124 !'iT CRITICALRHETORTC

7. On the priority of the concrete over the abstractor universal in ancient Greek thought, see Havelock( 1963).

8. For a dirussion and critique ofthe philosophi-c4l doctrihe of nominalism, see Woodey (1967),

9. On the Hobbesian raditiotr of linguistic refom,s Gustafson (1992).

I 0. For discussions of the cntrality of naming thatare compatible witl MclGrrow's emphasis, see the fol--.lowing entries: condensation symboli, definitlon/defi-nition ofthe situation, and ideographs.

11. The Ru$ian theorist Mikhail Bakhtin would de-scribe it as "internally dialogized" in that different idi-oms or languags intersect in the word. See discussionunder the entry for heteroglossia.

12. In th example, theword equality is the site or lo-cation of struggle between two rival idioms that havecenain ideological implications.

iiiJ References andAdditionalReading

Becker, S. (1971). Rhetoricai studies for the contempo-raryworld. ln E. Black & L- Bitzer (Eds.),The prospectof rhetoric. Eng)ewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Biesecker, B. ( 1992). Michel Foucault and the question ofrhetoric. Philosophy and Rhetotic, 25, 351'3,64.

Blair , C. (1987). The statement: Foundat ion ofFoucault's historical criticism. Western Journal ofSp eech Corumuniutio n, 5 1, 364-383.

Charland, M. (1991). Finding a horizon and telos: Thechallenge to critical rhetoric. Quarterly Journal ofSpeech, 77,7 1-74.

Clark, N. ( 1996). The citiqal servant: An Isocratean con-tribution to critical rhetoric. Quarteily lournal ofSpmh, 82,1rr-124.

Cloud, D. L. ( I994)- The materialitT of discourse as oxy-moron: A challenge to critical rhetoric. WesternJour-nal of Ca mmuniatlon, 58, I 47 -l 63.

Condit, C. (1987). Democracy and civil rights: The uni-versalizing influence of public argumentation, Cou

-

municatiofi Monognphs, 54, l-18.Eagleton, T. ( I 98 t ) . Walter'Benj amin or towards a reyolu

tionary oiticism, London: Verso.Edelman, M. (1977). Political language: Words that suc-

ceed end policies thetlail New York: Academic Press.Fiske, J. ( 1986). Television: Polysemy and popularity.

Critical Studies in Mrc Communication, 3,391-40g.Gaonkar, D. P. ( i993a). The idea of rhetoric in the rheto-

ric of science. Sotr} em Comffiuniution Journal, 58,258-295.

Gaonkar, D. P (1993b). Performing with fragments: Re-flections on crit ical rhetoric. tn R. E. McKerrow(Ed.), Argument and the postmodern challenge: pro-ceed.ings of the Eighth SCA/APA Confnmce on Argu-f,entatiot- Arnandale, VA; Speech ComuniationAssociation.

Greene, R. W. (1993). Social argumentation and theaporias of state formation: The palestinian Declan-tion of Independence, Arguffientation qnd Advocacy,29,124-136.

Greene, R. W. (1998). Another materialist rhetoric. Criri-nI Studies in M6s Comnuniution, 15,2141.

Gustafson, T. (1992\. Representatire words: politics, liter-atwq and the Ametican language, 1776-1g65. Cam-bridge, UK: Cambridge University press.

Habermas, j. (1982). The entwinement of myth and en-lightenment Re-read:ng Dialectic of Enlightenment.Nw Gnman Critique,26, !3-30,

Hariman, R. (1991). Critical rhetoric and Dostmodemtheory. Quarteily Journal of Sp eech, 77, ;7 -Z O.

Havelock, E. A. ( 1 9 63) , Preface to plato. Cambridge, MA:Hamrd University Prss.

Hobbes, T. (1994). Leviathan. London; Evernan Li-brary.

Jasinski J. (1995). The forms and limits ofprudence inHenry Clay's (1850) defense of the compromisemeasvs. Quarterly Joumal of Speech, Bl,454-479.

Lentricchia, F. (1983), Critklsm and social change. Chi-ego: University of Chiago pres*

McGee, M. C. (1982). A marerialisr's coneption of rhet-oric. In R. E. McKenow (Ed.), Erplo rations in rheto-ric Studis in honor of Dougfu Ehningn Glenview,IL: Scott, Foresman.

McGee, M. C. (1990). Text, context, and the fragmenta-tion of contemporary culture. Westem lournal ofSpeech Communicetion, 54, 274-2t9.

McKerrow, R. E. (1989), Crirical rhetoric Theory andpruis. Communicaion Monograpls, 56 9l - 1 I 1.

McKerrow, R. E. (i99la). Crit ical rhetoric in apostmodern woid. Quarterly loumal of Spech,77,75-78.

McKerrow, R E. (1991b). Critical rhetoric and Dropa-ganda studies. In J. Anderson (Ed.),Communimtionyeatbook (YoL l 4) . Newbury Park, CA: Sage-

McKenow, R. E. (1993). Cdticl rhetoric and the possi-bility ofthe subject. In t, Angus & L. Langsdorf (Ed.),The crit ical turn: Rhetoric end philosophy itpostmodem disaurse, Carbondale: Southern IllinoisUniversily Press.

Murphy, j. M. (f995). Critical rhetoric as political dis-corrse. Argurnefltation afld Advocacy, 32, l-l1,

Ono, K- A., & Sloop, J. M" (1992). Commitment to telos:A sustained critical rhetoric. Communicat;on Mono-grophs, 59,48-60.

Ono, K. A., & Sloop, l. M, (i995)" The critique ofvernac-ular disourse. Communication Mofrogrqphs, 62, lg-46.

Owen, A. S,, & Ehrenhau, P. (1993). Animating a criticalrhetoric: On the feeding habits of American mpire.W$tefn Journal of Communiution, 57, 169-177.

Shome, R. ( 1996). Postcolonial interventions in the rhet-.

oric mon: An "other" viw. Communication Theory,6,40-s9.

CRIITC/SMIN CONTEMPOMRYRHETONCALSruDIES ffi L25

Sloop, I. M. (1996). Ttte cultutalpilson: Discourse' prison'ers and punishmnt Tmcaloosa: University of Ala-bama Press.

Woozlet A. D. (1967). Universals. In P' Edwards (Ed.),The mcycbpedia of phihsoptty (Vol. 8). New York:Macmillm'

CRITICISM iN CONTEMPORARYRHETORICAI STUDIES

Since the revival of rhetorical studies withinthe field of speech communication during theearly part of the 20th century, rhetoricalscholars have tried to (a) articulate the natureof rhetorical criticism, (b) identiff the objectof this form of critical activit)t (c) identifyspecific procedures or methods for practicingcriticism, and (d) specifr the particuiar func-tion(s) or purpose(s) of rhetorical criticism.This entry for criticism in contemporary rhe-torical studies sketches how rhetoricians inspeech communication, drawing on a varietyof sources inciuding the classical tradition ofrhetorical thought, aesthetic theory, literarytheory and criticism, and (more recently) var-ious forms of critical social theory (Agger,1998), have sought to accomplish these fourobjectives. The sketch tries to illuminatepoints of agreement as weli as points of con-tinuing controversy.

What is cdticism? What is rhetorical criti-cism? One way of approaching these ques-tions, as Black (f978) noted, is to "focus onthe critic." Black remarked, "Criticism is thatwhich critics do" (p. ). Black admitted thatthis approach to the question might appear"suspiciously evasive" (p. a), but having tostart somewhere, he suggested that startingwith the critic has considerable heuristic po-tential. The first problem with Black's ap-proach, of course, is deciding who ,'s a critic.One issue in contemporary rhetorical studieshas been, to paraphrase Baskerville (1977),whether all rhetoricians must be rhetoricalcritics as opposed to, say, rhetorical histori-ans.r Once we are able to distinzuish critics

from noncritics, the next problem is trying touncover the point(s) of convergence in theiractivitf. It might be possible to collect a suffi-cient sample of critical practice that could besubjected to a type of factor analysis so as todiscover the common denominator that lini

126 'I4. CRITICISM IN CONTEMPORARY RHETARICAL ST|./D.IES

terpretation in rhetorical criticism, as the dis-cussion that follows notes, has been a topic ofdebate in rhetorical studies). Bryant (1973),on the other hand, included one characteristicleft out of Abrams's account (his secondpoint). The idea that oiticism involves amovement from "particular discourses" to the"wider phenomena of the rhetorical" is im--portant, but this essentially conceptual or the-oretical move might more appropriately betonsidered as one of the functions or pur-poses of criticism rather than a defining orimmanent characteristic of it. So, what thisbrief review of Abrams's and Bryant's defini-tions reveals is five crucial characteristics ofcriticism (see also Hatt,1997,p.26). A1l fivemight not be present in each and every act ofcriticism, but they nevertheless provide an ini-tial orientation tq the nature of criticism. Wecan deepen our-.understanding of the natureofcriticism by exploring more concretely howthese characteristics have helped to shape thepractice of rhetorical criticism.

