As easy as ABC: Investigating Canada’s Current Electoral System and Proposing an Alternative

Jay FallisProfessor Falkenheim

POL2811Y - MA Research Seminar IISeptember 4th, 2015

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Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction2.0 Canada’s Current Electoral System: First Past the Post

2.1 Drawbacks2.11 Multiple Parties in a two party system2.12 Misrepresenting Demographics2.13 Low Voter Turnout Rates2.14 Vote Splitting2.15 Strategic Voting

2.2 Majority Governments vs. Minority Governments2.3 Advantages

2.31 Regional Representation2.32 Simplicity

2.4 Undemocratic Election Results2.41 1987 New Brunswick Provincial Election2.42 1996 British Columbia Provincial Election

3.0 Criteria for a New Electoral System in Canada3.1 Regional Representation3.2 Fair Results3.3 Representation of Women and Minorities3.4 Increased Voter Turnout3.5 Further Factors

3.51 Simplicity3.52 Eliminating Strategic Voting3.53 More Input from the Population on Final Results

4.0 Electoral System not solely responsible for misrepresentation of demographics4.1 Failure of Party List Systems4.2 Societal Problems leading to misrepresentation

4.21 Provision of Services to Encourage Female Candidacy4.22 Quotas

4.221 Quotas on Parties4.222 Incentives for Local Riding Associations

4.3 Similar Approach for Visible Minorities4.4 Representation for Aboriginals

5.0 Alternative Electoral Systems5.1 Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)

5.11 Advantages of Party Lists5.12 Fair National Results5.13 Governments more Accountable5.14 Limitation of Strategic Voting5.15 Quality of Regional Representation compromised5.16 Internal Parliamentary Disputes based on two types of Members5.17 Stronger Party Association during parliamentary votes5.18 Complexity

5.2 Single Transferable Vote (STV)5.21 Regional Representation favoured over Party Lines5.22 Ridings are overextended5.23 Counting Process is complex5.24 Unreliable Results

5.3 Alternative Vote (AV)

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5.31 Maintenance of Regional Representation5.32 Fairer Results5.33 Phoney Reform: Not Reflective of National Results5.34 Secondary and Tertiary preferences rarely taken into consideration5.35 Impractical Counting Practices

5.4 Difficulty in choosing one Electoral System6.0 Difficulty in Accomplishing Reform

6.1 Governing Party has little incentive to implement Reform6.2 Embracing Reform can be costly for Governing Party6.3 Referendum

6.31 Costly to Inform Public6.32 Limited Media Coverage

7.0 Transitional Reform7.1 Implementing Ordinal Ballot as a Transitional Step7.2 Introducing a Borda Count System7.3 Point Distribution Method7.4 Possibility for Strategic Voting

7.41 Solution7.5 Voters could be allowed to fill out Incomplete Ballots

8.0 Alternative Borda Count System (ABC)8.1 Accomplishing the Four Core Goals

8.11 Maintains Strong Regional Representation8.12 Fairer Representation for Smaller Parties and Independents8.13 Improved Voter Turnout Rate8.14 Improved Representation of Women and Minorities

8.2 Alternative Borda Count alleviates further problems8.21 Conciliatory Results8.22 Eliminate Vote Splitting8.23 Ease of Implementation

8.3 Disadvantages of Alternative Borda Count8.31 Inclusion of More Parties and Candidates8.32 Potential to Favour Centrist Parties (critique of Alternative Vote)

8.321 Solution8.4 A reasonable System to implement

9.0 Preliminary Study9.1 Sample Population9.2 Survey Design9.3 Results

9.31 Elimination of Vote Splitting and Strategic Voting9.32 No advantage for Centrist Parties9.33 High Approval Ratings for Winning Candidate9.34 Fairer Representation for Smaller Parties and Independents9.35 High Likelihood for Success of ABC in Referendum

10.0 Conclusion11.0 Bibliography

11.1 Survey for Experiment11.2 Survey Findings from test Survey

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1.0 Introduction

One of the most important elements of politics in Canada is the Electoral process.1 However, for

the past few decades many have questioned whether Canada’s current electoral system is functioning

adequately. Often brought on by skewed election results and misrepresentation of particular

demographic groups, talk of reform has come in many provinces at different times. Nevertheless, it has

rarely been considered at the national level. As parties prepare for the upcoming 2015 national election,

it seems that the issue is re-emerging. Both opposition party leaders, Thomas Mulcair of the New

Democratic Party (NDP) and Justin Trudeau of the Liberal Party of Canada, have promised that if elected

they would seek to establish national electoral reform.2 Thus, Canada’s electorate must begin to take

this issue into serious consideration.

The premise of this paper will be to both give an extensive overview of our current electoral

system and to establish whether an alternative electoral system could be viable. The paper will first look

at Canada’s current First Past the Post System (FPTP), giving detail as to its benefits and drawbacks. It

will then look at what elements of an electoral system the Canadian public would most likely desire, also

taking into consideration recommendations for reform established in certain provinces. Additional

considerations which may not have been made by the Canadian public or within certain provinces will

also be alluded to.

Once establishing a basic framework for a preferable Canadian electoral system, the paper will

elaborate on reform systems that have been linked with reform proposals in Canada. These will include:

Mixed Member Proportional (MMP), Single Transferable Vote (STV), and Alternative Vote (AV). Upon

review it will be found that none of these proposals are suitable for Canada in the immediate future due

1 John C. Courtney, Elections. Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press, 2004: 5.2 Michael Bolen. "Mulcair Promises Proportional Representation If NDP Wins Next Election." The Huffington Post Canada. January 2, 2015.

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to the multiplicity of side effects associated with each reform as well as the difficulties associated with

implementing such reform.

This paper will instead argue that Canada should embrace an Alternative Borda Count (ABC)

voting method that has been modified in order to accommodate the nation’s unique needs. It is possible

that this system, with few significant side effects, could serve as an improvement on our current

electoral system and possibly as a transitional step toward a form of proportional representation. To

understand how important such a modification could be, it is necessary to consider Canada’s current

FPTP system.

2.0 Canada’s Current Electoral System: First Past the Post

Canada’s FPTP system has been utilized since Confederation in 1867 and even prior to that. It

remains one of the only elements of Canadian elections that have not been modified to accommodate

the nation’s changing political character.3 4 This system allows voters a single vote, which is meant to

allow the voter to select a local representative of their choice.

Most local representatives that are on the ballot are associated with a Federal political party.

The local candidate who receives the most votes wins a seat in the legislature, and the political party

that has the most candidates in the legislature is able to form the government.5

2.1 Drawbacks

In this sense it really is a winner takes all electoral system as only those who vote for the

winning candidate have a say in the outcome, while the remainder of the votes are wasted.6 The

3 J. Murray Beck. "The Democratic Process at Work in the Canadian General Elections." In Voting In Canada. Scarborough, ON.: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1967:2-31.4 Dennis Pilon. The Politics of Voting: Reforming Canada's Electoral System. Toronto, Ontario: Edmond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2007: 28.5 Pilon, The Politics of Voting, 28-29.6 Ibid., 28.

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origination of this system is understandable. In 1867 and prior, elections would rarely be between more

than two candidates with relatively lose party ties. In some cases candidates would even run

unopposed.

2.11 Multiple Parties in a two party system

However, over the ensuing decades, Canada would witness the creation of multiple parties with

stringent guidelines as to running party representatives.7 This would mean that a standard ballot would

include multiple options instead of just one or two. This transition from a two party system into a

multiple party system has had repercussions.

Certain types of parties have experienced exaggerated success and other types of parties have

experienced exaggerated failure. For the party that has the broadest support, their seat total will be

much higher than their popular vote.8 For the party or parties with slightly less support than the former,

they will often fail to win close to the number of seats in proportion with their popular vote. This is

because the winning party may only receive a negligible amount of support more than the losing party.9

10 Whereas with two parties the winner would need more than half of the votes to win, in a multiparty

system, the winner would only need more votes than his or her closest competitor.

Thus in order to win a party would require much less than the majority of the riding’s support.11

Despite the lack of the majority of support required, the winning party would receive the full

representation (1 seat) for a riding as opposed to no representation (no seat). If a majority of ridings

follow the overall trend, as is common in elections past, the first place party which received slightly

more votes in a majority of ridings will win those seats.12 At the same time, parties that receive slightly

7. Beck, The Democratic Process at Work, 22.8 Ibid., 21-22.9 Ibid., 21-22.10 Pilon, The Politics of Voting, 20.11 Ibid., 20-21, 28.12 Beck, The Democratic Process at Work, 21-23.

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less support in those same ridings come away empty handed. The value of the vote of someone voting

for the former is thus much more valuable than a vote of someone voting for the latter.

The extent to which these elections are unfair to voters is further emphasized by the

misrepresentation of certain types of smaller parties. FPTP tends to over represent regionalized parties,

leaving smaller nationalized parties very much underrepresented. In cases where parties have regionally

concentrated support, such as the Bloc Quebecois, the number of seats that is often won is much

higher.13 This is because the support is concentrated allowing the ridings where support exists to prevail

over other parties competing.14 15 For small parties with support more spread out, such as the Green

Party of Canada, success is limited.

Despite potentially receiving a significant portion of the popular vote, a party of this nature

would win few seats because each riding across the country has a small collective of party supporters

leaving few ridings obtainable.16 The problem is that if support for both types of parties is identical,

those supporting parties with regionally concentrated support get to have a much larger impact on the

election result, whereas the impact of voters should be close to equal.

2.12 Misrepresenting Demographics

The First Past the Post System, along with misrepresenting certain parties has a tendency to

misrepresent demographics within Canadian society. Both historically and currently, minorities and

women have consistently lacked adequate representation within the legislature.17 This problem can be

13 Harold J. Jansen, and Alan Siaroff. "Regionalism and Party Systems: Evaluating Proposals to Reform Canada's Electoral System." In Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada and Its Provinces. Peterborough, On: Broadview Press Limited, 2004: 46-49.14 Henry Milner. "Political Drop-Outs and Electoral System Reform." In Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada and Its Provinces. Peterborough, On: Broadview Press Limited, 2004: 21.15 Robert Richie, and Steven Hill. "The Fair Elections Movement in the United States: What It Has Done and Why It Is Needed." In Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada and Its Provinces. Peterborough, On: Broadview Press Limited, 2004: 216-218.16 Pilon, The Politics of Voting, 28-30.17 Richie and Hill, The Fair Elections Movement in the United States, 216-218.

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attributed to the candidate selection process that exists in FPTP. In this system it is the obligation of

every local party affiliate to develop their candidate.

In most cases a winnable candidate is considered someone who would be most likely to appeal

to a broad number of people without being seen as an abnormality within the political arena.18 Thus the

strategic move of many of these local party affiliates is to select a white male as a candidate.19 Although

some Federal parties in the past have taken it upon themselves to ensure a higher ratio of women and

visible minorities serve as candidates, it is often the case that these candidates are nominated in ridings

where they have little opportunity to win.20 Even with the initially low numbers of women and minorities

who have the opportunity to run, those who do are not placed in situations where they can earn a seat

in the House of Commons. The result is a legislature that is controlled by white males, despite the fact

that women and minorities represent a significant portion of the population.

2.13 Low Voter Turnout Rates

Misrepresentation aside, the FPTP system in this country has produced a series of negative

election practices that have become common place. The first is a low voter turnout rate for Federal

elections.21 While it is important to note that many developed nations around the world have

experienced this trend in the past few decades, countries with FPTP tend to have lower rates overall

than countries that use alternative systems.22 It has been argued that this could be voters’ response to

the lack of impact they have on an election outcome.23

18 Ibid., 216-218.19 Karen Bird. "Lessons from France: Would Quotas and a New Electoral System Improve Women's Representation in Canada?" In Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada and Its Provinces. Peterborough, On: Broadview Press Limited, 2004: 19320 Bird, Lessons from France, 212.21 Milner. Political Drop-Outs, 24-25.22 Ibid., 23-25.23 Ibid., 23-25.

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While in FPTP it is customary that a majority of votes in a riding will be wasted and will not be

used to determine the winning representative, in many forms of proportional representation, nearly all

ballots have a final impact on the outcome. The result is that fewer and fewer voters are going to the

ballot boxes on election day, recognizing that such an act does not bare a lot of significance in the

political system.24 One of the major reasons for this lack of significance is the prominence of vote

splitting in FPTP.

2.14 Vote Splitting

Vote splitting occurs when an ideology is represented by two parties, while opposing ideology is

represented by one, leaving the latter ideology to have much better representation in the legislature.25

Due to Canada’s multiparty system, there are often parties that identify with the centre-left side of the

political spectrum and those that align themselves with the right. While those on each side of the

spectrum may have some disagreement, there is a general consensus around most issues. In past

elections, both sides of the political spectrum have encapsulated multiple parties.

In the most recent 2011 election, the Liberals and New Democratic Party (NDP) were major

parties that split the centre-left side of the spectrum while the Conservative Party was the major party

that represented the right.26 The problem was that the Conservatives were given the advantage

because they were able to solely seek the support of the right side of the spectrum, while the Liberals

and the NDP were forced to compete against each other for supporters.27 Whereas if the totals of the

24 Ibid., 24.25 Andrew Coyne. "First past the Post Elections Can Hardly Be Called Democracy." The National Post, May 1, 2015. 26 Eric Grenier. "How Vote-splitting Gave the Tories Ontario - and a Majority." The Globe and Mail, August 4, 2012. 27 Grenier, How Vote-splitting Gave the Tories Ontario.

