supportshis counterdrug initiatives when ap-proached via PACOM.

Drug trafficking, terrorism, andinternational crime promise to becomedominant forces that will threatenboth democratic order and interna-tional stability in the next few years.The PACOM counterdrug strategy is

making a difference by developing in-telligence on heroin and other illegaldrugs which originate in Asia, plan-ning and executing intelligence-cueddetection and monitoring operations,and targeting drug traffickers in theeastern Pacific. Analysts at JIATF Westwho track heroin from Southwest andSoutheast Asia have perhaps the mostcomprehensive expertise on this sub-ject in the U.S. Government and repre-sent a valuable resource for law en-forcement agencies. Their analysisprovides a clearer picture of traffickingschemes and organizations and alsoaids in the identification and arrest ofsmugglers.

Drug traffickers are resourceful,and detecting and monitoring their ac-tivities for hand-off to law enforce-ment requires a constant vigil. JIATFWest deploys Navy and Coast Guardair and sea force packages that areproving crucial to efforts to seize illegaldrugs and arrest international traffick-ers. They operate in close coordinationwith U.S. Customs Service aircraft andother law enforcement forces to ensurea seamless hand-off of suspect targets.The payoff is that drugs are taken outof the supply stream, benefitting theUnited States and the community ofnations. JFQ

N O T E S

1 The National Drug Control Strategy(Washington: The White House, February1997), pp. 10–15.

2 Consult with America: A Look at HowAmericans View the Country’s Drug Problem,summary report (Rockville, Md.: Gallup Or-ganization, 1996).

3 The National Drug Control Strategy, p. 10, and International Narcotics ControlStrategy Report (Washington: Department ofState, 1997), p. 9.

4 Modeling the Demand for Cocaine (SantaMonica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1994).

5 International Narcotics Control StrategyReport, p. 9.

6 Molly Moore, “Latin Drugs Flow NorthVia Pacific,” The Washington Post, January 30,1997, p. A1.

7 The National Drug Control Strategy, p. 55.8 International Narcotics Control Strategy

Report, p. 261.9 Worldwide Maritime Challenges 1997

(Washington: Office of Naval Intelligence,1997), p. 10.

High speed boats offSan Diego.

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T he significance of the Aus-tralia, New Zealand, andUnited States (ANZUS) al-liance is not what it promises

but what it allows. It has great value tothe soldiers, sailors, marines, and air-men of each nation. Its advantage fromthe trenches is that it imposes few rulesand regulations on like-minded peoplewho share common hopes, aspirations,and professional approaches to the de-fense of their respective countries.

Though this article is focused onland forces, it should be noted that

naval and air forces are equally if notbetter supported within the alliancebecause of the extensive integration ofnaval and air equipment, intelligence,doctrine, and training. Before turningto the tactical level, however, it is use-ful to look at ANZUS from the strategicand operational levels.

Common InterestsOn the strategic level war is the

province of Parliament and the Chief

■


Brigadier Peter Leahy, Australian Army,who commands 3d Brigade, served asthe commander of Combined ArmyForce during Tandem Thrust ’97.

ANZUS:A View from the TrenchesBy P E T E R L E A H Y

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The author during Tandem Thrust ’97.

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of the Defence Force. Here things havebeen remarkably constant. But it is thelevel on which little is actuallypromised. Nevertheless, Australia andthe United States have worked to-gether to maintain the ANZUS treatywith a clear view of the advantages

that accrue to each. The treaty hasproven remarkably durable. It has beensupported by two governments of dif-ferent persuasions over four and a halfdecades of peace and conflict.

Like many international agree-ments the wording of the ANZUS docu-ment is ambivalent: no promises aremade and both countries are onlyobliged to act in accordance with theirconstitutions. This is no bad thing for atreaty between sovereign states whoseinterests can change over time and di-verge under particular circumstances.In this respect ANZUS differs markedly

from agreements such as the North At-lantic Treaty in which member statesare committed to certain actions.

The lack of compulsory action inANZUS does not seem to be a draw-back in the relations between Australiaand the United States, whose associa-

tion is based on common valuesand shared security interests.Both countries have held similarworld views for many years. Theirvalues and interests nurtured andsustained a relationship long be-fore the ANZUS treaty was signed

in 1951. One early example occurredat the battle of Hamel during WorldWar I when U.S. soldiers fought underAustralian command.

Common national objectives werealso apparent in the close relationsthat developed during World War IIand the Korean War. Since signing theANZUS treaty this bond has been en-hanced through the common experi-ence of the Vietnam and Persian GulfWars and through a shared hope for abetter world by cooperation in Somaliaand other humanitarian crises.

Both the United States and Aus-tralia are intent on sustaining the rela-tionship. In addressing the Australian

Parliament, the President of the UnitedStates said, “The alliance is not just forthis time. It is for all time.” Australia isseeking to invigorate the alliance bymaintaining its relevance, by reinforc-ing its importance in making a sub-stantial contribution to regional peaceand security, and by enhancing itsown capability for self-reliant defense.

StandardizationOn the operational level battles

and campaigns are conducted toachieve strategic objectives. Militarydoctrine holds that it is essential tomaintain a direct link between thestrategic through the operational tothe tactical level. Battles must befought and campaigns must be wagedfor strategic ends. There must be a di-rect relationship between the delibera-tions by Parliament or Congress andthe weapon pit or foxhole.

The political and diplomatic as-pects of the alliance should supportand be directly supported by opera-tions in the field and fleet. In practicalterms this begins on the operationallevel. It is here that a soldier gets the

L e a h y


Australia is seeking to invigorate the alliance by enhancing its owncapability for self-reliant defense

Australian gunners arrivingfor Tandem Thrust ’97.

DOD

(Rob

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first real view of ANZUS in action. Hebegins to realize that the strength ofthe alliance is in what is allowed, notwhat is promised.

The treaty is more symbolic thanpromissory. It is on the operationallevel that one finds practical coopera-tion in intelligence, technology, andlogistics and in substantive efforts toachieve interoperability and standard-ization. None of these actions are for-mally mandated under the treaty.

The American, British, Canadian,Australian (ABCA) Armies’ Standardiza-tion Program is an example of stronglinkages at ground level. Although notstrictly a product of ANZUS it cameabout and is largely sustained as a re-sult of the cooperation epitomized bythe treaty. Its strategy is to ensure thatmilitaries achieve agreed levels of stan-dardization necessary for two or moreABCA armies to cooperate effectivelyin a coalition. ABCA has the followingminimum requirements:

■ compatible doctrine, tactics, tech-niques, and procedures (TTP), training, elec-tronic systems, and platforms

■ interoperable communications andinformation systems (including functions ofmaneuver, fire control, air defense, intelli-gence, and combat service support), criticalweapon systems, and critical training simu-lation systems

■ interchangeable combat supplies,combat support and combat service, andformations and units

■ common critical TTP and engineer-ing quality standards.

Two important aspects of ABCAthat further consolidate these linkagesare that the program acknowledges theprimacy of U.S. doctrine on the opera-tional level and addresses army issuesand those joint issues which impingeon the land battle primarily on the tac-tical level.

The program contributes to armycoalition operations by being responsiveand focusing on standardization acrossfunctional areas of the battlefield. It al-lows both armies to share resources byexercising coalition operations and ex-changing information, matériel, andideas among military staffs, scientists,and developers and by matching armyrequirement documents.

Agreements and advisory publica-tions help to achieve standardizationunder business type arrangements thatensure that effective and tangible re-turns are provided efficiently from theresources invested by the participants.

Ground LevelDown in the trenches one talks

about how to make things work ratherthan about alliances. ANZUS is con-stant, something that we accept andwork within because it makes sense.

Thus we talk about standardizationand interoperability, personnel andequipment exchanges, and resolvingproblems that will enable us to operatemore effectively. The treaty does notlimit us to certain actions but insteadprovides the room for like-mindedpeople to function together. ANZUSworks on the tactical level because itfeels right. Parliament and Congressagree on a strategic view that helps tomaintain an important security anddefense relationship based on commonvalues and interests.

ANZUS is a constant for Australiajust as cooperation with America hasbeen in peace and conflict over manydecades. It is about people in and outof uniform and common aspirations.As the deputy commander of Com-bined Army Force for Tandem Thrust’97 observed in an interview pub-lished in the June 1997 issue of Armymagazine:

People are what really make joint opera-tions work. . . . I think fundamentally op-erations between militaries and success inmilitary operations are a function of howwell you get along culturally, how you seethe values of your society playing out in aworld landscape. Interoperability is a lotof talk about electrons, radio sets,weapons, and equipment but at its core inits most fundamental aspect, to ensuresuccess, it’s people bonding together in acommon cause. From what I’ve seen ofour two nations during Tandem Thrust,I’d say we’re doing OK.

Combined ExercisesTandem Thrust ’97 was a U.S.-led

and Australian-supported joint andcombined exercise that involved some27,000 personnel. Its object was to fur-ther develop procedures for combinedcrisis response operations as outlinedin the ANZUS planning manual. Ittested a combined task force based onU.S. Seventh Fleet in a short-warningpower projection scenario.

The commander of Australian De-ployable Joint Force Headquarters(Land) was the deputy commander ofthe combined task force under thecommander of Seventh Fleet. A largeelement of that headquarters was fullyintegrated into the command ship USSBlue Ridge.

■ J F Q F O R U M


F–15 in Australia during

Tandem Thrust ’97.

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[EDITOR’S NOTE: 3d Brigade (Aus-tralian)—with a battalion (Task Force2–35) from the 25th Infantry Division(U.S.) under its operational control—com-prised the Combined Army Force (CAR-FOR), which was commanded by the au-thor with the commander of 3d Brigade(U.S.) as his deputy. The Americans sup-plemented CARFOR headquarters withnearly 900 personnel.]

Tandem Thrust was really two ex-ercises. One was a combined force plan-ning exercise that 3d Brigade played inTownsville. In this phase the headquar-ters was deployed on USS Blue Ridge andbecame involved in crisis action plan-ning. Australian personnel assimilatedinto the combined task force and of-fered valuable planning assistance. TheAmerican presence in Townsvillemeant that many lessons were learned

for the next phase. Moreover, deployedU.S. forces conducted in-theater train-ing, became familiar with commandand control arrangements, and grew ac-climatized. The exercise also allowed

both national headquarters elements toconduct familiarization and cross level-ing, which meant that communica-tions officers could conduct interoper-ability checks and that staffs couldestablish standing operating proce-dures. Many combat and combat sup-port functions in the brigade were inte-grated at company, platoon, andsection level.

The field deployment phase com-menced after 10 days during whichCARFOR deployed to Shoalwater Bayby road, sea, and air. CARFOR was allo-cated an area of operations (AO) adja-cent to a force of U.S. Marines. Thisphase was marked by high intensityoperations using a range of joint andcombined assets.

Many lessons learned during bothphases fell within the framework of

the ABCA program objectives andthe stated minimum require-ments of compatible, interopera-ble, interchangeable, and com-mon critical procedures. Butpeople make Tandem Thrust andANZUS work. The soldiers of the

two countries get on with one another.Nationality makes no difference. Cul-tural commonality and shared hopes

extend from the soldiers in the field tothe politicians in the cabinet room.

Firstly, consider doctrine, TTP,training, electronic systems, andplatforms.

■ Our doctrine and TTP are largelycompatible and the differences are sur-mountable. The ABCA framework for U.S.corps-level doctrine provides a solid basisfor compatibility, and few difficulties aroseduring Tandem Thrust, even in the detailedtasking and direction of TF 2–35 by head-quarters CARFOR.

■ Australian training methods aresimilar. One major success was the trainingvalue gained by TF 2–35. During reconnais-sance for the exercise the task force com-mander was able to state his training needs,which easily translated into requirementsfor training areas and resources as well assafety and environmental considerations.

■ Electronic systems are generallycompatible though uneven areas existed,mostly related to the nature and scale ofequipment distribution. Examples are tacti-cal satellite systems and night vision gear.Australian forces are not as well equippedand in some cases were not able to operateon the scale and with the intensity of theU.S. military. At times U.S. forces had to de-grade their capabilities (such as radios andsatellite communications) to operate withAustralian forces.

Secondly, consider inoperablecommunications and information sys-tems (which include the functions ofmaneuver, fire control, air defense, in-telligence, and combat service sup-port), critical weapon systems, andcritical training simulation systems.

■ Our command and control systemsare not entirely compatible, and as theUnited States pursues digitization and satel-lite communications Australia is being leftbehind (as are other allies). Moreover, vari-ous U.S. services are developing differentequipment and disparate procedures.

■ There was trouble with informationsystems during Tandem Thrust. A system isneeded that filters information and pro-vides a commander with only what istimely, accurate, and relevant. Much can bedone with improved staff procedures andstaff discipline, but we also should employtechnological solutions (which is not partic-ularly a problem within ANZUS).

■ Tandem Thrust provided access tomyriad intelligence systems and sourceswhich were largely compatible and vastlyimproved. Recently our brigade capabilitieshave been extended to include access to thejoint intelligence support environment(JISE) through a dedicated terminal.

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National Guardsmen,Tandem Thrust ’97.

DO

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Tandem Thrust allowed both national headquarters to conductfamiliarization and cross leveling

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Thirdly, there is the issue of inter-changeable combat supplies, combatsupport, combat service support, andformations and units.

■ The experience at Tandem Thrustand other exercises and exchanges suggeststhat we can interchange formations andunits. While it is easier to swap companiesor platoons, exchanges can be done at bat-talion or brigade level. Command and con-trol remains a problem. Both nations mustdefine their operational parameters and ex-ercise control over certain functions and re-sponsibilities, and appropriate proceduresshould be developed to overcome any diffi-culties. (I was privileged to command a U.S.Army task force during Tandem Thrust ’97.Teaming arrangements developed by thedeputy commander and myself were crucialto mission accomplishment and were gen-erated without external guidance.)

■ There were no critical problems withcombat support and combat service support,though national differences still exist.

Finally, consider the followingcommon critical TTP and engineeringquality standards:

■ Australian notice to move (NTM)and battle procedures were not as respon-sive as those used by Seventh Fleet and em-barked Marine elements, which compelledus to truncate our NTM and accelerate the-oretical preparations. In a crisis Australianforces must be capable of responding inparallel with the U.S. forces they are taskedto deploy.

■ The procedures followed duringcrisis action planning and Australian bat-tle procedures are dissimilar. Moreover,U.S. Army procedures are dissimilar fromthose of the other services, which causedsome difficulty in rationalizing SeventhFleet procedures with current joint doc-trine. The Navy and embarked marinesfollowed a planning process of embark,plan, rehearse, execute while the Aus-tralian planning process is plan, rehearse,embark, execute.

■ Rules of engagement (ROE) are criti-cal and reflect national differences in theratification of protocols and interpretationof their impact. There has been an initialproposal for Asia-Pacific ROE which re-quires further development. Such rules arecritical for developing and maintainingcoalitions. Tandem Thrust did not provideadequate lessons in this area because theissue could not be fully played. ROE and or-ders for opening fire were not developedearly enough.

The FutureANZUS is well supported on the

strategic level. Although no promiseshave been made, remarks by our politi-cal leaders in both Washington andCanberra as well as the Sydney State-ment provide a framework for its con-tinued robust health and growth.

The alliance also remains vital onthe tactical level, where like-mindedsoldiers are given the latitude to put abasically sound concept into prac-tice—what is allowed makes the al-liance viable.

Fundamentals on the operationallevel are also solid, but more could bedone.

■ Maintaining ABCA objectives en-ables the continuance of basic levels of in-teroperability and should be considered asthe minimum requirement.

■ Ongoing training and exercise op-portunities such as Tandem Thrust are ofconsiderable benefit for an Australian unitas they are for an American.

■ More comprehensive participationin wargames and CPX activities is helpful asthis is the level on which commanders canbe trained at comparatively little cost.

■ Continued exchange of technologyis beneficial, especially when associated withcommunications and command and control.

■ If Australia, as a self-reliant nation,wants to take advantage of the so-calledrevolution in military affairs it must ac-tively engage with the United States; fullparticipation is also important in order tomaintain interoperability.

■ If the U.S. Marines are to be theAmerican 911 force of response in the Pa-cific, then the Australian army must be in-teroperable with them. Interoperability isgood with the U.S. Army (particularly withthe 25th Division) and has been built upover a long period, but it is not as goodwith the Marines. Further development willbe achieved through more exercises and ex-changes.

ANZUS remains relevant to thoseof us in the trenches. To preserve it,however, a number of challengesmust be acknowledged. An increased

commitment to engagement in the re-gion could draw Australia away fromANZUS. Maintaining the alliance maybe seen as Australia siding with Amer-ica or not being fully committed tothe Asia-Pacific. Finally, though thefocus of ANZUS for Australian soldiersis the U.S. Army, it may be necessaryto readjust that perspective more to-ward the U.S. Marine Corps.

The alliance remains an untrou-bled and rewarding relationship. Itworks because those of us in thetrenches are given a solid basis andleft to make it work. There are noneedless rules and regulations.ANZUS provides access to technology,equipment, and training. Moreover, itallows like-minded professional sol-diers to work together. In this waythe Australian army becomes morecapable both as a self-reliant forceand as an equal partner in coalitionarrangements during any contribu-tion to regional or world peace andsecurity. JFQ

This article is drawn from remarks presentedto a seminar organized in August 1997 bythe Australian Parliamentary Defence Sub-committee of the Joint Standing Committeeon Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade.

■ J F Q F O R U M


if the U.S. Marines are to bethe 911 force, then the Australian army must be interoperable with them

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The Chinese military is in theprocess of a long-term mod-ernization program. Uni-formed and civilian leaders

have studied recent conflicts, analyzedshortfalls, and identified improvementsto be made in doctrine, force structure,and equipment. They are aware of thegap in capabilities between the People’sLiberation Army (PLA) and other mili-taries, notably the U.S. Armed Forces.

Most foreign analysis of the cur-rent and potential Chinese militarythreat emphasizes recent equipmentpurchases from Russia and what theyportend. This article evaluates these ac-quisitions and compares them to a pre-vious regional threat and arrives atconclusions about the modernizationof the Chinese military which differfrom those usually found in the media.

Some characterize the Chinese asbuyers at a fire sale in their purchaseof Russian military equipment.1 Russ-ian arms merchants have introducedPLA leaders to hardware that couldgreatly improve Chinese capabilities.Elements of the defense industries inboth countries have established rela-tionships with their counterparts.Over the last five years reports on ne-gotiations for advanced technologieshave been common if vague andsometimes exaggerated. Many re-ported deals are never consummated.2

Purchases and technology transfershave been limited because of Chinesefinancial constraints and Russianstrategic suspicions.

Notwithstanding a need for hardcurrency, Moscow has not sold Beijingcomplete weapons systems that couldstrike the Russian heartland. Kremlinplanners keep a watchful eye on Chi-nese military modernization and tellcivilian leaders to be cautious aboutarms sales to China. However, sometransfer of strategic technology has


Colonel Dennis J. Blasko, USA (Ret.), served as Army attaché in Beijing and Hong Kong, and in assignments at Headquarters, Department of the Army, and with theDefense Intelligence Agency.

Evaluating Chinese Military Procurement from Russia

By D E N N I S J. B L A S K O

Russian IL–76.

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Su–27 fighter on coverof Chinese Air Forcemagazine.

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likely occurred whether it was sanc-tioned by the Russian leadership ornot. Moreover, the danger persists forrogue traders not only from Russia butfrom other former Soviet states to traf-fic in strategic systems and technologyin pursuit of personal gain. Similarly,Russian scientists and technicians whoare no longer gainfully employed maysee China as a lucrative market fortheir expertise.

Even though Beijing has accumu-lated vast foreign exchange reserves,the senior leadership has yet to divertsufficient resources from economic de-velopment to large-scale military pur-chases. For example, expenditures on

culture, health, education, and civilianscience and technology have outpacedofficial figures for defense spendingover the past decade.3 It would takehuge sums to buy the modern systemsnecessary to transform the Chinesemilitary, which is primarily equippedwith matériel based on the technologyof the 1950s and 1960s, to a force basedon that of the 1980s.

To gradually improve PLA techno-logical standards, Beijing has autho-rized the purchase of modest amountsof conventional Russian equipment.Foreign observers generally agree thatthese buys have been made with fundsprovided by the central government orthrough barter agreements, and arenot included in the official announcedmilitary budget.4

Recent AcquisitionsThe amount and type of Russian

hardware known to have been trans-ferred to China since the early 1990s areexhibited in figure 1.5 The WashingtonTimes first reported on the transfer oftwo Sovremenny class destroyers withSSN–22 anti-ship cruise missiles.6 A re-cent report indicated that these shipswhich are under construction will bedelivered within the next two years.The same source reports that 12 KamovK–28 anti-submarine warfare heli-copters are part of this deal.7

The total cost of such purchases isunclear. Prior to the deal for Sovremennydestroyers, one estimate put the figure

for 1991–94 at $4.5–6 billion.8

Another report cited Pentagonsources who said the ships andother systems would cost$8–10 billion over severalyears.9 If either estimate is pro-rated for a multiyear period,

the published Chinese defense budgetmight be augmented by $1–2 billionannually. By comparison the UnitedStates bought more than $43 billionworth of military hardware in 1995alone, with Lockheed Martin account-ing for over $10 billion of that total.10

The actual deliveries and potentialSovremenny transfer yield insights intothe state of both Chinese militarymodernization and defense industries.First, the classes of equipment pur-chased indicate trends in force devel-opment. Naval and air force capabili-ties have priority and these newsystems will provide some of the com-bat power required to fight the sort ofconflict which planners envision asmost likely: short-duration limitedwars using high-tech equipment onChina’s periphery. To fight such con-flicts, China must develop the ability

to project and sustain a joint, com-bined arms force some distance fromits borders. At present, China is bestsuited to fight a defensive war on itsown land mass and coastal waters.

Despite a number of allegations,the transfer of strategic long-rangebombers and intercontinental ballisticmissiles has not been verified. Whileseeking to improve its strategic capa-bility in cost-effective ways, Beijing ap-pears to believe its nuclear arsenal is anadequate strategic deterrent.11

Though sales of ground forceweapons systems have been reported(particularly main battle tanks), signif-icant cases of ground force hardwaretransfers have yet to be confirmed orcome to fruition except for Mi–17 heli-copters.12 This may be because Chinafaces no significant land threat andcalculates that the amount of equip-ment necessary to outfit its groundforces would be cost-prohibitive as wellas unnecessary. Such reasoning freesfunds for weapons more likely to beneeded in future conflicts.