Critlcism Defines

Any critical act will, either implicitly or ex-plicitly, define its object as a specific type ofthing. A piece of literary criticism wiil defineits object as literature (or as manifesting a sig-nificant literary dimension); similarly, any actof rhetorical criticism will define its object asrhetorical (or as manifesting a significant rhe-torical dimension). For example, Hart ( 1997)suggested, "The most basic job of the rhetori-cal critic is to be able to discover whenrheto-ric is being used in the fust place" (p. 1l).Gaonkar (1993) identified this characteristicin rhetorical criticism under the label of "re-cuperation." As Culler (1975) observed, recu,peration in literary studies refers to the way inwhich a critic l'makefs] a text intelligible"(p. 159). He also qbserved that recuperation"stresses the notion of recovery, of putting touse. It may be defined as the desire to leave nochaff, to make everything wheat, to iet noth-

(p. 137). In extending this concept from thedomain of fiterary studies into the realm ofrhetorical criticism, Gaonkar (1993) arguedthat rhetorical critics need to engage in acts ofrecuperation or definition because our cul-ture "lacks resources for spontaneously rec-ognizing what is and what is not 'rhetoric' "@, 264). Gaonkar explained this need as fol-Iows. Members of our culture are unable toidentifr rhetorical objects (texts and/or prac-tices) because of the general repression ofrhetoric that accompanied the rise of moder-nity, The critic is compelled to engage in a"politics of recognition" (p. 265); he or shemust employ recuperative strategies thatidentiS and define the critical object as rhe-torical (or as possessing a significant rhetori-cal dimension).

Gaonkar's discussion of recuperation andthe repression/recognition thesis higblights thedefinitional characteristic of criticism. But italso may distort the issue. Gaonkar suggestedthat recuperation is caught up in the disci-plinary status anxieties of contemporary rhe-torical studies; rhetorical cdtics resort to re-cuperation to gain new intellectual "turf'(new objects, texts, or practices) and therebyenhance their standing within the academy.An implication of this argument is that moreestablished discipiines (e.g., iiterary studies)do not practice recuperation, so recuperativedefinition is not a central characteristic ofcriticism; it is only a strategy forced on rhe-torical scholars by the problem of repressionand recognition. But this argument overlookstwo points. First, as Abrams (1993) suggested,recuperation or definition appears to be an al-ways implicit aspect of criticism. Criticismcan proceed only after it has identified the ob-ject as a particular type of thing. Second, ex-plicit definition or recuperation by no meansis limited to the realm of rhetorical criticism.As Iasinski (1997) pointed out, explicit recu-peration tends to be present whenever an ob-ject is approached and apprehended in waysthat run counter to a discipline's dominantpractices. So, a philosopher will have to recu-perate a text that he or she believes possessesing escape the process of assimiJation"

CNTIASM IN CONTEMPORARYRTIETORI(ALSruDIES *I$ I27

philosophical significance if that text is notcurrently granted that status' or a literaryscholar will have to recuperate a text like theConstitution ifhe or she wishes to approach ita6 a literary object (White, 1984). Althoughthe definitional comPonent of criticism maytake on added significance iu rhetorical criti-cism given the b.roader social context of re-Dression and recognition, this historical factioes not negate the claim that one generalcharacteristic of criticism is that it defines.

As Gaonkar noted, perhaps the most com-mon recuperative or definitional move inrhetorical criticism is to ground discoursewithin its situation (Bitzer, 1968; Bryant,1973). Criticism becomes rhetorical when itattends to the way in which discourse re-sponds to situational exigences artd con'straints. Defrlr.ition by way of situationalgrounding is present in countless examples ofrhetorical criticism (Condit & Greer, L997;Hogan, 1989; Leff & Mohrmann, 1974; Lucas,1989; Nichols, 1954). Another recurrent defi-nitional strategy relies on persuasive intent.Criticism becomes rhetorical through "thepositioning of the rhetor as the generatingcenter of discourse . . . [where] the agenry ofrhetoric is always reducible to the consciousand strategic thinking of the rhetor'?(Gaonkar, 1993, p, 275). Akhough gestures tothe historical and/or rhetorical situation andpersuasive intention are commonplace inrhetorical criticism, other modes of recupera-tive definition also are visible. For example,some critics have drawn on Burke's conceptof identification as a defining feature of rhet-oric (Carpenter, 1972; Charland, 1987;Cheney, 1983), whereas other critics havedrawn on innovations in philosophy, socialtheory, or literary theory to aid in the processof delining their object oi study (Blair, 1987;Hyde & Smith, 1979; McGuire, 1977). lnshort, critics have defined their objects ofstudy as rhetorical in numerous ways.

The observation at the end of the preced-ing paragraph leads to another importantpoint: Critics not only define specific objectsas rhetorical or as possessing characteristics

that make them ripe for rhetorical analysis;they also engage in defining rhetoric. That is,critical practice in contemporary rhetoricalstudies frequently contributes to the never-ending conversation about the essence ofrhetoric (see the introduction to this book foran ovel:rview of the dilemmas involved in de-fining rhetoric).

Criticism.Classifies

Beyond defining its object of study as rhe-toricai, a considerable amount of criticismalso will classifr its object in specific catego-ries. This characteristic is most prevalent incriticism oriented around the concept ofgenre. Criticism that explicitly evokes genericcategories such as apologia, jeremiad, andepideictic clearly dassifies objects as part ofthe critical process. But classification can bean implicit component of criticism as well,For example, if a critic invokes the stock topicin policy ilispute in the course of the processof criticism, then he or she is engaging in anact of classification. That is, in invoking thestock topics, the critic classi.fies the object asan instance of deliberative discourse. Thecritic also can classifr by placing an objectwithin a discursive formation (Sloop, 1996).By employing concepts associated with vari-ous discursive genres or by iocating objectswithin discursive formations, the critic en-gages in a less obvious process of classifica-tion. Although classification can occur inthese subtle ways, it should be noted that ofthe five central characteristics identified byAbrams (1993) and Bryant (1973), classifica-tion probably is the one most likely to be ab-sent from any sample of critical studies.

Criticism Analyzes

Critical activity seels to describe or dis-close how an object is put together and how.itworks. As Bryant (1973) maintained, thecritic is an "analytical e:rplicator" (p.40). An-

r28 iJfi CRITICISMINCONTEWORARYRHETORICALS?UDIES

alytical explication involves a carefitl recon-struction or unpacking of an object's struc-ture, design, and constituent features. Withinthe once dorninant neo-Aristotelian perspec-tive, critical analysis featured the five tradi-tional canons of classical rhetoric (invention,arrangement, stfe, memory, and delivery)and the three modes of proof (ethos,.logosiand pathos). [n contemporary rhetoricalstudies, critical analysis proceeds through alarge variety of analytic procedures or meth-ods ar,d invokes an equaly large body of ana-lytic concepts. The close reading movementin rhetorical studies, for example, continuesthe purported aim of the neo-Aristotelianmovement by tryurg to unpack the internaleconomy or overall design of an object. Thisquest typically involves careful attention to atext's modes of appeal, argument strate-gies, style (including figuration), and disposi-tion or structure (Browne, 1993; Leff &Mohrmann, 1974)- Other rhetorical criticshave drawn inspiration from the writings ofKenneth Burke, translating Burke's ideas intospecific methods (e.g., pentadic criticism[Foss, 1996; Ling, 1970]) or appropriatingparticular concepts that can be used in theprocess of analytic explication (e.g., perspec-tive by incongruityr representative anecdote).Other important bodies of source materialfrom which rhetorical scholars have drawnconceptual insights that are used in the pro-cess of criticai analysis are contemporary phi-losophy, literary theory, and social theory.a

