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5. G.R. No. 45037 November 21, 1991 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and GEORGE LITTON, SR., petitioners vs. HONORABLE FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME, in her capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, LEONOR SOCHAYSENG and ROGELIO PAZ, respondents. FERNAN, C.J FACTS: A complaint was filed before CFI, Rizal, by Petitioner George Litton Sr. charging Leonor Sochayseng and Rogelio Paz with adultery, which court was presided by Judge Castro-Bartolome. After prosecution rested its case, Respondents Sochaysen and Paz filed their respective demurrer to evidence (motions to dismiss) substantially raising similar grounds for the dismissal of the adultery charge that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of marriage between Litton, Sr. and Sochayseng during the alleged period of commission of adultery and that assuming arguendo that said marriage did in fact exist and that both respondents committed acts of adultery during coverture, petitioner Litton, Sr. has condoned and pardoned the adulterous acts of his wife and Paz. Nine (9) months after the prosecution rested its case and before respondent Judge could resolve the motions to dismiss submitted by Sochayseng and Paz, the private prosecutor (Atty. Estanislao Fernandez) filed a motion to reopen the case for the purpose of presenting additional evidence. Private prosecutor, justified the move, it was stated that these documents were not presented by the private prosecutor Dakila F. Castro at the close of the evidence of the prosecution in his belief that he had sufficiently proven the marriage between complaining witness George Litton, Sr. and the accused Leonor Trinidad Sochayseng, with the testimony, among others, of said George Litton, Sr., about said marriages. Granting that said opinion of Atty. Castro is erroneous, in the highest interest of justice, we are presenting this motion to enable us to present the above-mentioned documents to conclusively prove the fact of marriage between the complaining witness, George Litton, Sr. and the accused Leonor Sochayseng.

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5. G.R. No. 45037November 21, 1991PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and GEORGE LITTON, SR., petitionersvs.HONORABLE FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME, in her capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, LEONOR SOCHAYSENG and ROGELIO PAZ, respondents.FERNAN, C.JFACTS: A complaint was filed before CFI, Rizal, by Petitioner George Litton Sr. charging Leonor Sochayseng and Rogelio Paz with adultery, which court was presided by Judge Castro-Bartolome. After prosecution rested its case, Respondents Sochaysen and Paz filed their respective demurrer to evidence (motions to dismiss) substantially raising similar grounds for the dismissal of the adultery charge that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of marriage between Litton, Sr. and Sochayseng during the alleged period of commission of adultery and that assuming arguendo that said marriage did in fact exist and that both respondents committed acts of adultery during coverture, petitioner Litton, Sr. has condoned and pardoned the adulterous acts of his wife and Paz. Nine (9) months after the prosecution rested its case and before respondent Judge could resolve the motions to dismiss submitted by Sochayseng and Paz, the private prosecutor (Atty. Estanislao Fernandez) filed a motion to reopen the case for the purpose of presenting additional evidence.Private prosecutor, justified the move, it was stated that these documents were not presented by the private prosecutor Dakila F. Castro at the close of the evidence of the prosecution in his belief that he had sufficiently proven the marriage between complaining witness George Litton, Sr. and the accused Leonor Trinidad Sochayseng, with the testimony, among others, of said George Litton, Sr., about said marriages. Granting that said opinion of Atty. Castro is erroneous, in the highest interest of justice, we are presenting this motion to enable us to present the above-mentioned documents to conclusively prove the fact of marriage between the complaining witness, George Litton, Sr. and the accused Leonor Sochayseng. Respondent Judge Castro-Bartolome denied the motion to reopen trial. An urgent motion for reconsideration by petitioner was similarly rejected.ISSUE: Whether a party (prosecution) may be allowed to present additional evidence after it has rested its case and defendants have submitted their respective demurrer to evidence.RULING: NO. Under the factual milieu of the case at bar, we find that respondent Judge correctly rejected petitioner's motion to reopen the trial. Even the so-called paramount interests of justice cannot free petitioner from his self-imposed predicament. His counsel took a big gamble in not presenting the certificates attesting to the fact of marriage between petitioner and Leonor Sochayseng on the erroneous belief that said marriage had been amply established by the testimony of the aggrieved husband. Petitioner's counsel realized his folly when private respondents understandably moved for the quashal of the complaint on the material ground that coverture was not prove beyond reasonable doubt. As wisely observed by respondent Judge in her August 11, 1976 denial order:xxxIf the prosecution can be allowed to rectify a mistake pointed out in a demurrer to the evidence, what will be the court's reason to deny him a second or a third or a fourth reopening ad nauseam to rectify succeeding mistakes should the first reopening not serve the purpose? It is obvious that a reopening of the case to allow the introduction of additional evidence would be prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused.