The quantity of equipment pur-chased from Russia indicates selectivemodernization of PLA forces. Equip-ment has been acquired for only a fewunits. Selective modernization is evidentin the decision to form a limited num-ber of rapid reaction units rather thanupgrading the entire force structure. TheChinese military is simply too big andtoo bogged down with matériel de-signed decades ago to be fully equippedwith modern hardware. Further reduc-tions in personnel and force structurewill be vital for PLA modernization.

Finally, in nearly all purchases ofRussian equipment, Chinese industrycurrently produces a similar class ofweaponry, albeit at a lower technologi-cal level. Selecting Russian systems re-flects lack of confidence in Chineseweapons and the ability of domesticindustries to produce modern systemsnecessary to equip PLA forces to effec-tively project their capabilities.

Yet most foreign analysts stillpoint to overall numbers as the pri-mary indicator of Chinese military ca-pabilities. Such estimates often ignoremany complexities of war such as com-mand and control, training, logistics,

■ J F Q F O R U M


Figure 1. Russian Hardware Transferred to China

Mi–17 helicopters over 40

Su–27 fighters about 50 (includes AA–10 and AA–11 missiles) †

SA–10 surface-to-air missiles at least 220 missiles in six launch battalions (each with 4 launchers)

IL–76 transport aircraft 14

KILO submarines 3 (with 1 more to be delivered; additional transfers possible)

RD–33 aircraft engine 100 (for Super-7 and F8–3 fighters)

Beijing has authorized the purchaseof modest amounts of conventionalRussian equipment

† Another 25 or so Su–27s will probably be transferred as part of an agreement to assemble-from-kits or coproduce 200 more aircraft.

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and doctrine that must accompany theacquisition of modern equipment. Theensuing analysis focuses on militaryhardware in the Chinese inventorywhich can be considered modern andcompares it with portions of the forcesof the former Soviet Union. This ap-proach may provide a more realisticperspective on Chinese modernization.

Former Soviet ForcesMost would agree that even in its

final years Soviet military power was asignificant threat. Conventional forceswere divided into Western, Southern,and Far Eastern theaters of operations.Only the Far Eastern Theater and strate-gic forces are considered herein. More-over this comparison will address onlythe types of equipment recently trans-ferred from Russia or those manufac-tured by Chinese defense industriesthat approach contemporary standards.

The total amount of modernRussian equipment transferred toChina in the 1990s is only a minus-cule part of the PLA inventory. Thevast majority of deployed equipmentdoes not provide capabilities necessaryfor action outside Chinese borders.Though such weaponry may be effec-tive to defend the mainland, the

tremendous PLA strength on paper—huge manpower reserves and vastamounts of older equipment—willhave minimal value in the case offorce projection missions envisionedfor future limited, local war scenarios.

Modern Chinese forces pale bycomparison to that part of the formerSoviet force dedicated to the Pacific,not to mention strategic nuclear forces(figure 2). Certainly the internationalsecurity environment that the SovietUnion faced differs from the currentsituation in Asia. Moreover, the way inwhich Soviet forces would have beenemployed differs from Chinese doc-trine. But the order of magnitude ofdifference represents the gap betweena recognized threat and a potentialthreat that may never mature.

Numerical ImplicationsPerhaps the most significant im-

plication of the relatively small scaleintroduction of modern militaryequipment to PLA forces is that only alimited number of officers and enlistedpersonnel have had routine experience

operating and maintainingmodern hardware. Often theuse of this equipment in train-ing is restricted to demonstra-tion and experimentation. Butnew systems must eventuallybe integrated into old opera-

tional methods as new tactics, tech-niques, and procedures are developed.Such changes do not occur overnight.

Until enough soldiers, sailors, andairmen use modern equipment to be-come familiar with its capabilities andcomplexities, it is unlikely that suchweapons will be employed to their de-signed potential. Fear of the loss ordamage of expensive hardware proba-bly will result in a very conservativeapproach to using it in training.

The task facing the Chinese iscomplicated by the reality that, exceptfor internal security operations, almosta generation of PLA officers lacks anycombat experience.13 In particular,

they have none in planning for or em-ploying modern weapons in combat.Nor have they experienced the effectof such weaponry.

The relatively low level of educa-tion and technical sophistication in theforce hampers rapid modernization.Though PLA forces are engaged in amajor educational campaign abouthigh-tech capabilities, until such equip-ment is readily available throughoutthe force most personnel will have onlyacademic exposure to this weaponryand its application on the modern bat-tlefield. Thus it will be difficult to de-velop and disseminate doctrine, tactics,techniques, and procedures for employ-ing modern weapons that may enterthe force. These software challengesmay take longer to overcome than themore readily visible hardware shortfalls.

Defense IndustriesEven though China is credited

with having a defense base that canproduce the entire range of weaponry,with a few exceptions its defense in-dustries do not meet late 20th centurystandards. Except for pockets of excel-lence there are tremendous productionshortfalls. Success includes limitednumbers of indigenously designed,produced, and fielded nuclearweapons, ballistic and cruise missiles,

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Figure 2. Deployed Modern Systems

Weapons System Soviet (a) Chinese (b)

ICBM / SLBM 1,387 / 912 some 17 / 12 (c)

tactical SSM 300 unknown (d)

SA–10 SAM 1000 (e) at least 200

principal surface combatants 52 (f) 7 (g), plus 2 Sovremenny class destroyers to be delivered

ballistic missile submarines 23 1

attack submarines 66 8 (h), plus 1 more KILOclass to be delivered

fourth generation fighters about 670 (i) about 50

IL–76 strategic lift aircraft about 300 14

army helicopters 875 about 100

only a limited number of personnelhave had routine experience oper-ating modern hardware

Sources: (a) Military Forces in Transition (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991) and Soviet MilitaryPower (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1989, 1990); (b) Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, Arms Acquisitions, andThe Military Balance (London: Brassey’s for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996); (c) figures do notinclude warheads; (d) includes deployed M–9 missiles and potential M–11 missiles which may enter the force; (e) it was estimated 15 percent of 6,700 strategic SAMs were SA–10s; (f) includes frigates, destroyers, cruisers, andaircraft carriers; (g) includes 2 Luhu destroyers and 5 Jiangwei frigates; (h) includes 3 Russian built KILO class and 5 indigenously produced HAN nuclear attack submarines; (i) over 75 percent are fourth generation fighters.

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some world class electronics, and a fewfrigates and destroyers.

However, most military produc-tion is focused on upgrading foreignsystems based on pre-1970s technol-ogy and manufacturing techniques.For example, the J–7 aircraft, a modi-fied Soviet MiG–21 originally designedin the 1950s, is still the most widelyproduced fighter.14 In the 1990s thisplane is replacing older J–6 fighters, aChinese version of the MiG–19.15 Inthe Soviet Union the MiG–21 was re-placed in the 1980s by a generation ofaircraft represented by the Su–27.

For more than a decade there hasbeen talk of Chinese efforts to make anF–16 equivalent. When and if it will beproduced, and in what quantity, re-mains open to speculation. For ten

years they have also attempted to de-sign a main battle tank equal to the So-viet T–72. Cooperative efforts with Pak-istan have proven less than satisfactory,and no new tank can be expected anytime soon from China’s industrial base.

The decision to buy Sovremenny de-stroyers from Russia indicates the prob-lem confronting the Chinese defenseindustry. The Luhu destroyer is one ofthe few systems even approaching mod-ern standards, yet Beijing has decided to

acquire ships of the same class fromMoscow to accomplish the same func-tions. Similar thinking was reflected inthe acquisition of Su–27s after Chinahad attempted for years to develop anaircraft with equivalenttechnology to performsimilar functions. Suchdecisions demonstrate alack of confidence on thepart of military plannersin their own industrial ca-pabilities.

It is unlikely that theChinese industrial basecan surmount these prob-lems without massive re-sources from the centralgovernment and the ex-pense of acquiring con-siderably more technol-ogy and production assistance fromforeign sources. Manufacturing equip-ment and techniques on most lines areinadequate to meet modern standards.Production is too low even at currenttechnological levels to allow for a rapidbuildup of modern equipment. Itwould not be an overstatement to saythat even to produce a portion of therange of modern arms, Chinese indus-try with few exceptions would need anearly total recapitalization of its pro-duction lines.

When production estimates for se-lected Chinese weapons systems arecompared with those for the Soviet de-fense industrial base in the late 1980s,rates for less sophisticated Chineseequipment are much lower than the So-viet rates (figure 3). These low rates arecompounded by the effort to convertdefense production and technology tocivilian use. For several years official re-ports stated that 80 percent of the pro-duction value of defense industries wascivilian goods or services.16 The major-ity of the other 20 percent resulted insystems that do not meet modern stan-dards. Nor does the defense industrialbase appear to have a workable plan tosurge in an emergency.17

The decline in Chinese arms salesin the 1990s is another indication ofthe problem. Given the choice, foreignpurchasers have selected Western orRussian arms over Chinese in the lastseveral years.18 Today the low price ofChina’s weaponry cannot overcome its

lack of sophistication. Many recent pur-chases were made more for politicalpurposes than for military effectiveness.In the end, most foreign buyers havebeen dissatisfied with Chinese weapons.

Internal ConstraintsChinese leaders are aware of the

shortcomings in their system. Yet theyhave refrained from making the invest-ments required to significantly alter re-source distribution. Beijing analystsjustify this decision by pointing to thedisproportionate amount Moscowspent on the military as a prime causeof the fall of the Soviet Union.

The Central Intelligence Agencyestimates that the Soviet Union dedi-cated 15 to 17 percent of its gross do-mestic product (GDP) to defense formuch of the 1980s.19 This is far abovemost appraisals of present levels ofChinese defense spending even afteradjustments for extrabudgetary sourcesof income.20 Official Beijing statementsplace it at about 1.5 percent of GDP.Even if that number is tripled to ac-count for extrabudgetary sources, itwould amount to only about 5 percentof GDP.21 The Soviet figure suggests themagnitude of resources that Chinawould have to divert if it decided tospeed up modernization. The result ofsuch a decision would quickly becomeevident to the world and would not byitself guarantee a modern military.

Modernization thus faces severeconstraints. If Beijing tries to surmountits shortcomings too quickly, it could

■ J F Q F O R U M


Figure 3. Yearly Production Rates (late 1980s)

Weapons System Soviet Chinese

principal surface combatants 9 3–4

attack submarines 8 1

fighter aircraft 633 (a) 80(b)

(a) Soviet figures represent the average production level for 1988–90as found in Military Forces Transition, p. 23. (b) John Frankenstein andBates Gill, “Current and Future Challenges Facing Chinese Defense Industries,” The China Quarterly, no. 146 (June 1996), p. 413.

Manning the rail.

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bankrupt the nation and cause severereactions from governments through-out the region and the world. How-ever, if PLA forces do not take signifi-

cant steps, China cannot be confidentof protecting its sovereignty againstwhat it considers real threats. Withouta credible military, China will notachieve its goal of eventually becom-ing a global power.

After analyzing the problem inthe context of international and do-mestic environments, the civilian and

military leadership agree that the long-term program for gradual defensemodernization is appropriate and willnot jeopardize the Chinese economy.

However, unlike most other na-tions, China appears committed toincreasing defense spending. Yetincreases in magnitude (three tofive times more than adjusted esti-mates), which would put Beijingon a spending level equivalent to

that of Moscow in the mid-1980s, donot appear likely.

At the same time, the military willtake advantage of a relatively peacefulregional security atmosphere to con-tinue modernizing doctrine, education,and training levels as the sophisticationof its equipment gradually improves.The Chinese military will avoid ex-tended combat, preferring posturingand threats of deadly force. As seen

from exercises held near Taiwan in 1995and 1996, PLA forces will also stress lim-ited high-tech weapons, ballistic andcruise missiles in particular, to portraythemselves in a modern light.

If force is used there will be rapidefforts to maximize surprise. For theforeseeable future, because of its rela-tive weakness, technological andequipment factors indicate that Beijingis more likely to rely on stratagem andbluff than brute force to counter moremodern opponents.

In terms of conventional militaryhardware, PLA forces have about atenth the capability of Soviet forma-tions deployed in the Far Eastern The-ater in the late 1980s. Although thereare a few pockets of excellence, Chinahas only begun the long process ofequipment modernization. It still mustdevelop doctrine and educate and trainits personnel in modern techniques.The integration of high-tech weaponssystems on the training field, to in-clude modern communications, intelli-gence, and logistics systems, is a majorendeavor that has been underway foronly a brief time and only by a portionof the force.

Without massive foreign assis-tance, China’s industrial base can atbest produce equipment which is tech-nologically equivalent to that whichMoscow replaced in the 1980s. Mostdefense industries will have to be re-tooled and their workers taught newtechniques to produce greater amountsof state-of-the-art equipment. There-fore, despite a desire for self-suffi-ciency, it is probable that most modernhardware introduced into Chineseunits in the near and mid term will beforeign in origin.

The cost of modernization and re-vamping industry would be enormous.The international environment doesnot require China to reallocate re-sources between the civilian and mili-tary sectors at this time. In any case,over the next few years PLA forces arelikely to be reduced in size while theirbudget is modestly increased. Such atrend will advance the modernizationof selected units and improve overall

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unlike most other nations, Chinaappears committed to increasingdefense spending

Shenyang aircraft factory.

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PLA destroyer Harbin,Pearl Harbor.

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levels of education and trainingthroughout the military.

While the pace of Chinese mili-tary modernization will not pose a sig-nificant threat to major powers forsome time, Beijing’s neighbors arewary of its intentions. No matter whatthe foreign perception, however, forreasons of prestige and pursuit of na-tional objectives, China will seek a vis-ible standing force able to deter warand intimidate potential opponents.

China recognizes its militaryweaknesses and thus will seek to avoida prolonged conflict instead of initiat-ing one. Beijing is more likely to bene-fit from both economic developmentand international integration by es-chewing the use of force than by arbi-trary and risky displays of power. Be-cause no imminent threat exists Beijingneed not surmount deficiencies in itsconventional capabilities in the near ormid term. Rather, PLA forces are likelyto focus on enhancing proven pocketsof excellence: ballistic and cruise mis-siles and nuclear weapons. Althoughimprovements in systems can be ex-pected gradually, great advances are un-likely in the short run.

China will also attempt to exploitthe work of its best scientists using ad-vanced computers, electronics, and ap-plied technology to equalize a futurebattlefield through inexpensive infor-mation or electronic warfare. Defenseindustrial R&D will focus mainly onadvanced research as well as dual-useand critical technologies in what canbe regarded as economy of force mea-sures when it is not possible to matchforeign spending on conventional ar-maments.22 These efforts require care-ful monitoring. However, observerswho focus on the purchase of Russianarms or the production of weaponssystems with 1980s technology couldmiss other potentially more dangerousChinese military achievements in the21st century. JFQ

N O T E S

1 To a lesser degree, China is also look-ing toward other foreign sources such as Is-rael and Pakistan for specific hardware andtechnology.

2 For details of reported arms sales, seeKenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, andJonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air Force Entersthe 21st Century (Santa Monica: RAND Cor-poration, 1995), pp. 158–60 and Bates Gilland Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisitionsfrom Abroad; A Quest for “Superb and SecretWeapons,” Stockholm International PeaceResearch Institute report no. 11 (New York:Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 56–67.

3 See Paul Godwin’s paper entitled “‘PLAIncorporated’: Estimating China’s MilitaryExpenditures,” prepared for a conference on“China’s Economic Reform: The Impact onSecurity Policy” held on July 8–10, 1994 atthe Pacific Place Conference Center, HongKong, pp. 18–19, for figures on 1978 to 1994.According to Agatha Ngai and Daniel Kwanin “Defense Spending to Rise 12.7%,” SouthChina Morning Post, March 1, 1997, this trendcontinues. For example, education was re-ported to receive over 38 billion yuan morethan defense in 1997. Some funds used incivilian development of science and technol-ogy goes to the military.

4 Jasper Becker, “Ban on Pork ImportsUpsets Weapons Deal,” South China MorningPost, March 29, 1997, reports that the Su–27purchase would be transacted with 70 per-cent hard currency and 30 percent con-sumer products. A Russian Ministry ofHealth ban on Chinese pork caused the lat-est snag in this arrangement.

5 Gill and Kim, Arms Acquisitions, p. 68;updated with information on transfers in1996. See Richard D. Fisher, “How America’sFriends Are Building China’s MilitaryPower” (Washington: The Heritage Founda-tion, November 5, 1997) for a comprehen-sive listing of arms sales to China.

6 Bill Gertz, “China Buying Russian De-stroyers, Pentagon Says,” The WashingtonTimes, January 10–12, 1997. Jane’s FightingShips 1995–96 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s In-formation Group, 1995), p. 119, reportedon an offer in late 1994 to transfer thesevessels: “If the report is correct and the bidaccepted these ships should transfer in1995.” This shows how negotiations candrag on indefinitely, never actually occur,or be delayed for years. In addition, bycomparison, Jane’s lists 17 Sovremenny de-stroyers active in the Russian navy as of1994, with the first three of the class non-operational. Six of the active ships were inthe Pacific Ocean fleet.

7 “Russian Kamovs Set to Boost ChineseASW,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 4, 1998,p. 14.

8 Gill and Kim, Arms Acquisitions, p. 55.This included the KILO purchase.

9 Gertz, “China Buying.” It is unclearwhether these figures include all Russianweapons to be transferred to China.

10 Defense 96 Almanac (Washington: De-partment of Defense, 1996), pp. 13–14.

11 China’s nuclear forces provide a mini-mal deterrent capability.

12 A small sample of modern groundweapons systems (such as night vision de-vices) may have been acquired for test pur-poses. China has expressed interest in bothSmerch multiple rocket launcher andground air defense systems, but transfer ofthese weapons cannot be confirmed. Evenif verified, the transfers probably are onsuch a small scale that they must be con-sidered experimental rather than a seriouseffort to equip a significant portion of theground force.

13 Ground force officers last saw combatagainst Vietnam in 1979. Small naval forcesengaged in limited combat in the Paracelsin 1974 and the Spratlys in 1988. PLA airforce pilots have not seen combat since theTaiwan Strait Crisis of 1958.

14 John Frankenstein and Bates Gill,“Current and Future Challenges Facing Chi-nese Defense Industries,” The China Quar-terly, no. 146 (June 1996), p. 413.

15 Allen et al., China’s Air Force, p. 123.16 “China Issues White Paper on Arms,”

China Daily, November 17, 1995, p. 3.17 Author’s conversations with defense

industry officials, Beijing, January 1994.18 See Richard F. Grimmett, “Conven-

tional Arms Transfers to Developing Na-tions, 1987–1994,” The DISAM Journal, vol. 18, no. 1 (Fall 1995), pp. 59–76.

19 Central Intelligence Agency, The WorldFactbook 1995, p. 356.

20 Estimates of actual expenditures varyfrom official budget figures (just under $10billion in 1997, and about $11 billion in1998, some 1.5 percent of GDP) to over$100 billion. Estimates put actual defensespending between $30 and $40 billion; thelower figure seems the more reasonable.

21 “China: Finance Minister Analyzes In-crease in Defense Spending,” Hong Kong TaKong Bao in Chinese, March 3, 1997, in For-eign Broadcast Information Service Daily Re-port, FBIS–CHI–97–043.

22 Conversation with Mark Stokes, formerassistant air attaché in Beijing, April 2, 1997.

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Military Innovationand Carrier Aviation—

An Analysis

USS Langley leadingtask group in thePhilippines, 1944.

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Crashed VE–7 on USS Langley, 1925.

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By J A N M. V A N T O L

T he first part of this article, which ap-peared in the last issue of JFQ, chartedthe historical development of Britishand American carrier aviation, with

particular emphasis on the complex interplay oftechnological, operational, and organi-zational factors. The second part treatskey questions on how this revolutionsucceeded in the U.S. Navy and wasrather less successful in the Royal Navyand what that implies for military innovation.Among questions considered are:

■ How quickly did those who grasped the visionmove from a vague to a clearly-defined vision? Howquickly did change take place?

■ Which mattered more to making progress, indi-viduals or groups?

■ What were the barriers to change and how werethey overcome?

■ Did change depend on having a particularenemy?

■ How important was competition?■ How important was a consciousness of the new

concept’s potential?

Then and Now What was it like to be a junior officer follow-

ing World War I? An aviator? A senior naval offi-cer vis-à-vis a carrier aviator? Most junior officerswho sought naval careers considered which spe-cializations were best for advancement. Many of-ficers wanted to minimize professional risk.

Perceptions of present and future relevanceminimized that risk. In the early 1920s, there wasample evidence that aircraft could do militarily

interesting things at sea. While proponents of air-craft as independent strike weapons were a mi-nority, aviators were already well accepted by thecommanding officers of ships. Flying was not re-garded as a bad tour, though it is noteworthy thatmost aviators continued to do traditional ship-board tours.

Risk was further reduced by establishing aninstitutional home for champions and a venuefor experimenting with new capabilities and con-cepts of operation. This led to a viable career paththat kept officers employed when their few yearsof flying ended. (There were inevitably too manypilots for the available senior billets. There wasconcern over the future of aviators who were notselected to be commanders or executive officers.)The establishment of the Bureau of Aeronauticsin 1921 and the legislation passed in 1925 requir-ing commanding officers of aircraft carriers, sea-plane tenders, and naval air stations to be avia-tors created career paths.

The British case was simpler. If one wished tofly during the interwar period he joined the RoyalAir Force where advancement was based on beliefin the strategic bomber. Maritime flyers were notusually on a fast track. Even after reestablishmentof a Fleet Air Arm, aviation duty was somethingseparate from principal shipboard duties. Inshort, in the Royal Navy there were better ways tothe top than through aviation.

Bureaucratic factors, while perhaps necessary,were not by themselves sufficient to ensure the fu-ture of aviation. On personal and intellectual levelsin the 1920s, there was great enthusiasm overtechnology, particularly in the field of aviation.Prominent in the accounts of this period was thesense of adventure among those who wanted tofly. The newspapers were filled with stories of barn-storming and aviation firsts. Together with imagesof aviators as the only glamorous warriors of WorldWar I, this inevitably made flyers an elite group inthe eyes of the public.

There was professional excitement as well.The debate over the role of airpower generated byGeneral Billy Mitchell, the media, and others wasprolonged and serious if raucous. Many of thepropositions about airpower were prima facie nottrivial, including questions about the future via-bility of battleships. Other events such as themass production of automobiles and expansionof electricity, if not directly relevant to aviation,further stimulated interest in technical solutionsand applications. All this suggested in the early1920s that naval aviation had a future of its own.