The precise nature of critical analysis wiilvary, and these variations are based on a num-ber of factors. For example, the way in which acritic conceptualizes the object of criticismwili shape the process of analysis. Traditionalneo-Aristotelianism and contemporary closereading typicaily regard the discrete text asthe appropriate object of critical inquiry.With this understanding of the object, analy-sis then proceeds to describe or unpack itsspecific components and overail design. Butthe object of criticism can be conceptualizedin other ways. Social movement scholars, forexample, are not interested in unpacking thecomponents ofindividual texts. They devote

their attention to explicating the rhetoricaldynamics of the movement as a social Dhe-nomenon.t A second factor that can shapi thenature of analysis is the ultimate objective orpurpose of critical activity. Traditionai criti-cism (in both rhetorical and literary studies)usually assumes that its function is to guide orimprove taste or to help consumers better ap-preciate discursive artistry. This understand_ing of the purpose of criticism leads the criticto emphasize the structural or aesthetic auali-ties of the critical object. Many co.rt.-po.-ycritics, across a number of academic disci-plines, view the ultimate purpose of criticismin different terms, Instead of improving thepublic's taste or determining which objectsare granted the status of excellence, these crit_ics believe that the function of their criticalwork is to intervene or participate in the vari-ous processes of public life. A critic whoadopts this view of purpose, for example,would be less interested in appreciating theaesthetic qualities of a text as an end in itselfand much more interested in probing how thetext functions as a form of sociai or politicalpower. Aithough we can find variations in theprocess of analysis, there stili appears to be abasic unity: Critical analysis aims to expli-cate or explain what is going on in the criticalobiect.

Criticism Interprets

An understanding of this characteristic ofcriticism is complicated by the fact that inter-pretation can mean different things. In itbsimplest sense, interpretation is a process ofdecoding or transiating. Through interpreta-tion, a confusing or opaque word, phrase,passage, or entire text is made intellieible andits. latent meaning is made maniiest. De-coding or translating is a common feature inat least some forms of literary criticism. Acritic might, for example, try to decode themeaning of "the ship" image in Walt Whit-man's "O Captain! My Caprain!" (Whitman,193211996) or try to reveal the latent meaningcontained in Robert Frost's "stopping by

Woods on a Snowy Evening" (Frost' 1932/1996). Baskerville (1953) seemed to havesomethinglike this morelimited sense of inter-pretation in mind when he noted, "Speeches areseldom abstruse or esoteric- ' . . A speech, by itsnature, is or should be immediately comPre-hensible; hence the interpretive function ofthe critic is seidorr paramount" (p' 2). Rhe-torical criticism, Baskerville suggested, neednot concern itself with the problems of inter-pretation.

A similar argument was developed by theliterary theorist jonathan Culler. Comparingthe process of interpreting political or Publicdiscourse with what is invoived in interpret-ing a literary text," Culler ( 1975) noted,

To read a political speech, for example, is tosubmit to a teleology' to take the text as gov-erned by a communicative end which onereconstructs with the help of the conven-tions of discourse and of the relevant insti-tutions. But literature, foregrounding thetext itself, gives freer play to the rissentialdrift" and autonomous productivity of thelanguage. (pp. 132-133)

According to Culler, the nature of pubiic dis-course-its instrumental character, institu-tional embeddedness, and highly mnventionalstructure-negates the need for interpretiveeffort on the part of the critic.

This dismissal of interpretation is an im-portant moment in the development of whatGaonkar (1989, 1990) referred to as the trans-parency thesis. Negotiating the so-calledtransparency of t}re text is, as Gaonkar ob-served, a central preoccupation of the closereading movement in rhetorical criticism,prominentlyfeatured in the work of one of itsprincipal progenitors, Michael Leff Accord-ing to Leff ( 1980), it is through "the act of in-terpretation . . . [that] the critic attempts toaccount for and assign meaning to the rhetor-ical dirnensions of a given phenomenon"(p. 3a\, Such an account typically empha-snes externalfunction (bow aspecific rhetori-cai dimension such as argument responds tosituational factors) but also can focus on an

CNTICISM IN CONTEMPORARYRHETORICALSTUDIB'S # 129

iuternalfunction (how a specific rhetorical di-mension such as stylistic afiaphora helps togenerate a sense of unity within one segmentof a text).

Consider a simple example of interpreta-tion that focuses on external function. In theentry for style, $re idea of hypotaxis is intro-duced and illustrated through some examplesfrom Martin Luther King, fr.'s "Letter FromBirmingham Jail." Critical analysis revealsKing's hypotactic linguistic pattern. But whatis the significance of King's h'ypotaxis, andhow does it contribute to the meaning andrhetorical force of the letter? According toBaskerville (1953), the meanings ofthese pas-sages are, or should be, "imrnediately com-prehensible" and, therefore, require little (ifany) interpretive labor. But Leffs approach tocriticism encourages the critic to pause andthink more carefuliy about this srylistic phe-nomenon. Reflection on the phenomenon ofhypotaxis that is informed by the literature onprose stylistics (Lanham, 1983) allows thecritic to provide a richer account of what itwas doing in King's text; King's carefrrllycrafted linguistic subordination signaled toreaders that King possessed the capacity ofdiscernment or that he possessed the abilityto analyze a situation and make nuancedjudgments about the actions and events thathave transpired therein. And that is what Kingwas doing in the letter. He was trfng to revealto his critics that they had misread the situa-tion in Birmingham. They had not really con-sidered the plight of black Americans in theSouth. Lacking the power of discernment,these critics were not appropriate judges ofKing's conduct, and their criticisms should bedisdounted. And King's hypotactic sty1e, astyle that both enacts and reveals discern-ment, helped to drive home this point' Butwithout interpretive reflection on the stylisticphenomenon, the critic is unable to Providethis account of the text.

This reading ofhypotaxis in King's "LetterFrom Birmingham )ail" retains the sense ofinterpretation introduced at the outset Inter-pretation translates or decodes elements ofthe critical object and attempts to account for

I3O iii CRITICISMINCONTEMPOEARYHHEIORICALSTUDIES

the external function of the elements uncov,ered during the analytic phase ofcritical prac-tice (Andrews, Leff, & Terrill, 1998, pp. 75-

, 78). Interpretive.decoding is necessary given,in Gaonkar's (1989) terms, "the polysemouscharacter ofthe oratorical text" (p. 271).Btwe need to acknowledge, as Gaonkar madeclear, "that interpretation cannot fully arrestthe natural polysemy of language. Hence, thetext is potentially open to alternative readings,and privileged cultural texts can become sitesof intense ideological struggle over meaning"(p.27 I).' But the concept of interpretation incriticism also admits a more expansive mean-ing. Signs of an expanded sense of interpreta-tion can be detected in Niisen's (1957) re-sponse to Baskerville (1953). Nilsen (1957)began by claiming, "If the meaning of asp?ech is iirought of as the response it explic-itly seeks to evoke, then, to be sure, no inter-pretation is necessary" (p. 70). As the discus-sion of the King example tries to show thisclaim is probiematic; interpretation of tlreparticular features of the critical object is anessential part of criticism. But is interpretingparticulars the only thing that a critic does?Nilsen spoke directly to this issue: "But ifwithin the meaning of the speech are in-cluded the many attendant responses, themore subtle understandings and conceptionsevoked by the speech and their possible con-sequences, then interpretation is a muchneeded function of the speech critic" (p. 70).The key word in this passage is "understand-ing." Interpretation can invoive rnore thandecoding particular elements ofa text or evenof entire texts; it can, as the tradition of her-meneutic philosophy (Gadamer, 1975) empha-sizes, have a much more difftrse objective-understanding. Interpretive understandingwithin the tradition of philosophical herme-neutics is an extfemely challenging idea.Scholars and critics operating within this tra-dition describe the process differently.s At itscore, this tradition of thought views themeaning of a critiial object to be in a state offlux; it is something thai is continually discov-ered or uncovered rather than decoded.Whereas Baskerville saw interpretation as an

inessential characteristic of rhetorical criti-cism, the scholarship in the tradition ofhermeneutic philosophy teaches us that inter-pretation, as a vehicle for understanding, is aninescapable part of being human.