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NDP and the Liberals were added up in many ridings they may have won many more seats and

eliminated any chance for the Conservative Party to win.28

Vote splitting led to a Conservative Party victory in 2011, as it was able to defeat both the

Liberals and NDP in many tight races in many ridings and therefore able to win a majority government.29

It may not be accurate to say that in the absence of either the NDP or the Liberal Party the other would

gain all of the absent party’s support. Although, it is likely that in this type of situation much of the

support of one party would transition to the other.30

The problem with this trend in Canadian politics is that there are so many parties representing

one side of the political spectrum. This creates scenarios whereby a side of the political spectrum which

is unified under a single party is often able to have more success than parties seeking support from a

divided spectrum. 31 Supporters of the latter are less likely to see their preferred candidate win.

2.15 Strategic Voting

This problem has become so enshrined in our electoral system that voters have taken it upon

themselves to resolve the matter. While many within the Canadian electorate remain faithful to their

first preference parties, there is a movement in Canada for portions of the voting populous to vote

strategically in order to counter vote splitting.32 The principle of strategic voting is for voters to vote for a

candidate that is not their first preference in order to try and limit a candidate they truly dislike from

getting to power.33 Supporters of that particular party may recognize that a vote for their preferred

candidate will serve no purpose, thus they chose to use their vote to make an impact on the result.34

28 Ibid.29 Ibid.30 Ibid.31 Ibid.32 Ken Neumann. "The Case against Strategic Voting in the next Federal Election." The Toronto Star, September 23, 2014, Opinion/Commentary sec.33 Neumann, The Case against Strategic Voting. 34 Ibid.

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While it cannot be said for sure to what extent strategic voting has limited vote splitting, it

should be found that such a practice is not ideal. A significant problem with this practice is that it

compromises the value of voting. Without giving the voters the ability to make a selection based on

their preferences, it limits a voter’s ability to have their true ideals made known.35 It should not be the

voters’ obligation to correct the problems of a political system, but rather the obligation of the political

system to limit such problems from existing in the first place.

2.2 Majority Governments vs. Minority Governments

The final problem to note is one that is often debated by academics. This is the tendency of FPTP

to produce majority governments whereby the governing party holds a majority of seats in the

legislature. Canadian voters as a whole see this as an advantage.36 It is believed that by having a party

that is stable, important directional decisions can be made efficiently. Often cited is the fact that in a

minority situation, governments may not be able to react as quickly to economic problems facing the

country.37

Along with decisive decision making, the FPTP system’s method to produce governments is also

seen as preferable. In minority situations in countries with electoral reform in place, there is often an

initial period where parties must come to agreements to establish what parties will form the

government and what parties will serve as the opposition. Not only is this process time consuming but it

can allow insignificant parties to have a great deal of control in the process.38 In order to form

government, large parties may have to agree to give into many smaller party proposals in order to

maintain a majority of votes in the legislature.

35 Ibid.36 William Kuchapski. "Why Electoral Reform Failed in Ontario?" Manitoba Law Journal 36, no. 2 (2014): 149-150.37 Courtney, Elections, 142.38 Jack H. Nagel "Stormy Passage to a Safe Harbour? PR in New Zealand." In Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada and Its Provinces. Peterborough, On: Broadview Press Limited, 2004: 128.

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Following the establishment of electoral reform in New Zealand in 1996, the rate of support for

the system was not high. The sole reason was that the potentially anti-democratic, over-extended

government formation process in the weeks following the election, turned voters off. It took nine weeks

for the National Party of New Zealand to form the government, all the while allowing the small New

Zealand First Party to have a great deal of influence in the way the government was going to be

designed.39

The prolonged uncertainty of government formation, which allowed a party like the New

Zealand First Party to serve as a major determining factor in the outcome, and a deal that seemed to be

widely opportunistic for the political parties involved, ultimately led to a significant dip in the electoral

systems approval rating. 40 After experiencing a minority under the circumstances of a reform system,

the public is clearly against the implications. However, just as much as minority situations can be

unappealing for the electorate, they also serve to be advantageous.

Having a minority government as opposed to a majority guarantees that the governing party

does not have unlimited decision making power. In majority situations, if the leader and party brass of

the governing party want to pass legislation, they will have no obstacle in the legislature as it is only

their party that will need to give approval.

In a minority situation, the governing party needs to seek approval from at least one other party

to get support, meaning that the decision needs to be more conciliatory.41 Acquiring the support of

other parties becomes very important when voting on financial matters, as a defeat of the governing

party in the House of Commons will result in an election. Thus, in a minority government the governing

party is consistently in a situation where they must pander to the interests of other parties.42 This can be

39 Nagel, PR in New Zealand, 127-131.40 Ibid., 128.41 Pilon, The Politics of Voting, 184.42 Marc Gervais. "What Can One Expect from Minority Governments?" Optimum Online 42, no. 4 (2012).

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beneficial for the electorate as more representatives serving a broader portion of the population must

be taken into consideration when negotiating and passing legislation.43 Essentially this type of

government gives indirect power to a larger portion of the electorate, improving the value of their vote.

As for the establishment of a stable government with effective decision making power, minority

governments’ ability to handle financial matters demonstrates that such governments have an ability to

pass important legislation as required. In matters of finance, there is no statistical evidence to show that

in majority led countries economic growth is higher or that unemployment levels are lower.44

Furthermore it was found that cabinet durability on the whole, which is more common in majority

governments, has no bearing on the quality of economic output.45 While there may be negative

preconceptions regarding the way in which minority governments legislate, such governments can

function effectively. The preconceived notions of what a minority government is are different from

reality. Although there are drawbacks, there are advantages as well, making the more frequent

production of minority governments neither a dis-advantage nor an advantage.

2.2 Advantages

The production of minority governments aside, FPTP does maintain undisputed advantages. One

of the most admired aspects of the FPTP system is the extent to which the system represents regions.

2.31 Regional Representation

In a country as vast as Canada, having regional representation can be considered one of the

most important elements of an electoral system.46 The primary goal of the system during

43 Gervais, Minority Governments.44 Louis Massicotte. "That Bleak? Fathoming the Consequences of Representation in Canada." In Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada and Its Provinces. Peterborough, On: Broadview Press Limited, 2004: 75.45 Massicotte, Fathoming the Consequences of Representation, 75. 46 John A. Cousins, "Prince Edward Island's Cautious Path toward Electoral Reform." In Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada and Its Provinces. Peterborough, On: Broadview Press Limited,

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implementation according to Sir John A. MacDonald, a Father of Confederation and first Prime Minister

of Canada, was to ensure that every voter had the opportunity to meet their representatives and know

who they were voting for directly.47

By creating a system that focused on this notion of local representation, it could be guaranteed

that individual interests and concerns of each region were being taken into consideration at the Federal

level.48 A riding’s electorate select their Member of Parliament (MP), thus each member is accountable

to their local electorate and must look to serve their interests if they wish to remain in office. With a

country as vast as Canada, where there is a multiplicity of cultures in different regions, representation in

this form is important to maintain.

2.32 Simplicity

The simplicity of the system can also be seen as a benefit. Many of the systems that are often

proposed to replace FPTP are constantly critiqued for having a complicated calculation process. Voters

may be able to understand how to cast a ballot, as ballots differ from system to system. However,

understanding how ballots are calculated can require further education that may not be fully

accessible.49 It is important for the population to know how their electoral system works and produces

results so that the electorate feels comfortable voting and understands how to best display their

interests on their ballot.

2.4 Undemocratic Election Results

After considering the disadvantages and advantages of the system some may still argue that the

advantages to FPTP justify the flaws and that there is no real need for reform. However, when an

2004: 288.47 Courtney, Elections, 133-13448 Ibid., 133-141.49 Nagel, PR in New Zealand, 127.

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election using FPTP is conducted, there tends to be a consistent exposure to a variety of flaws. The most

commonly noted is the gap between popular vote and seat distribution amongst parties.50 In some cases

this gap can be so large that the result verges on anti-democratic.

2.41 1987 New Brunswick Provincial Election

Although there are many examples in the Canadian context, two extreme situations

demonstrate this gap between popular vote and seat distribution. The first, took place in the 1987 New

Brunswick provincial election. The Liberal Party of New Brunswick was able to receive approximately

60% of the popular vote.51 As a result they won all of the fifty eight seats in the legislature.52 The

problem was that 40% of the population, received absolutely no representation, simply because of the

way supporters were spread out across the province.

Without an opposition party in place, one that would be looking out for a significant portion

population, it is difficult to imagine how the governing party would have been kept in check. The very

purpose of the legislature, to provide a forum for political debate, served instead as grounds for partisan

discussion with limited opposition.53

2.42 1996 British Columbia Provincial Election

The second election that has raised a lot of questions about the practicality of FPTP is the 1996

provincial election in British Columbia. During this election the Liberal Party won a 41.82% of the

popular vote, more than any other party.54 However, in certain ridings the Liberal Party’s support was

highly concentrated, whereas in many ridings the NDP received slightly more support. This voting trend

50 Pilon, The Politics of Voting, 26-30.51 Ibid., 140-141.52 Ibid., 139-141.53 Stewart Hyson. "A One Party Legislature: Where's "Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition:" In The Loyalist Province?" Canadian Parliamentary Review 11, no. 2 (1988). 54 British Columbia. Elections BC. Report of the Chief Electoral Officer: Statement of Votes in the 36th Provincial General Election May 28, 1996. Victoria, BC. [February 10th, 1997]: 3-10.

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allowed the NDP party to win the election despite losing to the Liberal Party in popular support by

approximately 2.37%.55 To make the outcome seem even more undemocratic, the NDP won a majority

in the British Columbian legislature with 39 of 75 seats.56 This gave the party full control to pass

legislation despite receiving less overall support than the losing Liberal Party.

These two examples may be extreme, but they demonstrate why FPTP is not a system that

should be maintained. There is a distinct difference between flaws that come with an electoral system

and results that are not reflective of public opinion and are undemocratic. It is the latter that truly

establishes the need to move toward electoral reform in this country. While such extreme results may

not be totally corrected under electoral reform, the severity and frequency to which such results are

formulated can be reduced.

3.0 Criteria for a New Electoral System in Canada

Before considering what the ideal electoral system would be for Canada at the Federal level it is

important to consider what qualities the Canadian electorate are looking for. The criteria that have been

compiled in this paper reflect the suggestions from reform attempts made at the provincial level. These

suggestions come from commissions examining the possibilities of implementing reform that would

have taken into consideration public response. These commissions include those examining reform in

Ontario, British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, and Quebec. While these committees

would look to implement electoral reform in only portions of the country, they are reflective of

Canadian interests as a whole.

3.1 Regional Representation

55 British Columbia, Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 3-10.56 Ibid., 3-10.

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As previously mentioned there is general consensus that regional representation is important to

maintain within the country, which has been accomplished by FPTP.57 58 59 When the commissions

examining reform options in each of the provinces sought feedback from the public, the importance of

maintaining regional representation was often reiterated.

Despite serving Canada’s smallest province both in size and population, the Commissioner of

Prince Edward Island’s Electoral Reform Commission still found this sentiment reiterated within the

public. “If there is one thing people have told me it’s that everyone wants to retain their district member

of the legislature”60 If the people of the small province of PEI want to maintain regional representation

for provincial elections, the sentiment must be even stronger in federal elections where large

communities are more distinct from region to region.

However, the success of the FPTP system in maintaining representation for regional pockets

does not mean that other electoral systems could not meet this criterion. There are alternative systems

that simply employ a reformed ballot that fully maintain ridings, while others see redrawn boundary

lines but maintain less extensive regional representation.61 The popularity and practicality of this form of

representation would make alternatives that do not accommodate such representation both impractical

and unpopular. Thus if reform is to be considered in this country, regional representation will be a top

priority.

3.2 Fair Results

57 Cousins, PEI's Path toward Reform, 288.58 Brian Doody and Henry Milner. "Twenty Years after Rene Levesque Failed to Change the Electoral System, Quebec May Be Ready to Act." In Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada and Its Provinces. Peterborough, On: Broadview Press Limited, 2004: 273.59 Kuchapski, Electoral Reform Failed in Ontario, 137-156.60 Cousins, PEI's Path toward Reform, 288.61 Pilon, The Politics of Voting, 21-24.

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The next suggestion frequently recommended by various reform committees was fairness for

voters.62 63 64 This refers to the notion that voters as a whole should all get similar power to be able to

influence an election and that no vote is wasted.65 This principle often opposes regional representation

because the implementation of one of these principles can counteract the other, as is the case with

FPTP. 66 If the seats of a legislature are determined through regional representation, the discrepancy

with the popular vote can be quite extreme, as demonstrated by the examples of the 1987 New

Brunswick provincial election and the 1996 British Columbia provincial election that were alluded to

earlier.

While full establishment of both principles may be difficult to accomplish, there are certainly a

variety of systems that allow for a compromise of both values. There are two approaches to establishing

a system that maintains both principles. The first is to guarantee a set number of seats calculated via

popular vote in the legislature.67 This is the technique that allows the legislature to be the most

reflective of the popular vote, guaranteeing that almost all of the votes cast within the country will be

taken into consideration.68 The second technique to create a fairer system is to provide a ballot with

more utility for the voter.