■ C A R R I E R A V I A T I O N


legislation requiring commanding officers ofcarriers to be aviators created career paths

Mustin (fourth fromright) at Pensacola,1914.

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Commander Jan M. van Tol, USN, is commanding officer of USS O’Brienand formerly served in the Office of Net Assessment within the Officeof the Secretary of Defense.

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What was it like to be a senior officer then,with responsibility for evaluating new conceptsthat might supplant or change the paradigm inwhich he had served? There would appear to betwo types of senior officers whose views matteredin different ways. The first were those serving inkey billets but who would not reach flag rank.

They knew they would not participate in the nextparadigm so they had less incentive to get in-volved. Moreover, having done well in compari-son to their peers, seeing the paradigm underwhich they served slowly becoming less relevantwas hard to accept on a personal level and mayhave led to a certain skepticism. But though theycontinued to serve, they still influenced fellow of-ficers and the flags under whom they worked andwere a source of resistance to change.

Then there are those who continued to serveas senior captains or flag officers. They had tomake decisions on the future of the service andnature of combat. They faced a choice betweencontinuing with proven systems and methods orshifting resources to new concepts which mighthave been promising but difficult to realize. Thelatter involved both opportunity cost and risk offailure. Such choices would seem particularly dif-ficult in a time of budgetary constraint. One findsthis kind of conundrum facing the General Boardin the 1920s and 1930s as it weighed the value ofbattleships versus carrier aviation. So what en-abled senior officers to make the choices they didabout naval aviation in the 1920s?

Flying-off platform onturret of USS Arizona,1921.

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Japanese cruiserTsugaru being bombedin experimental attack(photo obtained byBilly Mitchell duringforeign inspection,1924).

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Whiting (third fromleft), 1918.

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The intellectual tradition of relying on anexperimentalist approach to tactics and technol-ogy allowed for evaluating evidence in makingoperational and technical judgments. By implica-tion, the feeling that serious ideas ought to get ahearing undoubtedly encouraged would-be inno-vators. As the potential of aviation increased, se-nior officers gave it their support.

The Royal Navy, by contrast, lacked anequivalent intellectual tradition. The British onlyestablished a naval staff shortly before the warand then at the insistence of civilian leaders. Staffcolleges in Britain did not have the standing ofthe Naval War College during that period, norwere assignments to them desirable, whereasmany future American flag officers attended andserved on the staff at Newport. The Royal Navywas more hierarchical, with the putative pre-sumption being that flag officers reached that

rank because they knew the answers. In short,young and innovative would-be naval aviatorshad little reason for optimism regarding receptiv-ity to their ideas.

Ideas for CarriersAircraft potential for spotting for battleships

was noted very early by Britain and America. Itaddressed how to shoot accurately when spottingwas no longer possible from the shooting ship(using other ships has the drawback of exposingthem to enemy fire). The value of scouting fromthe air was underlined by its absence at Jutlandand presence (zeppelins) on subsequent occasionswhich enabled the German fleet to avoid battlewith the Royal Navy.



Army “bombing”USS Alabama withwhite phosphorus,1921.

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HMS Furious after conversion from light battlecruiser.

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Other uses for aircraft were driven by specifictactical problems. Rifles then machine guns weremounted in friendly aircraft to stop enemy air-craft from doing reconnaissance in 1914. Air-dropped torpedoes were used to reach anchoredenemy ships when the Dardanelles were blockedto friendly ships in 1915. Zeppelins and seaplanesfound the enemy battle fleet at sea in 1916. Sub-marine and airship bases were bombed a yearlater. Targets too distant for land-based forceswere attacked from the sea in 1918. All theseideas were tried in World War I combat.

Lieutenant Commander Henry Mustin cameup with novel ideas for employing aircraft on hisown. While commanding the flight school atPensacola (1915–17), he prepared a lecture on the“naval airplane.” As a gunnery expert with serviceon battleships, he knew that devastating long-range gunfire, effectively controlled from aircraft,

could win engagements in minutes. He startedwith the idea of light aircraft carried andlaunched from battleships, then moved tolaunching and recovering them with a special air-craft-carrying ship. Sometime before 1917 he ad-vocated the use of aircraft to attack in support offriendly battleships. It is not clear why he madethis leap, but he discussed such ideas with W.S.Sims and others. After war broke out Mustin re-sponded to an appeal by the Secretary of theNavy for war-winning ideas by suggesting bomb-ing of land targets from sea-based platforms. Thisand a similar proposal by Lieutenant Ken Whit-ing, assigned to Pensacola during Mustin’s tenure,were endorsed by British and American plannersin early 1918.

Vought VE-7 landingon board USS Langley.

USS Langley, 1923.

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In sum, many innovations appeared to be at-tempts to solve specific problems. There seems tohave been a lot less of “Given technology X, whatmilitarily useful things might we do with it?”

Grasping the VisionHow quickly did those who grasped the con-

cept arrive at a clearly-defined vision? In the U.S.Navy, Mustin was describing carrier aircraft aslandstrike and seastrike forces in 1915–17. By theearly 1920s, Newport was gaming specific tacticalquestions, getting at physical realities and con-

straints. The president ofthe Naval War College, Ad-miral Sims, stressed theconnection between gam-ing rules and actual data.This was facilitated throughregular correspondence

among faculty members and aviators and, fol-lowing its establishment in 1921, the Bureau ofAeronautics.

The games suggested things like the pulsednature of carrier striking power, the importanceof many aircraft in the air, the need to strike first,and carrier air hitting an enemy carrier as theleading objective. Game outcomes had concreteresults. By 1923 there were explicit connectionsbetween gamed ideas and design of both fleet ex-ercises and warships. Similarly, lessons from theexercises and technical information on ships andaircraft were fed into game design and rules.

Outside the Navy, political pressures gener-ated by airpower purists such as Billy Mitchelland his congressional supporters pushed theNavy to put ideas into at-sea operational capabili-ties by the mid-1920s. The prolonged and highlypublic battleship versus airplane controversy had

the salutary effect of highlighting the question ofthe proper role of naval aviation.

In 1925, Admiral Moffett reassigned CaptainReeves, then head of the tactics department atNewport, as commanding officer of the experi-mental carrier USS Langley to test his ideas, manyof which stemmed from games. Reeves, havingdetermined through wargaming that the numberof aircraft aloft was the key measure of strikingpower, solved practical problems associated withlaunching and landing more planes. As a result,USS Langley was deemed an operational unit by1926. The presence of USS Lexington and USSSaratoga in fleet problems in 1929–31 suggestedtheir utility and acceptance in a variety of roles,although not as independent strike weapons.

However, the mature concept envisioned car-riers as an independent strike force against sea andland targets and was only achieved in 1944 afteryears of trial and error. Interestingly, after the fleetproblems noted above, little work was done onemploying larger numbers of carriers or what theirrole would be vis-à-vis the fleet. Because of treatyconstraints, there were not enough carriers for ex-perimentation. But there is also no record ofwork/gaming at Newport in the 1930s on suchmatters. This is puzzling given that Reeves becameCommander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, in the mid-1930sand was presumably in a position to have suchsimulation and exercising done.

In the British case, the vision died earlywhen those naval aviators who experimentedwith operations entailed in carrier strike warfare,albeit in primitive form, were transferred enmasse to the Royal Air Force where success de-manded adherence to strategic bombing.

Those who remained in the navy were by allaccounts also “air-minded.” However, their con-cept was wedded to bringing about battle with anenemy fleet, then combining air spotters with ad-vanced long-range gunnery to kill ships. Based onwartime experience it was clear what aircraft wereexpected to do, and much of British naval avia-tion was dedicated to those ends. The clarity ofthat vision was such that there was little room toquestion it. The British experience suggests thatoverconfidence in operational concepts can blindan organization to better alternatives.

Individuals or Groups?The relationships between individuals in

their institutional settings is vital. The presidencyof the Naval War College, the post of chief of theBureau of Aeronautics, and the commodore’s roleas head of fleet aviation squadrons is what gaveSims, Moffett, and Reeves an arena to interact



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Moffett (second from left), 1922.

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professionally. By contrast the removal of the air-craft component of naval aviation from directRoyal Navy control in 1919 precluded appropri-ate players from conducting planning and design-ing experiments and exercises essential to devel-oping the carrier concept. But there may be moreto it. It is rather like the dispute between the“great man” and “impersonal forces” schools ofhistory. Both individuals and organizations arecrucial at different times and in different ways.

The creative spark necessarily comes from in-dividuals or from interactions between them.Mustin appeared to be the first officer to see carri-ers as strike weapons. He actively discussed itwith officers who later occupied positions wheresuch ideas could be explored. The institutionalsetting mattered. This suggests that officers as-signed to influential positions should be per-ceived as receptive to innovative people.

An individual may matter in other ways. Thelongevity of a senior officer in a key billet some-times appeared crucial. Moffett remained thechief of the Bureau of Aeronautics from 1921until his death in 1933. His incumbency gavehim credibility with individuals and organiza-tions closely involved with developing naval avi-ation, such as the General Board, Congress, andsenior Navy leaders. This also enabled him to pro-tect innovators such as Reeves from interferenceand influence the advancement of junior officers.It may have saved good ideas from being abortedin case of early failure. While such longevity hasrisks, its virtual absence today because of rapidbillet changes may contribute to a lack of com-mitment to programs, inability to take the longview, and incapacity to build credibility for thebureaucratic struggle to get visions implemented.

Institutions played significant roles as well,particularly in seeing to the incremental detailsvital to translating ideas into practical reality. Or-ganizations like the Bureau of Aeronautics and

Bomber landing onUSS Lexington duringfleet problem, 1929.

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the Naval War College were key. The role of thelatter was important in two ways. First, long be-fore carriers and real aircraft emerged, innovatorslike Mahan and Luce established intellectual rigorat Newport which was maintained into the1930s. There was a reliance on rules of evidencewith the proper questions asked, exercises done,and results weighed which made it credible to ex-amine key questions with simulation in the1920s. Second, iterative gaming at the Naval WarCollege provided the theoretical underpinningsfor tests by Reeves with early carriers, inputs intoexercise and scenario design, and contributions toship and aircraft design. In short, creative individ-uals also needed the right sandbox to play in.

The role of the Bureau of Aeronautics in pro-viding data for Naval War College simulations anda home for aviation and aviators was also a factor.The bureau’s interaction with nonmilitary institu-tions was key. It provided financial support for in-dustry and initiated research in areas such as radialengines and served as a conduit for incorporatingcommercial advances to meet military needs,which was particularly critical as they outstrippedmilitary developments (like C4I today).

The General Board played a significant role inintegrating technology and tactics. Through it,voting on such issues as the future of aviation wascarried out in a community of professionals, notall aviators, with a shared sense of what mattered.Any large organization should have some mecha-nism through which new concepts which areproved worthwhile become institutionalized.

Again, the British case is instructive for whatwas lacking. The Royal Navy had no senior cham-pions along the lines of Moffett, Sims, and Reevessince those who might have assumed such roles

now wore air force blue. It had no organizationalmechanisms for relating technical choices withoperational capabilities, a striking failure that ac-counts for much of the stunted development.Neither did it have, in the absence of acceptableplatforms and aircraft, institutional mechanismsto examine alternative concepts as did the NavalWar College.

Overcoming BarriersVarious barriers faced the U.S. Navy. Those

confronted by Britain are of interest as well, ifonly to contrast the effect of America havingavoided them, not always by intention.

Budgetary constraints. While significant, theeffect of budgetary constraints was indirect. Cer-tainly there were not funds for large numbers ofexpensive platforms to experiment with, butmany would-be experiments could be primitivelysimulated through iterative gaming. The Bureauof Aeronautics was established to control fundingwhich gave it the freedom to dedicate money todevelop engine starters, arresting gear, better en-gines, etc., which incrementally solved many ofthe small technical problems. This also meantthat such items were not hostage to yearly bud-getary tradeoffs, ensuring continuity in develop-ment and easing a barrier to entry in contrast tomany R&D efforts today.

Possible effects of the absence of budgetaryconstraints have been noted. Had the incipient ri-valry between the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy con-tinued unconstrained by treaty, spending on bat-tleships might have crowded out spending forcarriers and carrier aircraft.

Scarce funds ensured that Britain would bestuck with carriers built before requirements forsustained carrier operations were understood. TheRoyal Air Force focus on strategic bombing, cou-pled with control of all aviation assets, slowedBritish naval aviation development since aircraftacquisition was a zero-sum game. It precluded ex-perimentation and may have lessened pressure toincrease carrier aircraft capacity since the navyhad little chance of getting more aircraft. TheRoyal Air Force consistently opposed increasingcarrier capacity for just that reason.

Treaty constraints. Some have argued that theWashington naval treaties limited advances incarriers, particularly multi-carrier operations. Butit appears that USS Langley, USS Lexington, andUSS Saratoga would not have been built fasterwithout treaties. Yet key developmental work wasdone on them and was directly reflected in thedesign of the USS Essex class carriers. By the timemore carriers became available in the late 1930s,



T4M–1 torpedo bomber on deck ofUSS Lexington.

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USS Saratoga.

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the treaties were no longer in force. There is nocompelling evidence that more carriers wouldhave been built in the 1920s and 1930s absentthe agreements, especially given the political cli-mate against defense spending.

What kind of carriers might the U.S. Navyhave bought had battle cruiser hulls not beenavailable for conversion? Lacking treaties, USS Lex-

ington and USS Saratogawould have been com-pleted as battle cruisers.What kind of carriersAmerica might have de-signed then is hard toknow, but Britain had sent

the design of its first built-for-purpose carrier tothe United States in late 1917, and one may won-der if and why American designers would have de-parted significantly from the plans of the ac-knowledged world leaders.

The Royal Navy, on the other hand, paid animmediate and lasting price for its four extantcarriers. Given the inability to replace them forbudgetary reasons, it was stuck with the physicallimits built into them. Since that directly affectedaircraft design, and in turn concepts of operation,the Royal Navy was effectively locked into learn-ing the wrong lessons from the wrong ships.

Sunk costs. The effect of sunk costs stickingBritain with the wrong ships has been noted. TheUnited States did not face that problem; but the1927 Taylor Board recommended acquisition of

five small carriers of the unsatisfactory USS Rangerdesign that might have put the U.S. Navy in thatposition. In the late 1930s, the General Board wasaware of that problem regarding aircraft in a pe-riod of rapid technological progress and recom-mended against acquiring a large inventory.

Technical barriers. Even had the Royal Navygrasped the carrier strike vision, it is difficult tosee how it would have overcome the technicalobstacles, given the financial inability to rid itselfof the “wrong” ships and aircraft. Admiral Reevessolved a key technical problem for the Navy on-board USS Langley and thus paved the way for ac-ceptance of carriers as fleet units.

The principal technical barrier to going be-yond that to the wider conception of carriers asan independent strike force was aircraft and ord-nance performance. In the 1920s bombs were notshipkillers and naval aircraft could not have car-ried them if they were. Torpedoes were ship-killers, but it was almost suicidal to attack anti-aircraft equipped ships given the flight profilerequired. Until aircraft and ordnance that couldkill ships were developed, it was difficult to sellthe mature carrier concept, which was one reasonbattleships continued to have pride of place intothe 1940s.

The risk of being wrong. In the early 1920s theGeneral Board observed almost plaintively that



bombs were not shipkillers and naval aircraft could not have carried them if they were

USS Ranger,circa 1930s.

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“it would be the height of unwisdom for any na-tion possessing sea power to pin its faith andchange its practice upon mere theories as to thefuture development of new and untriedweapons.” The burden of proof lies heavily onthose who propose change. The current way os-tensibly works well; the new way may not be bet-ter, and it may be worse. Moreover, a particularnew way may not be the best alternative. Andnew ways often imply high costs.

The key to overcoming this barrier is datawhich demonstrates the practical superiority(that is, lowers risks) of the new way. Initially,such data must come from theoretical explo-rations, simulation, and where possible testingwith extant systems. Incremental experimentalgains reduce risk and make it reasonable to con-tinue the process on an increasing scale untiltheir practical effect and superiority became insti-tutionally accepted. This was basically what theNaval War College-Bureau of Aeronautics-fleetoperations exchange achieved for carrier aviationin the 1920s.

Inability to experiment. Failing to consider al-ternatives is a certain barrier to entry and wasmanifested in various ways by the Royal Navyand U.S. Navy. Examples included:

■ Unwillingness to experiment, best characterizedby “we already have the answers.” To an extent, theRoyal Navy as the leader in early carrier aviation wassometimes guilty of assuming that its way of operatingwas the correct one, its problems were faced by all com-petitors, etc.

■ No platforms. Arguably this was what precludeddeveloping multi-carrier operations before the outbreakof war. But there remains the key question of to whatextent other means, such as simulation or analysis, canget around the need for actual platforms until furtherdown the conceptual road. It is conceivable that thesupport of senior officers discussed above could have,and perhaps ought have, led to better ideas of whatmulti-carrier operations would be like. The Royal AirForce chokehold over naval aircraft prevented some ex-perimental work that might have alerted the RoyalNavy earlier to problems it would encounter in 1940.

■ No means by which to evaluate. The U.S. Navywas able to evaluate operational and tactical conceptsthrough an intellectual tradition among senior officers.The Royal Navy was unable to do the same in a rigorousmanner.

■ Training realism. Moffett consciously accepted ahigh rate of peacetime damage to naval aircraft to pushthe envelope. Similar approaches prevailed in the Luft-waffe and Japanese navy in the 1930s. Both tolerated ahigh level of training casualties and damage to see whatreally worked.

■ Error tolerance. To the extent reasonable error isnot tolerated, the willingness to experiment is reduced.The counter to this is largely the open experimentalist“trial and error” approach so much in evidence at New-port in the 1920s. (Its relative absence today, certainly

vis-à-vis promotion and assignments, may be a factor inRMA-related progress.)

Competing organizations. The British andAmerican cases contrast sharply. The Royal AirForce crimped naval aviation efforts from thestart by removing aircraft and naval aviators fromthe control of the Royal Navy. The fortunate fail-ure of corresponding efforts to establish a sepa-rate air service probably prevented similar dis-torted effects on U.S. and Japanese carrierdevelopment.

The impact of competing concepts must notbe overlooked. The Mitchell campaign forcednaval aviation proponents to demonstrate theircase. Within naval aviation there was competitionwith the carrier idea as well; land-based naval avi-ation played a significant role in both the Britishand American navies during World War II.

Political and military interaction. The relation-ship between political and military leadership dif-fered greatly in Britain and America, particularlyaccess to political officials by military officers.Since the Royal Air Force controlled all aircraft inBritain, the Royal Navy effectively could only pre-sent its views and requirements to an often hostileAir Ministry. By contrast, the U.S. system affordedalternate ways of advancing ideas. Congress, byvirtue of being outside the military but able to in-tervene decisively in its affairs (beyond the powerof the purse), could push ideas, even against sub-stantial military opposition. The press also circu-lated ideas on various occasions during the 1920swhen Congress intervened substantively in carrieraviation development. While outside interventionmay add chaos, it may also prevent good ideasfrom being prematurely stifled.

Costs. Change meant investing in both carri-ers and battleships. Aircraft and submarines pre-sented greater technological opportunities fornavies in the 1920s even as reduced tensionmeant reduced funding to develop alternatives.There was not money to buy enough carriers toshow that battleships and battlecruisers wereabout to be superseded. At the same time the evi-dence of carrier superiority was not clear enoughfor navies to gamble on not buying battleshipsand other forces. So America and Japan investedin both carriers and battleships. In Britain, theneed for carriers to support the battle force wasclear. Moreover, the limited carrier aircraft capac-ity meant a greater number of carriers was re-quired—if not actually purchased.

Rapid technological progress rendered air-craft obsolete in the late 1930s and raised thecost of change, which is why the General Boardin 1937 was against high production levels of

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carrier aircraft. But this had to be consideredagainst the number of aircraft required to con-duct current operations, train new pilots, andkeep unit costs acceptable.

Competition and ChangeThere is a distinction between an enemy and

a rival. Were the United States not forced to con-sider how to fight Japan in the Pacific, the needto take aviation to sea might not have been so ap-parent. Royal Navy design considerations, even inthe post-treaty 1930s, were also affected by wherecarriers would be used (such as armored flightdecks to survive against land-based aircraft in theMediterranean). However, it was rivalry withBritain in engineering and on the operationallevel that helped drive early U.S. carrier develop-ment. Indeed, so little was known of the specificsof Japanese carrier aviation that “orange” avia-tion was usually given the same characteristics asU.S. naval forces in wargames.

The distinction between strategic opponentand technical rival is interesting. Is China today apotential strategic foe or Japan a technical rival?Which stimulates more competition?

Although crucial, there was no competitionin the sense of directly playing off Britain orJapan (save in the latter case to describe the sand-box). Rather, competition to develop commercialaviation played a notable role in military aviationand later in increasing production. While therewas little spillover from the civil sector to theNavy during the introduction of carrier aviationin the 1920s, an active exchange occurred overtime. The National Advisory Committee for Aero-nautics promoted dual-use technology, includingaerodynamic streamlining, supercharged pistonengines, and internally pressurized engines, as-sisted by Army and Navy financial and engineer-ing support. Because of restrictions imposed onservice contracting, the commercial aviation in-dustry often led the Army and Navy in adoptingnew technology. (This is an interesting parallelwith what appears to be the case today in such



USS Lexington duringfleet concentration offMaui, 1932.

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sectors as telecommunications, computers, andpossibly satellites.)

There was much less stimulative effect fromBritish industry. It arguably showed in the lowerquality of its aircraft. Perhaps the only top qualityBritish plane in 1940, the Spitfire, was more the

product of an individual designerthan a solidly based industry.

The effect of competing or-ganizations may warrant furtherstudy, especially since so manyconditions today resemble thoseof the 1920s. There was no clearenemy to plan against and there

were strong indications of significant technologi-cal changes to come, major budget constraints,and a bitter roles and missions debate brewing.

While being conscious of change was essen-tial, there was no particular way of achieving it.The meaning of carrier aviation varied evenamong naval aviators. In the U.S. Navy what al-lowed leading players with conflicting views tocooperate was a shared commitment to decidingrationally, on the basis of experimentation. Bycontrast the Royal Air Force, repository of allpost-1918 British aviation assets, did not have anethos of experimentation. It could not afford toin that financially constrained environment sinceits whole existence depended on maintaining andselling its fixed vision of strategic bombing.