Leffs (i980) account of the interpretivecomponent of rhetorical criticism empha_sized a concern with particulars as weil als aninterest in theoretical understandins, Tobring out both dimensions, he compare; rhe-torical interpretation with psychoanalytic in-terpretation; both interpretive processes are"simultaneously particular and theoretical',(p. 347). As Leff explaiaed, psychoanalytic in-terpretation

originates in the unique subject, since therelevant motives are discovered in the par-ticular case, and it ends with the particularcase, since its results are confirmed in rela-tion to the unique subject, Yet, the processalways involves explanation, and the at-tempt to explain puts the analyst in contactwith matters of theoretical interest. (p. 3a7)

For Leff, interpretation in rhetorical criticismprovides insight into particulars (specific pas-sages fiom King's "Letter From BirminghamJail" in April 1963) that both draw on andcontribute to our understanding ofmore gen-erai theoretical constructs (the concept ofhypotaxis). As Leffremarked, through the in-terpretive component of rhetorical criticism,"theoretical precepts aftain meaning. , . asthey are vibrated against the particular caseand are instantiated in an expianation of it"(p.3a7).

Leffs discussion ofthe nature of interpre-tation in rhetorical criticism raises a final is-sue that merits brief consideration: What isthe reiationship between analysis (critical ex-plication or explanation) and interpretation?The discussion so far suggests that these char-acteristics of criticism are discrete steDs orprocesses, and the example from King's "Let-ter From Birmingham Jail" seems to supportthis view. The critic first analfzes to compre-hend issues of style, argument, and/or struc-ture and then moves to the question of inter-

Dreting the particulars that have beenidentified. This bifurcated view of analysisand interpretation has come under fire dur-ing recent years. In trying to argue that liter-

"ri interp.etations never are arbitrary, liter-

ary cridc and theorist Stanley Fish challengeda tlvo-step view of the relationship betweenanalysis and interpretation. Maintaining thatcritics do not "confer' meanings on terts'Fish (1980) wrote, "'Confer' is exactiy thewrong word because it implies a tlvo-stageorocedure in which a reader or hearer firsticrutinizes an utterance and then gives it ameaning" (p. 310). Fish argued that the prob-lem with this view is that "there is no such{irst stage" (p. :10) because all analytic de-scription is "interpretation laden"; therenever is "a moment when my studelts 'simplysee' a physical configuration of atoms andthen assign that configuration a sigDificance"or meaning (p. 3fa). In other words, analysis("seeing" what is there in a critical object)and interpretation (deciding what it means)are inextricably interwoven.

Space limitations prevent a detailed con-sideration of Fish's (1980) position. But twopoints are worth noting. First, Fish raised animportant issue in noting the interrelation-ship between critical analysis and interpreta-tion. Leffs discussion of interpretation andexplanation raises a similar issue; the twoprocesses, analysis and interpretation, tend tobe mutually reinforcing. As Fish probablywould argue, we can recognize the hypotaxisin King's "ktter From Birmingham Jail" onlybecause we already have "interpreted" thisobject as an instance of prose discourse,thereby making it possible to use the conceptof hypotaxis in our anallsis/interPretation.But this account of how we approach the let-ter raises a second point. Fish's "argument"(or, more accurately, my rendering of it)seems to conflate the act of defining some-thtng as somethizrg with the potentiaily differ-ent act of interpreting it in some specifc man-ner. Raising this qualification with respect toFish's position does not lead to the claim thatcritical analysis or description can proceed ina thoroughly neutral or atheoretical manner.

CRMCISMINCONTEMPOMRYRHETORIULSTUDI'S tr 13I

,A. critic brings to King's text, or any criticalobject, a host of assumptions, beliefs, theoret-ical commitments, and political positionsthat wilt shape the interconnected Processesof analysis and interpretation. The point isthat Fish seems to reduce interPretation to aprocess of decoding meaning. But as the pre-ceding discussi6n has tried to suggest, the in-terpretive moment in criticism can exceedthis more limited sense of interpretation. Ac-knowledging the possibility of interpretiveexcess might be necessary to ensure the possi-bility ofnovelty in critical practice.

Criticism Evaluates

As noted earlier, Bryant (1973) viewed thecritic as an "analytic explicator." Literarycritic Monroe Beardsley provided an (unin-tentional) variation on Bryant's accountwhen he suggested that criticism involves"analytical appraisal . . . [or an] active con-cern with desirable and undesirable features."Beardsley (1981) continued, "Analytical ap-praisal is the characteristic and essential ele-ment of criticism in any of its fieids of appli-cation" (p. 154). There was no doubt inBeardsley's mind tlat evaluation is a funda-mental characteristic of criticism.

Rhetorical critics, Iike their literary coun-terparts, who have engaged in the process ofevaluation will argue about the apPropriatestandards for critical evaiuation. The domi-nant approach to evaluation for the first halfof the 20th centuy took its cue fromWichelns's (192511962) famous observationthat *rhetorical criticism . . is concernedwith effect" (p, 209). Thonssen and Baird(1948) would make effect or response the keyto rhetorical criticism, as can be seen in thispassage:

The men [sici who play roles in the makingof history-and this includes the orator$-are judged finally by their influence uponpeople and events. In the eventual reckon-ing, men will be tested in the light of whatthey did. Orators will be judged by what

I32 ::i4 CRITIASMINCONTEMPORARYRHETORICALSruDIES

they accomplished, either immediately or inthe long run ofpublic affairs. (p.448)

As Thonssen and Baird and other rhetoricai'scholars recognized, assessing effectiveness isan extremely challenging enterprise becausethe concept of effect can be taken to refer to arange of phenomena movi4g outw_ard fromthe response of the immediate audience to theimpact that a message might have on an entiresociety (on the need to consider social effects,see Nilsen, 1956;Wrage, 1947). Thonssen andBaird (1948) warned the critic: "Rabble-rous-ers and demagogues hope for instantaneousresponses and often get them. Yet the critic ofsuch oratory will not regard the acquisition ofthe response as a total measure of speech ef-fectiveness" (p. a6i). They concluded,

A secsch is effective, therefore, ifit achievesan end or response consistent with thspeaker's purpose-provided that the pur-pose is, in turn, consistent with the dictatesof responsible judgment and solicitous re-gard for the positive good of an enlightenedsociety. (p.461)

The preceding passage illustrates that, at leastfor many rhetorical scholars, the effects stan-dard never was "pure" in that speeches werenot evaluated solely in terms of whether ornot they influenced an audience. The effectsstandard typically was linked to some type ofoften unarticulated ethical standard as the ba-sis for final critical evaluation.'

A second common evaluative standardemployed by rhetorical critics is qualitative.This position was advanced by Parrish (1954)in these terms:

The critic should not be diverted into an at-tempt to assess the resalt of a speech exceptas its effect may help us io judge the qualityof the speech itself. Rhetoric, strictly speak-ing, is not concerned with the effect of aspeech but with its quality, and its qualitycan be determined quite apart from its ef-fect. (p. 7)

CRITICISMIN CONTEMPORARYRHETORICALSTUDTES ffi 133

Black (1978) later would subject parrish,s ar-gument to careful reflection. According toBlack, qualitative evaluation produces a'formalistic criticism. . . [that] would rendera judgment of the discourse as a self-con-tained unit without regard for any particularaudience" (p. 6Z). Black argued that aformalistic judgment or evaluation can pro-ceed along one of two lines: The judgmentwill rely on an assessment of the "persuasive-ness" of the speech, or the evaluation will relyon a critical touchstone,ro Black maintainedthat Parrish opted for some version ofthe firstapproach: lvaluating quality means assessingthe persuasiveness ofthe speech. The problemwith this approach, Black argued, is rhar it ul-timately negates the very distinction thatParrish sought to establish: euality becomesconflated with sffsg1. As Black explained, inParrish's version of formalism the criticmight evaluate a speech or an essay-judge its"persuasiveness"-in terms of certain pre-cepts or standards derived from classical rhe-torical theory. But what Parrish failed to real-ize is that

these [classical] standards are sanctioned bythe fact that they produced certain desiredeffects in audiences, . . . When the neo-Aris-toteiian critic appraises the quality of a dis-course in terms of criteria derived from theAristotelian tradition, the ultimate justifi ca-tion ofthese criteria is effect. (p. Z3)

Black insisted that there is no way of develop-ing qualitative standards of critical evaluationfrom the classical treatises on rhetoric; anysuch standard ultimately will collapse into anassessment of effect. But Black's analysis ofParrish's position did not lead to a completeabandonment of qualitative judgment.Black's concluding judgment was that "onlywhen the critic justifies some particular judg-ment of his [sic] with recourse to a touch-stone is he delivering a purely formalisticjudgment" (p. 73). A touchstone or analogapproach is, for Black, the only way of orga-nizing and justifying qualitative evaluation.