While this does not produce a legislature that is necessarily representative of the popular vote it

allows more votes cast to have influence on the outcome of local ridings.69 This gives a greater portion of

62 Doody and Milner, Quebec May Be Ready to Act, 273.63 Henry Milner. "(Appendix 1) New Brunswick Mission, Mandate, and Terms of Reference." In Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada and Its Provinces. Peterborough, On: Broadview Press Limited, 2004: 303.64 Kuchapski, Electoral Reform Failed in Ontario, 146. 65 Ontario. Parliament. Legislative Assembly. Select Committee on Electoral Reform. Report on Electoral Reform. 2d Sess., 38th Parliament, 2005: 88-89.66 John C. Courtney. "Reminders and Expectations about Electoral Reform." In Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada and Its Provinces. Peterborough, On: Broadview Press Limited, 2004: 107-112.67 Pilon, The Politics of Voting, 21-24.68 Ibid., 21-24.69 Ibid., 21-24.

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the population the ability to have input into the Federal election results. It is important to note that

some systems are considered fairer than others when reflecting the popular vote in the outcome, but

almost all are considered to be fairer than the current FPTP system.

3.3 Representation of Women and Minorities

Adequate representation of women and minority groups in Canada has also been a significant

priority for committees looking at reform.70 71 Canadian women are still far from being proportionally

represented although the number of women in the legislature has gone up. In 1984 women held 27

seats, effectively holding 9.6% of the legislature.72 There are currently, 77 women with seats in

parliament, with a slightly improved representative ratio of 25.3% of legislative seats.73 This places

Canada in 46th place in the world for the percentage of women in its parliament. 74 It is notable that

nations with poor gender equality records are ranked higher than Canada. Such nations include: South

Sudan, Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan.75 In contrast to these nations the custom in Canada is to recognize

women as equal to men.

It is enshrined in Canada’s Constitution within the Charter of Rights and Freedoms that women

share the same rights as men. For Canada to give women less than close to equal representation to the

point where representation is less significant than nations where mistreatment of women is common,

seems to go against the country’s social imperative. It seems essential to be concentrated on finding a

way in which women’s representation could be significantly improved.

70 Doody and Milner. Quebec May Be Ready to Act: 273.71 Cousins, PEI's Path toward Reform, 287.72 Julie Cool. "Background Paper: Women in Parliament." Library of Parliament, no. 05-62-E (2010). 73 "Women in National Parliaments." Inter-Parliamentary Union. June 1, 2015.74 Women In Parliaments, Inter-Parliamentary Union.75 Ibid.

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Committees have also sought better representation for visible minorities in House of

Commons.76 Canada’s policy toward culture is that of a multicultural society. Historically, Canada’s

citizenship and immigration policy has been extremely welcoming leading to a high increase in the

number of immigrants within the population.77 However, even with countless cultural communities in

Canada, it should be expected that a significant portion of these communities would be represented in

the House of Commons.

This is unfortunately not the case. In the 2011 Federal Election, 28 visible minorities were

elected to Canada’s Parliament, the highest in Canada’s History.78 Even with this record breaking

number, the percentage of minorities in the House is far below the proportion of visible minorities living

in Canada’s society. With 28 seats, minorities only receive 9.1% of the legislature leaving this

demographic significantly underrepresented in relation to the number living in Canada.79 The minority

population would have required 59 seats to receive adequate representation in relation to its

population.80 Needless to say, the system does not represent minorities to the fullest extent, and more

should be done to accommodate these populations within the House of Commons.

The final demographic to mention that is currently under-represented in the House of Commons

is the First Nations, Inuit, and Native populations. Again the 2011 federal election marked a record high

number of seats for a misrepresented group in the legislature. However, the number of seats needed in

the House of Commons was not enough to be reflective of this group’s population. The Election saw 7

people of Native, Inuit, or Metis descent elected as Members of the House of Commons, allowing this

76 Doody and Milner. Quebec May Be Ready to Act: 273.77 "Canadian Multiculturalism: An Inclusive Citizenship." Citizenship and Immigration Canada. October 19, 2012. 78 Jerome H. Black. "Racial Diversity in the 2011 Federal Election: Visible Minority Candidates and MPs." Canadian Parliamentary Review 36, no. 3 (2013). 79 Black, Racial Diversity.80 Ibid.

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group to have approximately 2.3% of the total seats.81 This is relatively low when considering that the

Native, Inuit, and Metis population represent 3.8% of Canada’s total population. 82 While the

discrepancy is not as large as the one seen by other minority groups, it is significant.

This is especially the case when considering the historical significance of these groups as well as

the recent political movement, “Idle no More”, that has worked toward increasing the representation of

all three aboriginal groups and limiting legislation that has been seen as harmful to Aboriginal culture

and communities.83

With calls from many committees, organizations, and the general public, it seems logical that if

Canadians are seriously going to consider electoral reform, this type of representation will be a major

consideration. Through modifying the electoral system, there is only one aspect that can exist within a

system that guarantees such representation.

This is the inclusion of party lists. Such lists are used when a portion of the seats in the

legislature are chosen through popular vote.84 In this case, parties have the opportunity to fill out lists to

determine what individuals associated with the party would receive seats that the party won via this

method. It guarantees better representation for these misrepresented groups because in this situation

parties would feel obligated to represent the general electorate as closely as possible.85 Party lists should

be seriously considered if representation of these three groups is to be desired. However, the paper will

later look at whether these lists maybe beyond the realm of electoral reform in Canada.

3.4 Increased Voter Turnout

81 Eric Grenier. "Natives are under-represented in Parliament – and for Women and Youth, It’s Even Worse." The Globe and Mail, 2013. 82 Grenier, Natives are under-represented in Parliament.83 "Calls for Change." Idle No More.84 Pilon, The Politics of Voting, 21.85 Courtney, Elections, 152-153.

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The trends of voter participation in this country have also been considered by electoral reform

committees. Since the 1988 Federal Election the voter turnout rate has been experienced a downward

trajectory, going from 75.3% to its lowest rate of 58.8% in 2008.86 In 2011, the turnout rate only slightly

increased to 61.1%.87 Factors aside from the type of electoral system play a role in the turnout rate, such

as the date of the last election and who the leaders are running for each party, leading to slight gains

and falls from election to election. However, the overall trend for voter turnout in Canada has been

downward.

High levels of voter turnout are considered an important factor in indicating the quality of a

countries democratic system. It illustrates the extent to which citizens are interested in being

represented and serves as an indicator of political equality.88 89 Thus, it will often be referred to as an

important concern for nations considering reform. It is believed this problem can be addressed simply

through reforming the FPTP system.90 This notion is based off findings from Arend Lijphart. He suggests

that countries that use systems that require less than the majority of voters to determine the winner,

like FPTP, are likely to have lower voter turnout rates.

The study found that when controlling for compulsory voting and the frequency of elections,

consensus democracies, systems that take into account many differing voter preferences, had a 7.5%

percentage point higher turnout rate than systems that used FPTP.91 It is argued that consensus

democracies allow more voters to have a say in the outcome of elections, giving their ballot more utility.

The logic is that if potential voters believe they have a high likelihood to influence elections, they will be

86 "Voter Turnout at Federal Elections and Referendums." Elections Canada. February 18, 2013. 87 Voter Turnout at Federal Elections, Elections Canada.88 "Can Fair Vote Systems Make a Difference?" Prepared By: Fair Vote Canada. Facts and Figures from Arend Lijphart's study (Patterns of Democracy):4.89 Arend Lijphart. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1999.90 Milner, Appendix 1, 303.91 Fair Vote Systems, Prepared by Fair Vote Canada, 4.

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more likely to cast a ballot.92 As alluded to earlier, the FPTP system leads to many wasted votes,

potentially leaving a significant portion of the population to question the value of participating in the

democratic process. If a system is be adopted that gives voters more input it will likely improve upon the

low turnout rate produced by the FPTP system.

3.5 Further Factors

All of the commonly cited reasons for reform that are proposed have re-emerged consistently

throughout the ongoing discussion of reform in Canada. Yet there are further factors that could play a

significant role in determining what type of reform would be embraced. Some factors may include

particular tendencies that exist within FPTP that the public feels should be maintained while others may

be based on critiques of FPTP and preferences of the public.

3.51 Simplicity

Previously discussed in this paper was the fact that a benefit of FPTP was its simplicity.

Maintaining this simplicity would be important for voters in order for them to understand how to use

the electoral system and how their vote is being used. This is a common problem for most reform

systems. Often vote calculation methods can be complicated, ballots intricate, and reasoning for seat

distribution unclear.93 If a system is to be adopted and accepted by the public, it would be preferable

that it be easy to understand. 94

3.52 Eliminating Strategic Voting

92 Ibid., 2-4.93 Shaun Bowler and Paul Savoie. "Electoral Systems, Party Competition, and Strength of Partisan Attachment: Evidence from Three Countries." The Journal of Politics 54, no. 4 (1994): 996-1005.94 Nathalie Des Rosier, Bernard Colas, Roderick J. Wood, and Mark L. Stevenson. "Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada." 2004: 56.

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Along with seeking to maintain advantages of FPTP, voters will also welcome reform that

addresses some of the current system’s weaknesses. As discussed, strategic voting in Canada has been a

common source of frustration.95 Canadians who have experienced this problem will likely embrace an

opportunity to be able to vote for their true preference. While different reform systems will be able to

solve problems to differing degrees and in different ways, most systems will work to alleviate the

problem.

3.53 More Input from the Population on Final Results

The more input that the electorate is able to give and the more votes that influence the final

outcome, the less likely strategic voting will be a factor in election outcomes.96 Thus an ideal system

would allow for the voter to have increased influence in the final outcome, giving the voter more power

and eliminating the need for strategic voting.

The fact that a broader population has power to influence outcomes could also translate into a

House of Commons that is more accountable, which would leave the electorate additionally satisfied.

With a broader portion of the population with power to influence an election, Members of Parliament

as well as Parties as a whole will feel more obligated to vote for legislation that is favoured by the

majority of the electorate. In essence it creates a brand of accommodative politics where parties are

more concerned with passing legislation supported by the general populous rather than seeking the

support of their own supporters. 97 Thus the electoral system’s capacity to provide broader voting power

results in increased accountability on the part of politicians. If a reform system produces of conciliatory

results it may be of significant benefit for Canadians.

95 Neumann, The Case against Strategic Voting.96 Pilon, The Politics of Voting, 68-69.97 Courtney, Elections, 157.

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Each of these factors may not have been outlined by committees investigating reform at the

provincial level. However, these factors should be taken into consideration if reform is to be proposed.

This paper has already gone into extensive detail on some of the problems facing FPTP and how the

electoral system can solve such problems. However, it is often the case that when implementing reform

systems, advocates falsely assume that the new system in place will solve every problem brought on by

FPTP. Although reform has the potential to solve particular problems that exist within the electoral

system, no system is perfect and reform cannot solve every problem.98 Instead of relying solely on

modifications to the electoral system, there are alternatives that can be put in place to solve particular

problems.

4.0 Electoral System not solely responsible for misrepresentation of demographics

The lack of representation provided to women and minority groups by FPTP is a problem that is

not solely a result of the electoral system. While implementing a different system that uses party lists

could alleviate the problem, it is not the only solution.99

4.1 Failure of Party List Systems

As demonstrated in France in the mid 1990’s, the inclusion of the party list was unable to

guarantee adequate representation of women. The electoral system was consistently producing results

that benefitted men over women.100 In response to this problem a quota was put in place to ensure that

parties would nominate close an equal proportion of women to men.101 The rate of improvement was

still minimal.

98 Massicotte, Fathoming the Consequences of Representation, 82.99 Bird, Lessons from France, 195-196.100 Ibid., 196.101 Ibid., 196.

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The reason was that parties in France were unwilling to give positions to women that had been

brought in to meet quotas when there were a high number of experienced men that could take a

position.102 Even with the implementation of party lists and quotas at the national level France is ranked

44th in the world for representation of women in their legislature, just slightly ahead of Canada.103 Since

the implementation of the quotas France has improved from 64th in 1997.104 Yet, the fact that there is

great room to grow suggests that more can be done to alleviate this problem, and that it is not solely an

effect of the electoral system.

4.2 Societal Problems leading to misrepresentation

In order to understand how this problem can be better dealt with, it is important to look not at

the system responsible for selecting members of a legislature but rather how women are regarded in

society, and the resources they have available to them. Domestic duties, lack of education or

professional experience, and lack of time and money are all factors that can affect the extent to which

women are involved women are in politics.105 In the Canadian context, while women are seen as equals

to men in society, there are more struggles that women face when getting involved in politics.

Joshua Moraes, a candidate recruiter for the Federal NDP in the upcoming 2015 election

suggested that recruitment of women itself is difficult. “It sometimes takes many conversations to get

women to run for office. They often don’t feel that they are qualified or have the resources

necessary.”106 A lack of time and resources are limiting women from having adequate representation.

Addressing these problems should be the focus for those working toward improving women’s

representation in Canada.

102 Ibid., 202-203.103 Women in National Parliaments, June 1, 2015. 104 "Women in National Parliaments." Inter-Parliamentary Union. May 15, 2002. 105 Bird, Lessons from France, 192.106 Moraes, Joshua. "Talking with Josh." Interview by author. July 11, 2015.