The lack of senior level involvement wasstriking in the Royal Navy. Without awareness atdecisionmaking levels, new concepts may nevertake practical effect. That was the most perniciouseffect of Royal Air Force control over aviation.Whereas the experience of the Royal Navy duringWorld War I convinced many senior Americanadmirals to support aviation, no relevant audi-ence of any size remained in the Royal Navy.

Senior leaders extended consciousness to im-portant external players. For example, Moffetturged prominent figures to talk to the President,gained influence with members of Congress, andappealed to the public through the press and sup-port for popular films such as “Helldivers” (1931).This was in stark contrast to the situation inBritain where senior officers could not approachsenior civilian officials and so had less opportu-nity to present their case.

The Naval War College played an importantrole in two ways. First, the Newport games con-vinced fairly senior officers like Reeves of the po-tential of carrier aviation, thus making allies inthe Navy. Second, games posed relevant questionsand provided data, thereby reducing the risk ofembracing a new concept.

A last significant factor was accumulating apool of junior officers who were enthusiastic overthe concept in its formative years—when its fullpotential could not be actually demonstrated be-cause of technological limitations (such as weakordnance and engines) and fiscal limitations (toofew platforms to experiment). They would be-come senior leaders when better technology al-lowed full realization of the concept.

According to Tom Hone, vision is twisting afamiliar situation in one’s mind and seeing it in anew light. It requires a thorough understanding ofextant technology and ideas, their strengths andweaknesses, and their potential to solve problems.The way visionaries get visions may also affectwhat they do with them. Visionaries tend to fallinto two groups. The first is comprised of whatmight be called the “unconstrained” visionarieswho believe in their vision as an end in itself(Mitchell). The second is more realistic—aimedless at a visionary mission and more at a visionaryapproach to fulfilling an existing mission (Reeves).

The vision that is eventually fulfilled maynot be the one that starts the process. Along theway other players become interested and start toparticipate in various ways, thereby changing thevision incrementally over time. There may becompeting versions of the vision, which in thiscase may be reflected by the competing visions ofdiverse factions within the naval aviation com-munity in the 1920s when not all aviators sawlarge carriers as the proper vision. This is likely tohappen with our vision of the emerging revolu-tion in military affairs. JFQ

This article is directly based on a study entitled “The Introduction of Carrier Aviation into the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy: Military-Technical Revolutions, Organi-zations, and the Problem of Decision” by Thomas C.Hone, Mark D. Mandeles, and Norman Friedman, whichwas conducted for the Office of Net Assessment withinthe Office of the Secretary of Defense in July 1994. A book-length version of the original study will be published by U.S. Naval Institute Press.

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In 1995 and again in 1996 terrorists breachedforce protection measures for U.S. personnellocated in Saudi Arabia. The November 1995attack on the Office of the Program Man-

ager/Saudi Arabian National Guard, which killed 6and wounded 40, was a sign of deadly events tofollow. In June 1996 at the Khobar Towers hous-ing complex a tanker truck loaded with explosiveswas detonated next to the northern perimeter

fence killing 19 U.S. airmen and injuring hun-dreds more. As Secretary of Defense William Perrystated at the time, “The Khobar Towers attackshould be seen as a watershed event pointing theway to a radically new mindset and dramaticchanges in the way we protect our forces deployedoverseas from this growing threat.” Accordingly,DOD launched an aggressive effort to protect allits personnel and their family members.

The Downing ReportTo establish an antiterrorism force protection

(AT/FP) baseline and corrective action plan afterthe Khobar Towers bombing, Perry immediately

Brigadier General Ronald F. Rokosz, USA (Ret.), and Major Charles H.Hash, USA, served together in the Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate at Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Changing the Mindset—Army AntiterrorismForce ProtectionBy R O N A L D F. R O K O S Z and C H A R L E S H. H A S H

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asked General Wayne Downing, USA (Ret.), a for-mer commander in chief of U.S. Special Opera-tions Command, to examine the circumstancessurrounding the attack. In late August 1996 theDowning Assessment Task Force made somesweeping recommendations. The report submit-ted by the Secretary to the President on The Pro-tection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad, which ap-peared the following month, declared that theDowning report was “an important contributionto changing our entire approach to force protec-tion and provides evidence of the need forchanges in the way we do business. We havetaken the following actions. . . . [We will]:

■ issue DOD-wide standards for providing forceprotection

■ give local commanders operational control withregard to force protection matters

■ designate the Chairman . . . as the principal ad-visor and the single DOD-wide focal point for force pro-tection activities

■ move force protection responsibilities from theDepartment of State to the Department of Defensewhere possible

■ improve the use of available intelligence and in-telligence collection capabilities

■ establish a workable division of responsibilitieson force protection matters between the United Statesand host nations

■ raise the funding level and priority for force pro-tection and get the latest technology into the field andinto the Department of Defense.”

The Chairman then named the J-34 deputydirector for Operations, Combating Terrorism, assingle point of contact on the Joint Staff for anti-terrorism/force protection. Moreover, he recog-nized the need to appoint a technical and field

agent for AT/FP. That role wasgiven to the Defense SpecialWeapons Agency (formerlythe Defense Nuclear Agency)which functions in conjunc-tion with J-34 to provide tech-nical expertise and assess-

ments. That agency established Joint Staf fintegrated vulnerability assessment teams whichwere assigned the AT/FP mission based on experi-ence in conducting facility vulnerability assess-ments, weapon-target interaction computations,and multidisciplinary threat assessments.

The ThreatThe danger to military personnel comes pri-

marily from unconventional means because ourconventional military capabilities are unrivalled.Foreign states, groups, and even individuals canavoid our military strengths and attack our vul-nerabilities through asymmetrical warfare. In sim-ple terms, this warfare pits one’s strengths againstan enemy’s weaknesses.

Command and control nodes, airfields, andwork areas are often hardened and difficult forterrorists to enter. However, barracks outside ofwork areas can house many soldiers and providesoft targets. Domestic terrorists looking to strike ablow may attack an accessible Federal officebuilding as opposed to a hardened, guarded mili-tary installation.

Such attacks are asymmetrical and uncon-ventional, but they accomplish their objective—to generate casualties and garner media attention.The broader the exposure and more spectacularthe attack the better. The potential for terroriststo inflict high casualties has increased with ad-vanced technology and larger bombs and theavailability of weapons of mass destruction suchas chemical and biological agents. Attacks like thebombing of the Oklahoma City Federal officebuilding and the sarin gas attack on the Tokyosubway system could become all too common.

Casualties are a center of gravity. Americanvalues are based on the sanctity of human life,and public opinion is easily swayed by fatalitiestelevised on CNN. That was demonstrated afterthe bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut andthe death of Army rangers in Somalia. Enemiesare willing to capitalize on American sensitivitiesand are not restricted by political or ethical rules.Casualties at Khobar Towers confirmed this phe-nomenon and led us to quickly refocus our effortsto protect U.S. forces in the region.

The Army and AT/FPThe U.S. policy of “engagement and enlarge-

ment” finds itself supporting operations acrossthe broad spectrum of conflict in every corner ofthe world. The Army has proven to be one of theforces of choice to execute these security mis-sions. On any day it has over 100,000 soldiersand civilians forward deployed and another35,000 temporarily deployed to 86 countries insupport of contingency operations and exercises.These personnel make the Army a target of op-portunity for terrorist acts. Our soldiers aroundthe world must be proactive in protecting them-selves, their unit members, and their families.

Although the Army has had a viable, focusedAT/FP program for years, following the KhobarTowers bombing, General Dennis J. Reimer, theChief of Staff, U.S. Army, directed the DeputyChief of Staff for Operations and Plans to establisha task force to assess force protection. Major Armycommands (MACOMs) focused on the adequacyof AT/FP in the areas of doctrine, policy, training,and resourcing and appraised program executionand recommendations to improve the protectionof personnel, information, and critical resources.

the danger to military personnel comes primarilyfrom unconventional means

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As directed, MACOMs reviewed their AT/FPposture and helped to develop task force findingsand recommendations. Once the results of the as-

sessment were re-viewed, the Chief ofStaff sent a message toArmy activities onJuly 26, 1996 outlin-ing the findings ofthe task force and

areas of emphasis. It directed commanders to en-sure that key AT/FP initiatives were being fol-lowed, including efforts to:

■ review and revise Army regulation 525-13, theArmy combating terrorism program, and ensure respon-sibilities and required actions are being followed

■ emphasize AT/FP training at all levels of com-mand

■ ensure AT/FP assessments are part of leader re-cons in conjunction with deployments

■ guarantee AT/FP requirements are given a highpriority in budgets

■ ensure AT/FP is an area of special emphasis forinspection and review relevant doctrine and supple-ment it with recent lessons learned.

Army initiatives were systematically beingworked by the Army staff and commanders at alllevels concurrent with a DOD-wide review of forceprotection directed by the Secretary of Defense.

What is AT/FP?It may help to define what Army force pro-

tection is and is not. It is not a new program forthe Army. AT/FP is the security portion of a muchlarger operational concept known as force protec-tion. AT/FP synchronizes select security programsinto comprehensive defensive measures to pro-tect personnel, information, and critical resources

against asymmetrical threat attacks. AT/FP targetsforeign and domestic terrorist threats, as well asthose criminals, violent protesters, saboteurs, andforeign intelligence agents who support terror-ism, promote conditions beneficial to the con-duct of terrorist operations, or otherwise mountoperations to further their own agendas at the ex-pense of the Army and its mission. According to adraft of Army regulation 525-13, antiterrorismforce protection is defined as:

A security program to protect personnel, informa-tion, and critical resources from asymmetrical attacks.This is accomplished through the planned integrationof personal security, C2 Protect [command and con-trol protection], physical security, and law enforce-ment, all supported by the synchronization of doc-trine, training, operations, intelligence, and resources.

General Reimer has described AT/FP as aholistic program with four pillars: physical secu-rity, C2 Protect, personal security, and law en-forcement operations. Moreover, he urged thatArmy personnel: “Keep focused on force protec-tion. It is a primary leader task and an inherentpart of all operations (home station or deployed)to protect soldiers, family members, Army civil-ians, and resources.”

Headquarters, Department of the Army, is re-sponsible for both AT/FP policy and require-ments. MACOMs further define policy, provideresources for critical requirements, and overseesubordinate command AT/FP programs. Both in-stallation and unit commanders are responsiblefor implementing this policy and for allocatingresources to maintain the protective posture ofinstallations/units based on local threats and vul-nerabilities. Commanders are ultimately responsi-ble for AT/FP. That includes individual and unitantiterrorism awareness training prior to deploy-ing outside the United States, its territories, andits possessions. U.S. Army Forces Command andU.S. Army Europe continue to ensure that alltroops deploying to Bosnia are aware of threatsand are ready to counter them.

The Army approaches AT/FP along threeaxes—doctrine and training, operations, and in-telligence—which drive resourcing and policyand define the overall program.

Doctrine and TrainingThe doctrine and training axis is the institu-

tionalization of the program. It is the catalyst forchanging the Army’s institutional mindset. Wemust not allow antiterrorism force protection tobe a peaks and valleys program. With continuedcommand emphasis, training can ensure thatAT/FP is embedded in all operations and activitiesmuch like the Army safety program.

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The foundation of our training programcomes from 15 security related courses taught bythe U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS),Intelligence School, Corps of Engineers, and theJohn F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center. USAMPSvolunteered for the mission to develop the CJCSlevel I, II, and III AT/FP training programs. A train-ing task force was formed with each member care-fully selected for instructional expertise and expe-rience. The task force condensed 18–24 months ofcourse planning and development to less thanthree to meet training implementation deadlines.

Level I training provides antiterrorism aware-ness and specific area of responsibility threat in-formation to all soldiers, Army civilians, and fam-ily members deploying or traveling overseas. Thepurpose is to reduce their vulnerability to terror-ism through increased and constant awarenessand to reemphasize personal protection measures.This level is divided into two subsets based onthreats in the destination country. Low/negligiblethreat deployments require only the viewing ofthe Army’s individual protective measures video,issuance of Joint Staff Guide 5260 (Personal Protec-tion Guide), a wallet-sized card, “Security WhileTraveling,” etc. Medium and higher threat areasrequire viewing of additional videos and trainingby a qualified level II instructor. USAMPS has de-veloped level II formal training entitled “TheForce Protection Unit Advisors Course.” Students

representing each unit, battalion and above, willbe certified as unit level I trainers and advisors.Level II training prepares individuals to manageunit force protection programs and provide AT/FPexpertise to commanders. The trainee can alsoserve as the level I trainer. This two-pronged pro-gram provides commanders with enhanced exper-tise and will integrate AT/FP into every mission.

The awareness of commanders must also beenhanced to complement level II training. Thelevel III program accomplishes that mission. It pro-vides battalion and brigade commanders withknowledge and skills to ensure unit combat powerpreservation. This two-hour training support pack-age has been integrated into pre-command courses,including those for garrison and installation com-manders. Army schools will energize the packagewith branch-specific tasks. Required tasks are alsogetting a technology boost through CD–ROMswhich put AT/FP data at one’s fingertips.

Level IV training is an executive tier seminarconducted three times a year in the Washingtonarea. It is directed at senior colonels, flag officers,and equivalent level Army civilians to explaintheir roles in developing programs, address issues,and spotlight information sources to assist in in-tegrating functional aspects of AT/FP. It also offersa forum for exchanging ideas on a host of AT/FP

T he American people will continue to ex-pect us to win any engagement, butthey will also expect us to be more effi-

cient in protecting lives and resources whileaccomplishing the mission successfully.

—Joint Vision 2010

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subjects, better understanding the terrorist, andexamining technology to enhance the program.It employs updates, briefings, guest speakers,panel discussions, and a tabletop wargame.

The Army is combining resident schools, ex-portable training packages, and mobile trainingteam programs with greater command emphasisto institutionalize AT/FP awareness across the

board. In addition, Head-quarters, Department of theArmy, and U.S. Army Train-ing and Doctrine Com-mand (TRADOC) are collab-orating on the revision ofAT/FP doctrine. The intent

is to field a stand alone publication to providecommanders with tactics, techniques, and proce-dures to implement viable AT/FP operations or in-tegrate them into extant operations field manuals.

OperationsThe Army operations axis is command em-

phasis on awareness and synchronized efforts toprotect people and critical assets. Establishingthreat-based standards and revising Army policyare critical to founding baseline requirements foran aggressive and pervasive AT/FP mindset that isembedded in all soldiers and part of every processfrom mission planning through execution to theafter action review.

While commanders are ultimately responsi-ble for providing security for people and assets,other key players include G-3 (operations), G-2(intelligence), resource manager, provost marshal,staff judge advocate, engineer, and public affairsofficer. G-3 integrates all staff efforts.

Policy is being updated through a rewrite ofAR 525-13 on the Army program to combat ter-rorism. The revision includes new DOD andArmy standards and policy and will synchronizeseparate AT/FP elements for a seamless deterrentto terrorists, criminals, spies, and saboteurs. Thenew regulation embodies the overarching natureof antiterrorism force protection.

The Army recognized that it needed a forceprotection baseline before fully implementing aprogram. The tool to assess the Army AT/FP pos-ture was Headquarters, Department of the Army,Force Protection Assistance Team (FPAT) assem-bled in January 1997. It represented the best fromthe fields of physical security/law enforcement,special operations, training, structural engineer-ing, information operations, counterintelligence,chemical/biological, medical service, and riskmanagement/safety. Its charter is to assess thehealth of the program, establish standards, andprovide a tool for commanders to measure theirforce protection posture.

Khobar Towers.

new standards and policy willsynchronize separate forceprotection elements

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FPAT completed 16 visits in early 1997 to in-clude Army component headquarters of unifiedcommands, MACOM headquarters and installa-tions, and the Reserve components. Commandersreceived a bonus from the FPAT visits: an assess-ment of their overall security posture and recom-mendations on further site enhancements.

FPAT coordinated with Headquarters, De-partment of the Army, to resolve issues from thefield and recommended initiatives to improveAT/FP. This feedback is critical in tracking trendsand indicators that will allow us to measure im-provement. The staffed recommendations werebrought to the AT/FP Steering Committee Boardof Directors for action.

Additionally, the results of the FPAT reviewwere briefed at the Senior Leaders’ Training Con-ference in July 1997. Although FPAT completedits charter, this effort will continue with MACOMassessments of subordinate commands and instal-lations, inspector general oversight of MACOMprograms, and Joint Staff integrated assessmentsof Army installations scheduled by MACOMS andcoordinated through Department of the Army.

The board, chaired by the director of Opera-tions, Readiness, and Mobilization at Headquar-ters, Department of the Army, is the integratingagency for Army AT/FP initiatives. Its inner circleincludes representatives from TRADOC, the U.S.Army Intelligence and Security Command, andArmy staff elements with responsibility for train-ing, counterintelligence/human intelligence, infor-mation operations, resource management, etc. Itsouter circle includes key advisors whose areas ofexpertise sharpen our focus and facilitate key tech-nical initiatives within their areas of specialization.Board oversight ensures that requirements areidentified, tracked, and completed. It also developsand allocates tasks based on terrorist threats, JointStaff team input, intelligence data, and CJCS guid-ance. The committee is currently reviewing initia-tives designed to facilitate and implement theAT/FP program. Two critical initiatives are resourc-ing programs and developing, acquiring, and in-stalling physical security equipment.

America has global interests and responsibilities. Our national security strategy for protecting those interestsand carrying out those interests requires deployment of

our forces to the far reaches of the globe. There will be future terrorist acts attempted against U.S. military forces. Some willhave tragic consequences. No force protection approach can beperfect, but the responsibility of leaders is to use our national re-sources, skill, and creativity to minimize them.

—William J. Perry

DO

D

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Since the Khobar Towers bombing the Armyhas reviewed resourcing for AT/FP with an em-phasis on antiterrorism. The initial review wascompleted in time for the submission of criticalforce protection initiatives in the FY97 congres-sional supplemental budget and the FY98–03 pro-gram objective memorandum relook. One majorinitiative is the acquisition and fielding of AT/FPequipment to the troops.

Properly equipping soldiers is vital to AT/FP.In 1997 $155 million was spent specifically onprotecting personnel. Major funding included$86.4 million for up-armored, high-mobilitymultipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs),$11.3 million for body armor, $9.8 million forballistic blankets, and $7.2 million for otherphysical security equipment. The Army receivedapproval for program enhancements in theamount of $58.1 million in the FY97 supple-mental budget. It included $37.6 million for theArmy Central Command Saudi relocation and$7 million to implement the land informationwarfare activity command and control-protect(C2-P) mission. The remainder was added to thecurrent Army program for activities related toantiterrorism force protection.

Since AT/FP is embedded in most Army ac-tivities, it is difficult to determine exact amounts

programmed or expended towards that mission,but at the core of the program are the physical se-curity equipment, law enforcement, antiterror-ism, installation counterintelligence, and crimi-nal investigations management decisionpackages. Some 85–90 percent of the personnelwere military, Army civilian, or contract guards.Technological initiatives to supplement or replacethe manpower-intensive guard force are being so-licited for investment funding priority.

The Army’s physical security equipment (PSE)program is a pivotal component of the operationalaxis and brings the latest in technology to counterthe threat. Headquarters, Department of the Army,funds critical equipment based on MACOM PSEpriorities. The most widely used intrusion detec-tion systems are the joint service interior system,commercial systems, integrated commercial sys-tems, and the alarm monitor group.

The Army has also taken the lead in prepar-ing a DOD physical security and AT/FP technol-ogy guide which will be available to commandersin 4th quarter FY97. Commanders on all levelswill use it to identify and purchase PSE. The ArmyPSE program is vital to the overall AT/FP postureof a command. Threat and vulnerability assess-ments are conducted and reviewed for all installa-tions on a continuing basis. We rely heavily uponArmy intelligence assets to help define the threatto personnel and installations. Once it is identi-fied PSE must be applied.

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IntelligenceThe intelligence axis, specifically counterin-

telligence, drives the collection, analysis, and dis-semination of terrorist threats. Army counterin-telligence provides commanders with apredictive analysis tool to counter asymmetricalthreats and identify potential terrorist attacksagainst soldiers and installations. Good intelli-gence facilitates training and applying resourcesto harden activities.

Counterintelligence (CI) support covers arange of functions by assisting in vulnerability as-sessments, advice and assistance to AT/FP andother security programs, liaison with local andnational agencies, and CI force protection sourceoperations overseas. Army CI elements collectand report military and military-related foreignintelligence and CI information on foreign terror-ist activities and other specified areas. Army CI el-ements report that information to the Defense In-telligence Agency and provide information copiesto the Army Counterintelligence Center (ACIC).Immediate threats are reported to commands andsupporting provost marshals.

ACIC conducts analysis and production ofstrategic CI information. All echelons with CIstaff capability conduct analysis and productionto meet local needs. Strategic CI production may

include worldwide assess-ments of organizations,personages, sites, funding,training, operations, capa-bilities, and when possiblethe intentions of terrorist

groups. Local CI elements may use these productsand analyze the local situation which affects sup-ported units, installations, or activities.

The intelligence community, though limitedby executive order from collecting informationabout U.S. persons, can effectively support AT/FP.There is a considerable difference between what CIelements can do for a commander in Bosnia and inCONUS. Federal, state, and local law enforcementagencies have primary responsibility for gatheringinformation to protect U.S. forces in this country.Commanders work with these agencies throughgarrison provost marshals. Army intelligence per-sonnel may collect, retain, analyze, and dissemi-nate force protection-related data on Americans inCONUS only when DOD has determined they arean actual or potential threat to DOD personnel, in-stallations, or matériel.

The nature of the threat is evolving. It is nolonger limited to the foreign-based extremist will-ing to carry out a suicide bombing. We face do-mestic dangers from radical militia groups, sepa-ratist organizations, and individuals with agendasthat include violence.

Threats include assaults on information sys-tems. DOD systems worldwide experienced over250,000 attacks in 1996 alone, ranging from ado-lescent hackers to foreign intelligence services.The information highway poses great opportu-nity and risk for the Army. Additionally, the In-ternet has become an excellent source for detailedinformation on bomb making and sabotage. Aterrorist or disgruntled employee on a tight bud-get has easy access to a wealth of information atlittle or no cost, which may seriously harm Armypersonnel, information, and critical resources.

