JDOhn - NFPARECOMMENDATION: Add an asterisk to Section 1-4.3.1. Acid a new Section A-1-4.3.1 to the recommendation of Proposal 86-57 to read as follows: A-1-4.3.1 The proximity of

Report of the Commit tee on

O v e n s and Furnaces

Algirdas Underys, Chair A. Finkl & Son Inc., IL [U] Rep. Forging Industry Assn.

j . William Sheppard, Secretar 3 General Motors Corp., MI [U]

Rep. NFPA Industrial Fire Protection Section

J D O h n J. Barron, Vacuum Furnace Systems Corp., PA [M] avid Collier, Eclipse Combustion, Inc., [L [M]

Gust A. Dadas, G. A. Dadas & Assoc., OH [SE] Christopher B. Fink, Honeywell Inc., PA [M]

Rep. Nat'l Electrical Mfrs. Assn. Arthur H. Hall, Jr., CIGNA Loss Control Services, FL [I] John C. Herron, Electric Furnace Co., OH [M] Gerald G. Hoeft, Caterpillar Inc., IL [U] James A. Huber, Surface Combustion Inc., OH [M] Jeffrey M. Hunt, Reynolds Metals Co., (EXO), VA [U] J. D. Jackson, Praxair, Inc., CT [IM] Fred IL Jensen, Jensen Oven Co. Inc., MI [M] Peter B. Matthews, Hartford Steam Boiler Insp & Ins Co., CT [I] Paul Mattiola, Air Products & Cheuficals, Inc., PA [IM] Glen R. Mortensen, Kemper Insurance, IL [I] Raymond Ostrowski, Protection Controls Inc., IL [M] Lee Paige, CNA Insurance, IL [I] Michae/C. Polagye, Factory Mutual Research Corp., MA [I] Richard C. Riccardl, North American Mfr Co., OH [M]

Rep. Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. Mircea Stefan Stanescu, BOC Gases, NC [IM] Robert G. Syring, Maxon Corp., IN [M] Grant F. Tiefen~ruck, 3M Co., MN [U] Jay D. Tindall, Royal Insurance, PA [I]

Rep. American Insurance Services Group, Inc. Lynn IL Underwood, Wausau HPR Engr, WI [I] W. H. White, White Consulting Services, OH [SE] PeterJ. Gore Willse, HSB Industrial Risk insurers, CT [I]

Alternates

Gary S. Andress, Wausau HPR Engr, WI [I] (/kit. to L. K. Underwood)

Bruce R. Deeds, Maxon Corp., IN [M] (AlL to R. G. Syring)

Leo P. Donovan, Factory Mutual Research Corp., MA [l] (Alt. to M. C. Polagye)

Richard A. Gallagher, HSB Industrial Risk Insurers, DE [I] (AIt. to P . J .G . Willse)

Jerry D. Jablonski, General Motors Corp., MI [U] (Alt. to J. W. Sheppard)

Kai-Eric Jensen, Jensen Oven Co. Inc., MI [M] (Air. to F. K. Jensen)

Gary D. Keil, Caterpillar Inc., IL [U] (Alt. to G. G. Hoeft)

Edward IL Lack, Protection Controls Inc., IL [M] (AIt. to R. Ostrowski)

David L. Phillips, 3M Co., MN [U] (Alt. to G. F. Tiefenbruck)

David S. Rohrbaugh, Drever Co., PA [M] (Alt. to R. C. Ricca~rdi)

Mark W. Ryan, Royal Insurance, PA [I] (Alt. to J. D. Tindali)

William P. Thomas Jr., Kemper Nat'l Insurance Cos., IL [I1 (Alt. to G.IL Mortensen)

Staff Liaison: Lee F. Richardson

C o m m i t t e e Scope: This Committee shall have primmy responsibility for documents on control of fire and explosion hazards in drying ovens for japan, enamel, and other finishes, bakery ovens, core ovens, annealing and heat treating furnaces, and other special atmosphere furnaces, including equipment for other special atmospheres.

This list represents the membership at the time the Committee was balloted on the text of this edition. Since that time, changes in the membership may have occurred. A key to classifications is found at the ff.ont of this book.

This portion of file Technical Committee Report of tile Committee on Ovens and Furnaces is presented for adoption in 3 parts.

Part I of this Report on Comments was prepared by the Technical C o m m i t t e e on O v e n s and Furnaces and documents its action on the comments received on its Report on Proposals on NVPA 86- 1995, Standard for Ovens and Furnaces as published in the Report on Proposals for the 1999 Spring (May) Meeting.

Part I of this Report on Comments has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical C o m m i t t e e on Ovens and Furnaces which consists of 27 voting members. The results of the balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in the report.

Part II of dais Report on Comments was prepared by the Technical C o m m i t t e e on O v e n s and Furnaces and documents its action on the comments received on its Report on Proposals on NFPA 86C-1995, Standard for Industrial Furnaces Using a Special Processing Atmosphere as published in the Report on Proposals for the 1999 Spring (May) Meeting.

Part I1 of dais Report on Comments has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical C o m m i t t e e on O v e n s and Furnaces which consists of 27 voting members. The results of the balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in the report.

Part HI of this Report on Comments was prepared by the Technical C o m m i t t e e on O v e n s and Furnaces and documents its action on the comments received on its Report on Proposals on NFPA 86D-1995, Standard for Industrial Furnaces Using Vacuum as an Atmosphere as published in the Report on Proposals for the 1999 Spring (May) Meeting.

Part IIl of dais Report on Comments has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical C o m m i t t e e on O v e n s and Furnaces which consists of 27 voting members. The results of the balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in the report.

276

N F P A 8 6 ~ A 9 9 R O C

PART I

(Log #CC9) 86- 1 - (1-4.3.1, A-1-4.3.1 (new)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technica l Commi t t ee on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2 RECOMMENDATION: Add an asterisk to Section 1-4.3.1.

Acid a new Section A-1-4.3.1 to the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of Proposal 86-57 to read as follows:

A-1-4.3.1 T h e proximity of electrical e q u i p m e n t a n d f lammable gas or l iquid in an electrical enc losure or panel is a known risk and would be cons idered a classified area. Article 500 of fine National Electrical Code shou ld be consul ted.

Condui t connec t ing devtces hand l i ng f l ammable material migh t carry dais material to an electrical enclosure ff the device fails, creat ing a classified area in tha t enclosure. Sealing of such condui ts shou ld be considered. S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Electrical enclosures such as control panels can collect f l ammable ga.~es or liquids via gas / l iqu id p ip ing or wire condui ts coming f rom decices that are part o f a f l a m m a b l e gas / l iqu id p ip ing system .due to leaks, ruptures , etc. These electrical enc losures typically contain devices tha t are sources of igni t ion via spark ing contacts in relays, contractors, switches, etc. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMrIq'EE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NEGATIVE: 1 N O T RETURNED: 1 Dadas

EXPLANATION OF NEC.ATIVE: MATTIOLA: This is my original proposal to create a commit tee

c o m m e n t for Section 1-4.3. Add the following Section 1-4.3 Electrical Electrical enclosures wldch conta in bo th electrical wiring and

devices and an internal source of f l ammable gas or liquid via process p ip ing or wire condui ts shall conform to the r equ i rements of NFPA 70 Article 500 Hazardous (Classified) Locations.

Substantiat ion: Electrical enclosures such as control panels can collect

f l a m m a ~ e gases or liquids via gas / l iqu id p ip ing or wire condui ts coming I rom devices tllat are part o f a f lammable gas / l iqu id p ip ing system due to leaks, ruptures , etc. These electrical enclosures typically conta in devices zhat are sources of ignit ion via sparking contacts in relays, cont rac t t r s , switches, etc. If the igni t ion source exists, and the fuel exists t hen inside an enclosure then you will have an explosion o f fire tha t could cause personne l and e q u i p m e n t damage . NE?A 70 Article 500 specifically addresses these s i tuat ions to p reven t explosions in control panels by classifying the area a r o u n d the panel as Class I, Division 2 a n d thus requi r ing a pu rged enclosure via NFPA 496 or c o m p o n e n t s listed for the classification or intrinsically safe systems or non incend ive circuits.

The substant ia t ions given for chang ing Section 1-4.3 a n d notes 1 and 2 in Proposals 86-2, 86C-3, a n d 8riD-2 do no t address the possibility of electrical enc losures exploding due to local igni t ion sources inside the enclosure combi ned with f lammable gases / l iquids tha t may enter . T h e append i x no te for 1-4.3.3 can be mis leading in dais regard as well, s ince NFPA 497A and 497B do address these situations.

1 believe loss da ta is av.filable for these type of explosion hazards and it suppor t s the NFPA 70 Article 500 existence.

It is my opin ion that NFPA 70 (National Electric Code) Articles 500, 501,502, 503, 504, 505 a n d 510 are specifically applicable to tlle Ovens and Furnaces Codes (NFPA 86, 86C, 86D) a n d as such shou ld be re fe renced a n d inc luded in the enforceable language of the code as my original proposal stated. Put t ing it into the append ix was the nex t Lest act ion s ince the commit tee was no t in majority a g r e e m e n t to add the requi rement .

Since furnaces that utiJize f lammable gases, wilether for the hea t ing system or for the special a tmosphere , mus t have f lammable gas p ip ing controls in the fo rm of valves, regulators, ins t ruments , etc.; and since there is usually an electrical control enclosure within close proximity of these valve trains; a n d the electrical control enclosure is usually connec t ed to the field devices with conduit ; t hen the possibility for f l ammable gases to en ter the electrical enclosure and mix with air exists. Once an ignitable or explosive mixture is inside tile electrical panel and a source o f ignit ion such as a sparking contact exists, t h en a fire or explosion is likely to occur. Loss da-a has been shown to exist for this type of acc ident a n d in fact NFPA 70 Article 500's existence is due to this type of loss due to f l ammable gases a n d dusts.

It is c o m m o n for o ther NFPA codes to specifically address the lmzardous classification o f an area with f l ammable gases an d dusts with enforceable language. I believe the Ovens and Furnaces Codes shou ld do the same.

(Log #36) 86- 2 - (1-4.3.1): Reject SUBMITTER: Robert Daley, Vacuum Furnace Systems Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

All wiring shall be in accordance with ~ P A 70, N~.tSon~2 E!cctr~c NFPA 79, Electrical S tandard for Industrial Machinery, an d

as descr ibed hereafter . SuDDlv conduc to r wirin~ to the filrnace shall be in accordance with-NFPA 70, National~Electric Code. Article 670. Wirin~ between furnaces of an industrial manufac tu r ing system shall be in accordance with NFPA 70, National E l e e ~ c Code. SUBSTANTIATION: NFPA 70 a n d NFPA 79 should no t bo th apply, to the wiring o f a fu rnace since there, are rules in certain sectaons of each s tandard that conflict w t h rules of the other s tandard. The NFPA 79 s tandard defines itseff as applying to the wiring of industr ial mach ine ry and e q u i p m e n t c o m m e n c i n g at the place of connec t ion of the supply to the e q u i p m e n t (i.e. the widng widlin the mach ine ) . NFPA 79 fu r the r indicates that wiring of the supply conductors to the machine , and wiring between mach ines is covered by NFPA 70. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: By the scope of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code®,. it applies to many parts, of the equ ipment . NFPA 79, Electrical S tandard for Industr ial Machinery, supp lemen t s NFPA 70. NFPA 70 is used where NFPA 79 does not address an issue. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 26 NOT RETURNED: 1 Dadas

(Log #CC1) 86- 3 - (Chapter 2 Valve, Safety Shutoff ): Accept SUBMITTER: Technica l Commi t tee on Ovens and Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2

I RECOMMENDATION: In Chapter 2, revise the defini t ion of Valve, Safety Shutoff to include "oxygen" a n d read as follows:

"... shu t off the fuel, a tmosphe re gas, or oxygen in the event ..." SUBSTANTIATION: The change is made to clarify that the safety shu tof f valve also applies to oxygen systems covered in Section 5-14. This act ion is also n e e d e d as a result of commi t t ee action on C o m m e n t s 86- 27 (Log #8) and C o m m e n t 86-20 (Log #9). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept . NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 26 N O T RETURNED: 1 Dadas

(Log #1) 86- 4 - (9-1 Explosion-Resistant (New)): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Peter B. Matthews, Har t ford S team Boiler COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-13 RECOMMENDATION: Provide the following definit ion for "explosion-resistant":

The ability of a radiant tube, or radiant tube hea t recovery system to withstand the over-pressure developed by the combus t ion of a s toichiometr ic ratio of approximate ly ten vo lumes of combus t ion air to one volume of natural gas (or the s toichiometr ic ratio of o ther gaseous fuel) . The radiant tube, or the rad iant tube hea t recovery system may exper ience bulg ing and distort ion, bu t shou ld no t fail catastrophically. SUBSTANTIATION: The word "explosion resistant" is n o t def ined in the text. Wi thou t definit ion, it is impossible to classify a rad ian t tube or the system as "explosion-resistant". This defini t ion shou ld clarify the in ten t of the Commi t tee as to what criteria satisfy the classification of "explosion-resistance", as used in this s tandard.

2 7 7

N F P A 86 ~ A 9 9 R O C

COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. [ Add the words "(Radiant Tube )" after the words "explosion- [ resistant" in the tide of the definit ion. [ In Chapte r 2 of the s tandard, add the defini t ion as conta ined in [ the c o m m e n t r e c o m m e n d a t i o n a long with the revised tide.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Clarification is needed since the defini t ion only applies to rad ian t tubes. T he added defini t ion is no t new material s ince it was the subject of a proposal and was addresses in t h e p r o p o s a l material . NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #30b) 86- 5 - (3-1.1.4): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: PeterJ . Gore Willse, HSB Industr ial Risk Insurers COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-10 RECOMMENDATION: To 3-1.1.4 add See 3~.1 SUBSTANTIATION: In the commi t tee substant ia t ion for rejecting my proposal they stated Sections 3-1.1.4 and 3-4.1 adequate ly address r equ i r emen t s for ventilation. However in, 3- 1.1.4 and 3-4.1 both sections state sufficient a m o u n t of air bu t do not give any gu idance for where to look. T he c o m m e n t s also stated I did no t give the requi red references to NFPA 31 and NFPA 54. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Add an asterisk to Section 3-1.1.4.

Add a new Section A-3-1.1.4 to read as follows: "A-3-1.1.4 For addi t ional informat ion, refer to NFPA 31, S tandard

for the Installation of Oil Burn ing Equipment ; NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code; .and NFPA 91, S tandard for Exhaust Systems for Air Conveying of Vapors, Gases, Mists, and Noncombus t ib l e Particulate Solids." COMMITTEE STATEMENT: T h e added section meets the in tent of the submit ter . NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #3) 86- 7 - (3-3.4): Reject SUBMITTER: James J. Hous ton , Industrial Heat ing Equ ipmen t As, COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"Explosion relief vent(s) shall be located ~ cl~.:= z.z pegz'~!e t*. eac!: k:=~-.~ ~ u = c c ~.f "gn i t~n to relieve pressure as rapidly as possible to min imize damage." SUBSTANTIATION: The cur ren t wording forces designers to locate relief panels at the hea te r box. R o o f vent panels a n d doors with rel ief latches and safety chains represen t reasonable, proven, and safe approaches for relieving pressure fronts. Vent panels on the hea te r box have the potent ia l to leak and raise the o v e n / f u r n a c e pressure. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The location for explosion-relief is a critical concern and needs to be close to the ignit ion source.

Tbe hea te r box is part of the oven system and needs to have explosion-rel ief provided. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CC2) 86- 8 - (Section 3-3.4 ): Accept SUBMITTER: Technica l Commi t t ee on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2

I RECOMMENDATION: Revise Section 3-3.4 of the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of Proposal 86-2 (Log #39) to read as follows:

"3-3.4* Explosion-rel ief vent(s) shall be located as close as prac'ticable to each known source of igni t ion to minimize damage." SUBSTANTIATION: The revised text clarifies the in ten t of the requ i rement . COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept . NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #19) 86- 6 - (3-3.1 Except ion No. 3 (New)): Hold SUBMITTER: L e o n a r d J . Shorek , General Motors Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2 RECOMMENDATION: Add the following except ion to Paragraph 3-3.1:

Except ion No. 3: Explosion-relief panels shall no t be requi red on indirect f ired ovens if it can be demons t r a t ed by calculation or by LEL detectors tha t the combust ible concentra t ion in the hea t ing chambe r and the combus t ion c h a m b e r canno t exceed 25 pe rcen t of the LEL. S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Ovens with explosion relief canno t be completely sealed. As a result, condensab le fumes leak f rom ovens with explosion relief con tamina t ing the s u r r o u n d i n g a t m o s p h e r e and c o n d e n s i n g inside of the oven insulation. This leakage results in fire hazards and heal th hazards. Many indirect fired ovens have been cons t ruc ted with totally welded inter ior skins without un toward results, when it has been demons t r a t ed by calculation or by LEL detectors that the concent ra t ion of combust ibles canno t exceed 25 pe rcen t of the LEL. COMMITTEE ACTION: Hold. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: T h e C o m m e n t in t roduces new material per Section 4-4.6.2.2(a) in NFPA Regulat ions Govering Commi t t ee Projects. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: SHEPPARD: I do no t feel daat the submit tal is necessarily new

material. The approach as p roposed follows the same logic for m e a s u r e m e n t of lower explosive limit as per the except ions in Paragraph 5-4.1.5.

(Log #20) 86- 9 - (3-3.7): Hold SUBMITTER: T h o m a s E. Myers, Despatcb Indust r ies COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"Explosion-relief vents for a long furnace shall be reasonably distr ibuted t h r o u g h o u t tile entire furnace length . . .~ t J . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ , , ~ , ~ "

m~'.,,:'m',:m ~ w , ~ c c ~c~.':ccn ez'plc~icn relief ;'cntz" ~!z~ll n e t exzzcd c, . . . . : . . . . i,^ c,'.'cn': ~_~nA_. :__:,~^ n; . . . . : ^ - (w~dt,h c,.- !~c'ght)." SUBSTANTIATION: No suppor t ing calculations or basis is given for the "five t imes" rule. "Reasonably distr ibuted" covers the eng inee r ing and safety r equ i r emen t adequately. COMMITTEE ACTION: Hold. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: T h e C o m m e n t in t roduces new material per Section 4-4.6.2.2(a) in NFPA Regulat ions Governing Commi t t ee Projects.

T h e commit tee notes that the cu r ren t r equ i r emen t is based on the l imitations of empirical da ta for explosion overpressure models . NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMM1TrEE ACTION:


(Log #30a) 86- 10 - (3-4.1): Accept in Principle SUBMrlq 'ER: Peter.]. Gore Willse, HSB Industr ial Risk Insurers COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-10 RECOMMENDATION: Add to 34.1 the following: For eas fired units, the reou i rements of Section .5.3 of ]qFPA 54 shall be followed. For oll fired units, the r equ i rements o f Section 1-9 NFPA 31 shall be followed.

2 7 8

N ~ A 86 1 A 9 9 R O C

S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : In the commi t t ee substant ia t ion for rejecting my proposal they stated Sections 3-1.1.4 a n d 5-4.1 adequate ly address r equ i r emen t s for ventilation. However in, 3- 1.1.4 a n d 3-4.1 bo th sections state sufficient a m o u n t o f air bu t do no t give any guidance for' where to look. T h e c o m m e n t s also stated I did no t give the requi red references to NFPA $1 a n d NFPA 54. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Add an asterisk to Section 3-4.