The effects and qualitative standards ofevaluation still are retained in some forms ofcontemporary rhetorical criticism. For exam-ple, the qualitative standard is central to someforms of critical close reading, and critics stillorhibit an interest in effects (but see the entryfor effects of rhetorical discourse for a dis-cussion of some of the shifts in contemporaryscholarship). In some contemporary criti-cism, the evaluative characteristic of criticismhas become severely muted; the critic's pri-miuy interest is to analyze and interpret. Inother cases, the evaluative characteristic hasbeen combined with the concept of ideologyto produce a rhetorical form of ideology cri-tique (Wander, 1983), But ideologically oriented evaluation-attacking a contemporarymessage because it perpetuates racial or gen-der stereotypes or appiauding an abolitionisttext for its eloquent attack on slavery-is es-sentially a species of ethiial judgment. Theprincipai differences between the evaluativepractices of current ideologically orientedcritics and an earlier genetation of neo-Aris-totelians is (a) disconnecting the effects-eth-ics relationship exemplified in neo-Aristo-telians such as Thonssen and Baird and (b)acknowledging the plurality ofethical (as wellas political and social) norms that might beintroduced as a basis for evaluation. But a lin-gering issue, identified by Black, remains inplace. Black (i978) posed the question ofwhether it was possible "to call a discourserhetorically good without referring to its ethi-cal, aesthetic, or logical quality or to its ef-fects" (p. 66). Black's .question, in short,was as follows: What is rhetorical quality?Rhetorical critics still are struggling with thisquestion,

Criticism, including rhetorical criticism,involves five common characteristics, Thisbrings us to our second general question:What do critics, especially rhetorical critics,study? Or, to frame the question as it often isdiscussed within the discipline What is theobject of rhetofical criticism? In one sense. ti.eobject of criticism of all sorts is quite exten-sive. For example, Black (1978) wrote,

" Criticism is a humanistic activity.. . . Criti-cism is concerned with hummity. . . . Thecritic . . . studies the products ofman [sic]., . . The subject of citicism is always someharvest of the human imagination, . . . Thesubject of criticism consists exclusively inhuman activities and their results. (p. 5)

But Black did not leave the issue of the obiettof rhetorical criticism at this level of abstiac-tion. In the first chapter of. Rhetorical Criti-cisffi,he narrowed his focus and articulated afairly traditional understanding of the objectof rhetorical criticism: "The subject matter ofrhetorical criticism is persuasive discourse. . . .Persuasive in this sense refers to intent, notnecessarily to accomplishment. Rhetoricaldiscourses are those discourses, spoken orwritten, which aim to influence men [sic]"(pp. Ia-15). Bill Clinton's "Second InauguralAddress," a newspaper op-ed piece, an "ad-vertorial" from Mobil Oil, the BITCH mani-festo, Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "Letter FromBirmingham Jail," Franklin Roosevelt's warmessage, Wiiliam ]ennings Bryan's "Cross ofGold" speech, Elizabeth Cady Stanton's "Soli-tude of Self" address, Abraham Lincoln's"Gettysburg Address," Andrew fackson's"Proclamation to the People of SouthCarolina," the Virginia and Kentucky resolu-tions, and the Declaration of Independenceall fit Black's definition and are appropriateobjects for critical study by rhetorical scholars.

Black's definition of the object of rhetori-cal criticism displays a considerable degree ofconfidence based on an assumed disciplinaryconsensus over the natur of the critical ob-ject. But in an important reading of recentwork in rhetorical criticism (an instance ofmetacriticism), Gaonkar (1990) derected asignificant degree of "anxiety" over the objectof rhetorical criticism. Gaonkar's essay tracedfwo rather distinct trtjectories in contempo-rary rhetorical criticism. The first trajectory,running through the works of Wrage (1947),Becker (1971), and McGee (1990), eventuatesin the "dissolution" and, especially inMcGee's work, the "fragmentation" of the

I34 f;i CNTIASMIN CONTEWOMRYRHETORICALSruDIES

object. Whereas Black's definition assumedthe existence of a stable thing-persuasive orrhetorical discourse-McGee's vision of the

'obiect was, Gaonkar (1990) argued, one of

scraps and fragments. Gaonkar explained thatindividuals today are "surrounded by a sea offragments-bits and scraps of evidence, dis-embodied arguments, issues and visions*out of which is woven the rhetor's own frag-ment" (p.307). But as soon as an advocate ora rhetor produces a piece of rhetorical dis-course, it quickly dissolves back into the sea offragments from which it came. Persuasive dis-course in Black's sense no longer exists'Critics do not study stable preexisting objects;rather, in the manner of practicing advocates,they assemble discursive artifacts out of thesea of fragments that then functions as theircrirical object. As McGee (1990) suggested' acritic might combine a few fragments ofKing's "I Have a Dream" speech with somescraps from the discourses of Malcolm X,iohn Lewis, John F. Kennedy, George Wallace,and Time Magazine in 1963 to fabricate anobject-American discourse on race in1963-for a critical study. But this object isthe critic's creation, and it has no more Per-manence or stability than the fragments fromwhich it is composed. Ultimately, as Gaonkar(1990) pointed out, McGee's dissolution ofthe critical object revealed rhetoric to be aglobal ubiquitous material process that leavesbehind traces or texts (pp. 304-305). McGeesuggested that the focus of critical studyshould be the process and not the trace.

The second trajectory that Gaonkar ( 1990)identified "springs from a phenomenon" thatcan be described as "the deferral of the text"(p. 309). Beginning with Redding (1957) andcontinuing through Mohrmann (1980) andbeyond, rhetorical critics have tried to ac-count for a paradox Why is it that a field ofstudy that professes to be concerned withspeeches and other forms of discursive prac-tice has managed to avoid devoting signifi-cant attention to the study of specific speechor discursive texts? Following Leff (1986),Gaonkar (1990) identified the transparency

thesis as the driving force behind the paradorRhetorical critics typically deferred their ob-ject of study-specific instances of persuasivediscourse-because the object was concePtu-alized as inerti there was no need to study theobject carefully because there was nothing ofreal interest going on in it. No real effort wasrequired to understand what was happeningin the average rhetorical text." FromRedding's and Mohrmann's "diagnosis" (p.309) of the problem of deferral, Gaonkartraced the way in which adherents ofthe closereading perspective, especially Leff, havesought to reconceptualize the text, endowingit with a density and an "ontological solidity'(pp. 301, 309). But this ontological solidity isnot the simple stability found in Black'sview of the critical object. For Leff and otherclose readers, the text is the site of dynamicaction, tension, and struggle that requirescarefirl and disciplined reading on the part ofthe critic.

These two competing characterizations ofthe object of rhetorical criticism-as a frag-ment within an undulating sea of fragmentsand as a dense complex instantiation of dis-cursive artistry-were at the center of disci-plinary debate for a good part of the 1990s.But they are not the only objects that can befound in the works of rhetorical critics. Fiveother objects deserve brief discussion. First,rhetorical critics can focus attention on thediscourse constituting a social movement. Itis the totality of the movement's discursivepractices that serves as the object of study.Second, critics can emphasize discursive con-troversy. The object of interest for these crit-ics is the discursive dynamics that shape andanimate the practices of advocates confront-ing pressing public problems. Third, criticscan focus attention on the invention, circula-tion, and transmutation of fantasy themes.The way in which specific themes are shapedor reshaped serves as the object of critical in-quiry. Fourth, critics can emphasize the devel-opment and evolution of discursive genres.The object in genre studies might be the spe-cific text, the broader genre, or the relation-

CRITICISMINCONTEMPOMRYKHETONCALSTUDTS # I35

ship between text and genre. Finally, criticscan study the texts and practices that consti-tute a discursive formation. The critic's ob-iective is to reconstruct the structure and/orrules that organize and reguiate large spheresof human interaction such as the discoursesof academic disciplines, the medical commu-nity, and the Ar.nerican presidency. Many ofthese diverse objects still retain something ofBiack's defirrition--discourse designed to in-fluence people-but they cannot be reducedto that way of conceptualizing the object ofrhetorical criticism.