The Army vision for the future is simple:AT/FP must be integral to everything we do andplan. To accomplish this we must continue to ed-ucate all soldiers, Army civilians, and familymembers. It is an individual and unit responsibil-ity that requires a dramatic change in outlook.

The Army mindset will be changed throughinitiatives designed to avoid the periodic peaksand valleys of interest in terrorist acts. We mustpermeate the operational environment with anti-terrorism force protection initiatives and recog-nize that the best measures are proactive, not re-active. We must also continually update policyand doctrine and ensure that every soldier, civil-ian, and family member is educated on the sub-ject. Finally, we must adhere to common stan-dards, apply resources based on the threat, andcontinue to oversee protection through both de-terrence and defense. JFQ

the threat is no longer limitedto the extremist willing tocarry out a suicide bombing

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■


The Ho Chi Minh Trail, which linkedNorth and South Vietnam via the Laot-ian panhandle, was an indispensablesource of supplies for communist forces

operating below the 17th parallel in the 1960s andearly 1970s. Air interdiction and special opera-tions forces slowed but never stopped the flow ofmatériel. President Lyndon Johnson, primarily forpolitical considerations, would not approve airstrikes around Hanoi and Haiphong, which mighthave been more successful in the overall effort todisrupt enemy activities.

General William Westmoreland—the com-mander of U.S. Military Assistance Command,Vietnam, from 1964 to 1968—commissioned anoperation plan designated El Paso to interdict thetrail. It was a corps-sized operation to seal off thetrail at Tchepone in Laos for 18 months duringthe dry season which was preceded and followedby torrential rains that reduced vehicle traffic to a

Colonel John M. Collins, USA (Ret.), a veteran of World War II, Korea,and Vietnam, served as senior specialist in national defense at the Library of Congress and is the author of eleven books, including Military Geography for Professionals and the Public (Washington: NDU Press, 1998) from which this article has been adapted.

Going to Tchepone:OPLANEl PasoBy J O H N M. C O L L I N S

I’d like to go to Tchepone, but I haven’t got the tickets.—William C. Westmoreland

M–48 tank leading marines along Route 9.

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Map 1. Main Avenues of Ho Chi Minh Trail

C o l l i n s


trickle. Planners who worked on the operationbetween November 1967 and March 1968 discov-ered that geography profoundly influenced everyaspect of a large-scale, long-duration operationmounted far from existing support facilities. Thisarticle examines the geographic considerationswhich the author encountered as a member ofthe El Paso planning staff while assigned as chiefof the campaign planning group at Headquarters,U.S. Army Vietnam.

The TrailInitially opened to support Viet Cong guer-

rillas in South Vietnam, the Ho Chi Minh Trailwas nothing more than a skein of rustic traces

through the wilderness in the late 1950s. Dedi-cated men, women, boys, and girls trudged downits paths bent bandy-legged beneath heavy loads,all but ignored by senior officials in Washingtonand Saigon because the invoices were unimpres-sive: a little rice, pitted handguns captured fromthe French, homemade weapons pieced togetherlike so many Rube Goldberg inventions. Thetempo, however, gradually picked up and theconsignments increasingly included items such asradios, pharmaceuticals, plastic explosives, recoil-less rifles, and repair parts. Ammunition require-ments multiplied exponentially after U.S. combatforces hit North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regularshead on in 1965.

Evolutionary DevelopmentBrutal courses that initially traversed several

hundred miles of exhausting, saw-toothed terrainbetween Vinh and the demilitarized zone (DMZ)later continued the grind through Laos, whichcould more than double the distance to ultimatedestinations in South Vietnam (see map 1).Human bearers and assorted beasts struggled totote swelling loads, yet gaps between supplies anddemands became ever wider as individual bur-dens grew progressively heavier. Each 122-mmrocket weighed 102 pounds (46 kilograms), morethan most of the porters; five would buckle theknees of pint-sized elephants which pushed andpulled better than they bore cumbersome loads.Requirements for routes that could accommodatetruck traffic thus were clear (figure 1), but mostpassages in the back country were primitive,largely bridgeless, pitted with water buffalo wal-lows, and subsequently battered by bombs.

Senior decisionmakers in Hanoi accordinglyinitiated ambitious renovation and expansionprograms to widen rights of way, span streams,level humps, fill in hollows, corduroy spongyground, and establish way stations. The improvedHo Chi Minh Trail, constructed and maintainedwith tools that ranged from D-handle shovels tobulldozers and scrapers, incrementally became alabyrinth of motorable roads, cart tracks, footpaths, and navigable streams that by early au-tumn 1967 furnished communist forces in SouthVietnam about a quarter of their supplies (70 per-cent of arms and munitions). Aerial bombard-ments pocked those avenues like the surface ofthe moon, but dogged peasants under military su-pervisors patched the damage and built bypassesas convoys shuttled from point to point undercover of darkness and ever more effective antiair-craft umbrellas.

Mekong River

Vinh

DMZ

Thanh Hoa

Muang Nakhon PhanomKhammouane

Lak Sao

Dong Hoi

MuongPhine

Tchepone

Saravane

Attopeu

DakTo

SavannakhetHue

Dong Ha

N O R T HV I E T N A M

SOUTH V IETNAM

L A O S

T H A I L A N D

C A M B O D I A

0 20 40 60 80 100 Miles

0 20 40 60 80 100 Kilometers

G U L FO F

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■ O P L A N E L P A S O


Business was necessarily cyclical since sea-sonal rains turned the Ho Chi Minh Trail intomush from mid-April until at least late Septem-ber. NVA logisticians on the lee side of mountainsthat block the southwest monsoon thus amassedstockpiles inside their border during summermonths, when skies were sunny along the coast,in preparation for great surges south when roadsin Laos became dry. Communist base areas hon-eycombed with caves, tunnels, bunkers, and sub-terranean storage pits inside Laos held stockspending distribution to using units.

Laotian LandscapesThe panhandle of Laos is comprised of three

parallel regions roughly oriented from northnorthwest to south southeast: jumbled moun-tains straddling the eastern frontier; a rollingplain west of Muong Phine stretching all the wayto the Mekong; and a rough, fever-ridden,sparsely-settled transition zone which lies be-tween them. The Ho Chi Minh Trail traversed allthree areas (map 2).

The Annamese Mountains. The highest peakalong the border between Laos and Vietnambarely tops 5,500 feet, and a few other summitssurpass 4,000 feet, but such heights are deceptivesince mountain streams chisel razorbacked ridgesand canyons from bedrock. Numerous inclinesexceed 45 degrees or 100 percent (one vertical foreach horizontal foot). Topography is roughestnorth and west of the DMZ, where massive lime-stone deposits dissolve in tropical downpours,sculpting needle-shaped pinnacles, sink holes,and culs-de-sac. NVA workshops, apartments, andstockpiles occupied giant caverns with cool, dry,blast-proof halls three or four stories high whichextended 1,000 feet or more into hillsides.

Figure 1. Transport on the Trail

Prime Movers Rated Capacity

Male Porters 68 lbs. (31 kg)

Female Porters 55 lbs. (25 kg)

Elephants 440 lbs. (200 kg)

Pack Bicycles 525 lbs. (238 kg)

Ox Carts 2,200 lbs. (998 kg)

Trucks

GAZ–51 4,400 lbs. (1,996 kg)

ZIL–151 5,500 lbs. (2,495 kg)

STAR–66 7,720 lbs. (3,500 kg)

Abandoned runway atBan Houei Sane.

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Few convenient apertures other than Mu GiaPass and Khe Sanh Gap cross that mountain wallbecause swift streams that cascade west carve con-stricted corridors studded with rapids—theBanghiang River traverses a gorge so steep thatcontour lines sit atop one another—and slopeseverywhere are as slippery as bobsled runs whengreased by rain.

Dank, gloomy, multistoried jungles withdense undergrowth mantle much of that redoubt

with thick stands of teakand mahogany towering90 to 100 feet with occa-sional monsters half againas high. Corded vines fes-toon the lower levels andlacerate unwary travelers

with terrible barbs. Huge breaks of bamboo stretchfrom Khe Sanh to Ban Houei Sane, close clumped,almost impenetrable, and with stalks up to half afoot thick. Secondary growth quickly reclaimslands exposed to slash-and-burn farming by Mon-tagnard tribal groups.

The transition zone. Topography in the transi-tion zone between mountains on the east and rel-atively level terrain on the west features discon-tinuous uplands that chop the Laotian landscape

into acute angle compartments. Two prominenteast-west ridges a few miles apart with a trough inbetween follow parallel paths fifty miles fromKhe Sanh past Tchepone, where the northernrunner peters out. Its companion, which plungeson for another fifty miles, is a natural barrierbreached in just four places. The Lang Vei cleftfarthest east expires south of Route 9 in a maze ofserrated highlands. A second portal at Ban Dongopens to form a shallow, oblong bowl generallycentered on Four Corners. Tchepone, a naturalhub, has breakthroughs leading southwest, south-east, and east. The final opening, farthest west,comprises a broad pass at Muong Phine.

Under optimum conditions the BanghiangRiver at Tchepone, which is 3 feet deep and 100yards wide, forms an impressive obstacle. Morethan 50 perpendicular runnels that drainwooded, broken ground just north of the PonRiver and corrugate its flood plains are militarilyinsignificant during dry seasons but become rag-ing torrents when it rains, while trackless pal-isades up to 800 feet high shadow the south bankfor 15 miles west of Ban Dong.

Blobs of blue and red that represent friendlyand enemy forces on tactical maps more oftenthan not are worlds apart in the transition zone,where no vehicles move far off roads and trails.Foot troops may hike a mile or two an hour inopen forests, but vegetation makes militarycolumns backtrack, doubling or tripling straight-line distances. Youthful Paul Bunyons wieldingmachetes can hew through 100 yards of bambooin 60 blistering minutes, provided they take aninterest in their work and sergeants rotate pointmen frequently. The racket sounds like severalunsynchronized Anvil Choruses.

Desolation typified the transition zone.Tchepone, once a large village of 1,500 occu-pants, was home to fewer than half that numberby the mid-1960s. With most hamlets desertedand their inhabitants dead or departed, panhan-dle life had shifted from traditional rural clustersto NVA base areas in dense woods or river townsthe Royal Laotian Government held.

The Savannakhet Plain. Relatively low, gentlyrolling real estate overgrown by brush and sa-vanna grass characterizes the Savannakhet Plainsave for scattered subsistence agricultural land.Most of the trail was positioned well to the eastin 1967–68 because its architects preferred bettercover and more direct routes to destinations inSouth Vietnam.

Motorable Infiltration RoutesThe Combined Intelligence Center in Saigon

estimated that 90 percent of all enemy troops in-filtrated Laos through the DMZ via Routes 103

Xe

PonXe

Nam

Nam

Xe

Rangi

Lanong

NamkokSamouXe

Xe

Xe

Banghiang Houay Namxe

Bang

hian

g

0 5 10 15 20 25 Miles

0 10 20 30 40 Kilometers

to Mu Gia Pass

L A O S

MuongPhine

Khe SanhLao Bao

Ban Amo

LangVeiBan

HoueiSane

BanDong

FourCorners

MuongNong

Tchepone

DMZ


912

911

92

91

9

92914

9

23

922

102

103

vegetation makes militarycolumns backtrack, doubling ortripling straight-line distances

Map 2. Laotian Panhandle at Midpoint

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and 102, after which some marched south whileothers swung back into South Vietnam along theNam Samou River and Route 9, both showeringtributary tracks (see map 2). Equipment and sup-plies, however, took different tacks in 1967–68.

Route 92. A rude way no more than 10 or 12feet wide, Route 92 was passable to one-waymotor traffic from the DMZ to Ban Dong, wheretrucks swam the Pon River in dry weather, thennegotiated extremely tight turns and steep gradesto Four Corners. Major improvements later trans-formed that byway into the preeminent infiltra-tion corridor in southern Laos.

Route 914. From 1965 until early 1968 whenit became the most heavily traveled supply routebetween Tchepone and Route 92 at Four Corners,Route 914 carried traffic from numerous sources,including Mu Gia Pass and inland waterways.With a width of 8 to 30 feet and a laterite surfacethat accommodated tractor-trailers in fair weather,the route did not exactly tip on end after fordingthe Banghiang River, but it climbed 23 percentgrades before finding an easier course.

Route 23. The only other motorable north-south avenue along the Ho Chi Minh Trail wasRoute 23, which became dormant and fell intodisrepair when convoys began to use Route 914as a shortcut. This traffic ceased in 1966 afterfighter-bombers destroyed the triple-span Banghi-ang bridge. The river at that point was unford-able, but traffic revived a bit when barges and by-passes appeared some months later. Constructioncrews, however, never restored or replaced thebattered bridge and quickly improved the naturalearth roadbed, which at best was 7 or 8 feet wide.

Route 9. The only east-west “turnpike” acrossLaos, Route 9 was once a passing fair post roadconnecting Quang Tri Province on the TonkinGulf coast with the town of Savannakhet on theMekong River, a distance of 200 miles. War andneglect had taken their toll, but the route stillhad greater potential than others: a stable base,crushed stone and laterite surfaces averaging 13to 14 feet in width (less shoulders), gradients thatdid not exceed plus or minus 3 to 5 percent evenin the Khe Sanh Gap, and access to nearly all mil-itarily significant features in the study area (trans-portation nodes along the trail, NVA base areas,and the few populated pockets).

Typical ford bypassingcolonial bridge onRoute 9.

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Liabilities countered the assets. Several gul-lied or grossly overgrown stretches up to a milelong restricted horizontal clearance to as little as 6feet. Lengthy meanders around fallen trees andbomb craters also reduced throughput capacitiesand increased transit time. Few colonial bridgessurvived U.S. air strikes, which systematically tookthem out starting in 1966. The rickety relics thatremained could not support fully loaded three-quarter-ton trucks, but enemy vehicles routinelysloshed across everywhere, including on the broadsand and mud Banghiang River bottom, where 12-ton U.S. semitrailers would have bogged down inthe absence of a pontoon bridge or ferry.

Significant AirfieldsU.S. Marines at Khe Sanh possessed the only

operational fixed-wing airfield in the study areaafter January 1968. Six others were abandoned invarious stages of disrepair (see figure 2).

Lao Bao and Ban Amo. Since they had notbeen capable in their heyday and were badly inneed of repair, neither Lao Bao nor Ban Amo wasworth rehabilitating. The time, manpower, andmoney which would have been required could bebetter spent elsewhere.

Ban Houei Sane. On the outskirts of thesleepy village from which it took its name, BanHouei Sane served U.S. C–130 transports untilJanuary 1968, when NVA regulars overran it ontheir way to Khe Sanh shortly before Tet. Thecrushed stone and laterite runway received morethan 20 deep craters at that time, but the rest wasin fairly good shape and expansion room to thewest was almost unlimited.

Tchepone. The former French airbase located23 air miles farther west at Tchepone fell to thecommunists in 1961, after the Royal LaotianArmy withdrew. U.S. engineers determined that itswell-drained, well-compacted 3,700-foot runwaycould be rehabilitated rapidly, though one endwas pocked with bomb craters and blocked by ele-phant grass and brush. A knife-edged ridge a mile

south might have made C–130 landings and take-offs iffy but would not have interfered with lightassault transports such as C–123s and C–17s.

Muong Phine. The derelict runway reclaimedby the jungle at Muong Phine was scarcely visiblefrom the air, but its bomb damage was slight andits laterite surface had a solid foundation. Refur-bishment would have required extensive landclearing plus filling to repair erosion scars as wellas one deep depression. Landings from and take-offs to the west were unobstructed, although therunway unhappily pointed straight at a mountainmass in the opposite direction.

Muong Nong. The stubby 1,300-foot earth-surfaced runway at Muong Nong butted into aloop of the Lanong River 20-some miles south ofRoute 9. Even so, there was room to double thatlength by planing off humps and drainingswampland. Engineers equipped with air trans-portable earth-moving machines probably couldhave produced a C–123 strip in about two weeks.

Khe Sanh. Just across the border from Laos inSouth Vietnam, the operational airfield at KheSanh combat base was built on weathered basalt,a reddish substance which resembles laterite buthas few of its properties. Aluminum planks cov-ered the runway, taxi strips, and parking areas toensure all-weather capabilities, because basaltchurns to mush and ruts quickly with any rain-fall. Khe Sanh, unlike other airfields in the area,was fully equipped with tactical air navigationsystems and radio beacons, ground-controlled ap-proach radar, and aircraft refueling facilities.

Drop and Landing ZonesOpen spaces usable as large-scale parachute

drop zones or helicopter landing zones are scarcein the Laotian panhandle except on the Savan-nakhet Plain. Topography elsewhere is too formi-dable and the vegetation too confining.

Parachute drop zones. Paddy fields aroundMuong Phine offered the only opportunity forsizable parachute assaults which, according toU.S. Seventh Air Force standards, required a cleardrop zone 2,925 yards long (more than a mileand a half) for 64 troopers in a fully-loadedC–130. But clearings located near Tchepone, FourCorners, and Ban Houei Sane were more than ad-equate for container deliveries of petroleum, oils,and lubricants (POL), ammunition, rations, andother high priority items (35,200 pounds perC–130). Well-qualified crews equipped with theparachute low altitude delivery system generallycould put 2,000-pound bundles on 20-yard-square bullseyes on isolated hilltops or in jungleclearings, and the low altitude parachute extrac-tion system could slide 18,000-pound platformsdown obstruction-free dirt roads or other smoothsurfaces that were 50 feet wide by 1,200 feet long.

Figure 2. Airfields

Runway Largest Dimension Elevation Potential

Airfield Name (feet) ( feet) Capacity Status

Lao Bao 1,100 x 65 650 C–7a Abandoned

Ban Amo 2,250 x 75 480 C–7a Abandoned

Ban Houei Sane 3,560 x 90 480 C–130 Abandoned

Tchepone 3,700 x 120 558 C–130? Abandoned

Muong Phine 2,900 x 60 656 C–130 Abandoned

Muong Nong 1,300 x 60 500 C–123 Abandoned

Khe Sanh 3,897 x 60 1,608 C–130 Operational

2217PGS 4/14/98 12:09 AM Page 123



Helicopter landing zones. While the versatilityof rotary-wing aircraft is limited by altitude andtemperature which affect their lift capacities, heli-

copter transport boded bet-ter than delivery by para-chute. Tilled flats alongMuong Phine and the PonRiver could handle forma-tion landings and takeoffs

by multiple flights, but there were few open areaselsewhere that could accommodate more thanone or two helicopters at a time. High explosivesand chain saws would have been needed toquickly cut small pads in the dense forest whereno natural cavities in vegetation reach the floor.

Monsoonal InfluencesPlanning for El Paso was complicated by the

fact that forces committed to combat in Laoswould have to stage in and be supported from oneclimatic zone along the coast of the Tonkin Gulfyet fight in another that is subject to differentconditions including monsoonal rains, low ceil-ings, poor visibility, heat, humidity, and destruc-tive winds. While hard data was available for mostof Vietnam where French meteorologists hadcompiled records for many years, American intel-ligence agencies never acquired similar statisticsfor Laos where predictions involved guesswork.

The Annamese Mountains, perpendicular toprevailing winds, separate climatic regimes assurely as a closed door (map 3). When the north-east monsoon inundates South Vietnam frommid-October until March Laos is dry. Coastal re-gions bask in sunlight when the southwest mon-soon occurs from May until early September,while Laos is saturated. Indefinite circulation dur-ing transitions produces instability and thunder-storms on both sides of the geologic curtain.

Spring rains in the Laotian panhandle, whichgenerally start in April, increase exponentiallywhen the southwest monsoon hits the nextmonth, accompanied by frequent downpours andlocal flooding. Fair weather roads turn to quag-mires and fords vanish beneath roiling runoff. Ve-hicular traffic ceased along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

The northeast monsoon begins October4–24. Precipitation perseveres in Laos for a weekor two thereafter, then subsides, but low-hangingclouds close mountain passes along the easternfrontier half the days of some months (figure 3),military construction stops in South Vietnam,and flying weather becomes abominable as soon

Figure 3. Monsoons at Tchepone, Khe Sanh, and Da Nang

H A I N A NL A O S

C A M B O D I A

T H A I L A N D

N V N

R V N

G u l fo f

T o n k i n

Northeast Monsoon

Southwest Monsoon

Da Nang

DMZ

Hué

Tchepone

the versatility of rotary-wingaircraft is limited by altitudeand temperature

annual rainfall = 74.4 inches (189 centimeters) annual rainfall = 89.7 inches (228 centimeters) annual rainfall = 73.0 inches (185 centimeters)

Tchepone

Average precipitation in inches

Average number of days each month with ceiling/visibility less than 1000 feet (305 meters)and 2.5 miles (4 kilometers) at 1000 hours

Khe Sanh Da Nang

24

22

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Map 3. Monsoonal Regimes in South Vietnam and Laos

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C o l l i n s


as the coastal rainy season starts. Fluctuationsfrom the autumn norm are fantastic. Hue, for ex-ample, has yo-yoed from 3.5 inches one year to66 inches in another (Typhoon Bess dumped 20inches on Da Nang in one day during 1968).

El PasoPlans for operation El Paso, designed to in-

terdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail, proceeded apaceonce the staff identified a sound lodgment area inLaos and a tactical area of responsibility (TAOR)within it. Efforts then turned to determining op-timum timing, postulating a concept of opera-tions, estimating force requirements, and present-ing proposals to Westmoreland for approval.

The El Paso mission was the soul of simplic-ity: the task force would seize, secure, and as longas necessary block choke points astride the trailbeginning at H-Hour on D-Day to forestall the in-filtration of North Vietnamese troops, supplies,and equipment through the Laotian panhandleto South Vietnam and communist sanctuaries in-side Cambodia.

Planning guidance earmarked one U.S. air-mobile division, one U.S. infantry division, andthe Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) air-borne division for Task Force Bottleneck, plussubstantial combat and logistical support. Thoseallocations established requirements for a cockpitin which a corps-sized force could conduct sus-tained offensive and defensive operations with-out excessive risks or costs.

The logical lodgment area. Selection of thelodgment area presented no special problems be-cause only one site meshed well with the mission:

■ Blocking positions at Mu Gia and Nape Passeswere assessed as unsuitable because they were too farfrom staging and support bases, expensive, probablyuntenable, and easily bypassed.

■ Those at the western end of the DMZ wouldhave scarcely affected traffic on the trail.

■ Those on the Bolovens Plateau far to the southafforded enemy troops, supplies, and equipment freeaccess to much of embattled South Vietnam.