Add a new Section A-3-~ to read as follows: "A-3-4 For addit ional i~fformation, refer to NFPA 31, Standard for

the Installation of Oil B u rn i ng Equipment ; NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code; and NFPA 91, S tandard for Exhaus t Systems for Air Conveying of Vapors, G:~es, Mists, and Noncombus t ib l e Particulate Solids." COMMITTEE STATEMF.NT: T he added section meets the in tent of the submit ter . NUMBER OF COMMITI'EE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTE E ACTION:


~,ccumulation of combust ib le part iculates which can be deposi ted on the hea t exchange r surface." SUBSTANTIATION: The cur ren t wording is overly restrictive in tha t it appears to require "removal o f all combust ib le particulates, ra ther t han those tha t can accumula te and resul t in a measurable safety risk. C O M M I ~ ACTION: Accept in Principle. Revise Section 4-7.3.2 in the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of Proposal 86-2 (Log#39 ) to read as follows:

"4-7.3.2 ff the oven a tmosphe re is recirculated over the hea t exchanger coils, a noncombus t ib l e filtration system shall be used if combust ib le part iculates can deposi t on the hea t exchange r surface. The filtration system and hea t exchanger shall be cleaned on a regular schedule." COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The revised wording meets the in tent of the submitter . NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #30) 86- 11 - (4-2.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Pe terJ . Gore Willse, HSB Industr ial Risk Insurers COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-10 R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : To 4-2.2 add See 34.1 S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : In the commi t tee substant ia t ion for rejecting my proposal they stated Sections 3-1.1.4 a n d 3-4.1 adequate ly address r equ i rements for ventilation. However in, 3- 1.1.4 and 3-4.1 both s e o i o u s state sufficient a m o u n t of air bu t do not give any guidance for where to look. T he c o m m e n t s also stated I did no t give the required references to NFPA 31 and NFPA 54. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Add an asterisk to Section 4-2.2.

Add a new Section A-4-2.2 to read as follows: "A-4-2.2 For addit ional informat ion, refer to NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code." COMMITTEE STATEMENT: T he added section meets the in tent o f the submit ter . NUMBER OF COMMrl'TEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITT E E ACTION:


(Log #4) 86- 14 - (5-5.3.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: J ames J. Hous ton , Industrial Heat ing Eq u ip m en t As, COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"A p rog rammab le controller used for safety service shall be provided with a watchdog timer..." S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : The r e q u i r e m e n t for a watchdog t imer shou ld only apply to PLCs listed a n d appl ied for combus t ion safeguard service. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

I Change the title of Section 5-3 in the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of Proposal 86-2 (Log #39) to read as follows:

"5-.3 Programmable Control lers For Safety Service" COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The revised text meets the in tent of the submit ter . NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITrEE ACTION:


(Log #31) 86- 12- (4-3.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: PeterJ . Gore Willse, HSB Industrial Risk Insurers COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-1 RECOMMENDATION: Add: S e e 3 4 . 1 SUBSTANTIATION: in the commit tee substant iat ion for rejecting my proposal they stated Sections 3-1.1.4 and 3-4.1 adequate ly address r equ i r emen t s for ventilation. However in, 3- 1.1.4 and 3-4.1 both sections state sufficient a m o u n t of air bu t do no t give any guidance for where to look. T he c o m m e n t s also stated I did no give the requi led references to NFPA 31 and NFPA 54. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Add an asterisk to Section 4-5.2.

Add a new Section A-~-3.2 to read as follows: "A~t-3.2 For addit ional informat ion, refer to NFPA 31, S tandard

for the Installation of Oil Burn ing Equipment ." COMMITTEE STATFAIENT: T he added section meets the in tent of the submit ter . The referenced proposal n u m b e r should be Proposal 86-15 (Log #33). NUMBER OF COMMIVI'EE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITT E E ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 26 N O T RETURNED: I Dadas

(Log #21) 86- 13 - (4-7.3.2): Acc~ pt in Principle SUBMITTER: Thoma~ E. Myers, Despatch Indust r ies COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2 R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Revise text to read as follows: "If tire oven a tmosphe re is recirculated over the hea t exchanger

coils, a filtration system shall be used to ~ ~

(Log #28) 86- 15 - (54.1.5): Hold

• SUBMITTER: Pete rJ . Gore Willse, HSB Industr ial Risk Insurers COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-1 RECOMMENDATION: Add to the end of 5-4.1.5 the following:

The vo lume of air for the preigni t ion purge, as required in 5-4.1.2 shall be referred to 70°F (21°C) (See Table 7-4.1). SUBSTANTIATION: At elevated tempera tures , the requi red volume of air for a p repurge is m u c h h igher t hen for a p repurge of a cold oven or fu rnace as requi red in 5-4.1.2. If the oven was operat ing a 600°F, the volume of air for the purge will be half of the volume for a cold oven. COMMITTEE ACTION: Hold. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: T h e C o m m e n t in t roduces new material per Section 4-4.6.2.2(a) in NFPA Regulat ions Governing Commi t t ee Projects. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE: SHEPPARD: The basic ques t ion is do you want four air changes"

regardless of tempera ture , or do you want fou r air changes based on mass. Tile s tandard has been silent on this, bu t addit ional studies will be needed , and this shou ld definitely be addressed du r ing the nex t revision cycle. I really do no t see the difference in this proposal in relation to t empera tu re calculations for ventilation when the oven t empera tu re is above ambien t (see Chapter 7). The ventilation rates are increased for elevated tempera tures , therefore it s tands to reason dmt similar approaches are necessary for purge rates at elevated temperatures .

2 7 9

~ A 86 1 ~ 9 R O C

(Log #17) 86- 16- (54.1.5(b)2): Accept SUBMITTER: J a m e s J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"...is equipped with ges safety shutOffvalves..." SUBSTANTIATION: This section concerns "any fuel fired system". COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(a) "For fuel t~as systems, it is demonstrated. . ." (b) "For fuel ~as systems, when the individual..."

SUBSTANTIATION: None. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The submitter did no t provide a substantiation. In addit ion it was the committee 's in tent to have the exception apply only to fuel gas fired systems. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #2) 86- 17 - (5-4.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: J . William Sheppard , General Motors Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revert to the wording contained in 86 (1995 edition), 86C (1995 edit ion), 86D (1995 edition) paragraphs 5-4.2 and Exception. SUBSTANTIATION: Current heater box designs sometimes require longer distances, between the..l{as train and the heater box due to space constraints and maxtmlzmg use of floor space, particularly for new oven installations] Due to the distance f rom the SSOV to dae burner, it may take more than 15 seconds jus t to reach the burner. This causes even the present wording of "15 seconds" to be s t re tched into exceptions. Further, the p roposed reduction of the time e lement will lead manufacturers to design for this new limitation, which will mandate to the user in many instances the need for expensive "add-ons" to s tandard equipment design with no apparent increase in burner safety over present insta]lation practices. 15 seconds has proven to be a reasonable p ruden t practice. The commit tee offers no substantial justification in loss history to effect dais change. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

[ In file Commit tee Action text o f Proposal 86-26 (Log #13) revise ] Section 5-4.2.1 and 5-4.2.2 including the exception to replace the [ text "10 seconds" with dae text "15 seconds"

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The revised text meets the intent o f tile submitter. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #5) 86- 18 - (5-4.2.3 Exception (New)): Reject SUBMITTER: James J. Houston, Industrial Heat ing Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-26 RECOMMENDATION: Add tile following exception to 5-4.2.3:

"Exception: Trial for ignition of main oil bu rne r shall be permit ted to exceed 15 seconds provided that a written request for an extension is a~[proved by die. Authority. Having Jurisdiction." SUBSTANTIATION: We beheve that reliable main burner ignition with an ex tended time is preferable to repeated failed attempts. This exception will allow an extension to be approved by the Authority Having Jurisdict ion if necessary. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: If die burner doesn ' t light in 15 seconds it is likely that there is a problem with file burner system. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #6) 86- 19- (5-7.1.2): Reject SUBMITTER: James J. Houston, Industrial Heat ing Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"Exception: For fli~4-gas systems..."

(Log #9) 86- 20 - (5-7.1.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: J a m e s J. Houston, Industr ial Heat ing Equipment A~ COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"Safety shutoff valves shall be selfclosing and by their construction shall no t be readily..."

SUBSTANTIATION: The intent o f the prose is to refer to the safety shutoff valve design, not the system construction. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept in Pr indple . Delete the last sentence of Section 5-7.1.2 in the committee action text of Proposal 86-2 (Log #39). COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Commit tee Action meets the intent of the submitter. The last sentence is r edundan t to the definition of safety shutoff valve and to the requirements covered in Sections 5-2.1, 5-2.8 and 5-2.9 in r e c o m m e n d e d text o f the

~ r l ~ I ~ OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITrEE ACTION:


(Log #'22) 86- 21 - (5-7.1.2): Reject SUBMITTER: Thomas E. Myers, Despatch Industries COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise main text to read as follows:

"...by any one of the interlocking safety devices cr ~r . . . . . . . . . . . :~o ~ , ,

Revise Exception (2) (a) to read as follows: "Activation of any ~per=~mg cc~'..~v! 2r interlocking safety

device..." SUBSTANTIATION: "Operat ing control(s)" is not defined. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The use of the term "operating control" is consistent th roughout the section and does not detract technically from the requirement . NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #29) 86- 22 - (5-7.1.2 Except ion) : Reject SUBMITTER: Pete rJ . Gore Wilise, HSB Industrial Risk Insurers COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-1 RECOMMENDATION: Delete the entire exception. SUBSTANTIATION: This whole exception is not based on field experience. There has been no substantiation given to make this change other than I think it might work. We have always required the two safety shutoff valves to operate on each burner system and with this exception, we are leaping backwards in safety. In addition there are many parts of the exception that cannot be done, unenforceable and would require a more sophisticated controller. In 1 (c), how do you moni tor file flow of gas to a burner to verify that there is no fuel flow following the operation of the burner? How do you e n f o r c e p a r t 2(d)? COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMbnTTEE STATEMENT: This is a common configuration in file field and there has been no loss exper ience noted to the committee to justify delet ion of the exception. Methods are

280

N F P A 8 6 1 A 9 9 R O C

available to be able to per form the requ i rements s t ipulated in the exception. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO V O T E : 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: WILLSE: I mus t vote negative on C o m m e n t 86-22 for a n u m b e r of

reasons. First, I believe ~lae p roposed change in no t based on a field experience. Second, there is no t defini t ion of "proof of closure." Some people believe simply because the design of the valve has the clapper ex tend beyond the open ing or that the valve has a target that states "open" or "closed," the valve has "proof of closure." I believe we want file p roof of closure wilere a signal is sent back to the controller ,.stating the valve is in the closed position. (I realize we baw." the similar r equ i rements in Section 5- 7.2.2. But that clarifies our intent.) f fwe keep this exception, we need to let tile authori t ies having jur isdic t ion Know exactly what type of p roof of closure we were considering. T h e fllird reason I believe we shou ld reject this except ion is tha t we do no t stipulate criteria for file 25 percertt LEL calculation. We need to state tha t the "available" airflow shou ld be based on m i n i m u m flow rate. We ,also need to state the g~s flow shou ld be at the full gas flow rate (with the valve full open) .

Until these points are rectified, I believe this itefn mus t be removed.

(Log #23) 86- 23 - (5-7.1.8): Accept SUBMITTER: T h o m a s E. Myers, Despatch Industr ies COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2

I RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: "Local visual posi t ion indicat ion shall be provided Co, at each

safety shu tof f valve..." SUBSTANTIATION: "/'he revision clar/fies fu r ther tha t the visual indicat ion is for opera tors in close proximity to the valve. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. " COMMITTEE STATEMENT: [The r ema i n i ng text of t h e p r o p o s a l r e c o m m e n d a t i o n for Section 5-7.1.8 is re ta ined unchanged . ] NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #16) 86- 2 4 - (5-7.2.1): Accept SUBMITTER: J ames J. Hous ton , Industrial Heat ing E q u i p m e n t Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"...pilot fuel gas bu rne r system shall be ~ equipped. . ." S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : "File existin~ sect ion is amb iguous as written. Each o f the pilot a n d m m n gas systems shall have two safety shu tof f valves. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept . NUMBER OF COMMFFFEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


the commi t tee believes tha t r e d u n d a n c y is requi red even at low fuel inputs. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE O N COMMITTEE ACTION:


EXPLANATION O F NEGATIVE: HUNT: Dur ing the debate there again was no adequate

substant ia t ion for requi r ing a second valve. T h e main concern appears to be related to the possible failure rate o f the valves where no data to suppor t this assert ion has ever been p resen ted to this commit tee , ff there are concerns with the failure rate of certain types o f valves used as safety shu t offvalves t hen we shou ld move to el iminate t[leir use or require tha t if only one valve is used tha t it m e e t the requ i rements of 5-7.2.2. ff the valve used is susceptible to failure then install ing two such valves does no t improve the si tuation and may give a false sense of security. More is n o t always better.

SHEPPARD: I agree with tile submit ter ' s substant ia t ion. Further , the same paragraphs as located in 86C and 86D shou ld conta in the same exceptions.

(Log #15) 86- 26 - (5-7.3.1(b)): Reject SUBMITTER: J ames J. H o u s t o n , Industrial Heat ing E q u i p m e n t Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2 RECOMMENDATION: Delete pa ragraph (b) entirely. S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : T h e oil p u m p m u s t be r u n n i n g to close the "low oil" switch a n d start t he system. This conflicts with (b).

T h e c i rcumstances descr ibed will no t occur as described. For clarity this sect ion should be r emoved entirely. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE ~I'ATEMENT: There are systems such as recirculat ing for heavy fuel oil, or mul t ip le furnaces suppl ied by a single pump . NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITrEE ACTION:


(Log #8) 86- 27 - (5-14.1): Accept in Principle SUBMI'fTER: J ames J . Hous ton , Industr ial Hea t ing Eq u ip m en t A~ COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"Safety shutof f valves shall be seffclosing a n d bv thei r construct ion shall n o t be readily..."

SUBSTANTIATION: The in ten t o f the prose is to refer to the safety shutof f valve design, no t the system construct ion. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Delete the last sen tence of Secdon 5-14.1 in the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of Proposal 86-2. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Refer to the Commi t tee S ta tement for C o m m e n t 86-20 (Log #9). NUMBER OF COMMITrEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMI'FrF.E ACTION:


(Log #24) 86- 25 - (5-7.2.1): Reject SUBMITTER: T h o m a s E. Myers, Despatch Industr ies COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2 RECOMMENDATION: Keep Except ion No. 1 and Except ion No. 2 for burners~pilots less than 400,000 B T U / h r . SUBSTANTIATION: T he addi t ion of a second safety shutof f valve to these lower B T U / h r . bu rne r s /p i lo t s will no t increase safety e n o u g h to warrant the h igh relative cost. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITrEE STATEMENT: R e d u n d a n c y has been used t h r o u g h o u t tile s t andard to achieve an acceptable level of safety a n d

(Log #18) 86- 28 - (5-18.1.3 Except ion) : Reject SUBMITFEPa Vincen t J . Saporita, Coope r B u s s m a n n COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-33 RECOMMENDATION: This p roposed except ion shou ld be rejected. S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : 5-18.1.3 of NFPA 86 requi res that resistance type hea t ing e lements ra ted m o r e t han 48 amperes be subdivided so tha t each subdivided load is no t greater t han 48 amperes . The re are two basic reasons for this r equ i rement . The first, for reasons of cont inui ty of service, is to reduce the chances of a comple te shu t down of the hea t ing system. T h e second is to min imize the

281

N F P A 86 - - A 9 9 R O C

a m o u n t of d a m a g i n g energy released into the system dur ing a shor t circuit condi t ion.

Cont inui ty of Service. T he purpose he re is to keep the system up and r u n n i n g even t hough an e l emen t fails. If each e l emen t o f 48 ,amperes or less is pro tec ted by an overcur rent protective device of no t greater t han 60 amperes , a fault in one e l emen t will cause the 60 ampe re (or less) device to open. The r e m a i n d e r of the e lements r emain energized and con t inue to provide their hea t output . If all e l ements were to be pro tec ted by a single overcurrent protective device, a fault in one e l emen t would open tha t one device, shu t t ing down the ent ire system.

Shor t Circuit Energy, W h e n a shor t circuit occurs, large arnounts of damag ing energy can be released into the system. This damage comes in the fo rm of both hea t a n d magne t ic energy. By limiting die size of the overcur rent device protec t ing the hea t ing elements , the damag ing shor t circuit energy is also greatly r educed and the e q u i p m e n t is pro tec ted u n d e r shor t circuit condit ions. This becomes especially impor tan t in industr ial appl icat ions where the available shor t circuit cu r ren t is quite high. In fact, dais is the very concept tha t is r equ i red by Section 110-10 of NFPA 70, the National Electrical Code, tha t the circuit protective devices clear a fault without do ing extensive damage to the electrical componen t s . For example, a 200 kilowatt, th ree phase heater at 480 volts would have

~ hase currents of 240.6 amperes . If dais load were to be protec ted y jus t one device it would be 240.6 t imes 1.25, or a 350 ampe re

device. A good place to compare energy let t h r o u g h by protective devices is the UL Electrical Cons t ruc t ion E q u i p m e n t Directory or "Green Book". In it, the let t h rough energy, approx ima ted by the cu r r en t squared mul t ip l ied by the t ime, or I squared t, is provided for various fuse classes. For our example , a 600 volt, 60 ampe re Class T fuse could have a le t -dlrough I squared t as h igh as 30,000 ampe re squared seconds. But, a 600 volt, 350 amp" Class T fuse could have a le t - through I squared t as h igh as 1,100,000 ampe re squared seconds. T ha t m e a n s the 350 a m p e r e fuse could let t h rough 36.67 t imes as m u c h damag i ng energy as the 60 ampe re fuse. It's s ignificant e n o u g h to make the difference between replacing an e l emen t or replacing a good por t ion o f the ent ire system. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: T h e r e are devices available tha t are able to limit the damag i ng electrical energy. The commit tee is no t aware of loss exper ience of this type associated with oven and fu rnace applicat ions. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #26) 86- 29 - (7-2.5): Accept SUBMITTER: T h o m a s E. Myers, Despatch Indust r ies COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-35 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"Class A ovens shall be mechanica l ly ventilated. T~c fan d.c;ign

14 ¢ 1 reduce o'a:ct 7 -'cn*.5.a'.ion. I~" reduct ion of safety ventilation by accumula t ion of deposi ts is nossible for the oven's i n t ended use, then the fan design shall b e s e l e c t e d to nrevent this accumula t ion ." SUBSTANTIATION: The original wording implies tha t all Class A oven fans shou ld be radial-blade or backward inc l ined a n d tha t ,all Class A ovens suffer f rom fan deposits. Forward-curved fan blades do no t accumula te deposi ts in m a n y Class A ovens con ta in ing f l ammable solvents, a n d shou ld be allowed. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


SUBSTANTIATION: This r e q u i r e m e n t is no t enforceable as written. How can an inspector de t e rmine the location of m a x i m u m concen t ra t ions o f combust ibles? COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The location for exhaus t duc t open ings is a critical concern and needs to be close to the greatest concent ra t ion of vapors. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CC7) 86- 31 - (Table 7-5.2.2(a), (b)): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commi t t ee on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-35 RECOMMENDATION: Revise Table 7-5.2.2(a) a n d (b) o f the Commi t t ee Action on Proposal 86-35 (Log 38) to read as shown on the following pages. SUBSTANTIATION: Appropr ia te table values were upda ted to be consis tent with the MDL data base for chemical properties. Changes were also n e e d e d to correct inconsistancies between Table 7-5.2.2(a) a n d (b) as shown on the following pages. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CC12) 86- 32 - (7-5.2.4): Accept SUBMITTER: Technica l Commi t t ee on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-35 RECOMMENDATION: A d d the following last sen tence to Section 7-5.2.4 in the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o f Proposal 86-35 (Log #38) to read as follows:

"This value is to be corrected for tile t empera tu re of the exhaus t s t ream exiting the oven." SUBSTANTIATION: The change is m a d e to be consis tent with the l anguage in Sections 7-5.2.3 and 7-4.1. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 2 6 N O T RETURNED: 1 Dadas

(Log #CC13) 86- 33 - (7-6.3 Except ion No. 2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technica l Commi t t ee on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-35 RECOMMENDATION: Revise Except ion No. 2 of Section 7-6.3 in the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of Proposal 86-35 (Log #38) as follows: "Exception No. 2: The safety venti lat ion shall be permi t ted to be

calculated by..." [The r e m a i n i n g text is re ta ined unchanged . ] SUBSTANTIATION: The language used previously resulted in manda to ry except ion which was not in tended . COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #14) 86- 30 - (7-2.7): Reject SUBMITTER: J am es J . Hous ton , Industr ial Hea t ing E q u i p m e n t Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-35 RECOMMENDATION: Make this section an Appendix , A-7-2.6 and modify the text to read:

". . .duct openings ~ shaig be located..."