6. G. R. No. 94555August 17, 1992THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.EDUARDO LABALAN OCIMAR and ALEXANDER CORTEZ MENDOZA, accused-appellants.The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Virgilio Y. Morales for accused-appellant.Alfredo Au. Alto for appellant Ocimar.BELLOSILLO, J.:FACTS: EDUARDO LABALAN OCIMAR and ALEXANDER CORTEZ MENDOZA, together with ALFONSO RAMOS BERMUDEZ, ALBERTO VENZIO CRUZ, VENZIO CRUZ alias "BOY PANA" and JOHN DOE alias "BUNSO" were charged in the court a quo for violation "Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974. Accused Eduardo Ocimar and Alexander Mendoza were arraigned. With the assistance of counsel de oficio, they pleaded "Not Guilty". The other accused were not arraigned because they could not be accounted for. Alfonso Bermudez was finally brought before the court. He was accordingly arraigned and with the assistance likewise of counsel de oficio, he entered a plea of "Guilty". The other two accused, Alberto Venzio Cruz and Venzio Cruz alias "Boy Pana", were never arraigned as the former was never arrested, while the latter jumped bail before arraignment.After the prosecution had already presented four witnesses, the prosecuting Fiscal moved for the discharge of accused Bermudez to be utilized as state witness. Although he had already entered a plea of guilt earlier, no judgment was as yet rendered against him. The trial court granted the motion of the prosecution. After he testified for the prosecution, Bermudez was released. The trial court rendered judgment finding accused Eduardo Labalan Ocimar and Alexander Cortez Mendoza guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals. Hence in this appeal, Ocimar imputes ERROR to the court a quo in (a) discharging accused Bermudez, who had earlier pleaded guilty to the charge, to be utilized as a state witness; (b) giving credence to the testimony of Bermudez; and, (c) not holding that the prosecution failed to prove his (Ocimar) guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On his part, accused Mendoza maintains that the lower court ERRED in (a) relying on the lone testimony of accused Bermudez; and, (b) convicting him (Mendoza) notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt.ISSUE: Whether the discharge of a co-accused depends on a sound judicial discretionRULING: YES. As may be gleaned from the aforequoted Sec. 9 of Rule 119, the trial court must be satisfied that the conditions prescribed by the rule exist. The court therefore, upon prior determination by the public prosecutor, retains the prerogative of deciding when a co-accused may be discharged to become a state witness. With Sec. 9 providing the guidelines, the discharge of an accused depends on sound judicial discretion. Once that discretion is exercised under those guidelines and a co-accused is discharged to become a state witness, and subsequently testifies in accordance with his undertaking with the government, any legal deficiency or defect that might have attended his discharge from the information will no longer affect the admissibility and credibility of his testimony, provided such testimony is otherwise admissible an credible. Besides, the matter of discharging a co-accused to become state witness is left largely to the discretion of the trial fiscal, subject only to the approval of the court. The reason is obvious. The fiscal should know better than the court, and the defense for that matter, as to who of the accused would best qualify to be discharged to become state witness. The public prosecutor is supposed to know the evidence in his possession ahead of all the rest. He knows whom he needs to establish his caseWe agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that the rule on the discharge of an accused to be utilized as state witness clearly looks at his actual and individual participation in the commission of the crime, which may or may not have been perpetrated in conspiracy with the other accused. Since Bermudez was not individually responsible for the killing committed on the occasion of the robbery except by reason of conspiracy, it cannot be said then that Bermudez appears to be the most guilty. Hence, his discharge to be a witness for the government is clearly warranted.