■ Blocking positions between Khe Sanh andMuong Phine were assessed as suitable since they cov-ered most tracks and all motorable routes from NorthVietnam through Laos to the South. Friendly forcescould have installed roadblocks farther west in the un-likely event that enemy truck convoys side-slipped viathe Savannakhet Plain where they would be exposed toair strikes.

Terrain. The tactical area of responsibility de-picted in map 4 is a 2,400-square-mile oblatespheroid measuring forty by sixty miles. It con-tained ample room to deploy forces and enclosedseven key terrain features:

■ the choke point and airfield at Tchepone■ the choke point and airfield at Muong Phine■ the choke point at Ban Dong■ the choke point at Four Corners■ Ban Houei Sane airfield■ Khe Sanh combat base■ Highway (Route) 9

Tchepone, together with the huge, heavilydefended NVA base area nearby, was the focalpoint for every motorable infiltration route fromMu Gia Pass except national highway 23. MuongPhine and Ban Dong were two other blockagepoints. Four Corners offered a possible alternativeto the hornet’s nest at Tchepone because roadblocks there would have shunted all enemymotor vehicles onto vulnerable Route 23 well tothe west of Vietnam. The C–130-capable airfieldat Ban Houei Sane would have been essential forany large-scale operation other than a raid. KheSanh combat base, airfield, and communicationscenter was the only U.S. or ARVN installation ca-pable of staging and supporting a corps-sized ven-ture into Laos (it sat on the Xom Cham Plateauwhich, though small, had room for added POLtank farms, ammunition pads, and helicoptermaintenance facilities that are voracious space

to Mu Gia Pass

L A O S

N O R T HV I E T N A M912

911

92

91

9

92914

9

23

922

102

103

Nam

Nam

Xe

Xe

Rangi

Lanong

Pon

NamkokSamouXe

Xe

Xe

Xe

Banghiang Houay Namxe

Bang

hian

g

0 5 10 15 20 25 Miles


III MAFX X X

Task ForceBottleneck

DMZ

Muong Phine

BanHoueiSane

FourCorners

MuongNong

Khe Sanh

LangVei

Tchepone

BanDong

Map 4. OPLAN El Paso: Tactical Area of Responsibility

2217PGS 4/14/98 12:09 AM Page 125



eaters). Military planners seldom regard lines ofcommunication as key terrain, but Route 9 wasindispensable as a main artery since no combina-tion of fixed-wing and heliborne delivery systemscould have borne long-term logistical loads.

Concept of OperationEl Paso called for the ARVN airborne division

to be dropped on Muong Phine at H-Hour on D-Day as U.S. airmobile brigades seized Tchepone,Ban Dong, and Ban Houei Sane airfield. U.S.tanks and infantry were to attack west from KheSanh simultaneously along Route 9 and link up assoon as possible. All three divisions and corps-level combat forces thereafter were to blockenemy movement southward.

Airfield rehabilitation and conversion ofRoute 9 to a double-lane artery were high-priority

Destroyed bridgeacross BanghiangRiver near Tchepone.

U.S

. Air

Forc

e

Bulldozing Highway 9east of Khe Sanh.

U.S

. Mar

ine

Cor

ps (L

ebla

nc)

Key Points■ Monsoon winds alternately encourage and discourage most mili-

tary operations in South and Southeast Asia.■ Geographical circumstances affect supply, maintenance, trans-

portation, medical, and other logistical requirements at least asmuch as combat operations.

■ Logistical problems multiply and intensify in direct proportion tothe distance between support bases and supported forces.

■ Construction requirements soar in underdeveloped areas of re-sponsibility.

■ Rudimentary road nets magnify military reliance on airfields andinland waterways.

■ Jungle-covered mountains reduce the advantages of airmobileforces in open terrain.

■ Parachute delivery systems and helicopters can sustain small, iso-lated units in jungles, but large formations need main supplyroutes with much greater capacities.

■ Pipelines can distribute large quantities of petroleum and watermore cost-effectively than other forms of transportation.

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C o l l i n s


tasks for Army engineers. Restrictions consistentwith the accomplishment of assigned missionswere designed to keep tonnages down since aerial

delivery would have to sufficeuntil those tasks were com-plete. Few vehicles were to ac-company assault echelons,rapid evacuation of personnelcasualties and inoperativeequipment promised to re-duce requirements for med-

ical and maintenance facilities in the TAOR, andno base camps were to be built in Laos at any time.

The optimum time to spring the trap wouldhave been in November before the communistcommissaries in Laos began to replenish de-pleted larders in the South. There was no man-date for Task Force Bottleneck to search and de-stroy once it cleaned out the base area aroundTchepone since the mission was merely to barri-cade the Ho Chi Minh Trail until the southwestmonsoon again soaked Laos. The only remain-ing question was whether American logisticianscould sustain a three-division corps so far fromestablished facilities.

Logistical LimitationsThe support structure needed for El Paso ex-

isted within 10 or 12 miles of the Tonkin Gulf.Most dry cargo ships unloaded in the port of Da

Nang and petroleum tankers pumped bulk POLdirectly into storage bins at Tan My and CuaViet. Fixed-wing aircraft, heavy-lift helicopters,and a meter-gauge railway transferred high-prior-ity items to ultimate destinations. Military andcivilian traffic shared coastal Highway 1, a heav-ily traveled artery that connected Saigon withHanoi before Vietnam was partitioned along the17th parallel, whereas military traffic predomi-nated on Route 9, which ran west from Dong Hato the prospective area of responsibility assignedto Bottleneck.

Logistical limitations and tactical vulnerabili-ties were as restrictive for purposes of El Paso aschoke points along the trail were to infiltrationsince throughput capabilities in 1967–68 fell farshort of I Corps tactical zone requirements com-bined with those for the Bottleneck TAOR (map 5).

Port Clearance CapacitiesDa Nang could have handled all dry cargo re-

quirements under adverse weather conditions withroom to spare, but the capability to shift suppliesand equipment north from that port was inade-quate during the period under consideration. POLdistribution problems were equally perplexing.

Coastal waterways and railroad. The cheapestway to move freight is by water or rail, but neitheralternative showed much promise. Floods, tides,and littoral drift made a deep water port at TanMy impractical despite repeated proposals, whilelogistics-over-the-shore at Wunder Beach to thenorth were infeasible during the northeast mon-soon. There was ample room for more landingcraft ramps at Cua Viet but no way to move in-land. Seabees figured that it would take 14 battal-ion months to build a road across coastal swamps.

The railway trunkline was unserviceable, andprospects for its early rehabilitation appeared dimgiven the number of demolished bridges betweenDa Nang and Dong Ha, including a colossal oneover the Perfume River at Hue. Some optimisticmembers of the Vietnamese Railway System wa-gered that in 70 days the line could be renovatedfor single-track, daylight operations at 10 milesper hour given sufficient physical security, andU.S. engineers generally agreed. They noted thatNorth Vietnamese trains managed to run part ofthe time despite savage aerial bombardment.

Highway 1. Upgrading had already shiftedinto high gear on Highway 1 with elements ofseven Seabee battalions along with a U.S. Armyengineer group and civilian contractors rapidlywidening and paving the road, straightening hair-pin curves in Hai Van Pass, creating turnarounds,strengthening bridges, and improving drainage.Capacities increased accordingly.

9

1

I Corps Total215,000 Troops

11,265 Short Tons Daily

L A O S


Northern I Corps 123,000 Troops


Bottleneck TAOR60,000 Troops


Tam Ky

Da Nang

Hai Van Pass

Tan My

Wunder Beach

G u l fo f

T o n k i n

QUANG TIN

QUANG NAM

THUA THIEN

QUANG TRI

QUANG NGAI

Hue

Dong HaCua Viet

DMZ

Tchepone

IXXX

II0 10 20 30 40 50 Miles


the mission was to barricadethe Ho Chi Minh Trail untilthe southwest monsoonagain soaked Laos

Map 5. OPLAN El Paso: Supply Requirements

2217PGS 4/14/98 12:10 AM Page 127



Land Lines to LaosThe only feasible supply route between the

Tonkin Gulf and the TAOR lay directly south ofthe DMZ where it was painfully exposed to enemyaction. No suitable alternative was available.

Route 9. The maximum capacities of Route 9,which were adequate for the Marines at the KheSanh combat base, looked ludicrous comparedwith the tonnages required by El Paso. Enemy sap-pers had blown half of the 36 bridges east of KheSanh and the ticklish bypasses cut in hillsides wereimpassable to heavy trucks. The roadway, averag-ing 12 to 14 feet wide, had been originally surfacedwith asphalt prime, a bituminous treatment lessthan an inch thick. Some of it remained in 1968,buried under mud slides and debris, but much wasgone and shoulders (where they existed) were sim-ply soil. Glutinous gumbo would grip tires like mo-lasses or cause wheels to slide during rainy seasonsunless Route 9 received a solid waterproof surface.

Petroleum pipelines. Quang Tri and ThuaThien Provinces in 1967–68 had barely 10 milesof 6-inch petroleum pipeline, which could pump756,000 gallons a day. Every drop of precious fuelfor Khe Sanh consequently had to be truckedover Route 9. There was no possible way to satisfythe task force’s insatiable thirst for POL short ofextending that embryonic pipeline system into

Laos or paving the road for use while the north-east monsoon pelted South Vietnam.

RehabilitationEl Paso planners assigned a high priority to

both road and airfield rehabilitation inside Laosbeginning on D-Day because blocking positionsastride the Ho Chi Minh Trail would have beenlogistically unsupportable otherwise. Plans conse-quently called for combat engineers to arrive byair and for others to follow closely behind groundlinkup parties attacking west from Khe Sanh.

Route 9, degraded by bomb craters, blastedbridges, erosion, and the encroaching jungle, wasin sad shape on the Laotian side of the border,but construction crews, confident of adhering totight schedules shown in figure 4, predicted thatconvoys could truck in 750 short tons a day as faras Muong Phine within three weeks. Few streamswould have demanded spans in dry season exceptthe Banghiang River at Tchepone, where progresswould be stalled for a day as engineers con-structed a floating bridge once they cleared as-sembly areas and prepared approaches through awelter of water-filled craters. Subsequent action towiden rights of way and scrape out forward sup-port areas where trucks could dump their loadswould have taken somewhat longer (figure 5).

Suitable materials could have come first fromremote basalt beds just west of Khe Sanh, thenfrom dry stream beds of many Pon River tribu-taries with their rocky bottoms and steep banks.There would have been no rush to widen Route 9as far as Muong Phine, garrisoned at most by oneor two light ARVN airborne brigades.

No airfield in the Bottleneck objective areaswould have been serviceable on D-Day. Those atTchepone and Muong Phine required immediateaction to clear obstructions, grade and compactsurfaces, apply dust palliatives, then constructtaxiways, parking lots, and cargo-handling areas.The runway at Ban Houei Sane looked like moldycheese in mid-1968 but was otherwise almost asgood as new. D+11 was not an unreasonable dateto anticipate full operational status.

The UpshotEl Paso was a stillborn operation. Westmore-

land never got the tickets to go to Tchepone,which consisted of added muscle—firepower, mo-bility, supplies, equipment, funds, and above allpolitical approval. President Johnson announcedhis decision not to seek reelection in March 1968and Richard Nixon, his successor, initiated theVietnamization program that led U.S. forces andmilitary presence in Southeast Asia to shrink in-stead of expand.

Figure 5. Dual-laning Route 9

Engineer Section Miles Companies Days Completion

Lang Vei to 11.8 3 37 D+40Ban Houei Sane

Ban Houei Sane 8.7 2 40 D+47to Ban Dong

Ban Dong to 17.4 3 54 D+66Tchepone Airfield

Figure 4. Road Openings

Section Miles Condition Streams Days Completion

Lang Vei to 7.4 Poor 6 3 D+2Lao Border

Lao Border to 4.4 Fair 7 1 D+3Ban Houei Sane

Ban Houei Sane 8.7 Poor 10 4 D+7to Ban Dong

Ban Dong to 17.4 Fair 30 5 D+12Tchepone Airfield

Tchepone Airfield 20.5 Fair 19 5 D+17to Muong Phine

2217PGS 4/14/98 12:10 AM Page 128


No one will ever know whether El Paso couldhave succeeded. The operation would have beendifficult with or without a determined enemy inthe empty lands west of Khe Sanh—remote fromexisting bases and subject to the rigors of merci-less terrain, heat, malarial fever, and leeches.Moreover, unopposed operations appear improba-ble because Hanoi wanted to maintain motorableroutes through Laos, which was the lifeline fortheir forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

General Giap, who could read a map as wellas Westmoreland, might have framed his ownmission as follows: “Task Force Spoiler seversRoutes 1 and 9 between the Tonkin Gulf coast andLaos beginning at H-Hour on D-Day to preventU.S. and puppet forces from blocking the Ho ChiMinh Trail.” Bottleneck would have been on aknife edge of existence if NVA forces successfullyisolated Da Nang from the TAOR while blockadingbrigades survived on daily replenishment and lo-gisticians struggled to build up supplies in objec-tive areas. A few well-placed mortar rounds on air-field runways at Muong Phine, Tchepone, and BanHouei Sane, plus attacks on ammunition and POL,would have been particularly effective. The Bottle-neck corps might have repulsed all such efforts,but the price in blood and sweat, if not tears, al-most surely would have been high.

Lam Son 719Vietnamization was intended to bolster

South Vietnam while reducing American casual-ties, cutting expenses, and enabling the U.S. mili-tary to withdraw began to unfold in 1969, soonafter Richard Nixon became President. Soon hecalled for a strictly South Vietnamese incursioninto Laos to test the program. ARVN I Corps, lessU.S. advisers but with U.S. tactical air, helicopter,and long-range artillery support, launched Opera-tion Lam Son 719 on February 8, 1971 to inter-dict the trail and obliterate the enemy base areaaround Tchepone; but neither U.S. nor ARVNforces completed the logistical preparations thatOPLAN El Paso prescribed.

The outcome was predictable: Lam Son 719,said one South Vietnamese general, “was a bloodyfield exercise for ARVN forces under the com-mand of I Corps. Nearly 8,000 ARVN soldiers andmillions of dollars worth of valuable equipmentand materiel (including more than 100 U.S. heli-copters) were sacrificed” before the last troopswithdrew on March 24. The enemy death toll washigh and ARVN raiders destroyed large stores ofenemy supplies but, in the final analysis, LamSon 719 had few if any lasting effects on infiltra-tion down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. JFQ

Convoy moving alongRoute 9.

Arm

y

Helipad surrounded bytriple canopy forest.

U.S

. Mar

ine

Cor

ps

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■


By D R E W A. B E N N E T T

Getting to the battle ready to fight is halfof the operational challenge. Unfortu-nately this is an area in which jointdoctrine is designed for the last war, not

the next. We must reevaluate how to mass the ef-fects of combat power in a theater to fight andwin a future major regional conflict. Warfare hasevolved from deploying massed troops and en-veloping an enemy on the tactical level to movingtroops and equipment into theater on the strate-gic level. Current doctrine has not gotten beyondthe Gulf War experience and assumes a benign en-vironment which may not always exist.

A Scenario for DisasterThe nation of Outlandia knew that it was no

match for the conventional military power of theUnited States. Its strategy was to grab as much ofneighboring Inlandia as quickly as possible whiledelaying an inevitable build-up of U.S. forces inthe area. Instead of pitting their tanks, ships, andaircraft against the enemy, Outlandese leadersplanned to employ asymmetric means to inflictheavy damage on the Americans before they wereready to fight. The objective of Outlandia was notto win a decisive battle but to throw U.S. forcesinto disarray, buying time while influencingAmerican public opinion. The Outlandese wouldnot attempt to prevail on the battlefield butrather at the negotiating table with a better bar-gaining position.

They started with terrorist attacks on Inlan-dian airports and seaports. As the enemy massed

Lieutenant Colonel Drew A. Bennett, USMC, is assigned to HeadquartersCompany, 7th Marine Regiment, and has served as a congressional fellow in the Office of the Speaker of the House.

Defending Inlandia: A Flawed Deployment Doctrine

Patrolling during Kernel Blitz ’97.

U.S

. Mar

ine

Cor

ps C

omba

t Cam

era

(Rya

n W

ard

)

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B e n n e t t


its troops on the disputed border, terrorist bombsdamaged every airport. One bomb sank a tankerin the middle of the narrow channel leading toInlandia’s best harbor. The Outlandese main at-tack advanced despite U.S. efforts to stop themwith airpower, and within a week Inlandia losthalf of its homeland. American amphibious andairborne forces helped Inlandia establish a defen-sive line, then waited for the arrival of the U.S.heavy divisions necessary for an offensive.

Commentators and media sages pointed tothe many similarities with the Persian Gulf War.Victory “on the cheap” seemed inevitable. Thenthe casualties began to mount. Within three daysOutlandese commandos blew up two 747s and aC–5 carrying over a thousand American troops asthey landed with their equipment on supposedlysecure airfields in southern Inlandia. Outlandeseinsertion teams had actually reconnoitered tar-geted airports before the war and practiced onmock-ups of the facilities in Outlandia usingmedia coverage of arriving flights.

What Could HappenThings fared no better at sea. Although U.S.

ships destroyed 25 Outlandese midget subs, oneslipped into a port where Buffalo Soldier, an Armyprepositioned afloat ship, was underway. A well

placed torpedo sank the vesselwith its desperately neededtanks and supplies at a chokepoint blocking the harbor. Be-fore the United States coulddeploy Patriot missiles, Scud 3swith far more accuracy thananything encountered during

Desert Storm found troop concentrations await-ing supplies and equipment undergoing mainte-nance preparations in staging areas adjacent toairfields and seaports. Two months and 6,000lives later, after U.S. and allied security forces, air,and missile defenses had neutralized the Out-landese threat, lines of communication were re-stored as American forces resumed deploymentto Inlandia.

Then Outlandian representatives sued forpeace at the United Nations, claiming that theirlongstanding territorial dispute with Inlandiacould be resolved through negotiations. The Out-landese agreed to return 75 percent of the seizedterritory if they could retain the balance of thecontested area which bordered their homelandand contained one of the richest oil fields in theworld. After bitter debate, Washington garneredsufficient international support to persuade theU.N. to refuse. U.S. aircraft, unable to regain thelost territory, did inflict horrible losses on enemyforces. While the American troops suffered andthe original time-phased force and deployment

data (TPFDD) list was useless, the build-up hadnot been stopped. Realizing that they could nothold on indefinitely, Outlandese forces unleashedchemical and biological weapons. Relying on un-conventional warfare teams and terrorists Out-landia detonated them on airfields and in portsused by the United States. Some soldiers and armshad been staged before the war began, based onthe Outlandian analysis of where the Americanswould most likely enter. While casualties wereheavy, television coverage was much worse. Pun-dits became worried, faltered, and turned gloomyas public support eroded. The staff of thewarfighting CINC blamed U.S. TransportationCommand which, in turn, blamed the services.And the services blamed each other.

The experts estimated it would be sixmonths before the United States and its alliescould go on the offensive. Although some advo-cated nuclear retaliation, Outlandia returned tothe United Nations to again sue for peace. Allthey wanted was the land—and the oil beneathit—they claimed was rightfully theirs.

This scenario is based on what could happenif our doctrine remains stagnant. Historically, astechnology has increased the effectiveness ofenemy firepower, military leaders have searchedfor solutions to the problem of getting to the bat-tle ready to fight. Those who failed to progresswere the losers. As range, accuracy, and rate offire increased, so did the difficulty of arriving atthe battle ready to attack.

Sequenced More Than SynchronizedOn the tactical level, Frederick the Great

achieved success at the Battle of Leuthen throughuse of iron discipline and precision drill, whichallowed the Prussian army to stay massed andstill envelop its enemy. Napoleon’s armies hadgrown so large that they were organized intocorps and marched along parallel routes and thenmassed just prior to the battle as they had atJena/Auerstadt. Eventually the practice of con-ducting a flanking attack in sight of one’s enemybecame impractical. On the operational level,Moltke the Elder constructed the campaign forthe Battle of Koniggratz so that Prussian forcesconcentrated at the point of battle, massing andenveloping simultaneously. By the 1900s the sizeof armies and the range of weapons expanded thescale of the problem since the enemy front couldextend for hundreds of miles. Used as the basisfor initial operations by the Germans at the out-set of World War I, the Schlieffen plan of a wideenvelopment by five armies swinging throughBelgium and into France attempted a solution atthe strategic level.

historically, leaders havesearched for solutions tothe problem of getting to the battle ready to fight

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■ D E P L O Y M E N T D O C T R I N E


By World War II the problem had increasedin difficulty by several orders of magnitude aswarfare became three dimensional. After devastat-ing losses the Allies organized a system of air-seacoordination and anti-submarine hunter-killergroups to protect convoys from threats above andunder the sea to get to the fight in two theaters.During the Korean War MacArthur turned defeatinto victory with the amphibious assault at In-chon which landed joint forces, cutting enemylines of communication and support. Finally, inDesert Shield/Desert Storm U.S. doctrine and ca-pabilities had advanced to a point where in sixmonths half a million troops and ten millionshort tons of fuel and cargo could be movedhalfway around the world.

Unfortunately, doctrine has not evolved sig-nificantly since. To get to the battle we rely onmoving forces into theater through secure air andseaports of debarkation (APOD/SPOD) accordingto TPFDD. Initially security may be limited andmost deploying forces will not be ready to fight.We must stage them, marry them up, and ensurethey are “logistically mature” and “operationallyready” before conducting a major campaign.1 In

getting to the fight troops are sequenced far morethan synchronized and arrive administratively asindependent units rather than as an integratedjoint force organized for combat.

No Safe HavenPotential enemies will study Schwarzkopf as

well as Frederick the Great, and the Gulf War aswell as the Silesian War. “Next time we may notbe surrounded by allies, have six months ofpreparations time to project our power ashoreunder ideal conditions, and then fight a shortconflict with limited casualties while controllingthe skies.”2 Even if there is a friendly country inthe area such as Saudi Arabia or a host countrythat expects us like South Korea, enemies will doanything to disrupt or prevent the introductionand build-up of U.S. forces in theater. We will bevulnerable to visibility and the tyranny of time asinternational news media report the slow assem-bly of forces through known APODs and SPODs.

Unloading C–5,Crisis Reach 95–02.

2dC

omm

unic

atio

ns S

quad

ron

(Billy

W. J

ohns

ton

)

Operational readinessinspection.