282

N F P A 8 6 - - A 9 9 R O C

Solvent Name

Table 7-5.2.2(a) Properties of Commonly Used Flammable Liquids in English Units

Acetone n-Amyl Acetate sec-Amyl Acetate Amyl Alcohol

Benzene Benzine n-Butyl Acetate n-Butyl Alcohol see-Butyl Alcohol

Butyl Cellosolve

Butyl Propionate Camphor Carbon Disulfide Cellosolve

Cellosolve Acetate Chlorobenzene Corn Oil Cottonseed Oil m or p-Cresol

Cyclohexane Cyclohexanone

p-Cymene

Dibutyl Phthalate

o-Dichlorobenzene Diethyl Ketone n-Dimethyl Formamide

p-Dioxane Ethyl Acetate Ethyl Alcohol Ethylbenzene Ethyl Ether Ethyl Lactate

Ethyl Methyl Ether Ethyl Propionate Ethylene Dichloride Gasoline n-Heptane n-Hexane

Molecular Flash Auto LEL UEL Specific Vapor Boiling Weight Point Ignition % by % by Gravity Density Point

De~ F De~ F Volume Volume Water=l Air=l De~ F 58 -4 869 2.5 12.8 0.79 2.0 133

130 60 680 1.1 7.5 0.88 4.5 300 130 89 1.0 7.5 0.88 4.5 249 88 91 572 1.2 I0.0 0.82 3.0 280

@212F @212F 78 12 928 1.2 7.8 0.88 2.8 176

Mix 0 550 1.1 5.9 0.64 2.5 116 72 797 1.7 7.6 0.88 4.0 260 74 98 650 1.4 11.2 0.81 2.6 245 74 75 761 1.7 9.8 0.81 2.6 201

@212F @212F 118 148 472 1.1 12.7 0.90 4.1 340

@200F @275F 130 90 799 0.88 4.5 295 152 150 871 0.6 3.5 0.99 5,2 399 76 -22 191 1.3 50.0 1.26 2.6 115 90 110 455 1.7 15.6 0.93 3.0 275

@260F @200F 132 124 7"15 1.7 13.0 0.98 4.7 313 113 82 1099 1.2, 9.6 1.11 3.9 270

Mix 490 740 0.90 Mix 486 650 0.90 108 187 1038 1.1 1.02, 3.7 395

@302F 84 .4 473 1.3 8.0 0.78 2.9 179 98 111 788 1.1 9.4 0.95 3.4 2,13

@212F 134 117 817 0.7 5.6 0.86 4.6 349

@212F 278 2,15 757 0.5 1.04 9.6 644

@456F 147 151 1198 2.2 9.2 1.31 5.1 356 86 55 842 1.6 0.81 3.0 217 72, 136 83,3 2.2 15.2 0,94 2.5 307

@212F 88 54 556 2.0 22.0 1.02, 3.0 214 88 24 8O0 2.0 11.5 0.99 2,.0 171 46 55 685 3.3 19.0 0.79 1.6 173

106 59 810 0.8 6.7 0.87 2,.7 277 74 -49 356 1.9 36.0 0.71 Z6 95

118 115 752 1.5 1.04 4.1 309 @212F

6O -35 374 2.0 10.1 0.70 2.1 51 102 54 824 1.9 11.0 0.89 3. 5 210 99 56 775 6,2 16.0 1.30 3.4 183

Mix -45 536 1.4 7.6 0.80 2,.0 - 4.0 1(1(3 25 399 1.0 6.7 0.68 3.5 209

-7 437 1.1 7.5 0.66 3.0 156

CF Lbs. CF CF Air Per Vapor Vapor @ LEL Gal. Per Gal. Per Lb. Per Gal. 6.58 42,.9 6.67 1712 7.33 21.8 2.98 1961 7.2,2, 21.8 2.98 2159 6.83 30.0 4.40 2472

7.33 35.0 4.78 2885 5.2,3 28.5 5.35 2566 7.32, 24.4 3.34 1413 6.75 2,5.2, 5,23 2484 6.75 35.3 5.23 2039

Z50 3 . 6 S.28 2299

7.33 21.8 Z98 8.24 21.1 2.55 3489 10.49 53.4 5.09 4056 7.75 34.6 ¢46 1998

8.16 23.1 2.84 1338 9.24 31.6 3.42 2403 7.50 7.50 8..58 30.7 3.58 2763

6.50 29.9 4.61 2271 7,91 31,2 2,,95 2808

7.16 20.7 2.92, 2933

8.66 12.1 1.41 2399

10.91 28.7 2.67 1276 6.75 30.2, 4.56 1866 7.83 41.5 5.37 1844

8.58 37.7 4.45 1848 7.50 33.0 4.45 1615 6.58 55.2, 8.52 1621 7.25 26.4 3.7O 2,279 5.91 30.9 5.$0 1596 8.66 28.4 3.2,2 1865

5.8 2,7.6 6.53 1842 7.4 28.1 2,.84 1452

10.8 42.2, 2,.96 640 6.7 29.7 4.46 2094 5.7 21.9 3.9"2 2169 5.5 24.7 4.56 2223

2 8 3

N F P A 86 - - A 9 9 R O C

Table 7-5.2.2(a) Properties of Commonly Used Flammable Liquids in English Units (continued)

Solvent Molecular Flash Auto LEL UEL Specific Vapor Boiling Lbs. CF CF Name Weight Point Ignition % by % by Gravity Density Point Per Vapor Vapor

De~ F De~ F Volume Volume Water--I Air=l De~ F Gal. Per Gal. Per Lb. Kerosene (Fuel Oil #1) Mix 100-162 410 0.7 5.0 0.83 6.9 Linseed Oil-Raw Mix 432 650 0.93 600 7.7 Magiesol 47 203 215 428 0.5 0.80 7.0 464 6.7 12.7 1.91 Magicsol 52 236 265 428 0.5 0.81 8.2 518 6.7 11.1 1.64 Methyl Acetate 74 14 850 3.1 16.0 0.93 2.8 140 7.7 37.0 5.30 Methyl Alcohol 32 52 725 6.0 36.0 0.79 1.1 147 6.6 79.5 12.25 Methyl Carbitol 129 205 465 1.4 22.7 1.01 4.1 379 8.4 27.2 3.27 Methyl Cellosolve 76 102 545 1.8 14.0 0.96 2.6 255 8.0 40.7 5.16 Methyl Cellosolve 118 111 1.7 8.2 1.01 4.1 292 8.4 27.6 3.32

Acetate Methyl Ethyl Ketone 72 16 759 1.4 11.4 0.80 2,5 176 6.7 35.8 5.44

@200F @200F Methyl Lactate 104 121 725 2.2 1.10 3,6 293 9.2 34.1 3.77

@212F Mineral Spirits #10 Mix 104 473 0.8 0.80 3,9 300 6.7 22.9 3.43

@21217 Naptha(VM&P Regular) Mix 28 450 0.9 6.0 203-320 Napthalene 128 174 979 0.9 5.9 1.10 4.4 424 9,2 27.7 3.06 Nitrobenzene 123 190 900 1.8 1.25 4.3 412 10.4 32.7 3.19

@200F Nitroethane 75 82 778 3.4 1.04 2.6 237 8.7 44.7 5.23 Nitrom ethane 61 95 785 7.3 1.13 • 2.1 214 9.4 59.7 6.43 Nitropropane-1 89 96 789 2.2 1.00 3.1 268 8.3 36.2 4.40 N i trop ropane-2 89 75 802 2.6 11.0 0.99 3.1 248 8.2 35.8 4.40 Paraffin Oil Mix 444 0.83-0.91 Peanut Oil Mix 540 833 0.90 7.5 PercMoroethylene 166 None None None 1.62 5.8 250 13.5 Petroleum Ether Mix <0 550 1.1 5.9 0.66 2.5 5.5 Propyl Acetate 102 55 842 1.7 8.0 0.89 3.5 215 7.4

@I00F n-Propyl Alcohol 60 74 775 2.2 13.7 0.80 2.1 207 6.7 i-Prowl Alcohol 60 53 750 2.0 12.7 0.78 2.1 181 6.5

@200F n-Propyl Ether 102 70 370 1.3 7.0 0.75 3.5 194 6.2 Pyridine 79 68 900 1.8 12.4 0.98 2.7 239 8.2 Rosin ()il Mix 266 648 1.00 680 8.3 Soy Bean Oil Mix 540 833 0.90 7.5 Tetrahydrofuran 72 6 610 2.0 I1.8 0.89 2.5 151 7.4 To lu ene 92 40 896 1.1 7.1 0.87 3.1 231 7.2 Turpentine 136 95 488 0.8 0.87 4.7 300 7.2 Vinyl Acetate 86 18 756 2.6 13.4 0.93 3.0 161 7.7 o-Xylene 106 88 867 0.9 6.7 0.88 3.7 2 ~ 7.3

CF Air

@LEL Per Gal.

2527 2201 1157 1246 1945 2220 1595

2521

1515

2836

3049 1786

1269 758

1609 1343

31.1 2.36 29.4 5.35 2646 28.1 3.84 1626

43.0 6.53 1910 41.9 6.53 2052

23.7 5.84 1798 40.0 4.96 2180

39.8 5.44 1952 31.1 4.26 28O0 20.6 2.88 2555 34.8 4.56 1305 26.7 3.7O 2945

284

N F P A 8 6 - - A 9 9 R O C

Solvent Molecular Name Weight

Acetone 58 n-Amyl Acetate 130 sec-Amyl Acetate 130 Amyl Alcohol 88

Benzene 78 Benzine Mix n-Butyl Acetate 116 n-Butyl Alcohol 74 ~c-Butyl Alcohol 74

Butyl Cellosolve 118

Butyl Propionate 130 Camphor 152 Carbon Disulfide 76 Gellosolve 90

Cellosolve Acetate 132 C]dorobenzene 113 Corn Oil Mix Cottonseed Oil Mix m or p-Cresol 108

Cyclohexane 84 Cyclohexanone 98

p-Cymene 134

Dibutyl Phthalate 278

o*Dichlorobenzene 147 Diethyl Ketone 86 n-Dimethyl Formamide 73

p-Dioxane 88 Ethyl Acetate 88 Ethyl Alcohol 46 Ethylbenzene 106 Ethyl Ether 74 Ethyl Lactate 118

Ethyl Methyl Ether 60 Ethyl Propionate 102 Ethyl Dichloride 90 Gasoline Mix n-Heptane 100 n-Hexane 86 Kerosene (Fuel Oil #1) Mix

TaMe 7-5.2.2(b) Properties of Commonly Used Flammable'Liquids in Metric Units

Flash Auto LEL UEL Specific Vapor Boiling I ~ Point Ignition % by % by Gravity Density Point Per De~ C De~ C Volume Volume Water=l Air=l De~C Liter

-20 465 2.5 12.8 0.79 2.0 56 0.788 16 360 1.1 7.5 0.88 4.5 149 0.878 32 1.0 7.5 0.88 4.5 131 0.878 33 300 1.2 10.0 0.82 3.0 138 0.818

@IOOC @lOOC -11 438 1.2 7.8 0.88 2.8 80 0.878

0 288 1.1 5.9 0.64 2.5 0.639 22 425 1.7 7.6 0.88 4.0 127 0.878 37 343 1.4 11.2 0.81 2.6 117 0.808 24 405 1.7 9.8 0.81 2.6 94 0.808

@lOOC @10{)(I 244 1.1 12.7 0.90 4.1 171 0.898

@93C @135(] 32 426 0.88 4.5 146 0.879 66 466 0.6 3.5 0.99 5.2 204 0.988

-30 90 1.3 50,0 1.26 2.6 46 1.258 43 255 1.7 15.6 0.93 3.0 135 0.928

@93C @93C 51 379 1.7 13.0 0.98 4.7 156 0.978 28 593 1.3 9.6 1.11 3.9 132 1.108

2254 393 0.90 0.898 252 343 0.90 0.898

86 559 1.1 1.03 3.7 202 1.028 @ 150C 0.000

-20 245 1.3 8.0 0.78 2.9 82 0.779 44 420 1.1 9.4 0.95 3.4 156 0.948

@IOOC 47 436 0.7 5.6 0,86 4.6 176 0.859

212 157 403 0.5 1.04 9.6 340 1.038

@236C 66 648 2.2 9.2 1.31 5.1 180 1.308 13 450 1.6 0.81 3.0 103 0.809 58 445 2.2 15.2 0.94 2.5 153 0.938

@IOOC 12 180 2.0 22.0 1.03 3.0 101 1.028 -4 427 2.0 11.5 0.90 3.0 77 0.898 13 363 3.3 19.0 0.79 1.6 78 0.789 15 432 0.8 6.7 0.87 3.7 150 0.869

-45 180 1.9 36.0 0.71 2.6 35 0.709 46 400 1.5 1.04 4.1 154 1.038

@IOOC -37 190 2.0 10.1 0.70 2.1 11 0.699 12 440 1.9 11.0 0.89 3.5 99 0.888 13 413 6.2 16.0 1.$0 3.4 84 1.298

-43 280 1.4 7.6 0.80 3.0-4.0 0.799 -4 204 1.0 6.7 0.68 3.5 98 0.679

-22 225 1.1 7.5 0.66 3.0 69 0.659 38-72 210 0.7 5.0 0.83 0.829

CM Vapor

Per Liter

O.329 0.164 0.164 O.225

0.262 0.213 0.183 0.265 0.265

0.184

0.164 0.158 0.401 0.259

0.174 0.238

0.231

0.225 0.234

0.155

0.090

0.216 0.228 0.311

0.283 0.247 0.415 0.199 0.232 0.213

0.282 0.211 0.318 0.222 0.164 o.186

CM Vapor

Per

0.418 0.186 0.186 0.275

O.298 0.334 0.209 0.327 0.327

0.205

0.186 0.159 0.319 0.278

0.178 0.214

0.224

0.288 0.247

0.181

O.O87

0.185 0.282 0.332

0.275 0.275 0.527 6.229 O.327 0.205

0.404 0.238 0.245 0.278 0.241 0.282

CM Air

@LEL Per L

12.84 14.72 16.20 18.55

21.57 19.19 10.61 18.64 15.$0

16.59

26.10 30.44 14.95

10.06 18.04

20.74

17.05 21.08

22.02

18.01

9.58 14.01 13.84

13.87 12.12 12.17 24.62 11.98 14.00

13.83 10.90

15.66 16.23 16.69

285

N F P A 86 - - A 9 9 R O C

Table 7-5.2.2(b) Properties of Commonly Used Flammable Liquids in Metric Units (continued) CM

Vapor Kgs Vapor Density Air:=- 1

Solvent Molecular Flash Auto LEL UEL Specific Name Weight Point ]gnllion % by % by Gravity

De~ C Del~ C Volume Volume Water=-I

Linseed Oil-Raw Mix 222 34.3 0.93 Magiesol 47 203 102 220 0.5 0.80 7.0 Magiesol fi2 236 129 220 0.5 0.81 8.2 Methyl Acetate 74 -10 454 3.1 16.0 0.93 2.8 Methyl Alcohol 32 11 38.5 6.0 36.0 0.79 1.1 Methyl Carbitol 120 96 241 1.4 22.7 1.01 4.1 Methyl Ccllosolve 76 39 285 1.8 14.0 0.96 2.6 Methyl Cellosolve 118 44 1.7 8.2 1.01 4.1

Acetate Methyl Ethyl Ketone 72 --9 404 1.4 11.4 0.80 2.5

@93C @93C Methyl Lac u't te 104 49 385 2.2 1.10 3.6

@IOOC Mineral Spirits #I0 Mix 40 245 0.8 0.80 3.9

@I00C Naptha(VM&P Regular) Mix -2 232 0.9 6.0 Napthalene 128 79 526 0,9 5.9 1.10 4.4 Nitrobenzene 123 88 482 1.8 1.25 4.3

@93C Nitroethane 75 28 414 3.4 1.04 2.6 Nitromethane 61 35 418 7.3 1.13 2.1 Nitropropane-1 89 36 421 2.2 1.6O 3.1 Nitropropane-2 89 24 428 2.6 11.0 0.99 3.1 Paraffin Oil Mix 229 0.83-0.91 Peanut Oil Mix 282 445 0.90 Perchloroethylene 166 None None None 1.62 5.8 Petroleum Ether Mix <-18 288 1.1 5.9 0.66 2.5

Propyl Acetate 102 13 450 1.7 8.0 0.89 3.5 @38C

n-Propyl Alcohol 60 23 413 2.2 13.7 0.80 2.1 i-Propyl Alcohol 60 11 399 2.0 12.7 0.78 2.1

@93C n-Propyl Ether 102 21 188 1.3 7.0 0.7,5 3.5 Pyridine 79 20 482 1.8 12.4 0.98 2.7 Rosin Oil Mix 130 342 1.6O Soy Bean Oil Mix 282 445 0.90 Tetrahydrofuran 72 -14 321 2.0 11.8 0.89 2.̀ 5 Toluene 92 4 480 1.1 7.1 0.87 3.1 Turpentine 136 3̀ 5 253 0.8 0.87 4.7 Vi~yl Acetate 86 ,,3 402 2.6 13A 0.93 3.0 o-Xylene 106 31 464 0.9 6.7 0.88 3.7

Boili~ Point Per Per De~C Liter Liter

316 0.928 240 0,799 0.095 27O 0,8O9 0.083

6O 0,928 0.277 64 0,789 0.597

193 1,6O8 0,204 124 O,958 0.306 144 L6O8 0.207

80 0.799 0.269

145 1.098 0,256

149 0.799 0.171

95-160 218 1.098 0.208 211 1.248 0.245

114 1,038 0.335 101 1.128 0.448 131 0.998 0.272 120 0.988 0.269

121

102

97 83

9O 115 36O

66 111 149 72

144

0.898 1.617 0.233 0.659 0.220

0.888 0.211

0.799 0.322 0.779 0.314

0.749 0.178 0.978 0.300 0.998 0.898 0.888 0.299 0.869 0.234 0.869 0.155 0.928 0.262 0.879 0.201