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4.21 Provision of Services to Encourage Female Candidacy

These problems could be alleviated by providing services not necessarily pertaining to electoral

reform. Among the services that could be provided could be free or discounted childcare for candidates

running in an election. This would give younger women raising a family more availability and time to

campaign.107 To fully ensure that women are able to focus time on their careers and the political world,

publically funded childcare could see not only higher rates of women enrolling but also overall more

qualified women available to run.108 Along with the inclusion of childcare, seminars could also help to

inform women to prepare them for running in an election.

Seminars could be offered to all aspiring candidates before elections.109 Such seminars could be

tailored to meet the needs of women as well as men and have a set quota of women enrolled. These

seminars could lead to a growth in the number of women willing to run.110 From expanding the number

of potential candidates who are women, both of these modifications could improve the number of

women that win seats in the House of Commons.

4.22 Quotas

While quotas do not totally eliminate gender inequality, they can improve female

representation within a legislature. If Canada were to adopt a policy of this nature it is debatable

whether it would have the desired affects. To place a quota on a party in Canada may be difficult to do

as it is not the parties that chose the constituents, but rather the party supporters from each riding.111

107 Rachel Silbermann."Encouraging More Female Candidacies by Subsidizing Childcare." Institution of Social and Policy Studies. 2012: 108 Silbermann, Encouraging More Female Candacies.109 William Cross. Political Parties. Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press, 2004: 70.110 Robert Darcy, Susan Welch, and Janet Clark. Women, Elections, and Representation. 2nd ed. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1994: 186-187.111 Ibid., 212.

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That being said Canadian parties in the past have been able to influence the number of women that run

for them.

4.221 Quotas on Parties

While several parties have made commitments to have the number of female candidates

equitable to the number of males, the New Democratic Party (NDP) demonstrates that it is possible for a

party to accomplish near complete equity via influence. Since 1993, the NDP have abided by a set of

affirmative action guidelines for promoting the nomination of women.112 The final goal is to have a 50/50

split between male and females running for office. For the upcoming election, the NDP is fielding 42%

female candidates (119 of 281 nominated).113 The value of implementing a quota would be that equal

representation will not be determined by parties’ good will, but will be more entrenched. After seeing

what the NDP have been able to accomplish, it still may serve some purpose to place quotas on parties,

even if there are no seats chosen by party lists.

4.222 Incentives for Local Riding Associations

There may be a more effective way to use quotas in Canada’s electoral system. As opposed to

putting the pressure on parties who have no official power in candidate selection, place the pressure on

local party units. It may seem unfair to punish local party affiliates for nominating a male candidate if

they are qualified to run and have a good chance of winning. Instead of these affiliates for failing to vote

in female candidates, reward the affiliates that do.114 Give incentives to local party affiliates that elect

women.115 It could be possible for such ridings to receive small financial rewards either through direct

deposit or through tax incentives. Donations made to a female candidate could also have larger rebates

112 Ibid., 212.113 Ben Spurr. "Women’s Issues ‘invisible’ This Election, Warns Group." The Toronto Star, August 24, 2015, News/Canada sec.114 Bird, Lessons from France, 195-196.115 Ibid., 196.

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than donations for male candidates. By focussing attention on encouraging local party affiliates, while

also implementing quotas for Federal parties and providing services to encourage women to enroll, the

overall number of women elected to the House of Commons will improve as more candidates running

will be female.

4.3 Similar Approach for Visible Minorities

It could be suggested that a similar approach should be taken when addressing the lack of

candidates from within visible minority groups in Canada. By giving minority groups experience and

access to needed resources and encouraging federal parties and local constituency party to select visible

minority representatives, the misrepresentation of this demographic could be reduced as well.

The lack of representation of Aboriginal populations in Canada could be dealt with in a similar

manner, although there is another method that could be used that would solidify native representation.

As has been done in New Zealand with the Maori population, seats could be added to House of

Commons that solely represent these populations.116 The principle here is that there would be ridings

that are overarching the ridings currently in place. The result would be that the aboriginal population

would have the choice to vote in standard local ridings or vote for an aboriginal representative who

would serve much larger regions.117

4.4 Representation for Aboriginals

As a way of determining the number of seats to be distributed to the aboriginal population, it

may be important to look at the proposal made by the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform, also

known as the Lortie Commission, in 1991. It recommended that a number of seats be designated to the

Aboriginal Population be based on voter registration numbers.118 If a province received aboriginal

116 Paul Adams. "Should Aboriginal Canadians Have Their Own Seats in Parliament?" IPolitics. January 6, 2013. 117 Adams, Their Own Seats in Parliament. 118 Trevor Knight. "Electoral Justice for Aboriginal People in Canada." The McGill Law Journal 46 (2001): 1065-1079.

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registration that reached 85% of the population of a standard provincial riding, a seat would be added to

accommodate this population.119 It is difficult to say exactly how many seats would be distributed. Yet

the Aboriginal voting patterns and Aboriginal populations in each province from the 2011 election give

some indication.

According to these numbers Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Quebec, and

Saskatchewan, could each receive one.120 121 122 This could guarantee at least 6 seats for the aboriginal

population along with leaving further possibility of winning seats in standard ridings across the country.

In the previous election, it is notable that two of the seven candidates came from provinces other than

those previously mentioned. Meaning that if these seats had been in place in 2011, Aboriginal

representation would have increased by at least one seat guaranteed, with likely more coming from

Quebec and Manitoba.123 While guaranteeing seats by province seems to provide improved

representation for the aboriginal population, a change of this nature would not be approved without

debate.

Some argue that giving aboriginal people seat representation and not extending this to other

demographic groups is un-parliamentary.124 If aboriginal people are getting this type of representation

why shouldn’t women, visible minorities, and the rest of Canada’s variety of population variations have

guaranteed representation as well? It could be found that this group’s impact on Canadian history is

unparalleled, yet of any demographic it has been hurt the most by governments of Canada’s past, either

through actions taken or legislation.125 Providing a method that allows the aboriginal population 119. Knight, Electoral Justice for Aboriginal People, 1076-1077.120 Eric Grenier. "Higher Native Turnout Could Have Reduced Harper to Minority Government." The Globe and Mail, January 15, 2013, Politics sec. 121 "Number and Distribution of the Population Reporting an Aboriginal Identity and Percentage of Aboriginal People in the Population, Canada, Provinces and Territories, 2011." Statistics Canada. April 24, 2013. 122 "House of Commons Seat Allocation by Province." Elections Canada. March 23, 2012. 123 Grenier, Natives are under-represented in Parliament.124 Knight, Electoral Justice for Aboriginal People, 1077-1079.125 "Canada Must Admit Aboriginal Maltreatment to Start Anew: Editorial." The Toronto Star, July 19, 2013, Editorials sec.

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guaranteed representation in order to redress the many transgressions of the past and to limit the

possibility that such mistreatment will continue, seems a necessary addition.

5.0 Alternative Electoral Systems

After taking into consideration Canada’s current FPTP system and how this system could be

improved, it is important to look at the alternative systems. It is possible that if Canada were to

progress toward reform it would endorse a system that has been proposed before. While each of the

following systems was proposed to improve upon FPTP, each system has drawbacks as well. This paper

will consider the most important advantages and disadvantages to each.

5.1 Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)

The first system, often considered the most legitimate choice for reform in Canada, is known as

Mixed Member Proportional (MMP). It is the system that was proposed during the reform referendums

in Prince Edward Island (2005), and in Ontario (2007).126 New Brunswick and Quebec seriously

considered holding a referendum proposing this system as well around the same time period.127 In

addition, the political special interest group Fair Vote Canada, which is devoted to bringing reform to

Canada, has embraced MMP as the system that should be considered for reform at the Federal level.128

MMP is a hybrid reform system. It distributes seats for the legislature in two manners. A portion

of the seats are distributed using the standard FPTP regional system, while the second portion of seats

are used to make the legislature reflective of the popular vote, taking into account the number of seats

each party has already won in the standard FPTP seats.129 This makes it so that the party that receives a

certain threshold of votes that do not have a similar percentage of seats already from the FPTP

126 Andre Barnes, and James R. Robertson. "Electoral Reform Initiatives in Canadian Provinces." Parliament of Canada. August 8, 2009: 1-12.127 Barnes and Robertson, Electoral Reform Initiatives, 1-12.128 "FAQ: Does Fair Vote Canada Advocate for a Particular System?" Fair Vote Canada. 2015.129 Pilon, The Politics of Voting, 21-22.

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elections, will be compensated accordingly.130 As discussed earlier, the members of the party that

receive these seats are taken from an ordered party list. The higher the ranking on the list the more

likely a party member has to win a seat.

Sometimes these lists are posted to the public before the election other times it may be based

on party candidates that received the highest percentage of popular vote, but lost in the FPTP

elections.131 The ballots used in this system allow the electorate to cast two votes. One ballot is used to

select the candidate of their choice in order to calculate regional seats, while the other is to select the

party of their choice to calculate seats determined by popular vote.132 It is important that this system not

be confused with the one employed in Japan to elect members to the House of Representatives. The

distinction being that in Japan, the seats that are distributed using popular vote do not take into

consideration the number of seats already won using FPTP. The result is a legislature that is not truly

reflective of the popular vote throughout country.133

5.11 Advantages of Party Lists

It has already been argued that the inclusion of party lists in this system helps to improve

representation for women or small groups. Yet party lists have other benefits. They allow more of those

who are deserving of a seat but do not have a high likelihood of winning in their own riding, an

opportunity to gain a seat.134 This can be valuable for those with little election experience, who have a

great deal of knowledge on subjects that would be advantageous in the development of Canadian

legislation.

130 Jansen and Siaroff. Regionalism and Party Systems, 49-51.131 Henry Milner. "A Mixed Member Proportional System Applied to the 2004 Election." Electoral Insight, 2005. 132 Pilon, The Politics of Voting, 21-22.133 Lawrence LeDuc. "Something Old, Something New: Electoral Reform in Japan." In Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada and Its Provinces. Peterborough, On: Broadview Press Limited, 2004: 179-189.134 Voting Systems, Fair Vote Canada, 6.

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Competition in certain ridings can also be such that the loser is very deserving of a seat. Their

competitor may be very experienced themselves or the candidate’s party does not have a history of

winning. Through the adoption of party lists, parties are able to provide seats to these deserving

candidates. The result of this would be a legislature that included more of the country’s most qualified

and intelligent political figures.

5.12 Fair National Results

This system also initiates elections that are much more democratic. This is because votes for

each party across the country are much better reflected. It allows small national parties such as the

Green Party of Canada to gain more influence in parliament.135 This corrects the overrepresentation of

regional parties and large parties with a broader electoral base. In addition, representativeness of larger

parties is more reflective of their nationwide support. Large parties that do not receive adequate

representation in certain provinces and regions also have the ability to prioritize party members from

these areas.136 This will ensure these larger parties have a high likelihood of representation from all

areas. Seeing as it will be these parties that form government with members holding a great deal of

power to pass legislation, the representation of all provinces and regions within these parties will be

beneficial for these areas.

5.13 Governments more Accountable

Accountability is another positive attribute that governments have under MMP. With seats

distribution more reflective of the overall popular vote, there is a greater tendency for minority

governments to be produced.137 As discussed, in minority situations, governing parties are consistently

trying to appease other parties. If the governing party wants to maintain the balance of power they

135 Milner, A Mixed Member Proportional System.136 Voting Systems, Fair Vote Canada, 6.137 Massicotte, Fathoming the Consequences of Representation, 80-81.

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must concede to the interests of other parties, making them accountable to these other parties and thus

a larger portion of Canadians.138

5.14 Limitation of Strategic Voting

Making the system even more democratic, is the limitation of the effect of strategic voting.

While the inclusion of a winner takes all ballot at the local level leaves room for strategic voting. This

coupled with an ability to vote for a national party makes it so that even if locally a vote is rendered

useless, nationally it still is relevant.139 Therefore the effects of strategic voting on the system are not as

detrimental.

5.15 Quality of Regional Representation compromised

Along with an extensive list of advantages come some significant disadvantages. MMP’s

implementation of proportional representativeness could however compromise the quality of regional

representation that Canadians hold so dear. Under a system where 1/3rd of seats are devoted to popular

vote totals, it is possible that only around 200 seats under a reformed system would be devoted to

regional representation.140 If ridings are to be modified to become larger the result will be that local

members will not have enough time and resources to represent their constituents, either from having a

regionally expansive riding, a highly populated riding, or a combination of both. As a result the extent to

which Canadians would be regionally represented is compromised.

5.16 Internal Parliamentary Disputes based on two types of Members

The introduction of two types of members into a legislature has also proven to be a problem in

cases where MMP has been employed. In Scotland’s MMP system, it has become accepted that there

138 Ibid., 80-81.139 Pilon, The Politics of Voting, 21-22.140 Milner, A Mixed Member Proportional System.

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are two types of members with different levels of legitimacy. Those elected in ridings are considered to

be more legitimate having won a riding.141 Those that are elected through seats determined by popular

vote are seen as less legitimate.142 No body of the electorate officially endorsed these candidates, and in

most cases they are former candidates from ridings, meaning they had already been rejected by the

electorate. This results in a parliament that is divided between members that are seen as legitimate and

illegitimate.