U.S

. Air

Forc

e (C

hris

top

her

Wia

nt)

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B e n n e t t


Evolving tactics and technology make it eas-ier for an enemy to start fighting before we areready. Unfortunately, these increased threatscome at a time when reduced overseas presence,due to downsizing and the loss of overseas bases,only increases the complexity of getting to thebattle. These threats make the idea of a benignairfield or port—a safe haven—obsolete.

Unconventional warfare. Countries with largeand small militaries are keenly aware of the sig-nificant damage that special operations assets caninflict on high value targets. One example is

North Korea which has 88,000 un-conventional warfare personnel, 280AN–2 aircraft able to evade radarwhile inserting teams, and thelargest mini-submarine fleet in theworld. These assets present a formi-dable threat to any lengthy U.S.build-up through known air and sea

ports on the Korean peninsula.3 Even countriesthat do not spend 26 percent of their GDP on de-fense, as does North Korea, understand the poten-tial benefit of such capabilities. For the price oftraining and equipping a few teams a country caninflict heavy damage on an enemy by shuttingdown an air or seaport, destroying enormousamounts of valuable equipment, and causingheavy casualties.

Terrorism. Countries that wish to concealtheir involvement, as well as non-state entitieswithout an organized military, can use terrorismto gravely hamper efforts to introduce forces intotheater. The terrorist bombing of the Marine bar-

racks in Beirut led the United States to pull out ofthe multinational peacekeeping ef fort inLebanon. Bombings of the World Trade Centertowers in New York and Federal Building in Okla-homa City created shock waves at home. Suchacts during a build-up could severely test nationalwill and divert public attention.

Missiles. The proliferation of precisionguided missiles (PGMs) is a continuing threat astheir range and accuracy improve. The number ofstates with ballistic missiles is expected to risefrom 15 to 20 by the year 2000. Some 77 havecruise missiles.4 When an enemy has the optionof using such weapons or standing by and watch-ing U.S. forces move uninterrupted into theater,there will be tremendous pressure to launch orlose PGMs.5 In that environment the attackeronly needs to get lucky once or twice while thedefender must be perfect every time.

Weapons of mass destruction. Despite Ameri-can efforts, the threat of the use of nuclear, bio-logical, and chemical weapons is growing. Withthe breakup of the Soviet Union, the security ofnuclear weapons in Eastern Europe—once as-sured—has become uncertain. With the Gulf Waragainst Iraq it became clear that weapons of massdestruction were not limited to major powers.The Japanese cult group Aum Shin Rikyo manu-factured the chemical compound sarin andwreaked havoc in the Tokyo underground. Inves-tigations revealed that they were also attemptingto acquire a biological weapon. Any state with ac-cess to a pharmaceutical industry, moderately so-phisticated university, or specialist research labo-ratory can produce either chemical or biologicalcapabilities.6 In time such weaponry could be de-livered by unconventional warfare teams, terror-ists, or PGMs to halt the TPFDD flow through anyAPOD or SPOD.7

CounterstrokesThere is a need for joint tactics, techniques,

and procedures (JTTP) to support a doctrine ofrapid, seamless, and relatively invisible introduc-tion of combat ready forces into theater. If we arewilling to break out of a culture that demands a12,000 foot runway, a deep water port, and se-cure staging areas, there are several conceptsworth considering.

Stealth. Available stealth technology is dedi-cated to protecting a finite number of bombersfrom detection. We must expand this concept toinclude defense of air and sealift platforms fromradar and satellite observation. In the past de-ployments have been publicized to deter. The fu-ture may require concealing the introduction offorces as a survival measure. The Royal SwedishNavy is already taking the lead and plans to buildeight stealth warships over this decade.8

there is a need for JTTPto support introductionof combat ready forcesinto theater

Loading tanks onboard USNS Cuato.

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Security. The vast majority of our equipmentwill get to the next fight by sea. As a result ofDesert Storm, each service now maintains equip-ment on prepositioned ships.9 Unfortunately,these ships are unarmed, usually unescorted, andhighly visible. They are susceptible to detectionand preemptive terrorist attacks on PGMs at thestart of hostilities and as they approach the SPOD.We should regard sealift ships as combatants andprovide them with means for self defense.

Ready on arrival. The Joint Staff should takeadvantage of Marine doctrine on amphibious op-erations. Ships are loaded to facilitate the offload-ing of troops and equipment as self supportingunits ready to fight. This concept should be in-corporated in moving all U.S. forces into theater.TPFDD lists and transports must be redesigned ac-cordingly. M1–A2 tanks that roll off aircraft orships should be topped off with fuel, loaded withordnance, and manned. Maintenance and vehiclepreps need to take place en route by teams thatwill use them in order to preclude the necessityfor staging areas that present lucrative targets.

Just-in-time marshaling. Japanese auto mak-ers mastered the art of just-in-time delivery ofauto parts to minimize storage costs. Applyingthis approach to introducing forces into theaterwill save lives as well as money. Troops shouldbe able to walk off transport aircraft as trucksloaded with their unit equipment are driving offtransport ships.

Expeditionary introduction. Introducing forcesinto theater today depends on cumbersome trans-ports that require major airports and seaports.These facilities must be located within a certaindistance of each other and are provided by a hostcountry or taken at great cost from an enemywho then can anticipate and target where we willenter the theater. We must develop the capabilityto rapidly establish expeditionary APODs andSPODs where we choose and operate with a gen-eration of expeditionary air and sea transports.This is not a new concept. During World War IIaircraft in the Pacific landed on airfields built bySeabees before the battle was over. The Allies de-veloped floating jetties to support the Normandyinvasion. The C–130 was designed for short dirtstrips and landing ships could beach and dis-charge cargo over a causeway it carried. Heavyairlift with a vertical short takeoff and landing ca-pability and cargo ships with an air cushioned ca-pability would revolutionize the way forces areintroduced into theater.

Scenario for VictoryAlthough Outlandia attacked first, it was the

only time they held the initiative. U.S. forcesbegan to stream into Inlandia at an extraordinaryrate from expeditionary APODs and SPODs along

the coast. A new generation of air and sea trans-ports evaded detection and were quickly of-floaded. Though most brigades were still not de-signed to conduct a forced entry, they wereorganized to be much more combat ready. Theyoffloaded at night and as a result of just-in-timemarshaling were consolidated into a fighting divi-sion and sent off to the front within two days.The introduction of forces had become part ofthe warfighting plan and no longer resembled atravel agent’s timetable. The Outlandese soon dis-covered empty PODs, which obliged their uncon-ventional warfare teams, terrorists, and PGMs tolook for other targets. Outlandia did not have theluxury of disrupting the flow of U.S. forces be-cause it was occupied protecting its flank from acounteroffensive.

This is truly a joint problem. It will not besolved by one service or U.S. TransportationCommand alone. The issue of moving troops andequipment into theater should be considered inconjunction with the joint monthly readiness re-view, the joint warfighting capabilities assess-ment, and the Joint Requirements OversightCouncil. Doctrine must be focused on deployingcapabilities militarily and evolve beyond the cur-rent ability to move forces commercially. JFQ

N O T E S

1 In December 1990 LTG Calvin A.H. Waller, USA,Deputy CINCCENT, stated that the United States wasnot ready to conduct an offensive. See Russell Watson,“Fire When Ready,” Newsweek, vol. 66, no. 27 (December31, 1990), pp. 20–21, and Lisa Beyer, “Are We Ready toWage War?” Time, vol. 136, no. 28 (December 31, 1990),pp. 26–27.

2 Drew A. Bennett, “Will the Next War Be Like theLast One?” Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 76, no. 3 (March1992), p. 39.

3 The Military Balance 1995–1996 (London: OxfordUniversity Press for the International Institute forStrategic Studies, 1996), p. 184.

4 “Theater Missile Defense: Rising to the Chal-lenge,” International Defense Review, vol. 28 (August1995), p. 26.

5 Also see Ronald R. Fogleman’s assessment of mis-sile threats to airfields and ports found in “Theater Bal-listic Missile Defense,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 9 (Au-tumn 1995), p. 75.

6 Richard J. Danzig, “Biological Warfare: A Nationat Risk—A Time to Act,” Strategic Forum 58 (Washington:National Defense University, January 1996), pp. 1–4.

7 John G. Roos, “The Ultimate Nightmare,” ArmedForces Journal, vol. 133, no. 3 (October 1995), pp. 67–73.

8 Bruce Linder, “Sea Shadow,” Proceedings, vol. 120,no. 1 (January 1994), p. 72.

9 For a detailed discussion see John M. Collins,“Prepositioning: Getting There First’est with theMost’est,” Proceedings, vol. 122, no. 1 (January 1996),pp. 72–75.

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O F C H I E F S A N D C H A I R M E N ■

General Earle Gilmore Wheeler(1908–1975)

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

VITA

Born in Washington, D.C.; graduated from Military Academy (1932); 29th Infantry (1932–36); InfantrySchool (1937); served with 15th Infantry, China (1937–40); mathematics instructor, West Point(1940–41); aide to commander, 36th Infantry; Command and General Staff College (1942); battalioncommander, 141st Infantry, 36th Division (1942); assistant chief of staff for operations, 99th Infantry

Division (1942–44); chief of staff, 63d Infantry, Europe (1944–45); instructor, Field Artillery School (1945–46);assistant chief of staff for supply, WesternBase Section, Paris (1946), and deputy chiefof staff for operations, U.S. constabulary inGermany (1947–49); Army War College(1949–50); Joint Intelligence Group(1950–51); commanded 351st Infantry, Italy(1951–52); assistant chief of staff for plansand operations, Allied Forces Southern Eu-rope (1952–55); director of plans, office ofdeputy chief of staff for plans and opera-tions, and then assistant deputy chief ofstaff for military operations at Headquar-ters, Department of the Army (1955–58);commanded 2d Armored Division(1958–59) and III Corps (1959–60); direc-tor, Joint Staff (1960–62); deputy comman-der in chief, U.S. European Command(1962); Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (1962–64);Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (1964–70);died in Frederick, Maryland.

The Vietnam War is the foggiest in my own personal experience.Moreover, it is the first war I know of wherein the fog of war isthicker away from the scene of conflict than on the battlefield. . . .

Nevertheless, from all the information at my disposal . . . I amconvinced of four things: (1) we are winning the war in Vietnam; (2) Icannot predict when the war will end; (3) although the tide of battleis running against Hanoi, they are not yet convinced that they cannotwin; and (4) flowing from item (3), Hanoi is not yet ready to negotiatean end to the war.

—Address by Earle G. Wheeler before the Economic Club of Detroit(December 18, 1967)

Portrait by Lloyd Bowers Embry.

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Doctrine

JDWP MEETINGThe 20th Joint Doctrine Working

Party (JDWP) meeting was held on October 28–29 at the Joint WarfightingCenter (JWFC) under the sponsorshipof the Director for Operational Plansand Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff,and attended by representatives of thecombatant commands, services, JointStaff, and service doctrine centers.

New joint doctrine proposalswere briefed and the following deci-sions approved:

■ Develop disposal guidance for materi-als used in joint operations for inclusion inJoint Pub 4-01.4, Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Theater Distribution. Disposalguidance will be referenced in Joint Pub 4-0,Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations,plus other publications as recommended by JWFC.

■ Cancel Joint Pub 3-04, Doctrine forJoint Maritime Operations (Air). Guidance formaritime air operations will be added to otherpublications as recommended by JWFC.

■ Cancel Joint Pub 5-00.3, Doctrine forthe Joint Operation Planning and Execution Sys-tem (JOPES).

■ Assess the SOCOM proposal to con-solidate Joint Pub 3-05.3, Joint Special Opera-tions Operational Procedures and Joint Pub 3-05.5, Joint Special Operations Targeting andMission Planning Procedures in a single publica-tion, after approval of Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrinefor Joint Special Operations. This new volumewill be designated Joint Pub 3-05.1, Joint Tac-tics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint SpecialOperations Task Force Operations.

The meeting also included infor-mation briefings on Joint Vision2010, joint training system terminol-ogy, and the Joint Task Force Com-mander’s Handbook for Peace Opera-tions; in addition, there werepresentations on the status of JointPub 3-06, Doctrine for Joint RiverineOperations; Joint Pub 3-18, Joint Doc-trine for Forcible Entry Operations;Joint Pub 3-18.1, Joint Doctrine forAirborne and Air Assault Operations;Joint Pub 3-51, Electronic Warfare inJoint Military Operations; Joint Pub 3-14, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for SpaceOperations; Joint Pub 3-59, Joint Doc-trine for Meteorological and Oceano-graphic Support; Joint Pub 3-56, Com-mand and Control of Joint Operations;Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Infor-mation Operations; Joint Pub 3-57,

Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs; andJoint Pubs 3-05.3 and 3-05.5 (as pre-viously mentioned).

The next JDWP meeting is sched-uled for April 1998. JFQ

JOINT PUBS UPDATEThe following titles have been ap-

proved through the joint doctrine de-velopment process:

■ Joint Pub 3-01.1, Aerospace Defense ofNorth America, establishes doctrinal guidanceto defend against aerospace attack of NorthAmerica and addresses implementation ofcombined U.S. and Canadian defense strategy(November 1, 1996).

■ Joint Pub 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations, furnishes doctrine on providing intelligence products, services, and support to joint operations (November 20, 1996).

■ Joint Pub 4-02.2, Joint Tactics, Tech-niques, and Procedures for Patient Evacuation inJoint Operations, outlines requirements andconsiderations for joint patient movement inthe health service support (HSS) system, in-cluding special operations and military opera-tions other than war (December 30, 1996).

■ Joint Pub 4-01.7, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Use of IntermodalContainers in Joint Operations, addresses jointtactics, techniques, and procedures for effec-tive, efficient use of intermodal containers to deploy, sustain, and redeploy forces (Janu-ary 7, 1997).

■ Joint Pub 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Opera-tions Security, outlines the use of operations se-curity in planning, preparing, and executingjoint operations (January 24, 1997).

■ Joint Pub 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Inter-diction Operations, contains guidance for jointaction to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroyenemy surface military potential before it canbe brought to bear against friendly forces(April 10, 1997).

■ Joint Pub 3-61, Doctrine for Public Af-fairs in Joint Operations, covers military supportto U.S. and international media on militaryoperations which constitutes the primary mis-sion of joint public affairs (May 14, 1997).

■ Joint Pub 4-01, Joint Doctrine for theDefense Transportation System, encompasses the interrelationships and employment of thedefense transportation system with focus

on combatant commanders, service compo-nent commands, and other user agencies (June17, 1997).

■ Joint Military Operations Historical Col-lection, provides anecdotal items from militaryhistory that shed light on the development ofmilitary doctrine (July 15, 1997).

■ Joint Doctrine Capstone and KeystonePrimer with Annex, provides executive sum-maries and outlines key principles containedin capstone and keystone doctrinal pubs (July15, 1997).

■ Joint Pub 3-07.5, Joint Tactics, Tech-niques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacua-tion Operations, contains procedures for JFCsand subordinate component commanders on noncombatant evacuation operations (Sep-tember 30, 1997).

■ Joint Pub 4-02.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Logistics Support in Joint Operations, providesguidance for service components of joint or multinational forces on theater health service logistics support for joint operations (October 6, 1997). JFQ

History

HEAVY LIFTINGA new book entitled United States

Transportation Command, The NationalDefense Reserve Fleet, and the Ready Reserve Force: A Chronology by James K.Matthews is available on request fromU.S. Transportation Command. Basedon material published by the Depart-ments of Defense and Transportation,it traces the evolution of the NationalDefense Reserve Fleet and the ReadyReserve Force from a joint perspective.With a range of statistical data and appendices on various aspects ofsealift, this work promises to become a standard reference for planners, oper-ators, and logisticians. For a copy contact: Director, Research Center, U.S.Transportation Command, 508 ScottDrive, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois62225–5357. JFQ

Missing an issue?Copies of back numbers of JFQ are available in limitedquantities to both members of the Armed Forces andinstitutions. Please send your request to the Editor at the address or FAX number listed on the masthead.

2417PGS 4/14/98 12:35 AM Page 136

MODERNIZATION OF THE PEOPLE’SLIBERATION ARMYA Book Review by

BATES GILL

Summing up his view of future war-fare, Wang Pufeng, a prolific writer

on the revolution in military affairs(RMA), states that: “. . . the authorizedstrength and equipment, strategy, tac-tics, and military theory of China’smilitary are still basically the productsof the industrial era and are far fromsatisfying the demands of informationwarfare. We have much work todo. . . . ”

From this and other analyses inChinese Views of Future Warfare, wegain greater insight into the paradoxesof the Chinese military: it faces newchallenges and opportunities but haslimited resources to address them. Itsofficer elite struggles to reconcile emer-gent doctrinal debates while their con-servative and outdated forces seek toshape traditional concepts to meet fu-ture demands.

High marks go to the editor of thisvolume, Michael Pillsbury, for assem-bling these articles for a wide audience.The collection presents translations of40 pieces by 44 authors—including 31with the rank of colonel or higher, in-cluding several senior Chinese militaryleaders—and not only makes the Peo-ple’s Liberation Army (PLA) far moretransparent but reveals an institutionwith high-tech visions of the future al-beit one which lacks a coherent planon how to get there.

Many articles in this volume ap-peared previously. Most are drawn froman open-source Chinese-language peri-

odical published by the PLA Academyof Military Science, Zhongguo JunshiKexue (China Military Science). Its issuesin recent years have carried numerouspieces such as those found in Pills-bury’s collection, often in large specialsections devoted to RMA. In addition,at least a dozen books on high-techwarfare and RMA have surfaced inChina. Articles found in open literaturesuch as Xiandai Junshi (known as Con-milit in the West) routinely discuss thesame subjects. In sum, the Chinesehave written extensively about RMAsince the early 1990s.

But these works have not beenwidely available to American readers,particularly those who do not focuson Chinese military affairs. Some ofthese articles have appeared in transla-tions by the Foreign Broadcast Infor-mation Service or other translationservices, but this is the first time thevast majority have appeared openly inEnglish sources.

Pillsbury has compiled articlesthat first came out between 1988 and1996, with about half published in1995–96. Written over seven years, theoriginal purpose of these pieces wasnot to present a coherent blueprint forChina to achieve revolutionary mili-tary-technical breakthroughs but to in-form Chinese military readers in twoways: to promote the correct ideologi-cal understanding of future PLA strat-egy and to describe developments inWestern (mostly U.S.) military think-ing and technology. As such, the dis-cussions about future warfare mainlydescribe what others are doing, notPLA intentions. The last chapter, “Nan-otechnology Weapons on Future Bat-tlefields,” is a case in point. It simplydescribes a RAND Corporation reporton microscale electromechanical sys-tems which appeared in 1993, not Chi-nese capabilities or intentions regard-ing such technologies.

The volume is divided into foursections, moving from the general tothe specific. The first two—on DengXiaoping’s strategic thought and futuresecurity trends respectively—perhapswill be the least interesting to Chinaspecialists and general readers alike.For specialists the contents will seemall too familiar or redundant while forgeneral readers the articles may appear

oblique and overladen with ideologyand unfamiliar references. The editoraddresses this potential problem in ex-planatory notes in the preface. China’sgreatest strategic objective comes outclearly in these first two sections: eco-nomic modernization and the realiza-tion of “comprehensive nationalstrength.” Rapid high-tech militarymodernization, force projection, andadoption of RMA are not prevalentthemes in the 11 articles which makeup these first two sections.

Sections 3 and 4—comprising thelast 300 pages—are the most directlyrelated to views of future warfare andtreat “local wars under high-tech con-ditions” and RMA. Section 4 will likelybe interesting to some readers but oldhat to devotees of RMA. It focuses onsystems, hardware, and operations thatwill characterize battlefields of thenext century, including naval systems,airpower, land operations, informationwarfare, stealth, and the nature of con-flict during the current RMA. Here themore forward-thinking authorsdemonstrate their mastery of the theo-retical concepts of the current RMA, atleast on paper. Of less concern is howto apply those concepts within the re-ality of the Chinese military-technicalsystem. Many articles in this sectionadvocating greater attention to RMAseem to almost blindly accept the sil-ver bullet of high technology and un-critically assess the Gulf War of 1991 asthe appropriate template from whichto understand the current RMA.

Among the gems in the book are“Managing China’s Future SecurityCrises” by Zheng Jian and a compari-son of Chinese “local war” and U.S.“limited war” by Chen Zhou. In“Weapons of the 21st Century,” ChangMengxiong displays a broad grasp of“information-intensified” weapons ofthe future, with an informed discus-sion of how a country might use “in-formation deterrence” to prevent theoutbreak of war. Perhaps the best pieceis a refreshingly frank and critical as-sessment by Wang Pufeng of China’stasks in facing the high-tech realities offuture conflict.

Three main aspects of ChineseViews of Future Warfare combine tomake it an interesting and valuable

O F F T H E S H E L F ■


Bates Gill is research professor at the Centerfor Nonproliferation Studies, MontereyInstitute of International Studies.

Chinese Views of Future WarfareEdited by Michael Pillsbury

Washington: National Defense University Press, 1997.

421 pp. $22.00[ISBN 1–57906–035–8]

2517PGS 4/14/98 12:42 AM Page 137



work: it demonstrates the differences ofopinion among China’s military elite,exhibits China’s ongoing military-tech-nical deficiencies, and reveals a contin-ued adherence to certain basic tradi-tions of Chinese military thinking.

The debates which emerge fromthese pages will partially dispel themyth of a monolithic Chinese “center”whose policies can be easily character-ized in black and white. For example,as in the United States, the opportuni-ties and risks of the new technologicalage present clear differences on thefundamental concepts that shouldguide doctrine and strategy in the fu-ture. Those Chinese authors publishedhere assign varying degrees of impor-tance to “people’s war,” “local warunder high-tech conditions,” and RMAwhile also trying to fit these conceptsinto a single strategic vision that isboth ideologically acceptable and mili-tarily feasible.

Americans will find it interestingthat the Chinese also argue overwhether the current RMA is “concept-driven” or “technology-driven” anddebate the nature and number of pre-vious RMAs. On the first point, mostauthors probably agree with ZhengQinsheng who admonishes those who“tend to place greater emphasis onhardware instead of software.” Formany of the authors, the current RMAis clearly “concept-driven” (probablymore a practical than a philosophicalopinion, given China’s technologicaldifficulties with RMA). Less explicit butpresent in these articles is the tensionbetween traditional highly-centralizedcommand structures (which are farmore vulnerable to precision-strike andinformation attack) and decentralized,dispersed, redundant, and interlinkedC3I networks which are far less familiarin Chinese planning.