CM Vapor

Per

0.119 0.102 0.298 0.%7 0.2O2 0.319 O.2O5

0.336

0,253

0.214

0,189 0.196

0.323 0.397 0.272 0.272

0.144 0.334

0,238

0.404 0.404

0.238 0.307

0,336 0.269 0.178 0,282 0,229

CM Air

@ LEL Per L

18.97 16.46 8.66 9.55

14.55 16.67 11.97

18.93

11.37

21.21

22.89 13.36

9.53 5.69

12.08 10.08

19.80

12.20

14.34 15.41

15.50 16.37

1.04 21.04 19.19 9.80

22.11

286

N F P A 8 6 ~ A 9 9 R O C

(Log #CCA) 86- 34 - (Section %7.3): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical C ommi t t e e on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8,6-35 RECOMMENDATION: In Section 7-7.3 of the proposal r e c o m m e n d a t i o n add an "a" before the words "solvent vapor concent ra t ion controller.. . ." in the first sen tence of the ma in paragraph. SUBSTANTIATION: The change is m a d e to be grammatical ly correct. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMrrTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 26 N O T RETURNED: 1 I)adas

(Log #CC14) 86- 35 - (7-7.3): Accept SUBMITTER: Technica l Commi t t ee on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-35 RECOMMENDATION: Revise the last sen tence of Section %7.3 in the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of Proposal 86-35 to read as follows:

"For tim purposes of t~is section, a ventilation zone shall be any port ion of an oven tha t contains an exhaus t duct." SUBSTANTIATION: The change more correctly defines the concep t of venti lat ion zones. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #13) 86- 36 - (7-7.3 Exception): Reject SUBMITTER: James J. Hous ton , Industrial Heat ing E qu ipmen t Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-35 ,. RECOMMENDATION: Delete %7.3 except ion entirely. SUBSTANTIATION: It c anno t be shown for all condi t ions tha t the 25 percen t LEL veil[ no t be exceeded. It is safer no t to permi t the except ion at all. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: It can be shown for a given process line tha t the 25 percen t LF',L will no t be exceeded in certain zones. This requires detai led knowledge, mode l ing and test ing of the

rocess. ~UMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 26 N O T RETIJRNED: 1 Dadas

(Log #12) 86- 37- (%7.8): Accept SUBMITTER: J ames J. Hous ton , Industr ial Heat ing E q u i p m e n t Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-35 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"...circuit, or ~ power failure." SUBSTANTIATION: This change will clarify the text to indicate diat the a larm shou ld c.ccur on a loss o f controller power, no t on a loss of system power. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CC6) 86- 38- (Section %7,8): Accept SUBMITTERz T e c h n i ~ d Commi t t ee on Ovens and Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-35 RECOMMENDATION: Add a second and tlfird sen tence to Section %7.8 in the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of Proposal 86-35 (Log #38) to read as follows:

I "Activation o f a ma l func t ion a larm shall initiate act ion to reduce the solvent concent ra t ion to a m i n i m u m . The activation oft .he mal func t ion a la rm shall requi re opera tor in tervent ion in accordance with Section 7-7.10 " SUBSTANTIATION: The reorganiza t ion of old Section 7-9.4 inadvertent ly e l iminated the act ion requ i red for a mal funct ion a larm. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #27) 86- 39 - (11-2.1): Accept in Principle in Part SUBMITTER: Mark W. Ryan, Amer i can Insurance Service Group COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-52 RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows:

4-3.11" Automat ic Sorinkler Systems A-4-]3.11 Gombustjt~le materials may be presen t inside industrial

ovens a n d / p r fi~rnaces. Automat ic sprinkler protect ion should be considered individually for each oven or dryer if any of the following condi t ions exist:

1. Construct ion of the oven or dryer is combustible. 2. The material bein~ processed is combustible.

v

3. Racks. trays, snacers, or conta iners are combustible. 4. If the re are areas where aooreciable accumula t ions of

combust ible dr ippings or deoosi{s are o resen t on the inside of the oven surface or on racks, travs, etc.

The type of sorinklers and a r r a n g e m e n t should be de t e rm in ed individually deDendin~ on the interior ductwork and the material passing Lhrougla the oven.

The following provides geoeral des ign soecifications for automat ic spr inkler protect ion in o v e n s and furnaces:

1. The sorinkler ra t ine should be aooroximate lv 5O°F h i ehe r than the h igh t empera tu re limit set t ing of the oven or drver.

2- Water filled-piping within the oven. exoosed to heat. can incur deposi t ion and bui ldup of minerals in the Dine.

3. Pioin~ shou ld be located on the outsicle of the oven with sprinklers nipp ed down-in a n e n d e n t oosit ion bv inverted U bends. Sprinklers can be placed in d o m e shaded recesses 10 in. d iamete r if there is no room for tllem.

Reference NFPA 13. Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, for fi lr ther informat ion or consul t a qualified fire protect ion professional. SUBSTANTIATION: Neither NFPA 13 nor NFPA 86-1995 offer any guidance on providing sprinkler protec t ion in ovens or turnaces. Chapter 11 of NFPA 86 refers back to NFPA 13. NFPA 13 offers no specific advice. This proposal, based on inf 'ormation f rom Factory Mutual Data Sheet 6-9 "Industrial Ovens and Dryers" (5/1990. Pages 13-16) a n d Industrial Risk Insurers ' IRInformat ion IM.4.2.0 "Ovens arid Furnaces" (June 3, 1996, Page 4), provides informat ion to use for guidance.

Note. Suppor t ing material available for review at NFPA head.quarters. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle in Part. Add the following new text at die end of the cur ren t text in Section A-11-2.1 in the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of Proposal 86-68 (Log #38a):

Combust ible materials may be presen t inside industr ial ovens a n d / o r furnaces . Automat ic sprinkler protect ion shou ld be considered individually for each oven or dryer if any of the following condi t ions exist:

1. The material being processed is combustible. 2. Racks, trays, spacers, or containers are combustible. 3. ff there are areas where appreciable accumula t ions of

combust ible dr ippings or deposi ts are p resen t on the inside of die oven surface or on racks, trays, etc.

The type of sprinklers and a r r a n g e m e n t shou ld be de t e rm in ed individually d e p e n d i n g on the oven interior ductwork and the material passing t h rough the oven.

Reference NFPA 13, S tandard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, for fu r ther information. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The material rejected is i tem 1 of the first paragraph, the third paragraph inc lud ing i tems 1, 2, a n d 3, and the last phrase of the 4th paragraph. Item 1 of the first paragraph is covered in Section 3-2.2. The r emain ing rejected

2 8 7

N F P A 86 - - A99 R O C

material is a matter o f individual design or should be considered under the scope of NFPA 13. The material accepted in principle meets the in tent o f the submit ter with the section reference corrected to Section 11-2.1. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #11) 86. 40 - (A-2-1): Accept SUBMITTER: .lames J. Houston, Industrial Heat ing Equ ipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-57 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"AO_tlLq/J~ a~oei ty having jurisdiction.. ." SUBSTANTIATION: Misspelling second paragraph. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CC3) 86- 41 - (Section A-3-3.4 (new)): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commit tee on Ovens and Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-57 RECOMMENDATION: Add a new Section A-3-3.4 to read as follows.

"The location for explosion-relief is a critical concern and needs to be close to the ignition source.

The heater box is part of the oven system and needs to have explosion-relief provided. Personnel considerations and proximity to o ther obstructions may impact the location selected for these vents." SUBSTANTIATION: The addit ional material provides guidance for location of explosion-relief vents. Also refer to Commit tee C o m m e n t 86-8 (Log #CC2). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #10) 86- 42 - (A-4-2.4.4): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-58 RECOMMENDATION: Add to the drawing the following note:

"A= Diameter of Pipe"

Tee

Drip --------~ leg (.game dia. a~ main gas pipe)

Gas in

F ]Mallual shutoff _..] valve

,A+3" rain.

G~t5 pressul¢ regulator

@ Fuel tilter/ strainer

IP

SUBSTANTIATION: The drawing is no t clear as it is drawn. The dimension "A" must be defined. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Revise Figure A-4-2.4.4 shown with Proposal 86-58 to change the 3 inch d imens ion as shown in the marked up figure.

Gas in

1 ~ Manual shutoff valve

Pressure Strainer regulator

Tee t ' ~ : ~ , ~ - q

in.

O,p,eg (same diameter ~ - as main gas pipe) Gap

Figure A-4-2.4.4 COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The revision meets the in tent o f the submitter. NUMBER OF COMMI'['IT~ MF_biBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITFEE ACTION:


(Log #CC11) .86- 43 - (A-4-2.7.4): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commit tee on Ovens and Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-59 RECOMMENDATION: Replace Section A-4-2.7.4 in the r ecommenda t ion of P roposa l 86-59 (Log #CP24) with text to read as follows:

Testing of radiant tubes should include subjecting t h e m to thermal cycling typical for the furnace application and then verifying their ability to withstand overpressure developed by a fuel- air explosion. Overpressure testlng can . . . . be done in one of two ways-.

1. Statically pressurize the tube until tt fails. Compare this Pdressure to the max i mumpres su re (from literature) that can be

eveloped in a conta ined deflagration of an op t imum fuel-air mixture.

2. After partially blocking the open end of the tube to simulate a heat exchanger, fill the tube with a well-mixed stoichiometric fuel- air mixture (ten volumes of air to one volume of fuel for natural gas). Ignite the mixture at the closed end of the tube. Measure the pressure developed. Compare this pressure to the maximum pressure (from literature) that can be developed in a contained deflagration of an opt imum fuel-air mixture. SUBSTANTIATION: The revised text more technically co r r ec t and provides more guidance and test options. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


F'~gu re A-4-2.4.4

288

N F P A 8 6 ~ A 9 9 R O C

(Log #32) 86- 44 - (A-5-7.2.3(a)): Hold SUBMITTER: Christopher B. Fink, Honeywell Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: N/A RECOMMENDATION: Revise Figure A-5-7.Z3(a) as follows:

~ m

m

L m m

~UT I~.OT

" " ~ PW ~" Tg ~ ~ i'~

V~ F1 ¥~

A~

ru~

SVlT~ V~.~ /

,a

t~ ~O L.KT

Figure A-5-7.2.3(a) Example of a Gas Piping Diagram for Leak Test

SUBSTANTIATION: Updating schematic. COMMITTEE ACTION: Hold. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Comment introduces new material per Section 4-4.6.2.2(a) in NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Proiects. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


289

N F P A 86 - - A 9 9 R O C

(Log #33) 86- 45 - (A-5-7.2.3(b)): Hold SUBMITrER: Christopher B. Fink, Honeywell Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-62 RECOMMENDATION: Revise figure A-5-7.2.3(b) as follows:

) PO',,'~

- - f l ~ m . Mm

CRL STOP zrr/~'r OL'* ~

c ~ l A1R

t~R PLC DUTPUT

- ~ " ~ " W - " 7 - ~ v } ,~ t ,o . LI a I IC'~I XFI]~4[R

F ..... Io ~ - - - -

• . . . . 2 1 2 2 ~vlrcH

MiD1

Figure A-5-7.2.3(b) Partial system schematic showing the appfication of a

programmable controller to monitor safety interlocks and provide burner control functions in series with hard-wired safety

interlocks.

SUBSTANTIATION: Updating schematic. COMMITTEE ACTION: Hold. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Comment introduces new material which would propose something which could not be properly be handled within the time for processing the report per Section 4-4.6.2.2(c) in NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #25) 86- 46 - (A-5-9.1 (New)): Reject SUBMITTER: Thomas E. Myers, Despatch Industries COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-2 RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows:

"5-9.1" Each burner flame..." "A-5-9.1:1-3.1 would also reauire existin~ systems to have a safe-

start check if the system is altered or extencle~t and would be nrudent even if the exlstin¢ system is only bein~ serviced." SUBSTANTIATION: Since 3-9.1 and 1-3.1 aresei~arate, the reader may incorrectly assume that the existing systems without a safe-start check are grandfathered in under the new rules. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The material is already covered in Sections 1o3.1 and A-l-3.1. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


290

N F P A 86 - - A 9 9 R O C

(Log #34) 86- 4 7 - (A-5-9.2.2(a)): Hold SUBMITIT.R: Christopher B. ~nk, Honeywell Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8665 RECOMMENDATION: Revise Figur e A-5-9.2.2(a) as shown:

PDJ]T PIt.~' ~fflET'r t, tF(TY SS4UTM s~JurJos'F

Pa..m" v k L v [ ~ VALVE fez PRCSSlJI~ ~ I~" lq~or or* i,w4tt~ ~c-u~T~ ~ CLI~UI~ M M

r ' ~ p-'q ~-~1 J L~K'~

. Gt$ IN ~ TrOT v~t.v¢

q~,j ~4.1~ ~d:'(T¥ SAF(TY f,~ t.fiV ¢~ ~J'i'ort r ~tffotrr

T V'41-Vrvul~ L PItI[I~SUR¢ VAt.V£ ND4~ VAI.,,/£ NOJ

T(( - . - . r lLT~ OR ~ ccos~m[ ¢~s~¢

GA~ PIPID CAP TT.ST Y~V(

NOJ

S ~ T I ~ r v ~ ~ A

TEST

NO2

P|I.DT I~MN F~RFIE-KTI~CTDR FL~I~-OI[TIrCI~

C~q¥1NU~J~ LJt~ I R . I ~ J S

Figure A-5-9.2.2(a) Example of an approved combustion safeguard supervising a pilot for a continuous line burner during light-off and

the main flame alone during firing.

SUBSTANTIATION: Updating schematic. COMMITTEE ACTION: Hold. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Comment introduces new material per Section 4-4.6.2.2(a) in NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects. The proposal referenced is incorrect. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #7) 86- 48 - (A-5-9.2.2(a) and (b)): Accept SUBMITTE~ James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-57 RECOMMENDATION: Insert a second safety shutoff valve in the pilot line of the example drawing.

Pilot safety Pilot safety shutoff valve shutoff valve

Pilot pressure No 1 No 2 r egu la to r& I:';i

Pilot gas inlet . . . ,

Leaktest valve No. I ,I, ,.L, w ~ . \ Leak test valve No. 2 \

• ' \ Pilot flame.sensing element Main flame-sensing element L o w W Pilot loumer~,%~ / / ~p pressure . ~ / / I

te e No 2 Cont nuous ne burners Leak ,est valve No. 1 Leak st van .

Figures A-5-9.2.2(a)

291

N F P A 86 ~ A 9 9 R O C


Pilot pressure No. 1 No. 2 regulator ~3::~ r ] [7

Pilot gas inlet ~ ~ ~ ~..~ ~. , ,

PHot shutoff valve ~ k Manual fl ~l shutoff \

Leak test valve No. 1 ~ j,~ valve Leak test valve No. 2

Low gas pressure High gas \ switc~h Safety shutoff Safety shutoff ~tcs~re.... \ Pilo"ur er

Gas pressure ~ valve No. 1 valve No. 2 ~ X~I Lo n regulator~]::) ~ [-1 r7 k ~ ~//pilot flame-sensing element

,MainsV-hutoff ,v~,, " " ~ " ~ ~ M:nu"aishu;off valve @1 ~1 valve _ I I

Flame-propagation path Leak test valve No. 1 L L Leak test valve No. 2 F l a m e - ~

/.( Radiant-cup burners Main flame-sensing element

Figures A-5-9.2.2(b)

SUBSTANTIATION: The drawings need to be amended to include two pilot safety shutoff valves to be consistent wifl~ Section 5-7.2.1. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #35) 86- 49 - (A-5-9.2.2(b)): Hold SUBMITrER: Christopher B. Fink, Honeywell Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-65 RECOMMENDATION: Revise Figure A-5-2.2.(b) as shown:

GA~ IN

V~LVEru{L

T E £ - - ~ FILTER DR STRAI~f~R

i

DRIP LE~ - - - ~ "-~ (SAME OIA

Ag MAIN

OILO~ p l ~ o ¢ ~FETY ~AfETY

PILOT $~o't~rr SHu*II}~'r PRES~UR~ VALVE ~O.I VALVENO~. REGULATOR ORDC~- Or PROOF" Or

CLOSURE CLOSURE

SAFFjT GAS LOV GAS $HUTDFr

PRE$$URE PRESSURE VALVE I~.1 REGULATOR SVIYCH PROOF Or

GAS PIPE) i I C~P

~NUAL. SHUTOff VALVE

0.,

LEAK T[$T

VALVe"

SAFETY P~DT SHUTOFF Hl6ff GA~ ~'t. ~'~I~: -b~ I"¢'e I"OR

VALVE HOg. PRESSURE

V'ALVE ~URN~

TEST T[~l" VALVE' ~ I VALVE

F.i.p~- i)ie.fEOTOR RAIBrANT -CUP BURNER ri.CXr..NT

Figure A-5-9.2.2(b) Example of an approved combustion safeguard supervising a group of radiant-cup burners having reliable flame-

propagation characteristics from one to the other by means of flame-propagation devices.

292

N F P A 8 6 ~ A 9 9 R O C

SUBSTANTIATION: Upda t ed schematic . COMMITTEE ACTION: Hold. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: T he C o m m e n t in t roduces new material per Section 4-4.6.2.2(a) in NFPA Regulat ions Governing Commi t t ee Projects. The proposal r e f e r e n c e d is incorrect . NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 26 N O T RETURNED: 1 [',adas

(Log #CC8) 86- 50 - (A-7-5.2.3, A7-5.4, A-7-6): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commi t t ee on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-68

I RECOMMENDATION: Revise Sections A-7-5.2.3, A-%5.4 and A-7- 6 of the Commi t tee Action on Proposal 86-68 (Log #38a) to read as follows.

A-%5.2.3 Theoret ica l De te rmina t ion of Requi red Ventilation. Problem: For con t i nuous oven:

The vo lume of oven dilut ion air tha t would r ende r vapor f rom a known vo lume of to luene barely f lammable is d e t e r m i n e d as follows:

Products of combus t ion mus t be a d d e d to dais vo lume in accordance with Section 7-5.3 and t hen correct ions made for h igher oven exhaus t t empera ture , and if applicable for elevations of 1000 ft (305m) or greater. An example of how these addidonM factors are appl ied can be f o u n d in Section A-7-5.4.

SI Units: To de t e rmine the cubic meters (m s) of vapor pe rJ i t e r (L) of solvent, the following calculation is used:

0.998 x SpGr = m3/L@ 21°C 1.200 x VD

For this example:

0.998 x 0.87 3 0.233 m vapor per L to luene @ 21°C

1.200 x 3.1

The LELr, being equivalent to 0.99 percen t o f the m 3 o f air r ende red explosive by 1 liter of to luene, is:

100 - 0.99 x 0.233 = 23.30 rn 3 air 21°C per L toluene

0.99

(a) One gallon of water weighs 8.328 Ib at 70°F. O n e liter of water weighs 0.998 kg at 21°C.

(b) l-)ry air at 70°l~and 29.9 in. Hg weighs 0.075 lb / f t 3. Dry air at 21°C and 0.76 m Hg weighs 1.200 k g / m ~

(c) O n e cubic me te r m '~) = 1000 liters (L) = 1000 cubic dec imeters (dm3) .

(d) Specific gravity (SpGr) of to luene = 0.87 (water = 1.0). (e) Vapor densi ty (VD) of to luene = 3.1 (air = 1.0). (f) Lower explosive limit (LEL) o f to luene in air = 1.1% by

volume [see Tables 7-5.2.2(a) and (b)] and in the LEL calculations is expressed as 1.1 (no t 0.011). This value for the lower explosive l imit is at s tandard a m b i e n t t empera tu re of 70°F (21°C).

(g) Measured oven exhaus t t empera tu re (t) = 300°F (149°C). (h) Corrected LEL (LELT) for oven exhaus t t empera tu re

= LEL x LELcz= 1.1 x [1 - 0.000784 x (149°C - 25°C) ] = 0.99. (See 7-4.2.) English:

To de te rmine the cubic feet ( fd) of vapor per gallon (gal) of solvent, d ie following calculation is used:

8.328 SpGr × = ftS/gal @ 70°F

0.075 VD

Products of combus t ion mus t be a d d e d to this vo lume in accordance with Section %5.3 a n d t hen correct ions ma d e for h igher oven exhaus t t empera ture , and if applicable for elevations of 1000 ft (305m) or greater. An example of how these addit ional factors are appl ied can be f o u n d in Section A-%5.4.