This distinction has in cases compromised the value of input made by members elected via list

seats and has caused internal conflict within the legislature.143 Among the most significant conflicts

between Members of Scottish Parliament has been over members’ jurisdiction. In FPTP the jurisdiction

of each Member of Parliament is clearly outlined as every member has a riding and a population they

are responsible for. However, in an MMP system, members that have received their seats through lists

have no local obligations to fulfill. It is customary then to allow these members to share certain

portfolios with members representing ridings.144 While there is a potential to alleviate the burden of

regionally elected members, this is not what has occurred in Scotland.

Instead there are disputes over who gets a high profile case, or disputes over whether one

member should have the ability to encroach on another members’ riding.145 Furthermore, there have

been cases where members, upon losing a local riding and being elected through the party list, establish

their electoral office in the very riding they campaigned in. By establishing themselves in a riding they

formerly ran in and seeking aspects of jurisdiction for this riding, these members can prepare for future

141 Peter Lynch. "Making Every Vote Count in Scotland: Devolution and Electoral Reform." In Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada and Its Provinces. Peterborough, On: Broadview Press Limited, 2004: 154-156.142 Lynch, Making Every Vote Count in Scotland, 154-156.143 Ibid., 155.144 Ibid., 154-155.145 Ibid., 154-155.

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elections and undermine the regional member’s presence.146 Regional members in Scotland have

reacted by reducing resources that these list members received from the government. The many

conflicts that develop between these two groups of members cause internal division within the

parliament. It is likely that division of this nature in Canada could compromise the effectiveness of the

legislature, limiting the value of the reform.

5.17 Stronger Party Association during parliamentary votes

Party association is another consideration that must be made when investigating electoral

reform. There are different opinions regarding strong party ties within a legislature. Currently in Canada

party elite, especially party whips, believe in having a party that votes together in order to maintain a

unified image to the public.147 148 For many within Canada, party ties are thought to be a restraint.149 It is

common place in the legislature for MPs, fearing the fallout at the discretion of party faithful, to vote

against their personal preferences.

In some cases this not only defies what the MP believes but also the local electorate the MP

represents.150 If an MP chooses to vote against their party, consequences will follow. The MP can fall out

of favour with party faithful, and lose the opportunity to receive high profile appointments.151 The MP

can also be terminated from the party caucus leaving him or her to either serve as an independent or to

find a new party.152 The power of parties within the legislature is already detrimental as it limits the

ability of candidates to serve as anything but party faithful.

146 Ibid., 154-155.147 Jonathan Malloy. "High Discipline, Low Cohesion? The Uncertain Patterns of Canadian Parliamentary Party Groups." The Journal of Legislative Studies 9, no. 4 (2003):120-121.148 "First-ever Survey Shows 71% of Canadians Want Legal Restrictions on Powers of Party Leaders to Control Politicians in Their Party – Only 20% Disagree." Your Canada, Your Constitution. June 10, 2013. 149 Duff Conacher. "Free the MPs! Canada Needs Rules to Restrict Party Whips." The Globe and Mail, June 19, 2013. 150 Malloy, High Discipline, 120-129151 Ibid., 119-120.152 Ibid., 119-120.

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The introduction of party lists would further increase the hold that parties have on MPs. If a

large portion of MPs in the legislature are being chosen by each party, voting against their own party can

make the possibility of re-election much less likely than it was before.153 The implementation of party

lists constrains candidates to vote with the party. Under a system with a list, parties have absolute

control over a legislature, leaving MPs less accountable to the electorate than before.

5.18 Complexity

The final concern with the MMP system is its complexity. While for all systems, information can

be provided to the public, MMP is one of the most difficult to understand. It is the calculation of list

seats for each party that make it so confusing.154 Concern for this problem even led to a survey

conducted in Scotland. A total of 48% of those surveyed reported difficulties with understanding seat

allocation.155 156 That is to say that nearly half of the electorate did not understand how the system

worked and how their vote would be used to calculate seats. The electorate should be able to

understand and feel comfortable with the system in order to be able to use it correctly. If MMP were to

be implemented extensive education would be required in order to properly educate the electorate.

While on the surface MMP seems to be practical in the sense that it is more representative of

the population it has many issues. These side effects could cause additional issues that would limit the

effectiveness of Canada’s Parliament and be impractical for voters.

5.2 Single Transferable Vote (STV)

153 David Denemark. "Choosing MMP in New Zealand: Explaining the 1993 Electoral Reform." In Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds? Oxford, UK.: Oxford University Press, 2001.154 Lindsay Paterson. The Autonomy of Modern Scotland. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press, 1994: 69-72.155 Paterson. The Autonomy of Modern Scotland, 69-72.156 Lynch, Making Every Vote Count in Scotland, 157.

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If MMP is the primary choice of reformists in Canada, Single Transferable Vote (STV) would be

the secondary choice. Only in British Columbia, where STV was once used to some extent in provincial

elections, was there recent attempts made to bring about this type of reform.157 STV utilizes multi-

member district that are much larger both in size and population than current FPTP ridings. The number

of members serving each district usually ranges from three to five.158 Voters are asked to rank their

choice of candidates. A percentage of the popular vote is required to be reached by a candidate to win a

seat.159 The threshold needed to win a seat is calculated by dividing 100% of the popular vote by the

number of candidates that will represent the riding.

To determine a winner the first ranked votes are counted out. If there are no candidates that

reach the threshold the candidate with the lowest number of first place rankings is eliminated and all of

the candidate’s ballots would be redistributed according to each ballot’s second place selection.160 In the

case that the first place ballot count results in a candidate winning, this candidate’s excess votes are

redistributed among the candidates until all of the ridings’ seats are filled.161 Candidates can still

associate themselves with parties, although more than one candidate belonging to a single party can

represent a given riding.

This technique serves to give results that are reflective of the popular vote. With many

candidates being elected, multiple parties being represented and most votes being counted, more

within the electorate feel represented and have a say in the outcome. 162 Although this system is not

perfectly representative of the popular vote it does a better job than FPTP.

5.21 Regional Representation favoured over Party Lines

157 Pilon, The Politics of Voting, 22.158 Ibid., 22.159 Ibid., 22.160 Ibid., 22.161 Ibid., 22.162 Ibid., 131-132

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MPs are also focussed on appeasing the voters of a region rather than their own party. Unlike in

MMP, parties are not able to declare seat holders, making MPs less reliant on parties to win in future

elections.163 It could also be argued that STV is better than FPTP in this matter as well. Under this system

voters are able to put thought into the individuals they are voting for rather than the just the parties.164

As a result the election provides a forum where candidates may be more willing to defy party lines in

favour of regional preferences to present themselves as different from other candidates of the same

party.

5.22 Ridings are overextended

STV also has extensive disadvantages. Like MMP, STV would have a problem representing

regions within Canada. Although ridings exist, they are much larger and an MP’s ability to represent local

concerns may be compromised.165 166 As a result a quality of FPTP that Canadians hold so dear would be

compromised. Along with a lack of adequate regional representation, popular votes for parties are

misrepresented as well. In comparison to FPTP, STV has a tendency to benefit larger parties or regionally

concentrated parties, especially in smaller ridings, and has been only been able to allow smaller national

parties to have a slightly better outcome in larger elections ridings.167 168 The result is still a legislature

that is slightly more representative of the popular vote than FPTP. However, the reflectiveness of the

system suggests the affect would be minimal.

5.23 Counting Process is complex

The complexity of counting ballots in STV is another significant problem of the system. In STV

counting ballots would be very time consuming or expensive depending on the method chosen. In STV,

163 Ibid.,121-126.164 Ibid., 126-127165 Ibid., 121.166 Ibid., 121-122.167 Jansen and Siaroff. Regionalism and Party Systems, 61.168 Pilon, The Politics of Voting, 120-132.

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to count ballots by hand takes days as each time a candidate is eliminated or elected, ballots must be

redistributed to other candidates.169 Alternatively, an electronic ballot counting system could be used.

This can be expensive, with the potential of costing tens of millions of dollars to set up and maintain.170

In addition, the results produced by an electronic ballot counting system are not always

correct.171 172 There are a variety of problems that can occur with the counting process. Machines can

over count, under count, or fail to count ballots that are marked correctly. 173 There is also the potential

that machines can mark ballots incorrectly during the voting process if votes are cast via electronic

ballot.174 There are so many potential errors that exist within these systems, and although technology

continues to improve, it seems logical that avoiding this counting method may be best.

5.24 Unreliable Results

The final and arguably the most catastrophic disadvantage of STV is its inability to produce the

same results if votes are counted differently. As previously mentioned if a candidate reaches the

threshold necessary to win a seat their “surplus” of votes is redistributed.175 Thus the determination of

the proceeding winner is dependent on which ballots are counted and which are considered surplus.176

The time at which an individual shows up to vote could determine how their vote is distributed, and

ultimately affect the outcome of the election.

169 Courtney, Elections, 183-184.170 Charles Arthur. "Counting the Cost – Electronically." The Guardian, September 30, 2009. 171 Arthur, Counting the Cost.172 Michael A. Carrier,"Vote Counting, Technology and Unintended Consequences." St. John`s Law Review 79, no. 3 (2005): 649-652.173 Carrier, Vote Counting Technology, 649-651174 Ibid., 649-652.175 Courtney, Elections, 183-184.176 Fuad Aleskerov, and Alexander Karpov. "A New Single Transferable Vote Method and Its Axiomatic Justification." Social Choice and Welfare 40, no. 3 (2012): 4.

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Even if the machine were to randomize the votes once they all had been collected there is still

the potential that depending on the randomization, the outcome could be different.177 A system where

results vary depending on the time each vote is counted seems antidemocratic in nature as the value of

votes is not the same amongst voters. It should not matter what time someone chooses to vote during

the election period.

STV has some benefits, but also some flaws. Its inability to represent voters accurately, its

complicated calculation method, and inconsistent results suggest it may not be the best system to be

implemented at the Federal Level in Canada.

5.3 Alternative Vote (AV)

Alternative Vote (AV) is the final system that has had the opportunity to be considered by

reformers in Canada. AV is a ballot reform system whereby every voter is able to rank candidates in

order of preference. The ballots are tallied up and if a candidate reaches 50% of popular support they

win the seat.178 If not, the last place candidate’s ballots are redistributed and the process continues until

one candidate reaches 50% support.179 AV is different from the other two reforms cited because it is

only a modification of the ballot. Unlike the other referenced systems it does not modify the way seats

are distributed.

5.31 Maintenance of Regional Representation

The advantage that is evident from this system is the maintenance of the regional

representation that exists with FPTP. As is the case within FPTP, each relatively compact region has a

177 Askerov and Karpov, A New Single Transferable Vote Method, 4.178 Courtney, Elections, 183.179 Ibid., 183.

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member with no overlap of jurisdiction.180 This establishes much better regional representation than

does the previously two systems mentioned.

5.32 Fairer Results

The second and arguably the most significant advantage to AV is that results when compared to

FPTP are fairer. AV first makes it so that a majority is required in each riding for a candidate to be

elected. This eliminates any chance that a riding would elect a candidate that is not approved by most in

the riding and limits the number of wasted votes.181 Its limitation of strategic voting also allows voters to

choose their true first preference on the ballot. If that preference has no opportunity to win, their

second preference is taken into consideration at the same value as the first.182 Even if a party that the

voter does not like has a good chance to win, the voter has an opportunity to have their vote count

towards a party likely to win against the former, while showing full support to the candidate and party

they truly prefer.

5.33 Phoney Reform: Not Reflective of National Results

Like every system AV has its disadvantages. The first is its inability to bring about results that are

reflective of the population. While it does insure that a majority of voters from each riding have

supported the candidate in question, the reality is that those elected to the seat is not that much

different from what would have been chosen under FPTP. AV continues to over exaggerate the number

of seats won by large parties, while the same hardship faced by small parties under FPTP would continue

to exist. For this reason it has been dubbed the “phoney reform”.183 Almost always the candidate leading

180 David Sanders, Harold Clarke, Marianne C. Stewart, and Paul Whiteley. "Simulating the Effects of the Alternative Vote in the 2010 UK General Election." Parliamentary Affairs, 2010: 2,4.181 "Plurality-Majority Electoral Systems: A Review." Elections Canada. June 13, 2014. 182 Plurality-Majority Electoral Systems, Elections Canada. 183 Dennis Pilon. "The Uncertain Path of Democratic Renewal In Ontario." In Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada and Its Provinces. Peterborough, On: Broadview Press Limited, 2004: 257.

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the race after one round votes is able to win the seat. Only a handful of ridings have the potential to

change.184 This leads to continual underrepresentation for smaller parties as few seats can be gained

beyond what was available under FPTP. 185

5.34 Secondary and Tertiary preferences rarely taken into consideration

The system also does not take into consideration second or third preferences where smaller

parties are likely to be ranked. For a majority of the electorate that would select a large party first, it is

likely that their second or third preferences may be smaller parties.186 187 This interest in these parties is

never recognized because the small parties are eliminated before the large ones.

While many voters may be favourable towards a small party, this feeling will not be expressed

by this system. Not only do the results of the system limit growth of smaller parties, the results of AV

can further widen the seat totals for parties in landslide victories. This creates results that are even less

proportional than under FPTP, as the winning party has the opportunity to eliminate small parties and

opposition parties in each constituency, to allow them to win more seats.188 These results produce

legislatures that are less proportional than before, eliminating the reason for the implementation of

reform in the first place.