The thtd central question to consider isthat of what procedures or steps critics, andespecially rhetorical critics, follow when theyengage in critical practice. Tiaditionally, oneof the first procedural n:Ies that a critic mustfollow is to adopt a neutral, impartial, objec-dve, or disinterested stance toward the criticalobject. Writing in the middle of the lgth cen-tury English literary critic Matthew Arnolddescribed conventional thinking when hewrote that the central rule of criticism

maybe summed up inoneword:, disinterat-ednas. And how is oiticism to show disin-terestedness? By keeping aloof from what iscalled "the practical view of things." . . . Forwhat is at present the bane of criticism inthis country? It is that practical consider-ations cling to it and stifle it. (Arnold, 1962,pp.269'270)

Arnold acknowledged that "by embracing . . .the Indian virtue of detachment and aban-doning the sphere of practical life," criticism"condemns itself to a slow and obscure work.Slow and obscure it may be," he concluded,"but it is the only proper work of criticism"\p.274). The norm of disinterestedness be-came so entrenched as to allow Black (1978)to write, "The standard ofdisinterested obiec-tivity in criticism has stood too long and beentoo widely accepted to require further elabo-ration here" (p. l8).',

During the latter part of the 20th century,the traditionai norm of disinterestedness

would come under fire in various fields ofcriticism. In rhetorical studies, one exampleof this attack can be fourid in Wander and)enkins's (1972) essay, "Rhetoric, Society, andthe Critical Response." In these authors'viewthe idea of objelctivity or disinterestednessleads to "the individual [critic] ideallybecom[ing] a passive instrument upon whichthings leave accurate impressioqs" (p. aaD.But they added that "the conceptions of aworld of distinct objects periodically bump-ing into [and leaving impressions on] a prop-erly sensitized critic is, in our view, pro-foundly misleading" (p. a 3). The two keyproblems that Wander and Ienkins found inthe traditional norm were, first, that it"mask[s] the personal quality of the criticaiact" and, second, that it distorts the complex"relationship of criticism to values" (p. aal).Regarding the first criticism, Wander andIenkins maintained that the norm of disinter-estedness tries to turn tle critic into a scien-tific observer when, in fact, the critic always isa participant in'a human world. Forcing thecritic to cut himself or herself off from thatworld distorts what it means to be a human.Regarding the iecond criticism, Wander andJenkins srrggested that the norm of disinter-estedness tris to present itself as completelyneutral or valueless when, in fact, all it does ismask the critic's acceptance or tacit endorse-ment of the status quo. They argued that criti-cism needs to "strip away the seemingly con-crete nature of current reality-to provide uswith an option" (pp, M7 -4a$ but that ir can-not firlfill this function so long as it remainsblindly tethered to a culture's dominant val-ues under the guise of being disinterested.The question of the critic's stance-as disin-terested observer or involved participant-remains a central issue in contemporary rhe-torical studies (Blair, feppeson, & Pucci,1991). It is one of the points in dispute be-tween adherents ofthe close reading perspec-tive and those who favor the projea of criticalrhetoric.

As important as the struggle over thecritic's stance is, it does not really address the

136 :$H CR/IICISMIN CONTEMPORARYRIIETORICALSTUDIES

narrower question: What are the specific pro-cedures of rhetorical criticism? Critical proce-dures are commonly referred to as methods,

. so an inquiry into critical procedures leadsinto a consideration of methods of criti-cism.l2 Textbooks in rhetorical criticism (e.g.,Andrews, 1990; Foss, 1996), as well as theoret-ical treatises on criticisr;r (e.g., Frye,-I957), irr-sist that criticism is a systematic activity, andthe procedures embodied in a critical methodoften are regarded as one way ofmaking criti-cism systematic, But textbooks that recognizethe importance of method, ironically, devotelittle (if any) attention to describing the gen-eral nature of critical method (most texts de-scribe specific methods) or to specifying howit functions in the process of criticism. pre-vious generations of rhetorical critics (Baird& Thonssen, 1947; Reid, L944\, for example,understood method as a way of supporting acritic's judgment or evaluafion of an object.But this is a rather restrictive view ofthe func-tion of method in rhetorical criticism. Additional reflection on the idea of method in crit-icism is warranted.

In broad traditional terms, method is away of organizing various forms of inquiryinciuding criticism, A method stipulates theresearch protocols (the steps or the sequenceof activity) that should be followed in theprocess of inquiry. Speaking analogically, amethod is like a recipe; it specifies the steps aperson needs to follow to achieve a desired re-sult (a recipe tells one how to bake a cake ormake ratioli, whereas a critical method tellsone how to do criticism). A critical methoddetermines what is significant and directs thecritic's perception of the criticai obiect. Therhetorical critic's method tells the critic howto "read" the text. Perhaps most important,merhod (at least in what we can cail its tradi-tional role in scientific inquiry) is seen as away ofguaranteeing that the results ofinquirywill be valid; method allows us to have faith inor trust the results of inquiry. We expect thatif a person in California and a person in NewYork each follow the specific steps in a recipefor making an apple tort, then each of them

will produce the same thing (discounting in-significant variations). Methods of inquiry-in science and criticism-are supposed to dolikewise. If a critic in Florida and a critic inAJaska apply the same method to the sameobject, then they should reach the same con-clusions. To be sure, this traditional sense ofmethod has been the focus of extensive criti-cism (Bernstein, 1983; Feyerabend, 1975), yetthis sense of method helped to shape thepractice of rhetorical criticism.r3

During the middle of this century, crit!cism in rhetorical studies was dominatedby the neo-Aristotelian method. Briefly, neo-Aristotelian criticism translated the preceptsof classical rhetorical theory into a recipe forreadiag texts. Critics focused their attentionprimarily on the five traditional canons ofrhetoric, the three modes of proof, and (tovarying degrees) ancillary issues such as thespeaker's education and oratorical training,the audience, and the occasion. The overallobjective of this method was to u:rcover andaccount for the effects ofthe speech. Critiques ,of the neo-Aristotelian method began to ap-'pear in the scholarly literature during the1940s and 1950s, and by the 1960s it was onthe decline. Black's (1978) Rhenrical Criti-cism, originally published in 1965, usually iscredited with delivering the fiial blow to theneo-Aristotelian method, yet the influence ofthis method clearly could be found well intothe 1970s and beyond (Gaonkar, 1993).,Withthe demise of the neo-Aristotelian method,rhetorical critics during the 1960s and 1970sdrew inspiration from various sources in aneffort to fashion new methods for organizingtheir activity. Leff (1980) summarized thepattern as foilows:

For twenty years, a substantial portion ofthe critical literature enacts the same ritual:Anathematize traditionai f neo-Aristote-lian] practice and method, sanctifr a newtheoretical approach (usually borrowedfrom another discipline), and, if possible,incarnate the newly risen faith by imposingit on,some artifact. (p. 339)

&ITIASM IN CONTEMPORARYRIIETORICALSTUDIES *N I37

The neo-Aristotelian method was replaced byflethodological pluralism; there appeared tobe nearly as many methods as there were crit-ics. The Matlon (1995) Inilex to fournals inCommunication Studies identifred more than60 critical methods under the heading formethodology in rhetorical criticism, Amongthe methods' Iisted were archetype,axiological, Burkeian, dialectical, dramatic,ethical, existential, factor anaiysis, fantasydreme, genpe studies, historical, inferential,intersubjective, Ianguage-action, Marxist,myth or mythological, organismic, phenome-nological, phi losophical, sociol inguist ic,structuralist, and symbolic analysis as well asidiosyncratic approaches such as potlach,fugue analogy, game theory, and the paneltechnique.'" The structure of many of thesecritical studies, as Leff (1980) suggested, wasthe same--a discussion of theoretical sourcesthat eventuated in an articulation of a criticalperspective or method (the specific proce-dures that would be employed) followed byan effort to apply the perspective or methodto some object so as to illustrate its analytic,interpretive, and/or evaluative potential. r5

Ivie's (1974) analysis of presidential wardiscourse illustrated this pattern. Drawing

t3B "r4f CRTTTCISM rN C1NTEMqOFARY RHETONCAL SIIUD]ES

developing new methods and approaches tocriticism that dominated the field during the1960s and 1970s (but beginning a bit e;ier

, and also Iasting a bit longer) appears to beover-'-

, .If criticism no longer is methodologicallydriven or oriented around the devdoJmen'ta4d ap.plication_ of spe.cific methodsl. thennow ls lt currenfly organized? How do criticsdiscover or develop their critical procedures?A general answer to the first quesiion is fairlveasy. Moving from that answer to the issuesr.1i-1ed bf the second question is much moredtttrcult. Instead of being preoccupied withthe question of method, much of tlx rhetori_cal criticism produced today is oriented to_ward, and organized by, conceptual issues.,r Abnef comparison befween a.method_drivencritical study and one that is more conceptu_ally oriented might be useful to clari$ thecnange..