A n o t h e r Me thod of Computa t ion . For this example, xylene is to be used as the solvenL

(a) Specific gravity (SpGr) of xylene = 0.88 (water = 1.0). (b) Molecular weight of C tH4(CHs) 2 = 106. (c). Lower explosive limit (LEL) o fxy lene in air = 0.9% by

volume [see Tables 7-5.2.2(a) and (b)] . (d) Corrected LEL (LELT) for oven exhaus t t empera tu re

= LEL x LELc~ = 0.9 x [1 - 0.000784 x ( 1 4 9 ° C - 25°C)] = 0.81 (see 7-4.2).

(e) The molecular weight in p o u n d s of any gas or vapor occupies 587 ft s at 70°F a n d 29.9 in. of mercury. The molecular weigtat in g rams of any gas or vapor occupies 24.1 L at 21°C an d 101 kPa.

For this example:

8 . 3 2 8 x 0 . 8 7

0 . 0 7 5 x 3 .1 = 3 1 . 1 6 f t 3 v a p o r p e r g a l o f t o l u e n e @ 7 0 ° F

Tile LELr, be ing equivalent to 0.99 pe rcen t of the ft s' of air r ende red explosive by 1 gal lon of toluene, is:

1 0 0 - 0 . 9 9

0.99 x 3 1 . 1 6 = 3 1 1 6 f t 3 a i r @ 7 0 ° F p e r g a l t o l u e n e

293

N F P A 86 - - A 9 9 R O C

English: Weigh t of 1 gal lon (gal) o fxy l ene is:

8.328 lb H 2 0 x 0.88 = 7.33 lb x y l e n e / g a l

gal

Volume of 1 gallon of xylene, when vaporized, is:

7.33 lb x 387 f t 3

1 0 6 ( m o l e c u l a r w e i g h t ) = 2 6 . 7 6 f t 3 x y l e n e v a p o r @ s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n s

The LELr, being equivalent to 0.81 pe rcen t of the f t s of air r ende red explosive by 1 gallon of xylene, is:

(100 - 0.81)

0.81 x 26.76 = 3277 ft 3 air @ 70°F/gal xylene

Products of combus t ion mus t be added to this vo lume in accordance with Section 7-5.3 a n d t hen correct ions m a d e for b igher oven exhaus t t empera tu re , a n d if applicable for elevations of 1000 ft (305m) or greater. An example of how fllese addi t ional factors are appl ied can be f o u n d in Section A-7-5.4.

SI Units: Weight of 1 liter (L) o fxy lene , when vaporized, is:

0.998 kg H20 1000 g x x 0.88 SpG r = 878 g xykene/L

L kg

Volume of 1 liter of xylene, when vaporized, is:

878 gx 24.1 L = 200 L xylene vapor @ standard conditions

106 (molecular weight)

Tile LELr, being equivalent to 0.81 pe rcen t of the m 3 of ,air r ende red explosive by 1 liter o fxy lene , is:

( 1 0 0 -- 0 . 8 1 ) l m s x 2 0 0 L x

0.81 1000 L 24 .49 m s a i r @ 2 1 ° C / L x y l e n e

Products of combus t ion mus t be a d d e d to this vo lume in accordance with Section 7-5.3 a n d t h e n correct ions made for h ighe r exhaus t t empera ture , and if applicable for elevations of 1000 ft (305m) or g r e a t e r . An example of how these addit ional factors are appl ied can be f o u n d in Section A-7-5.4.

A-7-5.2.4 The basis for the genera l rule is tha t 1 gal o f typical solvent p roduces a quant i ty of f l ammable vapor that, when diffused in air, forms approximate ly 2640 s tandard f t ° o f a lean mix ture tha t is barely explosive. O n e L of a typical solvent fo rms approximate ly 19.75 s tandard m 3 of a lean mix ture tha t is barely explosive. Refer

3 $ to table 7-5.2.2(a) and (b). T h e value of 12,000 ft (340 m ) includes a factor to accoun t for LEL correct ion at 350°F (177°C).

A-7-5.4 Revise p roposed Section A-7-5.4 of the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n to read ,as follows:

A-7-5.4 Tile following m e t h o d and examples demons t r a t e file calculation of venti lat ion rate for powder cur ing ovens.

(a) W = M a x i m u m hour ly rate of powder delivered into oven in p o u n d s or ki lograms per hour .

(b) R = Percent of powder const i tuents released du r ing oven cure cycle. (An accepted value for a typical powder a n d opera t ing condi t ion is 9 percen t by weight, b a s e d o n exper imenta l

de te rmina t ion . ) Thus , 0.09 p o u n d s or ki lograms f lammable const i tuents released pe r p o u n d or ki logram of powder cured.

(c) S = Surface area of parts to be coated in square feet or square meters per hour .

(d) T = M a x i m u m powder coat ing th ickness in t h o u san d th s of an inch (rail) or mil l imeters (ram). powder covers 135 ft ~ to a thickness of 0.001 in. (1 mil). Typically, 1 (e) C = Manufac ture r ' s r e c o m m e n d e d coverage in area per weight

~ owder for specif ied thickness. Typically, 1 p o u n d of i logram of powder covers 0.70 m Z t o a thickness of 1 mil l imeter (1

m m ) . (f) V = Vo lume of air r ende red barely explosive per weight of

powder cons t i tuent released (based on vo lume of air r ende red barely f lammable by 1 p o u n d or 1 k i logram of xylene [see Tables 7- 5.2.2(a) a n d (b)]. An example of V us ing xylene is as follows:

294

N F P A 8 6 1 A 9 9 R O C

V _ 2945 ft 3 gal

X

gad 7.3 lb xylene = 403.4 ft 3 a i r / lb powder

21.11 m s V=

L L = 25.15 m s air//kgpowder

0.879 kg xylene

(g) t = Oven exhaust r.emperature (h) I . ~ = LEL correction factor for temperature

= 1 - [0.000436 x (CF-77°F)]; or = 1 - [0.000784 x (t"C-25°C)]

(i) 1 lb = 0.4536 kg (j) 1 ft = = 0.0929 m e (k) 1 mil = 0.001 in. = 0.0254 mm

Calculation to establish the weight of powder entering the oven:

W = S x T

C - weight powder entering oven/hr

Dilution of powder cortstitui-~nts to barely explosive condition:

W x R x V x 1 D

LELcF x 60 min = volume of air/min barely flammable at 70°F (21°C)

Factor of safety of 4:1 and temperature correction for oven exhaust temperature:

Volume air

min x 4 x

(t°F + 460°F)

(70°F + 460°F)

Volume ~dr (t°C + 273°C) x 4 ×

rain (21°C + 273°C)

= volume of air/min at oven exhaust temperature; or

= volume of air/min at oven exhaust temperature

Sample calculation for a direct-fired continuous powder coating oven having a 2,000,000 B t u / h r (586.2 kW) burner system used to fuse an organic powder finish on steel products at 450°F (232°C) The oven is installed at. an elevation of 1000 ft (305 m) above sea level:

Surface coverage is to be 7000 f t~ /hr (650 m 2 / h r ) at a 3-mil (0.0762-mm) thickness intended to provide an average coverage of 135 ft2/lb at a 1-mil thickness or 0.702 me /kg at a 1-mm thickness. English: Exhaust calculated for products of combustion (see 7-5.3):

2,000,000 x 183 SCFM

1, o00, 000 Bm = 366 f t 3 air/min @ 70°F (SCFM)

Weight of powder to eater the oven:

7000 x 3 = 155.5 lb powder/hr

135 LEL~ at 450°F: 1 - [0.000436 × (450°F-77°F)] = 0.84

S,-ffety ventilation required for constituents released in oven:

155.5 x 0.09 x 403.4 x 4 0.84 x 60

= 448 f t 3 a i r / n f i n @ 7 0 ° F ( S C F M )

The required safety ventilation is, therefore, the combination of the vohlme required for the products of combustion and powder constituents.

295

N F P A 86 ~ A 9 9 R O C

366 ft 3 448 ft 3 +

min min - 814 t 3 a i r / ra in to be correc ted for oven operat ing tempera ture

Correction for oven operating temperature:

(450°F + 460 ° F) 814 x = 1398 ~ 3 a i r / m i n a t 4 5 0 ° F (CFM)

(70°F + 460°F)

sc~vi)

Correction for altitude:

1398 x 1.04 = 1454 ft 3 a i r / m i n at 450°F (CFM) at 1000 ft elevation

SI Units: Exhaust calculated for products of combustion (see 7- 5.3):

586.2 x 5 . 1 8 m 3/ra in

293. l k W = 10 .36 m 3 a i r / m i n at 2FC (s tandard m 3 / m i n )

Weight of powder to enter tile oven:

650 x 0.0762

0.702 LEL~ at 232°C:

= 70.56 kg powder/hr

1 - [0.000784 x (232°G-25°C)] = 0.84

Safety ventilation required for constituents released in oven:

70.56 x 0.09 x 25.15 x 4

0.84 x 60 = 12.68 m s a i r / m i n @ 21°C (standard m S / m i n )

The required safety ventilation is, therefore, the combination of the volume required for the products of combustion and powder constituents.

10.36 m 3 12.68 m 3 +

min min = 23.04 m 3 air/rain to be corrected for oven operating temperature (standard m3/m)

Correction for oven operating temperature:

23 .04 x (232°C + 273°C)

(21°C + 273°C) = 39 .58 m s a i r / m i n at 232°C

Correction for altitude:

39 .58 × 1.04 = 41 .16 m 3 a i r / m i n at 232°C at 305 m elevation

A-7-6 Sample Calculations for Batch Ovens. Example 1: Sample calculations for electrically heated batch oven processes; coatedmetal using approximation method. Dipped product fllrough batch oven operating at 300°F (149°C) at sea level. Volatiles in paint = 3 gal (11.4 L) of volatiles (mostly Methyl Ethyl Ketone) per batch into oven.

English:

Required ventilation, theoretl}zally not to reach the LEL (see 7-6.2 and 7-6. 4):

3 gal 440 SCFM × I x 1.4 factor = 1848 SCFM air

batch

Corrected for oven temperature:

296

N F P A 8 6 - - A 9 9 R O C

1848 x (300°F + 460°F) = 2650 ftS/min of air at 300°F (70°F + 460°F)

SI Units: Requi red ventilation, theoretically no t to reach the LEL (see 7-6.2 a n d 7-6.4 ):

3.29 slandard m s 11.4 L x - - x 1.4factor = 52.5 standard m3/min of air

min batch

Correc ted for oven tempera ture :

(149°C + 273°C) 52.5 x = 75.3 m3/min of air at 149°C

(21°C + 273°C)

Example 2: Sample calculations for electrically hea ted batch oven processes; venti lat ion (alculat ion us ing test measu remen t s . Batch oven operat ing at 255°F (124°C) at sea level cur ing t rans former coils impregna t ed with coating conta in ing 4.8 gal (18.2 L) of volatiles, mostly toluene. Tests u n d e r opera t ing condit ions indicate tha t over 5 hours were needed to evaporate all volatiles with the peak evaporation rate occurr ing in the first 5 minu tes after loading, at a rate of 0.06 g a l / m i n (0.227 L / m i n ) . The calculated venti lat ion rate, inc luding a t empera tu re correct ion factor for LEL for batch ovens (see 7-6.3 and 7-6.4 ) is as follows:

English:

Barely f lammable mix lure at peak evaporat ion rate [see Tables 7- 5.2.2(a) and (b)]:

2800 s t a n d a r d ft 3 air 0.06 gal x - - = 168 SCFM m i x t u r e at LEL

gal t o l u e n e m i n

Safety ventilation calculation: 168 SCFM x 4 (factor of safety) x 1.4 (LEL tempera tu re adjus tment) = 941 SCFM of air Gorrection for oven tempera ture :

(255°F + 460°F) 941 SCFM x = 1269 f tS/min of air at 255°F

(WO°F + 460°F)

SI l.Inits:

Barely f lammable mixture at peak evaporat ion rate [see Tables 7- 5.2.2(a) and (b)]:

21.04 standard m s mr 0.227 L x

L tohmne rain = 4.78 standard m 3 m i x m r e / l n i n at LEL

Safety venti lat ion calculation:

4.78 m s

min x 4 (factor of safety)x 1.4 (LEL tempera ture adjustment)= 26.77 standard n~/min

Correction for oven tempera ture :

26.77 st:mdard m s

min

(124°C + 273°C)

(21°C + 273°(.;) = 36o15 m3/min of air at 124°C

297

N F P A 8 6 - - A 9 9 R O C

Example $: Sample calculations for electrically heated batch oven processes; known solvent volume. A batch oven cures a load of fiber rings impregnated with thinned asphalt at 480°F (249°C), the volatiles being mostly Mineral Spirits No. 10. From weight tests of samples removed throughout the cure, it was established that the maximum amount of volatiles evaporated in any 1-hour period is 2.3 gal (8.7 L), and the total weight loss throughout dae cure is equivalent to 6.6 gal (25.0 L). The installation is at sea level. The estimated ventilation required in 7-6.5 , Exception No. 2, is as follows:

English:

Barely flammable mixture of Mineral Spirits No. 10 [see Tables 7- 5.2.2(a) and (b)]:

2836 ft 3 mixture 2.3 gal x = 6523 standard ftS/hr mixture at LEL

gal M.S. #10 hr

Calculated ventilation volume:

(lO) 6523 SCFH × x 1.4 (LEL temp. adjustment) = 1522 SCFM of air

Correction for oven temperature:

1522 SCFM x (480°F + 460°F)' = 2699 ft3/min of air at 480°F (70°F + 460°F)

SI Units:

Barely flammable mixture of Mineral Spirits No. 10 [see Tables 7- 5.2.2(a) and (b)]:

21.21 m 3 mixture 8.7 L x ~ = 184.5 standard m3]hr mixture at LEL

L M.S. #10 hr

Calculated ventilation volume:

184.5 m 3

hr

(lo) x x 1.4 (LEL temp. adjustment = 43.1 standard m3/min of air hr

Correction for oven temperature:

43.1 standard m 3 (249°C + 273°C) X

min (21°C + 273°C) = 76.21 m3/min of air at 249°C

SUBSTANTIATION: Corrections are needed to the appendix examples to be consistent with the changes made to Tables 7- 5.2.2(a) and (b). Refer to Comittee Comment 86-31 (Log #CC7). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. N U M B E R OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE T O VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


298

N F P A 8 6 ~ A 9 9 R O C

(Log #CCA) 86- 51 - (Section A-7-7.3): Accept SUBMITFERI Technica l Commi t t ee on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-68 RECOMMENDATION: Add a new first pa rag raph to Section #_-7- 7.3 to read as follows.

It can be shown for a given process line tha t the 25 percen t LEL will no t be exceeded in certain zones. This requires detai led knowledge, mode l i ng and test ing o f the process.

Retain the cu r r en t material of this sect ion as a second pmagraph . S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : This provides addit ional gu idance for the except ion to Section 7-7.3. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMFITEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CC10) 86- 52 - (A-7-7.8): Accept SUBMITTERI Technica l Commi t t ee on Ovens and Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-68 RECOMMENDATION: Change the Section n u m b e r of Section A- 7-7.8 of the proposal r e c o m m e n d a t i o n to A-7-7.9.

[The text of this secdon is to r emain unchanged . ] S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : T h e change is to correct the section n u m b e r made in e r ror in the proposal. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #37) 86- 53 - (Adl-2.1 (New)): Accept in Principle in Part SUBMITTER: Richard E. T h o n n i n g s , Amer i can Insurance Services Group , Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86-52 RECOMMENDATION: Add new append ix material:

A-11-2.1. T h e choice and a r r a n g e m e n t of sor inkler nro tec t ion needs to be d e t e r m i n e d individually for each oven and furnace because o f variations in eou inmen t , ooera t ing condit ions, and combust ib le loading. Use of-a c o m n e t e n t fire protec t ion en~,ineer. exper ienced in protect ion o f ovens ~md furnaces is r e c o m m e n d e d for the design of au tomat ic svr inkler orotection.

W h e n des ign ing or evaluatin~ sodnl~ler orotect ion for ovens and furnaces , the fol/owin~ su~ttestions shou ld be considered:

(a) Wet sorinkler systems are orefer red over dry svstems due to thei r ouicker resnonse .

(b) The orefer red a r r a n g e m e n t for o ioing is outside of the oven because water filled n io ing exoosed to hea t within an oven or f~rB~ce cab incur deppsi t ion and bu i ldun of minera ls within thg

(~) If the oven or fu rnace could be exnosed to freezin~ t empera tu res d ry-pendant heads are ,an alternative to wet n ine ~ysterI~. Ano the r opt iqn is t9 us¢ a dry pipe syster~,

(d) Snrinklers shou ld be installed in the o e n d a n t nosit ion when n io ine is located outs ide the oven or furnace.

(¢) The ;~prinkler t emnera tu re rat ing should be a,t leas~ 50°F (28°(;) g~reater t han the h igh temt)erature limit set t ing o f the oven or applicable zone. S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : I have revised my original proposal to b roaden its wording in order to address the commit tee ' s concern that the original proposal was worded too narrowly. Th e Commi t t ee shou ld r e m e m b e r tha t this is append ix material a n d is i n t ended for informat ional purposes ra ther than strict des ign criteria. The material is i n t ended for guidance. The user is n o t requ i red to follow append ix material. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle in Part.

1. The commi t tee accepts i n p r i n c i p l e the first sentence . Refer to C o m m e n t 86-39 (Log #27).

2. The commi t tee rejects the r emain ing material. COMMITTEE STATEMENT:

1. The Commi t tee Action in C o m m e n t 86-39 (Log #27) meets the in tent of the submit ter .

2. The rejected material is a mat ter of individual design or shou ld be considered u n d e r the scope of NFPA 13, S tandard for the Installation o f Sprinkler Systems. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


299

PART II

(Log #16) 86C- 1 - (Entire Documen t ) : Reject SUBMITTER: J a m e s Neill, CM Furnaces Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: N / A R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : CM Furnaces have been a h igh t empera tu re fu rnace manufac tu re r for over 52 years. We have carefully s tudied 86C a n d f ind tha t is has no t addressed all t he issties of a high t empera tu re pushe r furnace. In reading the text it appears to us tha t this was writ ten m o r e a r o u n d lower t empera tu re furnaces with metall ic l iners tha t open c h a m b e r or porous c h a m b e r h igh t empera tu re furnaces. High t empera tu re being def ined as 1200°C or above. SUBSTANTIATION: We feel the re is a safer way to start the furnace and in addi t ion to not risking the life or integrity of the furnace. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: T he submit ter ' s c o m m e n t does no t comply with Section 4-4.5(c) of the Regulat ions Governing Commi t tee Projects in tha t no p roposed text has been provided. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TOVOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE.: 26 N O T RETURNED: 1 Dadas

86C ~ A 9 9 ROC It is my opin ion that NFPA 70 (National Electric Code) Articles

500, 501,502, 50~,, 504, 505 a n d 510 are specifically applicable to the Ovens a n d Furnaces Codes (NFPA 86, 86C, 86D) an d as such should be re fe renced a n d inc luded in the enforceable language of the code as my original proposal stated. Put t ing it into the append ix was the nex t best act ion s ince the commit tee was not in majori ty a g r e e m e n t to add the requ i rement .