5.35 Impractical Counting Practices

Like STV, AV’s counting practices are not very practical. Again, counting ballots by hand would

be difficult and time consuming, while technology counting could be expensive and have a risk of error.

189 If AV is to be adopted vote counting will be reformed and will likely result in some consequences. AV

184 Jansen and Siaroff. Regionalism and Party Systems, 57-58.185 Pilon, The Politics of Voting, 71.186 "The Alternative Vote (or Instant Run-off Voting): It’s No Solution for the Democratic Deficit." Fair Vote Canada. August 4, 2009: 2.187 Ibid., 71.188 "Alternative Vote." Electoral Reform Society. 2010. 189 Arthur, Counting the Cost.

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does appear to give the public more selection, but whether that selection could translate into better

representation in the legislature and be easily implemented without consequence is unlikely. For this

reason it seems that AV could not accomplish what it would set out to.

5. 4 Difficulty in choosing one Electoral System

As has been examined, each of these reform systems fit varying needs of the Canadian

Electorate while still having notable flaws. It is analogous to an American drug commercial, where the

side effects of the drug have the potential to cause as many problems as the ones being solved. While

despite these affects such systems could improve upon FPTP, it is likely that the implementation of such

systems would be difficult. These difficulties are a result of a variety of factors, most of which have been

evident during attempts to implement electoral reform made at the provincial level.

6.0 Difficulty in Accomplishing Reform

Time and again we see a promise of reform from a party, but when that party comes to power it

fails to accomplish reform. It is often suggested that this is due to the fact that once a party comes to

power it has no interest in overthrowing the system that got it there. 190

6.1 Governing Party has little incentive to implement Reform

This stems not only from politicians wanting to maintain power, but internal party bureaucrats

fearing that implementing a system of this nature would limit a parties abilities to win majorities in the

future. This was the case in the 2007 Ontario Referendum with the Liberal party.

During the Progressive Conservative Government in the early 2000’s in Ontario, the Opposition

leader, Dalton McGuinty, was a strong advocate for electoral reform.191 After winning the election, a

190 Richie and Hill, The Fair Elections Movement in the United States, 218-221.191 Kuchapski, Electoral Reform Failed in Ontario, 154.

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commission was created to analyze how to best improve the electoral system in the province.192 The

commitment that Dalton McGuinty once had for this cause evaporated. By 2007 his party had distanced

itself from the proposed alternative and put the reform campaign in a position of difficulty.193 This has

been the case in many Reform attempts whereby the governing party reneges on its promise realizing

that the reform could compromise its ability to control government.

6.2 Embracing Reform can be costly for Governing Party

Even if a governing party is to embrace reform, it may come at a cost. This was the case of Parti

Quebecois in Quebec’s 1984 election. Leader of the Parti Quebecois Rene Levesque had been a strong

advocate of reform in the past and began to campaign on the issue.194 Opposition leader Robert

Bourassa attacked Levesque for trying to modify a system in order to maintain his power. It is suggested

that Levesque’s stance and Bourassa’s attack was a contributing factor in the defeat of the Parti

Quebecois in 1984.195 This establishes that even if parties do attempt to carry out their promises to

reform the electoral system, they can suffer consequences thus limiting the incentive.

6.3 Referendum

Upon being elected, if a politician was still to support reform, it would seem that further barriers

exist. Under constitutional provisions electoral reform could come about through ordinary legislation

and would not require a constitutional amendment.196 This means that there is no law in place making a

referendum necessary. Although it is not necessary, public pressure on Canadian politicians would likely

result in a referendum.

192 Ibid., 154.193 Ibid., 152.194 Doody and Milner, Quebec May Be Ready to Act, 269.195 Ibid., 269-271.196 Ronald L. Watts "The Federative Superstructure." In Essential Readings in Canadian Constitutional Politics. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2011: 69.

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The reason a referendum is likely to occur on this issue, is due to pressures from the public,

endorsement from opposition party leaders in Canada proposing reform, as well as the precedence set

by provincial referendums. 197 198 199 Otherwise it would seem that a change of this nature would be

undemocratic, without taking into account public opinion. A referendum poses another significant

obstacle for reform. As we have seen with the attempts made in British Columbia, Ontario and Prince

Edward Island, to get the necessary support from the public required to bring about electoral reform is

not an easy task.

A referendum of this nature would likely require more than simply 50% plus one vote in order to

pass. In British Columbia even with a majority of the population supporting the referendum (57.69%) the

referendum did not pass in 2005.200 This was because this referendum on electoral reform required that

60% of the ridings would require 50% support, along with 60% of the total population.201 202 These same

requirements were used in Ontario and Prince Edward Island as well.203 It is therefore likely then that if

Canada were to go forward with a referendum these would be the qualifications necessary for it to pass.

6.31 Costly to Inform Public

To convince this number of voters to support a proposal for electoral reform would be difficult.

The electorate would be hesitant to agree to changes they do not understand. Therefore, in order to

allow reform to pass in a referendum it is necessary to inform the electorate both about the benefits

and flaws of the current system as well as the proposed new system.204 These campaigns need extensive

197 Geddes, John. "Can Justin Trudeau Fix the Vote with Electoral Reform?" MacLean's, June 27, 2015. 198 Bolen, Mulcair Promises Proportional Representation.199 Campbell Clark. "In Reforming Voting System, Parties Favour What Benefits Them Most." The Globe and Mail, August 7, 2015, Politics sec.200 Barnes and Robertson, Electoral Reform Initiatives, 1-12.201 Ibid., 1-12.202 Kuchapski, Electoral Reform Failed in Ontario, 149.203 Barnes and Robertson, Electoral Reform Initiatives, 1-12.204 Nagel, PR in New Zealand, 125-127.

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finances and resources to accomplish these ends.205 Lacking these resources, the electorate is unlikely to

support the proposals when they have little knowledge on the subject as was the case in Ontario.206

Getting these finances and resources is a big challenge that reformers would face. This would

require significant contributions from the government to spread information to the electorate

nationwide.207 If support is difficult to come by from governing parties as it usually is, funding can be

scarce. The result could be that a large segment of the population uninformed, which would likely end in

rejection of the proposal.

6.32 Limited Media Coverage

A lack of media coverage can also be a reason of defeat for a referendum of this nature. If voters

are unaware of the issue prior to voting they will be able to develop an informed opinion beforehand,

increasing the likelihood they would vote in favour of the reform. This is often the case because of the

lack of media coverage, as was found during the 2007 referendum in Ontario. 75% Ontarians claimed

they knew little about the proposal was found to be significantly influenced by the lack of media

coverage.208 In the weeks leading up to the referendum, the proposal was scarcely mentioned by

Ontario’s largest media outlets including: CBC, CTV, the Toronto Star, the Globe and Mail, and the

Ottawa Citizen. 209 The coverage that was offered was also not balanced.

Many media pieces focused on the flaws of the new MMP system and the benefits of the old

FPTP system, giving little reference to the arguments in favour of the new system. 210 It is notable that of

the authors that wrote the articles mentioned, the majority were columnists that worked on a variety of

205 Ibid., 127.206 Kuchapski, Electoral Reform Failed in Ontario, 154-156.207 Nagel, PR in New Zealand, 127.208 Ibid., 154.209 George Hoff. "Covering Democracy: The Coverage of FPTP vs. MMP in the Ontario Referendum on Electoral Reform." Canadian Journal of Media Studies 5, no. 1 (2009): 30-44.210 Hoff, Covering Democracy, 30-44.

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political topics rather than academics. One of the few articles favouring MMP was written by Dennis

Pilon, an established academic in the field.211 Needless to say, media coverage was not balanced during

this campaign.

It is likely that during a federal referendum the media would serve not as a body to inform the

public, but rather serve as a sounding board for opponents, allowing fear regarding a new system to

creep into the public’s subconscious as was demonstrated in Ontario during the referendum.212 While it

is difficult to say why reform coverage was inadequate it may be because those that the issue fails to

attract the attention of the public, perhaps perceived as an uninteresting issue or that many in the

media have a vested interest in a particular party which benefits from FPTP to succeed.213 Whatever the

reasoning for this poor coverage, it stands that the media serves as an obstacle to accomplishing reform.

7.0 Transitional Reform

With these obstacles limiting the opportunity for reform, it seems unlikely that reform could be

accomplished. This difficultly has led many to suggest the implementation of reform options that are

transitional.214 A transitional system would be reform that moves toward eliminating problems in place

within the current system, but is seen to be less drastic. Ballot reform to an ordinal ballot could classify

as a transitional reform within a system currently employing FPTP. While the ordinal ballot gives electors

more input into the result, the constituency design remains.215 Bringing about this change can get the

electorate comfortable with the notion of reform so that in future referendums, voters will be less

hesitant to support reform proposals.

7.1 Implementing Ordinal Ballot as a Transitional Step

211 Ibid., 35.212 Ibid., 24-46.213 Kuchapski, Electoral Reform Failed in Ontario, 149-151.214 Richie and Hill, The Fair Elections Movement in the United States, 224-225.215 Pilon, The Politics of Voting, 19-25.

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Reform in Canada to an ordinal ballot allows for congruence towards full reform where there is

part proportional representation and part regional representation. That is because and ordinal ballot

maintains full regional representation while allowing the system to become slightly more

proportional.216 In addition, both systems previously mentioned have the capability to include ordinal

ballots. While not discussed, MMP could use an ordinal ballot to make the election of local

representatives even more reflective of the population’s interests.217 This makes the adoption of this

type of ballot an incremental step from the current FPTP system to MMP and STV.

7.2 Introducing a Borda Count System

Implementing a ballot modification may be a good transitional step. Although so far in Canada

only Alternative Vote has been considered as a ballot reform.218 Instead, it should be found that a Borda

Count system may be a better fit for the Canadian political system. Borda Count is a system originally

designed by French Mathematician Charles de Borda.219 It has likely not been considered in the past in

Canada because it is so infrequently used. Its use is limited to federal elections in the small island nation

of Nauru, Kiribati, as well as in the Slovenian Federal elections to determine two minority seats. 220

Although it is rarely used, it should not be discounted.

As mentioned Borda Count uses an ordinal ballot, but in a different way than AV does. Voters

are allowed to order their preferences first, second, third, and so on. Each placement is worth a set of

points. 221 The candidate that receives the most points wins their local riding, with all ridings remaining

as they are.

216 Ibid., 19-25.217 Heather MacIvor. "Proportional and Semi-Proportional Electoral Systems: Their Potential Effects on Canadian Politics." Elections Canada. April 23, 1999: 2-6.218 The Alternative Vote, Fair Vote Canada.219 Peter Emerson. "The Original Borda Count and Partial Voting." Social Choice and Welfare Soc Choice Welf, 2011: 355.220 Emerson, The Original Borda Count, 358.221 Ibid., 353

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7.3 Point Distribution Method

Although point distribution methods vary, the most common is to have the last place vote worth

zero points, the second last place worth one point, the third last worth two points and so on.222

However, this original method poses an obvious problem. It can encourage strategic voting. Voters,

wanting their preferred party to win, will place their preferred party in first place and list the opponent

of their preferred party in last.223 The problem is that parties ranked in the middle of a voter’s ballot may

be despised by the voter even more than the candidate that was ranked last.

7.4 Possibility for Strategic Voting

However, the voter will choose to give candidates they truly despise a better ranking in order to

improve the chances of the party they prefer.224 225 The ballot is then not reflective of the voter’s true

preferences. Furthermore, requiring the submission of a full ballot leaves room for the electorate to

make ill-informed decisions. Most electorate may know most of the candidates and parties but not all,

especially if the list of contenders is extensive.226 The result could be many ballots with candidates listed

in an order without the elector knowing anything about them.

7.41 Solution

A simple solution that has been proposed is to introduce a limited number of ordinal selections

that can be made by a voter, usually to a top three selection.227 This allows the voter to select only their

preferences, leaving the candidates they do not want to vote for out of the equation.228 This eliminates

222 Ibid., 353.223 Hannu Nurmi, and Hannu Salonen. "More Borda Count Variations for Project Assesment." Czech Economic Review, no. 2 (2008): 109.224 Nurmi and Salonen, More Borda Count Variations, 109.225 Emerson, The Original Borda Count, 357.226 Jeff Gill, and Jason Gainous. "Why Does Voting Get So Complicated? A Review of Theories for Analyzing Democratic Participation." Statistical Science 17, no. 4 (2002): 390-391.227 Emerson, The Original Borda Count, 354-357.228 Ibid., 354-357.

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the element of strategic voting as candidates are no longer able to be ranked last, and eliminates the

likelihood of making misinformed selections, as only one’s preferences are considered recorded on the

ballot.

7.5 Voters could be allowed to fill out Incomplete Ballots

A second adjustment that could be made would be to give voters the option to fill out an

incomplete ballot also known as a partial ballot.229 Instead of listing all three parties of choice, they could

list their top two or top one. If only one candidate or party inspires confidence from a voter, it would be

unfair to force a voter to choose more candidates they dislike.230 As a result this system provides a

compromise for those within the electorate uncomfortable with a new system. This is because it allows

voters to vote in accordance with the rules of FPTP.