Burgchardt's (19g5) study of the progres_sive Era Wisconsin politician Robert- LaFollette built off Osborn's (1967,1977\ woiton archetypal metaphor to develop a newconcept for rhetorical crit icism_rhe,,rhetor_ical imprint" (p. *al). According ro Burg_chardt, a rhetorical imprint is

a constant underlying pattern of distinctiveverbal characteristics that supports the con_tent of numerous speeches and articles indifferent cortexts.

. . . [Itj is not simply anisolared recurring element. . . [Uut rutirerlan integrated set of rhetorical features

. . .

[or a] deep structure that govetns a range ofconsonant verbal manifestations on the sur_faces of divergent speeches and writines,(p.441)

Burgchar.dt explained that his ..method fordiscovering La Follette,s rhetorical imprintwas to analyze ll I speeches and documentslrom the period Ig79 to 1925.,, Based on anexamination of various,.rhetorical aspects,,of the texts (defined as ..arguments, ideas,themes, techniques, metaphors, ' , etc.) ,Burgchardt "was a6le to identi$ 76 relativeiydistinct motifs in La Follette's dis.ours.,, with

"one motif, a distinctive narrative pattern . . .,predominant and constitut[ing] tire rhetori_

cal imprint in La Follette,s rhetoric,, (p. ++Zj,Burgchardt labeled this imprint the',,melo_dramatic scenario,,' and the buik of th. .rruvwas devoted to explicating its features anidemonstrating its persistence across a ranseof La Follette's texts. The essay concludJdwith a discussion of.,critical applications,, orspecific ways in which the critic might furtheranalyze rhetorical imprints.rs

We can detect a shift in critical orientationlT t:.:'::l :tudies by comparing Burg_chardt's

!t-985) study to Hariman,s (t9li)reading ofRyszard Kapuscinski's (t983) bookt ne Emperor, an account of the demise of theEthiopian ruler Haile Selassie. At one level,far.r.mant and Burgchardt's stud"ies weresrmilar; both identified specific concepts orsers ot concepts that wouid organize theirproiects. Bur analysis ofthe wayin which suchconcepts are deployed reveal some differencesm orlentation that, although oflen subtie, arenevertheless important. Burgchardt (19g5)was interested in introducing and exploring anew concept that, if proven useful, would el_pand

-

the repi:rtoire of methods and ap-proaches from which a rhetorical critic migLtchoose. Hariman (1992) was not interested-indeveloping new concepts or in expanding thecritic's range of methods. His project wai or_ganized around two very traditiona.l concepts:style and decorum, Hariman was interestedin the way in which style and decorum ,.can

,De. recast as laj concept for the analysis of po_

lrtrcal experience" (p. 150), but such an inier-est did not translate into the development ofanother new method for critical analysis.Rurgchardt's (i9g5) srudy was primarily aneilort to illustrate a new method or approachto criticism and to establish iti-value.Hariman's (1992) study was an effort to un_pack central terms within the rhetorical tradi_tion in a way that allowed them to speak to is_sues in contemporary social thtught. Itrgpresented an example of what Gaonkar(1989) referred to as ,.the thickening of con_cepts through grounded critical ieadings,,\p.270). Hariman (1992) was not illustratins

CRITICISMINCONTEMPORARYRHETONALSTUDIES ifi I39

a method (the essay lacks one of the standardfeatvtes of method-driven criticism, i'e., anarticuiadon of the specific critical proceduresthat are employed); rather' his study of thecourt of Haile Selassie advanced a conceptualargument about the relationship among style,decorum, and power or, more sPecifically, theway in which power is "activate[d]" (p. 165)and "represented and generated" (p. l6f) byvarious manifestations of style and decorum.Hariman did not articulate a method thatsubsequent critics could try to replicate. Hisstudy instead outlined the contours of a "the-ory of power" (p. 165), a way of thinkingabout the relationship betlveen power andrhetorical performance, that could serve asthe conceptual ground for further critical in-quiry. Hariman's essay, in short, did not ad-vance a method to be imitated but rather ad-vanced a conceptual equation in need ofadditional exploration.

Hariman's ( 1992) essay illustrated a grow-ing trend in rhetorical criticism--decreasedemphasis on questions of critical method andincreased emphasis on criticism as a means ofengaging questions of conceptual signifi-cance.tt Increasingly, then, rhetorical criti-cism is organized conceptually as opposed tomethodologically. But this shift in orientationdoes present a major problem. One of the val-ues of methodologically driven criticism isthat it is relatively easy to teach. Aspiring crit-ics and students can be taught the steps orcentral procedures of a specific method thatthey can then, in turn, employ in the analysisof various objects. Ivie's (1974) method foridentifting vocabularies of motive, orBurgchardt's (1985) procedures for uncover-ing rhetorical imprints, can be applied tonear\ any object. For example, a critic mightattempt to reconstruct the vocabularies ofmotive ofanti-war advocates or the rhetoricalimprint in the discourse of Malcolm X orRush Limbaugh. Conceptually oriented criti-cism lacks such fixed procedures. Method-ological criticism generally proceeds througha process of deduction; a general method isapplied to a specific case or object. Concep-tually oriented criticism, on the other hand,

proceeds more through a process of. abductionthat can be thought of as a back-and-forthmovement between criticai object (e.g., text,message) and the concept(s) that is being in-vestigated simr-rlpneously. A critic such asHariman (1992) would start with an interestin the phenomenon of power and try tounderstand how it is manifest discursively.This leads to an encounter with a critical ob-ject or a series ofcritical objects. Intermediaryconcepts such as style and decorum emerge asa way for the critic to organize his or herthinking about the relationship betweenpower and discursive practice. But the con-cept(s) remains essentially a work-in-progress; our understanding ofthe concept(s)evolves through the back-and-forth move-ment between concept and object. Similarly,the critic's understanding of the object growsor develops as conceptual thickening helps toilluminate its diverse qualities. Various spe-cific reading strategies might be employed(emphasizing issues of argument, structure,style, etc.), but in conceptuaUy oriented criti-cism, these strategies cannot be organized inany a priori fashion. Conceptually orientedcriticism proceeds through the constantinteraction of careful reading and conceptualreflection,

The fourth and final general question toconsider concerns the function(s) and pur-pose(s) of criticism. What do critics, espe-cially rhetorical critics, hope to accomplishthrough their citical practice? In some cases,the five characteristics of criticism noted pre-viously (define, classi!', aralyze, interpret,and evaluate) are ends in themselves. Criti-cism often functions to define, classifu, ana-lyze, interpret, and/or evaluate. But thesecharacteristic features also can' contribute tolarger purposes. What are some of the com-mon larger purposes that crittcs hope to ac-complish? One recurrent purpose or functionof criticism is to shape and/or improve publictaste. Writing duringthe earlypart of the 20thcentury, poet arrd critic T. S. Eliot identifiedtwo primary functions of criticism: "the elu-cidation ofworks of art and the correction oftaste" (Eliot, 1932, p. l3). This same basic idea

r4O Tilj CRITICISM IN CONTEMPORARY RHETORTCAL STUDIES

was reflected in Baskerville's (1953) observa_tion that "competent criticism, based uponsound and significant standards . . ., can do

.

much to guide and improve putrlic taste, todistinguish quality from shoddy, and by sodoing can force eventual modificafions inpractice" (p.2). Within its various spheres ofpractice, criticism frequently is seen.as a forcefor educating its audience and helping thoseaudience members to become better judgesand/or consumers of various types of pric-tice. Critics, then, often are regarded as theguardians of a culture's standards ofvalue. Itis their job to help maintain and enforce a cul_ture's sense of what is good and bad, appro_priate and inappropriate, or valuable and in-consequential. This sense of critical purposeoften gives rise to the charge that criticism is aconservative elitist activity whose social func_tion is the protection ofthe status quo or thedominant forces in society.