Since furnaces tha t utilize f l ammable gases, whe the r for the hea t ing system or for the special a tmosphere , m u s t have f lammable gas p ip ing controls in the form of valves, regulators, ins t ruments , etc.; a n d since the re is usually an electrical control enclosure within close proximity of these valve trains; a n d the electrical control enclosure is usually connec ted to the field devices with conduit ; t h en the possibility for f l ammable gases to en ter the electrical enclosure a n d mix with air exists. Once an ignitable or expl.osive mixture is inside the electrical panel and a source of ignit ion such as a sparking contact exists, t h en a fire or explosion is likely to occur. Loss da ta has been shown to exist for this type of acc ident and in fact NFPA 70 Article 500's existence is due to this tY~t e of loss due to f lammable gases a n d dusts.

is c o m m o n for o ther NFPA codes to specifically address the bazardous classification of an area with f l ammable gases and dusts with enforceable language. I believe the Ovens and Furnaces Codes shou ld do the same.

(Log #CC10) 86C- 2 - (1-4.3.1, A-1-4.3.1(new) ): Accept SUBMITTER: Technica l Commi t t ee on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C-3 RECOMMENDATION: Add an asterisk to Section 1-4.3.1.

Add a new Section A-1-4.3.1 to the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of Proposal 86G-36 to read as follows.

A-1-4.3.1 T h e proximity o f electrical e q u i p m e n t a n d f l ammable gas or l iquid in an electrical enc losure or panel is a known risk and would be cons idered a classified area. Article 500 of the National Electrical Code shou ld be consul ted.

Condu i t connec t ing devices hand l i ng f lammable material m igh t carry this material to an electrical enclosure if the device fails, creat ing a classified area in that enclosure. Sealing of such condui ts shou ld be cons idered . S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Electrical e n c l o s u ~ s such as control panels can collect f l ammable gases or liquids via gas / l i qu id p ip ing or wire condui ts coming f rom devices that are par t o f a f l ammable gas / l iqu id p ip ing system due to leaks, ruptures , etc. These electrical enclosures typically contain devices that are sources of ignit ion via spark ing contacts in relays, contactors, switches, etc. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITFEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: MATTIOLA: This is my original proposal to create a commi t t ee

c o m m e n t for Section 1-4.3. Add the following Section 1-4.:3 Electrical Electrical enclosures which contain' bo th electrical wiring and

devices a n d an in ternal source of f l ammable gas or liquid via process p ip ing or wire condui ts shall con fo rm to the r equ i r emen t s of NFPA 70 Article 500 Hazardous (Classified) Locations.

Substantiation: Electrical enclosures such as control panels can collect

f l ammable gases or l iquids via gas / l iqu id p ip ing or wire condui t s coming f rom devices tha t are par t of a f l ammable gas / l iqu id p ip ing system d u e to leaks, ruptures , etc. These electrical enclosures typically contain devices tha t are sources of ignit ion via sparking contacts in relays, contractors, switches, etc. f f t h e it ~gneition source exists, a n d the fuel exists t hen inside an enclosure

n you will bave an explosion of fire tha t could cause pe r sonne l a n d e q u i p m e n t damage . NFPA 70 Article 500 specifically addresses these s i tuat ions t o p r e v e n t explosions in control panels by classifying the area a r o u n d t h e p a n e l a s Class 1, Division 2 and thus requi r ing a p u r g e d enc losure via NFPA 496 or c o m p o n e n t s listed for the classification or intrinsically safe systems or non incend ive circuits.

T h e substant ia t ions given for chang ing Section 1-4.3 a n d notes 1 a n d 2 in Proposals 86-2, 86C-3, a n d 86D-2 do no t address ti~e possibility o f electrical enc losures exploding due to local igni t ion sources inside the enc losure c o m b i n e d with f l ammable gases / l iquids that may enter . T he append i x note for 1-4.3.3 can be mis leading in this regard as well, s ince NFPA 497A and 497B do address these si tuations.

I believe loss da ta is available for these type of explosion hazards a n d it suppor t s the NFPA 70 Article 500 existence.

(Log #15) 86C- 3 - (1-4.3.1): Reject SUBMITTEI~ Rober t Daley, V a c u u m Furnace Systems Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C-3 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

All wrong shall be in accordance with . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gogcg~, N~-~A 79, Electrical S tandard for Industrial Machinery, and as descr ibed hereafter . Suoolv conduc to r wirin~ to the

' fu rnace shall be in accordance with NFPA 70. National Electric Code. Article 670, Wirin~ between fu rnaces of an indusLrial mannfac tu r in~ system shall be in ~ccordance v~t~ N~~A 70, National Elec~ic Code. S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : NFPA 70 a n d NFPA 79 shou ld n o t bo th apply to the wiring o f a fu rnace since there are rules in certain sections of each s t andard tha t conflict with the rules of the o ther s tandard. The NFPA 79 s tandard defines itseff as applying to the wiring o f industr ial mach ine ry and e q u i p m e n t c o m m e n c i n g at the place o f connec t ion o f the supply to the e ~ u i p m e n t (i.e. the wiring within the mach ine) . NFPA 79 fur ther indicates tha t wiring of the supply conduc tors to the machine , a n d wiring be tween mach ines is covered by NFPA 70. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: By the scope of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code®, it appl ies to m a n y parts of the equ ipmen t . NFPA 79, Electrical S tandard for Industr ial Machinery, supp l emen t s NFPA 70. NFPA 70 is used where NFPA 79 does not address an issue. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE O N COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CG1) 86C- 4 - (Chapter 2, Valve, Safety Shutoff) : Accept SUBMITTER: Technica l Commi t t ee on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO': 86C-~

I RECOMMENDATION: In Cha,~pter 2, revise the defini t ion of Valve, Safety Shutof f to inc lude ' oxygen" a n d read as follows:

"... s hu t off the fuel, a tmosphe re gas, or oxygen in the event ..." SUBSTANTIATION: The change is made to darffy that the safety shu to f f valve also applies to oxygen systems covered in Section 5-14. This act ion is also n e e d e d as a resul t of commi t tee action on C o m m e n t s 86C-22 (Log #8) a n d C o m m e n t 86C-19 (Log #9). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept .

-NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #1 ) 86C- 5 - (2-1 Explosion-Resistant (New)): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Peter B. Matthews, Har t ford S team Boiler COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C-21

I RECOMMENDATION: Provide the following defini t ion for "explosion-resistant":

3OO

8 6 C - - A 9 9 R O C I The ability of a radiant tube, or rad ian t tube hea t recovery system

to withstand the over-pressure developed by the combus t ion of a s to ichiometr ic ratio o f approximate ly ten vo lumes of combus t ion air to one vo lume of natural gas (or the s to ichiometr ic rat io of odler gaseous fuel). The rad iant tube, or the rad iant tube hea t recovery system may exper ience bu lg ing a n d distort ion, bu t shou ld no t fail catastrophically. SUBSTANTIATION: 3"he word "explosion resistant" is no t def ined in the text. Wi thou t d e f n i d o n , it is impossible to classify a rad ian t tube or the system as "explosion-resistant". This def ini t ion should clarify the in tent of the Commi t t ee as to what criteria satisfy the classification of "explosion-resistance", as used in dais s tandard. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

I Add the words "(Radiaxkt Tube )" after the words "explosion- resistant" in the dtie of ~;he definit ion. In Chapter 2 of the s tandard , add the defini t ion as conta ined in the c o m m e n t r e c o m m e n d a t i o n a long with the revised rifle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Clarification is n e e d e d since the defini t ion only applies to rad ian t tubes. T he added defini t ion is no t new ma te r i a r s ince it was the subject of a proposal and was addresses in the proposal material . NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CC7) 86C- 6 - (Sections 3-1.1.4, A-3-1.1.4): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commi t t ee on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86G-3 RECOMMENDATION: Add an asterisk to Section 3.1.1.4.

tn Append ix A of the s tandard add a new Section A-3.1.1.4 to read as follows:

"A-3-1.1.4 For addit ional informat ion, refer to NFPA 31, S tandard for the Installation of Oil B u rn i ng Equipment ; NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code; and NFPA 91, S tandard for Exhaust Systems for Air Conveying of Vapors, Gases, Mists, a n d Noncombus t ib l e Part iculate Solids." S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : This change is m a d e to provide consistency between NFPA 86, NFPA 86C a n d NFPA 86D. C o m m e n t 86-5 (Log #30b) on Proposal 86-10 (Log #32) for NFPA 86 was accepted in principle to provide the above change. This material is c o m m o n to all th ree s tandards. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 26 N O T RETURNED: l Dadas

(Log #8) 86C- 7 - (3.3.4): Reject SUBMITTER: J a m e s J . Hous ton , Industrial Heat ing E qu ipmen t Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C-8 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"Explosion relief vent(s) shall be located az c!e~c ."~ po:~i~!c te e.~.c'.~ kno;-~= ~.~urce of i g : ~ c n to relieve pressure as rapidly as

~ ossible to min imize damage." UBSTANTIATION: T he cur ren t wording forces designers to

locate relief panels at the hea te r box. R o o f ven t panels and doors with relief latches and safety chains represen t reasonable, proven, a n d safe approaches for relieving pressure fronts. Vent panels on the heater box have the po t en t i a l t o leak a n d raise d~e o v e n / f u r n a c e pressure. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: T he location for explosion-relief is a critical concern a n d needs to be close to the ignit ion source.

The heater box is par t of the oven system and needs to have explosion-rel ief provided. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


I "3.8.4* Explosion-rel ief vent(s) shall be located as close as practicable to each known source of ignit ion to min imize damage." SUBSvI'ANTIATION: The revised text clarifies the in ten t o f the r equ i rement . COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept . NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITI'EE ACTION:


(Log #CC6) 86C- 9 - (Sections 5-4 a n d A-3.4): Accept SUBMITTER= Technica l Commi t t ee on Ovens and Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C~3 RECOMMENDATION: Add an asterisk to Section 3-4.

In Append ix A of the s tandard add a new Section A-3-4 to read as follows:

"A-3-4 For addit ional informat ion, refer to NFPA 31, S tandard for the Installation of Oil Bu rn ing Equipment ; NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code; a n d NFPA 91, S tandard for Exhaus t Systems for Air Conveying of Vapors, Gases, Mists, a n d Noncombus t ib l e Particulate Solids." SUBSTANTIATION: This change is made to provide consistency between NFPA 86, NFPA 86C a n d NFPA 86D. C o m m e n t 86-10 (Log 30a) on Proposal 86-10 (Log #32) for NFPA 86 was accepted in principle to provide the above change. This material is c o m m o n to all th ree s tandards. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CC4) 86C- 10 - (Sections 4-2.2 and A-4-2.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technica l Commi t t ee on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C,3

I RECOMMENDATION: Add an asterisk to Section 4-2.2. In Append ix A of the s tandard add a new Section A-4-2.2 to read

as follows: "A-4-2.2 For addi t ional informat ion, refer to NFPA 54, National

Fuel Gas Code." SUBSTANTIATION: This change is m a d e to provide consistency between NFPA 86, NFPA 8tic a n d NFPA 86D. C o m m e n t 86-11 (Log #30) on Proposal 86-10 (Log #32) for NFPA 86 was accepted in principle to provide the above change. This material is c o m m o n to all th ree s tandards. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept . NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CC5) 86C- 11 - (Sections 4-3.2 and A-4-3.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technica l Commi t t ee on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C-3 RECOMMENDATION: Add an asterisk to Section 4-3.2.

In Appendix A of the s tandard add a new Section A-4-8.2 to read as follows:

"A-4-3.2 For addit ional informat ion, refer to NFPA 31, S tandard for tile Installation of Oil Burn ing Equipment ." SUBSTANTIATION: This change is made to provide consistency between NFPA 86, NFPA 86C a n d NFPA 86D. C o m m e n t 86-12 ( Log #31) on Proposal 86-15 (Log #38) for NFPA 86 was accepted in principle to provide the above change. This material is c o m m o n to all th ree s tandards. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CC2) 86C- 8 - (Section 3-3.4 ): Accept SUBMITTER: Technica l Commi t t ee on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C-8 RECOMMENDATION: Revise Section 3-3.4 of the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of Proposal 86C-8 to read as follows:

(Log #CCt) 86C- 12 - (Section 4-7.3.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technica l Commi t t ee on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C-3

I RECOMMENDATION: Revise Section 4-7.3.2 in the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of Proposal 86C-3 to read as follows:

"4-7.3.2 ff the oven a tmosphe re is recirculated over the hea t exchange r coils, a noncombus t ib l e fi l tration system shall be used if

301

8 6 C ~ A 9 9 R O C combustible particulates can deposit 'on the heat exchanger surface. The filtration system and heat exchanger shall be cleaned on a regular schedule." SUBSTANTIATION: his change is made to provide consistency between NFPA 86, NFPA 86C and NFPA 86D. Comment 86-13 (Log #21) on Proposal 8&2 (Log #39) for NFPA 86 was accepted in principle to provide the above change. This material is common to all three standards. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #4) 86C- 13 - (5-3.3.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTERz James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C-3 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"A programmable controller used for safety service shall be

~ rovided with a watchdog timer..." UBSTANTIATION: The requirement for a watchdog timer

should only apply to PLCs listed and applied for combustion safeguard service. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

I Change the title of Section 5-3 in the recommendation of Proposal 86(3-3 (Log #21) to read as follows:

"5-3 Programmable Controllers For Safety Service" COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The revised text meets the intent of the submitter. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #14) 86C- 14- (5-4.1.5(b)2): Accept SUBMITTER: James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C-3 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"...is equipped with gas safety shutoff valves..." SUBSTANTIATION: This section concerns "any fuel fired system". COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 26 NoT RETURNED: 1 Dadas

(Log #2) 86C- 15 - (5-4.2 and Exception): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: J. William Sheppard, General Motors Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86G-3 RECOMMENDATION: Revert to the wording contained in 86 (1995 edition), 86C (1995 edition), 86D (1995 edition) paragraphs 5-4.2 and exception. SUBSTANTIATION: Current heater box designs sometimes require longer distances between the gas train and the heater box due to space constraints and maximizing use of floor space, particularly for new oven installations. Due to the distance from the SSOV to the burner, it may take more than 15 seconds just to reacb the burner. This causes even the present wording of"15 seconds" to be stretched into exceptions. Further, the proposed redtiction of the time element will lead manufacturers to design for this new limitation, which will mandate to the user in many instances the need for expensive "add-ons" to standard equipment design with no apparent increase in burner safety o ~ r present installation practices. 15 seconds has proven to be a reasonably prudent practice. The committee offers no substantial justification in loss history to effect this change. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

I In the Committee Action text of Proposal 86(2-3 (Log #CP12) revise Section 5-4.2.1 and 5-4.2.2 including the exception to replace the text "10 seconds" with the text "15 seconds" COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The revised text meets the intent of the submitter. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #5) 86C- 16 - (5-4.2.B Exception (New)): Reject SUBMITTER: JamesJ. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86G-3 RECOMMENDATION: Add the following exception to 5-4.2.3:

"Exception: Trial for ignition of main oil burner shall be permitted to exceed 15 seconds provided that a written request for an extension is approved by the Authority Having Jurisdiction." SUBSTANTIATION: We believe that reliable main burner ignition with an extended time is preferable to repeated failed attempts. This exception will allow an extension to be approved by the Authority Having Jurisdiction if necessary. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: ff the burner doesn't light in 15 seconds it is likely that there is a problem with the burner system. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CC9p 86C- 17- (Section 5-7.1.8): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Ovens and Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86G-3 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"Local visual position indication shall be provided f~-at each safety shutoff valve..."

[The remaining text of theproposal recommendation for Section 5-7.1.8 is retained unchanged.] SUBSTANTIATION: This change is made to provide consistency between NFPA 86, NFPA 86G and NFPA 86D. Comment 86-23 (Log #23) on Proposal 86-2 (Log #39) for NFPA 86 was accepted to provide the above change. This material is common to all three standards. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #6) 86C- 18- (5-7.1.2): Reject SUBMITTER: James j. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C-3 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"Exception: For fiaet-g~ systems..." (I) "(a) For filel gas systems it is demonstrated..." (2) "(b) For filel gas systems, when the individuaL.."

SUBSTANTIATION: None. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The submitter did not provide a substantiation. In addition it was the committee's intent to have file exception apply only to fuel gas fired systems. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #9) 86C- 19 - (5-7.1.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTEP~ James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C-3 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"Safety Shutoffvalves shall be self closing and bv their constrncti0n ~ shall not be readily..." SUBSTANTIATION: The intent of the prose is to refer to the safety shutoff valve design, not the system construction. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Delete the last sentence of Section 5-7.1.2 in tile committee action text of Proposal 86C-3 (Log #21). COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee Action meets the intent of the submitter. The last sentence is redundant to the definition of safety shutoff valve and to the requirements covered in Sections 5-2.1, 5-2.8 and 5-2.9 in recommended text of tile

ER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


302

8 6 C ~ A 9 9 R O C (Log #13)

86C- 20 - (5-7.2.1): Accept SUBMITTER; James j. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86G-3

I RECOMMENDATION: Delete text to read as follows: "...pilot fuel gas burner system shall be ~ equipped..."

SUBSTANTIATION: The existing section is ambiguous as written. Each of the pilot and main gas systems shall have two safety shutoff valves. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #12) 86C- 21 - (5-7.3.1(b)): Reject SUBMITTER: James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C-3 RECOMMENDATION: Delete paragraph (b) entirely. SUBSTANTIATION: The circumstances described will not occur ,as described. For clarity this section should be removed entirely. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: There are systems such as recirculating for heavy fuel oil, or multiple furnaces supplied by a single pump. NUMBER OF COMMrrrEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #8) 86C- 22- (5-14.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C-3 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"Sa£ety Shutoff valves sha/l be self closing and by their construction ~ shall not be readily..." SUBSTANTIATION: The intent of dae prose is to refer to the safety shutoff valve design, not fl~e system construction. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

] Delete the last sentence of Section 5-14.1 in the recommendation ] of Proposal 86C-3 (Log #21).

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Refer the Committee Statement for Comment 86-20 (Log #9). NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTF, E ACTION:


(Log #11) 86C- 23- (A-2-1): Accept SUBMITTER: James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C-36 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

" ~ ~ having jurisdiction..." SUBSTANTIATION: Misspelling in the second paragraph. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CC3) 86C- 24- (A-3-3.4): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Ovens and Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C-36 RECOMMENDATION: Add a new Section A-3-3.4 to read as follows.


I The heater box is part of the oven system and needs to have explosion-relief provided. Personnel considerations and proximity to other obstructions may impact the location selected for these vents." SUBSTANTIATION: The additional material provides guidance for location of explosion-relief vents. Also refer to Committee Comment 86C~ (Log #CC2). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 97 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #10) 86C- 25 - (A-4-2.4.4): Accept in Principle SUBMITrER: James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C-36 RECOMMENDATION: Add to drawing dae following note:


~ Gas in

Te..¢

Dr~ |.qg (same dla. as main gas pipe)

II --c p

A+3" ram.

Gas pressure rcgula[or

@ Fuel filter/ strairlcr

SUBSTANTIATION: dimension "A" must be defined. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Revise Figure A-4-2.4.4 shown with Proposal 86C-37 (Log #CP3) to change d~e 3 inch dimension as shown in die marked up figure.