8.0 Alternative Borda Count System (ABC)

If we are to take into consideration these changes to the Borda Count method, we are left with a

system where voters have the option to choose a first, second, and third preferred candidate. A first

ranked choice is worth three points, second choice worth two points, and third place choice worth one

point. If they wish they can choose to select only a first choice or a first and second choice with no

variation in the value of each ranking. For simplicity the paper will refer to this modified system as an

Alternative Borda Count system (ABC).231 232

229 Ibid., 353.230 John Cullinan, Samuel K. Hsiao, and David Polett. "A Borda Count for Partially Ordered Ballots." Soc Choice Welf 42 (2014): 913.231 To date I was unable to find reference to an ABC system. ABC is very similar to the selection method used for the Heisman Trophy given to the American College Football Most Valuable Player. 232 It is important to note that ABC (Alternative Borda Count) is distinct from Modified Borda Count (MBC).

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To analyze the value of this system within Canada, this paper will consider both the problems it

would seek to alleviate, and the disadvantages of the system. To look at the practicality and the value of

implementing a system of this nature, the paper will consider the results of a study that analyzed how

ABC results would differ from FPTP results amongst a sample group of Canadian voters. Also to be

analyzed is the approval rating of the ABC system within the same sample group.

8.1 Accomplishing the Four Core Goals

In the beginning of the paper, it was outlined that Canadian reform movements continually

sought four core goals. These included: strong regional representation, fairness for all voters, better

voter turnout, and better representation of minority groups. An ABC system employed in Canada would

work toward accomplishing the first three goals, while the final goal could be accomplished through

other means.

8.11 Maintains Strong Regional Representation

One of the main strengths of the ABC system is its ability to represent Canadians well regionally.

This is because, just like other systems that solely use a modified ballot, it maintains the number of MPs

as well as the size and number of ridings currently in place under the FPTP system.233 This ensures the

maintenance of the relationship between members and a local electorate and guarantees that the

issues facing each of these local electorate bodies will be addressed.

8.12 Fairer Representation for Smaller Parties and Independents

This system also proves to be much fairer to smaller national parties and independents. By

offering voters a second or third choice more individuals will be willing to vote for these smaller parties

because it will be at no cost to their first party choice. With more votes coming from more voters these

233 Emerson, The Original Borda Count, 354.

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unlikely victors have a higher chance of winning.234 This is in contrast to AV which provides the

opportunity for many voters to vote for smaller parties or independents on their second and third

choice, the likelihood of this changing the results of the riding is low.

These smaller parties will consistently be eliminated in the first few rounds of elimination.

Rather guaranteeing seats for smaller parties, ABC gives them an increased ability to win the local seat.

While it is difficult to say exactly whether the system will have more of a tendency to produce majorities

or minorities, the new found strength of third parties suggests that the average number of seats a

majority government receives under this system would be lessened.

8.13 Improved Voter Turnout Rate

As mentioned, better voter turnout rate has been a product of reform. By giving the voter more

utility in their vote, it has been established that the turnout rate will improve.235 This would especially be

the case in ABC. ABC gives the voter more utility than AV because all selections made are counted in the

final tally.236 In AV only one of the selections can be counted in the final outcome.237 With higher rates of

utility, turnout rates are likely to improve as well.

8.14 Improved Representation of Women and Minorities

Representation of women and minorities will not be guaranteed by ABC system. Aside from

giving a broader number of candidates the ability to compete in an election, there is little reason to

think that women or minorities would get better representation from this system. However, there are

alternatives that can be employed that would limit this problem. As mentioned earlier, the

implementation of quotas for women and minorities in Federal parties, at local affiliates of parties, as

234 Gerry Mackie. Democracy Defended. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003:60-69. (improvement of smaller parties turnout demonstrated by increase of parties and their success)235 Fair Vote Systems, Prepared by Fair Vote Canada, 2-4.236 ***237 Nurmi and Salonen, More Borda Count Variations, 110.

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well as implementing in seminars for candidates could serve to benefit these groups.238 239 Also

mentioned is the possibility that subsidized childcare for candidates could improve diverse enrollment

as well.240

Further adjustments could be made for the aboriginal population. As discussed there could be

an inclusion of designated aboriginal seats, determined by the number of Aboriginals that enroll by

province on the voters list.241 These seats would guarantee more fair representation for this

demographic. With these modifications, any electoral system has the capacity to improve upon

representation of these groups. If those responsible for changing the electoral system were serious

about better representation for these groups, such modification can be made alongside the

implementation of ABC.

8.2 Alternative Borda Count alleviates further problems

Implementing ABC in Canada allows for the possibility of addressing all four commonly cited

desires of reform committees at the provincial level. Yet ABC has further attractive attributes.

8.21 Conciliatory Results

Its ability to bring about both conciliatory results helps to change the electoral process for the

better. 242 243 244 With parties requiring support from many more segments of the population there could

be a tendency to seek approval from many within the electorate. This will ideally make it so that

candidates and MPs listen more to the local electorate, focusing on campaign promises that are in the

interest of the local electorate rather than political parties.

238 Bird, Lessons from France, 195-196.239 Silbermann, Encouraging More Female Candidacies.240 Ibid.241 Trevor Knight. "Electoral Justice for Aboriginal People in Canada." The McGill Law Journal 46 (2001): 1065-1079.242 Nurmi and Salonen, More Borda Count Variations,109-112.243 Gill and Gainous. A Review of Theories for Analyzing Democratic Participation, 390-391.244 "Borda Count." Electoral Reform Society. 2010.

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8.22 Eliminate Vote Splitting

If ABC were to be implemented, it would also resolve the issue of vote splitting in Canada. With

the inclusion of an ordinal ballot that allows voters to vote for more than one party, all of those on one

side of the political spectrum have the ability to unite all of their votes, while still being able to cast

votes for their preferred candidates.245 As a result, there will be no need for strategic voting, as voters do

not have to worry about a divided political spectrum. There is still the potential that the order of voters’

preferences could be affected by strategy, although this would still mark an improvement in the

accuracy of ballots from the current system.

8.23 Ease of Implementation

The final notable advantage to ABC is the ease to which it could be implemented. It is a system

based on distribution of points rather than a persistent redistribution of ballots (STV and AV) so process

of counting ballots could be done by hand.246 In Nauru where Borda Count is used, the counting is done

by hand, however can take a long time to complete.247 While the proposed ABC system includes fewer

votes to count, the counting process will still be time consuming in relation to FPTP. A simple solution

may be to hire several more counters in each riding to improve result timing while avoiding the cost and

complexity of electronic counting methods.

The final aspect that makes this system easily implementable is the fact that it has potential to

bring with it few objections from FPTP supporters. It avoids the inclusion of particularly unpopular

245 Great Britain. House of Commons. Political and Constitutional Reform Committee. Report on the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bills. 2010-2011 Sess., Report 3: 112-113246 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Report of the Pacific Islands Forum Election Observer Mission to the Nauru General Elections. April 2010: 10-31.247 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Nauru General Elections, 10-31.

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aspects of other reform systems such as the party list and modification of ridings.248 249 It also allows

those who preferred the old system to continue to use the ballot as they did before under FPTP.250 251 It

is a system that allows more inclusion of voters’ interests without drastically changing the current

system in place. With many similarities existing between ABC and FPTP, the population could find it

more difficult to find justifiable objections to the alteration. This in turn could translate into a higher

likelihood of success in a referendum, improving the chances for the establishment of reform in Canada

8.3 Disadvantages of Alternative Borda Count

Like all systems, ABC has its flaws as well. Although, the disadvantages that ABC possesses

would not be detrimental to the Canadian electoral system and could potentially be avoided.

8.31 Inclusion of More Parties and Candidates

The first disadvantage that academics refer to is its tendency to lead to the inclusion of many

more parties and candidates in an election because more votes are available to win.252 In ABC the

number of additional candidates and parties that enroll would probably be limited because voters are

limited to three selections and Canada’s party system is already very diverse.253

8.32 Potential to Favour Centrist Parties (critique of Alternative Vote)

A second critique that could apply to ABC is the fact that this system may have a tendency to

produce candidates that associate with being in the centre of the political spectrum. While this is more a

critique of AV, I felt it important to consider, seeing as ABC uses an ordinal ballot.254 As much as

248 Benzie, Robert. "Pros and Cons of MMP." The Toronto Star, October 5, 2007, News / Ontario sec. 249 Emerson, The Original Borda Count, 354.250 Cullinan, Hsiao, and Polett. Borda Count for Partially Ordered Ballots, 913.251 Ibid., 353-357.252 Mackie, Democracy Defended, 60-69.253 John C. Courtney. "Forty and Counting." In Election. Toronto, ON: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2010: 20-21, 26-31254 Alternative Vote, Electoral Reform Society.

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compromise can be beneficial for a political system, the concern with this critique is that a party

associated with the centre would garner more success.

In Canada’s case it could be suggested that Liberal party would benefit from a system of this

nature because it is seen as the compromise party for both Conservative and NDP supporters. This is not

necessarily the case. Due to the diversity of parties in Canada’s electoral system, the second and even

the third choices of NDP and Conservative supporters would not necessarily be Liberal.255 In addition,

giving voters the opportunity to select only their first choice or their first and second choice, could limit

candidates from supporting a compromise candidate unless they are legitimately favoured by that voter.

8.321 Solution

It would seem that the likelihood this system could benefit the Liberal party over others is low in

the Canadian context. To eliminate any possibility of this occurring, the first place selection point total

could be increased from 3 points to 4 points. This would make it so that two second place votes would

be equal to one first place vote, as opposed to being worth more. While it reduces the effects of the

second and third place selection, it stills allows them to be important in the final outcome. If ABC were

to be considered, further study would need to be done to analyze which mode best suits Canada.

8.4 A reasonable System to implement

ABC is a system that would carry with it many benefits and only a few insignificant

disadvantages for Canada. Its implementation could be the type of change that Canadians both want

and deserve. This ABC system is very much a hypothetical creation and has never been applied to

elections that have bearing on a legislature. 256 To determine its effectiveness, an extensive study must

be done to test this system in Canada.

255 Courtney, Forty and Counting, 20-31.256 ABC is very similar to the selection method used for the Heisman Trophy given to the American College Football Most Valuable Player.

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9.0 Preliminary Study

Although resources were limited, I was able to conduct a small study to determine the type of

results this system would produce in contrast to FPTP, as well as the overall approval rate of ABC

amongst those analyzed.

9.1 Sample Population

This study analyzed voters in Simcoe North federal riding. This riding served as an excellent

sample riding for three reasons. The electorate in Simcoe North adamantly voted against reform in

Ontario’s 2007 referendum on MMP (the Federal riding of Simcoe North previously shared identical

borders to provincial riding of the same name).257 258 259 If ABC were to get a positive reception here, it

could indicate a high probability of passing federally.

Simcoe North also has a high tendency to select Conservative victors with Liberals in second

place.260 Poling this population will give an indication as to whether or not the Liberal party over any

other would benefit from the implementation of ABC. Finally Simcoe North is often a victim of vote

splitting. The problem is so severe that in 2012 an attempt was made to unite the Liberals, NDP, and

Greens locally. 261 To date it marks the only attempt made within a Federal riding to unify parties under

one candidate. Thus the results of this study could indicate whether or not ABC would in fact eliminate

vote splitting.

Before looking at the results there are important considerations that must be made. This study

is not reflective of the entire federal electorate nor the electorate of Simcoe North. It is simply a random

257 "Statistical Results / Résultats Statistiques." Elections Ontario. 2007. 258 "Simcoe North – Historical Data." Elections Ontario. 2003. 259 "Simcoe North." Elections Ontario. 2007. 260 "History of Federal Ridings Since 1867: Simcoe North, Ontario (1867 - )." Parliament of Canada. 261 Tim Harper. "Uniting Progressives at the Grassroots Level — Is Simcoe North Alone?" The Toronto Star, June 5, 2012, Canada sec.

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sample of 51 Canadian voters who were in the riding on the days the research was conducted.262 Of this

sample 11 were taken from a Café in Orillia, Ontario, while 40 were taken outside of a grocery store in

Coldwater, Ontario. It is also important to note that the demographic analyzed may have had a tendency

to be more progressive thinking as those desiring change may have been more willing to participate.

9.2 Survey Design

Participants were asked to use a FPTP ballot to display how they would likely vote in the

upcoming 2015 election in the riding. After filling out the FPTP ballot, the ABC system was briefly

described. Participants were then asked to display how they would likely vote using an ABC ballot.

Finally they were asked which system they preferred the former or the latter and why. Completed

entries were submitted anonymously. While the outcome may not be completely reflective of Canada’s

electorate the information will indicate tendencies of the ABC system if it were to be employed in

Canada as well as what the attitudes toward the new system might be across the country.

9.3 Results

The results of the study were extremely promising. The study found that when participants used

ABC to vote as they would in the local federal election, the system would both eliminate vote splitting

and would not especially benefit the Liberal Party over others.

Party/Candidate FPTP totals (50 valid ballots)

ABC 1st (49 valid ballots)

ABC 2nd (49 valid Ballots)

ABC 3rd (40 valid ballots)

ABC totals (1st choice worth 4 points/ 3 points)

ABC Totals including spoiled ballots (1st choice worth 4 points/3 points)

New Demcoratic Party (NDP) /Richard Banigan

12(3rd)

12 15 9 87/75(Winner)

87/75(Winner)

Independent/Jacob Kearey-

3 (4th) 5 4 6 34/29 (5th) 34/29 (5th)

262 To see the ballot/survey participants were asked to complete please refer to the last page of the paper, after the bibliography.