A second recurrent purpose or function,already alluded to in the previous discussion,is theoretical. Criticism contributes to the de_velopment of theory within its respectivespheres ofpractice. For example, CroftltsSe;offered a.relatively early account of this func_tion in the literature of rhetorical studies.Hart (1986) provided a more recent defenseof this function.z0 The tiieoretical function ofrhetorical criticism has given rise to twointerrelated tensions in rhetorical studies.First, the concept of a theoretical function isambiguous, To some scholars in rhetoricalstudies, it means that criticism should assistin the fbrmulation of 'lscientific" theories ofpersuasion (Bowers, 1968), whereas otherscholars accept the theoretical function butreject a social science orientation to it. Thistension reflects the ongoing struggle toreconceptualize the nature of ,,theory' inlight of intellectual trends such as Dost-modernism. The second tension concern^s therelationship between theoretically or concep-tually oriented criticism and that version ofrhetorical criticism that is primarily historicalin emphasis. Medhurst (1989), for one, re_jected the proposition that criticism mustcontribute to what Hart (198d) called the

"conceptual record" (p. 2g4).21 Medhurst(1989) contended that such an approach fos-ters "a narrow standard ofscholarh contribu_tion and intellectual importance" ip. f6) thatmust be resisted. It appears that the .schism,'that Lucas (1981) identified in rhetoricalstudies has been reformulated as a tension be_tween theoretically and historically orientedcriticism.

Finally, a growing number of critics, inrhetorical studies as well as in other academicdisciplines, believe that criticism must piay arole in both exposing and fighting viriousforms of oppression and injustice in theworld. Adherena of this view contend thatcriticism must be political, must intervene inthe practical affairs ofsociety (Eagleton, 19g6;in rhetoricai studies, see especially McKerrow,i989, 1991; Wander, i983). In contemporaryrhetorical studies, this position is argoedmost strenuously by proponents of criticalrhetoric. Of course, not all critics support theradical politicization of criticism. Reacting tothe ferment in literary studies, Fish ( 1995) ar-gued that criticism is, and must be, con_strained by a series of specific institutionalstructures (e.g., the university, individual dis_ciplines) and their associated traditions thatnegate the possibiliry of radically politicizedcriticism. The call for a radically politicizedcriticism is, on Fish's interpretation, tanta_mount to advocating either the dismantlingor the abandoning of academic disciplineithat specialize in criticism. Fish wrote.

In the end, thc desite for a truly historicalcriticism, for a truly political criticism, and[for] a truly interdisciplinary criticism isthe familiar desire of the academic, and es_pecially of the humanist academic, to besomething other than what he or she is.(p.1+o)22

In response, politically oriented rhetoricalcritics such as Wander and McKerrow mightask the following question: What is wrongwith the academic critic trying to be somelthing other than what his or her discipiinarystructure and tradition currentlyallowthe ac_

ademic critic to be? This question, in short,seems to ask tlle following: Can an individualbe both an academic qitic and an engaledpolitical agent at the same time? Fish appar-enrly believed that such a fusion is impossibie,while polirically oriented critics have tried toprove him wrong.

This entry hirs reviewed four key issues: thenature of criticism (specificaily rhetoricaicriticism), the object of rhetorical criticism,the procedures of rhetorical criticism, and thefunction(s) or purPose(s) of rhetorical criti-cism. Criticism is, in many ways, the centralactivity in the discipline of contemporaryrhetoricai studies. The continued vitality ofthe field will depend on the intellectual andcreative efforts ofthe scholars and critics whoconstitute it.

iffii Notes

t. On the crit ic-historian 'debate," see alsoGronbeck ( 1975), Lucas (1981), and the brief discussionat the end of this fltry.

2, For example, Bryant (1973) noted later that"rhetorical criticisn

-

. . is first ofall analytical; it discov-ers how the object is made" (p. 36).

3- But Brlant ( 1973) did acknowledge this compo-nent of criticism when he disrused how the aitic mutreach a decision on whether m object is essntially po-etiq rhetorical, or mired (p.35).

4. See the entries for hermeneutics and rhetoric,ffiiety of influene, and interpellation, rapectively, forexuples of this trend h critical scholuship.

5. The issue of conceptualizing the obiect of criti-cism is given greater attention later in this entry..

6. This is a common practice il the tradition ofrhetoriel studies. See, for exmple, Hudson (1923).

7. See the entry for polysemy for additional treat-ment of this issue.

8. In rhetorical studies, see Hyde and Smith (1979)and Rosenfield (1974).

9. For a detailed study of ethical criticism, seeBooth (1988). Garver (1998) mntinued this line of in-quiry. For enmples of an ethical criticism of public ora-tory see Artczak ( 1 991 , 1993, .

CRITICISMINCONTEMPOMRY RHETORICALSTUDIES H I41

I 2. The discussion in the next few paragraphs drawson lasinski (in pres).

13. On the wy in which critical methods fosteredthe "scientizing of *iticism," see Nothstine, Blair, mdCopeland (1994, pp. 3i-42).

14. For disossion and illustration of many of ttreenduring methods, see Brock, Scott, and Cheseboro(1990) and Foss 61996).

15. Or, if not u explicit applietion, then it was adiscussion of how the method might be applied (Gregg,1965; Hyde & Smith, i979; Liligan, 1969).

16. But Nothstinc and colleagues (1994), writingduring the early 1990s, maintained that "method hasbeen and ontinues to be ofprime concrn to most crit-ics" (p. 39).

17. This discussion extends Aune's (1989) observa-tion regardin! the shift from "method-driven" criticalstudies to "theory-driven" ones (p. 44).

18. Burgchardt (1985) identif ied three areas ofanalysis: "pragmatic, psychological, and historical" (p.449).

19. For other enmples of this tendency, see Browne(1994), lasinski (1995), Ono and Sloop (1995) and thediscussion of theoretically motivated clor reading. Foradditional discusiors ofthis growing tendency, see Foss( 1990), Henry ( 1992), ard Zatefs!

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DEBAIE

In their widely resPected text Deckion by De'bate, Ehninger and Brockriede (1969) noted''The terms 'discussion,' 'debate,' 'public dis-cussion,' 'dialectic,' etc., do not have well-de-fined meanings in popular discourse and are,in fact, often used so looseiy as to be Practi-caUy interchangeable" (p. 9). The term de-bate, as Ehninger and Brockriede suggested,possesses a range of meanings, Within thisrange, we will find identifiable patterns in theway in which debate is defined as well as somedistinctions among different types or catego-ries of debate.

Perebnan and Olbrechts-lyteca (1969)noted how some definitions are "normative"in nature; they contain directions for evaluat-ing or appraising obiects. As an example of anormative definition of debate, considetBranham's (i991) discussion of a "true de-bate":

To the popular mind, the term debateevoks certain images of a particular formof contest two or more speakers who ap-pear on the same stage and speak within settime limits on opposing sides of a commonquestion. In fact, however, such exchangesare often not true debates, and many gnu-ine debates . . . are neither formallv nor

orally transacted. Even in organized oral ex-changes, debate is not synonymous withformat. (p.21, emphasis added)

Branham employed a dissociative ilcfinitionalstrategy; the realm of debate is divided intotwo sub-realms. In one sub-realm, we find'true" or "genuine" debate; in the other, wefind only the superficial appearance (e.g., aparticular "format") that must not be con-fused with the real thing. The dissociative cri-teria then become the essence of Branham'sdefinition. Real debate is "the process bywhich opinions are advanced, supported, dis'puted, and defended" (p.22). Absent thesecharacteristics, we have only pseudo-debate.Hence, the definition has a strong normativeor evaluatrve component. By way of contrast,consider the following definition: Debate is"discursive interaction on a specific toPic."This definition is much more inclusive andless evaluative.

Definitions also differ in terms of whetheror not preparatory or developmental effortsare included as a specific pdrt of the phenom-enon being defined, Fbr example, McBurney,O'Neill, and Mills (1951) wrote, "Debate con-sists of opposing arguments on a given prop-osition between a supporting aflirmative andan opposing negative" (p. 2). The essence ofdebate, they suggested, is the argument, andthe production of that argument (its inven-

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