Jan-Inge Svensson is today a colonel retired from the Royal Swedish Army. In 2002, his final active duty position, he was the  Commanding officer of the Swedish Armed Forces Intelligence and Security Centre In 1996 he developed and implemented a Swedish National Intelligence Cell in Sarajevo.  In 1995 he was Head of the G-2 section (intelligence) of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Zagreb.  Since retirement he has been the lead Course Director and strategic planner for Multinational Information Sharing and Sense-Making at the Folke Bernadette Academy in Sweden, and is among those in the senior ranks of the Nordic countries who have been asked to create the United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence curriculum.  His original contribution to the literature, “Peacekeeping and Intelligence Experience with UNPROFOR 1995,” was published as Chapter 4 in the first book devoted to this vital topic, PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future (OSS, 2003).

“Intelligence is no longer a ‘dirty word’ at the leadership level of the United Nations (UN). So said MajGen Patrick Cammaert, RN NL, speaking to the second Peacekeeping Intelligence Conference. In keeping with the Brahimi Report recommendations, he and many others have been working with great energy to both implement the recommendations, and to create the new discipline of Intelligence for Peace, one that must by its very nature rely almost exclusively on open sources and methods that can be easily shared with all Member states, with all non-governmental organizations, and with such private sector individuals and organizations as are relevant to achieving the strategic mandate. Intelligence is decision-support. Everything else is information. Without tailored decision-support at the strategic level, the mandate will not be correct. Without tailored decision-support at the operational level, the force structure and the timing of forces will not be correct. Finally, without decision-support at the tactical level, UN forces and the UN Mission will be at risk. Progress has been made. Especially important have been the emerging concepts, doctrine, and practical field implementation of both the Joint Operations Center (JOC) and the Joint Military Analysis Center (JMAC) capabilities. Those Secretary General Special Representatives (SGSR) who have had a JOC or a JMAC are now champions of these capabilities for they substantially improve what, when, and how UN forces can use intelligence—decision-support—as a substitute for violence, as a substitute for manpower and financial outlays Intelligence for Peace can also help harmonize the investments and behaviors of the(Continued on back flap)

(Continued from front flap)many multinational participants, changing constantly, each with different priorities., but each attentive to unclassified intelligence helpful to avoiding waste and casualties.

? “Multinational Police Operations” who? 2004 conference? The SGSR from Norway was MOST impressiveAkerlund, Anna Conflict analysis and conflict impact assessments - an NGO perspectiveBamber, Clare UN JMAC (Slides Only)Borrie, Brehm, Cattaneo, Atwood

Learn, adapt, succeed: potential lessons from the Ottawa and Oslo processes for other disarmament and arms control challenges

Brown (UK PM) Tech has changed foreign policy Cammaert, Patrick ‘UN Peacekeeping and Intelligence - no longer a secret’ Charters (CA) OSINT for Peace Support Operations: Perspectives from UN OperationsChitumbo (IAEA) The Role of Open Source Information in Enhancing Nuclear Transparency Cox (CA BGen) Reflections of the former NATO Deputy N-2Dearth (US DIA) Peacekeeping in the Information AgeDearth (US DIA) Intelligence in the 21st Century: Re-focusing Intelligence to Shape the Strategic Envir

onment

Dorn, Walter Peacekeeping Intelligence Early Warning (abridged)Dorn, Walter Peacekeeping Intelligence Tools of the Trade (abridged)Durch (US) UN Peace Operations and the “Brahimi Report”Durch et al The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace OperationsGabel, Medard EarthGame and the UN—Visualizing MDG ProgressGillvray, Martin Military-Police Interaction: the need for specialisation and co-operation in PKIHeidenreich (US) Early Warning of Genocide: The Utlity of Open Sources & MethodsHusberg, P.A. EU intel. Perspective Maj SE (slides Only)Isberg (MONUC) “Lack of intelligence hampers operations,”Lewis (UNIDIR) Creating the Global Brain: The United NationsMunson USN Looking for Anomalies in All the Wrong PlacesPalmer (US Amb) Achieving Universal Democracy by Eliminating All Dictators within the DecadePeleman, Johan head of JMAC MONUPombo, (ZA Col) INTELLIGENCE IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS – SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCESRod-Larsen, Terje LEBANON AS A MICROCOSM OF THE CONFLICTS IN THE REGION Sovereign (US NPS) Information Superiority for the Lower End of the Spectrum (Humanitarian Assistanc

e and Disaster Relief)

Staud, Jean-Paul PEACE KEEPING IN AFRICA – THE FRENCH EXPERIENCESteele (US) Information Peacekeeping: Innovative Policy OptionsStempe “Religion and Intelligence” IJIC 18/2 Summer 2005Syren, Haken Introductory remarks Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed ForcesWiebes, Cees SREBRENICA: AN INTELLIGENCE FAILURE?Yekelo (ZA BGen) Continental Early Warning & Information Sharing: A Military PerspectiveZREF Cline “Operational Intelligence in Peace Enforcement and Stability Operations,” IJIC 15/2 ZREF DeMars “Hazardous Partnership: NGOs and United States Intelligence in Small Wars,” IJIC

14/2 ZREF Ekpe “Intelligence Assets of the United Nations: Sources, Methods, and Implications,”

IJIC 20/3 ZREF Politi “The Citizen as ‘Intelligence Minuteman’,” IJIC 16/1 ZREF Steele “World Brain as EarthGame” from COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCEZREF Steele “Peacekeeping Intelligence and Information Peacekeeping,” IJIC 19/3