There are also differences amongand within articles over the respectiveroles of “state” and “market” forces to

encourage the defense industrial base toexploit new technological opportunitiesinherent in RMA. There are even diver-gences of opinion—as in this country—over the nature and role of peacekeep-ing forces. Defense Minister ChiHaotian notes approvingly that China“actively participated in U.N. peace-keeping operations, making a positivecontribution to world peace and stabil-ity,” while Yu Qifen criticizes peace-keeping as “new interference from theU.S. and Western countries” and as at-tempts to “overthrow governments”that alarm the developing world.

Secondly, careful reading of thisvolume demonstrates that the contrib-utors are for the most part very awareof the many military-technical difficul-ties China must overcome to take ad-vantage of the current RMA. A colonelstates that “the chief contradiction”for modernization is “between the ob-jective requirements of modern war-fare and the relative low level of mod-ernization of our national defense.”Solving it “will be the central task ofour national defense construction.” Inthe articles about future militarytrends, an analyst from the Academyof Social Sciences cautions that “therewill be a big gap in the military capa-bility between China and other rele-vant countries” and that in the futurethe “gap will be wider.” One authorwarns the Chinese military “to over-come the enemy in ourselves” to meetthe “severe historical requirement” ofhigh-tech warfare.

Ding Henggao, formerly head ofthe ministry-level body in charge ofthe military-industrial base, directs at-tention to the “relationship betweenrequirements and possibility.” He pre-dicts that “for a considerably longtime, the gap between available fundsand the large investment needed fordeveloping high-tech weapons will bea restriction on development.” Thecontribution on logistics moderniza-tion by the Chief of the General Staffgoes on at length about what “should”be done and stresses the problems toovercome rather than solutions tothem. Such comments abound.

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PLA destroyer Harbinarriving in San Diego.

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According to Pillsbury, U.S. ana-lysts have decided that China “lacks avision of the nature of future warfare.”But this may be an overstatement.Most American observers are clearlyaware of Chinese military aspirationsbut seriously question how the gap be-tween visions and reality will beclosed. These articles do not greatlyalter that understanding. There is nosystematic effort in the articles, even ata theoretical level, to map out a strat-egy over time to meet the require-ments and achieve the military-techni-cal breakthroughs which they describein detail as the next RMA.

In the end, in spite of pointed de-bates and revealing insights, one isstruck with the lack of fundamentalconceptual change in military think-ing even as China contemplates theimportance of RMAs. In one ratherstrange instance, an author calls onPLA leaders to conduct a conscientiousstudy of “magic weapons” starkly remi-niscent of Chinese military reformersmore than a century ago who urgedmastering “superb and secret weapons”to defeat foreign threats.

But significantly, Chinese militarythinkers remain closely wedded toconcepts of Maoist people’s war, andseveral authors attempt to apply thoseto modern warfighting and RMA. Onthe one hand, the implications of thisoutlook extend beyond political or ide-ological considerations: the continuedintellectual adherence to people’s wardoctrine also suggests sluggishness onthe part of the Chinese military toadapt to a rapidly changing military-technical environment which will de-fine the future of warfare. On the otherhand, drawing on Sun Zi and Mao, thepeople’s war concept of “defeating thesuperior with the inferior” runsthroughout this collection. This ap-proach suggests a more realistic senseof Chinese capabilities and encouragescreative thinking in a new technologi-cal era to confront and defeat a morepowerful adversary.

Spelling and translation miscuescan be a bit distracting and confusing.For example, the well-known Maoist“third line” military-industrial strategyis rendered as the “three-line,” and the“Mydao Co.” should be McDonnellDouglas Corporation. Two workhorses

of the Chinese troop transport fleet—the Yun-8 and the Yun-12 aircraft—aremisnamed; the term for “national se-curity” often gets translated as “na-tional safety.” Similar errors pop upelsewhere, but they are minor. (Thepromise of a revised edition of thisbook is welcome news.)

More importantly, this volumewould profit from greater analyticalinput from the editor. As a long-timespecialist on China and its military-technical development, he certainlycould have gone beyond the useful butbasic descriptive summaries of thechapters and applied his skill for theanalytical benefit of readers. Greatercontextual discussions would havebeen especially useful to those who areapproaching Chinese military writingsfor the first time. For example, withoutmore analysis to provide context, non-specialists might come away with theimpression that these articles representcapabilities that China can readily de-velop and employ. Such mispercep-tions only bolster Beijing’s psychologi-cal deterrent or encourage those whopredict confrontation with China,though neither alternative seems to beintended by this work. An index wouldalso have proven useful.

China will likely continue a steadybut problem-ridden integration of ad-vanced technologies into its force struc-ture. These developments will not re-semble the current U.S.-style RMA, butthere is no reason it should. Futurechanges in PLA modernization mightbe revolutionary by Chinese standardsand best be termed an “RMA with Chinese characteristics.” Its most capa-ble aspects are those whereby Chinacan use its “inferior position” to defeata “superior enemy” and may combineold and new: stand-off weaponry suchas ballistic and cruise missiles, informa-tion deception, sabotage, and deter-rence, and methods to manage disad-vantageous conflict escalation.

But no matter which directionChina takes in pursuit of RMA, we willhave a better sense of the process andproblems it will face thanks to thisunique and timely volume. JFQ

PENETRATING THEHERMIT KINGDOMA Book Review By

ROBERT W. SENNEWALD

Don Oberdorfer’s account of con-temporary Korea is a must read for

Asian specialists and laymen alike. Itprovides excellent background oncomplex events in the two Koreas overthe last two and a half decades, thepart played by the United States, andthe impact of other major powers onthe peninsula. While the book remindsus that formal U.S. contact with Koreabegan in 1882 (America being the firstWestern nation to establish diplomaticrelations) and briefly touches on theKorean War, it is focused on the periodfrom the early 1970s until the present.

Considered by many observers(including this reviewer) as the finestAmerican reporter on East Asia, Ober-dorfer is well qualified to write a de-tailed account of this period in Koreanhistory. He covered most of the crisesreviewed in The Two Koreas and con-ducted hundreds of interviews in thecourse of his research. While acade-mics may be disappointed by the lackof documentation, his efforts to iden-tify sources and offer a balanced viewof events are impressive. Readersshould heed the author’s admonitionin the foreword that the book is a con-temporary history which “seeks totranscend journalism but is writtenonly a few years after the events it de-scribes.” It requires a certain degree ofintellectual courage to undertake sucha work. Many controversies raged inboth Seoul and Washington over issuestreated in the book which continue togenerate strong reactions for those in-volved in the saga on the Korean

The Two Koreas: A ContemporaryHistory

by Don OberdorferReading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1997.

480 pp. $30.00[ISBN 0–201–40927–5]

General Robert W. Sennewald, USA (Ret.),was commander in chief of U.S. ForcesKorea from 1982 to 1984.

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Korean officer standingwatch on USS Princetonduring RIMPAC ’96

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peninsula. Finally, one should not bedeterred by the tendency of journaliststo take some liberties with their prose.

The Two Koreas chronicles a legacyof strife which is attributed in large partto geography. It explains tensions onthe Korean peninsula that range fromcontacts between North and South, tohigh-sounding peace initiatives, to vio-lence along the demilitarized zone andthe assassination of a South Koreanpresident. Moreover, the pivotal role ofthe United States is examined through-out. Many lessons emerge for govern-ment leaders on both sides of the Pa-cific, including that:

■ Washington has had little leverageon the domestic scene in South Korea sincethe 1970s

■ dealing with both Koreas is not atypical exercise in diplomacy for the UnitedStates

■ lack of accurate information on theNorth seriously complicates policymakingin both Seoul and Washington

■ Seoul has a difficult time dealingwith Washington on issues involving theNorth.

A major portion of this book is ap-propriately devoted to defining theChun Doo Hwan era, including theKwangju incident and the nuclear prob-lem in the 1990s. The latter accountwarrants close consideration and pre-sents a feasible explanation of Americanpolicy, although with a distinct StateDepartment flavor. Oberdorfer skillfullyand breathlessly recounts the U.S. slidetoward war in the spring of 1994. ManyKorean observers believe the potentialfor conflict at that time was misreadand greatly exaggerated by Washington.The author acknowledges differences ofopinion over the threat when he con-cludes the discussion of the war scareby observing that it will be years beforewe learn the truth about just how closethe Korean peninsula came to war.

Oberdorfer has made a valuablecontribution to our general knowledgeof Korea and to the trials and tribula-tions of its people over the last 25years. Unfortunately, his book ap-peared before the recent Asian finan-cial meltdown opened another dy-namic chapter in Korean history. JFQ

AMERICA’S LONGROAD TO VIETNAMA Book Review by

ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, JR.

Following the Bay of Pigs, PresidentJohn Kennedy observed that, while

victory has many fathers, defeat is anorphan. In Dereliction of Duty, however,H.R. McMaster ponders the period lead-ing up to the deployment of U.S. com-bat forces to South Vietnam in summer1965 and finds that their eventual de-feat was fathered by almost every leaderof the national security community.

The author, a serving Army offi-cer, uses recently released documentsthat include records of White Housemeetings and deliberations by theJoint Chiefs. But he does not so muchbreak new ground on events leading tointervention in Vietnam as deepen ourknowledge of what became a decade-long, slow-motion Bay of Pigs. Al-though there are few revelations, read-ers are rewarded by his painstakingresearch, which presents a vivid ac-count of the policy process that ulti-mately led to the greatest U.S. militarydefeat of this century.

Few of the players escape indict-ment. President Lyndon Johnson ap-pears as a commander in chief whosees Vietnam as a subject for damagecontrol, not serious strategic thought.He first determines that the conflict isan impediment to his election as Presi-dent in his own right, and then a bar-rier to the Great Society, which hehopes will secure him a place in his-tory not unlike that of Franklin Roo-sevelt. Toward that end LBJ is notabove “slow rolling” the American

Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam

by H.R. McMasterNew York: Harper Collins, 1997.

446 pp. $27.50[ISBN 0–06–018795–6]

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew F. Krepinevich,Jr., USA (Ret.), is the author of The Army and Vietnam.

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people, their elected representatives,and the media. He approves a strategyof gradually increasing pressure on thecommunist regime in North Vietnam.But it is more of an election and leg-islative consideration with little if anyregard for military issues.

The President’s senior civilian ad-visors appear to be willing (though in-creasingly anxious) supporters of hisapproach to the war and dismissive ofthe Nation’s senior military leaders,who seem to be old warriors who donot grasp that the nuclear age haschanged the nature of conflict. Secre-tary of Defense Robert McNamara, As-sistant Secretary of Defense John Mc-Naughton, and National SecurityAdvisor McGeorge Bundy are depictedas intent on managing the war byusing political science game theoryand analytic methodologies, attempt-ing to send the proper “signals” toHanoi to cease and desist from sup-porting the Viet Cong.

The difficulty with efforts tomicro-manage the war was demon-strated in a tragic, yet comic episodein which the U.S. Ambassador to theRepublic of Vietnam, Maxwell Taylor,frets that the newly initiated RollingThunder bombing campaign is not

proceeding with growing intensityfrom the central panhandle to thenorthern heartland of Vietnam andthus may not send the right signal.The Joint Chiefs, however, are moreinterested in destroying Hanoi’s mili-tary capabilities, causing strikes to bepostponed—with a corresponding re-duction in the tempo of the bomb-ing—when poor weather obscures themost lucrative targets. At the sametime, to safeguard his domestic politi-cal flank Johnson placed tight restric-tions on “marching” bombing raidsinto the Red River Delta, thereby stop-ping Taylor’s “mounting crescendo” inits tracks.

As the Nation slowly proceededdown the road toward tragic interven-tion, the Joint Chiefs emerge as an ob-ject of both sympathy and contempt.At times they are depicted as isolatedfrom policymaking on the war, deniedby McNamara (and supported by twoChairmen, Maxwell Taylor and EarleWheeler) the opportunity to presenttheir views to the President. Muchmore disturbing is the account of occa-sions when McNamara, Taylor, and

Wheeler distorted recommendationsby the Joint Chiefs or selectively citedthem to advance their agendas withLBJ. Here the evidence is compellingand the author’s verdict is both chill-ing and blunt: “When the Chiefs’ ad-vice was not consistent with his ownrecommendations, McNamara, withthe aid of the Chairman . . . lied inmeetings of the National SecurityCouncil about the Chiefs’ views.”

But the Chiefs also appear as the“gang that couldn’t shoot straight.”When opportunities arose to advance apersuasive strategy, they invariablysquabbled over the proper course of ac-tion. Their inability to put aside servicerivalry and adopt a unified approachleft them on the sidelines in seniorlevel policy debates over Vietnam.

Far more disturbing, however, wasthe willingness of several members ofthe Joint Chiefs to put the welfare oftheir service ahead of national inter-ests. General Harold Johnson, Chief ofStaff of the U.S. Army, agonized overwhether to resign in protest, then de-cided to stay on, in McMaster’s words,to “protect the Army’s interests as besthe could.” Admiral David McDonald,Chief of Naval Operations, mutes hiscriticism of McNamara’s approach tothe war after the latter supported re-taining the position of commander inchief, U.S. Pacific Command, as a Navybillet. This was an issue deemed vitalfor Navy morale and for McDonald’scredibility within the service. GeneralJohn McConnell, Chief of Staff of theAir Force, was chosen for this positiononly after assuring the President thathe could support policies inconsistentwith his views as a professional officer.The Joint Chiefs backed Johnson’s ap-proach despite a lack of faith in its effi-cacy, while consoling themselves thattheir strategic logic would eventuallyprevail. It did not.

What the President wanted mostfrom the Joint Chiefs was their loyaltyand support, not professional militaryadvice. Strategy was subordinate, inLyndon Johnson’s mind, to the needto protect his domestic power base andenact the Great Society. AlthoughRobert McNamara may have been abarrier between the President and sen-ior military leaders, the fact remainsthat Johnson saw the Joint Chiefs not

Johnson, McNamara, andTaylor.

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as a source of counsel, but rather as aconstituency he wanted on board toprotect himself from accusations thathe was soft on the war. As the authornotes, when members of the JointChiefs named by Eisenhower retired,Kennedy and Johnson replaced themwith men who would not “pull aMacArthur” or who, like Taylor, werecomfortable with the nostrums of lim-ited war deterrence theory.

This tragic state of affairs begs sev-eral important questions: What if theJoint Chiefs had gotten their way?What if the United States had appliedfar more military force more quicklythan the Johnson administration per-mitted? Would it have made a differ-ence? On this particular point the au-thor leaves us with the somewhatambiguous and ultimately unsatisfyingobservation that the war “was not lostin the field, nor was it lost on the frontpages of The New York Times or on thecollege campuses. It was lost in Wash-ington, D.C., even before Americansassumed sole responsibility for thefighting in 1965. . . .” But that is notso. The conflict was lost principally inVietnam. It was lost by a succession ofSaigon regimes that could not com-mand the loyalty and support of theirpeople to extract the sacrifices requiredto prevail. And it was also lost becausethe enemy proved to be resourcefuland both willing and able to wage aprotracted conflict, which the UnitedStates was not.

Putting aside speculation over“Who lost Vietnam,” McMaster haswritten a compelling and detailed ac-count of a policymaking process thatled to defeat. Already in its fifth print-ing with 55,000 copies in circulation,Dereliction of Duty is a must-read foranyone with interest in that conflict orcivil-military relations. JFQ

THE NEW LIVINGROOM WARA Book Review by

ROBERT B. OAKLEY

Warren Strobel has produced awell-researched and well-written

study of the influence that the mediaexerts on U.S. foreign policy, with spe-cial emphasis on recent attempts atpeacekeeping. He makes the penetrat-ing observation that the media is aptto have more effect on peace opera-tions than on conventional militaryoperations and illustrates this point byexamining events in Somalia, Bosnia,Haiti, and Rwanda. He shows why “un-derstanding properly the role of thenews media is vital to the future ofAmerican foreign policy.”

Late-Breaking Foreign Policy dealswith print and electronic media, partic-ularly the latter’s accelerating impacton policymaking. Based on a range ofsources and his own research, Strobelconcludes that the media does not byitself exercise a determining influenceon policy. That opinion is shared byothers such as Ted Koppel. However,his analysis as well as some of his otherconclusions reveal that this is an over-simplification. Among the operationshe examines are instances in which themedia had a major impact on policy.

The argument advanced by thosewho, like Strobel, believe that there isno “CNN effect” in the making of for-eign policy is that powerful media influ-ence results from weaknesses in policy.When there is sufficient public andcongressional support and policymakersare resolute, the media cannot changepolicy. Yet this tends to belittle thedemonstrated power of the media to

alter public and congressional opinionby providing a decisive weapon to op-ponents of a policy who have been un-able to prevail otherwise. It seems tovastly underrate our political system asit now functions within the reality ofan energized public with limited long-term perspectives.

Occasionally, determined officialshave tried to explain their policy tostay on course in the face of whatcould have been a major backlash—even with a significant loss of life,which Strobel identifies as the numberone determinant of negative public re-action. One such case was the 1987Iraqi missile attack that killed 37sailors aboard USS Stark in the PersianGulf. The President and the Secretariesof State and Defense had already ar-gued in favor of protecting friendlyshipping. Moreover, the merits ofmaintaining U.S. presence had beenvirtually an article of faith since theCarter doctrine, and the Reagan ad-ministration was firmly behind it.Contrast that with the reaction to the1983 bombing of the Marine barracksin Beirut, which obliged the same offi-cials to reverse the policy of our mili-tary presence in Lebanon. However,the carnage of the bombing was shownin bloody detail shortly after it tookplace, creating public shock. Therewere no television pictures of USS Starkfor several days since it was at sea; andthere were none of the fatalities.

Certainly images of dead Ameri-can soldiers in the streets of Mo-gadishu and another being held incaptivity had a profound influence onthe decision by the Clinton adminis-tration to pull out in six months. Fol-lowing a meeting with congressionalleaders when the President set March31, 1993 as a deadline for withdrawal,Senator Sam Nunn and RepresentativeLee Hamilton privately criticized theannouncement of a date for with-drawal since it would strengthen thehand of Aideed, who could simply waitout the United States. However, whenasked what Congress would have doneif Clinton had appealed to his preroga-tive as commander in chief and re-fused to set any limit, both menreplied that Senator William Byrdcould have easily gotten a law passed



Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media’s Influence on

Peace Operations

by Warren P. StrobelWashington: U.S. Institute of

Peace Press, 1997.304 pp. $29.95

[ISBN 1–878379–68–2]

Robert B. Oakley served as special envoy toSomalia under Presidents Bush and Clinton.

JFQwelcomes your lettersand comments

Fax your correspondence to

(202) 685–4219/DSN 325–4219

or via e-mail to [email protected]

2517PGS 4/14/98 12:43 AM Page 142

requiring that all U.S. forces be out ofSomalia before January 1, 1993.

Strobel is on solid ground since hiscareful examination of peace opera-tions draws upon interviews with mili-tary and civilian personnel in the fieldand in Washington, higher levels in theadministration, members of Congress,and other observers. He offers percep-tive insights, starting with the com-ment that there is much less margin oferror in the conduct of peace opera-tions than in more traditional militaryefforts. This can be attributed to thelower degree of national commitmentto such operations—which are morecomplicated and must avoid an exces-sive use of force—and to inescapablemedia attention, at least during initialstages of an operation. Thus he con-cludes that peace operations “require amore sophisticated understanding onthe part of military and civilian offi-cials of news media behaviors.” Hegives an accurate account of operationsand demonstrates the negative conse-quences that occur when this “more so-phisticated understanding” does notexist. This conclusion has not onlybeen endorsed by officials and militarycommanders involved, it has becomedoctrine for the Army and Marines inplanning for peace operations.

The book shows how the media—together with nongovernmental orga-nizations, Congress, and individualswithin a hesitant administration—pro-mote their own policy agendas. Inlooking at the Rwanda and Somaliaoperations, Strobel documents the ad-vocacy of interventionist policies byactors deeply concerned over dire hu-manitarian situations and how theyprovided information to the media to

advance their perspective on address-ing the root cause.

Strobel cites senior officials (in-cluding a former national security ad-visor to the President, Brent Scowcroft)who asserted that absent TV cameras,the United States might not havemounted these operations. He alsopoints out how Secretary of StateJames Baker used television coverage ofhis visit to Iraqi Kurds to build supportfor the humanitarian policies of theBush administration and how BrianAtwood, the administrator of the U.S.Agency for International Develop-ment, used it to precipitate the deci-sion for massive assistance of theRwandan refugees. On the other hand,he notes the limits of the media in in-fluencing the Bush administration onU.N. peace operations in Bosnia. Tosupport his arguments he has gathereddata on media coverage, how the levelof that coverage varied, and its ulti-mate impact.

Late-Breaking Foreign Policy is alaudable book on a controversial sub-ject which contains useful backgroundfor civilian officials and military offi-cers. It is worthwhile for anyone en-gaged in peace operations in particularand military operations other than warin general. Strobel explains both howthe media operates and how to workwith media representatives rather thanaccepting the adverse consequences ofnot cooperating. JFQ



Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1,The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide 1997, provides a comprehensive summary ofdetails on joint planning and execution that cannot be foundelsewhere. It presents an overview of the players, processes,and procedures used in the joint arena as well as a widerange of reference material of interest to joint staffs as wellas officers in the field and fleet.

AFSC Pub 1 can be found on the Internet (at www.afsc.edu)and also can be accessed through the Joint Electronic Library. Copies are for sale from the Superintendent of Documents at $38.00 each by writing to: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, or phoning (202) 512–1800 [GPO stock no. 008–020–01422–2]. In addition, it may be purchased from the Defense AutomatedPrinting Service (DAPS) for $14.00 by contacting Don Mruk in San Diego, California, at (619) 556–7187/ DSN 526–7187 or Everett Morton in Norfolk, Virginia, at (757) 444–7724 / DSN 464–7724 (extension 19). JFQ

For your reference shelf . . .

SRO news conference,Sarajevo.

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Cover 3 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 1997–98

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JFQJ O I N T F O R C E Q U A R T E R L Y

Published for theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

by the Institute for National Strategic StudiesNational Defense University

Washington, D.C.

coming next . . .

Plumbing the Battlespaceplus

professional military education,multinational doctrine,

global mobility,and more in the Spring 98 issue of JFQ

0117PGS C4 4/13/98 7:48 PM Page 1