59

MorelandLiberal Party/Elisabeth Riley

14(2nd)

12 12* 10 82/70 (2nd) 80/68 (2nd)

Conservative Party/ Bruce Stanton

17 (Winner)

14 7* 5 75/61 (3rd) 73/59 (3rd)

Green Party/ Peter Stubbins

3 (4th) 6 11* 9 55/49 (4th) 53/47 (4th)

Christian Heritage Party/ Scott Whittaker

1 (6th) 0 2* 1 5/5 (6th) 3/3 (6th)

263 264 (*indicates a single ballot that had two second choices selected- considered a spoiled column of the ballot)265

***Please Note: This study was conducted in the first two weeks of the campaign. It is likely that the

same study conducted on election day would have been less favourable to the Conservative Party and

NDP, while more favourable to the Liberal Party and Green Party, according to poling done just prior

to election day***

9.31 Elimination of Vote Splitting and Strategic Voting

Vote splitting is very evident in the FPTP totals. In this simulated FPTP election, the Conservative

party would win with 3 votes over the other five contenders essentially splitting the voters on the

centre-left of the spectrum between the NDP and the Liberals. This is demonstrated by the fact that if

the votes of the Liberal and the NDP were added up, the combination would lead to a defeat of the

Conservative Party by 9 votes, a significant differential. In the ABC election this is no longer an issue as

both parties are able to combine their support.

As a result the vote splitting is no longer a problem as both parties are able to feed off each

other’s support and place higher than the Conservative Party. There is also evidence to suggest that

263 "Ridings & Candidates in the 2015 Canada Federal Election: Simcoe North." Election Almanac. 2015. 264 Patrick Bales. "Local Man Who Was Disqualified as NDP Candidate Running as Independent." The Packet and Times, August 4, 2015, News Local sec.265 An alternative to counting two second place votes on a ballot could be to count them and eliminate the third choice if there was one made. That way the ballot is still counted but, is not overvalued because 2 second choice selections were made.

60

voters would use ABC to vote for their true preferences, further limiting the effects of strategic voting.

Liberals and Conservatives would be considered front runners in this election. Therefore an increase of

1st place votes in relation to FPTP votes for parties other than the Liberals and Conservatives would

indicate an increase in true preferential voting and the declining effect of strategic voting. Despite a

drop in the number of ballots being cast from the FPTP election to the ABC election, the four opposition

candidates were able to increase their first place votes in ABC. While the differential of four votes is

small, it still indicates that voters were much more willing to vote without strategy.

9.32 No advantage for Centrist Parties

A further positive outcome of this system was the fact that, the Liberal party did not appear to

benefit more than any other party. In both FPTP and ABC simulated elections, the Liberal party was the

second place finishing party. It is also notable that the NDP was able to receive more second and third

place votes, indicating that the Liberal position on the political spectrum did not place them in an

advantageous position.

9.33 High Approval Ratings for Winning Candidate

In addition to eliminating strategic voting and not over representing the Liberal party, the ABC

mock election produced further finding suggesting that it could improve representation in Canada. One

of the most promising findings in this research was that the ABC system did in fact produce a candidate

that was approved by the majority of the riding. The NDP overall received 73.5% of the total number of

voters’ support. It seems reasonable that they should be victorious over the Liberal Party which received

69.4% of the electorates support and the Conservative party which only received support from 53% of

support from voters.

9.34 Fairer Representation for Smaller Parties and Independents

61

These results also indicate the improved chance of 3rd parties and independents. While the

placement of the two smaller parties and the independent candidate remained low in contrast to the

larger parties, the results of the ABC election allowed two of three to get much closer to winning the

election. The Green party was the closest to winning, and although they were still relatively far off the

53 points received allowed them to collect 60.9% of the total points necessary to win. The independent

candidate’s results also indicated that the system could increase his likelihood of independents winning.

In the ABC example, the independent receive 39.1% of the total required to win. While the Christian

Heritage Party did not benefit from the results of the system, it is clear from the Green Party results and

the results of the independent did. Thus, in an ABC electoral system, smaller parties and even

independents would have more potential to significantly improve their results and have a greater

opportunity to win seats.

9.35 High Likelihood for Success of ABC in Referendum

The second portion of the survey found results that further supported the implementation of

ABC. Despite conducting the research in a riding that rejected Mixed Member Proportional in 2007 with

62.6% in favour of maintaining the status quo, the results indicated support for ABC.266 Not only was the

ABC system passed in this artificial referendum, it superseded expectations, receiving 31 votes in

support and 10 against. This meant that the population would have favoured ABC by 75.6%.

However it is notable that 10 participants refused to vote, potentially failing to understand the

question, or refusing to make a declaration of their intentions. In a referendum failing to mark an

answer would result in a discarded ballot, however, even if we are to consider that these participants

used their non-vote to demonstrate distaste for the new system proposed, the result would still favour

the ABC system. Considering blank ballots, 60.8% of voters favoured the ABC system. If there was a

266 Statistical Results, Elections Ontario.

62

referendum requiring 60% popular support, it would pass even in counting spoiled ballots as rejections.

If a population from a region that has adamantly opposed other reform systems in the past supports a

reform to this extent, it suggests that there might be a high likelihood that ridings across Canada that

have previously objected to reform would be more open to the proposal.

Systems Support with ABC first selection worth 4 points

Support with ABC selection worth 3 points

FPTP election Conservative supporters

FPTP election other party supporters

Total Support

FPTP 8 2 7 3 10ABC 16 15 5 26 31

The drastic change from the results of the 2007 referendum to the results of this study would

likely lead some to question why. One contributing factor would be the fact that voters had the

opportunity to use the system before voting in favour or against it to get a sense, whereas before the

MMP referendum in 2007 not everybody had this opportunity. It is also likely that some attributes of the

system would have been evident to the electors increasing likelihood for support. Many cited the

increased selection as a primary reason for supporting the reform, making it so that they were less

conflicted between different parties.

While MMP may offer selection of candidate and party, it does not offer diversified selection for

candidates competing against each other. The necessity of choosing one candidate in MMP could very

well be a contributing factor to the Ontario referendum’s failure and could explain why there is such a

large discrepancy between the reception of ABC and MMP.

Also cited by many as reasons for supporting the change was the elimination of split voting.

These participants recognized that strategy would no longer be necessary at the ballot booths, and that

this system would allow them to freely vote in accordance with their preferences. It also seems likely

63

that the ease to which the system could be used, and the easy to understand calculation methods, could

have made participants less threatened by the notion of reform. While there may be external factors

affecting the outcome of this experimental referendum, it is plausible that ABC was able to win largely

due to its own merits.

The other concern I had was that the support for ABC may be affected by the number of points

the party chosen first received. I wondered if 3 points would be seen as more favourable than 4 points

simply because of the logical transition of points 1-2-3. It was found that the relationship was negligible,

and support did not vary depending on the number of points the first place received. While in the table

above, the first two columns suggest there is some relationship, the second two columns are much more

telling.

It seems that a large majority of Conservative supporters in the FPTP election (10 participants)

were given ABC descriptions where the first place selection was worth 4 points. Whereas only 2

participants that were Conservative supporters in the FPTP election were given descriptions suggesting

ABC first place selections were worth three points. Seeing as the Conservatives are currently in office, it

would be logical for Conservative supporters to be less open to the idea of reform, making the

discrepancy between the first two columns understandable.267 The second two columns reinforce this

notion as the difference in statistics between Conservative and non-Conservative voters are much

stronger. It is revealed that 53.8% (7 of 13) Conservatives opposed the reform while only 10.3% (3 of 29)

non-Conservative supporters rejected the proposal.

Although Conservative supporters on the whole would have rejected ABC, the fact that as many

as 46.2% supported it, suggests that the system was able to bridge some of the gap between reform and

267 Pilon, The Uncertain Path of Democratic Renewal, 251.

64

the concern of one’s preferred party losing. This could indicate that ABC may do better in a referendum

than other potential systems.

10.0 Conclusion

After considering the current flaws of the FPTP system, and the aspirations of reformers in

Canada, it seems that any of the systems that are currently proposed by reformers would face serious

difficulties within the Canadian context. Instead, an Alternative Borda Count system (ABC) could be

implemented. While it may serve as a transition to a different reform type, it should be found that its

implementation could meet the many needs of the Canadian political system.

This system has an ability to maintain full regional representation, improve upon the fairness of

elections, improve voter turnout rates, eliminate vote splitting, and increase accountability of

candidates and MPs. It also appears that this system has the potential to receive the approval necessary

in a national referendum. With an extensive list of advantages, and few disadvantages, it seems that

ABC should be considered seriously in future reform discussions within the country.

65

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11.1 Survey for Experiment

Participation in this survey is anonymous and will be used for research purposes only. These results will not be used by political parties or by independent research agencies.

Please indicate with an X the candidate and party you are likely going to support in the upcoming 2015 federal election:

Party Candidate SelectionNew Democratic Party (NDP) Richard BaniganIndependent Jacob Kearey-

MorelandLiberal Party Elisabeth RileyConservative Party Bruce StantonGreen Party Peter StubbinsChristian Heritage Party Scott WhittakerThe purpose of this study is to analyze the effectiveness of a new electoral system called Borda Count. This system allows voters to select a first, second, and third choice vote instead of voting for a single candidate:

A first choice vote is worth 3 points *(changed to 4 on certain ballots)

A second choice is worth 2 points

A third choice is worth 1 point

The points are added up and the candidate with the most points wins.

How would you vote in the upcoming election if this system were in place? Please indicate your selection with a single X in each Place category.

If voters want they can select only their first choice or only their first and second choice.

Party Candidate 1st Place

2nd Place

3rd Place

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New Democratic Party (NDP) Richard BaniganIndependent Jacob Kearey-MorelandLiberal Party Elisabeth RileyConservative Party Bruce StantonGreen Party Peter StubbinsChristian Heritage Party Scott WhittakerOf these two systems which do you prefer (circle one): Current system or New System (Borda Count)

Why?:__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

11.2 Survey Findings from test Survey

Eligible to Vote in 2015 Election

age cohort

Participation in referendum

if so- for or against reform

(SMP or MMP)

SMP/ MMP/ Borda

reasoning

YES 36-50 blank blank blank MMP fairnessYES 51-64 YES FOR MMP blank

(MMP)equitable

YES 51-64 YES FOR MMP MMP better candidatesYES Over

65YES FOR MMP Borda (separate vote)

YES 51-64 YES FOR MMP MMP vote better reflects party platforms

YES Over 65

YES FOR MMP MMP more representative system

YES 51-64 NO blank MMP blank blankYES Over

65NO Unable to

Answerblank MMP possible to vote for one party

twiceNO Under

18NO Unable to

AnswerSMP SMP Simple

YES 51-64 NO Unable to Answer

MMP MMP has more impact on parties in power

YES Over 65

YES FOR MMP blank blank

YES Over 65

YES FOR MMP MMP separate local candidates and party

YES Over 65

YES FOR MMP Borda blank

YES 51-64 NO blank MMP Borda more support for candidate elected

YES 36-50 YES FOR MMP MMP fairer (not sure how Borda works in other contexts)

YES 51-64 NO Unable to MMP MMP fairer (party support reflected)

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AnswerYES 51-64 NO FOR MMP Borda fairer (recognizing preferences)YES 51-64 YES FOR MMP MMP (thinks Borda in

unimplementable)YES Over

65NO Unable to

AnswerMMP MMP fairer (party support reflected)

YES 18-25 NO Unable to Answer

MMP MMP fairer (party support reflected)- Borda (high potential for vote splitting)

YES 51-64 YES FOR MMP MMP provides better regional representation of party in power

YES Over 65

NO blank MMP MMP fairer representation

YES Over 65

NO blank MMP MMP fairer representation

YES 18-25 NO Unable to Answer

MMP Borda Unable to answer

YES 51-64 YES FOR MMP MMP Smaller parties get more power

Upon collecting the findings it seemed that the Borda Count system was strongly rejected. However, upon closer examination I determined that it was my collection method that produced inaccurate results. All that had participated in the referendum had voted YES for the MMP system before. In addition, with the exception of one person who did not understand the MMP system, all voted in favour of its implementation over the SMP system. This largely contrasts the provincial average in Ontario where approximately 63% rejected the system in the 2007 referendum. Even in the riding where the survey was taken, only 59.2% favoured the system. Upon further review I discovered that Trinity St. Paul’s United Church had played an intricate role in 2007 to bring about reform. Many of those participating in the survey already had an extensive knowledge of MMP with little prior knowledge of Borda Count. In addition, while all participants had well thought out reasons for favouring MMP it was clear from certain comments that they did not know enough about the Borda system or its impacts to favour it over MMP. On this basis I decided to redesign the survey. Many cited party-seat distribution and better selection as reasons for choosing MMP. Seeing as both these are also existent under a Borda Count system there is little reason to suggest that they would reject a Borda Count System over the current single member plurality, even though their first choice was Borda.

It seemed that if this survey were to produce valuable results I would need to consider a group that had less involvement direct involvement in the referendum, I would need to narrow the selection of systems down to two (Borda and SMP), although if I had the resources and time I could also have introduced MMP after considering the first two. Finally I would need do give a better demonstration of how Borda Count works.

The conclusion of this study led me to create the second survey where I reviewed only SMP and Borda Count, and gave participants a better understanding of Borda Count by allowing them to fill out a ballot.

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