Figure A-4-2.4.4 The drawing is not clear as it is drawn. Tile

Gas in

~ I ~ M a n u a l shutoff valve

Pressure Strainer regulator

.T --¢-3 i. Drip leg , ~ " ~ T ~ ~[-(mln) (same diameter ~ A as main gas pipe) - -uap

Figure A-4.2.4.4 COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Tile revision meets the intent of the submitter. The correct Proposal Number is 86C-37 (Log #CP3) not 86C-36 (Log #21a). NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


303

8 6 C ~ A99 ROC (Log #CC11)

86C- 26 - (A-4-2.7.4): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commit tee on Ovens and Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86(3-38 RECOMMENDATION: Replace Section A-4-2.7.4 in the recommenda t ion of Proposal 86C-38 (Log #CP20) witil text to read as follows: Testing of radiant tubes should include subjecting them to thermal cycling typical for the furnace application ,and then verifying their ability to withstand overpressure developed by a fuel-air explosion. rS)verpressure testing can be done in one of two ways:

1. Statically pressurize die tube until it fails. Compare fills pressure to the maximum pressure (from literature) that can be developed in a conta ined deflagration of an opt imum fuel-air mixture.

2. After partially blocking tile open end of die tube to simulate a heat exchanger, fill the tube widl a well-mixed stoichiomelric fuel- air mixture (ten volumes of air to one volume of fuel for natural gas). Ignite the mixture at die closed end of die tube. Measure the pressure developed. Compare tilis pressure to die maximum pressure (from literature) daat can be developed in a contained det]agration of an opt imum fuel-air mixture. SUBSTANTIATION: The revised text more technically correct and provides more guidance and test options. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #17) 86C- 27 - (A-5-7.2.~(a)): Hold SUBMITTER: Christopher B. Fink, Honeywell Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: N / A RECOMMENDATION: Revise Figure A-5-7.2.3(a) as shown below: SUBSTANTIATION: Upda ted scbematic. COMMITTEE ACTION: Hold. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The C o m m e n t introduces new material per Section 4-4.6.2.2(a) in NFPA Regulations Governing Commit tee Projects. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


~ |

P~T ~TI/F

PILOT ~ X ~ ~

PlLOY ~ u ~ v~.v[

~ ~T~r

~L'TY ,~V'[TY ~}lJTOff ~T~F

Y~V[ ~ T~ v~V[ HO, I tESt OF I~ ~br IT TiP ~rsT

Y~ Y1 Y1

HI~4

m I rl,.Ov I Enl'n~ Roy I I $VIT~I IVII~

Figure A-5-7.2.3(a) Example o f a gas piping diagram for leak test.

3 0 4

8 6 C ~ A 9 9 R O C

(Log #18) 86C- 28 - (A-5-7.2.3(b)): Hold SUBMITTER: Christopher B. Fink, Honeywell Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C-41 RECOMMENDATION: Revise Figure A-5-7.2.3(b) as shown:

FU~iE ~L t lV Sr.a~T I i~ I

~ POVER rUSE __a__ ~ _ _

(--PL-C I N F U T

¥DIP

PLII~ G{ MAIN GAS: AI F'LQV VCS - - - . / - - ' ~ 1 G ( ) O TM

START"

FLAME RQD OR ~G~NNER ~-- O I I - -

COMB, AIR VLITI~IQ $1"ARTER

PURGE TIME (X> MINUTES

I G N I T I O N XFORMER

H A I N ~ QV I

.%~"g-~ . . . . I L_

ON

Figure A-5-7.2.3(b) Partial system schematic showing the application of a pro m'ammable controller to monitor safety interlocks and provide burner control

functions in series with hard-wired safety interlocks.

SUBSTANTIATION: Updated schematic. COMMITTEE ACTION: Hold. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Comment introduces new material which would propose someflaing which could not be properly be handled within the time for processing the report per Section 4-4.6.2.2!c) in NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects. NI-~IBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


305

8 6 C ~ A 9 9 R O C (Log #19)

86C- 29 - (Figure A-5-9.2.2(a)): Hold SUBMITTER: Christopher B. Fink, Honeywell Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C-43 RECOMMENDATION: Revise Figure A-5-9.2.2(a) ,as shown:

P.~Nt~L ~J ~i~TOFF

VALVE

GAS IN

ru~. Tt~ - - ~ FILTCR \ ~TR~I~R

~IP LEO ---,,I r ~AHE tI|A ", AS HA[N

PILOT PILOT SAFETY SAt£TY SHUTOFF SHUTOFF

PILOT VALVE I~1 VALVE NO2 PRE$$L~E PROOf' OF PROOF DF REfi~ATOR LM_O~E CLO~J~

.~'ETY GAS LOV GAS SHUTOFF

PRESSURE ' PRESEURE VALVE Nt'l.l REGULATOR S~H PROl,i gF ~ CLC~

NM4UAL SHUTOFF VALVE

LE'AK TEST

VALVE SAFETY SHUTDFF

VALVE ~2 PROOF OF CLDSURE

LEAK TEST VALVE

14ANU~L SHUTOFT VN.VE

LEAK TEST

VALVE

" • PILI]] RA~

"~ FLAEo]]ETECTOR FLAHE-gETECIOK "k~^ ELEEHT ELEHEHT

CONTINUOU~ LINE ~JRNER$

Figure A-5-9.2.2(a) Example of an approved combustion safeguard supervising a pilot for a continuous line burner during light- off and the main flame alone during ruing.

SUBSTANTIATION: Updated schematic. COMMITTEE ACTION: Hold. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Comment introduces new material per Section 4-4.6.2.2(a) in NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects. The proposal referenced is incorrect. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 26 NOT RETURNED: l Dadas

(Log #7) 86C- 30 - (A-5-9.2.2(a) and (b)): Accept SUBMITTER: James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86C-36 RECOMMENDATION: Insert a second safety shutoff valve in the pilot line of the example drawing as shown:


Pilot pressure No. 1 No. 2 reg ulat°rt~::D::: )

Gas inlet

Pilot shutoff valve Manual shutoff

Leak test valve No. 1 valve Leak test valve No, 2

ilot flame-sensing element Main flame-sensing element

Low gas ~ I Pilot / / I pressure bumer'~

Gas pressure ~ valve No. 1 valve No. 2 swr~ch['~,~ regulat°r 6 ~~r~/ I~

Main s~ut%ff I v " ~ " ~ k k M~ualshutoff valve t l ?1 valve

Leak test valve No. 1 ~Lm LLJ Leak test valve No. 2 Continuous line burners

Figure A-5-9.2.2(a)

306

8 6 C - - A 9 9 R O C


Pilot pressure No. I No. 2 regulato~

.9+ Pilot sh"uto"ffvalve ~ - - - - ~t, Ma"-nu~ X 4~m'l ~I shutoff N

Leak test valve No. 1,1, ~L= valve Leak test valve No. 2

- 4 . Low gas • pressure High gas

G a s p r e s s u r : W ~ vSa~veetYNSh~ °fl vSa~eetyNshu~ pff P : ~ c S l ~ ~Pi lo tbumer regulat°r L_.C[~_~ ) ' ~ [ ] [ ] ' ~ / ' ~ I t Pilot flame-sensing element

Gas inlet ~ ~ ~ I ~ ,,._T~ "-~-L~ - Main sVh'~off . . . . ~ . ~ - - - - ~.~ M%nu~'al shutoff ~ ~ ~

alve ~I 4#'I valve ..... I I I = = Ramo-propag~tlon path I l Leak test valve No. 1 , I , ,1, Leak test valve No. 2

, ,_) ~r Radiant-cup burners

Main flame-sen~ing element Figure A-5-9.2.2(b)

SUBSTANTIATION: The drawing needs to be a m e n d e d to include two pilot safety shutoff valves to be consistant widl Section 5-7.Z1. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #20) 86C- 31 - (Figure A-5-9.2.2(b) ): Hold SUBMITrER: Chris topher B. Fink, Honeywell Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86G-45 RECOMMENDATION: Revise Figure A-5-9.2.2(b) as shown:

PILOT PILOT SAFETY SAFETY

PILOT SHUTOFf ~4UIOFF PR[$SUE VALVE NOt VALVE NO2 REGULATOR PRQOr ~ PROOF

CLOSURE CLOSURE

GAS IN

~ HANUAL SHUTOFF GA~ VALVE PRESSURE

]REGULATOR FUEL

TEE'--~ FILTER OR'

I, mAi _ m LcG-- IP "V "" time DIA N AS rain | GAS PIE) I CAP

SAFETY LOV GAS SHUTOFF PRESSURC VALVE ~.1

S~H PROOkiA~ CLOSURE

¥,

HA~AL S~TOFF V~VE

LEAK TE+:T VALVE

SAFETY PILOT SHUTOFF HIGH GAS FLA~-KTECII~R

v~vE ~ . ~ PRESSL~E . , . ~ , . N / PROOF OF MANUAL

CLOSURE ~TI~F ~ PILOT'~ ~ T

TEST TEST VALVE I l V~/E NQ,t

MA~ v ;LAP4E-ETE~ R.4~.~NT -~P ~t)~R

~LO~(NT

Figure A-5-9.2.2(b) Example of an approved combustion safeguard supervising a group of radiant-cup burners having reliable f lame-propagation characteristics f rom one to the other means fo flame-progration devices.

307

86C - - A99 R 0 C SUBSTANTIATION: Updated schematic. COMMITTEE ACTION: Hold. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Comment introduces new material per Section 4-4.6.2.2(a) in NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects. The proposal referenced is incorrect. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #21) 86C- 32- (Figure A-13): Accept SUBMITTEI~ George D. Homa, Super Systems Inc, COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: N/A

I RECOMMENDATION: On right side vertical axis (02 concentration percent) change lowest cardinal point from 0.1 to 0.01 or .01. SUBSTANTIATION: A correctly positioned ".1" cardinal point exists below the 'T ' cardinal point and above the proposed ".01" cardinal point. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The change is editorial. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


308

8 6 D i A 9 9 R O C

PART IH

(Log #CC10) 86D- 1 - (1-4.3.1 and A-1-4.3.1 (New)): Accept SUBMITTER: Technica l C ommi t t e e on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-2 RECOMMENDATION: Add an asterisk to Section 1-4.3.1.

Add a new Section A-1-4.3.1 to the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of Proposal 86D-29 to read as follows.

A-1-4.3.1 T h e proximity of electrical e q u i p m e n t a n d f lammable gas or l iquid in an electrical enclosure or panel is a known risk a n d would be cons idered a classified area. Article 500 of the National Electrical Code shou ld be consul ted.

Condu i t connec t ing de~ices hand l i ng f lammable material migh t carry this material to an electrical enclosure if the device fails, creat ing a classified area tn that enclosure. Sealing of such condui ts shou ld be cons idered . S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Electrical enclosures such as control panels can collect f l ammable gases or liquids via gas / l iqu id p ip ing or wire condui ts coming f rom devices tha t are part of a f l ammable gas / l iqu id p ip ing system due to leaks, ruptures , etc. These electrical enclosures typically contain devices tha t are sources of igni t ion via sparking contacts in relays, contactors, switches, etc. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NEGATIVE: 1 ~ N O T RETURNED: 1 Dadas

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: MATTIOLA: This is my original proposal to create a commi t tee

c o m m e n t for Section 1-43. Add die following Section 1-4.3 Electrical Electrical enclosures which conta in bo th electrical wiring and

devices and an in ternal source of f l ammable gas or l iquid via - process p ip ing or wire condui t s shall con fo rm to the r equ i r emen t s of NFPA 70 Article 500 Hazardous (Classified) Locations.

Substantiat ion: Electrical enclosures such as control panels can collect

flammable, gases .dr iiquuids via gas / l i qu id ppi ing or wire condui ts coming f rom dexaces tha t are par t of a f l ammable gas / l iqu id p ip ing system due to leaks, ruptures , etc. These electrical enclosures typically cont:fin devices tha t are sources o f ignit ion via spark ing contacts in relays, contractors, switches, etc. f f t h e ignition source exists, a nd the fuel exists t hen inside an enclosure t hen you will have an explosion of fire tha t could cause pe r sonne l a n d e q u i p m e n t damage . NFPA 70 Article 500 specifically addresses these si tuations t o p r e v e n t explosions in control panels by classifying the area a r o u n d t h e p a n e l a s Class I, Division 2 and thus requi r ing a pu rged enclosure via NFPA 496 or componen t s listed for the classification or intrinsically safe systems or non incend ive circuits.

The substant ia t ions given for chang ing Section 1-4.3 and notes 1 and 2 in Proposals 86-2, 8603 , and 86D-2 do no t address the possibility of electrical enclosures exploding due to local ignit ion sources inside the enclosure c o m b i n e d with f l ammable gases / l iquids tha t may enter . T he append i x no te for 1-4.3.3 can be mis leading in this regard as well, s ince NFPA 497A and 497B do address these situations.

[ believe loss da ta is av.filable for these type of explosion hazards and it suppor t s the NFPA 70 Article 500 existence.

It is my opin ion that NFPA 70 (National Electric Code) Articles 500, 501,502, 503, 504, ~505 a n d 510 are specifically applicable to the Ovens and Furnace. Codes (NFPA 86, 86C, 86D) a n d as such shou ld be re fe renced ar~,d inc luded in the enforceable language of the code as my original proposal stated. Put t ing it into the append ix was the nex t best act ion since the commit tee was no t in majority a g r e e m e n t to add the requi rement .

Since furnaces that utilize f lammable gases, wilether for the hea t ing system or for the special a tmosphere , mus t have f lammable gas p ip ing controls in the fo rm of valves, regulators, ins t ruments , etc.; and since there is usually an electrical control enclosure within close proximity of these valve trains; a n d the electrical control enclosure is usually connec t ed to the field devices with conduit ; then die possibility for f lammable gases to en te r the electrical enclosure and mix with air exists. Once an ignitable or explosive mixture is inside the electrical panel and a source of ignit ion such as a spark ing contact exists, t hen a fire or explosion is likely to occur. Loss da ta has been shown to exist for this type of accident and in fact NFPA 70 Article 500's existence is due to dais type o f loss due to f l ammable gases and dusts.

It is c o m m o n for o the r NFPA codes to specifically address the hazardous classification o f an a rea with f l ammable gases an d dusts with enforceable language. I believe the Ovens a n d Furnaces Codes shou ld do the same.

(Log #15) 86D- 2 - (1-4.3.1): Reject SUBMITTER: Robert Daley, V a c u u m Furnace Systems Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

All wiring shall be in accordance with ~LFPA 79, NztJ~.r.al E!e~r ' c C=,ode¢~, NFPA 79, Electrical S tandard for Industrial Machinery, and as descr ibed hereafter . Sunnlv conduc to r wirin~ to the [urD~¢e shall be in accordance 'wi t1 NFPA 70. National Electric Code. Article 670. Wirin~ between furnaces of an industr ial

v

manufactur inf f system shall be in accordance with NFPA 70. National Electric Code. SUBSTANTIATION: NFPA 70 a n d NFPA 79 shou ld no t bo th apply to the wiring of a fu rnace since the re are rules in certain sections of each s tandard tha t conflict with the rules of the o ther s tandard. T h e NFPA 79 Standard def ines itself as applying to the wiring of industrial mach inery and e q u i p m e n t c o m m e n c i n g at the place of connec t ion of the supply to the e q u i p m e n t (i.e. the wiring within the mach ine) . NFPA 79 fu r the r indicates that wiring o f the supply conductors to the machine , and wiring between mach ines is covered by NFPA 70. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: By the scope of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code®, it applies to m a n y p a r t s o f the equ ipment . NFPA 79, Electrical S t a n d a r d f o r Industrial Machinery, supp l emen t s NFPA 70. NFPA 70 is used where NFPA 79 does not address an issue. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CCI ) 86D- 3 - (Chapter 2, Valve, Safety Shutof f ): Accept SUBMIq[TER: Technica l Commi t t ee on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8613-2 RECOMMENDATION: In Chapter 2, revise the definit ion of Valve, Safety Shutoff to inc lude ' oxygen" a n d read as follows:

"... s hu t off the filel, a tmosphe re gas, or oxygen in the event ..." SUBSTANTIATION: The change is made to clarify that the safety shu tof f valve also applies to oxygen systems covered in Section 5-14. This act ion is also n e e d e d as a result of commi t t ee act ion on C o m m e n t s 86D-21 (Log #8) and C o m m e n t 86D-17 (Log #9). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #1 ) 86D- 4 - (2-1 Explosion-Resistant (New)): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Peter B. Matthews, Har t ford Steam Boiler COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-12 RECOMMENDATION: Provide the following defini t ion for "explosion-resistant":

The ability of a radiant tube, or rad ian t tube hea t recovery system to wi ths tand the over-pressure developed by the combus t ion of a s toichiometr ic ratio of approximate ly ten vo lumes o f combus t ion air to one vo lume of natural gas (or the s toichiometr ic ratio of o ther gaseous fuel) . The radiant tube, or the rad ian t tube hea t recovery system may exper ience bulg ing and distort ion, bu t shou ld no t fail catastrophically. SUBSTANTIATION: The word "explosion resistant" is n o t def ined in the text. Wi thou t defini t ion, it is impossible to classify a rad ian t tube or the system as "explosion-resistant". This defini t ion shou ld clarify the in ten t of the Commi t tee as to what criteria satisfy the classification of "explosion-resistance", as used in this s tandard. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

3 0 9

8 6 D w A 9 9 R O C

Add the words "(Radiant Tube)" after the words "explosion- resistant" in the title of the definit ion. In Chapter 2 of the s tandard , add the defini t ion as conta ined in the c o m m e n t r e c o m m e n d a t i o n a long with the revised title. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Clarification is n e e d e d since the defini t ion only applies to rad ian t tubes. T he added defini t ion is no t new ma te r i a l s ince it was the subject of a proposal and was addresses in the proposal material . NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEaMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CC7) 86D- 5 - (Sections 3-1.1.4, A-3-1.1.4): Accept SUBMITTER: Technica l C o m m i t t e e on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-2 RECOMMENDATION: Add an asterisk to Section 3-1.1.4.

In Append ix A of the s tandard add a new Section A-3-1.1.4 to read as follows:

"A-3-1.1.4 For addi t ional informat ion, refer to NFPA 31, S tandard for the Installation of Oil B u r n i n g Equipment ; NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code; and NFPA 91, S tandard for Exhaust Systems for Air Conveying of Vapors, Gases, Mists, a n d Noncombus t ib l e Part iculate Solids." S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : This change is made to provide consistency between NFPA 86, NFPA 86C a n d NFPA 86D. C o m m e n t 86-5 (Log #30b) on Proposal 86-10 (Log #32) for NFPA 86 was accepted in principle to provide the above change. This material is c o m m o n to all th ree s tandards. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATWE: 26 N O T RETURNED: 1 Dadas

(Log #3) 86D- 6 - (3-3.4): Reject SUBMITTER: James J. Hous ton , Industrial Heat ing Equ ipmen t Ass n. C O M M E N T ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-2 R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Revise text to read as follows:

"Explosion relief vent(s) shall be located em c!c.ae aa pa~ai~!c +,..~ each knawn acurce c f ignit ion to relieve pressure as rapidly as

~ ossible to min imize damage ." U B S T A N T I A T I O N : T he cur ren t wording forces designers to

locate relief panels at the heater box. Roof vent panels and doors with relief latches and safety chains r ep resen t reasonable, proven, and safe approaches for relieving pressure fronts. Vent panels on tim beater box have the potential to leak and raise the o v e n / f u r n a c e pressure. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: T he location for explosion-relief is a critical concern and needs to be close to the ignit ion source.

The heater box is part of the oven system and needs to have explosion-relief provided. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CC2) 86D- 7 - (Section 3-3.4 ): Accept SUBMITTER: Tecbnical Commi t t ee on o v e n s a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8613-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise Section 3-3.4 of the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of Proposal 86D-2 to read as follows:

] "3-3.4 Explosion-relief vent(s) shall be located as close as [ practicable to each known source of ignit ion to minimize ] damage."