7. G.R. No. 199100 July 18, 2014PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.ROSENDO AMARO, Accused-Appellant.PEREZ, J.:FACTS: Rosendo Amaro was charged with the crime of forcible abduction with rape. The facts as presented were, in front of Boots & Maya located at Mal var Street, Puerto Princesa City, the accused, by means of deceit at the beginning and of force and intimidation later and with lewd designs, abduct one [AAA], a seven (7) year old girl, by forcing her and took her to his house at Bgy. Tagburos, Puerto Princesa City and without any justifiable reason, accused detained and deprived her of her liberty for a period of twenty eight (28) [sic] days; that while she is being detained accused ROSENDO AMARO had carnal knowledge of said AAA all committed against her will.Appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial then proceeded. AAA, who was then only 7 years old,testified that she was walking on her way home from school when she passed by Boots & Maya store. She met a man, whom she later identified in court as the appellant, who asked her to buy cigarettes. After buying the cigarettes and handing it to appellant, the latter gave her bread and banana cue. After eating them, she suddenly became dizzy and passed out. AAA was brought to the house of appellant. When she regained consciousness, she saw appellant naked. Appellant then undressed her, kissed her on the lips and neck, and inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her to feel pain. AAA cried but appellant covered her mouth with his hand. AAA was detained for six (6) days and was raped five (5) times by appellant. AAA clarified that appellants penis touched the outer portion of her vagina.During the cross-examination, AAA admitted that she voluntarily went with appellant because the latter promised to bring her home.The prosecution also presented AAAs mother, BBB, to corroborate her daughters testimony.Appellant testified on his behalf. He denied abducting and raping AAA but admitted that he brought the latter to his house when AAA approached him asking for bread first, before begging him to take her with him because she was always being scolded by her parents. The trial court found AAAs testimony as credible and straightforward and supported by medical findings. Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision affirming the ruling of the RTC.ISSUE: Whether in the prosecution of rape cases, conviction on acquittal depends on the complainants testimony RULING: YES. In the prosecution of rape cases, conviction or acquittal depends on the complainant's testimony because of the fact that usually only the participants are witnesses to their occurrences. The issue therefore boils down to credibility. Significantly, findings of fact of the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal since conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court which is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying.Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, saysthat she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show thatrape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.17 Moreover, AAA testified in a straightforward manner.The appellate court is correct in affirming the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

8. G.R. No. 203984 June 18, 2014PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, Accused-Appellant.LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:FACTS: PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ were on duty, a certain EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office and asked for police assistance regarding a shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it appears that while driving a towing truck and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow said vehicle until they reached along 8th Avenue Street corner C-3 Road, Caloocan City. Thereat, the passengers of said taxi cab, one of them was accused Calantiao, alighted and fired their guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do anything but continued his driving until he reached a police station nearby where he reported the incident.The police officers on duty then were PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ. PO1 Mariano testified that they immediately responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where they found the white taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police officers) and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black bag containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from Calantiaos companion [a] .38 revolver.The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3 PABLO TEMENA, police investigator at Bagong Barrio Police Station for investigation. Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the bricks of marijuana contained in a black bag with his initials, "NM". Thereafter, said specimen were forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the examination conducted by P/SINSP. JESSSE DELA ROSA revealed that the same was positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.The foregoing testimony of PO1 MARIANO was corroborated by PO3 RAMIREZ who testified that he personally saw those bricks of marijuana confiscated from the accused. He confirmed that he was with PO1 Mariano when they apprehended said accused and his companion and testified that while PO1 Mariano recovered from the accused a black bag containing marijuana, on his part, he confiscated from accuseds companion a .38 revolver.MR. CRISENDO AMANSEC, the driver of the taxi where the suspects boarded was also presented in open court and testified as to what he knows about the incident. He confirmed that on that date, two (2) persons boarded on his taxi and upon reaching C-3 Road, they alighted and fired three (3) shots and ran away.RTC rendered its Decision giving credence to the prosecutions case.The Court of Appeals found no reason to overturn Calantiaos conviction.ISSUE: WON the admissibility of the marijuana found in his possession can be used as evidence against him on the grounds of either it was discovered via an illegal search, or because its custodial chain was broken.HELD: The Court finds no merit in Calantiaos arguments.The Court cannot subscribe to Calantiaos contention that the marijuana in his possession cannot be admitted as evidence against him because it was illegally discovered and seized, not having been within the apprehending officers "plain view.The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach."13 It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the States police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspects person and premises under his immediate control. This is so because "[o]bjects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence."16 "The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure."The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiaos situation because the police officers purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in Calantiaos possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to Calantiaos lawful arrest.