SUBSTANTIATION: T he revised text clarifies the in ten t of the requ i rement . COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CCt) 86I)- 8 - (Sections 3-4 and A-3-4): Accept SUBM1TTER: Technical Commi t t ee on o v e n s a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-2 RECOMMENDATION: Add an asterisk to Section 3-4.

In Append ix A of the s tandard add a new Section A-3-4 to read as follows:

"A-$-4 For addit ional informat ion, refer to NFPA 31, S tandard for the Installation of Oil Bu rn ing Equipment ; NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code; a n d NFPA 91, S tandard for Exhaus t Systems for Air Conveying of Vapors, Gases, Mists, and Noncombus t ib l e Particulate Solids." SUBSTANTIATION: This change is m a d e to provide consistency between NFPA 86, NFPA 86C a n d NFPA 86D. C o m m e n t 86-10 (Log #$0a) on Proposal 86-10 (Log#S2) for NFPA 86 was accepted in pr inciple to provide t he above change. This material is c o m m o n to all th ree s tandards. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept . NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CC4) 86D- 9 - (Sections 4-2.2 a n d A 4 2 . 2 ) : Accept SUBMITTEI~- Technical Commi t t ee on o v e n s a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-2 RECOMMENDATION: Add an asterisk to Section 4-2.2.

In Appendix A of the s tandard add a new Section A-4-2.2 to read as follows:

"A-4-2.2 For addit ional informat ion, refer to NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code." SUBSTANTIATION: This change is made to provide consistency between NFPA 86, NFPA 86C and NFPA 86D. C o m m e n t 86-11 (Log #30) on Proposal 86-10 (Log #32) for NFPA 86 was accepted in principle to provide the above cbange. This material is c o m m o n to all th ree s tandards. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CC5) 86D- 10 - (Sections 4-3.2 and A-4-3.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technica l Commi t tee on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-2 RECOMMENDATION: Add an asterisk to Section 4-3.2. In Append ix A of the s tandard add a new Section A-4-3.2 to read as follows:

'%-4-3.2 For addi t ional informat ion, refer to NFPA 31, S tandard for the Installation of Oil Bu rn ing Equipment ." SUBSTANTIATION: This change is m a d e to provide consistency between NFPA 86, NFPA 86C a n d NFPA 86D. C o m m e n t 86-12 (Log #31) on Proposal 86-15 (Log #33) for NFPA 86 was accepted in principle to provide the above change. This material is c o m m o n to all tiaree s tandards. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept . NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 26 N O T RETURNED: t Dadas

(Log #CC8) 86D- 11 - (Section 4-7.3.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technica l Commi t t ee on Ovens a n d Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise Section 4-7.3.2 in the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of Proposal 86D-2 (Log #39) to read as follows:

"4-7.3.2 ff the oven a tmosphe re is recirculated over the beat exchange r coils, a noncombus t ib l e fi l tration system shall be used if combust ib le part iculates can deposi t on the hea t exchange r surface. The filtration system and hea t exchanger shall be cleaned on a regular schedule." SUBSTANTIATION: This change is made to provide consistency between NFPA 86, NFPA 86C and NFPA 86D. C o m m e n t 86-13 (Log #21) on Proposal 86-2 (Log #39) for NFPA 86 was accepted

310

8 6 D - - A 9 9 R O C

in principle to provide the above change. This material is common to all three standards. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITrEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 26 NOT RETURNED: 1 I)adas

(Log #4) 86D- 12 - (5-3.3.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8613-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise to read as follows:

"A programmable controller used for safety servic;¢ shall be provided with a watchdog timer..." SUBSTANTIATION: The requirement for a watchdog timer should only apply to PLCs listed and applied for combustion safeguard service. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Change the title of Section 5-3 in the recommendation of Proposal 86D-2 (Log #15) to read as follows:

"5-3 Programmable Controllers For Safety Service" COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The revised text meets the intent of the submitter. NUMBER OF COMMIT'FEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #14) 86D- 13 - (5-4.1.5(b)2): Accept SUBMITTER: James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"...is equipped with g ~ safety shutoff valves..." SUBSTANTIATION: This section concerns "any fuel fired system". COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #2) 86D- 14 - (5-4.2.1 and 5~I.X2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: J. William Sheppard, General Motors Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revert to the wordin~ contained in 86 (1995 edition), 86C (edition), 86D (1995 edition) paragraphs 5-4.2 and exception. SUBSTANTIATION: Current heater box designs sometimes require longer distances between the gas train and the heater box due to space constraints and maximizing use of floor space, particularly for new oven installations. Due to the distance from the SSOV to the burner, it may take more than 15 seconds just to reach the burner. This causes even the present wording of "15 seconds" to be stretched into exceptions. Further, the proposed reduction of the time element will lead manufacturers to design for this new limitation, which will mandate to the user in many instances the need for expensive "add-ons" to standard equipment design with no apparent increase in burner safety over present installation practices. 15 seconds has proven to be a reasonable prudent practice. The committee offers no substantial justification in loss history to effect this change. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. In the Committee Action text of Proposal 86D-2 (Log #15) revise Section 5-4.2.1 and 5-4.2.2 including the exception to replace the text "10 seconds" with the text "15 seconds" COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The revised text meets the intent of the submitter. NUMBER OF COMMrVrEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #5) 86D- 15 - (5-4.2.3 Exception (New)): Reject SUBMITTER: James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-2 RECOMMENDATION: Add the following exception to 5-4.2.3:

"Exception: Trial for ignition of main oil burner shall be permitted to exceed 15 seconds provided that a written request for an extension is approved by the Authority Having Jurisdiction." SUBSTANTIATION: We believe that reliable main burner ignition with an extended time is preferable to repeated failed attempts. This exception will allow an extension to be approved by the Authority Having Jurisdiction, if necessary. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: ff the burner doesn't light in 15 seconds it is likely that there is a problem with the burner system. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CC9) 86D- 16 - (Section 5-7.1.8): Accept SUBMrrTER: Technical Committee on Ovens and Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"Local visual position indication shall be provided ~ a t each safety shutoff valve..." [The remaining text of the proposal recommendation for Section 5-7.1:.8 is retained unchanged.] SUBSTANTIATION: This change is made to provide consistency between NFPA 86, NFPA 86C and NFPA 86D. Comment 86-23 (Log #23) on Proposal 86-2 (Log #39) for NFPA 86 was accepted to provide the above change. This material is common to all three standards. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #9) 86D- 17 - (5-7.1.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTEI/a James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"Safety Shutoff valves shall be self closing and by their construction ~ shall not be readily..." SUBSTANTIATION: The intent of file prose is to refer to the safety shutoff valve design, not the system construction. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

I Delete the last sentence of Section 5-7.1.2 in the committee action I text of Proposal 86D-2 (Log #15).

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee Action meets the intent of the submitter. The last sentence is redundant to the definition of safety shutoff valve and to the requirements covered in Sections 5-2.1, 5-2.8 and 5-2.9 in recommended text of the proposal. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #6) 86D- 18 - (5-7.1.2 Exception): Reject SUBMITTEI~ James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"Exception" For f - ~ systems..." (1) "(a) For fuel gas svstems, it is demonstrated..." (2) "(b) For fuel ~as systems, when the individual..."

SUBSTANTIATION: None. COMMITrEE ACTION: Reject.

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8 6 D - - A 9 9 R O C

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The submitter did not provide a substantiation. In addition it was the committee's intent to have the exception apply only to fuel gas fired systems. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #13) 86D- 19- (5-7.2.1): Accept SUBMITTER: James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"...pilot fuel gas burner system shall be ~ equipped ..." SUBSTANTIATION: The existing section is ambiguous as written. Each of the pilot and main gas systems shall have two s,-ffety shutoff valves. COMMII~rEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #12) 86D- 20 - (5-7.3.1(b)): Reject SUBMITTER: James j. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 851)-2 RECOMMENDATION: Delete paragraph (b) entirely. SUBSTANTIATION: The circumstances described will not occur as described. For clarity this section should be removed entirely. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: There are systems such as recirculating for heavy fuel oil, or multiple furnaces supplied by a single pump. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATWE: 26 NOT RETURNED: 1 Dadas

(Log #8) 86D- 21 - (5-14.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8613-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"Safety Shutoff valves shall be self closing and by tileir ¢onstructioll ~ shall not be readily..." SUBSTANTIATION: The intent of the prose is to refer to the safety shutoff valve design, not the system construction. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

I Delete the last sentence of Section 5-14.1 in the recommendation of Proposal 86D-2 (Log #15). COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Refer to the Committee Statement for Comment 86D-17 (Log 9). NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #11) 86D- 22- (A-2-1): Accept SUBMITTER: James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-29

I RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: " ~ ~ having jurisdiction..."

SUBSTANTIATION: Misspelling in the second paragraph. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CC3) 86[)- 23 - (A-3-3.4): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Ovens and Furnaces

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-29 RECOMMENDATION: Add a new Section A-3-3.4 to read as follows.


The heater box is part of the oven system and needs to have explosion-relief provided. Personnel considerations and proximity to other obstructions may impact the location selected for these vents." SUBSTANTIATION: The additional material provides guidance for location of explosion-relief vents. Also refer to Committee Comment 86D-7 (Log #CC2). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #10) 8OD- 24 - (A-4-2.4.4): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-29 RECOMMENDATION: Add to drawing the following note:


~ Gas in

r I ~ . = ~..,o= ' I valve

J k G~ pr~,sur¢ regulator

Toc

Drip leg ( ~ e di~L as main gas pipe)

mm*- p

A÷3" rnin,

\

\ Fu©l filter/ stralncr

ID

Figure A-4-2.4.4. SUBSTANTIATION: The drawing is not clear as it is drawn. The dimension "A" must be defined. COMMII~rEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Revise Figure A-4-2.4.4 shown with Proposal 86D-30 (Log #CP3) to change the 3 inch dimension as shown in the marked up figure.

Gasin

Tee

as main gas pipe)

Y . ~ I ' < ' ~ Manual shutoff valve k

Pressure regulator

Strainer/ I m , = ~

I ~ P'~ ~ql )

'~ in. rnin)

~"Cap

Figure A-4-2.4.4

312

8 6 D - - A 9 9 R O C

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The revision meets the intent of the submitter. The correct Proposal Number is 86D-30 (Log #CP3) not 86D-29 (Log #15a). NUMBER OF COMMITrEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #CC11) 86D- 25 - (A-4-2.7.4): A~cept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Ovens and Furnaces COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-31 RECOMMENDATION: Replace Section A-4-2.7.4 in the recommendation of Proposal 86D-31 (Log #CP18) with text to read as follows:

Testing of radiant tubes should include subjecting them to thermal cycling typical fi~r the furnace application and then verifying their ability to withstand overpressure developed by a fuel- ,'fir explosion. Overpressure testing can be done in one of two ways:

1. Statically pressurize the tube until it fails. Compare this pressure to the maximum pressure (from literature) that can be developed in a contained deflagration of an optimum fi~el-air mixture.

2. After partially blocking the open end of the tube to simulate a heat exchanger, fill the tube with a well-mixed stoichiometric fuel- air mixture (ten volumes of air to one volume of fuel for natural gas). Ignite the mixture at the closed end of the tube. Measure the pressure developed. Compare this pressure to the maximum pressure (from literature) that can be developed in a contained deflagration of an optimum fuel-air mixture. SUBSTANTIATION: The revised text more technically correct and provides more gui~mce and test options. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #16) 86D- 26 - (A-5-7.2.3(a)): Hold SUBMITTER: Christopher B. Fink, Honeywell Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: N/A RECOMMENDATION: Revise Figure A-5-7.2.3(a) as shown below: SUBSTANTIATION: Updated schematic. COMMITTEE ACTION: Hold. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Comment introduces new material per Section 4-4.6.2.2(a) in NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


~P,P I.(5 - - ~ I BAt( BIA X ~MAN

I

PJI.0T ~TOft"

COCK

to

~UI'OF"T I~[$,~g£ VAI.V£

flC~q,AfO~ PRf~" OF'

PILOT

l~l]Br BF

v~,v~

k~ L~

V~LV~ iIV~V[

t, gv $~C.[T!r $AF'[TY ~ | ~UI"I]FF" $~tUTIEr

P~f$'l~ V~VE ~L T[,TI' V ~ Ifl.| TEST w n ~ PIZOII" [1"

CI,OSUR[ COCK CLO~'U~£ COCK

P"'q F 1 Prl

r ~ I ~ - m ~ m y I I tvnm I / ~ I c~ I I

HI0~ P'~ KD// /

Figure A-5-7.2.3(a) Example of a gas piping diagram for leak test.

313

8 6 D - - A 9 9 R O C

(Log #17) 86D- 27 - (A-5-7.2.3(b)): Hold SUBMITrER: Christopher B. Fink, Honeywell Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-34 RECOMMENDATION: Revise Figure A-5-7.2.3(b) as shown:

4~

_ _ TRANSFaRHr'R L4 ~ L~

' P[I',/F_R

C ~ A1R

LOw A m c o y cAs m e ~ c,a ~r~,.~

HIGH LIHIT

Islzre.~TCD _ . [ ~ ITR PIC I~JTPUT

I ~ l ; N s [ o

,~o

" = ' - , q L£AK CH~CK ;S~,/ITCH

r 6 A ~ . ~

i , ,

Figure A-g-7.2.3(b) Partial system schematic showing the application of a programmable controller to monitor safety interlocks and provide burner control

functions in series with hard-wired safety interlocks.

SUBSTANTIATION: Updating schematic. COMMITTEE ACTION: Hold. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Comment introduces new material which would propose something which could not be properly be handled widfin die time for processing die report per Section 4-4.6.2.2(c) in NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


314

8 6 D ~ A 9 9 R O C

(Log #19) 86D- 28 - (Figure A-5-g.2.2(b) ): Hold SUBMITTER: Christopher B. Fink, Honeywell Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: N/A RECOMMENDATION: Revise Figure A-5-7.2.3(a) as shown:

PILOT ~ILtlt

;"]LDT $ h ~ J ? ~ m e d l a r PRESSUI~ VALVE N01 V~LVE I~.Z RCG~.^r0R ~(]or' or PRDI~" W" MANUAL

~L~UR~: CLO:gtlR£ $1~10¢r V&LVC

GA~ N ~ J ~ E~T

i V~LV[ ~At~4_ $ Y SAr[TY 3HUTBFF ~S LOV GAS SHUTIT~ ,T, HU tl2,~r VALVE P~E$~L~E PRCS~URC VALVE I~,I VN.VE hg].E

REC~LAi'OR 8 V l T ~ PROOf" Of ~ {IF Tg[ ~ FILER OR

STRAINER

($gflE D]

r.,,A$ pipE) TL[,T V~LVE

~O,t

IL LEAK

~ I ~ ~t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

~'LN~-~£T[GT~ R A ~ I T -CIJP ]t~t~R

Figure A-5-9.2.2(b) Example of an approved combustion safeguard supervising a group of radiant-cup burners having reliable flame-propagation charateristics from one to the other by means of flame-propagation devices.

SUBSTANTIATION: Updating schematic. COMMITTEE ACTION: Hold. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Comment introduces new material per Section 4-4.6.2.2(a) in NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects.

[The Committee believes the correct reference in the recommendation is A-5-9.2.2(b).] NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 26 NOT RETURNED: l Dadas

(Log #18) 86D- 29 - (Figure A-5-g.2.2(a) ): Hold SUBMITTER: Christopher B. Fink, Honeywell Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-34 RECOMMENDATION: Revise Figure A-5-9.2.2(a) as shown:

PILlar PILOT SarETT $wrETy ~HIJ~IDFF SHUTOIrF

PILOT VAt .V [ NO.] V~..V[ N[]Z PR~SStJ~ PROOF ~" P9OOf D- W~mJAL

a[Cga.ATO~ CLnSIJIE CLDSUJE g'HIJT0rf VAL.V~

LEAK ~e~$ lX TKST ~LEj VALVE

NANUAL SAFETY SAFETY ~ H u r a r r { ~ Lt]V OA:S xh~JTOff ,TaIUTI]FF VALVE PRESSURE PRES~gURE VALVE ND.t VALVE NO2

rUB- r ~ CLDSORE CLG~UP,£ T~ - - , . FILER

AS n~lM ~ L~-AK ~ PIP~) CAp T[ST

v~l,.vc NO.I

Figure A-5-9.2.2(a)

~ PILOT I.~m f U I H E - DETECT OR rLAVlE-BETECI[~

k [ M r N l I~L[~NT

CI~e~TI~UgIU~ I . IH[ IIURt~gR$

14ANUAL ,~,4tJTOFF Wl.VC ~4

TCST VALV[

NO.2

Example of an approved combustion safeguard supervising a pilot for continous line burner during light-off and the main flame alone during firing.

SUBSTANTIATION: Updated schematic. COMMITTEE ACTION: Hold. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Comment introduces new material per Section 4-4.6.2.9(a) in NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects. The proposal referenced is incorrect. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 26 NOT RETURNED: ] Dadas

315

8 6 D - - A 9 9 R O C

(Log #7) 86D- 30 - (A-5-9.2.2(a) and (b)): Accept SUBMITTER: James J. Houston, Industrial Heating Equipment Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 86D-29 RECOMMENDATION: Insert a second safety shutoff valve in the pilot line of the drawing shown:

Pilot safely Pilot safely shutoff vaJve shutoff vdve Pilot pressure regul=o-- No. 1 No, 2

Pilo~h~offv~v: " '~ ~ P ' ' ~q ~oUff ai

LeaktestwJve No. 1 ,I, ,I, v~e Leak test valve No. 2

\ Pilot flame-sensing deme,~t Main'flame-saving dement Low gas Pilot bume~.%l / / pressure ~ , I I I switch Safety shutoff Safety shutoff Hi~.gaspressure' I I / / I I r

G~sprassure (~v=veNo . 1 v~veNo.2 ~ch(~,~ I I ~ 1 I /

reg~ator~ y ~ ~ y I I / / I I /

~ r ' ~ ="-~ / e ' ~ / M~ TM / / M~n shutoff ~ ~ anuai shutoff / / v~ve t i t ' v~,e - - -

Leak test vaJve No. 1 .I. ,I. Leak test vaJve No. 2 Con~nuous line burners

Figure A-5-9.2.2(a)

Pilot safety Pilot safety shutoff valve shutoff valve Pilot pressure regulator ~ No, 1 • No. 2

Pilot gas in~t ~'-~'1~ ~ ~ =,[~/~ "~.,=

Pilot sh'~uto~ffvalve ~J~ - - " ~-~ Ma ~n~a[ X ~pI ~pI shutoff X Leak test valve No. I J~ kh valve X

Leak test valve No. 2 Low gas . X pressure H~lh gas switch pressure Safety shutoff Safety shutoff . . . . . . r e ~ . . . .

Gaspressure /'Mth~ valve No. 1 valve No. 2 . . . . . . ~ '~ l lOt burner regulator L ~ ~ [~ ] [ ] ~ - ) ~ P i l o t flare e-se nsing elaine ut

Main shutoff Manual shutoff valve valve

Leak test valve No. 1 Leak test valve No. 2 • ,

Main flame-sensing element

Figure A-5-9.2.2(b)

SUBSTANTIATION: The drawings need to be a m e n d e d to include two pilot safety shutoff valves to be consistent with Section 5-7.2.1. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. N U M B E R OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE T O VOTE: 27 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


3 1 6

Documents

JDOhn - NFPARECOMMENDATION: Add an asterisk to Section 1-4.3.1. Acid a new Section A-1-4.3.1 to the recommendation of Proposal 86-57 to read as follows: A-1-4.3.1 The proximity of